From 8253a953bd5add9d0663f8635ba104ac7f7bd27c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: supowang Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2021 16:30:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix all board compile for v3.0 fix all board compile for v3.0 --- board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/BSP/Src/main.c | 12 +- .../KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx | 24 +- .../hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx | 36 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 2 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 4 +- .../BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx | 12 +- .../BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx | 12 +- .../BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx | 24 +- .../tencent_os_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 1312 --- .../tencent_os_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 892 -- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx | 2 +- .../BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx | 26 +- .../BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx | 414 +- .../BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx | 189 +- board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/main.c | 24 - .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 14 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 6 +- .../demo/tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c | 110 + .../startup_stm32l431xx.s | 0 .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 30 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 22 +- .../demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c | 176 + .../startup_stm32l431xx.s | 0 .../shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.supowang} | 231 +- .../BSP/Inc/adc.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/adc_if.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/dma.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/gpio.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/main.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/mcu_init.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/platform.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/rtc.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/rtc_if.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/stm32_lpm_if.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_hal_conf.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_it.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/usart.h | 0 .../BSP/Inc/usart_if.h | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.c | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.h | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.c | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.h | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/soft-se.c | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/LICENSE.txt | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.c | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.h | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.c | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassBConfig.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacFCntHandler.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacHeaderTypes.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacMessageTypes.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.h | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTest.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTypes.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/lora_mac_version.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/secure-element.h | 0 .../Patterns/Basic/app_conf_template.h | 0 .../Patterns/Basic/app_system_template.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.h | 0 .../Patterns/Modem/app_conf_template.h | 0 .../Patterns/Modem/app_system_template.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.h | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.c | 0 .../LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.h | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.c | 0 .../Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.h | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/readme.md | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/st_readme.txt | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/LICENSE.txt | 0 .../BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/radio.h | 0 .../stm32_radio_driver/mw_log_conf_template.h | 0 .../SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio.c | 0 .../stm32_radio_driver/radio_conf_template.h | 0 .../stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.c | 0 .../stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.h | 0 .../stm32_radio_driver/radio_mw_version.h | 0 .../BSP/Src/adc.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/adc_if.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/dma.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/gpio.c | 0 .../TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/main.c | 24 + .../BSP/Src/mcu_init.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/rtc.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/rtc_if.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/stm32_lpm_if.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_hal_msp.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it_lora.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/system_stm32wlxx.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/usart.c | 0 .../BSP/Src/usart_if.c | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.c | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.h | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.c | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.h | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.c | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.h | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.c | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.h | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.c | 0 .../BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.h | 0 .../KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx | 28 +- .../KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx | 12 +- .../KEIL/hello_world/startup_stm32wle5xx.s | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/Commissioning.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/app_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/lorawan_version.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/mcu_init.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/App/stm32wlxx_it.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/Target/lorawan_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/Target/mw_log_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/Target/radio_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/Target/systime.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer_wrapper.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/Target/utilities_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan/startup_stm32wle5xx.s | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/Commissioning.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/lorawan_version.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/mcu_init.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/stm32wlxx_it.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/lorawan_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/mw_log_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/radio_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/systime.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer_wrapper.c | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/utilities_conf.h | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx | 0 .../KEIL/lorawan_pm25/startup_stm32wle5xx.s | 0 .../TOS_CONFIG/tos_config.h | 0 board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/BSP/Src/main.c | 13 +- .../hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx | 32 +- .../hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx | 10 - .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx | 48 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx | 10 - .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx | 19 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx | 52 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx | 10 - .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx | 52 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx | 10 - .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx | 46 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx | 10 - .../BSP/Src/quadspi.c | 3 +- .../GCC/hello_world/Makefile | 38 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 2659 ----- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 1432 --- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 36 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 18 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 4 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 4 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf | 70 - .../RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h | 21 - .../TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq | 1860 ---- .../fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 2 +- .../fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 2 +- .../iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvoptx | 4 +- .../iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvprojx | 24 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 1263 --- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 858 -- .../startup_stm32l431xx.s | 404 - .../KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 16 +- .../KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 34 +- .../KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 2 +- .../KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../startup_stm32l431xx.s | 404 - .../KEIL/mqttclient/startup_stm32l431xx.s | 404 - .../KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 1292 --- .../KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 842 -- .../KEIL/nb-iot_demo/startup_stm32l431xx.s | 404 - .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 2 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 3007 ----- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 1577 --- .../startup_stm32l431xx.s | 404 - .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 2 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf | 70 - .../RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h | 21 - .../MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 2 +- .../KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 4 +- .../KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 2 +- .../KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 56 +- .../tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 23 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 2 +- .../TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 2 +- .../KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx | 6 +- .../KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 24 +- .../udp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx | 2 +- .../TOS-CONFIG/event_driven/tos_config.h | 19 - .../TOS-CONFIG/tos_config.h | 2 + .../TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx | 4 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx | 14 +- .../TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvprojx | 12 +- .../demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c | 8 +- components/fs/kv/tos_kv.c | 2 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/.gitignore | 4 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/CMakeLists.txt | 22 + .../3rdparty/include/configs/README.txt | 24 + .../include/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h | 85 + .../include/configs/config-no-entropy.h | 85 + .../3rdparty/include/configs/config-suite-b.h | 112 + .../include/configs/config-symmetric-only.h | 89 + .../3rdparty/include/configs/config-thread.h | 88 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aes.h | 128 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/arc4.h | 141 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aria.h | 117 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1.h | 428 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h | 386 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/base64.h | 9 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bignum.h | 877 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h | 244 - .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/build_info.h | 83 + .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/camellia.h | 221 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ccm.h | 344 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/certs.h | 100 - .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h | 68 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h | 111 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 307 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher.h | 537 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cmac.h | 35 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h | 2525 ----- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h | 58 + .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h | 770 ++ .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h | 379 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/debug.h | 108 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/des.h | 20 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/dhm.h | 409 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h | 340 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h | 413 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h | 192 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 844 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy.h | 59 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/error.h | 120 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/gcm.h | 222 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/havege.h | 75 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h | 28 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h | 367 +- .../mbedtls/{config.h => mbedtls_config.h} | 1294 ++- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md.h | 66 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md2.h | 301 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md4.h | 306 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md5.h | 139 +- .../include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h | 12 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h | 40 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h | 11 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/oid.h | 98 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pem.h | 43 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk.h | 456 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h | 175 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h | 33 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h | 18 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform.h | 73 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h | 12 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h | 66 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h | 71 +- .../mbedtls/{net.h => private_access.h} | 28 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 503 + .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h | 120 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa.h | 804 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha1.h | 185 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha256.h | 189 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha512.h | 218 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 2263 ++-- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h | 61 +- .../include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h | 184 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h | 21 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h | 757 -- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h | 39 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading.h | 30 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading_alt.h | 5 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/timing.h | 72 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/version.h | 34 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509.h | 94 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h | 61 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h | 743 +- .../3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h | 69 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/xtea.h | 133 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto.h | 4109 +++++++ .../include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h | 93 + .../include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h | 140 + .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_compat.h | 165 + .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_config.h | 128 + .../include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h | 53 + .../psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h | 62 + .../psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h | 69 + .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_extra.h | 1824 ++++ .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_platform.h | 108 + .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h | 1396 +++ .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h | 1129 ++ .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 479 + .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_types.h | 384 + .../3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_values.h | 2396 ++++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/.gitignore | 8 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/CMakeLists.txt | 229 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/Makefile | 309 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/aes.c | 434 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/aesni.c | 12 +- .../{include/mbedtls => library}/aesni.h | 54 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/aria.c | 78 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/asn1parse.c | 224 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/asn1write.c | 242 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/base64.c | 141 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/bignum.c | 1388 ++- .../{include/mbedtls => library}/bn_mul.h | 119 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/camellia.c | 100 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/ccm.c | 121 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/chacha20.c | 76 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/chachapoly.c | 139 +- .../3rdparty/library/check_crypto_config.h | 91 + .../3rdparty/{src => library}/cipher.c | 667 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/cipher_wrap.c | 424 +- .../cipher_wrap.h} | 41 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/cmac.c | 71 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/common.h | 56 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ctr_drbg.c | 888 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/debug.c | 214 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/des.c | 117 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/dhm.c | 348 +- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdh.c | 729 ++ .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdsa.c | 929 ++ .../3rdparty/{src => library}/ecjpake.c | 138 +- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp.c | 3440 ++++++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_curves.c | 5459 +++++++++ .../ecp_internal_alt.h} | 18 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_invasive.h | 81 + .../3rdparty/{src => library}/entropy.c | 130 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/entropy_poll.c | 180 +- .../mbedtls => library}/entropy_poll.h | 40 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/gcm.c | 492 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/hkdf.c | 19 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/hmac_drbg.c | 264 +- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md.c | 812 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/md5.c | 281 +- .../md_internal.h => library/md_wrap.h} | 63 +- .../{src => library}/memory_buffer_alloc.c | 10 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_common.h | 195 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_error.h | 103 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.c | 564 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.h | 382 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.c | 127 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.h | 175 + .../3rdparty/{src => library}/net_sockets.c | 103 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/nist_kw.c | 25 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/oid.c | 347 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/padlock.c | 16 +- .../{include/mbedtls => library}/padlock.h | 46 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/pem.c | 53 +- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk.c | 649 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk_wrap.c | 1080 ++ .../pk_internal.h => library/pk_wrap.h} | 47 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/pkcs12.c | 76 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/pkcs5.c | 122 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/pkparse.c | 438 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/pkwrite.c | 192 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/platform.c | 99 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/platform_util.c | 133 + .../3rdparty/{src => library}/poly1305.c | 74 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto.c | 5322 +++++++++ .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.c | 367 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.h | 151 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c | 723 ++ .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h | 363 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_client.c | 82 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_core.h | 531 + .../library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c | 1814 +++ .../library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h | 260 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 668 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h | 256 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.c | 617 ++ .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.h | 272 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h | 82 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_its.h | 149 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.c | 797 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.h | 372 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h | 205 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 706 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h | 250 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.c | 383 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.h | 198 + .../library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 574 + .../library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 224 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.c | 532 + .../3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.h | 399 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_its_file.c | 255 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ripemd160.c | 519 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/rsa.c | 1006 +- .../rsa_alt_helpers.c} | 179 +- .../rsa_alt_helpers.h} | 16 +- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha1.c | 536 + .../3rdparty/{src => library}/sha256.c | 232 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/sha512.c | 279 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cache.c | 357 + .../{src => library}/ssl_ciphersuites.c | 513 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/ssl_cli.c | 2322 ++-- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/ssl_cookie.c | 42 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_invasive.h | 100 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_misc.h | 1279 +++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_msg.c | 5651 ++++++++++ .../3rdparty/{src => library}/ssl_srv.c | 1476 +-- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/ssl_ticket.c | 228 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls.c | 6774 ++++++++++++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c | 702 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h | 501 + .../3rdparty/{src => library}/threading.c | 61 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/timing.c | 162 + .../3rdparty/{src => library}/version.c | 10 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/{src => library}/x509.c | 299 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/x509_create.c | 190 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/x509_crl.c | 101 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/x509_crt.c | 4203 ++++--- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/x509_csr.c | 54 +- .../3rdparty/{src => library}/x509write_crt.c | 301 +- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509write_csr.c | 345 + .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/arc4.c | 201 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/blowfish.c | 652 -- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/certs.c | 403 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ctr_drbg.c | 650 -- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdh.c | 268 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdsa.c | 461 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp.c | 2207 ---- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp_curves.c | 1460 --- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/error.c | 895 -- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/havege.c | 241 - components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md.c | 475 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md2.c | 363 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md4.c | 468 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md_wrap.c | 586 - components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk.c | 379 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk_wrap.c | 523 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs11.c | 240 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/src/platform_util.c | 67 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ripemd160.c | 552 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha1.c | 547 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cache.c | 327 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_tls.c | 9719 ----------------- .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/timing.c | 537 - .../mbedtls/3rdparty/src/version_features.c | 770 -- .../mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509write_csr.c | 262 - .../security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/xtea.c | 277 - .../mbedtls/wrapper/include/tls_config.h | 3953 +++++++ .../mbedtls/wrapper/include/tos_tls_config.h | 3269 ++++++ .../mbedtls/wrapper/src/net_module_alt.c | 2 +- .../security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/timing_alt.c | 2 +- {kernel => devices/l610}/Makefile | 8 +- devices/l610/l610.c | 645 ++ .../tos_evtdrv_types.h => devices/l610/l610.h | 15 +- devices/ml302/Makefile | 36 + devices/ml302/ml302.c | 517 + .../tos_evtdrv.h => devices/ml302/ml302.h | 18 +- devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.c | 594 + devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.h | 151 + ..._Qmk_A_Makefile_Framework_For_TencentOS.md | 344 - .../aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt.c | 44 - .../aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/mqtt_example.c | 250 - .../at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_evtdrv.h | 405 - .../at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.h | 23 - .../at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_evtdrv.c | 756 -- .../at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.c | 79 - .../esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.c | 687 -- .../esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.h | 134 - .../event_driven_at_module.c | 160 - .../event_driven_hello_world.c | 261 - examples/mqttclient/gokit3_mqttclient.c | 102 - .../mqttclient_iot_explorer.c | 20 +- examples/nb-iot_demo/nb-iot_example.c | 60 - examples/nimble_gatt/blehr_sens.h | 40 - examples/nimble_gatt/gatt_svr.c | 280 - examples/nimble_gatt/main.c | 229 - .../nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_cn.md | 6 - .../nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_en.md | 13 - .../nimble_heart_rate_sensor/blehr_sens.h | 46 - examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/gatt_svr.c | 238 - examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/main.c | 294 - examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_config.h | 78 - examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_import.c | 424 - .../date_template/ble_qiot_template.c | 541 - .../date_template/ble_qiot_template.h | 285 - .../nimble_llsync/date_template/nrf52832.json | 183 - examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.c | 209 - examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.h | 48 - examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.c | 85 - examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.h | 114 - .../fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.c | 516 - .../fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.h | 86 - examples/nimble_llsync/gatt_svr.c | 155 - examples/nimble_llsync/main.c | 142 - examples/nimble_mesh/main.c | 564 - examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.c | 244 - examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.h | 37 - examples/nimble_mesh_light/main.c | 207 - examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.c | 143 - examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.h | 42 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_1/README.md | 79 - examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_1/main.c | 817 -- .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/README.md | 101 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.c | 96 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.h | 36 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.c | 116 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.h | 73 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/common.h | 33 - .../device_composition.c | 2778 ----- .../device_composition.h | 177 - examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/main.c | 365 - .../no_transition_work_handler.c | 89 - .../no_transition_work_handler.h | 34 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.c | 265 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.h | 46 - .../state_binding.c | 308 - .../state_binding.h | 53 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.c | 266 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.h | 47 - .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.c | 792 -- .../nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.h | 87 - examples/nimble_scanner/main.c | 313 - examples/nimble_uart/main.c | 258 - .../action_config.c | 33 - .../data_config.c | 39 - .../data_template_sample.c | 590 - .../entry.c | 46 - .../events_config.c | 53 - examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_ota/entry.c | 46 - .../ota_mqtt_sample.c | 522 - .../qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap/coap_sample.c | 191 - .../qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap.c | 48 - .../qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt/mqtt_sample.c | 322 - .../qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt.c | 48 - .../tcp_through_module/tcp_through_module.c | 36 +- .../tcp_through_module_based_at_socket.c | 4 - examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.c | 162 - examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.h | 16 - examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.c | 165 - examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.h | 12 - examples/wifi_ln882x/wifi_app_ln882x.c | 210 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_err.h | 37 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_event.h | 88 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_global.h | 41 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_msg.h | 86 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_sys.h | 53 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_task.h | 48 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_tick.h | 62 - kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_timer.h | 100 - kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_event.c | 128 - kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_global.c | 38 - kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_msg.c | 121 - kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_sys.c | 89 - kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_task.c | 47 - kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_tick.c | 53 - kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_timer.c | 126 - tools/addr2line.zip | Bin 0 -> 708599 bytes 615 files changed, 96466 insertions(+), 80894 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx delete mode 100644 board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx delete mode 100644 board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/main.c rename board/{TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware}/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx (99%) rename board/{TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware}/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx (99%) create mode 100644 board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/demo/tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c rename board/{BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware}/startup_stm32l431xx.s (100%) rename board/{TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer}/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx (98%) rename board/{TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer}/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx (97%) create mode 100644 board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c rename board/{TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer}/startup_stm32l431xx.s (100%) rename board/{TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.supowang} (86%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/adc.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/adc_if.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/dma.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/gpio.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/main.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/mcu_init.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/platform.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/rtc.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/rtc_if.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/stm32_lpm_if.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_hal_conf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_it.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/usart.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Inc/usart_if.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/soft-se.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/LICENSE.txt (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassBConfig.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacFCntHandler.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacHeaderTypes.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacMessageTypes.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTest.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTypes.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/lora_mac_version.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/secure-element.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_conf_template.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_system_template.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_conf_template.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_system_template.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/readme.md (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/st_readme.txt (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/LICENSE.txt (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/radio.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/mw_log_conf_template.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_conf_template.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_mw_version.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/adc.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/adc_if.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/dma.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/gpio.c (100%) create mode 100644 board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/main.c rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/mcu_init.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/rtc.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/rtc_if.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/stm32_lpm_if.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_hal_msp.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it_lora.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/system_stm32wlxx.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/usart.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Src/usart_if.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx (98%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx (98%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/hello_world/startup_stm32wle5xx.s (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/Commissioning.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_conf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/lorawan_version.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/mcu_init.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/App/stm32wlxx_it.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/Target/lorawan_conf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/Target/mw_log_conf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/Target/radio_conf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/Target/systime.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer_wrapper.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/Target/utilities_conf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan/startup_stm32wle5xx.s (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/Commissioning.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_conf.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/lorawan_version.h (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL}/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/mcu_init.c (100%) rename board/{RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx => 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100644 kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_sys.c delete mode 100644 kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_task.c delete mode 100644 kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_tick.c delete mode 100644 kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_timer.c create mode 100644 tools/addr2line.zip diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/BSP/Src/main.c b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/BSP/Src/main.c index 646bdf65..037a63a8 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/BSP/Src/main.c +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/BSP/Src/main.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ #include "mcu_init.h" -#include "cmsis_os.h" #define APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE 4096 +k_task_t application_task; +uint8_t application_task_stk[APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE]; extern void application_entry(void *arg); -osThreadDef(application_entry, osPriorityNormal, 1, APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE); __weak void application_entry(void *arg) { @@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ __weak void application_entry(void *arg) int main(void) { board_init(); - printf("Welcome to TencentOS tiny\r\n"); - osKernelInitialize(); // TOS Tiny kernel initialize - osThreadCreate(osThread(application_entry), NULL); // Create TOS Tiny task - osKernelStart(); // Start TOS Tiny + printf("Welcome to TencentOS tiny(%s)\r\n", TOS_VERSION); + tos_knl_init(); // TencentOS Tiny kernel initialize + tos_task_create(&application_task, "application_task", application_entry, NULL, 4, application_task_stk, APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE, 0); + tos_knl_start(); } diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx index 69e411cb..b2f66d4f 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ examples - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ - cmsis + config 0 0 0 @@ -1142,26 +1142,6 @@ 9 66 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - cmsis_os.c - 0 - 0 - - - - - config - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 10 - 67 5 0 0 diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx index 788e5b63..e7bf596d 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/hello_world/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ USE_HAL_DRIVER,STM32L431xx,WITH_TOS_NET_ADAPTER,USE_ESP8266 - ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\BSP\Hardware\LCD_ST7789;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\..\..\examples\helloworld + ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\..\..\net\at\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\BSP\Hardware\LCD_ST7789;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\..\..\examples\helloworld @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -744,16 +745,6 @@ - - cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - config @@ -784,4 +775,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index eec30c11..4ad609c8 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ devices - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 21a8ab69..50927f80 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.3.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_ml302_4g_cat_1_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_ml302_4g_cat_1_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx index c29e5096..e98a2f2e 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_ml302_4g_cat_1_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_ml302_4g_cat_1_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060960::V5.06 update 7 (build 960)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.1.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -829,6 +829,12 @@ BearPi_STM32L31RC + + + + + + 0 1 diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx index ddc255e0..dc80e456 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tcp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060960::V5.06 update 7 (build 960)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.1.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -829,6 +829,12 @@ BearPi_STM32L31RC + + + + + + 0 1 diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_guilite_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_guilite_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx index 90ca64f1..b477e58e 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_guilite_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_guilite_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -794,4 +795,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx deleted file mode 100644 index 4c889fd2..00000000 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1312 +0,0 @@ - - - - 1.0 - -
### uVision Project, (C) Keil Software
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..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_mail_queue.c - - - tos_priority_message_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_message_queue.c - - - tos_priority_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_queue.c - - - tos_ring_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_ring_queue.c - - - tos_stopwatch.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_stopwatch.c - - - - - cpu - - - port_s.S - 2 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_s.S - - - tos_cpu.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\tos_cpu.c - - - port_c.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_c.c - - - - - cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - - - config - - - tos_config.h - 5 - ..\..\TOS-CONFIG\tos_config.h - - - - - devices - - - esp8266.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266\esp8266.c - - - - - hal - - - tos_hal_uart.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\platform\hal\st\stm32l4xx\src\tos_hal_uart.c - - - - - at - - - tos_at.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\net\at\src\tos_at.c - - - sal_module_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper\sal_module_wrapper.c - - - - - mqtt - - - mqtt_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\wrapper\src\mqtt_wrapper.c - - - transport_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\wrapper\src\transport_wrapper.c - - - MQTTConnectClient.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTConnectClient.c - - - MQTTConnectServer.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTConnectServer.c - - - MQTTDeserializePublish.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTDeserializePublish.c - - - MQTTFormat.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTFormat.c - - - MQTTPacket.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTPacket.c - - - MQTTSerializePublish.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTSerializePublish.c - - - MQTTSubscribeClient.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTSubscribeClient.c - - - MQTTSubscribeServer.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTSubscribeServer.c - - - MQTTUnsubscribeClient.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTUnsubscribeClient.c - - - MQTTUnsubscribeServer.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\Eclipse-Paho-MQTT\3rdparty\src\MQTTUnsubscribeServer.c - - - - - ::CMSIS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 16105c77..015dae56 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.2.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -1014,4 +1015,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx index 296a7eaa..f65e7154 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ Application/User - 1 + 0 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx index f0c360d3..38ce3f72 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_stemwin_demo/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ USE_HAL_DRIVER,STM32L431xx,WITH_TOS_NET_ADAPTER,USE_ESP8266 - ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\BSP\Hardware\LCD_ST7789;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\..\..\examples\stemwin_gui_demo;..\..\..\..\components\gui\STemWin\inc;.\STemWin_Config\Config + ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\BSP\Hardware\LCD_ST7789;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\..\..\examples\stemwin_gui_demo;..\..\..\..\components\gui\STemWin\inc;.\STemWin_Config\Config;..\..\..\..\net\at\include @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -814,4 +815,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx index 647986f6..bacdbabd 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvoptx @@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ kernel - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -806,8 +806,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mmblk.c - tos_mmblk.c + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_barrier.c + tos_barrier.c 0 0 @@ -818,162 +818,6 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mmheap.c - tos_mmheap.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 41 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mutex.c - tos_mutex.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 42 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sched.c - tos_sched.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 43 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sem.c - tos_sem.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 44 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sys.c - tos_sys.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 45 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_task.c - tos_task.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 46 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_tick.c - tos_tick.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 47 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_time.c - tos_time.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 48 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_timer.c - tos_timer.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 49 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_event.c - tos_event.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 50 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_global.c - tos_global.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 51 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_pend.c - tos_pend.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 52 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_robin.c - tos_robin.c - 0 - 0 - - - 7 - 53 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_binary_heap.c tos_binary_heap.c 0 @@ -981,7 +825,19 @@ 7 - 54 + 41 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_bitmap.c + tos_bitmap.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 42 1 0 0 @@ -993,7 +849,7 @@ 7 - 55 + 43 1 0 0 @@ -1005,7 +861,7 @@ 7 - 56 + 44 1 0 0 @@ -1017,7 +873,31 @@ 7 - 57 + 45 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_event.c + tos_event.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 46 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_global.c + tos_global.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 47 1 0 0 @@ -1029,7 +909,7 @@ 7 - 58 + 48 1 0 0 @@ -1041,7 +921,55 @@ 7 - 59 + 49 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mmblk.c + tos_mmblk.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 50 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mmheap.c + tos_mmheap.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 51 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mutex.c + tos_mutex.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 52 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_pend.c + tos_pend.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 53 1 0 0 @@ -1053,7 +981,7 @@ 7 - 60 + 54 1 0 0 @@ -1065,7 +993,7 @@ 7 - 61 + 55 1 0 0 @@ -1077,7 +1005,7 @@ 7 - 62 + 56 1 0 0 @@ -1087,6 +1015,126 @@ 0 0 + + 7 + 57 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_robin.c + tos_robin.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 58 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_rwlock.c + tos_rwlock.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 59 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sched.c + tos_sched.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 60 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sem.c + tos_sem.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 61 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_stopwatch.c + tos_stopwatch.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 62 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sys.c + tos_sys.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 63 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_task.c + tos_task.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 64 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_tick.c + tos_tick.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 65 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_time.c + tos_time.c + 0 + 0 + + + 7 + 66 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_timer.c + tos_timer.c + 0 + 0 + @@ -1097,7 +1145,7 @@ 0 8 - 63 + 67 2 0 0 @@ -1109,7 +1157,7 @@ 8 - 64 + 68 1 0 0 @@ -1121,7 +1169,7 @@ 8 - 65 + 69 1 0 0 @@ -1141,7 +1189,7 @@ 0 9 - 66 + 70 1 0 0 @@ -1161,7 +1209,7 @@ 0 10 - 67 + 71 5 0 0 @@ -1181,7 +1229,7 @@ 0 11 - 68 + 72 1 0 0 @@ -1201,7 +1249,7 @@ 0 12 - 69 + 73 1 0 0 @@ -1213,19 +1261,7 @@ 12 - 70 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\net\at\src\tos_at_utils.c - tos_at_utils.c - 0 - 0 - - - 12 - 71 + 74 1 0 0 @@ -1245,7 +1281,7 @@ 0 13 - 72 + 75 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx index dbc2d835..c64e28fe 100644 --- a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx +++ b/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/udp_through_module/BearPi_STM32L31RC.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.2.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -602,6 +603,56 @@ kernel + + tos_barrier.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_barrier.c + + + tos_binary_heap.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_binary_heap.c + + + tos_bitmap.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_bitmap.c + + + tos_char_fifo.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_char_fifo.c + + + tos_completion.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_completion.c + + + tos_countdownlatch.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_countdownlatch.c + + + tos_event.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_event.c + + + tos_global.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_global.c + + + tos_mail_queue.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mail_queue.c + + + tos_message_queue.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_message_queue.c + tos_mmblk.c 1 @@ -617,6 +668,41 @@ 1 ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mutex.c + + tos_pend.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_pend.c + + + tos_priority_mail_queue.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_mail_queue.c + + + tos_priority_message_queue.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_message_queue.c + + + tos_priority_queue.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_queue.c + + + tos_ring_queue.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_ring_queue.c + + + tos_robin.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_robin.c + + + tos_rwlock.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_rwlock.c + tos_sched.c 1 @@ -627,6 +713,11 @@ 1 ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sem.c + + tos_stopwatch.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_stopwatch.c + tos_sys.c 1 @@ -652,76 +743,6 @@ 1 ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_timer.c - - tos_event.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_event.c - - - tos_global.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_global.c - - - tos_pend.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_pend.c - - - tos_robin.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_robin.c - - - tos_binary_heap.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_binary_heap.c - - - tos_char_fifo.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_char_fifo.c - - - tos_completion.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_completion.c - - - tos_countdownlatch.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_countdownlatch.c - - - tos_mail_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mail_queue.c - - - tos_message_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_message_queue.c - - - tos_priority_mail_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_mail_queue.c - - - tos_priority_message_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_message_queue.c - - - tos_priority_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_queue.c - - - tos_ring_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_ring_queue.c - @@ -782,11 +803,6 @@ 1 ..\..\..\..\net\at\src\tos_at.c - - tos_at_utils.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\net\at\src\tos_at_utils.c - sal_module_wrapper.c 1 @@ -824,4 +840,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/main.c b/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4b60cba9..00000000 --- a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -#include "mcu_init.h" -#include "cmsis_os.h" - -#define APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE 4096 - -extern void application_entry(void *arg); -osThreadDef(application_entry, 3, 1, APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE); - -__weak void application_entry(void *arg) -{ - while (1) { - printf("This is a demo task,please use your task entry!\r\n"); - tos_task_delay(1000); - } -} - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - printf("Welcome to TencentOS tiny\r\n"); - osKernelInitialize(); // TOS Tiny kernel initialize - osThreadCreate(osThread(application_entry), NULL); // Create TOS Tiny task - osKernelStart(); // Start TOS Tiny -} diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx similarity index 99% rename from board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 60dc296c..0df7bcde 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Application/User - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ examples - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -421,8 +421,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\examples\tencent_firmware_mqtt\tencent_firmware_mqtt.c - tencent_firmware_mqtt.c + .\demo\tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c + tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c 0 0 @@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ kernel - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ devices - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ at - 1 + 0 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx similarity index 99% rename from board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 015b5105..fa17aacf 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -454,9 +454,9 @@ examples - tencent_firmware_mqtt.c + tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c 1 - ..\..\..\..\examples\tencent_firmware_mqtt\tencent_firmware_mqtt.c + .\demo\tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c diff --git a/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/demo/tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/demo/tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec7d2372 --- /dev/null +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/demo/tencent_firmware_mqtt_iot_explorer.c @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +#include "tos_k.h" +#include "esp8266_tencent_firmware.h" +#include "tencent_firmware_module_wrapper.h" + +#define PRODUCT_ID "FWR8PGACUS" +#define DEVICE_NAME "dev001" +#define DEVICE_KEY "XIBjgofTv/QEQTlRTDQnGg==" + +#define REPORT_DATA_TEMPLATE "{\\\"method\\\":\\\"report\\\"\\,\\\"clientToken\\\":\\\"00000001\\\"\\,\\\"params\\\":{\\\"brightness\\\":%d\\,\\\"name\\\":\\\"bedroom\\\"}}" + +void default_message_handler(mqtt_message_t* msg) +{ + printf("callback:\r\n"); + printf("---------------------------------------------------------\r\n"); + printf("\ttopic:%s\r\n", msg->topic); + printf("\tpayload:%s\r\n", msg->payload); + printf("---------------------------------------------------------\r\n"); +} + +char payload[256] = {0}; +static char report_topic_name[TOPIC_NAME_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; +static char report_reply_topic_name[TOPIC_NAME_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + +void mqtt_demo_task(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int size = 0; + int lightness = 0; + mqtt_state_t state; + + char *product_id = PRODUCT_ID; + char *device_name = DEVICE_NAME; + char *key = DEVICE_KEY; + + device_info_t dev_info; + memset(&dev_info, 0, sizeof(device_info_t)); + + /** + * Please Choose your AT Port first, default is HAL_UART_2(USART2) + */ + ret = esp8266_tencent_firmware_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); + + if (ret < 0) { + printf("esp8266 tencent firmware sal init fail, ret is %d\r\n", ret); + } + + esp8266_tencent_firmware_join_ap("Supowang", "wang13975426138"); + + strncpy(dev_info.product_id, product_id, PRODUCT_ID_MAX_SIZE); + strncpy(dev_info.device_name, device_name, DEVICE_NAME_MAX_SIZE); + strncpy(dev_info.device_serc, key, DEVICE_SERC_MAX_SIZE); + tos_tf_module_info_set(&dev_info, TLS_MODE_PSK); + + mqtt_param_t init_params = DEFAULT_MQTT_PARAMS; + if (tos_tf_module_mqtt_conn(init_params) != 0) { + printf("module mqtt conn fail\n"); + } else { + printf("module mqtt conn success\n"); + } + + if (tos_tf_module_mqtt_state_get(&state) != -1) { + printf("MQTT: %s\n", state == MQTT_STATE_CONNECTED ? "CONNECTED" : "DISCONNECTED"); + } + + size = snprintf(report_reply_topic_name, TOPIC_NAME_MAX_SIZE, "$thing/down/property/%s/%s", product_id, device_name); + + if (size < 0 || size > sizeof(report_reply_topic_name) - 1) { + printf("sub topic content length not enough! content size:%d buf size:%d", size, (int)sizeof(report_reply_topic_name)); + } + if (tos_tf_module_mqtt_sub(report_reply_topic_name, QOS0, default_message_handler) != 0) { + printf("module mqtt sub fail\n"); + } else { + printf("module mqtt sub success\n"); + } + + memset(report_topic_name, 0, sizeof(report_topic_name)); + size = snprintf(report_topic_name, TOPIC_NAME_MAX_SIZE, "$thing/up/property/%s/%s", product_id, device_name); + + if (size < 0 || size > sizeof(report_topic_name) - 1) { + printf("pub topic content length not enough! content size:%d buf size:%d", size, (int)sizeof(report_topic_name)); + } + + while (1) { + tos_sleep_ms(5000); + + /* use AT+PUB AT command */ + memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload)); + snprintf(payload, sizeof(payload), REPORT_DATA_TEMPLATE, lightness++); + + if (lightness > 100) { + lightness = 0; + } + + if (tos_tf_module_mqtt_pub(report_topic_name, QOS0, payload) != 0) { + printf("module mqtt pub fail\n"); + break; + } else { + printf("module mqtt pub success\n"); + } + } +} + +void application_entry(void *arg) +{ + mqtt_demo_task(); + while (1) { + printf("This is a mqtt demo!\r\n"); + tos_task_delay(1000); + } +} diff --git a/board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt/startup_stm32l431xx.s b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s similarity index 100% rename from board/BearPi_STM32L431RC/KEIL/tencent_os_mqtt/startup_stm32l431xx.s rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx similarity index 98% rename from board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 310d61cd..58a870f3 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Application/User - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ examples - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -421,8 +421,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\BSP\Src\mqttclient.c - mqttclient.c + .\demo\mqttclient_iot_explorer.c + mqttclient_iot_explorer.c 0 0 @@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec600s\ec600s.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c ec600s.c 0 0 @@ -1680,6 +1680,26 @@ + + cjson + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + + 21 + 107 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + ..\..\..\..\components\utils\JSON\src\cJSON.c + cJSON.c + 0 + 0 + + + ::CMSIS 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx similarity index 97% rename from board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 5546f4be..82a9c97d 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.3.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ USE_HAL_DRIVER,STM32L431xx - ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\BSP\Hardware\DHT11;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\BSP\Hardware\OLED;..\..\..\..\examples\helloworld;..\..\..\..\net\at\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper;..\..\..\..\examples\mqtt;..\..\..\..\devices\bc35_28_95;..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266;..\..\..\..\devices\ec600s;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common\log;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqtt;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqttclient;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\network;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\platform\TencentOS-tiny + ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\BSP\Hardware\DHT11;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\BSP\Hardware\OLED;..\..\..\..\examples\helloworld;..\..\..\..\net\at\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper;..\..\..\..\examples\mqtt;..\..\..\..\devices\bc35_28_95;..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266;..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common\log;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqtt;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqttclient;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\network;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\platform\TencentOS-tiny;..\..\..\..\components\utils\JSON\include @@ -454,9 +454,9 @@ examples - mqttclient.c + mqttclient_iot_explorer.c 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\mqttclient.c + .\demo\mqttclient_iot_explorer.c @@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ ec600s.c 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec600s\ec600s.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c @@ -1010,6 +1010,16 @@ + + cjson + + + cJSON.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\components\utils\JSON\src\cJSON.c + + + ::CMSIS diff --git a/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f9c8cac --- /dev/null +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +#include "stm32l4xx_hal.h" +#include "mcu_init.h" +#include "tos_k.h" +#include "mqttclient.h" +#include "cjson.h" +#include "sal_module_wrapper.h" + +#define USE_ESP8266 + +//#define USE_EC600S + +#if defined(USE_ESP8266) +#include "esp8266.h" + +#elif defined(USE_EC600S) +#include "ec600s.h" +#endif + +#ifdef USE_ESP8266 +static hal_uart_port_t esp8266_port = HAL_UART_PORT_0; + +void mqtt_set_esp8266_port(hal_uart_port_t port) { + esp8266_port = port; +} +#endif + +k_event_t report_result_event; +k_event_flag_t report_success = 1<<0; +k_event_flag_t report_fail = 1<<1; + +static void tos_topic_handler(void* client, message_data_t* msg) +{ + (void) client; + cJSON* cjson_root = NULL; + cJSON* cjson_status = NULL; + char* status = NULL; + k_event_flag_t event_flag = report_fail; + + /* ´òÓ¡ÈÕÖ¾ */ + MQTT_LOG_I("-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------"); + MQTT_LOG_I("%s:%d %s()...\ntopic: %s, qos: %d. \nmessage:\n\t%s\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, __FUNCTION__, + msg->topic_name, msg->message->qos, (char*)msg->message->payload); + MQTT_LOG_I("-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n"); + + /* ʹÓÃcjson½âÎöÉϱ¨ÏìÓ¦Êý¾Ý */ + cjson_root = cJSON_Parse((char*)msg->message->payload); + if (cjson_root == NULL) { + printf("report reply message parser fail\r\n"); + event_flag = report_fail; + goto exit; + } + + /* ÌáÈ¡status״̬ */ + cjson_status = cJSON_GetObjectItem(cjson_root, "status"); + status = cJSON_GetStringValue(cjson_status); + if (cjson_status == NULL || status == NULL) { + printf("report reply status parser fail\r\n"); + event_flag = report_fail; + goto exit; + } + + /* ÅжÏstatus״̬ */ + if (strstr(status,"success")) { + event_flag = report_success; + }else { + event_flag = report_fail; + } + +exit: + cJSON_Delete(cjson_root); + cjson_root = NULL; + status = NULL; + + tos_event_post(&report_result_event, event_flag); + + return; +} + +#define REPORT_DATA_TEMPLATE "{\"method\":\"report\",\"clientToken\":\"00000001\",\"params\":{\"brightness\":%d,\"name\":\"bedroom\"}}" + +char report_buf[200]; + +void mqttclient_task(void) +{ + int error; + + int lightness = 0; + + mqtt_client_t *client = NULL; + + mqtt_message_t msg; + + k_event_flag_t match_flag; + + char host_ip[20]; + + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); + +#ifdef USE_ESP8266 + esp8266_sal_init(esp8266_port); + esp8266_join_ap("Supowang", "wang13975426138"); +#endif + + +#ifdef USE_EC600S + ec600s_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); +#endif + + mqtt_log_init(); + + client = mqtt_lease(); + + tos_event_create(&report_result_event, (k_event_flag_t)0u); + + /* Domain Format: .iotcloud.tencentdevices.com */ + tos_sal_module_parse_domain("TCC64FUFGD.iotcloud.tencentdevices.com",host_ip,sizeof(host_ip)); + + /* + These infomation is generated by mqtt_config_gen.py tool in "TencentOS-tiny\tools" directory. + */ + mqtt_set_port(client, "1883"); + mqtt_set_host(client, host_ip); + mqtt_set_client_id(client, "TCC64FUFGDsupowang"); + mqtt_set_user_name(client, "TCC64FUFGDsupowang;21010406;12365;4294967295"); + mqtt_set_password(client, "f7ab801d3119ad21bdd3f409c8be3c20bbf2a2b7;hmacsha1"); + mqtt_set_clean_session(client, 1); + + error = mqtt_connect(client); + + MQTT_LOG_D("mqtt connect error is %#0x", error); + + error = mqtt_subscribe(client, "$thing/down/property/TCC64FUFGD/supowang", QOS0, tos_topic_handler); + + MQTT_LOG_D("mqtt subscribe error is %#0x", error); + + while (1) { + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); + + snprintf(report_buf, sizeof(report_buf), REPORT_DATA_TEMPLATE, lightness++); + + if (lightness > 100) { + lightness = 0; + } + + msg.qos = QOS0; + msg.payload = (void *) report_buf; + + error = mqtt_publish(client, "$thing/up/property/TCC64FUFGD/supowang", &msg); + + MQTT_LOG_D("mqtt publish error is %#0x", error); + + tos_event_pend(&report_result_event, + report_success|report_fail, + &match_flag, + TOS_TIME_FOREVER, + TOS_OPT_EVENT_PEND_ANY | TOS_OPT_EVENT_PEND_CLR); + + if (match_flag == report_success) { + printf("report to Tencent IoT Explorer success\r\n"); + + }else if (match_flag == report_fail){ + printf("report to Tencent IoT Explorer fail\r\n"); + } + + tos_task_delay(5000); + } +} + +void application_entry(void *arg) +{ + mqttclient_task(); + while (1) { + printf("This is a mqtt demo!\r\n"); + tos_task_delay(1000); + } +} diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/startup_stm32l431xx.s b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/startup_stm32l431xx.s similarity index 100% rename from board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/startup_stm32l431xx.s rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient_iot_explorer/startup_stm32l431xx.s diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.supowang similarity index 86% rename from board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.supowang index 3434f86c..545112cf 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.supowang @@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ 44 - 2 - 3 + 0 + 1 -1 -1 @@ -101,17 +101,17 @@ -1 - 120 - 1912 - 3538 - 630 + 7 + 222 + 1821 + 1063 0 - 60 - 010000000400000001000000010000000100000001000000000000000200000000000000010000000100000000000000280000002800000000000000 + 404 + 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 @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000D20A000031010000 + A2070000390000006A0A0000C9000000 @@ -150,11 +150,11 @@ 0 16 - 0300000066000000D601000039030000 + 0300000066000000ED00000076020000 16 - 0A080000A1000000FA0800006C010000 + A2070000390000009208000004010000 @@ -170,11 +170,11 @@ 0 16 - 0300000066000000D601000039030000 + 0300000066000000ED00000076020000 16 - 0A080000A100000026090000E1020000 + A207000039000000BE08000079020000 @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000D20A000031010000 + A2070000390000006A0A0000C9000000 @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000D20A000031010000 + A2070000390000006A0A0000C9000000 @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000D20A000031010000 + A2070000390000006A0A0000C9000000 @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000D20A000031010000 + A2070000390000006A0A0000C9000000 @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000FA0800006C010000 + A2070000390000009208000004010000 @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000D20A000031010000 + A2070000390000006A0A0000C9000000 @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000FA0800006C010000 + A2070000390000009208000004010000 @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ 16 - 0A080000A1000000FA0800006C010000 + A2070000390000009208000004010000 @@ -354,7 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583 @@ -1857,4 +1857,31 @@ + + 1 + 0 + + 100 + 1 + + ..\..\BSP\Src\main.c + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1 + + 0 + + + ..\..\..\..\examples\shell\shell_sample.c + 30 + 58 + 54 + 1 + + 0 + + + + diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/adc.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/adc.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/adc.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/adc.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/adc_if.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/adc_if.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/adc_if.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/adc_if.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/dma.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/dma.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/dma.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/dma.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/gpio.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/gpio.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/gpio.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/gpio.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/main.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/main.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/main.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/main.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/mcu_init.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/mcu_init.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/mcu_init.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/mcu_init.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/platform.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/platform.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/platform.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/platform.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/rtc.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/rtc.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/rtc.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/rtc.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/rtc_if.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/rtc_if.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/rtc_if.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/rtc_if.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/stm32_lpm_if.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/stm32_lpm_if.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/stm32_lpm_if.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/stm32_lpm_if.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_hal_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_hal_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_hal_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_hal_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_it.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_it.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_it.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/stm32wlxx_it.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/usart.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/usart.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/usart.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/usart.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/usart_if.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/usart_if.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Inc/usart_if.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Inc/usart_if.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/aes.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/cmac.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/soft-se.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/soft-se.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/soft-se.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Crypto/soft-se.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/LICENSE.txt b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/LICENSE.txt similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/LICENSE.txt rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/LICENSE.txt diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMac.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacAdr.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassB.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassBConfig.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassBConfig.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassBConfig.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacClassBConfig.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCommands.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacConfirmQueue.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacCrypto.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacFCntHandler.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacFCntHandler.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacFCntHandler.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacFCntHandler.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacHeaderTypes.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacHeaderTypes.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacHeaderTypes.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacHeaderTypes.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacMessageTypes.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacMessageTypes.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacMessageTypes.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacMessageTypes.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacParser.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacSerializer.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTest.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTest.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTest.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTest.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTypes.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTypes.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTypes.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/LoRaMacTypes.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/lora_mac_version.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/lora_mac_version.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/lora_mac_version.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/lora_mac_version.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/Region.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAS923.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionAU915.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN470ALI.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCN779.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionCommon.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU433.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionEU868.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionIN865.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionKR920.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionRU864.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/region/RegionUS915.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/secure-element.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/secure-element.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/secure-element.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Mac/secure-element.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_conf_template.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_conf_template.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_conf_template.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_conf_template.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_system_template.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_system_template.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_system_template.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/app_system_template.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora-test.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lora.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Basic/lorawan_info.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_conf_template.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_conf_template.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_conf_template.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_conf_template.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_system_template.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_system_template.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_system_template.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/app_system_template.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora-test.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lora.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Patterns/Modem/lorawan_info.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/Utilities/utilities.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/readme.md b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/readme.md similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/readme.md rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/readme.md diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/st_readme.txt b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/st_readme.txt similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/st_readme.txt rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/LoRaWAN/st_readme.txt diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/LICENSE.txt b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/LICENSE.txt similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/LICENSE.txt rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/LICENSE.txt diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/radio.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/radio.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/radio.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/radio.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/mw_log_conf_template.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/mw_log_conf_template.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/mw_log_conf_template.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/mw_log_conf_template.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_conf_template.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_conf_template.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_conf_template.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_conf_template.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_driver.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_mw_version.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_mw_version.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_mw_version.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Middlewares/SubGHz_Phy/stm32_radio_driver/radio_mw_version.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/adc.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/adc.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/adc.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/adc.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/adc_if.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/adc_if.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/adc_if.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/adc_if.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/dma.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/dma.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/dma.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/dma.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/gpio.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/gpio.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/gpio.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/gpio.c diff --git a/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/main.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/main.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ec06e56 --- /dev/null +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +#include "mcu_init.h" + +#define APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE 4096 +k_task_t application_task; +uint8_t application_task_stk[APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE]; + +extern void application_entry(void *arg); + +__weak void application_entry(void *arg) +{ + while (1) { + printf("This is a demo task,please use your task entry!\r\n"); + tos_task_delay(1000); + } +} + +int main(void) +{ + board_init(); + printf("Welcome to TencentOS tiny(%s)\r\n", TOS_VERSION); + tos_knl_init(); // TencentOS Tiny kernel initialize + tos_task_create(&application_task, "application_task", application_entry, NULL, 4, application_task_stk, APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE, 0); + tos_knl_start(); +} diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/mcu_init.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/mcu_init.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/mcu_init.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/mcu_init.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/rtc.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/rtc.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/rtc.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/rtc.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/rtc_if.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/rtc_if.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/rtc_if.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/rtc_if.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32_lpm_if.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32_lpm_if.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32_lpm_if.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32_lpm_if.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_hal_msp.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_hal_msp.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_hal_msp.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_hal_msp.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it_lora.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it_lora.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it_lora.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/stm32wlxx_it_lora.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/system_stm32wlxx.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/system_stm32wlxx.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/system_stm32wlxx.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/system_stm32wlxx.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/usart.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/usart.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/usart.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/usart.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/usart_if.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/usart_if.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Src/usart_if.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Src/usart_if.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/lpm/tiny_lpm/stm32_lpm.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_mem.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_systime.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_sscanf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/BSP/Utilities/misc/stm32_tiny_vsnprintf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx similarity index 98% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx index d32cc64b..b81abd7f 100644 --- a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ Application/User - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ - tos/cmsis + examples 0 0 0 @@ -976,26 +976,6 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - cmsis_os.c - 0 - 0 - - - - - examples - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 8 - 57 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 ..\..\..\..\examples\hello_world\hello_world.c hello_world.c 0 @@ -1010,8 +990,8 @@ 0 0 - 9 - 58 + 8 + 57 5 0 0 diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx similarity index 98% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx index 01542192..edc90e4f 100644 --- a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ STM32WLE5JCIx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32WLxx_DFP.1.0.2.OEM + Keil.STM32WLxx_DFP.1.0.7 http://www.keil.com/pack IRAM(0x20000000,0x10000) IROM(0x08000000,0x40000) CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") FPU2 CLOCK(12000000) ELITTLE @@ -685,16 +685,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - examples diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/startup_stm32wle5xx.s b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/startup_stm32wle5xx.s similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/hello_world/startup_stm32wle5xx.s rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/hello_world/startup_stm32wle5xx.s diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/Commissioning.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/Commissioning.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/Commissioning.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/Commissioning.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_lorawan.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/app_system.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/lorawan_version.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/lorawan_version.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/lorawan_version.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/lorawan_version.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/mcu_init.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/mcu_init.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/mcu_init.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/mcu_init.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/stm32wlxx_it.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/stm32wlxx_it.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/App/stm32wlxx_it.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/App/stm32wlxx_it.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/lorawan_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/lorawan_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/lorawan_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/lorawan_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/mw_log_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/mw_log_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/mw_log_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/mw_log_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/radio_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/radio_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/radio_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/radio_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/systime.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/systime.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/systime.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/systime.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer_wrapper.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer_wrapper.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer_wrapper.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/timer_wrapper.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/utilities_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/utilities_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/Target/utilities_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/Target/utilities_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/startup_stm32wle5xx.s b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/startup_stm32wle5xx.s similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan/startup_stm32wle5xx.s rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan/startup_stm32wle5xx.s diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/Commissioning.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/Commissioning.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/Commissioning.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/Commissioning.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_lorawan.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/app_system.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/lorawan_version.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/lorawan_version.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/lorawan_version.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/lorawan_version.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/mcu_init.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/mcu_init.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/mcu_init.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/mcu_init.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/sensor_parser.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/stm32wlxx_it.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/stm32wlxx_it.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/stm32wlxx_it.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/App/stm32wlxx_it.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/lorawan_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/lorawan_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/lorawan_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/lorawan_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/mw_log_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/mw_log_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/mw_log_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/mw_log_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/radio_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/radio_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/radio_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/radio_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/systime.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/systime.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/systime.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/systime.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer_wrapper.c b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer_wrapper.c similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer_wrapper.c rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/timer_wrapper.c diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/utilities_conf.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/utilities_conf.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/utilities_conf.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/Target/utilities_conf.h diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvoptx diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/TencentOS_Tiny.uvprojx diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/startup_stm32wle5xx.s b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/startup_stm32wle5xx.s similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/startup_stm32wle5xx.s rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/KEIL/lorawan_pm25/startup_stm32wle5xx.s diff --git a/board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/TOS_CONFIG/tos_config.h b/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/TOS_CONFIG/tos_config.h similarity index 100% rename from board/RHF0M0E5_STM32WLE5xx/TOS_CONFIG/tos_config.h rename to board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_STM32WL/TOS_CONFIG/tos_config.h diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/BSP/Src/main.c b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/BSP/Src/main.c index 1ec2c0c1..ee43f95a 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/BSP/Src/main.c +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/BSP/Src/main.c @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ #include "mcu_init.h" -#include "cmsis_os.h" #define APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE 1024 +k_task_t application_task; +uint8_t application_task_stk[APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE]; + extern void application_entry(void *arg); -osThreadDef(application_entry, osPriorityNormal, 1, APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE); __weak void application_entry(void *arg) { @@ -16,9 +17,9 @@ __weak void application_entry(void *arg) int main(void) { board_init(); - printf("Welcome to TencentOS tiny\r\n"); - osKernelInitialize(); - osThreadCreate(osThread(application_entry), NULL); - osKernelStart(); + printf("Welcome to TencentOS tiny(%s)\r\n", TOS_VERSION); + tos_knl_init(); // TencentOS Tiny kernel initialize + tos_task_create(&application_task, "application_task", application_entry, NULL, 4, application_task_stk, APPLICATION_TASK_STK_SIZE, 0); + tos_knl_start(); } diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx index 5fb57a13..5a398ed6 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Application/User - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ Drivers/STM32G0xx_HAL_Driver - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ Drivers/CMSIS - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ - tos/cmsis + tos/config 0 0 0 @@ -1002,26 +1002,6 @@ 7 63 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - cmsis_os.c - 0 - 0 - - - - - tos/config - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 8 - 64 5 0 0 @@ -1040,8 +1020,8 @@ 0 0 - 9 - 65 + 8 + 64 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx index a151cf28..da6c6cf5 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx @@ -720,16 +720,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - tos/config diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx index de564e92..0706119e 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx @@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ - tos/cmsis + tos/config 0 0 0 @@ -1014,26 +1014,6 @@ 7 64 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - cmsis_os.c - 0 - 0 - - - - - tos/config - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 8 - 65 5 0 0 @@ -1047,13 +1027,13 @@ examples - 1 + 0 0 0 0 - 9 - 66 + 8 + 65 1 0 0 @@ -1067,13 +1047,13 @@ hal - 1 + 0 0 0 0 - 10 - 67 + 9 + 66 1 0 0 @@ -1087,13 +1067,13 @@ at - 1 + 0 0 0 0 - 11 - 68 + 10 + 67 1 0 0 @@ -1104,8 +1084,8 @@ 0 - 11 - 69 + 10 + 68 1 0 0 @@ -1124,8 +1104,8 @@ 0 0 - 12 - 70 + 11 + 69 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx index 863fde4d..dabe9bc9 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx @@ -725,16 +725,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - tos/config diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_e53_light/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_e53_light/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx index 9d29861e..f356e240 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_e53_light/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_e53_light/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_Tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060960::V5.06 update 7 (build 960)::.\ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32G070RBTx STMicroelectronics Keil.STM32G0xx_DFP.1.2.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack/ + https://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x20008FFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x801FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) CPUTYPE("Cortex-M0+") @@ -835,4 +835,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx index 767c39ab..cb0feb13 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx @@ -1005,26 +1005,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 7 - 64 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - cmsis_os.c - 0 - 0 - - - tos/config 1 @@ -1032,8 +1012,8 @@ 0 0 - 8 - 65 + 7 + 64 5 0 0 @@ -1052,8 +1032,8 @@ 0 0 - 9 - 66 + 8 + 65 1 0 0 @@ -1072,8 +1052,8 @@ 0 0 - 10 - 67 + 9 + 66 1 0 0 @@ -1092,8 +1072,8 @@ 0 0 - 11 - 68 + 10 + 67 1 0 0 @@ -1104,8 +1084,8 @@ 0 - 11 - 69 + 10 + 68 1 0 0 @@ -1124,8 +1104,8 @@ 0 0 - 12 - 70 + 11 + 69 1 0 0 @@ -1144,8 +1124,8 @@ 0 0 - 13 - 71 + 12 + 70 1 0 0 @@ -1156,8 +1136,8 @@ 0 - 13 - 72 + 12 + 71 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx index fba089ea..382913c2 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_ch20_oled/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx @@ -725,16 +725,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - tos/config diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx index c9f761d7..97abc3ab 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx @@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ - tos/cmsis + tos/config 0 0 0 @@ -1014,26 +1014,6 @@ 7 64 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - cmsis_os.c - 0 - 0 - - - - - tos/config - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 8 - 65 5 0 0 @@ -1047,13 +1027,13 @@ examples - 1 + 0 0 0 0 - 9 - 66 + 8 + 65 1 0 0 @@ -1072,8 +1052,8 @@ 0 0 - 10 - 67 + 9 + 66 1 0 0 @@ -1092,8 +1072,8 @@ 0 0 - 11 - 68 + 10 + 67 1 0 0 @@ -1104,8 +1084,8 @@ 0 - 11 - 69 + 10 + 68 1 0 0 @@ -1124,8 +1104,8 @@ 0 0 - 12 - 70 + 11 + 69 1 0 0 @@ -1144,8 +1124,8 @@ 0 0 - 13 - 71 + 12 + 70 1 0 0 @@ -1156,8 +1136,8 @@ 0 - 13 - 72 + 12 + 71 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx index dd092e88..6cd7061e 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_pm25/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx @@ -725,16 +725,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - tos/config diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx index 7650c1bd..18c14b5d 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvoptx @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Application/User - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -1005,26 +1005,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 7 - 64 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - cmsis_os.c - 0 - 0 - - - tos/config 1 @@ -1032,8 +1012,8 @@ 0 0 - 8 - 65 + 7 + 64 5 0 0 @@ -1052,8 +1032,8 @@ 0 0 - 9 - 66 + 8 + 65 1 0 0 @@ -1072,8 +1052,8 @@ 0 0 - 10 - 67 + 9 + 66 1 0 0 @@ -1092,8 +1072,8 @@ 0 0 - 11 - 68 + 10 + 67 1 0 0 @@ -1104,8 +1084,8 @@ 0 - 11 - 69 + 10 + 68 1 0 0 @@ -1124,8 +1104,8 @@ 0 0 - 12 - 70 + 11 + 69 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx index 2bb72027..fa0d6ecc 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0/KEIL/mqtt_iothub_based_tencent_firmware/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_G0.uvprojx @@ -725,16 +725,6 @@ - - tos/cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - tos/config diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/quadspi.c b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/quadspi.c index 9e4a004f..c5b857f8 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/quadspi.c +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/quadspi.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void MX_QUADSPI_Init(void) } } - +#if 0 void HAL_QSPI_MspInit(QSPI_HandleTypeDef* qspiHandle) { @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ void HAL_QSPI_MspDeInit(QSPI_HandleTypeDef* qspiHandle) /* USER CODE END QUADSPI_MspDeInit 1 */ } } +#endif /* USER CODE BEGIN 1 */ diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/GCC/hello_world/Makefile b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/GCC/hello_world/Makefile index eede8d2f..060196be 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/GCC/hello_world/Makefile +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/GCC/hello_world/Makefile @@ -49,20 +49,20 @@ CMSIS_SRC = \ C_SOURCES += $(CMSIS_SRC) HAL_DRIVER_SRC = \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/main.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/mcu_init.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/main.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/mcu_init.c \ $(TOP_DIR)/examples/hello_world/hello_world.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/gpio.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/adc.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/dac.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/i2c.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/usart.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/spi.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/tim.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/stm32l4xx_it.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_msp.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/DHT11/DHT11_BUS.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/OLED/oled.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/gpio.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/adc.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/dac.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/i2c.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/usart.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/spi.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/tim.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/stm32l4xx_it.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_msp.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/DHT11/DHT11_BUS.c \ + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/OLED/oled.c \ $(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_adc.c \ $(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_adc_ex.c \ $(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_dac.c \ @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ HAL_DRIVER_SRC = \ $(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_pwr_ex.c \ $(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_cortex.c \ $(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l4xx_hal_exti.c \ - $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/system_stm32l4xx.c + $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Src/system_stm32l4xx.c C_SOURCES += $(HAL_DRIVER_SRC) # ASM sources @@ -156,21 +156,21 @@ KERNEL_INC = \ -I $(TOP_DIR)/kernel/hal/include \ -I $(TOP_DIR)/arch/arm/arm-v7m/common/include \ -I $(TOP_DIR)/arch/arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc \ - -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/\TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG + -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/\TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG C_INCLUDES += $(KERNEL_INC) CMSIS_INC = \ -I $(TOP_DIR)/osal/cmsis_os C_INCLUDES += $(CMSIS_INC) HAL_DRIVER_INC = \ - -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Inc \ + -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Inc \ -I$(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Inc \ -I$(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver/Inc/Legacy \ -I$(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/CMSIS/Device/ST/STM32L4xx/Include \ -I$(TOP_DIR)/platform/vendor_bsp/st/CMSIS/Include \ - -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/\TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/DHT11 \ - -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/\TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/BH1750 \ - -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/\TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/OLED + -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/DHT11 \ + -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/BH1750 \ + -I $(TOP_DIR)/board/TencentOS_Tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/BSP/Hardware/OLED C_INCLUDES += $(HAL_DRIVER_INC) # compile gcc flags diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx deleted file mode 100644 index 20f06e4a..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2659 +0,0 @@ - - - - 1.0 - -
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- - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx deleted file mode 100644 index 62d515f8..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1432 +0,0 @@ - - - - 2.1 - -
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1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\platform.c - - - platform_util.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\platform_util.c - - - poly1305.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\poly1305.c - - - ripemd160.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ripemd160.c - - - rsa.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\rsa.c - - - rsa_internal.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\rsa_internal.c - - - sha1.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\sha1.c - - - sha256.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\sha256.c - - - sha512.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\sha512.c - - - ssl_cache.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_cache.c - - - ssl_ciphersuites.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_ciphersuites.c - - - ssl_cli.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_cli.c - - - ssl_cookie.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_cookie.c - - - ssl_srv.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_srv.c - - - ssl_ticket.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_ticket.c - - - ssl_tls.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_tls.c - - - threading.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\threading.c - - - timing.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\timing.c - - - version.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\version.c - - - version_features.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\version_features.c - - - x509.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509.c - - - x509_create.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_create.c - - - x509_crl.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_crl.c - - - x509_crt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_crt.c - - - x509_csr.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_csr.c - - - x509write_crt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509write_crt.c - - - x509write_csr.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509write_csr.c - - - xtea.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\xtea.c - - - entropy_hardware_alt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\wrapper\src\entropy_hardware_alt.c - - - net_module_alt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\wrapper\src\net_module_alt.c - - - timing_alt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\wrapper\src\timing_alt.c - - - - - ::CMSIS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index fdead64c..5007baa2 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -1213,8 +1213,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec200s\ec200s.c - ec200s.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\air724\air724.c + air724.c 0 0 @@ -1225,32 +1225,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20\ec20.c - ec20.c - 0 - 0 - - - 12 - 75 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\air724\air724.c - air724.c - 0 - 0 - - - 12 - 76 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\l610\l610.c - l610.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c + ec600s.c 0 0 @@ -1264,7 +1240,7 @@ 0 13 - 77 + 75 1 0 0 @@ -1284,7 +1260,7 @@ 0 14 - 78 + 76 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index e1677d1a..7c498a13 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/bin_file_download_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.3.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -798,25 +798,15 @@ 1 ..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266\esp8266.c - - ec200s.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec200s\ec200s.c - - - ec20.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20\ec20.c - air724.c 1 ..\..\..\..\devices\air724\air724.c - l610.c + ec600s.c 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\l610\l610.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 2f1ba1a7..9dffbb9e 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ Application/User - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ examples - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index e9ee3f7e..521d681d 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_relocatable_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -914,4 +915,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index cf470b80..7e89bdb3 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ Application/User - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ examples - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 71d65865..c45b8fa7 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/elfloader_shared_object/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -914,4 +915,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/DebugConfig/TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/DebugConfig/TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf deleted file mode 100644 index 713c198e..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/DebugConfig/TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -// File: STM32L43x_44x_45x_46x.dbgconf -// Version: 1.0.0 -// Note: refer to STM32L43xxx STM32L44xxx STM32L45xxx STM32L46xxx Reference manual (RM0394) -// refer to STM32L431xx STM32L432xx STM32L433xx STM32L442xx STM32L443xx STM32L451xx STM32L452xx STM32L462xx datasheets - -// <<< Use Configuration Wizard in Context Menu >>> - -// Debug MCU configuration register (DBGMCU_CR) -// DBG_STANDBY Debug Standby mode -// DBG_STOP Debug Stop mode -// DBG_SLEEP Debug Sleep mode -// -DbgMCU_CR = 0x00000007; - -// Debug MCU APB1 freeze register1 (DBGMCU_APB1FZR1) -// Reserved bits must be kept at reset value -// DBG_LPTIM1_STOP LPTIM1 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_CAN1_STOP bxCAN1 stopped when core is halted -// DBG_I2C3_STOP I2C3 SMBUS timeout counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_I2C2_STOP I2C2 SMBUS timeout counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_I2C1_STOP I2C1 SMBUS timeout counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_IWDG_STOP Independent watchdog counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_WWDG_STOP Window watchdog counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_RTC_STOP RTC counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM7_STOP TIM7 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM6_STOP TIM6 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM2_STOP TIM2 counter stopped when core is halted -// -DbgMCU_APB1_Fz1 = 0x00000000; - -// Debug MCU APB1 freeze register 2 (DBGMCU_APB1FZR2) -// Reserved bits must be kept at reset value -// DBG_LPTIM2_STOP LPTIM2 counter stopped when core is halted -// -DbgMCU_APB1_Fz2 = 0x00000000; - -// Debug MCU APB2 freeze register (DBGMCU_APB2FZR) -// Reserved bits must be kept at reset value -// DBG_TIM16_STOP TIM16 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM15_STOP TIM15 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM1_STOP TIM1 counter stopped when core is halted -// -DbgMCU_APB2_Fz = 0x00000000; - -// TPIU Pin Routing (TRACECLK fixed on Pin PE2) -// TRACECLK: Pin PE2 -// TRACED0 -// ETM Trace Data 0 -// <0x00040003=> Pin PE3 -// <0x00020001=> Pin PC1 -// TRACED1 -// ETM Trace Data 1 -// <0x00040004=> Pin PE4 -// <0x0002000A=> Pin PC10 -// TRACED2 -// ETM Trace Data 2 -// <0x00040005=> Pin PE5 -// <0x00030002=> Pin PD2 -// TRACED3 -// ETM Trace Data 3 -// <0x00040006=> Pin PE6 -// <0x0002000C=> Pin PC12 -// -TraceClk_Pin = 0x00040002; -TraceD0_Pin = 0x00040003; -TraceD1_Pin = 0x00040004; -TraceD2_Pin = 0x00040005; -TraceD3_Pin = 0x00040006; - -// <<< end of configuration section >>> diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h deleted file mode 100644 index 248f644f..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ - -/* - * Auto generated Run-Time-Environment Configuration File - * *** Do not modify ! *** - * - * Project: 'TencentOS_tiny' - * Target: 'TencentOS_tiny' - */ - -#ifndef RTE_COMPONENTS_H -#define RTE_COMPONENTS_H - - -/* - * Define the Device Header File: - */ -#define CMSIS_device_header "stm32l4xx.h" - - - -#endif /* RTE_COMPONENTS_H */ diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq deleted file mode 100644 index 26b671b4..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvguix.yangq +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1860 +0,0 @@ - - - - -6.1 - -
### uVision Project, (C) Keil Software
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- - - - 0 - 1920 - 1080 - - - - - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index bc240673..675584d8 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@ config - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 5ea3d852..b54b8089 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/fatfs_through_vfs/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -889,4 +890,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 8d518802..4ee88aab 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ examples - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 6222f149..d748aee7 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/application/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -794,4 +795,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvoptx index 085eea09..f2cd87d8 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvoptx @@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ Drivers/CMSIS - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ Application/User - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvprojx index 40604355..c3f9c6de 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iap/bootloader/MDK-ARM/bootloader.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ bootloader 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -594,4 +595,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iot_explorer_mqtt_based_4g_cat1_l610_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iot_explorer_mqtt_based_4g_cat1_l610_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx deleted file mode 100644 index 58a62019..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iot_explorer_mqtt_based_4g_cat1_l610_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1263 +0,0 @@ - - - - 1.0 - -
### uVision Project, (C) Keil Software
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- - - 2.1 - -
### uVision Project, (C) Keil Software
- - - - TencentOS_tiny - 0x4 - ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC - 0 - - - STM32L431RCTx - STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.3.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ - IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $$Device:STM32L431RCTx$CMSIS\SVD\STM32L4x1.svd - 0 - 0 - - - - - - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - - .\obj\ - TencentOS_tiny - 1 - 0 - 1 - 1 - 0 - .\list\ - 1 - 0 - 0 - - 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - 0 - - - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 3 - - - 0 - - - SARMCM3.DLL - -REMAP -MPU - DCM.DLL - -pCM4 - SARMCM3.DLL - -MPU - TCM.DLL - -pCM4 - - - - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 16 - - - - - 1 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 1 - 4107 - - 1 - STLink\ST-LINKIII-KEIL_SWO.dll - - - - - - 0 - - - - 0 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 0 - "Cortex-M4" - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 2 - 0 - 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- - - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 4 - - - - - - - - - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0x08000000 - 0x20000000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - Application/MDK-ARM - - - startup_stm32l431xx.s - 2 - startup_stm32l431xx.s - - - - - Application/User - - - gpio.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\gpio.c - - - main.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\main.c - - - mcu_init.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\mcu_init.c - - - stm32l4xx_hal_msp.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\stm32l4xx_hal_msp.c - - - usart.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\usart.c - - - adc.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\adc.c - - - dac.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\dac.c - - - i2c.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\i2c.c - - - spi.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\spi.c - - - stm32l4xx_it_module.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\stm32l4xx_it_module.c - - - tim.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\tim.c - - - - - examples - - - mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_demo.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\l610_tencent_firmware\mqtt_iot_explorer_tc_demo.c - - - - - Drivers/STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver - - - stm32l4xx_hal_tim.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Src\stm32l4xx_hal_tim.c - 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1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_robin.c - - - tos_sched.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sched.c - - - tos_sem.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sem.c - - - tos_sys.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sys.c - - - tos_task.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_task.c - - - tos_tick.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_tick.c - - - tos_time.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_time.c - - - tos_timer.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_timer.c - - - tos_stopwatch.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_stopwatch.c - - - - - cpu - - - port_s.S - 2 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_s.S - - - tos_cpu.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\tos_cpu.c - - - port_c.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_c.c - - - - - cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - - - config - - - tos_config.h - 5 - ..\..\TOS-CONFIG\tos_config.h - - - - - devices - - - l610_tencent_firmware.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\l610_tencent_firmware\l610_tencent_firmware.c - - - - - hal - - - tos_hal_uart.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\platform\hal\st\stm32l4xx\src\tos_hal_uart.c - - - - - at - - - tos_at.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\net\at\src\tos_at.c - - - tencent_firmware_module_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\net\tencent_firmware_module_wrapper\tencent_firmware_module_wrapper.c - - - - - ::CMSIS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <Project Info> - - - - - - 0 - 1 - - - - - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iot_explorer_mqtt_based_4g_cat1_l610_qcould_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iot_explorer_mqtt_based_4g_cat1_l610_qcould_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s deleted file mode 100644 index 6a5c15a5..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/iot_explorer_mqtt_based_4g_cat1_l610_qcould_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,404 +0,0 @@ -;********************** COPYRIGHT(c) 2017 STMicroelectronics ****************** -;* File Name : startup_stm32l431xx.s -;* Author : MCD Application Team -;* Description : STM32L431xx Ultra Low Power devices vector table for MDK-ARM toolchain. -;* This module performs: -;* - Set the initial SP -;* - Set the initial PC == Reset_Handler -;* - Set the vector table entries with the exceptions ISR address -;* - Branches to __main in the C library (which eventually -;* calls main()). -;* After Reset the Cortex-M4 processor is in Thread mode, -;* priority is Privileged, and the Stack is set to Main. -;* <<< Use Configuration Wizard in Context Menu >>> -;******************************************************************************* -;* -;* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -;* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -;* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -;* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -;* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -;* 3. Neither the name of STMicroelectronics nor the names of its contributors -;* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software -;* without specific prior written permission. -;* -;* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" -;* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -;* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -;* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE -;* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL -;* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR -;* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER -;* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, -;* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE -;* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -;* -;******************************************************************************* -; -; Amount of memory (in bytes) allocated for Stack -; Tailor this value to your application needs -; Stack Configuration -; Stack Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Stack_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA STACK, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -Stack_Mem SPACE Stack_Size -__initial_sp - - -; Heap Configuration -; Heap Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Heap_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA HEAP, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -__heap_base -Heap_Mem SPACE Heap_Size -__heap_limit - - PRESERVE8 - THUMB - - -; Vector Table Mapped to Address 0 at Reset - AREA RESET, DATA, READONLY - EXPORT __Vectors - EXPORT __Vectors_End - EXPORT __Vectors_Size - -__Vectors DCD __initial_sp ; Top of Stack - DCD Reset_Handler ; Reset Handler - DCD NMI_Handler ; NMI Handler - DCD HardFault_Handler ; Hard Fault Handler - DCD MemManage_Handler ; MPU Fault Handler - DCD BusFault_Handler ; Bus Fault Handler - DCD UsageFault_Handler ; Usage Fault Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SVC_Handler ; SVCall Handler - DCD DebugMon_Handler ; Debug Monitor Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD PendSV_Handler ; PendSV Handler - DCD SysTick_Handler ; SysTick Handler - - ; External Interrupts - DCD WWDG_IRQHandler ; Window WatchDog - DCD PVD_PVM_IRQHandler ; PVD/PVM1/PVM2/PVM3/PVM4 through EXTI Line detection - DCD TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler ; Tamper and TimeStamps through the EXTI line - DCD RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler ; RTC Wakeup through the EXTI line - DCD FLASH_IRQHandler ; FLASH - DCD RCC_IRQHandler ; RCC - DCD EXTI0_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line0 - DCD EXTI1_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line1 - DCD EXTI2_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line2 - DCD EXTI3_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line3 - DCD EXTI4_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line4 - DCD DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 1 - DCD DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 2 - DCD DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 3 - DCD DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 4 - DCD DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 5 - DCD DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 6 - DCD DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 7 - DCD ADC1_IRQHandler ; ADC1 - DCD CAN1_TX_IRQHandler ; CAN1 TX - DCD CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX0 - DCD CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX1 - DCD CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler ; CAN1 SCE - DCD EXTI9_5_IRQHandler ; External Line[9:5]s - DCD TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Break and TIM15 - DCD TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Update and TIM16 - DCD TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Trigger and Commutation - DCD TIM1_CC_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Capture Compare - DCD TIM2_IRQHandler ; TIM2 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD I2C1_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Event - DCD I2C1_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Error - DCD I2C2_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Event - DCD I2C2_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Error - DCD SPI1_IRQHandler ; SPI1 - DCD SPI2_IRQHandler ; SPI2 - DCD USART1_IRQHandler ; USART1 - DCD USART2_IRQHandler ; USART2 - DCD USART3_IRQHandler ; USART3 - DCD EXTI15_10_IRQHandler ; External Line[15:10] - DCD RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler ; RTC Alarm (A and B) through EXTI Line - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SDMMC1_IRQHandler ; SDMMC1 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SPI3_IRQHandler ; SPI3 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler ; TIM6 and DAC1&2 underrun errors - DCD TIM7_IRQHandler ; TIM7 - DCD DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 1 - DCD DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 2 - DCD DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 3 - DCD DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 4 - DCD DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 5 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD COMP_IRQHandler ; COMP Interrupt - DCD LPTIM1_IRQHandler ; LP TIM1 interrupt - DCD LPTIM2_IRQHandler ; LP TIM2 interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 6 - DCD DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 7 - DCD LPUART1_IRQHandler ; LP UART1 interrupt - DCD QUADSPI_IRQHandler ; Quad SPI global interrupt - DCD I2C3_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C3 event - DCD I2C3_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C3 error - DCD SAI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Audio Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SWPMI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Wire Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD TSC_IRQHandler ; Touch Sense Controller global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD RNG_IRQHandler ; RNG global interrupt - DCD FPU_IRQHandler ; FPU - DCD CRS_IRQHandler ; CRS interrupt - -__Vectors_End - -__Vectors_Size EQU __Vectors_End - __Vectors - - AREA |.text|, CODE, READONLY - -; Reset handler -Reset_Handler PROC - EXPORT Reset_Handler [WEAK] - IMPORT SystemInit - IMPORT __main - - LDR R0, =SystemInit - BLX R0 - LDR R0, =__main - BX R0 - ENDP - -; Dummy Exception Handlers (infinite loops which can be modified) - -NMI_Handler PROC - EXPORT NMI_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -HardFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT HardFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -MemManage_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT MemManage_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -BusFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT BusFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -UsageFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT UsageFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SVC_Handler PROC - EXPORT SVC_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -DebugMon_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT DebugMon_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -PendSV_Handler PROC - EXPORT PendSV_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SysTick_Handler PROC - EXPORT SysTick_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP - -Default_Handler PROC - - EXPORT WWDG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT PVD_PVM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FLASH_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RCC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT ADC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_TX_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI9_5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_CC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI15_10_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SDMMC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT COMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPUART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT QUADSPI_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SAI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SWPMI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TSC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RNG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FPU_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CRS_IRQHandler [WEAK] - -WWDG_IRQHandler -PVD_PVM_IRQHandler -TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler -RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler -FLASH_IRQHandler -RCC_IRQHandler -EXTI0_IRQHandler -EXTI1_IRQHandler -EXTI2_IRQHandler -EXTI3_IRQHandler -EXTI4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler -ADC1_IRQHandler -CAN1_TX_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler -CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler -EXTI9_5_IRQHandler -TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler -TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler -TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler -TIM1_CC_IRQHandler -TIM2_IRQHandler -I2C1_EV_IRQHandler -I2C1_ER_IRQHandler -I2C2_EV_IRQHandler -I2C2_ER_IRQHandler -SPI1_IRQHandler -SPI2_IRQHandler -USART1_IRQHandler -USART2_IRQHandler -USART3_IRQHandler -EXTI15_10_IRQHandler -RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler -SDMMC1_IRQHandler -SPI3_IRQHandler -TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler -TIM7_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler -COMP_IRQHandler -LPTIM1_IRQHandler -LPTIM2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler -LPUART1_IRQHandler -QUADSPI_IRQHandler -I2C3_EV_IRQHandler -I2C3_ER_IRQHandler -SAI1_IRQHandler -SWPMI1_IRQHandler -TSC_IRQHandler -RNG_IRQHandler -FPU_IRQHandler -CRS_IRQHandler - - B . - - ENDP - - ALIGN - -;******************************************************************************* -; User Stack and Heap initialization -;******************************************************************************* - IF :DEF:__MICROLIB - - EXPORT __initial_sp - EXPORT __heap_base - EXPORT __heap_limit - - ELSE - - IMPORT __use_two_region_memory - EXPORT __user_initial_stackheap - -__user_initial_stackheap - - LDR R0, = Heap_Mem - LDR R1, =(Stack_Mem + Stack_Size) - LDR R2, = (Heap_Mem + Heap_Size) - LDR R3, = Stack_Mem - BX LR - - ALIGN - - ENDIF - - END - -;************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE***** diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 6c84d7a4..d0ae6266 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ Application/User - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -418,8 +418,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\BSP\Src\quadspi.c - quadspi.c + ..\..\BSP\Src\tim.c + tim.c 0 0 @@ -430,8 +430,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\BSP\Src\tim.c - tim.c + ..\..\BSP\Src\quadspi.c + quadspi.c 0 0 @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ examples - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ Hardware - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ kv - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 88f2e7fd..00ab71a9 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/kv/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.0.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -442,16 +443,16 @@ 1 ..\..\BSP\Src\spi.c - - quadspi.c - 1 - ..\..\BSP\Src\quadspi.c - tim.c 1 ..\..\BSP\Src\tim.c + + quadspi.c + 1 + ..\..\BSP\Src\quadspi.c + @@ -834,4 +835,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 737dcf83..6fb8fc6d 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ devices - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index fde04d95..391d1233 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/lorawan/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.2.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -849,4 +850,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s deleted file mode 100644 index 6a5c15a5..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqtt_based_qcould_firmware/startup_stm32l431xx.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,404 +0,0 @@ -;********************** COPYRIGHT(c) 2017 STMicroelectronics ****************** -;* File Name : startup_stm32l431xx.s -;* Author : MCD Application Team -;* Description : STM32L431xx Ultra Low Power devices vector table for MDK-ARM toolchain. -;* This module performs: -;* - Set the initial SP -;* - Set the initial PC == Reset_Handler -;* - Set the vector table entries with the exceptions ISR address -;* - Branches to __main in the C library (which eventually -;* calls main()). -;* After Reset the Cortex-M4 processor is in Thread mode, -;* priority is Privileged, and the Stack is set to Main. -;* <<< Use Configuration Wizard in Context Menu >>> -;******************************************************************************* -;* -;* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -;* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -;* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -;* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -;* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -;* 3. Neither the name of STMicroelectronics nor the names of its contributors -;* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software -;* without specific prior written permission. -;* -;* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" -;* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -;* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -;* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE -;* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL -;* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR -;* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER -;* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, -;* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE -;* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -;* -;******************************************************************************* -; -; Amount of memory (in bytes) allocated for Stack -; Tailor this value to your application needs -; Stack Configuration -; Stack Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Stack_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA STACK, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -Stack_Mem SPACE Stack_Size -__initial_sp - - -; Heap Configuration -; Heap Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Heap_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA HEAP, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -__heap_base -Heap_Mem SPACE Heap_Size -__heap_limit - - PRESERVE8 - THUMB - - -; Vector Table Mapped to Address 0 at Reset - AREA RESET, DATA, READONLY - EXPORT __Vectors - EXPORT __Vectors_End - EXPORT __Vectors_Size - -__Vectors DCD __initial_sp ; Top of Stack - DCD Reset_Handler ; Reset Handler - DCD NMI_Handler ; NMI Handler - DCD HardFault_Handler ; Hard Fault Handler - DCD MemManage_Handler ; MPU Fault Handler - DCD BusFault_Handler ; Bus Fault Handler - DCD UsageFault_Handler ; Usage Fault Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SVC_Handler ; SVCall Handler - DCD DebugMon_Handler ; Debug Monitor Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD PendSV_Handler ; PendSV Handler - DCD SysTick_Handler ; SysTick Handler - - ; External Interrupts - DCD WWDG_IRQHandler ; Window WatchDog - DCD PVD_PVM_IRQHandler ; PVD/PVM1/PVM2/PVM3/PVM4 through EXTI Line detection - DCD TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler ; Tamper and TimeStamps through the EXTI line - DCD RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler ; RTC Wakeup through the EXTI line - DCD FLASH_IRQHandler ; FLASH - DCD RCC_IRQHandler ; RCC - DCD EXTI0_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line0 - DCD EXTI1_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line1 - DCD EXTI2_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line2 - DCD EXTI3_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line3 - DCD EXTI4_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line4 - DCD DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 1 - DCD DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 2 - DCD DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 3 - DCD DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 4 - DCD DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 5 - DCD DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 6 - DCD DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 7 - DCD ADC1_IRQHandler ; ADC1 - DCD CAN1_TX_IRQHandler ; CAN1 TX - DCD CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX0 - DCD CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX1 - DCD CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler ; CAN1 SCE - DCD EXTI9_5_IRQHandler ; External Line[9:5]s - DCD TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Break and TIM15 - DCD TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Update and TIM16 - DCD TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Trigger and Commutation - DCD TIM1_CC_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Capture Compare - DCD TIM2_IRQHandler ; TIM2 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD I2C1_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Event - DCD I2C1_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Error - DCD I2C2_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Event - DCD I2C2_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Error - DCD SPI1_IRQHandler ; SPI1 - DCD SPI2_IRQHandler ; SPI2 - DCD USART1_IRQHandler ; USART1 - DCD USART2_IRQHandler ; USART2 - DCD USART3_IRQHandler ; USART3 - DCD EXTI15_10_IRQHandler ; External Line[15:10] - DCD RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler ; RTC Alarm (A and B) through EXTI Line - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SDMMC1_IRQHandler ; SDMMC1 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SPI3_IRQHandler ; SPI3 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler ; TIM6 and DAC1&2 underrun errors - DCD TIM7_IRQHandler ; TIM7 - DCD DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 1 - DCD DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 2 - DCD DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 3 - DCD DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 4 - DCD DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 5 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD COMP_IRQHandler ; COMP Interrupt - DCD LPTIM1_IRQHandler ; LP TIM1 interrupt - DCD LPTIM2_IRQHandler ; LP TIM2 interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 6 - DCD DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 7 - DCD LPUART1_IRQHandler ; LP UART1 interrupt - DCD QUADSPI_IRQHandler ; Quad SPI global interrupt - DCD I2C3_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C3 event - DCD I2C3_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C3 error - DCD SAI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Audio Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SWPMI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Wire Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD TSC_IRQHandler ; Touch Sense Controller global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD RNG_IRQHandler ; RNG global interrupt - DCD FPU_IRQHandler ; FPU - DCD CRS_IRQHandler ; CRS interrupt - -__Vectors_End - -__Vectors_Size EQU __Vectors_End - __Vectors - - AREA |.text|, CODE, READONLY - -; Reset handler -Reset_Handler PROC - EXPORT Reset_Handler [WEAK] - IMPORT SystemInit - IMPORT __main - - LDR R0, =SystemInit - BLX R0 - LDR R0, =__main - BX R0 - ENDP - -; Dummy Exception Handlers (infinite loops which can be modified) - -NMI_Handler PROC - EXPORT NMI_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -HardFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT HardFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -MemManage_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT MemManage_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -BusFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT BusFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -UsageFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT UsageFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SVC_Handler PROC - EXPORT SVC_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -DebugMon_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT DebugMon_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -PendSV_Handler PROC - EXPORT PendSV_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SysTick_Handler PROC - EXPORT SysTick_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP - -Default_Handler PROC - - EXPORT WWDG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT PVD_PVM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FLASH_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RCC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT ADC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_TX_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI9_5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_CC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI15_10_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SDMMC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT COMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPUART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT QUADSPI_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SAI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SWPMI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TSC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RNG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FPU_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CRS_IRQHandler [WEAK] - -WWDG_IRQHandler -PVD_PVM_IRQHandler -TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler -RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler -FLASH_IRQHandler -RCC_IRQHandler -EXTI0_IRQHandler -EXTI1_IRQHandler -EXTI2_IRQHandler -EXTI3_IRQHandler -EXTI4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler -ADC1_IRQHandler -CAN1_TX_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler -CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler -EXTI9_5_IRQHandler -TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler -TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler -TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler -TIM1_CC_IRQHandler -TIM2_IRQHandler -I2C1_EV_IRQHandler -I2C1_ER_IRQHandler -I2C2_EV_IRQHandler -I2C2_ER_IRQHandler -SPI1_IRQHandler -SPI2_IRQHandler -USART1_IRQHandler -USART2_IRQHandler -USART3_IRQHandler -EXTI15_10_IRQHandler -RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler -SDMMC1_IRQHandler -SPI3_IRQHandler -TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler -TIM7_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler -COMP_IRQHandler -LPTIM1_IRQHandler -LPTIM2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler -LPUART1_IRQHandler -QUADSPI_IRQHandler -I2C3_EV_IRQHandler -I2C3_ER_IRQHandler -SAI1_IRQHandler -SWPMI1_IRQHandler -TSC_IRQHandler -RNG_IRQHandler -FPU_IRQHandler -CRS_IRQHandler - - B . - - ENDP - - ALIGN - -;******************************************************************************* -; User Stack and Heap initialization -;******************************************************************************* - IF :DEF:__MICROLIB - - EXPORT __initial_sp - EXPORT __heap_base - EXPORT __heap_limit - - ELSE - - IMPORT __use_two_region_memory - EXPORT __user_initial_stackheap - -__user_initial_stackheap - - LDR R0, = Heap_Mem - LDR R1, =(Stack_Mem + Stack_Size) - LDR R2, = (Heap_Mem + Heap_Size) - LDR R3, = Stack_Mem - BX LR - - ALIGN - - ENDIF - - END - -;************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE***** diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/startup_stm32l431xx.s b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/startup_stm32l431xx.s deleted file mode 100644 index 6a5c15a5..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/mqttclient/startup_stm32l431xx.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,404 +0,0 @@ -;********************** COPYRIGHT(c) 2017 STMicroelectronics ****************** -;* File Name : startup_stm32l431xx.s -;* Author : MCD Application Team -;* Description : STM32L431xx Ultra Low Power devices vector table for MDK-ARM toolchain. -;* This module performs: -;* - Set the initial SP -;* - Set the initial PC == Reset_Handler -;* - Set the vector table entries with the exceptions ISR address -;* - Branches to __main in the C library (which eventually -;* calls main()). -;* After Reset the Cortex-M4 processor is in Thread mode, -;* priority is Privileged, and the Stack is set to Main. -;* <<< Use Configuration Wizard in Context Menu >>> -;******************************************************************************* -;* -;* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -;* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -;* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -;* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -;* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -;* 3. Neither the name of STMicroelectronics nor the names of its contributors -;* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software -;* without specific prior written permission. -;* -;* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" -;* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -;* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -;* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE -;* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL -;* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR -;* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER -;* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, -;* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE -;* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -;* -;******************************************************************************* -; -; Amount of memory (in bytes) allocated for Stack -; Tailor this value to your application needs -; Stack Configuration -; Stack Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Stack_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA STACK, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -Stack_Mem SPACE Stack_Size -__initial_sp - - -; Heap Configuration -; Heap Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Heap_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA HEAP, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -__heap_base -Heap_Mem SPACE Heap_Size -__heap_limit - - PRESERVE8 - THUMB - - -; Vector Table Mapped to Address 0 at Reset - AREA RESET, DATA, READONLY - EXPORT __Vectors - EXPORT __Vectors_End - EXPORT __Vectors_Size - -__Vectors DCD __initial_sp ; Top of Stack - DCD Reset_Handler ; Reset Handler - DCD NMI_Handler ; NMI Handler - DCD HardFault_Handler ; Hard Fault Handler - DCD MemManage_Handler ; MPU Fault Handler - DCD BusFault_Handler ; Bus Fault Handler - DCD UsageFault_Handler ; Usage Fault Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SVC_Handler ; SVCall Handler - DCD DebugMon_Handler ; Debug Monitor Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD PendSV_Handler ; PendSV Handler - DCD SysTick_Handler ; SysTick Handler - - ; External Interrupts - DCD WWDG_IRQHandler ; Window WatchDog - DCD PVD_PVM_IRQHandler ; PVD/PVM1/PVM2/PVM3/PVM4 through EXTI Line detection - DCD TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler ; Tamper and TimeStamps through the EXTI line - DCD RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler ; RTC Wakeup through the EXTI line - DCD FLASH_IRQHandler ; FLASH - DCD RCC_IRQHandler ; RCC - DCD EXTI0_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line0 - DCD EXTI1_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line1 - DCD EXTI2_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line2 - DCD EXTI3_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line3 - DCD EXTI4_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line4 - DCD DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 1 - DCD DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 2 - DCD DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 3 - DCD DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 4 - DCD DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 5 - DCD DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 6 - DCD DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 7 - DCD ADC1_IRQHandler ; ADC1 - DCD CAN1_TX_IRQHandler ; CAN1 TX - DCD CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX0 - DCD CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX1 - DCD CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler ; CAN1 SCE - DCD EXTI9_5_IRQHandler ; External Line[9:5]s - DCD TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Break and TIM15 - DCD TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Update and TIM16 - DCD TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Trigger and Commutation - DCD TIM1_CC_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Capture Compare - DCD TIM2_IRQHandler ; TIM2 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD I2C1_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Event - DCD I2C1_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Error - DCD I2C2_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Event - DCD I2C2_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Error - DCD SPI1_IRQHandler ; SPI1 - DCD SPI2_IRQHandler ; SPI2 - DCD USART1_IRQHandler ; USART1 - DCD USART2_IRQHandler ; USART2 - DCD USART3_IRQHandler ; USART3 - DCD EXTI15_10_IRQHandler ; External Line[15:10] - DCD RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler ; RTC Alarm (A and B) through EXTI Line - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SDMMC1_IRQHandler ; SDMMC1 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SPI3_IRQHandler ; SPI3 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler ; TIM6 and DAC1&2 underrun errors - DCD TIM7_IRQHandler ; TIM7 - DCD DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 1 - DCD DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 2 - DCD DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 3 - DCD DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 4 - DCD DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 5 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD COMP_IRQHandler ; COMP Interrupt - DCD LPTIM1_IRQHandler ; LP TIM1 interrupt - DCD LPTIM2_IRQHandler ; LP TIM2 interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 6 - DCD DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 7 - DCD LPUART1_IRQHandler ; LP UART1 interrupt - DCD QUADSPI_IRQHandler ; Quad SPI global interrupt - DCD I2C3_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C3 event - DCD I2C3_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C3 error - DCD SAI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Audio Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SWPMI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Wire Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD TSC_IRQHandler ; Touch Sense Controller global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD RNG_IRQHandler ; RNG global interrupt - DCD FPU_IRQHandler ; FPU - DCD CRS_IRQHandler ; CRS interrupt - -__Vectors_End - -__Vectors_Size EQU __Vectors_End - __Vectors - - AREA |.text|, CODE, READONLY - -; Reset handler -Reset_Handler PROC - EXPORT Reset_Handler [WEAK] - IMPORT SystemInit - IMPORT __main - - LDR R0, =SystemInit - BLX R0 - LDR R0, =__main - BX R0 - ENDP - -; Dummy Exception Handlers (infinite loops which can be modified) - -NMI_Handler PROC - EXPORT NMI_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -HardFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT HardFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -MemManage_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT MemManage_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -BusFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT BusFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -UsageFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT UsageFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SVC_Handler PROC - EXPORT SVC_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -DebugMon_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT DebugMon_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -PendSV_Handler PROC - EXPORT PendSV_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SysTick_Handler PROC - EXPORT SysTick_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP - -Default_Handler PROC - - EXPORT WWDG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT PVD_PVM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FLASH_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RCC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT ADC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_TX_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI9_5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_CC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI15_10_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SDMMC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT COMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPUART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT QUADSPI_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SAI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SWPMI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TSC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RNG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FPU_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CRS_IRQHandler [WEAK] - -WWDG_IRQHandler -PVD_PVM_IRQHandler -TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler -RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler -FLASH_IRQHandler -RCC_IRQHandler -EXTI0_IRQHandler -EXTI1_IRQHandler -EXTI2_IRQHandler -EXTI3_IRQHandler -EXTI4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler -ADC1_IRQHandler -CAN1_TX_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler -CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler -EXTI9_5_IRQHandler -TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler -TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler -TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler -TIM1_CC_IRQHandler -TIM2_IRQHandler -I2C1_EV_IRQHandler -I2C1_ER_IRQHandler -I2C2_EV_IRQHandler -I2C2_ER_IRQHandler -SPI1_IRQHandler -SPI2_IRQHandler -USART1_IRQHandler -USART2_IRQHandler -USART3_IRQHandler -EXTI15_10_IRQHandler -RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler -SDMMC1_IRQHandler -SPI3_IRQHandler -TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler -TIM7_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler -COMP_IRQHandler -LPTIM1_IRQHandler -LPTIM2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler -LPUART1_IRQHandler -QUADSPI_IRQHandler -I2C3_EV_IRQHandler -I2C3_ER_IRQHandler -SAI1_IRQHandler -SWPMI1_IRQHandler -TSC_IRQHandler -RNG_IRQHandler -FPU_IRQHandler -CRS_IRQHandler - - B . - - ENDP - - ALIGN - -;******************************************************************************* -; User Stack and Heap initialization -;******************************************************************************* - IF :DEF:__MICROLIB - - EXPORT __initial_sp - EXPORT __heap_base - EXPORT __heap_limit - - ELSE - - IMPORT __use_two_region_memory - EXPORT __user_initial_stackheap - -__user_initial_stackheap - - LDR R0, = Heap_Mem - LDR R1, =(Stack_Mem + Stack_Size) - LDR R2, = (Heap_Mem + Heap_Size) - LDR R3, = Stack_Mem - BX LR - - ALIGN - - ENDIF - - END - -;************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE***** diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx deleted file mode 100644 index b10f9541..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1292 +0,0 @@ - - - - 1.0 - -
### uVision Project, (C) Keil Software
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134234708
- 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - D:\Code\tencentos_tiny\temp_develop\TencentOS-tiny\examples\tcp_through_module\tcp_through_module.c - - \\TencentOS_tiny\../../../../examples/tcp_through_module/tcp_through_module.c\69 - - - 1 - 0 - 66 - 1 -
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0 - 0 - - - - - ::CMSIS - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - - - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx deleted file mode 100644 index 8ef7666d..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,842 +0,0 @@ - - - - 2.1 - -
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- - tos_sem.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sem.c - - - tos_sys.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sys.c - - - tos_task.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_task.c - - - tos_tick.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_tick.c - - - tos_time.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_time.c - - - tos_timer.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_timer.c - - - tos_stopwatch.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_stopwatch.c - - - - - cpu - - - port_s.S - 2 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_s.S - - - tos_cpu.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\tos_cpu.c - - - port_c.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_c.c - - - - - cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - - - config - - - tos_config.h - 5 - ..\..\TOS-CONFIG\tos_config.h - - - - - at - - - tos_at.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\net\at\src\tos_at.c - - - - - devices - - - bc35_28_95_lwm2m.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\bc35_28_95_lwm2m\bc35_28_95_lwm2m.c - - - - - sal_module_wrapper - - - sal_module_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper\sal_module_wrapper.c - - - - - hal - - - tos_hal_uart.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\platform\hal\st\stm32l4xx\src\tos_hal_uart.c - - - - - ::CMSIS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/startup_stm32l431xx.s b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/startup_stm32l431xx.s deleted file mode 100644 index 6a5c15a5..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/nb-iot_demo/startup_stm32l431xx.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,404 +0,0 @@ -;********************** COPYRIGHT(c) 2017 STMicroelectronics ****************** -;* File Name : startup_stm32l431xx.s -;* Author : MCD Application Team -;* Description : STM32L431xx Ultra Low Power devices vector table for MDK-ARM toolchain. -;* This module performs: -;* - Set the initial SP -;* - Set the initial PC == Reset_Handler -;* - Set the vector table entries with the exceptions ISR address -;* - Branches to __main in the C library (which eventually -;* calls main()). -;* After Reset the Cortex-M4 processor is in Thread mode, -;* priority is Privileged, and the Stack is set to Main. -;* <<< Use Configuration Wizard in Context Menu >>> -;******************************************************************************* -;* -;* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -;* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -;* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -;* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -;* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -;* 3. Neither the name of STMicroelectronics nor the names of its contributors -;* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software -;* without specific prior written permission. -;* -;* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" -;* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -;* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -;* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE -;* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL -;* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR -;* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER -;* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, -;* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE -;* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -;* -;******************************************************************************* -; -; Amount of memory (in bytes) allocated for Stack -; Tailor this value to your application needs -; Stack Configuration -; Stack Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Stack_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA STACK, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -Stack_Mem SPACE Stack_Size -__initial_sp - - -; Heap Configuration -; Heap Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Heap_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA HEAP, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -__heap_base -Heap_Mem SPACE Heap_Size -__heap_limit - - PRESERVE8 - THUMB - - -; Vector Table Mapped to Address 0 at Reset - AREA RESET, DATA, READONLY - EXPORT __Vectors - EXPORT __Vectors_End - EXPORT __Vectors_Size - -__Vectors DCD __initial_sp ; Top of Stack - DCD Reset_Handler ; Reset Handler - DCD NMI_Handler ; NMI Handler - DCD HardFault_Handler ; Hard Fault Handler - DCD MemManage_Handler ; MPU Fault Handler - DCD BusFault_Handler ; Bus Fault Handler - DCD UsageFault_Handler ; Usage Fault Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SVC_Handler ; SVCall Handler - DCD DebugMon_Handler ; Debug Monitor Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD PendSV_Handler ; PendSV Handler - DCD SysTick_Handler ; SysTick Handler - - ; External Interrupts - DCD WWDG_IRQHandler ; Window WatchDog - DCD PVD_PVM_IRQHandler ; PVD/PVM1/PVM2/PVM3/PVM4 through EXTI Line detection - DCD TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler ; Tamper and TimeStamps through the EXTI line - DCD RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler ; RTC Wakeup through the EXTI line - DCD FLASH_IRQHandler ; FLASH - DCD RCC_IRQHandler ; RCC - DCD EXTI0_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line0 - DCD EXTI1_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line1 - DCD EXTI2_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line2 - DCD EXTI3_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line3 - DCD EXTI4_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line4 - DCD DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 1 - DCD DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 2 - DCD DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 3 - DCD DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 4 - DCD DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 5 - DCD DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 6 - DCD DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 7 - DCD ADC1_IRQHandler ; ADC1 - DCD CAN1_TX_IRQHandler ; CAN1 TX - DCD CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX0 - DCD CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX1 - DCD CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler ; CAN1 SCE - DCD EXTI9_5_IRQHandler ; External Line[9:5]s - DCD TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Break and TIM15 - DCD TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Update and TIM16 - DCD TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Trigger and Commutation - DCD TIM1_CC_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Capture Compare - DCD TIM2_IRQHandler ; TIM2 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD I2C1_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Event - DCD I2C1_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Error - DCD I2C2_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Event - DCD I2C2_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Error - DCD SPI1_IRQHandler ; SPI1 - DCD SPI2_IRQHandler ; SPI2 - DCD USART1_IRQHandler ; USART1 - DCD USART2_IRQHandler ; USART2 - DCD USART3_IRQHandler ; USART3 - DCD EXTI15_10_IRQHandler ; External Line[15:10] - DCD RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler ; RTC Alarm (A and B) through EXTI Line - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SDMMC1_IRQHandler ; SDMMC1 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SPI3_IRQHandler ; SPI3 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler ; TIM6 and DAC1&2 underrun errors - DCD TIM7_IRQHandler ; TIM7 - DCD DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 1 - DCD DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 2 - DCD DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 3 - DCD DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 4 - DCD DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 5 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD COMP_IRQHandler ; COMP Interrupt - DCD LPTIM1_IRQHandler ; LP TIM1 interrupt - DCD LPTIM2_IRQHandler ; LP TIM2 interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 6 - DCD DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 7 - DCD LPUART1_IRQHandler ; LP UART1 interrupt - DCD QUADSPI_IRQHandler ; Quad SPI global interrupt - DCD I2C3_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C3 event - DCD I2C3_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C3 error - DCD SAI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Audio Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SWPMI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Wire Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD TSC_IRQHandler ; Touch Sense Controller global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD RNG_IRQHandler ; RNG global interrupt - DCD FPU_IRQHandler ; FPU - DCD CRS_IRQHandler ; CRS interrupt - -__Vectors_End - -__Vectors_Size EQU __Vectors_End - __Vectors - - AREA |.text|, CODE, READONLY - -; Reset handler -Reset_Handler PROC - EXPORT Reset_Handler [WEAK] - IMPORT SystemInit - IMPORT __main - - LDR R0, =SystemInit - BLX R0 - LDR R0, =__main - BX R0 - ENDP - -; Dummy Exception Handlers (infinite loops which can be modified) - -NMI_Handler PROC - EXPORT NMI_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -HardFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT HardFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -MemManage_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT MemManage_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -BusFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT BusFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -UsageFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT UsageFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SVC_Handler PROC - EXPORT SVC_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -DebugMon_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT DebugMon_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -PendSV_Handler PROC - EXPORT PendSV_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SysTick_Handler PROC - EXPORT SysTick_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP - -Default_Handler PROC - - EXPORT WWDG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT PVD_PVM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FLASH_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RCC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT ADC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_TX_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI9_5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_CC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI15_10_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SDMMC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT COMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPUART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT QUADSPI_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SAI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SWPMI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TSC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RNG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FPU_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CRS_IRQHandler [WEAK] - -WWDG_IRQHandler -PVD_PVM_IRQHandler -TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler -RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler -FLASH_IRQHandler -RCC_IRQHandler -EXTI0_IRQHandler -EXTI1_IRQHandler -EXTI2_IRQHandler -EXTI3_IRQHandler -EXTI4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler -ADC1_IRQHandler -CAN1_TX_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler -CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler -EXTI9_5_IRQHandler -TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler -TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler -TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler -TIM1_CC_IRQHandler -TIM2_IRQHandler -I2C1_EV_IRQHandler -I2C1_ER_IRQHandler -I2C2_EV_IRQHandler -I2C2_ER_IRQHandler -SPI1_IRQHandler -SPI2_IRQHandler -USART1_IRQHandler -USART2_IRQHandler -USART3_IRQHandler -EXTI15_10_IRQHandler -RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler -SDMMC1_IRQHandler -SPI3_IRQHandler -TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler -TIM7_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler -COMP_IRQHandler -LPTIM1_IRQHandler -LPTIM2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler -LPUART1_IRQHandler -QUADSPI_IRQHandler -I2C3_EV_IRQHandler -I2C3_ER_IRQHandler -SAI1_IRQHandler -SWPMI1_IRQHandler -TSC_IRQHandler -RNG_IRQHandler -FPU_IRQHandler -CRS_IRQHandler - - B . - - ENDP - - ALIGN - -;******************************************************************************* -; User Stack and Heap initialization -;******************************************************************************* - IF :DEF:__MICROLIB - - EXPORT __initial_sp - EXPORT __heap_base - EXPORT __heap_limit - - ELSE - - IMPORT __use_two_region_memory - EXPORT __user_initial_stackheap - -__user_initial_stackheap - - LDR R0, = Heap_Mem - LDR R1, =(Stack_Mem + Stack_Size) - LDR R2, = (Heap_Mem + Heap_Size) - LDR R3, = Stack_Mem - BX LR - - ALIGN - - ENDIF - - END - -;************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE***** diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_http/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_http/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 8258754b..8c148be9 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_http/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_http/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcloud_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcloud_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx deleted file mode 100644 index 0a0ddeb6..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcloud_iot_explorer/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3007 +0,0 @@ - - - - 1.0 - -
### uVision Project, (C) Keil Software
- - - *.c - *.s*; *.src; *.a* - *.obj; *.o - *.lib - *.txt; *.h; *.inc - *.plm - *.cpp - 0 - - - - 0 - 0 - - - - TencentOS_tiny - 0x4 - ARM-ADS - - 80000000 - - 1 - 1 - 0 - 1 - 0 - - - 1 - 65535 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - - 79 - 66 - 8 - .\list\ - - - 1 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - - - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 0 - - - 1 - 0 - 1 - - 18 - - 0 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - STLink\ST-LINKIII-KEIL_SWO.dll - - - - 0 - ARMRTXEVENTFLAGS - -L70 -Z18 -C0 -M0 -T1 - - - 0 - DLGTARM - (1010=-1,-1,-1,-1,0)(1007=-1,-1,-1,-1,0)(1008=-1,-1,-1,-1,0)(1009=-1,-1,-1,-1,0)(1012=-1,-1,-1,-1,0) - - - 0 - ARMDBGFLAGS - - - - 0 - DLGUARM - (105=-1,-1,-1,-1,0) - - - 0 - UL2CM3 - UL2CM3(-S0 -C0 -P0 -FD20000000 -FC1000 -FN1 -FF0STM32L4xx_256 -FS08000000 -FL040000 -FP0($$Device:STM32L431RCTx$CMSIS\Flash\STM32L4xx_256.FLM)) - - - 0 - ST-LINKIII-KEIL_SWO - -U303030303030303030303031 -O10446 -SF4000 -C0 -A0 -I0 -HNlocalhost -HP7184 -P1 -N00("ARM CoreSight SW-DP") -D00(2BA01477) -L00(0) -TO18 -TC10000000 -TP21 -TDS8007 -TDT0 -TDC1F -TIEFFFFFFFF -TIP8 -FO15 -FD20000000 -FC1000 -FN1 -FF0STM32L4xx_256.FLM -FS08000000 -FL040000 -FP0($$Device:STM32L431RCTx$CMSIS\Flash\STM32L4xx_256.FLM) - - - - - 0 - 0 - 46 - 1 -
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- - - 2.1 - -
### uVision Project, (C) Keil Software
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tos_mutex.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_mutex.c - - - tos_pend.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_pend.c - - - tos_priority_mail_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_mail_queue.c - - - tos_priority_message_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_message_queue.c - - - tos_priority_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_priority_queue.c - - - tos_ring_queue.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_ring_queue.c - - - tos_robin.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_robin.c - - - tos_sched.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sched.c - - - tos_sem.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sem.c - - - tos_sys.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_sys.c - - - tos_task.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_task.c - - - tos_tick.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_tick.c - - - tos_time.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_time.c - - - tos_timer.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_timer.c - - - tos_stopwatch.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\kernel\core\tos_stopwatch.c - - - - - cpu - - - port_s.S - 2 - ..\..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_s.S - - - tos_cpu.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\tos_cpu.c - - - port_c.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc\port_c.c - - - - - cmsis - - - cmsis_os.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os\cmsis_os.c - - - - - module_wrapper - - - sal_module_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper\sal_module_wrapper.c - - - lora_module_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\net\lora_module_wrapper\lora_module_wrapper.c - - - tencent_firmware_module_wrapper.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\net\tencent_firmware_module_wrapper\tencent_firmware_module_wrapper.c - - - - - devices - - - esp8266.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266\esp8266.c - - - RHF76.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\devices\rhf76_lora\RHF76.c - - - bc35_28_95.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\devices\bc35_28_95\bc35_28_95.c - - - esp8266_tencent_firmware.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266_tencent_firmware\esp8266_tencent_firmware.c - - - sim800a.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\devices\sim800a\sim800a.c - - - - - config - - - tos_config.h - 5 - ..\..\..\TOS-CONFIG\tos_config.h - - - - - hal - - - tos_hal_uart.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\platform\hal\st\stm32l4xx\src\tos_hal_uart.c - - - - - at-framwork - - - tos_at.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\net\at\src\tos_at.c - - - - - mbedtls - - - entropy_hardware_alt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\wrapper\src\entropy_hardware_alt.c - - - net_module_alt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\wrapper\src\net_module_alt.c - - - timing_alt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\wrapper\src\timing_alt.c - - - aes.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\aes.c - - - aesni.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\aesni.c - - - arc4.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\arc4.c - - - aria.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\aria.c - - - asn1parse.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\asn1parse.c - - - asn1write.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\asn1write.c - - - base64.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\base64.c - - - bignum.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\bignum.c - - - blowfish.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\blowfish.c - - - camellia.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\camellia.c - - - ccm.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ccm.c - - - certs.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\certs.c - - - chacha20.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\chacha20.c - - - chachapoly.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\chachapoly.c - - - cipher.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\cipher.c - - - cipher_wrap.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\cipher_wrap.c - - - cmac.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\cmac.c - - - ctr_drbg.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ctr_drbg.c - - - debug.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\debug.c - - - des.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\des.c - - - dhm.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\dhm.c - - - ecdh.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ecdh.c - - - ecdsa.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ecdsa.c - - - ecjpake.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ecjpake.c - - - ecp.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ecp.c - - - ecp_curves.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ecp_curves.c - - - entropy.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\entropy.c - - - entropy_poll.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\entropy_poll.c - - - error.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\error.c - - - gcm.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\gcm.c - - - havege.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\havege.c - - - hkdf.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\hkdf.c - - - hmac_drbg.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\hmac_drbg.c - - - md.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\md.c - - - md_wrap.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\md_wrap.c - - - md2.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\md2.c - - - md4.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\md4.c - - - md5.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\md5.c - - - memory_buffer_alloc.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\memory_buffer_alloc.c - - - net_sockets.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\net_sockets.c - - - nist_kw.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\nist_kw.c - - - oid.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\oid.c - - - padlock.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\padlock.c - - - pem.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pem.c - - - pk.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pk.c - - - pk_wrap.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pk_wrap.c - - - pkcs5.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pkcs5.c - - - pkcs11.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pkcs11.c - - - pkcs12.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pkcs12.c - - - pkparse.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pkparse.c - - - pkwrite.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\pkwrite.c - - - platform.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\platform.c - - - platform_util.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\platform_util.c - - - poly1305.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\poly1305.c - - - ripemd160.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ripemd160.c - - - rsa.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\rsa.c - - - rsa_internal.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\rsa_internal.c - - - sha1.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\sha1.c - - - sha256.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\sha256.c - - - sha512.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\sha512.c - - - ssl_cache.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_cache.c - - - ssl_ciphersuites.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_ciphersuites.c - - - ssl_cli.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_cli.c - - - ssl_cookie.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_cookie.c - - - ssl_srv.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_srv.c - - - ssl_ticket.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_ticket.c - - - ssl_tls.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\ssl_tls.c - - - threading.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\threading.c - - - timing.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\timing.c - - - version.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\version.c - - - version_features.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\version_features.c - - - x509.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509.c - - - x509_create.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_create.c - - - x509_crl.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_crl.c - - - x509_crt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_crt.c - - - x509_csr.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509_csr.c - - - x509write_crt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509write_crt.c - - - x509write_csr.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\x509write_csr.c - - - xtea.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\security\mbedtls\3rdparty\src\xtea.c - - - - - qcloud/port - - - HAL_AT_UART_tencentos_tiny.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\port\TencentOS_tiny\HAL_AT_UART_tencentos_tiny.c - - - HAL_Device_tencentos_tiny.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\port\TencentOS_tiny\HAL_Device_tencentos_tiny.c - - - HAL_OS_tencentos_tiny.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\port\TencentOS_tiny\HAL_OS_tencentos_tiny.c - - - HAL_TCP_module.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\port\TencentOS_tiny\HAL_TCP_module.c - - - HAL_Timer_tencentos_tiny.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\port\TencentOS_tiny\HAL_Timer_tencentos_tiny.c - - - HAL_UDP_module.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\port\TencentOS_tiny\HAL_UDP_module.c - - - - - qcloud/protocol/mqtt - - - mqtt_client.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client.c - - - mqtt_client_common.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client_common.c - - - mqtt_client_connect.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client_connect.c - - - mqtt_client_net.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client_net.c - - - mqtt_client_publish.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client_publish.c - - - mqtt_client_subscribe.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client_subscribe.c - - - mqtt_client_unsubscribe.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client_unsubscribe.c - - - mqtt_client_yield.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\mqtt\mqtt_client_yield.c - - - - - qcloud/utils - - - json_parser.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\json_parser.c - - - json_token.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\json_token.c - - - qcloud_iot_log.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\qcloud_iot_log.c - - - string_utils.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\string_utils.c - - - utils_aes.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_aes.c - - - utils_base64.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_base64.c - - - utils_getopt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_getopt.c - - - utils_hmac.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_hmac.c - - - utils_list.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_list.c - - - utils_md5.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_md5.c - - - utils_ringbuff.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_ringbuff.c - - - utils_sha1.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_sha1.c - - - utils_timer.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\utils_timer.c - - - qcloud_iot_ca.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\qcloud_iot_ca.c - - - qcloud_iot_device.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\utils\qcloud_iot_device.c - - - - - qcloud/network - - - network_interface.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\network\network_interface.c - - - network_socket.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\network\socket\network_socket.c - - - network_tls.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\network\tls\network_tls.c - - - HAL_DTLS_mbedtls.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\platform\tls\mbedtls\HAL_DTLS_mbedtls.c - - - HAL_TLS_mbedtls.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\platform\tls\mbedtls\HAL_TLS_mbedtls.c - - - - - qcloud/services/ota - - - ota_client.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\services\ota\ota_client.c - - - ota_fetch.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\services\ota\ota_fetch.c - - - ota_lib.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\services\ota\ota_lib.c - - - ota_mqtt.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\services\ota\ota_mqtt.c - - - - - qcloud/protocol/http - - - utils_httpc.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\qcloud-iot-explorer-sdk\3rdparty\sdk_src\protocol\http\utils_httpc.c - - - - - ota/common - - - ota_flash.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\ota\common\flash\ota_flash.c - - - crc8.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\ota\common\crc\crc8.c - - - ota_image.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\ota\common\image\ota_image.c - - - ota_partition.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\ota\common\partition\ota_partition.c - - - ota_env.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\ota\common\env\ota_env.c - - - ota_info.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\ota\common\info\ota_info.c - - - - - kv - - - tos_kv.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\..\components\fs\kv\tos_kv.c - - - - - ::CMSIS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcloud_iot_explorer/startup_stm32l431xx.s b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcloud_iot_explorer/startup_stm32l431xx.s deleted file mode 100644 index 6a5c15a5..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcloud_iot_explorer/startup_stm32l431xx.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,404 +0,0 @@ -;********************** COPYRIGHT(c) 2017 STMicroelectronics ****************** -;* File Name : startup_stm32l431xx.s -;* Author : MCD Application Team -;* Description : STM32L431xx Ultra Low Power devices vector table for MDK-ARM toolchain. -;* This module performs: -;* - Set the initial SP -;* - Set the initial PC == Reset_Handler -;* - Set the vector table entries with the exceptions ISR address -;* - Branches to __main in the C library (which eventually -;* calls main()). -;* After Reset the Cortex-M4 processor is in Thread mode, -;* priority is Privileged, and the Stack is set to Main. -;* <<< Use Configuration Wizard in Context Menu >>> -;******************************************************************************* -;* -;* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -;* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -;* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -;* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -;* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -;* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -;* 3. Neither the name of STMicroelectronics nor the names of its contributors -;* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software -;* without specific prior written permission. -;* -;* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" -;* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -;* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -;* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE -;* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL -;* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR -;* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER -;* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, -;* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE -;* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -;* -;******************************************************************************* -; -; Amount of memory (in bytes) allocated for Stack -; Tailor this value to your application needs -; Stack Configuration -; Stack Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Stack_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA STACK, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -Stack_Mem SPACE Stack_Size -__initial_sp - - -; Heap Configuration -; Heap Size (in Bytes) <0x0-0xFFFFFFFF:8> -; - -Heap_Size EQU 0x100 - - AREA HEAP, NOINIT, READWRITE, ALIGN=3 -__heap_base -Heap_Mem SPACE Heap_Size -__heap_limit - - PRESERVE8 - THUMB - - -; Vector Table Mapped to Address 0 at Reset - AREA RESET, DATA, READONLY - EXPORT __Vectors - EXPORT __Vectors_End - EXPORT __Vectors_Size - -__Vectors DCD __initial_sp ; Top of Stack - DCD Reset_Handler ; Reset Handler - DCD NMI_Handler ; NMI Handler - DCD HardFault_Handler ; Hard Fault Handler - DCD MemManage_Handler ; MPU Fault Handler - DCD BusFault_Handler ; Bus Fault Handler - DCD UsageFault_Handler ; Usage Fault Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SVC_Handler ; SVCall Handler - DCD DebugMon_Handler ; Debug Monitor Handler - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD PendSV_Handler ; PendSV Handler - DCD SysTick_Handler ; SysTick Handler - - ; External Interrupts - DCD WWDG_IRQHandler ; Window WatchDog - DCD PVD_PVM_IRQHandler ; PVD/PVM1/PVM2/PVM3/PVM4 through EXTI Line detection - DCD TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler ; Tamper and TimeStamps through the EXTI line - DCD RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler ; RTC Wakeup through the EXTI line - DCD FLASH_IRQHandler ; FLASH - DCD RCC_IRQHandler ; RCC - DCD EXTI0_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line0 - DCD EXTI1_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line1 - DCD EXTI2_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line2 - DCD EXTI3_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line3 - DCD EXTI4_IRQHandler ; EXTI Line4 - DCD DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 1 - DCD DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 2 - DCD DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 3 - DCD DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 4 - DCD DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 5 - DCD DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 6 - DCD DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA1 Channel 7 - DCD ADC1_IRQHandler ; ADC1 - DCD CAN1_TX_IRQHandler ; CAN1 TX - DCD CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX0 - DCD CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler ; CAN1 RX1 - DCD CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler ; CAN1 SCE - DCD EXTI9_5_IRQHandler ; External Line[9:5]s - DCD TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Break and TIM15 - DCD TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Update and TIM16 - DCD TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Trigger and Commutation - DCD TIM1_CC_IRQHandler ; TIM1 Capture Compare - DCD TIM2_IRQHandler ; TIM2 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD I2C1_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Event - DCD I2C1_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C1 Error - DCD I2C2_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Event - DCD I2C2_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C2 Error - DCD SPI1_IRQHandler ; SPI1 - DCD SPI2_IRQHandler ; SPI2 - DCD USART1_IRQHandler ; USART1 - DCD USART2_IRQHandler ; USART2 - DCD USART3_IRQHandler ; USART3 - DCD EXTI15_10_IRQHandler ; External Line[15:10] - DCD RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler ; RTC Alarm (A and B) through EXTI Line - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SDMMC1_IRQHandler ; SDMMC1 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SPI3_IRQHandler ; SPI3 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler ; TIM6 and DAC1&2 underrun errors - DCD TIM7_IRQHandler ; TIM7 - DCD DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 1 - DCD DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 2 - DCD DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 3 - DCD DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 4 - DCD DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 5 - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD COMP_IRQHandler ; COMP Interrupt - DCD LPTIM1_IRQHandler ; LP TIM1 interrupt - DCD LPTIM2_IRQHandler ; LP TIM2 interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 6 - DCD DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler ; DMA2 Channel 7 - DCD LPUART1_IRQHandler ; LP UART1 interrupt - DCD QUADSPI_IRQHandler ; Quad SPI global interrupt - DCD I2C3_EV_IRQHandler ; I2C3 event - DCD I2C3_ER_IRQHandler ; I2C3 error - DCD SAI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Audio Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD SWPMI1_IRQHandler ; Serial Wire Interface 1 global interrupt - DCD TSC_IRQHandler ; Touch Sense Controller global interrupt - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD 0 ; Reserved - DCD RNG_IRQHandler ; RNG global interrupt - DCD FPU_IRQHandler ; FPU - DCD CRS_IRQHandler ; CRS interrupt - -__Vectors_End - -__Vectors_Size EQU __Vectors_End - __Vectors - - AREA |.text|, CODE, READONLY - -; Reset handler -Reset_Handler PROC - EXPORT Reset_Handler [WEAK] - IMPORT SystemInit - IMPORT __main - - LDR R0, =SystemInit - BLX R0 - LDR R0, =__main - BX R0 - ENDP - -; Dummy Exception Handlers (infinite loops which can be modified) - -NMI_Handler PROC - EXPORT NMI_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -HardFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT HardFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -MemManage_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT MemManage_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -BusFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT BusFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -UsageFault_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT UsageFault_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SVC_Handler PROC - EXPORT SVC_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -DebugMon_Handler\ - PROC - EXPORT DebugMon_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -PendSV_Handler PROC - EXPORT PendSV_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP -SysTick_Handler PROC - EXPORT SysTick_Handler [WEAK] - B . - ENDP - -Default_Handler PROC - - EXPORT WWDG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT PVD_PVM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FLASH_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RCC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT ADC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_TX_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI9_5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM1_CC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C1_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C2_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT USART3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT EXTI15_10_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SDMMC1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SPI3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TIM7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT COMP_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPTIM2_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT LPUART1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT QUADSPI_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_EV_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT I2C3_ER_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SAI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT SWPMI1_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT TSC_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT RNG_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT FPU_IRQHandler [WEAK] - EXPORT CRS_IRQHandler [WEAK] - -WWDG_IRQHandler -PVD_PVM_IRQHandler -TAMP_STAMP_IRQHandler -RTC_WKUP_IRQHandler -FLASH_IRQHandler -RCC_IRQHandler -EXTI0_IRQHandler -EXTI1_IRQHandler -EXTI2_IRQHandler -EXTI3_IRQHandler -EXTI4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel5_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA1_Channel7_IRQHandler -ADC1_IRQHandler -CAN1_TX_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX0_IRQHandler -CAN1_RX1_IRQHandler -CAN1_SCE_IRQHandler -EXTI9_5_IRQHandler -TIM1_BRK_TIM15_IRQHandler -TIM1_UP_TIM16_IRQHandler -TIM1_TRG_COM_IRQHandler -TIM1_CC_IRQHandler -TIM2_IRQHandler -I2C1_EV_IRQHandler -I2C1_ER_IRQHandler -I2C2_EV_IRQHandler -I2C2_ER_IRQHandler -SPI1_IRQHandler -SPI2_IRQHandler -USART1_IRQHandler -USART2_IRQHandler -USART3_IRQHandler -EXTI15_10_IRQHandler -RTC_Alarm_IRQHandler -SDMMC1_IRQHandler -SPI3_IRQHandler -TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler -TIM7_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel1_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel3_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel4_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel5_IRQHandler -COMP_IRQHandler -LPTIM1_IRQHandler -LPTIM2_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel6_IRQHandler -DMA2_Channel7_IRQHandler -LPUART1_IRQHandler -QUADSPI_IRQHandler -I2C3_EV_IRQHandler -I2C3_ER_IRQHandler -SAI1_IRQHandler -SWPMI1_IRQHandler -TSC_IRQHandler -RNG_IRQHandler -FPU_IRQHandler -CRS_IRQHandler - - B . - - ENDP - - ALIGN - -;******************************************************************************* -; User Stack and Heap initialization -;******************************************************************************* - IF :DEF:__MICROLIB - - EXPORT __initial_sp - EXPORT __heap_base - EXPORT __heap_limit - - ELSE - - IMPORT __use_two_region_memory - EXPORT __user_initial_stackheap - -__user_initial_stackheap - - LDR R0, = Heap_Mem - LDR R1, =(Stack_Mem + Stack_Size) - LDR R2, = (Heap_Mem + Heap_Size) - LDR R3, = Stack_Mem - BX LR - - ALIGN - - ENDIF - - END - -;************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE***** diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 1fa3ac9d..c855fa72 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_application_download_through_qcould_firmware/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/DebugConfig/TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/DebugConfig/TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf deleted file mode 100644 index 713c198e..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/DebugConfig/TencentOS_tiny_STM32L431RCTx.dbgconf +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -// File: STM32L43x_44x_45x_46x.dbgconf -// Version: 1.0.0 -// Note: refer to STM32L43xxx STM32L44xxx STM32L45xxx STM32L46xxx Reference manual (RM0394) -// refer to STM32L431xx STM32L432xx STM32L433xx STM32L442xx STM32L443xx STM32L451xx STM32L452xx STM32L462xx datasheets - -// <<< Use Configuration Wizard in Context Menu >>> - -// Debug MCU configuration register (DBGMCU_CR) -// DBG_STANDBY Debug Standby mode -// DBG_STOP Debug Stop mode -// DBG_SLEEP Debug Sleep mode -// -DbgMCU_CR = 0x00000007; - -// Debug MCU APB1 freeze register1 (DBGMCU_APB1FZR1) -// Reserved bits must be kept at reset value -// DBG_LPTIM1_STOP LPTIM1 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_CAN1_STOP bxCAN1 stopped when core is halted -// DBG_I2C3_STOP I2C3 SMBUS timeout counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_I2C2_STOP I2C2 SMBUS timeout counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_I2C1_STOP I2C1 SMBUS timeout counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_IWDG_STOP Independent watchdog counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_WWDG_STOP Window watchdog counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_RTC_STOP RTC counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM7_STOP TIM7 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM6_STOP TIM6 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM2_STOP TIM2 counter stopped when core is halted -// -DbgMCU_APB1_Fz1 = 0x00000000; - -// Debug MCU APB1 freeze register 2 (DBGMCU_APB1FZR2) -// Reserved bits must be kept at reset value -// DBG_LPTIM2_STOP LPTIM2 counter stopped when core is halted -// -DbgMCU_APB1_Fz2 = 0x00000000; - -// Debug MCU APB2 freeze register (DBGMCU_APB2FZR) -// Reserved bits must be kept at reset value -// DBG_TIM16_STOP TIM16 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM15_STOP TIM15 counter stopped when core is halted -// DBG_TIM1_STOP TIM1 counter stopped when core is halted -// -DbgMCU_APB2_Fz = 0x00000000; - -// TPIU Pin Routing (TRACECLK fixed on Pin PE2) -// TRACECLK: Pin PE2 -// TRACED0 -// ETM Trace Data 0 -// <0x00040003=> Pin PE3 -// <0x00020001=> Pin PC1 -// TRACED1 -// ETM Trace Data 1 -// <0x00040004=> Pin PE4 -// <0x0002000A=> Pin PC10 -// TRACED2 -// ETM Trace Data 2 -// <0x00040005=> Pin PE5 -// <0x00030002=> Pin PD2 -// TRACED3 -// ETM Trace Data 3 -// <0x00040006=> Pin PE6 -// <0x0002000C=> Pin PC12 -// -TraceClk_Pin = 0x00040002; -TraceD0_Pin = 0x00040003; -TraceD1_Pin = 0x00040004; -TraceD2_Pin = 0x00040005; -TraceD3_Pin = 0x00040006; - -// <<< end of configuration section >>> diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h deleted file mode 100644 index 248f644f..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/RTE/_TencentOS_tiny/RTE_Components.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ - -/* - * Auto generated Run-Time-Environment Configuration File - * *** Do not modify ! *** - * - * Project: 'TencentOS_tiny' - * Target: 'TencentOS_tiny' - */ - -#ifndef RTE_COMPONENTS_H -#define RTE_COMPONENTS_H - - -/* - * Define the Device Header File: - */ -#define CMSIS_device_header "stm32l4xx.h" - - - -#endif /* RTE_COMPONENTS_H */ diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index e87b353d..4819a2d9 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/ota/ota_bootloader_recovery/MDK-ARM/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 75a80202..162255a4 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ examples - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ config - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 2b869d14..1fe302c6 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/posix/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.2.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -869,4 +870,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 904b3faf..4c5f93d0 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ examples - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 67c5ff64..a9302902 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/shell/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.2.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -819,4 +820,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 00a87e67..3a989118 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Application/User - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ examples - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ at - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ devices - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1213,8 +1213,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec200s\ec200s.c - ec200s.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\air724\air724.c + air724.c 0 0 @@ -1225,43 +1225,7 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20\ec20.c - ec20.c - 0 - 0 - - - 12 - 75 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\air724\air724.c - air724.c - 0 - 0 - - - 12 - 76 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\l610\l610.c - l610.c - 0 - 0 - - - 12 - 77 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec600s\ec600s.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c ec600s.c 0 0 @@ -1270,13 +1234,13 @@ sal_module_wrapper - 1 + 0 0 0 0 13 - 78 + 75 1 0 0 @@ -1296,7 +1260,7 @@ 0 14 - 79 + 76 1 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 064f8d58..d1f7aae9 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.3.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ USE_HAL_DRIVER,STM32L431xx,WITH_TOS_NET_ADAPTER - ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\BSP\Hardware\DHT11;..\..\BSP\Hardware\OLED;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266;..\..\..\..\net\at\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper;..\..\..\..\devices\ec20;..\..\..\..\devices\ec200s;..\..\..\..\devices\air724;..\..\..\..\devices\l610;..\..\..\..\devices\ec600s + ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32L4xx_HAL_Driver\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32L4xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\TOS-CONFIG;..\..\..\..\platform\arch\arm\cortex-m4\keil;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m4\armcc;..\..\BSP\Hardware\DHT11;..\..\BSP\Hardware\OLED;..\..\BSP\Hardware\BH1750;..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266;..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600;..\..\..\..\net\at\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper @@ -798,30 +798,15 @@ 1 ..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266\esp8266.c - - ec200s.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec200s\ec200s.c - - - ec20.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20\ec20.c - air724.c 1 ..\..\..\..\devices\air724\air724.c - - l610.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\l610\l610.c - ec600s.c 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec600s\ec600s.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index d28b34d5..bc782f56 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ socket_wrapper - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 43aeb255..e9cc01a5 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx index 2e7004e2..7b203899 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvoptx @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Application/User - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ examples - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ bsp_tickless - 1 + 0 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index a4217e29..73c05a86 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/tickless/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ TencentOS_tiny 0x4 ARM-ADS - 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::ARMCC + 5060750::V5.06 update 6 (build 750)::.\ARMCC 0 STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics - Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.2.0 - http://www.keil.com/pack + Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ 0 2 0 + 0 0 0 8 @@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ 0 0 0 - 0 + 4 @@ -839,4 +840,19 @@ + + + + <Project Info> + + + + + + 0 + 1 + + + + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/udp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/udp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx index 0083af20..521dfbbf 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/udp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/KEIL/udp_through_module/TencentOS_tiny.uvprojx @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ STM32L431RCTx STMicroelectronics Keil.STM32L4xx_DFP.2.4.0 - https://www.keil.com/pack/ + http://www.keil.com/pack/ IRAM(0x20000000-0x2000FFFF) IROM(0x8000000-0x803FFFF) CLOCK(8000000) FPU2 CPUTYPE("Cortex-M4") diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG/event_driven/tos_config.h b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG/event_driven/tos_config.h deleted file mode 100644 index 43493faf..00000000 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG/event_driven/tos_config.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _TOS_CONFIG_H_ -#define _TOS_CONFIG_H_ - -#include "stm32l4xx.h" - -#define TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN 1u - -#define TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_EN 1u - -#define TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 0x8000 - -#define TOS_CFG_PWR_MGR_EN 0u - -#define TOS_CFG_CPU_TICK_PER_SECOND 1000u - -#define TOS_CFG_CPU_CLOCK (SystemCoreClock) - -#endif - diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG/tos_config.h b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG/tos_config.h index f3fd4f22..1a0b744f 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG/tos_config.h +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/TOS-CONFIG/tos_config.h @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ #define TOS_CFG_SEM_EN 1u +#define TOS_CFG_BARRIER_EN 1u + #define TOS_CFG_TASK_STACK_DRAUGHT_DEPTH_DETACT_EN 1u #define TOS_CFG_FAULT_BACKTRACE_EN 0u diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx index c234afe2..88fcd744 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/hello_world/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Application/MDK-ARM - 0 + 1 0 0 0 @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Application/User/Core - 0 + 1 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx index 39901e8a..bd112ca2 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvoptx @@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ example - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ devices - 1 + 0 0 0 0 @@ -1494,8 +1494,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20\ec20.c - ec20.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266\esp8266.c + esp8266.c 0 0 @@ -1506,8 +1506,8 @@ 0 0 0 - ..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266\esp8266.c - esp8266.c + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c + ec600s.c 0 0 @@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ hal - 1 + 0 0 0 0 diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvprojx b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvprojx index b1df4b7c..5303e1eb 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvprojx +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750.uvprojx @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ USE_HAL_DRIVER,STM32H750xx - ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32H7xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32H7xx_HAL_Driver\Inc\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32H7xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m7\armcc;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\TOS_CONFIG;..\..\..\..\devices\ec20;..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266;..\..\..\..\net\at\include;..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common\log;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqtt;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqttclient;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\network;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\platform\TencentOS-tiny;..\..\..\..\components\utils\JSON\include + ..\..\BSP\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32H7xx_HAL_Driver\Inc;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\STM32H7xx_HAL_Driver\Inc\Legacy;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Device\ST\STM32H7xx\Include;..\..\..\..\platform\vendor_bsp\st\CMSIS\Include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\common\include;..\..\..\..\arch\arm\arm-v7m\cortex-m7\armcc;..\..\..\..\kernel\core\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\pm\include;..\..\..\..\kernel\hal\include;..\..\..\..\osal\cmsis_os;..\..\TOS_CONFIG;..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600;..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266;..\..\..\..\net\at\include;..\..\..\..\net\sal_module_wrapper;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\common\log;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqtt;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\mqttclient;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\network;..\..\..\..\components\connectivity\mqttclient\platform\TencentOS-tiny;..\..\..\..\components\utils\JSON\include @@ -933,16 +933,16 @@ devices - - ec20.c - 1 - ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20\ec20.c - esp8266.c 1 ..\..\..\..\devices\esp8266\esp8266.c + + ec600s.c + 1 + ..\..\..\..\devices\ec20_200_600\ec600s.c + diff --git a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c index 30fbd63b..029f1a56 100644 --- a/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c +++ b/board/TencentOS_tiny_STM32H750/KEIL/mqtt_client_iot_exporer/demo/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c @@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ #if defined(USE_ESP8266) #include "esp8266.h" -#elif defined(USE_EC20) -#include "ec20.h" +#elif defined(USE_EC600S) +#include "ec600.h" #endif #ifdef USE_ESP8266 @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ void mqttclient_task(void) #endif -#ifdef USE_EC20 - ec20_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_6); +#ifdef USE_EC600S + ec600s_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); #endif mqtt_log_init(); diff --git a/components/fs/kv/tos_kv.c b/components/fs/kv/tos_kv.c index 77c6a215..b4de95af 100644 --- a/components/fs/kv/tos_kv.c +++ b/components/fs/kv/tos_kv.c @@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ __STATIC__ int kv_mgr_ctl_build(void) if (KV_BLK_IS_GC_DST_NOT_DONE(&blk_hdr)) { gc_dst_not_done_blk.blks[gc_dst_not_done_blk.nr++] = cur_blk; - continue + continue; } // do index building diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/.gitignore b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf67d02e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Makefile +*.sln +*.vcxproj +mbedtls/check_config diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/CMakeLists.txt b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e693bc17 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +option(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS "Install mbed TLS headers." ON) + +if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + + file(GLOB headers "mbedtls/*.h") + file(GLOB psa_headers "psa/*.h") + + install(FILES ${headers} + DESTINATION include/mbedtls + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) + + install(FILES ${psa_headers} + DESTINATION include/psa + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) + +endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + +# Make mbedtls_config.h available in an out-of-source build. ssl-opt.sh requires it. +if (ENABLE_TESTING AND NOT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} STREQUAL ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + link_to_source(mbedtls) + link_to_source(psa) +endif() diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/README.txt b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/README.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e5a243f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/README.txt @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +This directory contains example configuration files. + +The examples are generally focused on a particular usage case (eg, support for +a restricted number of ciphersuites) and aim at minimizing resource usage for +this target. They can be used as a basis for custom configurations. + +These files are complete replacements for the default mbedtls_config.h. To use one of +them, you can pick one of the following methods: + +1. Replace the default file include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h with the chosen one. + +2. Define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and adjust the include path accordingly. + For example, using make: + + CFLAGS="-I$PWD/configs -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=''" make + + Or, using cmake: + + find . -iname '*cmake*' -not -name CMakeLists.txt -exec rm -rf {} + + CFLAGS="-I$PWD/configs -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=''" cmake . + make + +Note that the second method also works if you want to keep your custom +configuration file outside the mbed TLS tree. diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..51bb9629 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/** + * \file config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration for TLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration for TLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites + * Distinguishing features: + * - no bignum, no PK, no X509 + * - fully modern and secure (provided the pre-shared keys have high entropy) + * - very low record overhead with CCM-8 + * - optimized for low RAM usage + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +/* System support */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME /* Optionally used in Hello messages */ +/* Other MBEDTLS_HAVE_XXX flags irrelevant for this configuration */ + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * A future version of the library will have this option disabled + * by default. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/* Save some RAM by adjusting to your exact needs */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 16 /* 128-bits keys are generally enough */ + +/* + * You should adjust this to the exact number of sources you're using: default + * is the "platform_entropy_poll" source, but you may want to add other ones + * Minimum is 2 for the entropy test suite. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 2 + +/* + * Use only CCM_8 ciphersuites, and + * save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + +/* + * Save RAM at the expense of interoperability: do this only if you control + * both ends of the connection! (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".) + * The optimal size here depends on the typical size of records. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 1024 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 1024 diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-no-entropy.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-no-entropy.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..edba4a07 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-no-entropy.h @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/** + * \file config-no-entropy.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration of features that do not require an entropy source + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration of features that do not require an entropy source + * Distinguishing reatures: + * - no entropy module + * - no TLS protocol implementation available due to absence of an entropy + * source + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +/* System support */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * A future version of the library will have this option disabled + * by default. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + +/* Miscellaneous options */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-suite-b.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-suite-b.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c70773d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-suite-b.h @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/** + * \file config-suite-b.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration for TLS NSA Suite B Profile (RFC 6460) + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration for TLS NSA Suite B Profile (RFC 6460) + * + * Distinguishing features: + * - no RSA or classic DH, fully based on ECC + * - optimized for low RAM usage + * + * Possible improvements: + * - if 128-bit security is enough, disable secp384r1 and SHA-512 + * - use embedded certs in DER format and disable PEM_PARSE_C and BASE64_C + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +/* System support */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * A future version of the library will have this option disabled + * by default. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/* For test certificates */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/* Save RAM by adjusting to our exact needs */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 48 // 384-bit EC curve = 48 bytes + +/* Save RAM at the expense of speed, see ecp.h */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 2 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 0 + +/* Significant speed benefit at the expense of some ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/* + * You should adjust this to the exact number of sources you're using: default + * is the "mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll" source, but you may want to add other ones. + * Minimum is 2 for the entropy test suite. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 2 + +/* Save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +/* + * Save RAM at the expense of interoperability: do this only if you control + * both ends of the connection! (See coments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".) + * The minimum size here depends on the certificate chain used as well as the + * typical size of records. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 1024 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 1024 diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-symmetric-only.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-symmetric-only.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6aff42f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-symmetric-only.h @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/** + * \file config-symmetric-only.h + * + * \brief Configuration without any asymmetric cryptography. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* System support */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + +/* Mbed Crypto feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY +#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/* Mbed Crypto modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * A future version of the library will have this option disabled + * by default. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-thread.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-thread.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be889a18 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/configs/config-thread.h @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/** + * \file config-thread.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration for using TLS as part of Thread + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Minimal configuration for using TLS a part of Thread + * http://threadgroup.org/ + * + * Distinguishing features: + * - no RSA or classic DH, fully based on ECC + * - no X.509 + * - support for experimental EC J-PAKE key exchange + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +/* System support */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * A future version of the library will have this option disabled + * by default. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/* For tests using ssl-opt.sh */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/* Save RAM by adjusting to our exact needs */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 32 // 256-bit EC curve = 32 bytes + +/* Save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aes.h index 4c8dab31..00509808 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aes.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aes.h @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ * . */ -/* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved. +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -34,18 +35,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_H #define MBEDTLS_AES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -60,8 +56,6 @@ /* Error codes in range 0x0021-0x0025 */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021 /**< Invalid input data. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0023 /**< Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0025 /**< AES hardware accelerator failed. */ #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) @@ -81,9 +75,9 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context { - int nr; /*!< The number of rounds. */ - uint32_t *rk; /*!< AES round keys. */ - uint32_t buf[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds. */ + uint32_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk); /*!< AES round keys. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for one of the following purposes:
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is @@ -100,9 +94,9 @@ mbedtls_aes_context; */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context { - mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crypt); /*!< The AES context to use for AES block encryption or decryption. */ - mbedtls_aes_context tweak; /*!< The AES context used for tweak + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tweak); /*!< The AES context used for tweak computation. */ } mbedtls_aes_xts_context; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ @@ -117,7 +111,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * - * \param ctx The AES context to initialize. + * \param ctx The AES context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); @@ -125,6 +119,8 @@ void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES context. * * \param ctx The AES context to clear. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. */ void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); @@ -135,7 +131,7 @@ void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * - * \param ctx The AES XTS context to initialize. + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); @@ -143,6 +139,8 @@ void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES XTS context. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to clear. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. */ void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ @@ -151,7 +149,9 @@ void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); * \brief This function sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. * \param key The encryption key. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of data passed in bits. Valid options are: *
    • 128 bits
      • *
    • 192 bits
      • @@ -167,7 +167,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. * \param key The decryption key. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: *
      • 128 bits
        • *
      • 192 bits
        • @@ -185,8 +187,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, * sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. * \param key The encryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 * concatenated with the XTS key2. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: *
        • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
          • *
        • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
        @@ -203,8 +207,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, * sets the decryption key. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. * \param key The decryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 * concatenated with the XTS key2. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: *
        • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
          • *
        • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
        @@ -230,10 +236,13 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, * call to this API with the same context. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. - * \param input The 16-Byte buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The 16-Byte buffer holding the output data. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. + * \param output The buffer where the output data will be written. + * It must be writeable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. * \return \c 0 on success. */ @@ -256,8 +265,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called * before the first call to this API with the same context. * - * \note This function operates on aligned blocks, that is, the input size - * must be a multiple of the AES block size of 16 Bytes. + * \note This function operates on full blocks, that is, the input size + * must be a multiple of the AES block size of \c 16 Bytes. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the same function again on the next @@ -268,13 +277,17 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a - * multiple of the block size (16 Bytes). + * multiple of the block size (\c 16 Bytes). * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH @@ -302,9 +315,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to use for AES XTS operations. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. - * \param length The length of a data unit in bytes. This can be any + * \param length The length of a data unit in Bytes. This can be any * length between 16 bytes and 2^24 bytes inclusive * (between 1 and 2^20 block cipher blocks). * \param data_unit The address of the data unit encoded as an array of 16 @@ -312,15 +326,15 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * is typically the index of the block device sector that * contains the data. * \param input The buffer holding the input data (which is an entire - * data unit). This function reads \p length bytes from \p + * data unit). This function reads \p length Bytes from \p * input. * \param output The buffer holding the output data (which is an entire - * data unit). This function writes \p length bytes to \p + * data unit). This function writes \p length Bytes to \p * output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if \p length is - * smaller than an AES block in size (16 bytes) or if \p + * smaller than an AES block in size (16 Bytes) or if \p * length is larger than 2^20 blocks (16 MiB). */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, @@ -356,13 +370,18 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, * * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. - * \param length The length of the input data. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ @@ -397,12 +416,16 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT * \param length The length of the input data. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ @@ -447,11 +470,16 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * will compromise security. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data. * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ @@ -523,15 +551,21 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data. * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block, for * resuming within the current cipher stream. The * offset pointer should be 0 at the start of a stream. + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. + * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This is * overwritten by the function. + * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ @@ -574,43 +608,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function - * without return value. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_aes_encrypt_ext() in 2.5.0. - * - * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. - * \param input Plaintext block. - * \param output Output (ciphertext) block. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ); - -/** - * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function - * without return value. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_aes_decrypt_ext() in 2.5.0. - * - * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. - * \param input Ciphertext block. - * \param output Output (plaintext) block. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine. * @@ -619,6 +617,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/arc4.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/arc4.h deleted file mode 100644 index 83a7461f..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/arc4.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,141 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file arc4.h - * - * \brief The ARCFOUR stream cipher - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARC4_H -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0019 /**< ARC4 hardware accelerator failed. */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief ARC4 context structure - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_arc4_context -{ - int x; /*!< permutation index */ - int y; /*!< permutation index */ - unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ -} -mbedtls_arc4_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ -#include "arc4_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize ARC4 context - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Clear ARC4 context - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be cleared - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief ARC4 key schedule - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be setup - * \param key the secret key - * \param keylen length of the key, in bytes - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen ); - -/** - * \brief ARC4 cipher function - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context - * \param length length of the input data - * \param input buffer holding the input data - * \param output buffer for the output data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ); - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose ); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* arc4.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aria.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aria.h index 4a79c138..08547068 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aria.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aria.h @@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ * Korean, but see http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/index-e.html in English) * and also described by the IETF in RFC 5794. */ -/* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -23,22 +24,19 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ARIA_H #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT 1 /**< ARIA encryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT 0 /**< ARIA decryption. */ @@ -46,27 +44,26 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS 16 /**< Maxiumum number of rounds in ARIA. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x005C /**< Invalid key length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E /**< Invalid data input length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x005A /**< Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0058 /**< ARIA hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x005C /**< Bad input data. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E /**< Invalid data input length. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + /** * \brief The ARIA context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context { - unsigned char nr; /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ /*! The ARIA round keys. */ - uint32_t rk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; } mbedtls_aria_context; @@ -80,14 +77,16 @@ mbedtls_aria_context; * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * - * \param ctx The ARIA context to initialize. + * \param ctx The ARIA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_aria_init( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified ARIA context. * - * \param ctx The ARIA context to clear. + * \param ctx The ARIA context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized ARIA context. */ void mbedtls_aria_free( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); @@ -95,14 +94,16 @@ void mbedtls_aria_free( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); * \brief This function sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. - * \param key The encryption key. - * \param keybits The size of data passed in bits. Valid options are: + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The size of \p key in Bits. Valid options are: *
        • 128 bits
          • *
        • 192 bits
          • *
        • 256 bits
        * - * \return \c 0 on success or #MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH - * on failure. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, @@ -112,13 +113,16 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. - * \param key The decryption key. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: *
        • 128 bits
          • *
        • 192 bits
          • *
        • 256 bits
        * - * \return \c 0 on success, or #MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, @@ -137,10 +141,12 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, * call to this API with the same context. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param input The 16-Byte buffer holding the input data. * \param output The 16-Byte buffer holding the output data. * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], @@ -172,16 +178,21 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, * * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. - * \param mode The ARIA operation: #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT or - * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a * multiple of the block size (16 Bytes). * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * - * \return \c 0 on success, or #MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH - * on failure. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int mode, @@ -216,15 +227,22 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, * * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. - * \param mode The ARIA operation: #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT or - * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT. - * \param length The length of the input data. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * This must not be larger than 15. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int mode, @@ -294,17 +312,24 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. - * \param length The length of the input data. - * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block, for - * resuming within the current cipher stream. The - * offset pointer should be 0 at the start of a stream. - * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. - * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This is - * overwritten by the function. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param nc_off The offset in Bytes in the current \p stream_block, + * for resuming within the current cipher stream. The + * offset pointer should be \c 0 at the start of a + * stream. This must not be larger than \c 15 Bytes. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must point to + * a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This must + * point to a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. + * This is overwritten by the function. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * - * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, size_t length, diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1.h index 96c1c9a8..46685810 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Generic ASN.1 parsing */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,22 +18,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -#include "bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #endif /** @@ -52,7 +47,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -0x0062 /**< ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -0x0064 /**< Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -0x0066 /**< Actual length differs from expected length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -0x0068 /**< Data is invalid. (not used) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -0x0068 /**< Data is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -0x006A /**< Memory allocation failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x006C /**< Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure. */ @@ -75,6 +70,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL 0x05 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID 0x06 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED 0x0A #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING 0x0C #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET 0x11 @@ -89,6 +85,18 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80 +/* Slightly smaller way to check if tag is a string tag + * compared to canonical implementation. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG( tag ) \ + ( ( tag ) < 32u && ( \ + ( ( 1u << ( tag ) ) & ( ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) ) != 0 ) ) + /* * Bit masks for each of the components of an ASN.1 tag as specified in * ITU X.690 (08/2015), section 8.1 "General rules for encoding", @@ -119,6 +127,10 @@ ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf)->len ) || \ memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) != 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(oid_str, oid_buf, oid_buf_len) \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf_len) ) || \ + memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf), (oid_buf_len) ) != 0 ) + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -133,9 +145,9 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_buf { - int tag; /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */ - size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ - unsigned char *p; /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag); /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p); /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */ } mbedtls_asn1_buf; @@ -144,9 +156,9 @@ mbedtls_asn1_buf; */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_bitstring { - size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ - unsigned char unused_bits; /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */ - unsigned char *p; /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unused_bits); /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p); /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */ } mbedtls_asn1_bitstring; @@ -155,8 +167,8 @@ mbedtls_asn1_bitstring; */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence { - mbedtls_asn1_buf buf; /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */ - struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ + mbedtls_asn1_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf); /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ } mbedtls_asn1_sequence; @@ -165,10 +177,10 @@ mbedtls_asn1_sequence; */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data { - mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ - mbedtls_asn1_buf val; /**< The named value. */ - struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ - unsigned char next_merged; /**< Merge next item into the current one? */ + mbedtls_asn1_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(oid); /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_asn1_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(val); /**< The named value. */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged); /**< Merge next item into the current one? */ } mbedtls_asn1_named_data; @@ -176,119 +188,342 @@ mbedtls_asn1_named_data; * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param len The variable that will receive the value + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the first byte of the length, + * i.e. immediately after the tag. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length + * read from the ASN.1 input. * - * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA on reaching - * end of data, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if length is - * unparseable. + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element + * would end beyond \p end. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparseable. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *len ); + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ); /** - * \brief Get the tag and length of the tag. Check for the requested tag. + * \brief Get the tag and length of the element. + * Check for the requested tag. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the tag and length. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param len The variable that will receive the length - * \param tag The expected tag + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length + * read from the ASN.1 input. + * \param tag The expected tag. * - * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if tag did - * not match requested tag, or another specific ASN.1 error code. + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the data does not start + * with the requested tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element + * would end beyond \p end. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparseable. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *len, int tag ); + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len, int tag ); /** * \brief Retrieve a boolean ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param val The variable that will receive the value + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value (\c 0 or \c 1). * - * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 error code. + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BOOLEAN. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - int *val ); + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); /** * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param val The variable that will receive the value + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value. * - * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 error code. + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - int *val ); + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an enumerated ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 ENUMERATED. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); /** * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param bs The variable that will receive the value + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param bs On success, ::mbedtls_asn1_bitstring information about + * the parsed value. * - * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 error code. + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains + * extra data after a valid BIT STRING. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs); + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs ); /** * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag without unused bits and its * value. * Updates the pointer to the beginning of the bit/octet string. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param len Length of the actual bit/octect string in bytes + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * of the content of the BIT STRING. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On success, \c *len is the length of the content in bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 error code. + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input starts with + * a valid BIT STRING with a nonzero number of unused bits. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - size_t *len ); +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ); /** - * \brief Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " - * Updated the pointer to immediately behind the full sequence tag. + * \brief Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF ". + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full sequence tag. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param cur First variable in the chain to fill - * \param tag Type of sequence + * This function allocates memory for the sequence elements. You can free + * the allocated memory with mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(). * - * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 error code. + * \note On error, this function may return a partial list in \p cur. + * You must set `cur->next = NULL` before calling this function! + * Otherwise it is impossible to distinguish a previously non-null + * pointer from a pointer to an object allocated by this function. + * + * \note If the sequence is empty, this function does not modify + * \c *cur. If the sequence is valid and non-empty, this + * function sets `cur->buf.tag` to \p tag. This allows + * callers to distinguish between an empty sequence and + * a one-element sequence. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param cur A ::mbedtls_asn1_sequence which this function fills. + * When this function returns, \c *cur is the head of a linked + * list. Each node in this list is allocated with + * mbedtls_calloc() apart from \p cur itself, and should + * therefore be freed with mbedtls_free(). + * The list describes the content of the sequence. + * The head of the list (i.e. \c *cur itself) describes the + * first element, `*cur->next` describes the second element, etc. + * For each element, `buf.tag == tag`, `buf.len` is the length + * of the content of the content of the element, and `buf.p` + * points to the first byte of the content (i.e. immediately + * past the length of the element). + * Note that list elements may be allocated even on error. + * \param tag Each element of the sequence must have this tag. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains + * extra data after a valid SEQUENCE OF \p tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts with + * an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag that + * is different from \p tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, - int tag); + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, + int tag ); +/** + * \brief Free a heap-allocated linked list presentation of + * an ASN.1 sequence, including the first element. + * + * There are two common ways to manage the memory used for the representation + * of a parsed ASN.1 sequence: + * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` with mbedtls_calloc(). + * Pass this node as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). + * When you have finished processing the sequence, + * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head`. + * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` in any manner, + * for example on the stack. Make sure that `head->next == NULL`. + * Pass `head` as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). + * When you have finished processing the sequence, + * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head->cur`, + * then free `head` itself in the appropriate manner. + * + * \param seq The address of the first sequence component. This may + * be \c NULL, in which case this functions returns + * immediately. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ); + +/** + * \brief Traverse an ASN.1 SEQUENCE container and + * call a callback for each entry. + * + * This function checks that the input is a SEQUENCE of elements that + * each have a "must" tag, and calls a callback function on the elements + * that have a "may" tag. + * + * For example, to validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of `tag1` and call + * `cb` on each element, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xff, tag1, 0, 0, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of ANY and call `cb` on + * each element, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0, 0, 0, 0, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of CHOICE {NULL, OCTET STRING} + * and call `cb` on each element that is an OCTET STRING, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xfe, 0x04, 0xff, 0x04, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * The callback is called on the elements with a "may" tag from left to + * right. If the input is not a valid SEQUENCE of elements with a "must" tag, + * the callback is called on the elements up to the leftmost point where + * the input is invalid. + * + * \warning This function is still experimental and may change + * at any time. + * + * \param p The address of the pointer to the beginning of + * the ASN.1 SEQUENCE header. This is updated to + * point to the end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container + * on a successful invocation. + * \param end The end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container. + * \param tag_must_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within + * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_must_value. + * \param tag_must_val The required value of each ASN.1 tag found in the + * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_must_mask. + * Mismatching tags lead to an error. + * For example, a value of \c 0 for both \p tag_must_mask + * and \p tag_must_val means that every tag is allowed, + * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_must_mask means + * that \p tag_must_val is the only allowed tag. + * \param tag_may_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within + * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_may_value. + * \param tag_may_val The desired value of each ASN.1 tag found in the + * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_may_mask. + * Mismatching tags will be silently ignored. + * For example, a value of \c 0 for \p tag_may_mask and + * \p tag_may_val means that any tag will be considered, + * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_may_mask means + * that all tags with value different from \p tag_may_val + * will be ignored. + * \param cb The callback to trigger for each component + * in the ASN.1 SEQUENCE that matches \p tag_may_val. + * The callback function is called with the following + * parameters: + * - \p ctx. + * - The tag of the current element. + * - A pointer to the start of the current element's + * content inside the input. + * - The length of the content of the current element. + * If the callback returns a non-zero value, + * the function stops immediately, + * forwarding the callback's return value. + * \param ctx The context to be passed to the callback \p cb. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful the entire ASN.1 SEQUENCE + * was traversed without parsing or callback errors. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input + * contains extra data after a valid SEQUENCE + * of elements with an accepted tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts + * with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag + * that is not accepted. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. + * \return A non-zero error code forwarded from the callback + * \p cb in case the latter returns a non-zero value. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char* start, size_t len ), + void *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) /** - * \brief Retrieve a MPI value from an integer ASN.1 tag. + * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param X The MPI that will receive the value + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param X On success, the parsed value. * - * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + * \return An MPI error code if the parsed value is too large. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_mpi *X ); + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ /** @@ -296,10 +531,14 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full * AlgorithmIdentifier. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID - * \param params The buffer to receive the params (if any) + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. + * \param params The buffer to receive the parameters. + * This is zeroized if there are no parameters. * * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. */ @@ -313,9 +552,12 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full * AlgorithmIdentifier. * - * \param p The position in the ASN.1 data - * \param end End of data - * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. * * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. */ @@ -333,21 +575,25 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, * * \return NULL if not found, or a pointer to the existing entry. */ -mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, +const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, const char *oid, size_t len ); /** * \brief Free a mbedtls_asn1_named_data entry * - * \param entry The named data entry to free + * \param entry The named data entry to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_free() on + * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p`. */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry ); /** - * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list - * Head will be set to NULL + * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list. * - * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free + * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data() and + * mbedtls_free() on each list element and + * sets \c *head to \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h index f76fc807..d60ca0da 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief ASN.1 buffer writing functionality */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,199 +18,320 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H -#include "asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) do { if( ( ret = f ) < 0 ) return( ret ); else \ - g += ret; } while( 0 ) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = (f) ) < 0 ) \ + return( ret ); \ + else \ + (g) += ret; \ + } while( 0 ) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** - * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param len the length to write + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param len The length value to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + size_t len ); +/** + * \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param tag The tag to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + unsigned char tag ); /** - * \brief Write a ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write raw buffer data. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param tag the tag to write + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The data buffer to write. + * \param size The length of the data buffer. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - unsigned char tag ); - -/** - * \brief Write raw buffer data - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer - * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param buf data buffer to write - * \param size length of the data buffer - * - * \return the length written or a negative error code - */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) /** - * \brief Write a big number (MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write a arbitrary-precision number (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) + * in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param X the MPI to write + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param X The MPI to write. + * It must be non-negative. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_mpi *X ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ /** - * \brief Write a NULL tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write a NULL tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data + * in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start ); /** - * \brief Write an OID tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data + * in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param oid the OID to write - * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param oid The OID to write. + * \param oid_len The length of the OID. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *oid, size_t oid_len ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len ); /** - * \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param oid the OID of the algorithm - * \param oid_len length of the OID - * \param par_len length of parameters, which must be already written. + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param oid The OID of the algorithm to write. + * \param oid_len The length of the algorithm's OID. + * \param par_len The length of the parameters, which must be already written. * If 0, NULL parameters are added * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - size_t par_len ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + size_t par_len ); /** - * \brief Write a boolean tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write a boolean tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value + * in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param boolean 0 or 1 + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param boolean The boolean value to write, either \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + int boolean ); /** - * \brief Write an int tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write an int tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value + * in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param val the integer value + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param val The integer value to write. + * It must be non-negative. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val ); /** - * \brief Write a printable string tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) and - * value in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write an enum tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED) and value + * in ASN.1 format. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param text the text to write - * \param text_len length of the text + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param val The integer value to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *text, size_t text_len ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val ); /** - * \brief Write an IA5 string tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING) and - * value in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific + * string encoding tag. + + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param text the text to write - * \param text_len length of the text + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param tag The string encoding tag to write, e.g. + * #MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *text, size_t text_len ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + int tag, const char *text, + size_t text_len ); /** - * \brief Write a bitstring tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and - * value in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the PrintableString + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING). * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param buf the bitstring - * \param bits the total number of bits in the bitstring + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); /** - * \brief Write an octet string tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) and - * value in ASN.1 format - * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * \brief Write a UTF8 string in ASN.1 format using the UTF8String + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING). * - * \param p reference to current position pointer - * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param buf data buffer to write - * \param size length of the data buffer + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * - * \return the length written or a negative error code + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the IA5String + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING). + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a bitstring tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and + * value in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The bitstring to write. + * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ); + +/** + * \brief This function writes a named bitstring tag + * (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and value in ASN.1 format. + * + * As stated in RFC 5280 Appendix B, trailing zeroes are + * omitted when encoding named bitstrings in DER. + * + * \note This function works backwards within the data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer which is used for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The bitstring to write. + * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits ); + +/** + * \brief Write an octet string tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) + * and value in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The buffer holding the data to write. + * \param size The length of the data buffer \p buf. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); /** * \brief Create or find a specific named_data entry for writing in a @@ -218,15 +339,20 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * a new entry is added to the head of the list. * Warning: Destructive behaviour for the val data! * - * \param list Pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek - * through (will be updated in case of a new entry) - * \param oid The OID to look for - * \param oid_len Size of the OID - * \param val Data to store (can be NULL if you want to fill it by hand) - * \param val_len Minimum length of the data buffer needed + * \param list The pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek + * through (will be updated in case of a new entry). + * \param oid The OID to look for. + * \param oid_len The size of the OID. + * \param val The associated data to store. If this is \c NULL, + * no data is copied to the new or existing buffer. + * \param val_len The minimum length of the data buffer needed. + * If this is 0, do not allocate a buffer for the associated + * data. + * If the OID was already present, enlarge, shrink or free + * the existing buffer to fit \p val_len. * - * \return NULL if if there was a memory allocation error, or a pointer - * to the new / existing entry. + * \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success. + * \return \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error. */ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/base64.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/base64.h index 7a64f521..e3938b40 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/base64.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/base64.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x002A /**< Output buffer too small. */ @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * @@ -82,6 +83,8 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, */ int mbedtls_base64_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bignum.h index 732ecbef..5187d866 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bignum.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bignum.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Multi-precision integer library */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,17 +18,12 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -46,7 +41,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -0x000E /**< The input arguments are not acceptable. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0010 /**< Memory allocation failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f) do { if( ( ret = f ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = (f) ) != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) /* * Maximum size MPIs are allowed to grow to in number of limbs. @@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 6 * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6. * - * Result is an array of ( 2 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used + * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used * for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default) * * Reduction in size, reduces speed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum windows size used. */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) @@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ defined(__ia64__) || defined(__alpha__) || \ ( defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__) ) || \ - defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) ) + defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) || \ + defined(__aarch64__) ) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ @@ -179,103 +180,122 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_mpi { - int s; /*!< integer sign */ - size_t n; /*!< total # of limbs */ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; /*!< pointer to limbs */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); /*!< Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(n); /*!< total # of limbs */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p); /*!< pointer to limbs */ } mbedtls_mpi; /** - * \brief Initialize one MPI (make internal references valid) - * This just makes it ready to be set or freed, + * \brief Initialize an MPI context. + * + * This makes the MPI ready to be set or freed, * but does not define a value for the MPI. * - * \param X One MPI to initialize. + * \param X The MPI context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** - * \brief Unallocate one MPI + * \brief This function frees the components of an MPI context. * - * \param X One MPI to unallocate. + * \param X The MPI context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is + * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized MPI. */ void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** - * \brief Enlarge to the specified number of limbs + * \brief Enlarge an MPI to the specified number of limbs. * - * This function does nothing if the MPI is already large enough. + * \note This function does nothing if the MPI is + * already large enough. * - * \param X MPI to grow - * \param nblimbs The target number of limbs + * \param X The MPI to grow. It must be initialized. + * \param nblimbs The target number of limbs. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); /** - * \brief Resize down, keeping at least the specified number of limbs + * \brief This function resizes an MPI downwards, keeping at least the + * specified number of limbs. * * If \c X is smaller than \c nblimbs, it is resized up * instead. * - * \param X MPI to shrink - * \param nblimbs The minimum number of limbs to keep + * \param X The MPI to shrink. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param nblimbs The minimum number of limbs to keep. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed * (this can only happen when resizing up). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); /** - * \brief Copy the contents of Y into X + * \brief Make a copy of an MPI. * - * \param X Destination MPI. It is enlarged if necessary. - * \param Y Source MPI. + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \note The limb-buffer in the destination MPI is enlarged + * if necessary to hold the value in the source MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** - * \brief Swap the contents of X and Y + * \brief Swap the contents of two MPIs. * - * \param X First MPI value - * \param Y Second MPI value + * \param X The first MPI. It must be initialized. + * \param Y The second MPI. It must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** - * \brief Safe conditional assignement X = Y if assign is 1 + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of MPI which doesn't + * reveal whether the condition was true or not. * - * \param X MPI to conditionally assign to - * \param Y Value to be assigned - * \param assign 1: perform the assignment, 0: keep X's original value - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, + * \param X The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Possible values: + * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = Y`. + * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X. * * \note This function is equivalent to - * if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, Y ); + * `if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, Y );` * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak * information through branch prediction and/or memory access * patterns analysis). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ); /** - * \brief Safe conditional swap X <-> Y if swap is 1 + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap which doesn't + * reveal whether the condition was true or not. * - * \param X First mbedtls_mpi value - * \param Y Second mbedtls_mpi value - * \param assign 1: perform the swap, 0: keep X and Y's original values - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, + * \param X The first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param Y The second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. Possible values: + * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y. + * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y. * * \note This function is equivalent to * if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_swap( X, Y ); @@ -283,415 +303,564 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak * information through branch prediction and/or memory access * patterns analysis). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + * */ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ); /** - * \brief Set value from integer + * \brief Store integer value in MPI. * - * \param X MPI to set - * \param z Value to use + * \param X The MPI to set. This must be initialized. + * \param z The value to use. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); /** - * \brief Get a specific bit from X + * \brief Get a specific bit from an MPI. * - * \param X MPI to use - * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit in X + * \param X The MPI to query. This must be initialized. + * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to query. * - * \return Either a 0 or a 1 + * \return \c 0 or \c 1 on success, depending on whether bit \c pos + * of \c X is unset or set. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ); /** - * \brief Set a bit of X to a specific value of 0 or 1 + * \brief Modify a specific bit in an MPI. * - * \note Will grow X if necessary to set a bit to 1 in a not yet - * existing limb. Will not grow if bit should be set to 0 + * \note This function will grow the target MPI if necessary to set a + * bit to \c 1 in a not yet existing limb. It will not grow if + * the bit should be set to \c 0. * - * \param X MPI to use - * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit in X - * \param val The value to set the bit to (0 or 1) + * \param X The MPI to modify. This must be initialized. + * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to modify. + * \param val The desired value of bit \c pos: \c 0 or \c 1. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if val is not 0 or 1 + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ); /** - * \brief Return the number of zero-bits before the least significant - * '1' bit + * \brief Return the number of bits of value \c 0 before the + * least significant bit of value \c 1. * - * Note: Thus also the zero-based index of the least significant '1' bit + * \note This is the same as the zero-based index of + * the least significant bit of value \c 1. * - * \param X MPI to use + * \param X The MPI to query. + * + * \return The number of bits of value \c 0 before the least significant + * bit of value \c 1 in \p X. */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** * \brief Return the number of bits up to and including the most - * significant '1' bit' + * significant bit of value \c 1. * - * Note: Thus also the one-based index of the most significant '1' bit + * * \note This is same as the one-based index of the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. * - * \param X MPI to use + * \param X The MPI to query. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return The number of bits up to and including the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** - * \brief Return the total size in bytes + * \brief Return the total size of an MPI value in bytes. * - * \param X MPI to use + * \param X The MPI to use. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \note The value returned by this function may be less than + * the number of bytes used to store \p X internally. + * This happens if and only if there are trailing bytes + * of value zero. + * + * \return The least number of bytes capable of storing + * the absolute value of \p X. */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** - * \brief Import from an ASCII string + * \brief Import an MPI from an ASCII string. * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param radix Input numeric base - * \param s Null-terminated string buffer + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the input string. + * \param s Null-terminated string buffer. * - * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ); /** - * \brief Export into an ASCII string + * \brief Export an MPI to an ASCII string. * - * \param X Source MPI - * \param radix Output numeric base - * \param buf Buffer to write the string to - * \param buflen Length of buf - * \param olen Length of the string written, including final NUL byte + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the output string. + * \param buf The buffer to write the string to. This must be writable + * buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The available size in Bytes of \p buf. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of the string + * written, including the final \c NULL byte. This must + * not be \c NULL. * - * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code. - * *olen is always updated to reflect the amount - * of data that has (or would have) been written. + * \note You can call this function with `buflen == 0` to obtain the + * minimum required buffer size in `*olen`. * - * \note Call this function with buflen = 0 to obtain the - * minimum required buffer size in *olen. + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer \p buf + * is too small to hold the value of \p X in the desired base. + * In this case, `*olen` is nonetheless updated to contain the + * size of \p buf required for a successful call. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** - * \brief Read MPI from a line in an opened file + * \brief Read an MPI from a line in an opened file. * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param radix Input numeric base - * \param fin Input file handle - * - * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if - * the file read buffer is too small or a - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the string representation used + * in the source line. + * \param fin The input file handle to use. This must not be \c NULL. * * \note On success, this function advances the file stream * to the end of the current line or to EOF. * - * The function returns 0 on an empty line. + * The function returns \c 0 on an empty line. * * Leading whitespaces are ignored, as is a - * '0x' prefix for radix 16. + * '0x' prefix for radix \c 16. * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the file read buffer + * is too small. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ); /** - * \brief Write X into an opened file, or stdout if fout is NULL + * \brief Export an MPI into an opened file. * - * \param p Prefix, can be NULL - * \param X Source MPI - * \param radix Output numeric base - * \param fout Output file handle (can be NULL) + * \param p A string prefix to emit prior to the MPI data. + * For example, this might be a label, or "0x" when + * printing in base \c 16. This may be \c NULL if no prefix + * is needed. + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base to be used in the emitted string. + * \param fout The output file handle. This may be \c NULL, in which case + * the output is written to \c stdout. * - * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code - * - * \note Set fout == NULL to print X on the console. + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ); +int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int radix, FILE *fout ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ /** - * \brief Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian + * \brief Import an MPI from unsigned big endian binary data. * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param buf Input buffer - * \param buflen Input buffer size + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian. * Always fills the whole buffer, which will start with zeros * if the number is smaller. * - * \param X Source MPI - * \param buf Output buffer - * \param buflen Output buffer size + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if buf isn't large enough + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p X. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); /** - * \brief Left-shift: X <<= count + * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian. + * Always fills the whole buffer, which will end with zeros + * if the number is smaller. * - * \param X MPI to shift - * \param count Amount to shift + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p X. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a left-shift on an MPI: X <<= count + * + * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); /** - * \brief Right-shift: X >>= count + * \brief Perform a right-shift on an MPI: X >>= count * - * \param X MPI to shift - * \param count Amount to shift + * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); /** - * \brief Compare unsigned values + * \brief Compare the absolute values of two MPIs. * - * \param X Left-hand MPI - * \param Y Right-hand MPI + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 1 if |X| is greater than |Y|, - * -1 if |X| is lesser than |Y| or - * 0 if |X| is equal to |Y| + * \return \c 1 if `|X|` is greater than `|Y|`. + * \return \c -1 if `|X|` is lesser than `|Y|`. + * \return \c 0 if `|X|` is equal to `|Y|`. */ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** - * \brief Compare signed values + * \brief Compare two MPIs. * - * \param X Left-hand MPI - * \param Y Right-hand MPI + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 1 if X is greater than Y, - * -1 if X is lesser than Y or - * 0 if X is equal to Y + * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p Y. + * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p Y. + * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p Y. */ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** - * \brief Compare signed values + * \brief Check if an MPI is less than the other in constant time. * - * \param X Left-hand MPI - * \param z The integer value to compare to + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI + * with the same allocated length as Y. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI + * with the same allocated length as X. + * \param ret The result of the comparison: + * \c 1 if \p X is less than \p Y. + * \c 0 if \p X is greater than or equal to \p Y. * - * \return 1 if X is greater than z, - * -1 if X is lesser than z or - * 0 if X is equal to z + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the allocated length of + * the two input MPIs is not the same. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret ); + +/** + * \brief Compare an MPI with an integer. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param z The integer value to compare \p X to. + * + * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p z. + * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p z. + * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p z. */ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); /** - * \brief Unsigned addition: X = |A| + |B| + * \brief Perform an unsigned addition of MPIs: X = |A| + |B| * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| + * \brief Perform an unsigned subtraction of MPIs: X = |A| - |B| * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is greater than \p A. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if B is greater than A */ -int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Signed addition: X = A + B + * \brief Perform a signed addition of MPIs: X = A + B * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Signed subtraction: X = A - B + * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of MPIs: X = A - B * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Signed addition: X = A + b + * \brief Perform a signed addition of an MPI and an integer: X = A + b * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param b The integer value to add + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The second summand. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); +int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** - * \brief Signed subtraction: X = A - b + * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of an MPI and an integer: + * X = A - b * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param b The integer value to subtract + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The subtrahend. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** - * \brief Baseline multiplication: X = A * B + * \brief Perform a multiplication of two MPIs: X = A * B * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Baseline multiplication: X = A * b + * \brief Perform a multiplication of an MPI with an unsigned integer: + * X = A * b * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param b The unsigned integer value to multiply with + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The second factor. * - * \note b is unsigned + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ); +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ); /** - * \brief Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R + * \brief Perform a division with remainder of two MPIs: + * A = Q * B + R * - * \param Q Destination MPI for the quotient - * \param R Destination MPI for the rest value - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * quotient is not needed. + * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * remainder is not needed. + * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param B The divisor. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if B == 0 - * - * \note Either Q or R can be NULL. + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Division by int: A = Q * b + R + * \brief Perform a division with remainder of an MPI by an integer: + * A = Q * b + R * - * \param Q Destination MPI for the quotient - * \param R Destination MPI for the rest value - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param b Integer to divide by + * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * quotient is not needed. + * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * remainder is not needed. + * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param b The divisor. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if b == 0 - * - * \note Either Q or R can be NULL. + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** - * \brief Modulo: R = A mod B + * \brief Perform a modular reduction. R = A mod B * - * \param R Destination MPI for the rest value - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * \param R The destination MPI for the residue value. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The base of the modular reduction. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if B == 0, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if B < 0 */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Modulo: r = A mod b + * \brief Perform a modular reduction with respect to an integer. + * r = A mod b * - * \param r Destination mbedtls_mpi_uint - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param b Integer to divide by + * \param r The address at which to store the residue. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. + * This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param b The integer base of the modular reduction. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if b == 0, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if b < 0 + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p b is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** - * \brief Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N + * \brief Perform a sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param E Exponent MPI - * \param N Modular MPI - * \param _RR Speed-up MPI used for recalculations + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The base of the exponentiation. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param E The exponent MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param N The base for the modular reduction. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param _RR A helper MPI depending solely on \p N which can be used to + * speed-up multiple modular exponentiations for the same value + * of \p N. This may be \c NULL. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized MPI. If it hasn't been used after + * the call to mbedtls_mpi_init(), this function will compute + * the helper value and store it in \p _RR for reuse on + * subsequent calls to this function. Otherwise, the function + * will assume that \p _RR holds the helper value set by a + * previous call to mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(), and reuse it. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if N is negative or even or - * if E is negative + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \c N is negative or + * even, or if \c E is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failures. * - * \note _RR is used to avoid re-computing R*R mod N across - * multiple calls, which speeds up things a bit. It can - * be set to NULL if the extra performance is unneeded. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *_RR ); +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *_RR ); /** - * \brief Fill an MPI X with size bytes of random + * \brief Fill an MPI with a number of random bytes. * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param size Size in bytes - * \param f_rng RNG function - * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param size The number of random bytes to generate. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. * - * \note The bytes obtained from the PRNG are interpreted + * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA. */ @@ -699,65 +868,143 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); -/** - * \brief Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. * - * \param G Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param B Right-hand MPI + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param min The minimum value to return. + * It must be nonnegative. + * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive. + * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return. + * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p min or \p N is invalid + * or if they are incompatible. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); /** - * \brief Modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N + * \brief Compute the greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param A Left-hand MPI - * \param N Right-hand MPI + * \param G The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if N is <= 1, - MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if A has no inverse mod N. + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ); +int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** - * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test + * \brief Compute the modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N * - * \param X MPI to check - * \param f_rng RNG function - * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The MPI to calculate the modular inverse of. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param N The base of the modular inversion. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. * - * \return 0 if successful (probably prime), - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if X is not prime + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N is less than + * or equal to one. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p has no modular inverse + * with respect to \p N. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ); +int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *N ); /** - * \brief Prime number generation + * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test. * - * \param X Destination MPI - * \param nbits Required size of X in bits - * ( 3 <= nbits <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) - * \param dh_flag If 1, then (X-1)/2 will be prime too - * \param f_rng RNG function - * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \warning If \p X is potentially generated by an adversary, for example + * when validating cryptographic parameters that you didn't + * generate yourself and that are supposed to be prime, then + * \p rounds should be at least the half of the security + * strength of the cryptographic algorithm. On the other hand, + * if \p X is chosen uniformly or non-adversially (as is the + * case when mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime calls this function), then + * \p rounds can be much lower. * - * \return 0 if successful (probably prime), - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if nbits is < 3 + * \param X The MPI to check for primality. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param rounds The number of bases to perform the Miller-Rabin primality + * test for. The probability of returning 0 on a composite is + * at most 2-2*\p rounds. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use + * a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag, +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +/** + * \brief Flags for mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() + * + * Each of these flags is a constraint on the result X returned by + * mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(). + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH = 0x0001, /**< (X-1)/2 is prime too */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR = 0x0002, /**< lower error rate from 2-80 to 2-128 */ +} mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t; + +/** + * \brief Generate a prime number. + * + * \param X The destination MPI to store the generated prime in. + * This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param nbits The required size of the destination MPI in bits. + * This must be between \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. + * \param flags A mask of flags of type #mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use + * a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, in which case \p X holds a + * probably prime number. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if `nbits` is not between + * \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief Checkup routine * @@ -765,6 +1012,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag, */ int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h deleted file mode 100644 index eea6882f..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,244 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file blowfish.h - * - * \brief Blowfish block cipher - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS 448 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS 32 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 /**< Rounds to use. When increasing this value, make sure to extend the initialisation vectors */ -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8 /* Blowfish uses 64 bit blocks */ - -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0016 /**< Invalid key length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0017 /**< Blowfish hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0018 /**< Invalid data input length. */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief Blowfish context structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_blowfish_context -{ - uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; /*!< Blowfish round keys */ - uint32_t S[4][256]; /*!< key dependent S-boxes */ -} -mbedtls_blowfish_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ -#include "blowfish_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize Blowfish context - * - * \param ctx Blowfish context to be initialized - */ -void mbedtls_blowfish_init( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Clear Blowfish context - * - * \param ctx Blowfish context to be cleared - */ -void mbedtls_blowfish_free( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Blowfish key schedule - * - * \param ctx Blowfish context to be initialized - * \param key encryption key - * \param keybits must be between 32 and 448 bits - * - * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ); - -/** - * \brief Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption - * - * \param ctx Blowfish context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT - * \param input 8-byte input block - * \param output 8-byte output block - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE] ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/** - * \brief Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - * Length should be a multiple of the block - * size (8 bytes) - * - * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can - * call the function same function again on the following - * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was - * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. - * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the - * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher - * module instead. - * - * \param ctx Blowfish context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT - * \param length length of the input data - * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) - * \param input buffer holding the input data - * \param output buffer holding the output data - * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/** - * \brief Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption. - * - * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can - * call the function same function again on the following - * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was - * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. - * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the - * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher - * module instead. - * - * \param ctx Blowfish context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT - * \param length length of the input data - * \param iv_off offset in IV (updated after use) - * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) - * \param input buffer holding the input data - * \param output buffer holding the output data - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ); -#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/** - * \brief Blowfish-CTR buffer encryption/decryption - * - * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so - * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with - * the same nonce and key. - * - * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: - * - * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over - * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to - * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and - * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p - * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be - * updated by this function. - * - * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**64 - * blocks of data with the same key. - * - * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p - * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a - * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one - * updated by this function internally. - * - * For example, you might reserve the first 4 bytes for the - * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that - * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to - * set the first 4 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce - * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p - * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most - * 2**32 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. - * - * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct - * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. - * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message - * counter. - * - * Note that for both stategies, sizes are measured in blocks and - * that a Blowfish block is 8 bytes. - * - * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its - * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be - * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. - * - * \param ctx Blowfish context - * \param length The length of the data - * \param nc_off The offset in the current stream_block (for resuming - * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer to - * should be 0 at the start of a stream. - * \param nonce_counter The 64-bit nonce and counter. - * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. Is overwritten - * by the function. - * \param input The input data stream - * \param output The output data stream - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* blowfish.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/build_info.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23f85ba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/build_info.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/** + * \file build_info.h + * + * \brief Build-time configuration info + * + * Include this file if you need to depend on the + * configuration options defined in mbedtls_config.h or MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + */ + /* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H +#define MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H + +/* + * This set of compile-time defines can be used to determine the version number + * of the Mbed TLS library used. Run-time variables for the same can be found in + * version.h + */ + +/** + * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. + * Major, Minor, Patchlevel + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 0 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0 + +/** + * The single version number has the following structure: + * MMNNPP00 + * Major version | Minor version | Patch version + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03000000 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.0.0" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 3.0.0" + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION) && ( \ + MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION < 0x03000000 || \ + MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION > MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER ) +#error "Invalid config version, defined value of MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION is unsupported" +#endif + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/camellia.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/camellia.h index fa1e05ee..6a09da88 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/camellia.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/camellia.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Camellia block cipher */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,27 +18,24 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0024 /**< Invalid key length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 /**< Invalid data input length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0027 /**< Camellia hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0024 /**< Bad input data. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 /**< Invalid data input length. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -53,8 +50,8 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context { - int nr; /*!< number of rounds */ - uint32_t rk[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< number of rounds */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ } mbedtls_camellia_context; @@ -63,52 +60,68 @@ mbedtls_camellia_context; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ /** - * \brief Initialize CAMELLIA context + * \brief Initialize a CAMELLIA context. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context to be initialized + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be initialized. + * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_camellia_init( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief Clear CAMELLIA context + * \brief Clear a CAMELLIA context. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context to be cleared + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_camellia_free( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief CAMELLIA key schedule (encryption) + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for encryption. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context to be initialized - * \param key encryption key - * \param keybits must be 128, 192 or 256 + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key to use. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, + * \c 192 or \c 256. * - * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ); +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); /** - * \brief CAMELLIA key schedule (decryption) + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for decryption. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context to be initialized - * \param key decryption key - * \param keybits must be 128, 192 or 256 + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, + * \c 192 or \c 256. * - * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ); +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); /** - * \brief CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT - * \param input 16-byte input block - * \param output 16-byte output block + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \c 16 Bytes. + * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \c 16 Bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mode, @@ -117,9 +130,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** - * \brief CAMELLIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - * Length should be a multiple of the block - * size (16 bytes) + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following @@ -129,15 +140,22 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT - * \param length length of the input data - * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) - * \param input buffer holding the input data - * \param output buffer holding the output data + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length in Bytes of the input data \p input. + * This must be a multiple of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated to allow streaming + * use as explained above. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must point to a + * readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must point to a + * writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mode, @@ -149,11 +167,14 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /** - * \brief CAMELLIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + * operation. * - * Note: Due to the nature of CFB you should use the same key schedule for - * both encryption and decryption. So a context initialized with - * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() for both MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT and CAMELLIE_DECRYPT. + * \note Due to the nature of CFB mode, you should use the same + * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls + * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via + * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode + * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following @@ -163,16 +184,24 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT - * \param length length of the input data - * \param iv_off offset in IV (updated after use) - * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) - * \param input buffer holding the input data - * \param output buffer holding the output data + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input. Any value is allowed. + * \param iv_off The current offset in the IV. This must be smaller + * than \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to allow + * the aforementioned streaming usage. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to + * allow the aforementioned streaming usage. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer to hold the output data. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \p length Bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mode, @@ -185,11 +214,13 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /** - * \brief CAMELLIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. * - * Note: Due to the nature of CTR you should use the same key schedule for - * both encryption and decryption. So a context initialized with - * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() for both MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT and MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * *note Due to the nature of CTR mode, you should use the same + * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls + * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via + * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode + * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. * * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with @@ -212,41 +243,49 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one * updated by this function internally. * - * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the - * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that - * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to - * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce - * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p - * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most - * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. + * For example, you might reserve the first \c 12 Bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last \c 4 Bytes for internal use. + * In that case, before calling this function on a new message you + * need to set the first \c 12 Bytes of \p nonce_counter to your + * chosen nonce value, the last four to \c 0, and \p nc_off to \c 0 + * (which will cause \p stream_block to be ignored). That way, you + * can encrypt at most \c 2**96 messages of up to \c 2**32 blocks + * each with the same key. * * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct - * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. - * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message - * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this - * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted: - * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt - * more than 2**32 messages with the same key. + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be + * unique. The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a + * message counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, + * but this limits the number of messages that can be securely + * encrypted: for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should + * not encrypt more than 2**32 messages with the same key. * * Note that for both stategies, sizes are measured in blocks and - * that a CAMELLIA block is 16 bytes. + * that a CAMELLIA block is \c 16 Bytes. * * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. * - * \param ctx CAMELLIA context - * \param length The length of the data - * \param nc_off The offset in the current stream_block (for resuming + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * Any value is allowed. + * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block (for resuming * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer to - * should be 0 at the start of a stream. - * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. - * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. Is overwritten - * by the function. - * \param input The input data stream - * \param output The output data stream + * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream. It is updated + * at the end of this call. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must be a read/write + * buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must be a + * read/write buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The input data stream. This must be a readable buffer of + * size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data stream. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \p length Bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, size_t length, @@ -257,6 +296,8 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief Checkup routine * @@ -264,6 +305,8 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ccm.h index e1dc124b..6613cee7 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ccm.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ccm.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ * consistent with RFC 3610. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -42,19 +42,23 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H #define MBEDTLS_CCM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT 2 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT 3 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D /**< Bad input parameters to the function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F /**< Authenticated decryption failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0011 /**< CCM hardware accelerator failed. */ - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ } mbedtls_ccm_context; @@ -83,7 +87,7 @@ mbedtls_ccm_context; * to make references valid, and prepare the context * for mbedtls_ccm_setkey() or mbedtls_ccm_free(). * - * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. + * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); @@ -91,9 +95,10 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); * \brief This function initializes the CCM context set in the * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key. * - * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. + * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must be an initialized + * context. * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. - * \param key The encryption key. + * \param key The encryption key. This must not be \c NULL. * \param keybits The key size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -108,7 +113,8 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, * \brief This function releases and clears the specified CCM context * and underlying cipher sub-context. * - * \param ctx The CCM context to clear. + * \param ctx The CCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the function + * has no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); @@ -121,19 +127,27 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide. * - * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param iv Initialization vector (nonce). + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. - * Must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer holding the output data. - * Must be at least \p length Bytes wide. - * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. + * \param ad The additional data field. If \p ad_len is greater than + * zero, \p ad must be a readable buffer of at least that + * length. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * @@ -142,7 +156,7 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); */ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); @@ -159,23 +173,30 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * the tag length has to be encoded into the \p iv passed to * this function. * - * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param iv Initialization vector (nonce). + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. - * Must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer holding the output data. - * Must be at least \p length Bytes wide. - * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * - * \warning Passing 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is no + * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is no * longer authenticated. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -183,7 +204,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); @@ -191,20 +212,27 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * \brief This function performs a CCM authenticated decryption of a * buffer. * - * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param iv Initialization vector (nonce). + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. - * Must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer holding the output data. - * Must be at least \p length Bytes wide. - * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. - * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field in Bytes. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least that \p ad_len Bytes.. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates that the message is authentic. @@ -213,7 +241,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); @@ -226,23 +254,30 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * this function as \p tag_len. (\p tag needs to be adjusted * accordingly.) * - * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param iv Initialization vector (nonce). + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. - * Must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer holding the output data. - * Must be at least \p length Bytes wide. - * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least that \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field in Bytes. * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * - * \warning Passing 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is no + * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is nos * longer authenticated. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -251,10 +286,211 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); +/** + * \brief This function starts a CCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() must be called + * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before + * or after mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * \p mode is invalid, + * \p iv_len is invalid (lower than \c 7 or greater than + * \c 13). + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_starts( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function declares the lengths of the message + * and additional data for a CCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function and mbedtls_ccm_starts() must be called + * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before + * or after mbedtls_ccm_starts(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param total_ad_len The total length of additional data in bytes. + * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. + * \param plaintext_len The length in bytes of the plaintext to encrypt or + * result of the decryption (thus not encompassing the + * additional data that are not encrypted). + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate in Bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * For CCM*, zero is also valid. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * \p total_ad_len is greater than \c 0xFF00. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t total_ad_len, + size_t plaintext_len, + size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data + * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a CCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the additional data. The + * lengths \p ad_len of the data parts should eventually add + * up exactly to the total length of additional data + * \c total_ad_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). You + * may not call this function after calling + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts(), the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() and this must not have yet + * received any input with mbedtls_ccm_update(). + * \param ad The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL + * if \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, + * \p ad may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * total input length too long. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, + size_t ad_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to + * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to + * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call + * mbedtls_ccm_finish(). The lengths \p input_len of the + * data parts should eventually add up exactly to the + * plaintext length \c plaintext_len passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * + * This function may produce output in one of the following + * ways: + * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal + * to the input length. + * - Buffered output: except for the last part of input data, + * the output consists of a whole number of 16-byte blocks. + * If the total input length so far (not including + * associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* with *A* < 16 then + * the total output length is 16 \* *B*. + * For the last part of input data, the output length is + * equal to the input length plus the number of bytes (*A*) + * buffered in the previous call to the function (if any). + * The function uses the plaintext length + * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() + * to detect the last part of input data. + * + * In particular: + * - It is always correct to call this function with + * \p output_size >= \p input_len + 15. + * - If \p input_len is a multiple of 16 for all the calls + * to this function during an operation (not necessary for + * the last one) then it is correct to use \p output_size + * =\p input_len. + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_len + * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p input_len bytes. + * \param input_len The length of the input data in bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of + * at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes. + * See the function description regarding the output size. + * \param output_len On success, \p *output_len contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_len is + * unspecified. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * total input length too long, + * or \p output_size too small. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_update( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the CCM operation and generates + * the authentication tag. + * + * It wraps up the CCM stream, and generates the + * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. If \p tag_len is greater + * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least \p + * tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag. Must match the tag length passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() function. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * invalid value of \p tag_len, + * the total amount of additional data passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() was lower than the total length of + * additional data \c total_ad_len passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(), + * the total amount of input data passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_update() was lower than the plaintext length + * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_finish( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) /** * \brief The CCM checkup routine. diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/certs.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/certs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8dab7b5c..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/certs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file certs.h - * - * \brief Sample certificates and DHM parameters for testing - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CERTS_H -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_H - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -/* Concatenation of all CA certificates in PEM format if available */ -extern const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len; -#endif - -/* List of all CA certificates, terminated by NULL */ -extern const char * mbedtls_test_cas[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[]; - -/* - * Convenience for users who just want a certificate: - * RSA by default, or ECDSA if RSA is not available - */ -extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_crt; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len; -extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_key; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len; -extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_pwd; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len; -extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_crt; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len; -extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_key; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len; -extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_crt; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len; -extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_key; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len; -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* certs.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h index cfea40a5..25e1a263 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ * \author Daniel King */ -/* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved. +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -26,25 +27,18 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051 /**< Invalid input parameter(s). */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0053 /**< Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0055 /**< Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -54,9 +48,9 @@ extern "C" { typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context { - uint32_t state[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ - uint8_t keystream8[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ - size_t keystream_bytes_used; /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream8)[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream_bytes_used); /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ } mbedtls_chacha20_context; @@ -77,13 +71,18 @@ mbedtls_chacha20_context; * \c mbedtls_chacha20_free(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_chacha20_init( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief This function releases and clears the specified ChaCha20 context. + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * ChaCha20 context. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized context. * - * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to clear. */ void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); @@ -96,7 +95,9 @@ void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); * \c mbedtls_chacha_update(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the key should be bound. - * \param key The encryption/decryption key. Must be 32 bytes in length. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption/decryption key. This must be \c 32 Bytes + * in length. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or key is NULL. @@ -115,8 +116,9 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, * messages encrypted with the same nonce and key. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the nonce should be bound. - * \param nonce The nonce. Must be 12 bytes in size. - * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually 0. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. + * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or nonce is @@ -144,16 +146,16 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, * key and nonce. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to use for encryption or decryption. - * \param size The length of the input data in bytes. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key and nonce. + * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This pointer can be NULL if size == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. - * Must be able to hold \p size bytes. - * This pointer can be NULL if size == 0. + * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the ctx, input, or - * output pointers are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, size_t size, @@ -174,19 +176,19 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or * point to non-overlapping buffers. * - * \param key The encryption/decryption key. Must be 32 bytes in length. - * \param nonce The nonce. Must be 12 bytes in size. - * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually 0. - * \param size The length of the input data in bytes. + * \param key The encryption/decryption key. + * This must be \c 32 Bytes in length. + * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. + * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. + * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This pointer can be NULL if size == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. - * Must be able to hold \p size bytes. - * This pointer can be NULL if size == 0. + * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if key, nonce, input, - * or output is NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], const unsigned char nonce[12], diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h index 7de6f4e8..3f6e4a33 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ * \author Daniel King */ -/* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved. +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -26,21 +27,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" /* for shared error codes */ -#include "poly1305.h" +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE -0x0054 /**< The requested operation is not permitted in the current state. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED -0x0056 /**< Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic. */ @@ -58,16 +54,16 @@ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) -#include "chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context { - mbedtls_chacha20_context chacha20_ctx; /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ - mbedtls_poly1305_context poly1305_ctx; /**< The Poly1305 context. */ - uint64_t aad_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ - uint64_t ciphertext_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ - int state; /**< The current state of the context. */ - mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ + mbedtls_chacha20_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chacha20_ctx); /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ + mbedtls_poly1305_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(poly1305_ctx); /**< The Poly1305 context. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aad_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphertext_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /**< The current state of the context. */ + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ } mbedtls_chachapoly_context; @@ -115,27 +111,29 @@ mbedtls_chachapoly_context; * all previous outputs of \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), * otherwise you can now safely use the plaintext. * - * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to initialize. + * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to initialize. Must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_chachapoly_init( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief This function releases and clears the specified ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. * - * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to clear. + * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function is a no-op. */ void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief This function sets the ChaCha20-Poly1305 symmetric encryption key. + * \brief This function sets the ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * symmetric encryption key. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to which the key should be - * bound. - * \param key The 256-bit (32 bytes) key. + * bound. This must be initialized. + * \param key The \c 256 Bit (\c 32 Bytes) key. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if \p ctx or \p key are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ); @@ -155,14 +153,15 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * - * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. - * \param nonce The nonce/IV to use for the message. Must be 12 bytes. + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param nonce The nonce/IV to use for the message. + * This must be a redable buffer of length \c 12 Bytes. * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT (discouraged, see warning). * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if \p ctx or \p mac are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], @@ -193,11 +192,12 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * - * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. - * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD. The length has no + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param aad_len The length in Bytes of the AAD. The length has no * restrictions. * \param aad Buffer containing the AAD. - * This pointer can be NULL if aad_len == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA @@ -227,20 +227,19 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * - * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. * \param len The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. - * This pointer can be NULL if len == 0. - * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data is written. - * Must be able to hold \p len bytes. - * This pointer can be NULL if len == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data is + * written. This must be able to hold \p len bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if \p ctx, \p input, or \p output are NULL. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE * if the operation has not been started or has been * finished. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, size_t len, @@ -251,18 +250,17 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, * \brief This function finished the ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation and * generates the MAC (authentication tag). * - * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. * \param mac The buffer to where the 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC is written. * * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if \p ctx or \p mac are NULL. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE * if the operation has not been started or has been * finished. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16] ); @@ -280,20 +278,21 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, * and key. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). + * This must be initialized. * \param length The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. * \param nonce The 96-bit (12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. - * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated data (AAD). - * This pointer can be NULL if aad_len == 0. + * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated + * data (AAD). This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. - * This pointer can be NULL if ilen == 0. - * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data is written. - * This pointer can be NULL if ilen == 0. - * \param tag The buffer to where the computed 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC is written. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data + * is written. This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param tag The buffer to where the computed 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC + * is written. This must not be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if one or more of the required parameters are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, size_t length, @@ -312,22 +311,22 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). - * \param length The length (in bytes) of the data to decrypt. - * \param nonce The 96-bit (12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. + * \param length The length (in Bytes) of the data to decrypt. + * \param nonce The \c 96 Bit (\c 12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated data (AAD). - * This pointer can be NULL if aad_len == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer containing the data to decrypt. - * This pointer can be NULL if ilen == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * \param output The buffer to where the decrypted data is written. - * This pointer can be NULL if ilen == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if one or more of the required parameters are NULL. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED * if the data was not authentic. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, size_t length, diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 9e6bb8a4..e38892d8 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Consistency checks for configuration options */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,13 +18,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -/* - * It is recommended to include this file from your config.h - * in order to catch dependency issues early. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H @@ -44,17 +37,21 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows" #endif -/* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in config.h as - * it would confuse config.pl. */ +/* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in mbedtls_config.h as + * it would confuse config.py. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT #endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +#endif #endif /* _WIN32 */ -#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) ) -#error "The NET and TIMING modules are not available for mbed OS - please use the network and timing functions provided by mbed OS" +#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) +#error "The NET module is not available for mbed OS - please use the network functions provided by Mbed OS" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ @@ -78,10 +75,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_DHM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) #error "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -98,6 +91,17 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) ) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -108,11 +112,23 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \ @@ -123,10 +139,16 @@ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) ) ) + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequesites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -145,18 +167,18 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but entropy sources too" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) +#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer" +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) ) + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -192,8 +214,8 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK defined, but no alternative implementation enabled" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) @@ -205,12 +227,14 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -259,11 +283,27 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE defined, but not all prerequesites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequesites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) #error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -289,10 +329,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -486,6 +522,54 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + !( ( ( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) ) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites (missing RNG)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) && \ + ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ + ! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with actual entropy sources" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined, but it cannot coexist with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO." +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -501,19 +585,16 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA384_C defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA224_C defined without MBEDTLS_SHA256_C" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C defined without MBEDTLS_SHA224_C" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && \ @@ -521,8 +602,28 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) ) +#error "One or more versions of the TLS protocol are enabled " \ + "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -540,28 +641,10 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1))) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -576,21 +659,29 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 255 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > 255 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequsites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequsites" #endif @@ -599,11 +690,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -628,6 +714,10 @@ #endif #undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) && !defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) #error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -673,10 +763,75 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + + + +/* Reject attempts to enable options that have been removed and that could + * cause a build to succeed but with features removed. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/2599" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 (SSL v3.0 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO (SSL v2 ClientHello support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT (compatibility with the buggy implementation of truncated HMAC in Mbed TLS up to 2.7) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See the ChangeLog entry if you really need SHA-1-signed certificates." +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 (TLS v1.0 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4286" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 (TLS v1.1 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4286" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4313" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4335" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4335" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4341" +#endif + /* * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this * workaround since this is included by every single file before the - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in emtpy translation units. + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in empty translation units. */ typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher.h index dfb15411..7afdc6ac 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -22,20 +22,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD @@ -45,7 +41,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM #endif @@ -62,7 +58,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -0x6280 /**< Decryption of block requires a full block. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -0x6300 /**< Authentication failed (for AEAD modes). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380 /**< The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x6400 /**< Cipher hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN 0x02 /**< Cipher accepts keys of variable length. */ @@ -74,7 +69,7 @@ extern "C" { /** * \brief Supported cipher types. * - * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * \warning DES is considered weak cipher and its use * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ @@ -85,8 +80,6 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, /**< The Blowfish cipher. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, /**< The RC4 cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */ } mbedtls_cipher_id_t; @@ -94,7 +87,7 @@ typedef enum { /** * \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs. * - * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * \warning DES is considered weak cipher and its use * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ @@ -137,11 +130,6 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, /**< Blowfish cipher with ECB mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, /**< Blowfish cipher with CBC mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, /**< Blowfish cipher with CFB64 mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, /**< Blowfish cipher with CTR mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, /**< RC4 cipher with 128-bit mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ @@ -173,21 +161,29 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, /**< ChaCha20 stream cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, /**< ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KWP mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KWP mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KWP mode. */ } mbedtls_cipher_type_t; /** Supported cipher modes. */ typedef enum { - MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */ - MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, /**< The SP800-38F KWP mode */ } mbedtls_cipher_mode_t; /** Supported cipher padding types. */ @@ -218,10 +214,30 @@ enum { }; /** Maximum length of any IV, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH defined + * in library/ssl_misc.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 + /** Maximum block size of any cipher, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined + * in library/ssl_misc.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +/** Maximum key length, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * For now, only check whether XTS is enabled which uses 64 Byte keys, + * and use 32 Bytes as an upper bound for the maximum key length otherwise. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined + * in library/ssl_misc.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS + * since the latter isn't used in SSL/TLS. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + /** * Base cipher information (opaque struct). */ @@ -241,37 +257,37 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t /** Full cipher identifier. For example, * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. */ - mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /** The cipher mode. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. */ - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /** The cipher key length, in bits. This is the * default length for variable sized ciphers. * Includes parity bits for ciphers like DES. */ - unsigned int key_bitlen; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen); /** Name of the cipher. */ - const char * name; + const char * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); /** IV or nonce size, in Bytes. * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, * this is the recommended size. */ - unsigned int iv_size; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); /** Bitflag comprised of MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN and * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN indicating whether the * cipher supports variable IV or variable key sizes, respectively. */ - int flags; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); /** The block size, in Bytes. */ - unsigned int block_size; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size); /** Struct for base cipher information and functions. */ - const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *base; + const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base); } mbedtls_cipher_info_t; @@ -281,52 +297,70 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t { /** Information about the associated cipher. */ - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info); /** Key length to use. */ - int key_bitlen; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen); /** Operation that the key of the context has been * initialized for. */ - mbedtls_operation_t operation; + mbedtls_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) /** Padding functions to use, if relevant for * the specific cipher mode. */ - void (*add_padding)( unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len ); - int (*get_padding)( unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len ); + void (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_padding))( unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len ); + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(get_padding))( unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len ); #endif /** Buffer for input that has not been processed yet. */ - unsigned char unprocessed_data[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_data)[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /** Number of Bytes that have not been processed yet. */ - size_t unprocessed_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len); /** Current IV or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode, data unit (or sector) number * for XTS-mode. */ - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv)[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /** IV size in Bytes, for ciphers with variable-length IVs. */ - size_t iv_size; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); /** The cipher-specific context. */ - void *cipher_ctx; + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) /** CMAC-specific context. */ - mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac_ctx); #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed + * by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation + * of the PSA Crypto API. + * This is unset if the cipher context was established through + * mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through + * mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). + */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_enabled); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } mbedtls_cipher_context_t; /** - * \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported by the generic - * cipher module. + * \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported + * by the generic cipher module. * - * \return A statically-allocated array of ciphers. The last entry - * is zero. + * For any cipher identifier in the returned list, you can + * obtain the corresponding generic cipher information structure + * via mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), which can then be used + * to prepare a cipher context via mbedtls_cipher_setup(). + * + * + * \return A statically-allocated array of cipher identifiers + * of type cipher_type_t. The last entry is zero. */ const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ); @@ -334,11 +368,12 @@ const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ); * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information * structure associated with the given cipher name. * - * \param cipher_name Name of the cipher to search for. + * \param cipher_name Name of the cipher to search for. This must not be + * \c NULL. * * \return The cipher information structure associated with the * given \p cipher_name. - * \return NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. */ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name ); @@ -350,7 +385,7 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher * * \return The cipher information structure associated with the * given \p cipher_type. - * \return NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. */ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ); @@ -366,7 +401,7 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher * * \return The cipher information structure associated with the * given \p cipher_id. - * \return NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. */ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, int key_bitlen, @@ -374,6 +409,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_ciph /** * \brief This function initializes a \p cipher_context as NONE. + * + * \param ctx The context to be initialized. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); @@ -381,16 +418,32 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); * \brief This function frees and clears the cipher-specific * context of \p ctx. Freeing \p ctx itself remains the * responsibility of the caller. + * + * \param ctx The context to be freed. If this is \c NULL, the + * function has no effect, otherwise this must point to an + * initialized context. */ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); /** - * \brief This function initializes and fills the cipher-context - * structure with the appropriate values. It also clears - * the structure. + * \brief This function prepares a cipher context for + * use with the given cipher primitive. * - * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be NULL. + * \note After calling this function, you should call + * mbedtls_cipher_setkey() and, if the mode uses padding, + * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(), then for each + * message to encrypt or decrypt with this key, either: + * - mbedtls_cipher_crypt() for one-shot processing with + * non-AEAD modes; + * - mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() for one-shot + * processing with AEAD modes or NIST_KW; + * - for multi-part processing, see the documentation of + * mbedtls_cipher_reset(). + * + * \param ctx The context to prepare. This must be initialized by + * a call to mbedtls_cipher_init() first. * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -398,141 +451,182 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the * cipher-specific context fails. - * - * \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure. - * In future versions, the caller will be required to call - * mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ); +int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for + * PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive. + * + * \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL. + * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. + * \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the + * authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() must provide + * the same tag length. + * For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the + * cipher-specific context fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. Must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * - * \return The size of the blocks of the cipher. - * \return 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized. + * \return The block size of the underlying cipher. + * \return \c 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ -static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL ) return 0; - return ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size); } /** * \brief This function returns the mode of operation for * the cipher. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. Must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The mode of operation. * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ -static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE ); + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; - return ctx->cipher_info->mode; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); } /** * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce * of the cipher, in Bytes. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. Must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The recommended IV size if no IV has been set. * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce. * \return The actual size if an IV has been set. */ -static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL ) return 0; - if( ctx->iv_size != 0 ) - return (int) ctx->iv_size; + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size) != 0 ) + return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); - return (int) ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; + return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); } /** * \brief This function returns the type of the given cipher. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. Must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The type of the cipher. * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ -static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE ); + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; - return ctx->cipher_info->type; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); } /** * \brief This function returns the name of the given cipher * as a string. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. Must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The name of the cipher. * \return NULL if \p ctx has not been not initialized. */ -static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL ) return 0; - return ctx->cipher_info->name; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); } /** * \brief This function returns the key length of the cipher. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. Must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The key length of the cipher in bits. * \return #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if ctx \p has not been * initialized. */ -static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE ); + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE; - return (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen; + return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen); } /** * \brief This function returns the operation of the given cipher. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. Must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The type of operation: #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. * \return #MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ -static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE ); + if( ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE; - return ctx->operation; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation); } /** * \brief This function sets the key to use with the given context. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. May not be NULL. Must have - * been initialized using mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type() - * or mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(). - * \param key The key to use. - * \param key_bitlen The key length to use, in bits. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param key The key to use. This must be a readable buffer of at + * least \p key_bitlen Bits. + * \param key_bitlen The key length to use, in Bits. * \param operation The operation that the key will be used for: * #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. * @@ -541,8 +635,10 @@ static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_ci * parameter-verification failure. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_operation_t operation ); +int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_operation_t operation ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) /** @@ -551,7 +647,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *k * * The default passing mode is PKCS7 padding. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param mode The padding mode. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -560,7 +657,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *k * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the cipher mode * does not support padding. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ); +int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ /** @@ -570,8 +668,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_ciph * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these * ciphers, this function has no effect. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. This + * must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. * @@ -580,12 +680,36 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_ciph * parameter-verification failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len ); + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ); /** * \brief This function resets the cipher state. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. + * \note With non-AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message + * is as follows: + * 1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce. + * 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset() + * 3. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times + * 4. mbedtls_cipher_finish() + * . + * This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple + * messages with the same key. + * + * \note With AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message + * is as follows: + * 1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce. + * 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset() + * 3. mbedtls_cipher_update_ad() + * 4. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times + * 5. mbedtls_cipher_finish() + * 6. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or + * mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() (for encryption). + * . + * This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple + * messages with the same key. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be bound to a key. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on @@ -597,11 +721,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); /** * \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. - * Must be called exactly once, after mbedtls_cipher_reset(). * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param ad The additional data to use. - * \param ad_len the Length of \p ad. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A specific error code on failure. @@ -620,19 +744,17 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block * in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES. * - * \note If the underlying cipher is used in GCM mode, all calls - * to this function, except for the last one before - * mbedtls_cipher_finish(), must have \p ilen as a - * multiple of the block size of the cipher. - * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. Must be able to hold at - * least \p ilen + block_size. Must not be the same buffer - * as input. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to + * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the + * same buffer as \p input. * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the - * actual number of Bytes written. + * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be + * \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on @@ -641,8 +763,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * unsupported mode for a cipher. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); +int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, + size_t *olen ); /** * \brief The generic cipher finalization function. If data still @@ -650,9 +774,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i * contained in it is padded to the size of * the last block, and written to the \p output buffer. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param output The buffer to write data to. Needs block_size available. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key. + * \param output The buffer to write data to. This needs to be a writable + * buffer of at least \p block_size Bytes. * \param olen The length of the data written to the \p output buffer. + * This may not be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on @@ -670,10 +797,14 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /** * \brief This function writes a tag for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. - * Must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). + * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param tag The buffer to write the tag to. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized, + * bound to a key, and have just completed a cipher + * operation through mbedtls_cipher_finish() the tag for + * which should be written. + * \param tag The buffer to write the tag to. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to write. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -685,10 +816,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /** * \brief This function checks the tag for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. - * Must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). + * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param tag The buffer holding the tag. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param tag The buffer holding the tag. This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to check. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -702,18 +834,22 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \brief The generic all-in-one encryption/decryption function, * for all ciphers except AEAD constructs. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len + * Bytes. * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size * IV. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. Must be able to hold at - * least \p ilen + block_size. Must not be the same buffer - * as input. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to + * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the + * same buffer as \p input. * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the - * actual number of Bytes written. + * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be + * \c NULL. * * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these * ciphers, use \p iv = NULL and \p iv_len = 0. @@ -732,58 +868,100 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) /** - * \brief The generic autenticated encryption (AEAD) function. + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. - * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. - * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. - * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. - * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag will be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. - * Must be able to hold at least \p ilen. - * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the - * actual number of Bytes written. - * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. - * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen + \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen + 8 + * (rounded up to a multiple of 8 if KWP is used); + * \p ilen + 15 is always a safe value. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); /** - * \brief The generic autenticated decryption (AEAD) function. + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. * * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being * used, making this interface safer. * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. - * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. - * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. - * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. - * \param ad The additional data to be authenticated. - * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. - * Must be able to hold at least \p ilen. - * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the - * actual number of Bytes written. - * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag. - * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag must be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. For AEAD ciphers this + * must be at least \p tag_len. For NIST_KW this must be + * at least \c 8. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * may be \c NULL if \p output_len is \c 0. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen - \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen - 8. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The actual length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on @@ -791,14 +969,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ - + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cmac.h index a4fd5525..3e599b9d 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cmac.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cmac.h @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * Authentication is defined in RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -21,21 +21,20 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H #define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x007A /**< CMAC hardware accelerator failed. */ - #define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 #define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8 @@ -53,14 +52,14 @@ extern "C" { struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t { /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */ - unsigned char state[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still * pending processing, or the final block. */ - unsigned char unprocessed_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; /** The length of data pending processing. */ - size_t unprocessed_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len); }; #else /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ @@ -72,6 +71,12 @@ struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t * the input data. * Must be called with an initialized cipher context. * + * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate + * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers + * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus + * return an error. Alternate implementations must support + * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES. + * * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation, initialized * as one of the following types: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, @@ -149,6 +154,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); * The CMAC result is calculated as * output = generic CMAC(cmac key, input buffer). * + * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate + * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers + * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus + * return an error. Alternate implementations must support + * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES. * * \param cipher_info The cipher information. * \param key The CMAC key. @@ -193,6 +203,13 @@ int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, /** * \brief The CMAC checkup routine. * + * \note In case the CMAC routines are provided by an alternative + * implementation (i.e. #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is defined), the + * checkup routine will succeed even if the implementation does + * not support the less widely used AES-192 or 3DES primitives. + * The self-test requires at least AES-128 and AES-256 to be + * supported by the underlying implementation. + * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h deleted file mode 100644 index 213b6914..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2525 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file compat-1.3.h - * - * \brief Compatibility definitions for using mbed TLS with client code written - * for the PolarSSL naming conventions. - * - * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "Including compat-1.3.h is deprecated" -#endif - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H -#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H - -/* - * config.h options - */ -#if defined MBEDTLS_AESNI_C -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_C MBEDTLS_AESNI_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -#define POLARSSL_AES_ALT MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_C -#define POLARSSL_AES_C MBEDTLS_AES_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES -#define POLARSSL_AES_ROM_TABLES MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_ALT MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_C -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_C MBEDTLS_ARC4_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#define POLARSSL_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_ALT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_ALT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CCM_C -#define POLARSSL_CCM_C MBEDTLS_CCM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CERTS_C -#define POLARSSL_CERTS_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_C MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C -#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING -#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_ALT -#define POLARSSL_DES_ALT MBEDTLS_DES_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_C -#define POLARSSL_DES_C MBEDTLS_DES_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DHM_C -#define POLARSSL_DHM_C MBEDTLS_DHM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDH_C -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_C MBEDTLS_ECDH_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_C MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define POLARSSL_ECP_C MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM -#define POLARSSL_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -#define POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES -#define POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_C MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_C -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_FS_IO -#define POLARSSL_FS_IO MBEDTLS_FS_IO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_GCM_C -#define POLARSSL_GCM_C MBEDTLS_GCM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -#define POLARSSL_GENPRIME MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C -#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_SSE2 MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD2_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#define POLARSSL_MD2_C MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD2_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD4_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_C -#define POLARSSL_MD4_C MBEDTLS_MD4_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD4_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD5_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#define POLARSSL_MD5_C MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD5_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD_C -#define POLARSSL_MD_C MBEDTLS_MD_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BACKTRACE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NET_C -#define POLARSSL_NET_C MBEDTLS_NET_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES -#define POLARSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY -#define POLARSSL_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define POLARSSL_OID_C MBEDTLS_OID_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C -#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_PEM_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_C MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_C MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_C MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_C MBEDTLS_PK_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED -#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MEMORY MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN -#define POLARSSL_PSK_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES -#define POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define POLARSSL_RSA_C MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT -#define POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST -#define POLARSSL_SELF_TEST MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_C MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_C MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_C MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#define POLARSSL_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#define POLARSSL_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL -#define POLARSSL_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#define POLARSSL_SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_TLS_C MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#define POLARSSL_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_ALT MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_C MBEDTLS_THREADING_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_PTHREAD MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_ALT MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_C -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_C MBEDTLS_TIMING_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_C -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_C MBEDTLS_VERSION_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_FEATURES MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 -#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION -#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE -#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CREATE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA -#define POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_USE_C MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_ALT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_C -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_C MBEDTLS_XTEA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -#endif - -/* - * Misc names (macros, types, functions, enum constants...) - */ -#define AES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT -#define AES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT -#define ASN1_BIT_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING -#define ASN1_BMP_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING -#define ASN1_BOOLEAN MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN -#define ASN1_CHK_ADD MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD -#define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED -#define ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC -#define ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME -#define ASN1_IA5_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING -#define ASN1_INTEGER MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER -#define ASN1_NULL MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL -#define ASN1_OCTET_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING -#define ASN1_OID MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID -#define ASN1_PRIMITIVE MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE -#define ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING -#define ASN1_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE -#define ASN1_SET MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET -#define ASN1_T61_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING -#define ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING -#define ASN1_UTC_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME -#define ASN1_UTF8_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING -#define BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH -#define BADCERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED -#define BADCERT_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE -#define BADCERT_MISSING MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING -#define BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED -#define BADCERT_OTHER MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER -#define BADCERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED -#define BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY -#define BADCRL_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED -#define BADCRL_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE -#define BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED -#define BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE -#define BLOWFISH_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT -#define BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT -#define BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS -#define BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS -#define BLOWFISH_ROUNDS MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS -#define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT -#define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT -#define COLLECT_SIZE MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN -#define CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS -#define CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#define CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF -#define CTR_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON -#define CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#define CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN -#define DEPRECATED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#define DES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT -#define DES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT -#define DES_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER -#define ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -#define ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK -#define ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE -#define ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM -#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL -#define EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES -#define EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS -#define EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL -#define EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY -#define EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME -#define EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE -#define EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE -#define EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS -#define EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME -#define EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS -#define EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define GCM_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT -#define GCM_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT -#define KU_CRL_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN -#define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT -#define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE -#define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT -#define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN -#define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT -#define KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION -#define LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE -#define MPI_CHK MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK -#define NET_PROTO_TCP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP -#define NET_PROTO_UDP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 -#define OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_AT -#define OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN -#define OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY -#define OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER -#define OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER -#define OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME -#define OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS -#define OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY -#define OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION -#define OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT -#define OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS -#define OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE -#define OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM -#define OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER -#define OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE -#define OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME -#define OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE -#define OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM -#define OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES -#define OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH -#define OID_CMP MBEDTLS_OID_CMP -#define OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING -#define OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US -#define OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS -#define OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER -#define OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC -#define OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 -#define OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 -#define OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH -#define OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED -#define OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 -#define OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION -#define OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL -#define OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_GOV -#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 -#define OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE -#define OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY -#define OID_ISO_CCITT_DS MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS -#define OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG -#define OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY -#define OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG -#define OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES -#define OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME -#define OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_KP -#define OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 -#define OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE -#define OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL -#define OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL -#define OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL -#define OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT -#define OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE -#define OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE -#define OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT -#define OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE -#define OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL -#define OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL -#define OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME -#define OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 -#define OID_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION -#define OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 -#define OID_ORG_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM -#define OID_ORG_DOD MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD -#define OID_ORG_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV -#define OID_ORG_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE -#define OID_ORG_OIW MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW -#define OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY -#define OID_ORG_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST -#define OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS -#define OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 -#define OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 -#define OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 -#define OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 -#define OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 -#define OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ -#define OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL -#define OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX -#define OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS -#define OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD -#define OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS -#define OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY -#define OID_RSA_SHA_OBS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS -#define OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH -#define OID_SIZE MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE -#define OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME -#define OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS -#define OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST -#define OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING -#define PADLOCK_ACE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE -#define PADLOCK_ALIGN16 MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16 -#define PADLOCK_PHE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE -#define PADLOCK_PMM MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM -#define PADLOCK_RNG MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_IV MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY -#define PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT -#define PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT -#define PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT -#define PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_AES MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_CLMUL MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_H MBEDTLS_AESNI_H -#define POLARSSL_AES_H MBEDTLS_AES_H -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_H MBEDTLS_ARC4_H -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_H -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H -#define POLARSSL_BASE64_H MBEDTLS_BASE64_H -#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_H MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_H MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H -#define POLARSSL_BN_MUL_H MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_H MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H -#define POLARSSL_CCM_H MBEDTLS_CCM_H -#define POLARSSL_CERTS_H MBEDTLS_CERTS_H -#define POLARSSL_CHECK_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ARC4_128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_3DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H -#define POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT -#define POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H -#define POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_OURS MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_THEIRS MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_H MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_MAX MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_H MBEDTLS_ECP_H -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN -#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE -#define POLARSSL_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_POLL_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_H MBEDTLS_ERROR_H -#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_GCM_H MBEDTLS_GCM_H -#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_H MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT32 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_UDBL MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86_64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_MD2_H MBEDTLS_MD2_H -#define POLARSSL_MD4_H MBEDTLS_MD4_H -#define POLARSSL_MD5_H MBEDTLS_MD5_H -#define POLARSSL_MD_H MBEDTLS_MD_H -#define POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD2 MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD4 MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD5 MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 -#define POLARSSL_MD_NONE MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MD_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA224 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA256 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 -#define POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR -#define POLARSSL_MODE_ECB MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_GCM MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM -#define POLARSSL_MODE_NONE MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MODE_OFB MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS -#define POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H -#define POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG -#define POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H -#define POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_NONE MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H -#define POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_H MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH -#define POLARSSL_PK_H MBEDTLS_PK_H -#define POLARSSL_PK_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA MBEDTLS_PK_RSA -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PK_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_H MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H -#define POLARSSL_PREMASTER_SIZE MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_H MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H -#define POLARSSL_RSA_H MBEDTLS_RSA_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_H MBEDTLS_SHA1_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_H MBEDTLS_SHA256_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_H MBEDTLS_SHA512_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_H MBEDTLS_SSL_H -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_H MBEDTLS_THREADING_H -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_IMPL MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_H MBEDTLS_TIMING_H -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_H MBEDTLS_VERSION_H -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MAJOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MINOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_PATCH MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING_FULL MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_H MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_H MBEDTLS_X509_H -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_H MBEDTLS_XTEA_H -#define RSA_CRYPT MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT -#define RSA_PKCS_V15 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 -#define RSA_PKCS_V21 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 -#define RSA_PRIVATE MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE -#define RSA_PUBLIC MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC -#define RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY -#define RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN -#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL -#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED -#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED -#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED -#define SSL_ARC4_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED -#define SSL_ARC4_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED -#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN ( ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) < ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) \ - ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) -#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES -#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT -#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED -#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN -#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN -#define SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND -#define SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND -#define SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES -#define SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED -#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO -#define SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD -#define SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE -#define SSL_COMPRESS_NULL MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL -#define SSL_DEBUG_BUF MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF -#define SSL_DEBUG_CRT MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT -#define SSL_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP -#define SSL_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI -#define SSL_DEBUG_MSG MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG -#define SSL_DEBUG_RET MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET -#define SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME -#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX -#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN -#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO -#define SSL_ETM_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED -#define SSL_ETM_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED -#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED -#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED -#define SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#define SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS -#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER -#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP -#define SSL_HASH_MD5 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 -#define SSL_HASH_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE -#define SSL_HASH_SHA1 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA224 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA256 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA384 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA512 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 -#define SSL_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED -#define SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_IS_CLIENT MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT -#define SSL_IS_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK -#define SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK -#define SSL_IS_SERVER MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER -#define SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_MAC_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD -#define SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 -#define SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE -#define SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#define SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MSG_ALERT MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT -#define SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA -#define SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_PADDING_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING -#define SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT -#define SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED -#define SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING -#define SSL_RETRANS_SENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING -#define SSL_RETRANS_WAITING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING -#define SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_SERVER_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT -#define SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED -#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED -#define SSL_SIG_ANON MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON -#define SSL_SIG_ECDSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA -#define SSL_SIG_RSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA -#define SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM -#define SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM -#define SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN -#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED -#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED -#define SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN -#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE -#define SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL -#define SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_EXT_ALPN MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN -#define TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#define TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#define TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#define TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO -#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME -#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME -#define TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET -#define TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT -#define TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 -#define X509_FORMAT_DER MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER -#define X509_FORMAT_PEM MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM -#define X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE -#define X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN -#define X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN -#define XTEA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT -#define XTEA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT -#define _asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring -#define _asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf -#define _asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data -#define _asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence -#define _ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context -#define _ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry -#define _ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t -#define _ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context -#define _ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -#define _ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -#define _ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -#define _ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret -#define _ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session -#define _ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform -#define _x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl -#define _x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry -#define _x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt -#define _x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr -#define _x509_time mbedtls_x509_time -#define _x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert -#define _x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr -#define aes_context mbedtls_aes_context -#define aes_crypt_cbc mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc -#define aes_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128 -#define aes_crypt_cfb8 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8 -#define aes_crypt_ctr mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr -#define aes_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb -#define aes_free mbedtls_aes_free -#define aes_init mbedtls_aes_init -#define aes_self_test mbedtls_aes_self_test -#define aes_setkey_dec mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec -#define aes_setkey_enc mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc -#define aesni_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb -#define aesni_gcm_mult mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult -#define aesni_inverse_key mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key -#define aesni_setkey_enc mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc -#define aesni_supports mbedtls_aesni_has_support -#define alarmed mbedtls_timing_alarmed -#define arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context -#define arc4_crypt mbedtls_arc4_crypt -#define arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free -#define arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init -#define arc4_self_test mbedtls_arc4_self_test -#define arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup -#define asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring -#define asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf -#define asn1_find_named_data mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data -#define asn1_free_named_data mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data -#define asn1_free_named_data_list mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list -#define asn1_get_alg mbedtls_asn1_get_alg -#define asn1_get_alg_null mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null -#define asn1_get_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring -#define asn1_get_bitstring_null mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null -#define asn1_get_bool mbedtls_asn1_get_bool -#define asn1_get_int mbedtls_asn1_get_int -#define asn1_get_len mbedtls_asn1_get_len -#define asn1_get_mpi mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi -#define asn1_get_sequence_of mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of -#define asn1_get_tag mbedtls_asn1_get_tag -#define asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data -#define asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence -#define asn1_store_named_data mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data -#define asn1_write_algorithm_identifier mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier -#define asn1_write_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring -#define asn1_write_bool mbedtls_asn1_write_bool -#define asn1_write_ia5_string mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string -#define asn1_write_int mbedtls_asn1_write_int -#define asn1_write_len mbedtls_asn1_write_len -#define asn1_write_mpi mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi -#define asn1_write_null mbedtls_asn1_write_null -#define asn1_write_octet_string mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string -#define asn1_write_oid mbedtls_asn1_write_oid -#define asn1_write_printable_string mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string -#define asn1_write_raw_buffer mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer -#define asn1_write_tag mbedtls_asn1_write_tag -#define base64_decode mbedtls_base64_decode -#define base64_encode mbedtls_base64_encode -#define base64_self_test mbedtls_base64_self_test -#define blowfish_context mbedtls_blowfish_context -#define blowfish_crypt_cbc mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc -#define blowfish_crypt_cfb64 mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64 -#define blowfish_crypt_ctr mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr -#define blowfish_crypt_ecb mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb -#define blowfish_free mbedtls_blowfish_free -#define blowfish_init mbedtls_blowfish_init -#define blowfish_setkey mbedtls_blowfish_setkey -#define camellia_context mbedtls_camellia_context -#define camellia_crypt_cbc mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc -#define camellia_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128 -#define camellia_crypt_ctr mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr -#define camellia_crypt_ecb mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb -#define camellia_free mbedtls_camellia_free -#define camellia_init mbedtls_camellia_init -#define camellia_self_test mbedtls_camellia_self_test -#define camellia_setkey_dec mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec -#define camellia_setkey_enc mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc -#define ccm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt -#define ccm_context mbedtls_ccm_context -#define ccm_encrypt_and_tag mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag -#define ccm_free mbedtls_ccm_free -#define ccm_init mbedtls_ccm_init -#define ccm_self_test mbedtls_ccm_self_test -#define cipher_auth_decrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt -#define cipher_auth_encrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt -#define cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t -#define cipher_check_tag mbedtls_cipher_check_tag -#define cipher_context_t mbedtls_cipher_context_t -#define cipher_crypt mbedtls_cipher_crypt -#define cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definition_t -#define cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions -#define cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish -#define cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free -#define cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size -#define cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode -#define cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size -#define cipher_get_key_size mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen -#define cipher_get_name mbedtls_cipher_get_name -#define cipher_get_operation mbedtls_cipher_get_operation -#define cipher_get_type mbedtls_cipher_get_type -#define cipher_id_t mbedtls_cipher_id_t -#define cipher_info_from_string mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string -#define cipher_info_from_type mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type -#define cipher_info_from_values mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values -#define cipher_info_t mbedtls_cipher_info_t -#define cipher_init mbedtls_cipher_init -#define cipher_init_ctx mbedtls_cipher_setup -#define cipher_list mbedtls_cipher_list -#define cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t -#define cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t -#define cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset -#define cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv -#define cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode -#define cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey -#define cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type_t -#define cipher_update mbedtls_cipher_update -#define cipher_update_ad mbedtls_cipher_update_ad -#define cipher_write_tag mbedtls_cipher_write_tag -#define ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context -#define ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free -#define ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init -#define ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random -#define ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add -#define ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed -#define ctr_drbg_self_test mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test -#define ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len -#define ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance -#define ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval -#define ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update -#define ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file -#define ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file -#define debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf -#define debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt -#define debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp -#define debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi -#define debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg -#define debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret -#define debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold -#define des3_context mbedtls_des3_context -#define des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc -#define des3_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb -#define des3_free mbedtls_des3_free -#define des3_init mbedtls_des3_init -#define des3_set2key_dec mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec -#define des3_set2key_enc mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc -#define des3_set3key_dec mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec -#define des3_set3key_enc mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc -#define des_context mbedtls_des_context -#define des_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc -#define des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb -#define des_free mbedtls_des_free -#define des_init mbedtls_des_init -#define des_key_check_key_parity mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity -#define des_key_check_weak mbedtls_des_key_check_weak -#define des_key_set_parity mbedtls_des_key_set_parity -#define des_self_test mbedtls_des_self_test -#define des_setkey_dec mbedtls_des_setkey_dec -#define des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc -#define dhm_calc_secret mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret -#define dhm_context mbedtls_dhm_context -#define dhm_free mbedtls_dhm_free -#define dhm_init mbedtls_dhm_init -#define dhm_make_params mbedtls_dhm_make_params -#define dhm_make_public mbedtls_dhm_make_public -#define dhm_parse_dhm mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm -#define dhm_parse_dhmfile mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile -#define dhm_read_params mbedtls_dhm_read_params -#define dhm_read_public mbedtls_dhm_read_public -#define dhm_self_test mbedtls_dhm_self_test -#define ecdh_calc_secret mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret -#define ecdh_compute_shared mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared -#define ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context -#define ecdh_free mbedtls_ecdh_free -#define ecdh_gen_public mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public -#define ecdh_get_params mbedtls_ecdh_get_params -#define ecdh_init mbedtls_ecdh_init -#define ecdh_make_params mbedtls_ecdh_make_params -#define ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public -#define ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params -#define ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public -#define ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side -#define ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context -#define ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free -#define ecdsa_from_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair -#define ecdsa_genkey mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey -#define ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info -#define ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init -#define ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature -#define ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign -#define ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det -#define ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify -#define ecdsa_write_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature -#define ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det -#define eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info -#define eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info -#define ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey -#define ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv -#define ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey -#define ecp_copy mbedtls_ecp_copy -#define ecp_curve_info mbedtls_ecp_curve_info -#define ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id -#define ecp_curve_info_from_name mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name -#define ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id -#define ecp_curve_list mbedtls_ecp_curve_list -#define ecp_gen_key mbedtls_ecp_gen_key -#define ecp_gen_keypair mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair -#define ecp_group mbedtls_ecp_group -#define ecp_group_copy mbedtls_ecp_group_copy -#define ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free -#define ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id -#define ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init -#define ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list -#define ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero -#define ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair -#define ecp_keypair_free mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free -#define ecp_keypair_init mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init -#define ecp_mul mbedtls_ecp_mul -#define ecp_point mbedtls_ecp_point -#define ecp_point_free mbedtls_ecp_point_free -#define ecp_point_init mbedtls_ecp_point_init -#define ecp_point_read_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary -#define ecp_point_read_string mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string -#define ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary -#define ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test -#define ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero -#define ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group -#define ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point -#define ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group -#define ecp_tls_write_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point -#define ecp_use_known_dp mbedtls_ecp_group_load -#define entropy_add_source mbedtls_entropy_add_source -#define entropy_context mbedtls_entropy_context -#define entropy_free mbedtls_entropy_free -#define entropy_func mbedtls_entropy_func -#define entropy_gather mbedtls_entropy_gather -#define entropy_init mbedtls_entropy_init -#define entropy_self_test mbedtls_entropy_self_test -#define entropy_update_manual mbedtls_entropy_update_manual -#define entropy_update_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file -#define entropy_write_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file -#define error_strerror mbedtls_strerror -#define f_source_ptr mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr -#define gcm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt -#define gcm_context mbedtls_gcm_context -#define gcm_crypt_and_tag mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag -#define gcm_finish mbedtls_gcm_finish -#define gcm_free mbedtls_gcm_free -#define gcm_init mbedtls_gcm_init -#define gcm_self_test mbedtls_gcm_self_test -#define gcm_starts mbedtls_gcm_starts -#define gcm_update mbedtls_gcm_update -#define get_timer mbedtls_timing_get_timer -#define hardclock mbedtls_timing_hardclock -#define hardclock_poll mbedtls_hardclock_poll -#define havege_free mbedtls_havege_free -#define havege_init mbedtls_havege_init -#define havege_poll mbedtls_havege_poll -#define havege_random mbedtls_havege_random -#define havege_state mbedtls_havege_state -#define hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context -#define hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free -#define hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init -#define hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random -#define hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add -#define hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed -#define hmac_drbg_self_test mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test -#define hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len -#define hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance -#define hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval -#define hmac_drbg_update mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update -#define hmac_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file -#define hmac_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file -#define hr_time mbedtls_timing_hr_time -#define key_exchange_type_t mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t -#define md mbedtls_md -#define md2 mbedtls_md2 -#define md2_context mbedtls_md2_context -#define md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish -#define md2_free mbedtls_md2_free -#define md2_info mbedtls_md2_info -#define md2_init mbedtls_md2_init -#define md2_process mbedtls_md2_process -#define md2_self_test mbedtls_md2_self_test -#define md2_starts mbedtls_md2_starts -#define md2_update mbedtls_md2_update -#define md4 mbedtls_md4 -#define md4_context mbedtls_md4_context -#define md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish -#define md4_free mbedtls_md4_free -#define md4_info mbedtls_md4_info -#define md4_init mbedtls_md4_init -#define md4_process mbedtls_md4_process -#define md4_self_test mbedtls_md4_self_test -#define md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts -#define md4_update mbedtls_md4_update -#define md5 mbedtls_md5 -#define md5_context mbedtls_md5_context -#define md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish -#define md5_free mbedtls_md5_free -#define md5_info mbedtls_md5_info -#define md5_init mbedtls_md5_init -#define md5_process mbedtls_md5_process -#define md5_self_test mbedtls_md5_self_test -#define md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts -#define md5_update mbedtls_md5_update -#define md_context_t mbedtls_md_context_t -#define md_file mbedtls_md_file -#define md_finish mbedtls_md_finish -#define md_free mbedtls_md_free -#define md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name -#define md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size -#define md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type -#define md_hmac mbedtls_md_hmac -#define md_hmac_finish mbedtls_md_hmac_finish -#define md_hmac_reset mbedtls_md_hmac_reset -#define md_hmac_starts mbedtls_md_hmac_starts -#define md_hmac_update mbedtls_md_hmac_update -#define md_info_from_string mbedtls_md_info_from_string -#define md_info_from_type mbedtls_md_info_from_type -#define md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t -#define md_init mbedtls_md_init -#define md_init_ctx mbedtls_md_init_ctx -#define md_list mbedtls_md_list -#define md_process mbedtls_md_process -#define md_starts mbedtls_md_starts -#define md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_t -#define md_update mbedtls_md_update -#define memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get -#define memory_buffer_alloc_free mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free -#define memory_buffer_alloc_init mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init -#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get -#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset -#define memory_buffer_alloc_self_test mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test -#define memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status -#define memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify -#define memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify -#define mpi mbedtls_mpi -#define mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs -#define mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int -#define mpi_add_mpi mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi -#define mpi_cmp_abs mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs -#define mpi_cmp_int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int -#define mpi_cmp_mpi mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi -#define mpi_copy mbedtls_mpi_copy -#define mpi_div_int mbedtls_mpi_div_int -#define mpi_div_mpi mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi -#define mpi_exp_mod mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod -#define mpi_fill_random mbedtls_mpi_fill_random -#define mpi_free mbedtls_mpi_free -#define mpi_gcd mbedtls_mpi_gcd -#define mpi_gen_prime mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime -#define mpi_get_bit mbedtls_mpi_get_bit -#define mpi_grow mbedtls_mpi_grow -#define mpi_init mbedtls_mpi_init -#define mpi_inv_mod mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod -#define mpi_is_prime mbedtls_mpi_is_prime -#define mpi_lsb mbedtls_mpi_lsb -#define mpi_lset mbedtls_mpi_lset -#define mpi_mod_int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int -#define mpi_mod_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi -#define mpi_msb mbedtls_mpi_bitlen -#define mpi_mul_int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int -#define mpi_mul_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi -#define mpi_read_binary mbedtls_mpi_read_binary -#define mpi_read_file mbedtls_mpi_read_file -#define mpi_read_string mbedtls_mpi_read_string -#define mpi_safe_cond_assign mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign -#define mpi_safe_cond_swap mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap -#define mpi_self_test mbedtls_mpi_self_test -#define mpi_set_bit mbedtls_mpi_set_bit -#define mpi_shift_l mbedtls_mpi_shift_l -#define mpi_shift_r mbedtls_mpi_shift_r -#define mpi_shrink mbedtls_mpi_shrink -#define mpi_size mbedtls_mpi_size -#define mpi_sub_abs mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs -#define mpi_sub_int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int -#define mpi_sub_mpi mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi -#define mpi_swap mbedtls_mpi_swap -#define mpi_write_binary mbedtls_mpi_write_binary -#define mpi_write_file mbedtls_mpi_write_file -#define mpi_write_string mbedtls_mpi_write_string -#define net_accept mbedtls_net_accept -#define net_bind mbedtls_net_bind -#define net_close mbedtls_net_free -#define net_connect mbedtls_net_connect -#define net_recv mbedtls_net_recv -#define net_recv_timeout mbedtls_net_recv_timeout -#define net_send mbedtls_net_send -#define net_set_block mbedtls_net_set_block -#define net_set_nonblock mbedtls_net_set_nonblock -#define net_usleep mbedtls_net_usleep -#define oid_descriptor_t mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t -#define oid_get_attr_short_name mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name -#define oid_get_cipher_alg mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg -#define oid_get_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp -#define oid_get_extended_key_usage mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage -#define oid_get_md_alg mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg -#define oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string -#define oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp -#define oid_get_oid_by_md mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md -#define oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg -#define oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg -#define oid_get_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg -#define oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg -#define oid_get_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg -#define oid_get_sig_alg_desc mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc -#define oid_get_x509_ext_type mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type -#define operation_t mbedtls_operation_t -#define padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support -#define padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc -#define padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb -#define pem_context mbedtls_pem_context -#define pem_free mbedtls_pem_free -#define pem_init mbedtls_pem_init -#define pem_read_buffer mbedtls_pem_read_buffer -#define pem_write_buffer mbedtls_pem_write_buffer -#define pk_can_do mbedtls_pk_can_do -#define pk_check_pair mbedtls_pk_check_pair -#define pk_context mbedtls_pk_context -#define pk_debug mbedtls_pk_debug -#define pk_debug_item mbedtls_pk_debug_item -#define pk_debug_type mbedtls_pk_debug_type -#define pk_decrypt mbedtls_pk_decrypt -#define pk_ec mbedtls_pk_ec -#define pk_encrypt mbedtls_pk_encrypt -#define pk_free mbedtls_pk_free -#define pk_get_len mbedtls_pk_get_len -#define pk_get_name mbedtls_pk_get_name -#define pk_get_size mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen -#define pk_get_type mbedtls_pk_get_type -#define pk_info_from_type mbedtls_pk_info_from_type -#define pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t -#define pk_init mbedtls_pk_init -#define pk_init_ctx mbedtls_pk_setup -#define pk_init_ctx_rsa_alt mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt -#define pk_load_file mbedtls_pk_load_file -#define pk_parse_key mbedtls_pk_parse_key -#define pk_parse_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile -#define pk_parse_public_key mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key -#define pk_parse_public_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile -#define pk_parse_subpubkey mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey -#define pk_rsa mbedtls_pk_rsa -#define pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func -#define pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func -#define pk_rsa_alt_sign_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func -#define pk_rsassa_pss_options mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options -#define pk_sign mbedtls_pk_sign -#define pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_type_t -#define pk_verify mbedtls_pk_verify -#define pk_verify_ext mbedtls_pk_verify_ext -#define pk_write_key_der mbedtls_pk_write_key_der -#define pk_write_key_pem mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem -#define pk_write_pubkey mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey -#define pk_write_pubkey_der mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der -#define pk_write_pubkey_pem mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem -#define pkcs11_context mbedtls_pkcs11_context -#define pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt -#define pkcs11_priv_key_free mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free -#define pkcs11_priv_key_init mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind -#define pkcs11_sign mbedtls_pkcs11_sign -#define pkcs11_x509_cert_init mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind -#define pkcs12_derivation mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation -#define pkcs12_pbe mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe -#define pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 -#define pkcs5_pbes2 mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2 -#define pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac -#define pkcs5_self_test mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test -#define platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll -#define platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit -#define platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf -#define platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf -#define platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf -#define polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit -#define polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf -#define polarssl_free mbedtls_free -#define polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free -#define polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init -#define polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock -#define polarssl_mutex_unlock mbedtls_mutex_unlock -#define polarssl_printf mbedtls_printf -#define polarssl_snprintf mbedtls_snprintf -#define polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror -#define ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 -#define ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context -#define ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish -#define ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free -#define ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info -#define ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init -#define ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process -#define ripemd160_self_test mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test -#define ripemd160_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_starts -#define ripemd160_update mbedtls_ripemd160_update -#define rsa_alt_context mbedtls_rsa_alt_context -#define rsa_alt_info mbedtls_rsa_alt_info -#define rsa_check_privkey mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey -#define rsa_check_pub_priv mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv -#define rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey -#define rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context -#define rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy -#define rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free -#define rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key -#define rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info -#define rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init -#define rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt -#define rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt -#define rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign -#define rsa_pkcs1_verify mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify -#define rsa_private mbedtls_rsa_private -#define rsa_public mbedtls_rsa_public -#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt -#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign -#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext -#define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test -#define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding -#define safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp -#define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm -#define sha1 mbedtls_sha1 -#define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context -#define sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish -#define sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free -#define sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info -#define sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init -#define sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process -#define sha1_self_test mbedtls_sha1_self_test -#define sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts -#define sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update -#define sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info -#define sha256 mbedtls_sha256 -#define sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context -#define sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish -#define sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free -#define sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info -#define sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init -#define sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process -#define sha256_self_test mbedtls_sha256_self_test -#define sha256_starts mbedtls_sha256_starts -#define sha256_update mbedtls_sha256_update -#define sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info -#define sha512 mbedtls_sha512 -#define sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context -#define sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish -#define sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free -#define sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info -#define sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init -#define sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process -#define sha512_self_test mbedtls_sha512_self_test -#define sha512_starts mbedtls_sha512_starts -#define sha512_update mbedtls_sha512_update -#define source_state mbedtls_entropy_source_state -#define ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context -#define ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry -#define ssl_cache_free mbedtls_ssl_cache_free -#define ssl_cache_get mbedtls_ssl_cache_get -#define ssl_cache_init mbedtls_ssl_cache_init -#define ssl_cache_set mbedtls_ssl_cache_set -#define ssl_cache_set_max_entries mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries -#define ssl_cache_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout -#define ssl_check_cert_usage mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage -#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_id mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id -#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_string mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string -#define ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t -#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec -#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk -#define ssl_close_notify mbedtls_ssl_close_notify -#define ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context -#define ssl_cookie_check mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check -#define ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t -#define ssl_cookie_ctx mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx -#define ssl_cookie_free mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free -#define ssl_cookie_init mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init -#define ssl_cookie_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout -#define ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup -#define ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write -#define ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t -#define ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys -#define ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check -#define ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update -#define ssl_fetch_input mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input -#define ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -#define ssl_flush_output mbedtls_ssl_flush_output -#define ssl_free mbedtls_ssl_free -#define ssl_get_alpn_protocol mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol -#define ssl_get_bytes_avail mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_name mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg -#define ssl_get_peer_cert mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert -#define ssl_get_record_expansion mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion -#define ssl_get_session mbedtls_ssl_get_session -#define ssl_get_verify_result mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result -#define ssl_get_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version -#define ssl_handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake -#define ssl_handshake_client_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step -#define ssl_handshake_free mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free -#define ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -#define ssl_handshake_server_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step -#define ssl_handshake_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step -#define ssl_handshake_wrapup mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup -#define ssl_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len -#define ssl_hs_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len -#define ssl_hw_record_activate mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate -#define ssl_hw_record_finish mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish -#define ssl_hw_record_init mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init -#define ssl_hw_record_read mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read -#define ssl_hw_record_reset mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset -#define ssl_hw_record_write mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write -#define ssl_init mbedtls_ssl_init -#define ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -#define ssl_legacy_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation -#define ssl_list_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites -#define ssl_md_alg_from_hash mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash -#define ssl_optimize_checksum mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum -#define ssl_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_own_cert -#define ssl_own_key mbedtls_ssl_own_key -#define ssl_parse_certificate mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate -#define ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec -#define ssl_parse_finished mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished -#define ssl_pk_alg_from_sig mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig -#define ssl_pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt -#define ssl_pkcs11_key_len mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len -#define ssl_pkcs11_sign mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign -#define ssl_psk_derive_premaster mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster -#define ssl_read mbedtls_ssl_read -#define ssl_read_record mbedtls_ssl_read_record -#define ssl_read_version mbedtls_ssl_read_version -#define ssl_recv_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed -#define ssl_renegotiate mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate -#define ssl_resend mbedtls_ssl_resend -#define ssl_reset_checksum mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum -#define ssl_send_alert_message mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message -#define ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure -#define ssl_send_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed -#define ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session -#define ssl_session_free mbedtls_ssl_session_free -#define ssl_session_init mbedtls_ssl_session_init -#define ssl_session_reset mbedtls_ssl_session_reset -#define ssl_set_alpn_protocols mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols -#define ssl_set_arc4_support mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support -#define ssl_set_authmode mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode -#define ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_set_bio -#define ssl_set_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain -#define ssl_set_cbc_record_splitting mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting -#define ssl_set_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites -#define ssl_set_ciphersuites_for_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version -#define ssl_set_client_transport_id mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id -#define ssl_set_curves mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves -#define ssl_set_dbg mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg -#define ssl_set_dh_param mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param -#define ssl_set_dh_param_ctx mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx -#define ssl_set_dtls_anti_replay mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay -#define ssl_set_dtls_badmac_limit mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit -#define ssl_set_dtls_cookies mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies -#define ssl_set_encrypt_then_mac mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac -#define ssl_set_endpoint mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint -#define ssl_set_extended_master_secret mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret -#define ssl_set_fallback mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback -#define ssl_set_handshake_timeout mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout -#define ssl_set_hostname mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname -#define ssl_set_max_frag_len mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len -#define ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version -#define ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version -#define ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert -#define ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk -#define ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb -#define ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation -#define ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced -#define ssl_set_renegotiation_period mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period -#define ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng -#define ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session -#define ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache -#define ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets -#define ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni -#define ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport -#define ssl_set_truncated_hmac mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac -#define ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify -#define ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk -#define ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states -#define ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform -#define ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free -#define ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write -#define ssl_write_certificate mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate -#define ssl_write_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec -#define ssl_write_finished mbedtls_ssl_write_finished -#define ssl_write_record mbedtls_ssl_write_record -#define ssl_write_version mbedtls_ssl_write_version -#define supported_ciphers mbedtls_cipher_supported -#define t_sint mbedtls_mpi_sint -#define t_udbl mbedtls_t_udbl -#define t_uint mbedtls_mpi_uint -#define test_ca_crt mbedtls_test_ca_crt -#define test_ca_crt_ec mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec -#define test_ca_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa -#define test_ca_key mbedtls_test_ca_key -#define test_ca_key_ec mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec -#define test_ca_key_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa -#define test_ca_list mbedtls_test_cas_pem -#define test_ca_pwd mbedtls_test_ca_pwd -#define test_ca_pwd_ec mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec -#define test_ca_pwd_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa -#define test_cli_crt mbedtls_test_cli_crt -#define test_cli_crt_ec mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec -#define test_cli_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa -#define test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key -#define test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec -#define test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa -#define test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt -#define test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec -#define test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa -#define test_srv_key mbedtls_test_srv_key -#define test_srv_key_ec mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec -#define test_srv_key_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa -#define threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_mutex_t -#define threading_set_alt mbedtls_threading_set_alt -#define timing_self_test mbedtls_timing_self_test -#define version_check_feature mbedtls_version_check_feature -#define version_get_number mbedtls_version_get_number -#define version_get_string mbedtls_version_get_string -#define version_get_string_full mbedtls_version_get_string_full -#define x509_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring -#define x509_buf mbedtls_x509_buf -#define x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl -#define x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry -#define x509_crl_free mbedtls_x509_crl_free -#define x509_crl_info mbedtls_x509_crl_info -#define x509_crl_init mbedtls_x509_crl_init -#define x509_crl_parse mbedtls_x509_crl_parse -#define x509_crl_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der -#define x509_crl_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file -#define x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt -#define x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage -#define x509_crt_check_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage -#define x509_crt_free mbedtls_x509_crt_free -#define x509_crt_info mbedtls_x509_crt_info -#define x509_crt_init mbedtls_x509_crt_init -#define x509_crt_parse mbedtls_x509_crt_parse -#define x509_crt_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der -#define x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file -#define x509_crt_parse_path mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path -#define x509_crt_revoked mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked -#define x509_crt_verify mbedtls_x509_crt_verify -#define x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr -#define x509_csr_free mbedtls_x509_csr_free -#define x509_csr_info mbedtls_x509_csr_info -#define x509_csr_init mbedtls_x509_csr_init -#define x509_csr_parse mbedtls_x509_csr_parse -#define x509_csr_parse_der mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der -#define x509_csr_parse_file mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file -#define x509_dn_gets mbedtls_x509_dn_gets -#define x509_get_alg mbedtls_x509_get_alg -#define x509_get_alg_null mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null -#define x509_get_ext mbedtls_x509_get_ext -#define x509_get_name mbedtls_x509_get_name -#define x509_get_rsassa_pss_params mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params -#define x509_get_serial mbedtls_x509_get_serial -#define x509_get_sig mbedtls_x509_get_sig -#define x509_get_sig_alg mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg -#define x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time -#define x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper -#define x509_name mbedtls_x509_name -#define x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test -#define x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence -#define x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets -#define x509_set_extension mbedtls_x509_set_extension -#define x509_sig_alg_gets mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets -#define x509_string_to_names mbedtls_x509_string_to_names -#define x509_time mbedtls_x509_time -#define x509_time_expired mbedtls_x509_time_is_past -#define x509_time_future mbedtls_x509_time_is_future -#define x509_write_extensions mbedtls_x509_write_extensions -#define x509_write_names mbedtls_x509_write_names -#define x509_write_sig mbedtls_x509_write_sig -#define x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert -#define x509write_crt_der mbedtls_x509write_crt_der -#define x509write_crt_free mbedtls_x509write_crt_free -#define x509write_crt_init mbedtls_x509write_crt_init -#define x509write_crt_pem mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem -#define x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier -#define x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints -#define x509write_crt_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension -#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key -#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name -#define x509write_crt_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage -#define x509write_crt_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg -#define x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type -#define x509write_crt_set_serial mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name -#define x509write_crt_set_validity mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity -#define x509write_crt_set_version mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version -#define x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr -#define x509write_csr_der mbedtls_x509write_csr_der -#define x509write_csr_free mbedtls_x509write_csr_free -#define x509write_csr_init mbedtls_x509write_csr_init -#define x509write_csr_pem mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem -#define x509write_csr_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension -#define x509write_csr_set_key mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key -#define x509write_csr_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage -#define x509write_csr_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg -#define x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type -#define x509write_csr_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name -#define xtea_context mbedtls_xtea_context -#define xtea_crypt_cbc mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc -#define xtea_crypt_ecb mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb -#define xtea_free mbedtls_xtea_free -#define xtea_init mbedtls_xtea_init -#define xtea_self_test mbedtls_xtea_self_test -#define xtea_setup mbedtls_xtea_setup - -#endif /* compat-1.3.h */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cdf81dcb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/** + * \file compat-2.x.h + * + * \brief Compatibility definitions + * + * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Including compat-2.x.h is deprecated" +#endif + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H +#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H + +/* + * Macros for renamed functions + */ +#define mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update +#define mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update +#define mbedtls_md5_starts_ret mbedtls_md5_starts +#define mbedtls_md5_update_ret mbedtls_md5_update +#define mbedtls_md5_finish_ret mbedtls_md5_finish +#define mbedtls_md5_ret mbedtls_md5 +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_starts +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_update +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_finish +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_ret mbedtls_ripemd160 +#define mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret mbedtls_sha1_starts +#define mbedtls_sha1_update_ret mbedtls_sha1_update +#define mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret mbedtls_sha1_finish +#define mbedtls_sha1_ret mbedtls_sha1 +#define mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret mbedtls_sha256_starts +#define mbedtls_sha256_update_ret mbedtls_sha256_update +#define mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret mbedtls_sha256_finish +#define mbedtls_sha256_ret mbedtls_sha256 +#define mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret mbedtls_sha512_starts +#define mbedtls_sha512_update_ret mbedtls_sha512_update +#define mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret mbedtls_sha512_finish +#define mbedtls_sha512_ret mbedtls_sha512 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f182c527 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,770 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_psa.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options takes settings defined in + * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses + * those definitions to define symbols used in the library code. + * + * Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit + * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for MBETLS_XXX settings or + * include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "psa/crypto_config.h" +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* De facto synonyms */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* If any of the block modes are requested that don't have an + * associated HW assist, define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE for checking + * in the block cipher key types. */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS)) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1 +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#endif /*PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ + +/* If any of the software block ciphers are selected, define + * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these + * situations. */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#error "CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_XTS 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +/* + * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4249). + */ +#error "Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3541). + */ +#error "SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +/* + * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * is not defined + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1 + +// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLSS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_XTS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +#endif + +/* Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4249) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +#endif + +/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +/* These features are always enabled. */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h index 3a4b7f3f..c188b08a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h @@ -1,18 +1,28 @@ /** * \file ctr_drbg.h * - * \brief This file contains CTR_DRBG definitions and functions. + * \brief This file contains definitions and functions for the + * CTR_DRBG pseudorandom generator. * * CTR_DRBG is a standardized way of building a PRNG from a block-cipher * in counter mode operation, as defined in NIST SP 800-90A: * Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random * Bit Generators. * - * The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 as the underlying - * block cipher. + * The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 (default) or AES-128 + * (if \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled at compile time) + * as the underlying block cipher, with a derivation function. + * + * The security strength as defined in NIST SP 800-90A is + * 128 bits when AES-128 is used (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY enabled) + * and 256 bits otherwise, provided that #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is + * kept at its default value (and not overridden in mbedtls_config.h) and that the + * DRBG instance is set up with default parameters. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more + * information. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -26,17 +36,18 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0034 /**< The entropy source failed. */ @@ -45,7 +56,23 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A /**< Read or write error in file. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< The block size used by the cipher. */ -#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32 /**< The key size used by the cipher. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 16 +/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. + * + * Compile-time choice: 16 bytes (128 bits) + * because #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled. + */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32 +/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. + * + * Compile-time choice: 32 bytes (256 bits) + * because \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled. + */ +#endif + #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 8 ) /**< The key size for the DRBG operation, in bits. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) /**< The seed length, calculated as (counter + AES key). */ @@ -53,26 +80,36 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them using the compiler command + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them using the compiler command * line. * \{ */ +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + * + * \brief The amount of entropy used per seed by default, in bytes. + */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) +/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512 + * (\c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is disabled). + */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 -/**< The amount of entropy used per seed by default: - *
        • 48 with SHA-512.
          • - *
        • 32 with SHA-256.
        + +#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ + +/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256 + * (the SHA512 module is disabled or + * \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled). */ -#else +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +/** \warning To achieve a 256-bit security strength, you must pass a nonce + * to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). + */ +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 32 -/**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default: - *
        • 48 with SHA-512.
          • - *
        • 32 with SHA-256.
        - */ -#endif -#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 @@ -91,7 +128,7 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 -/**< The maximum size of seed or reseed buffer. */ +/**< The maximum size of seed or reseed buffer in bytes. */ #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ @@ -105,33 +142,69 @@ extern "C" { #endif +#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 +/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. + * + * This is \c 0 because a single read from the entropy source is sufficient + * to include a nonce. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN 0 +#else +/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. + * + * This is half of the default entropy length because a single read from + * the entropy source does not provide enough material to form a nonce. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1 ) / 2 +#endif + /** * \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context { - unsigned char counter[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ - int reseed_counter; /*!< The reseed counter. */ - int prediction_resistance; /*!< This determines whether prediction + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(counter)[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< The reseed counter. + * This is the number of requests that have + * been made since the last (re)seeding, + * minus one. + * Before the initial seeding, this field + * contains the amount of entropy in bytes + * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, + * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly + * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< This determines whether prediction resistance is enabled, that is whether to systematically reseed before each random generation. */ - size_t entropy_len; /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each - seed or reseed operation. */ - int reseed_interval; /*!< The reseed interval. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each + seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< The reseed interval. + * This is the maximum number of requests + * that can be made between reseedings. */ - mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; /*!< The AES context. */ + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes_ctx); /*!< The AES context. */ /* * Callbacks (Entropy) */ - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< The entropy callback function. */ - void *p_entropy; /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if f_entropy != NULL. + * This means that the mutex is initialized during the initial seeding + * in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it + * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. + */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context; @@ -141,6 +214,11 @@ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context; * and prepares it for mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). * + * \note The reseed interval is + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL by default. + * You can override it by calling + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). + * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to initialize. */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); @@ -149,17 +227,97 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); * \brief This function seeds and sets up the CTR_DRBG * entropy source for future reseeds. * - * \note Personalization data can be provided in addition to the more generic - * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. + * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is + * to use the entropy module: + * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); + * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized + * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default + * entropy sources). + * + * The entropy length is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN by default. + * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * The entropy nonce length is: + * - \c 0 if the entropy length is at least 3/2 times the entropy length, + * which guarantees that the security strength is the maximum permitted + * by the key size and entropy length according to NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1; + * - Half the entropy length otherwise. + * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). + * With the default entropy length, the entropy nonce length is + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN. + * + * You can provide a nonce and personalization string in addition to the + * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. + * See SP 800-90A §8.6.7 for more details about nonces. + * + * The _seed_material_ value passed to the derivation function in + * the CTR_DRBG Instantiate Process described in NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2 + * is the concatenation of the following strings: + * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy + * length. + */ +#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0 +/** + * - If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() has been called, a string + * obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the specified length. + */ +#else +/** + * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy nonce + * length. If the entropy nonce length is \c 0, this function does not + * make a second call to \p f_entropy. + */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * - The \p custom string. + * + * \note To achieve the nominal security strength permitted + * by CTR_DRBG, the entropy length must be: + * - at least 16 bytes for a 128-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); + * - at least 32 bytes for a 256-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). + * + * In addition, if you do not pass a nonce in \p custom, + * the sum of the entropy length + * and the entropy nonce length must be: + * - at least 24 bytes for a 128-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); + * - at least 48 bytes for a 256-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to seed. + * It must have been initialized with + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + * After a successful call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), + * you may not call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() again on + * the same context unless you call + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free() and mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init() + * again first. + * After a failed call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), + * you must call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the - length of the buffer. - * \param p_entropy The entropy context. - * \param custom Personalization data, that is device-specific - identifiers. Can be NULL. - * \param len The length of the personalization data. + * length of the buffer. + * \p f_entropy is always called with a buffer size + * less than or equal to the entropy length. + * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * This must be at most + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * - #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. @@ -171,7 +329,8 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ); /** - * \brief This function clears CTR_CRBG context data. + * \brief This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to clear. */ @@ -182,7 +341,8 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); * The default value is off. * * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of - * every call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(). + * every call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient * throughput. * @@ -194,18 +354,61 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, /** * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each - * seed or reseed. The default value is - * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. + * seed or reseed. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. + * + * \note The security strength of CTR_DRBG is bounded by the + * entropy length. Thus: + * - When using AES-256 + * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled, + * which is the default), + * \p len must be at least 32 (in bytes) + * to achieve a 256-bit strength. + * - When using AES-128 + * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled) + * \p len must be at least 16 (in bytes) + * to achieve a 128-bit strength. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. - * \param len The amount of entropy to grab. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * and at most the maximum length accepted by the + * entropy function that is set in the context. */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ); +/** + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed + * as a nonce for the initial seeding. + * + * Call this function before calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to read + * a nonce from the entropy source during the initial seeding. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab for the nonce, in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * and at most the maximum length accepted by the + * entropy function that is set in the context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if \p len is + * more than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if the initial seeding has already taken place. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ); + /** * \brief This function sets the reseed interval. - * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. + * + * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function + * is called again. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param interval The reseed interval. @@ -217,9 +420,18 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, * \brief This function reseeds the CTR_DRBG context, that is * extracts data from the entropy source. * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. - * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. Can be NULL. + * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. Can be \c NULL. * \param len The length of the additional data. + * This must be less than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len + * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length + * configured for the context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. @@ -230,31 +442,53 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, /** * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. * - * \note If \p add_len is greater than - * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first - * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used. - * The remaining Bytes are silently discarded. + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. - * \param additional The data to update the state with. - * \param add_len Length of \p additional data. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. This must not be + * \c NULL unless \p add_len is \c 0. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. This must be at + * most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if + * \p add_len is more than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure. */ -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ); /** * \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional * data and uses it to generate random data. * - * \note The function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded. + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. - * \param output_len The length of the buffer. - * \param additional Additional data to update. Can be NULL. - * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * \param additional Additional data to update. Can be \c NULL, in which + * case the additional data is empty regardless of + * the value of \p add_len. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data + * if \p additional is not \c NULL. + * This must be less than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and less than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len + * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length + * configured for the context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or @@ -267,12 +501,22 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, /** * \brief This function uses CTR_DRBG to generate random data. * - * \note The function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded. - * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. - * \param output_len The length of the buffer. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or @@ -290,7 +534,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed * failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); @@ -304,12 +548,16 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on + * reseed failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing + * seed file is too large. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief The CTR_DRBG checkup routine. * @@ -318,10 +566,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); -/* Internal functions (do not call directly) */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *, - int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/debug.h index ef8db67f..0aed5961 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/debug.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/debug.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Functions for controlling and providing debug output from the library. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,22 +18,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H #define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include "ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) @@ -61,8 +55,17 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) \ mbedtls_debug_print_crt( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, crt ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) do { } while( 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) \ + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, ecdh, attr ) #endif #else /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ @@ -73,9 +76,59 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) do { } while( 0 ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE + * + * Mark a function as having printf attributes, and thus enable checking + * via -wFormat and other flags. This does nothing on builds with compilers + * that do not support the format attribute + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#if defined(__has_attribute) +#if __has_attribute(format) +#if defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \ + __attribute__((__format__ (gnu_printf, string_index, first_to_check))) +#else /* defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \ + __attribute__((format(printf, string_index, first_to_check))) +#endif +#else /* __has_attribute(format) */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) +#endif /* __has_attribute(format) */ +#else /* defined(__has_attribute) */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) +#endif + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + * + * MBEDTLS_PRINTF_xxx: Due to issues with older window compilers + * and MinGW we need to define the printf specifier for size_t + * and long long per platform. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#if (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) + #include + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET PRIuPTR + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "I64d" +#else /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "zu" + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "lld" +#endif /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -114,7 +167,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( int threshold ); */ void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, - const char *format, ... ); + const char *format, ... ) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); /** * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This @@ -200,7 +253,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, @@ -221,9 +274,38 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, +} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; + +/** + * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug + * output. This function is always used through the + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file + * and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param ecdh the ECDH context + * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ); +#endif + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* debug.h */ - diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/des.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/des.h index 91d16b6f..9e2f6839 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/des.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/des.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * instead. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -23,17 +23,12 @@ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H #define MBEDTLS_DES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -42,7 +37,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032 /**< The data input has an invalid length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0033 /**< DES hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8 @@ -63,7 +57,7 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_des_context { - uint32_t sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des_context; @@ -72,7 +66,7 @@ mbedtls_des_context; */ typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context { - uint32_t sk[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des3_context; @@ -336,6 +330,8 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief Checkup routine * @@ -343,6 +339,8 @@ void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], */ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/dhm.h index 3e117894..75baed95 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/dhm.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/dhm.h @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ * */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -58,19 +58,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H #define MBEDTLS_DHM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif -#include "bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /* * DHM Error codes @@ -84,9 +79,19 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3380 /**< The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480 /**< Read or write of file failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3500 /**< DHM hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580 /**< Setting the modulus and generator failed. */ +/** Which parameter to access in mbedtls_dhm_get_value(). */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, /*!< The prime modulus. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, /*!< The generator. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X, /*!< Our secret value. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX, /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY, /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K, /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ +} mbedtls_dhm_parameter; + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -98,17 +103,16 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context { - size_t len; /*!< The size of \p P in Bytes. */ - mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus. */ - mbedtls_mpi G; /*!< The generator. */ - mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< Our secret value. */ - mbedtls_mpi GX; /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi GY; /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi K; /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi pX; /*!< The previous \c X. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The prime modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(G); /*!< The generator. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< Our secret value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GX); /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GY); /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(K); /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pX); /*!< The previous \c X. */ } mbedtls_dhm_context; @@ -124,9 +128,15 @@ mbedtls_dhm_context; void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief This function parses the ServerKeyExchange parameters. + * \brief This function parses the DHM parameters in a + * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message + * (DHM modulus, generator, and public key). * - * \param ctx The DHM context. + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client + * sets up its DHM context from the server's public + * DHM key material. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized. * \param p On input, *p must be the start of the input buffer. * On output, *p is updated to point to the end of the data * that has been read. On success, this is the first byte @@ -140,31 +150,37 @@ void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, - unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end ); + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ); /** - * \brief This function sets up and writes the ServerKeyExchange - * parameters. + * \brief This function generates a DHM key pair and exports its + * public part together with the DHM parameters in the format + * used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. * - * \note The destination buffer must be large enough to hold - * the reduced binary presentation of the modulus, the generator - * and the public key, each wrapped with a 2-byte length field. - * It is the responsibility of the caller to ensure that enough - * space is available. Refer to \c mbedtls_mpi_size to computing - * the byte-size of an MPI. - * - * \note This function assumes that \c ctx->P and \c ctx->G - * have already been properly set. For that, use + * \note This function assumes that the DHM parameters \c ctx->P + * and \c ctx->G have already been properly set. For that, use * mbedtls_dhm_set_group() below in conjunction with * mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() and mbedtls_mpi_read_string(). * - * \param ctx The DHM context. + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server generates + * and exports its DHM key material. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized + * and have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not + * already have imported the peer's public key. * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. - * \param olen The number of characters written. - * \param output The destination buffer. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes + * written on success. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * sufficient size to hold the reduced binary presentation of + * the modulus, the generator and the public key, each wrapped + * with a 2-byte length field. It is the responsibility of the + * caller to ensure that enough space is available. Refer to + * mbedtls_mpi_size() to computing the byte-size of an MPI. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. @@ -177,12 +193,14 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, /** * \brief This function sets the prime modulus and generator. * - * \note This function can be used to set \p P, \p G + * \note This function can be used to set \c ctx->P, \c ctx->G * in preparation for mbedtls_dhm_make_params(). * - * \param ctx The DHM context. - * \param P The MPI holding the DHM prime modulus. - * \param G The MPI holding the DHM generator. + * \param ctx The DHM context to configure. This must be initialized. + * \param P The MPI holding the DHM prime modulus. This must be + * an initialized MPI. + * \param G The MPI holding the DHM generator. This must be an + * initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. @@ -192,11 +210,17 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *G ); /** - * \brief This function imports the public value of the peer, G^Y. + * \brief This function imports the raw public value of the peer. * - * \param ctx The DHM context. - * \param input The input buffer containing the G^Y value of the peer. - * \param ilen The size of the input buffer. + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server imports + * the Client's public DHM key. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and have + * its DHM parameters set, e.g. via mbedtls_dhm_set_group(). + * It may or may not already have generated its own private key. + * \param input The input buffer containing the \c G^Y value of the peer. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The size of the input buffer \p input in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. @@ -205,21 +229,25 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** - * \brief This function creates its own private key, \c X, and - * exports \c G^X. + * \brief This function creates a DHM key pair and exports + * the raw public key in big-endian format. * * \note The destination buffer is always fully written * so as to contain a big-endian representation of G^X mod P. - * If it is larger than ctx->len, it is padded accordingly + * If it is larger than \c ctx->len, it is padded accordingly * with zero-bytes at the beginning. * - * \param ctx The DHM context. + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and + * have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not already + * have imported the peer's public key. * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. - * \param output The destination buffer. - * \param olen The length of the destination buffer. Must be at least - * equal to ctx->len (the size of \c P). - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p olen Bytes. + * \param olen The length of the destination buffer. This must be at least + * equal to `ctx->len` (the size of \c P). + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. @@ -230,22 +258,27 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, void *p_rng ); /** - * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret - * \c (G^Y)^X mod \c P. + * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret + * \c (G^Y)^X mod \c P. * - * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to blind the input as - * a countermeasure against timing attacks. Blinding is used - * only if our private key \c X is re-used, and not used - * otherwise. We recommend always passing a non-NULL - * \p f_rng argument. + * \note If \p f_rng is not \c NULL, it is used to blind the input as + * a countermeasure against timing attacks. Blinding is used + * only if our private key \c X is re-used, and not used + * otherwise. We recommend always passing a non-NULL + * \p f_rng argument. * - * \param ctx The DHM context. - * \param output The destination buffer. - * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. Must be at least - * the size of ctx->len (the size of \c P). + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized + * and have its own private key generated and the peer's + * public key imported. + * \param output The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This + * must be a writable buffer of size \p output_size Bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at + * least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P). * \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written. - * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. Used for + * blinding. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. @@ -256,45 +289,88 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, void *p_rng ); /** - * \brief This function frees and clears the components of a DHM context. + * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bits. * - * \param ctx The DHM context to free and clear. + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * + * \return The size of the prime modulus in bits, + * i.e. the number n such that 2^(n-1) <= P < 2^n. + */ +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bytes. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * + * \return The size of the prime modulus in bytes, + * i.e. the number n such that 2^(8*(n-1)) <= P < 2^(8*n). + */ +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function copies a parameter of a DHM key. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * \param param The parameter to copy. + * \param dest The MPI object to copy the value into. It must be + * initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p field is invalid. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code if the copy fails. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_get_value( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_dhm_parameter param, + mbedtls_mpi *dest ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees and clears the components + * of a DHM context. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to free and clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized DHM context. */ void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -/** \ingroup x509_module */ /** * \brief This function parses DHM parameters in PEM or DER format. * - * \param dhm The DHM context to initialize. - * \param dhmin The input buffer. - * \param dhminlen The size of the buffer, including the terminating null - * Byte for PEM data. + * \param dhm The DHM context to import the DHM parameters into. + * This must be initialized. + * \param dhmin The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of + * length \p dhminlen Bytes. + * \param dhminlen The size of the input buffer \p dhmin, including the + * terminating \c NULL Byte for PEM data. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX error code - * error code on failure. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX error + * code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, - size_t dhminlen ); + size_t dhminlen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -/** \ingroup x509_module */ /** * \brief This function loads and parses DHM parameters from a file. * * \param dhm The DHM context to load the parameters to. + * This must be initialized. * \param path The filename to read the DHM parameters from. + * This must not be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX error code - * error code on failure. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX + * error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief The DMH checkup routine. * @@ -303,6 +379,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ); */ int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif @@ -348,170 +425,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ); * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const * mbedtls_deprecated_constant_t; -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ - ( (mbedtls_deprecated_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL -#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ - -/** - * \warning The origin of the primes in RFC 5114 is not documented and - * their use therefore constitutes a security risk! - * - * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated and are - * likely to be removed in a future version of the library without - * replacement. - */ - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the - * 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined - * in RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with - * IETF Standards. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "AD107E1E9123A9D0D660FAA79559C51FA20D64E5683B9FD1" \ - "B54B1597B61D0A75E6FA141DF95A56DBAF9A3C407BA1DF15" \ - "EB3D688A309C180E1DE6B85A1274A0A66D3F8152AD6AC212" \ - "9037C9EDEFDA4DF8D91E8FEF55B7394B7AD5B7D0B6C12207" \ - "C9F98D11ED34DBF6C6BA0B2C8BBC27BE6A00E0A0B9C49708" \ - "B3BF8A317091883681286130BC8985DB1602E714415D9330" \ - "278273C7DE31EFDC7310F7121FD5A07415987D9ADC0A486D" \ - "CDF93ACC44328387315D75E198C641A480CD86A1B9E587E8" \ - "BE60E69CC928B2B9C52172E413042E9B23F10B0E16E79763" \ - "C9B53DCF4BA80A29E3FB73C16B8E75B97EF363E2FFA31F71" \ - "CF9DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F" ) - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP - * Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined in RFC-5114: - * Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "AC4032EF4F2D9AE39DF30B5C8FFDAC506CDEBE7B89998CAF" \ - "74866A08CFE4FFE3A6824A4E10B9A6F0DD921F01A70C4AFA" \ - "AB739D7700C29F52C57DB17C620A8652BE5E9001A8D66AD7" \ - "C17669101999024AF4D027275AC1348BB8A762D0521BC98A" \ - "E247150422EA1ED409939D54DA7460CDB5F6C6B250717CBE" \ - "F180EB34118E98D119529A45D6F834566E3025E316A330EF" \ - "BB77A86F0C1AB15B051AE3D428C8F8ACB70A8137150B8EEB" \ - "10E183EDD19963DDD9E263E4770589EF6AA21E7F5F2FF381" \ - "B539CCE3409D13CD566AFBB48D6C019181E1BCFE94B30269" \ - "EDFE72FE9B6AA4BD7B5A0F1C71CFFF4C19C418E1F6EC0179" \ - "81BC087F2A7065B384B890D3191F2BFA" ) - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 2048-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - * - * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 3625 are deprecated and - * superseded by the corresponding macros providing them as - * binary constants. Their hex-encoded constants are likely - * to be removed in a future version of the library. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 3072-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3072: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ - "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ - "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ - "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ - "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ - "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 3072-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 4096-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ - "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ - "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ - "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ - "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ - "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D7" \ - "88719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA" \ - "2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6" \ - "287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED" \ - "1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA9" \ - "93B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199" \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 4096-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h index 95f39805..7fa7440a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * Cryptography. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -27,14 +27,39 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +/* + * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context + * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes + * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, + * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + + * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller + * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it + * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. + * The new format is incompatible with applications that access + * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#else +#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) +#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#include "everest/everest.h" +#endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -49,23 +74,99 @@ typedef enum MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS, /**< The key of the peer. */ } mbedtls_ecdh_side; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) /** + * Defines the ECDH implementation used. + * + * Later versions of the library may add new variants, therefore users should + * not make any assumptions about them. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE = 0, /*!< Implementation not defined. */ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0,/*!< The default Mbed TLS implementation */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST /*!< Everest implementation */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdh_variant; + +/** + * The context used by the default ECDH implementation. + * + * Later versions might change the structure of this context, therefore users + * should not make any assumptions about the structure of + * mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; +#endif + +/** + * + * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same + * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type + * should not be shared between multiple threads. * \brief The ECDH context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context { - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ - mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ - int point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi _d; /*!< The previous \p d. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(_d); /*!< The previous \p d. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#else + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages + as defined in RFC 4492. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_ecdh_variant MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(var); /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ + union + { + mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mbed_ecdh); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(everest_ecdh); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< Implementation-specific context. The + context in use is specified by the \c var + field. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of + an alternative implementation not supporting + restartable mode must return + MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error + if this flag is set. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ } mbedtls_ecdh_context; +/** + * \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH. + * + * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. + * + * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); + /** * \brief This function generates an ECDH keypair on an elliptic * curve. @@ -76,16 +177,20 @@ mbedtls_ecdh_context; * * \see ecp.h * - * \param grp The ECP group. + * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have + * domain parameters loaded, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). * \param d The destination MPI (private key). + * This must be initialized. * \param Q The destination point (public key). - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. - * */ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -104,15 +209,22 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). * - * \param grp The ECP group. + * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have + * domain parameters loaded, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). * \param z The destination MPI (shared secret). + * This must be initialized. * \param Q The public key from another party. + * This must be initialized. * \param d Our secret exponent (private key). - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a + * context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, @@ -123,39 +235,62 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, /** * \brief This function initializes an ECDH context. * - * \param ctx The ECDH context to initialize. + * \param ctx The ECDH context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief This function frees a context. + * \brief This function sets up the ECDH context with the information + * given. * - * \param ctx The context to free. - */ -void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief This function generates a public key and a TLS - * ServerKeyExchange payload. + * This function should be called after mbedtls_ecdh_init() but + * before mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(). There is no need to call + * this function before mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). * * This is the first function used by a TLS server for ECDHE * ciphersuites. * - * \note This function assumes that the ECP group (grp) of the - * \p ctx context has already been properly set, - * for example, using mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param grp_id The group id of the group to set up the context for. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees a context. + * + * \param ctx The context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function does nothing. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized ECDH context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an EC key pair and exports its + * in the format used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake + * message. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS server for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup().) * * \see ecp.h * - * \param ctx The ECDH context. - * \param olen The number of characters written. - * \param buf The destination buffer. - * \param blen The length of the destination buffer. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, @@ -163,24 +298,32 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng ); /** - * \brief This function parses and processes a TLS ServerKeyExhange - * payload. + * \brief This function parses the ECDHE parameters in a + * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. * - * This is the first function used by a TLS client for ECDHE - * ciphersuites. + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client + * sets up its ECDHE context from the server's public + * ECDHE key material. * * \see ecp.h * - * \param ctx The ECDH context. - * \param buf The pointer to the start of the input buffer. - * \param end The address for one Byte past the end of the buffer. + * \param ctx The ECDHE context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param buf On input, \c *buf must be the start of the input buffer. + * On output, \c *buf is updated to point to the end of the + * data that has been read. On success, this is the first byte + * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters. + * On error, this is the point at which an error has been + * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug + * failures. + * \param end The end of the input buffer. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, - const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ); + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ); /** * \brief This function sets up an ECDH context from an EC key. @@ -191,36 +334,45 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, * * \see ecp.h * - * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. - * \param key The EC key to use. - * \param side Defines the source of the key: 1: Our key, or - * 0: The key of the peer. + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized. + * \param side Defines the source of the key. Possible values are: + * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS: The key is ours. + * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS: The key is that of the peer. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. * */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, - mbedtls_ecdh_side side ); +int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ); /** - * \brief This function generates a public key and a TLS - * ClientKeyExchange payload. + * \brief This function generates a public key and exports it + * as a TLS ClientKeyExchange payload. * * This is the second function used by a TLS client for ECDH(E) * ciphersuites. * * \see ecp.h * - * \param ctx The ECDH context. - * \param olen The number of Bytes written. - * \param buf The destination buffer. - * \param blen The size of the destination buffer. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, the latter usually by + * mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The size of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, @@ -228,23 +380,26 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng ); /** - * \brief This function parses and processes a TLS ClientKeyExchange - * payload. + * \brief This function parses and processes the ECDHE payload of a + * TLS ClientKeyExchange message. * - * This is the second function used by a TLS server for ECDH(E) - * ciphersuites. + * This is the third function used by a TLS server for ECDH(E) + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup() and + * mbedtls_ecdh_make_params().) * * \see ecp.h * - * \param ctx The ECDH context. - * \param buf The start of the input buffer. - * \param blen The length of the input buffer. + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). + * \param buf The pointer to the ClientKeyExchange payload. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); /** * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret. @@ -257,22 +412,45 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). * * \see ecp.h - * - * \param ctx The ECDH context. - * \param olen The number of Bytes written. - * \param buf The destination buffer. - * \param blen The length of the destination buffer. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and have its own private key generated and the peer's + * public key imported. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of + * Bytes written on success. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This + * must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng + * doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief This function enables restartable EC computations for this + * context. (Default: disabled.) + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() + * + * \note It is not possible to safely disable restartable + * computations once enabled, except by free-ing the context, + * which cancels possible in-progress operations. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h index ce1a03d7..71b73eee 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ * */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -25,50 +25,117 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "ecp.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -/* - * RFC-4492 page 20: +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +/** + * \brief Maximum ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size * + * \param bits Curve size in bits + * \return Maximum signature size in bytes + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument + * is one. It may evaluate its argument multiple times. + */ +/* * Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { * r INTEGER, * s INTEGER * } * - * Size is at most - * 1 (tag) + 1 (len) + 1 (initial 0) + ECP_MAX_BYTES for each of r and s, - * twice that + 1 (tag) + 2 (len) for the sequence - * (assuming ECP_MAX_BYTES is less than 126 for r and s, - * and less than 124 (total len <= 255) for the sequence) + * For each of r and s, the value (V) may include an extra initial "0" bit. */ -#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES > 124 -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES bigger than expected, please fix MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN" -#endif -/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN ( 3 + 2 * ( 3 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits ) \ + ( /*T,L of SEQUENCE*/ ( ( bits ) >= 61 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ + /*T,L of r,s*/ 2 * ( ( ( bits ) >= 127 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ + /*V of r,s*/ ( ( bits ) + 8 ) / 8 ) ) -/** - * \brief The ECDSA context structure. - */ -typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context; +/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS ) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif +/** + * \brief The ECDSA context structure. + * + * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same + * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type + * should not be shared between multiple threads. + */ +typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_verify() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign_det() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx; +#endif + +/** + * \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ecp); /*!< base context for ECP restart and + shared administrative info */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(det); /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief This function checks whether a given group can be used + * for ECDSA. + * + * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. + * + * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); + /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message. * - * \note The deterministic version is usually preferred. + * \note The deterministic version implemented in + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is usually preferred. * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated @@ -78,14 +145,22 @@ extern "C" { * * \see ecp.h * - * \param grp The ECP group. - * \param r The first output integer. - * \param s The second output integer. - * \param d The private signing key. - * \param buf The message hash. - * \param blen The length of \p buf. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized. + * \param buf The content to be signed. This is usually the hash of + * the original data to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX @@ -112,21 +187,35 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, * * \see ecp.h * - * \param grp The ECP group. - * \param r The first output integer. - * \param s The second output integer. - * \param d The private signing key. - * \param buf The message hash. - * \param blen The length of \p buf. - * \param md_alg The MD algorithm used to hash the message. + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. + * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX * error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, - const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ /** @@ -141,12 +230,19 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi * * \see ecp.h * - * \param grp The ECP group. - * \param buf The message hash. - * \param blen The length of \p buf. - * \param Q The public key to use for verification. + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be + * initialized and setup. * \param r The first integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. * \param s The second integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the signature @@ -155,8 +251,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi * error code on failure for any other reason. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s); + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s); /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it @@ -173,92 +270,94 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be at least twice as large as the + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. - * - * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the - * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as - * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group - * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section - * 4.1.3, step 5. - * - * \see ecp.h - * - * \param ctx The ECDSA context. - * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. - * \param hash The message hash. - * \param hlen The length of the hash. - * \param sig The buffer that holds the signature. - * \param slen The length of the signature written. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, + * it is used only for blinding and may be set to \c NULL, but + * doing so is DEPRECATED. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /** - * \brief This function computes an ECDSA signature and writes - * it to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: - * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for - * Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it + * to a buffer, in a restartable way. * - * The deterministic version is defined in RFC-6979: - * Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) - * and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() * - * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in - * multiple threads. + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be at least twice as large as the - * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if a - * 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the + * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if + * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. - * - * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the - * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as - * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group - * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section - * 4.1.3, step 5. - * - * \see ecp.h - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() in - * Mbed TLS version 2.0 and later. - * - * \param ctx The ECDSA context. - * \param hash The message hash. - * \param hlen The length of the hash. - * \param sig The buffer that holds the signature. - * \param slen The length of the signature written. - * \param md_alg The MD algorithm used to hash the message. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, + * it is unused and may be set to \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); /** * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature. @@ -271,11 +370,14 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, * * \see ecp.h * - * \param ctx The ECDSA context. - * \param hash The message hash. - * \param hlen The size of the hash. - * \param sig The signature to read and verify. - * \param slen The size of \p sig. + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and public key bound to it. + * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p size Bytes. + * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. + * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. @@ -288,16 +390,54 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ); +/** + * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature, + * in a restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() + * + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and public key bound to it. + * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p size Bytes. + * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. + * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure for any other reason. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + /** * \brief This function generates an ECDSA keypair on the given curve. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to store the keypair in. + * This must be initialized. * \param gid The elliptic curve to use. One of the various * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macros depending on configuration. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. @@ -306,32 +446,59 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** - * \brief This function sets an ECDSA context from an EC key pair. + * \brief This function sets up an ECDSA context from an EC key pair. * * \see ecp.h * - * \param ctx The ECDSA context to set. - * \param key The EC key to use. + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to setup. This must be initialized. + * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized and hold + * a private-public key pair or a public key. In the former + * case, the ECDSA context may be used for signature creation + * and verification after this call. In the latter case, it + * may be used for signature verification. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); +int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); /** * \brief This function initializes an ECDSA context. * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function frees an ECDSA context. * - * \param ctx The ECDSA context to free. + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h index 59d12f08..a73f6249 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Elliptic curve J-PAKE */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,11 +18,10 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H #define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" /* * J-PAKE is a password-authenticated key exchange that allows deriving a @@ -40,9 +39,10 @@ * The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could * also be use outside TLS. */ +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "ecp.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -70,21 +70,21 @@ typedef enum { */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /**< Hash to use */ - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /**< Elliptic curve */ - mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; /**< Are we client or server? */ - int point_format; /**< Format for point export */ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info); /**< Hash to use */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /**< Elliptic curve */ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role); /**< Are we client or server? */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /**< Format for point export */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xm1; /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xm2; /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp1; /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp2; /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp; /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm1); /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm2); /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp1); /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp2); /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp); /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ - mbedtls_mpi xm1; /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ - mbedtls_mpi xm2; /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm1); /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm2); /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ - mbedtls_mpi s; /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ } mbedtls_ecjpake_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ @@ -92,28 +92,33 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ /** - * \brief Initialize a context - * (just makes it ready for setup() or free()). + * \brief Initialize an ECJPAKE context. * - * \param ctx context to initialize + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief Set up a context for use + * \brief Set up an ECJPAKE context for use. * * \note Currently the only values for hash/curve allowed by the - * standard are MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256/MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. + * standard are #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256/#MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. * - * \param ctx context to set up - * \param role Our role: client or server - * \param hash hash function to use (MBEDTLS_MD_XXX) - * \param curve elliptic curve identifier (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX) - * \param secret pre-shared secret (passphrase) - * \param len length of the shared secret + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param role The role of the caller. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT or #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER. + * \param hash The identifier of the hash function to use, + * for example #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256. + * \param curve The identifier of the elliptic curve to use, + * for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. + * \param secret The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be + * a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need + * only be valid for the duration of this call. + * \param len The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret. * - * \return 0 if successfull, - * a negative error code otherwise + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, @@ -123,29 +128,49 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, size_t len ); /** - * \brief Check if a context is ready for use + * \brief Set the point format for future reads and writes. * - * \param ctx Context to check + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to configure. + * \param point_format The point format to use: + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED (default) + * or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED. * - * \return 0 if the context is ready for use, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p point_format + * is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + int point_format ); + +/** + * \brief Check if an ECJPAKE context is ready for use. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to check. This must be + * initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the context is ready for use. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Generate and write the first round message * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, - * excluding extension type and length bytes) + * excluding extension type and length bytes). * - * \param ctx Context to use - * \param buf Buffer to write the contents to - * \param len Buffer size - * \param olen Will be updated with the number of bytes written - * \param f_rng RNG function - * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be + * initialized and set up. + * \param buf The buffer to write the contents to. This must be a + * writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number + * of Bytes written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. * - * \return 0 if successfull, - * a negative error code otherwise + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, @@ -155,14 +180,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, /** * \brief Read and process the first round message * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, - * excluding extension type and length bytes) + * excluding extension type and length bytes). * - * \param ctx Context to use - * \param buf Pointer to extension contents - * \param len Extension length + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized + * and set up. + * \param buf The buffer holding the first round message. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. * - * \return 0 if successfull, - * a negative error code otherwise + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, @@ -170,17 +197,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, /** * \brief Generate and write the second round message - * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange) + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). * - * \param ctx Context to use - * \param buf Buffer to write the contents to - * \param len Buffer size - * \param olen Will be updated with the number of bytes written - * \param f_rng RNG function - * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up, and already have performed round one. + * \param buf The buffer to write the round two contents to. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The size of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. * - * \return 0 if successfull, - * a negative error code otherwise + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, @@ -189,14 +220,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, /** * \brief Read and process the second round message - * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange) + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). * - * \param ctx Context to use - * \param buf Pointer to the message - * \param len Message length + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized + * and set up and already have performed round one. + * \param buf The buffer holding the second round message. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. * - * \return 0 if successfull, - * a negative error code otherwise + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, @@ -204,17 +237,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, /** * \brief Derive the shared secret - * (TLS: Pre-Master Secret) + * (TLS: Pre-Master Secret). * - * \param ctx Context to use - * \param buf Buffer to write the contents to - * \param len Buffer size - * \param olen Will be updated with the number of bytes written - * \param f_rng RNG function - * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up and have performed both round one and two. + * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. * - * \return 0 if successfull, - * a negative error code otherwise + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, @@ -222,14 +259,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, void *p_rng ); /** - * \brief Free a context's content + * \brief This clears an ECJPAKE context and frees any + * embedded data structure. * - * \param ctx context to free + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECJPAKE context. */ void mbedtls_ecjpake_free( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); - - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index ed1b9d73..b87114bc 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -29,14 +29,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /* * ECP error codes @@ -49,7 +50,27 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -0x4D00 /**< Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 /**< Invalid private or public key. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 /**< The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4B80 /**< The ECP hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 /**< Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */ + +/* Flags indicating whether to include code that is specific to certain + * types of curves. These flags are for internal library use only. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED +#endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -64,6 +85,22 @@ extern "C" { * parameters. Therefore, only standardized domain parameters from trusted * sources should be used. See mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). */ +/* Note: when adding a new curve: + * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by + * changing the numerical value for existing curves. + * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed. + * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS below. + * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to + * mbedtls_config.h. + * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h. + * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro + * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above. + * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c. + * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c. + * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c. + * - Add the curve to applicable presets in ssl_tls.c. + */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */ @@ -89,15 +126,25 @@ typedef enum */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 12 +/* + * Curve types + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x + b */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x */ +} mbedtls_ecp_curve_type; + /** * Curve information, for use by other modules. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info { - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */ - uint16_t tls_id; /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */ - uint16_t bit_size; /*!< The curve size in bits. */ - const char *name; /*!< A human-friendly name. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id); /*!< An internal identifier. */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_id); /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bit_size); /*!< The curve size in bits. */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); /*!< A human-friendly name. */ } mbedtls_ecp_curve_info; /** @@ -113,9 +160,9 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point { - mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ - mbedtls_mpi Y; /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ - mbedtls_mpi Z; /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y); /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z); /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ } mbedtls_ecp_point; @@ -155,6 +202,16 @@ mbedtls_ecp_point; * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximative modular * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure. * + * \note Alternative implementations of the ECP module must obey the + * following constraints. + * * Group IDs must be distinct: if two group structures have + * the same ID, then they must be identical. + * * The fields \c id, \c P, \c A, \c B, \c G, \c N, + * \c pbits and \c nbits must have the same type and semantics + * as in the built-in implementation. + * They must be available for reading, but direct modification + * of these fields does not need to be supported. + * They do not need to be at the same offset in the structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group { @@ -170,14 +227,16 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P. For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the private keys. */ - unsigned int h; /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ - int (*modp)(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction + /* End of public fields */ + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(h); /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(modp))(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction mod \p P (see above).*/ - int (*t_pre)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ - int (*t_post)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ - void *t_data; /*!< Unused. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ - size_t T_size; /*!< The number of pre-computed points. */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_pre))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_post))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_data); /*!< Unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T); /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T_size); /*!< The number of dynamic allocated pre-computed points. */ } mbedtls_ecp_group; @@ -185,24 +244,15 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. * \{ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) -/** - * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< The maximum size of groups, in bits. */ -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 ) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 ) - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) /* * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication. - * Default: 6. + * Default: a point where higher memory usage yields disminishing performance + * returns. * Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7. * * Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) @@ -219,20 +269,21 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; * 224 475 475 453 398 342 * 192 640 640 633 587 476 */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< The maximum window size used. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< The maximum window size used. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) /* - * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication. + * Trade code size for speed on fixed-point multiplication. * * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4. * - * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2. + * For each n-bit Short Weierstrass curve that is enabled, this adds 4n bytes + * of code size if n < 384 and 8n otherwise. * - * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage. + * Change this value to 0 to reduce code size. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ @@ -243,6 +294,111 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; #include "ecp_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +/** + * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* Dummy definition to help code that has optional ECP support and + * defines an MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES-sized array unconditionally. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 +/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 225 // n is slightly above 2^224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192 +#else +#error "Missing definition of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS" +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for multiplication + * + * \note Opaque struct + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecp_muladd() + * + * \note Opaque struct + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx; + +/** + * \brief General context for resuming ECC operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ops_done); /*!< current ops count */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(depth); /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rsm); /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ma); /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ +} mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; + +/* + * Operation counts for restartable functions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK 3 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_check_pubkey() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL 8 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_double_jac() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD 11 /*!< basic ops count for see ecp_add_mixed() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV 120 /*!< empirical equivalent for mpi_mod_inv() */ + +/** + * \brief Internal; for restartable functions in other modules. + * Check and update basic ops budget. + * + * \param grp Group structure + * \param rs_ctx Restart context + * \param ops Number of basic ops to do + * + * \return \c 0 if doing \p ops basic ops is still allowed, + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops ); + +/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, rs_ctx, \ + (unsigned) (ops) ) ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */ + +/* We want to declare restartable versions of existing functions anyway */ +typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + /** * \brief The ECP key-pair structure. * @@ -253,9 +409,9 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair { - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< our secret value */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< our public value */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< our secret value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< our public value */ } mbedtls_ecp_keypair; @@ -270,10 +426,89 @@ mbedtls_ecp_keypair; */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE 3 /**< The named_curve of ECCurveType. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of basic operations done in a row. + * + * If more operations are needed to complete a computation, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS will be returned by the + * function performing the computation. It is then the + * caller's responsibility to either call again with the same + * parameters until it returns 0 or an error code; or to free + * the restart context if the operation is to be aborted. + * + * It is strictly required that all input parameters and the + * restart context be the same on successive calls for the + * same operation, but output parameters need not be the + * same; they must not be used until the function finally + * returns 0. + * + * This only applies to functions whose documentation + * mentions they may return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS for functions in the + * SSL module). For functions that accept a "restart context" + * argument, passing NULL disables restart and makes the + * function equivalent to the function with the same name + * with \c _restartable removed. For functions in the ECDH + * module, restart is disabled unless the function accepts + * an "ECDH context" argument and + * mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart() was previously called on + * that context. For function in the SSL module, restart is + * only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges + * (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA). + * + * \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row. + * Default: 0 (unlimited). + * Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for + * a lesser maximum amount of time. + * + * \note A "basic operation" is defined as a rough equivalent of a + * multiplication in GF(p) for the NIST P-256 curve. + * As an indication, with default settings, a scalar + * multiplication (full run of \c mbedtls_ecp_mul()) is: + * - about 3300 basic operations for P-256 + * - about 9400 basic operations for P-384 + * + * \note Very low values are not always respected: sometimes + * functions need to block for a minimum number of + * operations, and will do so even if max_ops is set to a + * lower value. That minimum depends on the curve size, and + * can be made lower by decreasing the value of + * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. As an indication, here is the + * lowest effective value for various curves and values of + * that parameter (w for short): + * w=6 w=5 w=4 w=3 w=2 + * P-256 208 208 160 136 124 + * P-384 682 416 320 272 248 + * P-521 1364 832 640 544 496 + * + * \note This setting is currently ignored by Curve25519. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ); + +/** + * \brief Check if restart is enabled (max_ops != 0) + * + * \return \c 0 if \c max_ops == 0 (restart disabled) + * \return \c 1 otherwise (restart enabled) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + /** * \brief This function retrieves the information defined in - * mbedtls_ecp_curve_info() for all supported curves in order - * of preference. + * mbedtls_ecp_curve_info() for all supported curves. + * + * \note This function returns information about all curves + * supported by the library. Some curves may not be + * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() + * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is + * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. * * \return A statically allocated array. The last entry is 0. */ @@ -284,6 +519,12 @@ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ); * identifiers of all supported curves in the order of * preference. * + * \note This function returns information about all curves + * supported by the library. Some curves may not be + * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() + * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is + * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. + * * \return A statically allocated array, * terminated with MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. */ @@ -335,7 +576,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); * * \note After this function is called, domain parameters * for various ECP groups can be loaded through the - * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group() + * mbedtls_ecp_group_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group() * functions. */ void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); @@ -356,25 +597,51 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** * \brief This function frees the components of an ECP group. - * \param grp The group to free. + * + * \param grp The group to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP group. */ void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); /** * \brief This function frees the components of a key pair. - * \param key The key pair to free. + * + * \param key The key pair to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP key pair. */ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized restart context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + /** * \brief This function copies the contents of point \p Q into * point \p P. * - * \param P The destination point. - * \param Q The source point. + * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. + * \param Q The source point. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code for other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); @@ -382,31 +649,35 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); * \brief This function copies the contents of group \p src into * group \p dst. * - * \param dst The destination group. - * \param src The source group. + * \param dst The destination group. This must be initialized. + * \param src The source group. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ); +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ); /** - * \brief This function sets a point to zero. + * \brief This function sets a point to the point at infinity. * - * \param pt The point to set. + * \param pt The point to set. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** - * \brief This function checks if a point is zero. + * \brief This function checks if a point is the point at infinity. * - * \param pt The point to test. + * \param pt The point to test. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 1 if the point is zero. * \return \c 0 if the point is non-zero. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); @@ -416,8 +687,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); * \note This assumes that the points are normalized. Otherwise, * they may compare as "not equal" even if they are. * - * \param P The first point to compare. - * \param Q The second point to compare. + * \param P The first point to compare. This must be initialized. + * \param Q The second point to compare. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 if the points are equal. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the points are not equal. @@ -429,7 +700,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, * \brief This function imports a non-zero point from two ASCII * strings. * - * \param P The destination point. + * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. * \param radix The numeric base of the input. * \param x The first affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. * \param y The second affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. @@ -444,19 +715,31 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, * \brief This function exports a point into unsigned binary data. * * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. - * \param P The point to export. - * \param format The point format. Should be an \c MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_XXX macro. - * \param olen The length of the output. - * \param buf The output buffer. - * \param buflen The length of the output buffer. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param P The point to export. This must be initialized. + * \param format The point format. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is + * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above + * values.) + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * or #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer + * is too small to hold the point. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format + * or the export for the given group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int format, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief This function imports a point from unsigned binary data. @@ -466,137 +749,224 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ * for that. * * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. - * \param P The point to import. - * \param buf The input buffer. - * \param ilen The length of the input. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param P The destination context to import the point to. + * This must be initialized. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format - * is not implemented. - * + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the import for the + * given group is not implemented. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ); +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function imports a point from a TLS ECPoint record. * - * \note On function return, \p buf is updated to point to immediately + * \note On function return, \p *buf is updated to point immediately * after the ECPoint record. * - * \param grp The ECP group used. + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param pt The destination point. * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. * \param len The length of the buffer. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization failure. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization + * failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, - const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); /** - * \brief This function exports a point as a TLS ECPoint record. + * \brief This function exports a point as a TLS ECPoint record + * defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. * - * \param grp The ECP group used. - * \param pt The point format to export to. The point format is an - * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_XXX constant. - * \param format The export format. - * \param olen The length of the data written. - * \param buf The buffer to write to. - * \param blen The length of the buffer. + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The point to be exported. This must be initialized. + * \param format The point format to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length in Bytes + * of the data written. + * \param buf The target buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the target buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer + * is too small to hold the exported point. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, - int format, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); /** - * \brief This function sets a group using standardized domain parameters. + * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context + * from a standardized set of domain parameters. * * \note The index should be a value of the NamedCurve enum, * as defined in RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography * (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), * usually in the form of an \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macro. * - * \param grp The destination group. + * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. * \param id The identifier of the domain parameter set to load. * - * \return \c 0 on success, - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization failure. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for unkownn groups. - + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p id doesn't + * correspond to a known group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ); /** - * \brief This function sets a group from a TLS ECParameters record. + * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context from a TLS + * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. * - * \note \p buf is updated to point right after the ECParameters record - * on exit. + * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after + * the ECParameters record on exit. * - * \param grp The destination group. + * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. - * \param len The length of the buffer. + * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not + * recognized. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); /** - * \brief This function writes the TLS ECParameters record for a group. + * \brief This function extracts an elliptic curve group ID from a + * TLS ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. * - * \param grp The ECP group used. - * \param olen The number of Bytes written. - * \param buf The buffer to write to. - * \param blen The length of the buffer. + * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after + * the ECParameters record on exit. + * + * \param grp The address at which to store the group id. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not + * recognized. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, + size_t len ); +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve as a TLS + * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to be exported. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The buffer to write to. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output + * buffer is too small to hold the exported group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); /** - * \brief This function performs multiplication of a point by - * an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P. + * \brief This function performs a scalar multiplication of a point + * by an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P. * * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads. * * \note To prevent timing attacks, this function * executes the exact same sequence of base-field * operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or - * array index depending on the value of \p m. + * array index depending on the value of \p m. If also uses + * \p f_rng to randomize some intermediate results. * - * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize - * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks - * targeting these results. We recommend always providing - * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible. - * - * \param grp The ECP group. - * \param R The destination point. - * \param m The integer by which to multiply. - * \param P The point to multiply. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication of a point by + * an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P in a restartable way. + * + * \see mbedtls_ecp_mul() + * + * \note This function does the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_mul(), but + * it can return early and restart according to the limit set + * with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private + * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /** * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q @@ -606,23 +976,83 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * \note In contrast to mbedtls_ecp_mul(), this function does not * guarantee a constant execution flow and timing. * - * \param grp The ECP group. - * \param R The destination point. + * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. + * It may not be included in builds without any short + * Weierstrass curve. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. - * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. + * This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. + * This must be initialized. * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. + * This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public * keys. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not + * designate a short Weierstrass curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two + * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q in a + * restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd() + * + * \note This function works the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd(), + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. + * It may not be included in builds without any short + * Weierstrass curve. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. + * This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. + * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. + * This must be initialized. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not + * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public + * keys. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not + * designate a short Weierstrass curve. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + /** * \brief This function checks that a point is a valid public key * on this curve. @@ -640,30 +1070,60 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * - * \param grp The curve the point should lie on. - * \param pt The point to check. + * \param grp The ECP group the point should belong to. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The point to check. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid public key. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not + * a valid public key for the given curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** - * \brief This function checks that an \p mbedtls_mpi is a valid private - * key for this curve. + * \brief This function checks that an \p mbedtls_mpi is a + * valid private key for this curve. * * \note This function uses bare components rather than an * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * - * \param grp The group used. - * \param d The integer to check. + * \param grp The ECP group the private key should belong to. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The integer to check. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid private key. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not a valid + * private key for the given curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d ); +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a private key. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a private key for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function generates a keypair with a configurable base @@ -674,22 +1134,29 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi * * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * - * \param grp The ECP group. - * \param G The chosen base point. + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param G The base point to use. This must be initialized + * and belong to \p grp. It replaces the default base + * point \c grp->G used by mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(). * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). + * This must be initialized. * \param Q The destination point (public part). - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code * on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, - mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ); + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function generates an ECP keypair. @@ -699,34 +1166,82 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * - * \param grp The ECP group. + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). + * This must be initialized. * \param Q The destination point (public part). - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code * on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ); +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function generates an ECP key. * * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. - * \param key The destination key. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param key The destination key. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code * on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The destination key. + * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the + * key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte + * string for Montgomery curves.) + * \param buflen The length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY error if the key is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param key The private key. + * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation + * of the key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte + * string for Montgomery curves.) + * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key + representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects @@ -734,16 +1249,23 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, * same public point, and that the private key in * \p prv is consistent with the public key. * - * \param pub The keypair structure holding the public key. - * If it contains a private key, that part is ignored. + * \param pub The keypair structure holding the public key. This + * must be initialized. If it contains a private key, that + * part is ignored. * \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair. + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * * \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX * error code on calculation failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ); +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy.h index ca06dc3c..a16a3753 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Entropy accumulator implementation */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,37 +18,29 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) -#include "sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR -#include "sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "havege.h" -#endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x003C /**< Critical entropy source failure. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -0x003E /**< No more sources can be added. */ @@ -60,7 +52,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -109,11 +101,11 @@ typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, s */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state { - mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source; /**< The entropy source callback */ - void * p_source; /**< The callback data pointer */ - size_t size; /**< Amount received in bytes */ - size_t threshold; /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ - int strong; /**< Is the source strong? */ + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_source); /**< The entropy source callback */ + void * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_source); /**< The callback data pointer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(size); /**< Amount received in bytes */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(threshold); /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(strong); /**< Is the source strong? */ } mbedtls_entropy_source_state; @@ -122,26 +114,33 @@ mbedtls_entropy_source_state; */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context { - int accumulator_started; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator_started); /* 0 after init. + * 1 after the first update. + * -1 after free. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha512_context accumulator; + mbedtls_sha512_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator); #else - mbedtls_sha256_context accumulator; -#endif - int source_count; - mbedtls_entropy_source_state source[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_state havege_data; + mbedtls_sha256_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator); #endif + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source_count); /* Number of entries used in source. */ + mbedtls_entropy_source_state MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source)[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) - int initial_entropy_run; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(initial_entropy_run); #endif } mbedtls_entropy_context; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + /** * \brief Initialize the context * diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/error.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/error.h index 6b82d4fb..9a8690dc 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/error.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/error.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Error to string translation */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,14 +18,19 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H #define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + #include +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + /** * Error code layout. * @@ -46,16 +51,15 @@ * For historical reasons, low-level error codes are divided in even and odd, * even codes were assigned first, and -1 is reserved for other errors. * - * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0003-0x007F) + * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0001-0x007F) * * Module Nr Codes assigned + * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001 * MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010 * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0014 0x0013-0x0013 - * BLOWFISH 3 0x0016-0x0018 0x0017-0x0017 * THREADING 3 0x001A-0x001E * AES 5 0x0020-0x0022 0x0021-0x0025 * CAMELLIA 3 0x0024-0x0026 0x0027-0x0027 - * XTEA 2 0x0028-0x0028 0x0029-0x0029 * BASE64 2 0x002A-0x002C * OID 1 0x002E-0x002E 0x000B-0x000B * PADLOCK 1 0x0030-0x0030 @@ -69,17 +73,15 @@ * PBKDF2 1 0x007C-0x007C * HMAC_DRBG 4 0x0003-0x0009 * CCM 3 0x000D-0x0011 - * ARC4 1 0x0019-0x0019 - * MD2 1 0x002B-0x002B - * MD4 1 0x002D-0x002D * MD5 1 0x002F-0x002F * RIPEMD160 1 0x0031-0x0031 - * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 - * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 - * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 + * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 0x0073-0x0073 + * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 0x0074-0x0074 + * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 0x0075-0x0075 * CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055 * POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B * CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056 + * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072 * * High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...) * Name ID Nr of Errors @@ -90,12 +92,14 @@ * DHM 3 11 * PK 3 15 (Started from top) * RSA 4 11 - * ECP 4 9 (Started from top) + * ECP 4 10 (Started from top) * MD 5 5 * HKDF 5 1 (Started from top) - * CIPHER 6 8 - * SSL 6 22 (Started from top) - * SSL 7 31 + * SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00) + * CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080) + * SSL 6 22 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) + * SSL 7 20 (Started from 0x7000, gaps at + * 0x7380, 0x7900-0x7980, 0x7A80-0x7E80) * * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.) */ @@ -104,6 +108,60 @@ extern "C" { #endif +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR -0x0001 /**< Generic error */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E /**< This is a bug in the library */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 /**< Hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 /**< The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ + +/** + * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. + * + * Wrapper macro for mbedtls_error_add(). See that function for + * more details. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( high, low ) \ + mbedtls_error_add( high, low, __FILE__, __LINE__ ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** + * \brief Testing hook called before adding/combining two error codes together. + * Only used when invasive testing is enabled via MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS. + */ +extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. + * + * This function can be called directly however it is usually + * called via the #MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD macro. + * + * While a value of zero is not a negative error code, it is still an + * error code (that denotes success) and can be combined with both a + * negative error code or another value of zero. + * + * \note When invasive testing is enabled via #MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS, also try to + * call \link mbedtls_test_hook_error_add \endlink. + * + * \param high high-level error code. See error.h for more details. + * \param low low-level error code. See error.h for more details. + * \param file file where this error code addition occurred. + * \param line line where this error code addition occurred. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_error_add( int high, int low, + const char *file, int line ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if( *mbedtls_test_hook_error_add != NULL ) + ( *mbedtls_test_hook_error_add )( high, low, file, line ); +#endif + (void)file; + (void)line; + + return( high + low ); +} + /** * \brief Translate a mbed TLS error code into a string representation, * Result is truncated if necessary and always includes a terminating @@ -115,6 +173,36 @@ extern "C" { */ void mbedtls_strerror( int errnum, char *buffer, size_t buflen ); +/** + * \brief Translate the high-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string + * representation. + * + * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller + * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for + * logging purposes. + * + * \param error_code error code + * + * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error + * code is unknown. + */ +const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ); + +/** + * \brief Translate the low-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string + * representation. + * + * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller + * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for + * logging purposes. + * + * \param error_code error code + * + * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error + * code is unknown. + */ +const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ); + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/gcm.h index d2098eb9..d1219bb1 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/gcm.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/gcm.h @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -26,14 +26,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H #define MBEDTLS_GCM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include @@ -41,7 +42,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012 /**< Authenticated decryption failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0013 /**< GCM hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #ifdef __cplusplus @@ -55,15 +55,15 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ - uint64_t HL[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */ - uint64_t HH[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */ - uint64_t len; /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ - uint64_t add_len; /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ - unsigned char base_ectr[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ - unsigned char y[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ - unsigned char buf[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ - int mode; /*!< The operation to perform: + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(HL)[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(HH)[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base_ectr)[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ } @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ mbedtls_gcm_context; * cipher, nor set the key. For this purpose, use * mbedtls_gcm_setkey(). * - * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. + * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); @@ -90,9 +90,10 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); * \brief This function associates a GCM context with a * cipher algorithm and a key. * - * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. - * \param key The encryption key. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of at + * least \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The key size in bits. Valid options are: *
        • 128 bits
          • *
        • 192 bits
          • @@ -119,7 +120,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * authentic. You should use this function to perform encryption * only. For decryption, use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead. * - * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. + * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. This + * must be initialized. * \param mode The operation to perform: * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT to perform authenticated encryption. * The ciphertext is written to \p output and the @@ -133,22 +135,28 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * calling this function in decryption mode. * \param length The length of the input data, which is equal to the length * of the output data. - * \param iv The initialization vector. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. - * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at + * least that size in Bytes. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. Its size is \b length. - * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. It must have room - * for \b length bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. - * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed * successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode, * this does not indicate that the data is authentic. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or a cipher-specific - * error code if the encryption or decryption failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are + * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the encryption + * or decryption failed. */ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int mode, @@ -170,24 +178,30 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * - * \param ctx The GCM context. + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also * the length of the decrypted plaintext. - * \param iv The initialization vector. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. - * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at + * least that size in Bytes. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. - * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. + * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to verify. - * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. Its size is \b length. - * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. It must - * have room for \b length bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size. + * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. If \p length + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at + * least that size. * * \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or a cipher-specific - * error code if the decryption failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are + * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the decryption + * failed. */ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t length, @@ -204,50 +218,99 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * \brief This function starts a GCM encryption or decryption * operation. * - * \param ctx The GCM context. + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. - * \param iv The initialization vector. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. - * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or NULL - * if \p add_len is 0. - * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If 0, - * \p add is NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char *iv, - size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, - size_t add_len ); + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data + * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a GCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * Call this function after mbedtls_gcm_starts() to pass + * the associated data. If the associated data is empty, + * you do not need to call this function. You may not + * call this function after calling mbedtls_cipher_update(). + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_gcm_starts() and must not have yet received + * any input with mbedtls_gcm_update(). + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL + * if \p add_len is \c 0. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, + * \p add may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM * encryption or decryption operation. * - * ` The function expects input to be a multiple of 16 - * Bytes. Only the last call before calling - * mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes. + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to + * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to + * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call + * mbedtls_gcm_finish(). + * + * This function may produce output in one of the following + * ways: + * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal + * to the input length. + * - Buffered output: the output consists of a whole number + * of 16-byte blocks. If the total input length so far + * (not including associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* + * with *A* < 16 then the total output length is 16 \* *B*. + * + * In particular: + * - It is always correct to call this function with + * \p output_size >= \p input_length + 15. + * - If \p input_length is a multiple of 16 for all the calls + * to this function during an operation, then it is + * correct to use \p output_size = \p input_length. * * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * - * \param ctx The GCM context. - * \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of - * 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish(). - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_length + * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p input_length bytes. + * \param input_length The length of the input data in bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of + * of at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes. + * See the function description regarding the output size. + * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is + * unspecified. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * total input length too long, + * unsupported input/output buffer overlap detected, + * or \p output_size too small. */ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ); + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); /** * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates @@ -256,25 +319,48 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * It wraps up the GCM stream, and generates the * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. * - * \param ctx The GCM context. - * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. - * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. Must be at least four. + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least + * four. + * \param output The buffer for the final output. + * If \p output_size is nonzero, this must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be large enough for the output that + * mbedtls_gcm_update() has not produced. In particular: + * - If mbedtls_gcm_update() produces immediate output, + * or if the total input size is a multiple of \c 16, + * then mbedtls_gcm_finish() never produces any output, + * so \p output_size can be \c 0. + * - \p output_size never needs to be more than \c 15. + * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is + * unspecified. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * invalid value of \p tag_len, + * or \p output_size too small. */ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - unsigned char *tag, - size_t tag_len ); + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); /** * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying * cipher sub-context. * - * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. + * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the call has + * no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief The GCM checkup routine. * @@ -283,6 +369,8 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); */ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/havege.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/havege.h deleted file mode 100644 index 57e8c409..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/havege.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file havege.h - * - * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H -#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H - -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE 1024 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE state structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_havege_state -{ - int PT1, PT2, offset[2]; - int pool[MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE]; - int WALK[8192]; -} -mbedtls_havege_state; - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE initialization - * - * \param hs HAVEGE state to be initialized - */ -void mbedtls_havege_init( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); - -/** - * \brief Clear HAVEGE state - * - * \param hs HAVEGE state to be cleared - */ -void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE rand function - * - * \param p_rng A HAVEGE state - * \param output Buffer to fill - * \param len Length of buffer - * - * \return 0 - */ -int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* havege.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h index e6ed7cde..81a62701 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h @@ -7,27 +7,27 @@ * specified by RFC 5869. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H #define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" /** * \name HKDF Error codes diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h index 3bc675ec..0df8ee85 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h @@ -1,10 +1,14 @@ /** * \file hmac_drbg.h * - * \brief HMAC_DRBG (NIST SP 800-90A) + * \brief The HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator. + * + * This module implements the HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator described + * in NIST SP 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using + * Deterministic Random Bit Generators. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,16 +22,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /* @@ -42,7 +47,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -76,60 +81,116 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context { - /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitely, + /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly, * but is implied by the HMAC context */ - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ - unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ - int reseed_counter; /*!< reseed counter */ + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx); /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(V)[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< reseed counter */ /* Administrative state */ - size_t entropy_len; /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ - int prediction_resistance; /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic reseed before every random generation) */ - int reseed_interval; /*!< reseed interval */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< reseed interval */ /* Callbacks */ - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ - void *p_entropy; /*!< context for the entropy function */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< context for the entropy function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if + * md_ctx->md_info != NULL. This means that the mutex is initialized + * during the initial seeding in mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() or + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it + * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. + */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context; /** - * \brief HMAC_DRBG context initialization - * Makes the context ready for mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(), - * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() or - * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(). + * \brief HMAC_DRBG context initialization. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialized + * This function makes the context ready for mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(), + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(). + * + * \note The reseed interval is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL + * by default. Override this value by calling + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). + * + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialized. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief HMAC_DRBG initial seeding - * Seed and setup entropy source for future reseeds. + * \brief HMAC_DRBG initial seeding. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be seeded - * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG - * \param f_entropy Entropy callback (p_entropy, buffer to fill, buffer - * length) - * \param p_entropy Entropy context - * \param custom Personalization data (Device specific identifiers) - * (Can be NULL) - * \param len Length of personalization data + * Set the initial seed and set up the entropy source for future reseeds. * - * \note The "security strength" as defined by NIST is set to: - * 128 bits if md_alg is SHA-1, - * 192 bits if md_alg is SHA-224, - * 256 bits if md_alg is SHA-256 or higher. + * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is + * to use the entropy module: + * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); + * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized + * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default + * entropy sources). + * + * You can provide a personalization string in addition to the + * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. + * + * \note By default, the security strength as defined by NIST is: + * - 128 bits if \p md_info is SHA-1; + * - 192 bits if \p md_info is SHA-224; + * - 256 bits if \p md_info is SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. * Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224. + * The security strength can be reduced if a smaller + * entropy length is set with + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED. + * \note The default entropy length is the security strength + * (converted from bits to bytes). You can override + * it by calling mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * \note During the initial seeding, this function calls + * the entropy source to obtain a nonce + * whose length is half the entropy length. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be seeded. + * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. + * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the + * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the + * length of the buffer. + * \p f_entropy is always called with a length that is + * less than or equal to the entropy length. + * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and also at most + * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * 3 / 2 + * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length + * described above. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough + * memory to allocate context data. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if the call to \p f_entropy failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, @@ -140,95 +201,156 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, /** * \brief Initilisation of simpified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds). - * (For use with deterministic ECDSA.) * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised - * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG - * \param data Concatenation of entropy string and additional data - * \param data_len Length of data in bytes + * This function is meant for use in algorithms that need a pseudorandom + * input such as deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised. + * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. + * \param data Concatenation of the initial entropy string and + * the additional data. + * \param data_len Length of \p data in bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED. + * \return \c 0 if successful. or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough + * memory to allocate context data. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); /** - * \brief Enable / disable prediction resistance (Default: Off) + * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. + * The default value is off. * - * Note: If enabled, entropy is used for ctx->entropy_len before each call! - * Only use this if you have ample supply of good entropy! + * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of + * every call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() + * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(). + * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient + * throughput. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param resistance MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance ); /** - * \brief Set the amount of entropy grabbed on each reseed - * (Default: given by the security strength, which - * depends on the hash used, see \c mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init() ) + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each + * seed or reseed. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param len Amount of entropy to grab, in bytes + * See the documentation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() for the default value. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ); /** - * \brief Set the reseed interval - * (Default: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) + * \brief Set the reseed interval. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param interval Reseed interval + * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function + * is called again. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param interval The reseed interval. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ); /** - * \brief HMAC_DRBG update state + * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param additional Additional data to update state with, or NULL - * \param add_len Length of additional data, or 0 + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * - * \note Additional data is optional, pass NULL and 0 as second - * third argument if no additional data is being used. + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. + * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying + * hash calculation. */ -void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); /** - * \brief HMAC_DRBG reseeding (extracts data from entropy source) + * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is + * extracts data from the entropy source. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param additional Additional data to add to state (Can be NULL) - * \param len Length of additional data + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data + * and \p len should be \c 0. + * \param len The length of the additional data. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and also at most + * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len + * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length + * (see mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len()). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy function failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ); /** - * \brief HMAC_DRBG generate random with additional update input + * \brief This function updates an HMAC_DRBG instance with additional + * data and uses it to generate random data. * - * Note: Automatically reseeds if reseed_counter is reached or PR is enabled. + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. * - * \param p_rng HMAC_DRBG context - * \param output Buffer to fill - * \param output_len Length of the buffer - * \param additional Additional data to update with (can be NULL) - * \param add_len Length of additional data (can be 0) + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG. + * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * \param additional Additional data to update with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data + * and \p add_len should be \c 0. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy source failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if + * \p output_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if + * \p add_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, @@ -236,49 +358,69 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, size_t add_len ); /** - * \brief HMAC_DRBG generate random + * \brief This function uses HMAC_DRBG to generate random data. * - * Note: Automatically reseeds if reseed_counter is reached or PR is enabled. + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param out_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. * - * \param p_rng HMAC_DRBG context - * \param output Buffer to fill - * \param out_len Length of the buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy source failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if + * \p out_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ); /** - * \brief Free an HMAC_DRBG context + * \brief This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to free. + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context to free. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** - * \brief Write a seed file + * \brief This function writes a seed file. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param path Name of the file + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. * - * \return 0 if successful, 1 on file error, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed + * failure. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); /** - * \brief Read and update a seed file. Seed is added to this - * instance + * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed + * is added to this instance. * - * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param path Name of the file + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. * - * \return 0 if successful, 1 on file error, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on + * reseed failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing + * seed file is too large. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ @@ -286,9 +428,10 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const ch #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** - * \brief Checkup routine + * \brief The HMAC_DRBG Checkup routine. * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return \c 1 if the test failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/config.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h similarity index 72% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/config.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h index 052aed0d..a60db7e9 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/config.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file config.h + * \file mbedtls_config.h * * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) * @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * memory footprint. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) -#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 -#endif +/** + * This is an optional version symbol that enables comatibility handling of + * config files. + * + * It is equal to the #MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER of the Mbed TLS version that + * introduced the config format we want to be compatible with. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION 0x03000000 /** * \name SECTION: System support @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ * * Used in: * library/aria.c - * library/timing.c - * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * library/bn_mul.h * * Required by: * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C @@ -137,12 +136,21 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE * - * System has time.h and time(), gmtime() and the clock is correct. - * The time needs to be correct (not necesarily very accurate, but at least + * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below). + * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of * X.509 certificates. * * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock. + * + * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that + * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to + * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information. + * + * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE @@ -217,33 +225,34 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING * - * Mark deprecated functions so that they generate a warning if used. - * Functions deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the next - * version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a new - * major version by making sure your code is not using these functions. + * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. * * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED * - * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions. + * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features. */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING /** * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED * - * Remove deprecated functions so that they generate an error if used. - * Functions deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the next - * version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a new - * major version by making sure your code is not using these functions. + * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. * - * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions. + * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features. */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED @@ -260,7 +269,7 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT * - * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() * * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. @@ -289,16 +298,14 @@ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * module. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message * digests and ciphers instead. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT @@ -309,8 +316,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT @@ -318,7 +323,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT /* * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is @@ -332,7 +336,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT * * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in @@ -347,27 +351,27 @@ * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible * with this definition. * - * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are - * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, - * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should - * be overriden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt - * must stay untouched. - * - * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set + * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES * tables. * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * function. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests * and ciphers instead. * + * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are + * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the + * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore + * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating + * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(). + * */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT @@ -400,34 +404,46 @@ * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the * alternative. * + * The original implementation can in addition be removed by setting the + * MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK option, in which case any function for which the + * corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT macro is defined will not be + * able to fallback to curves not supported by the alternative implementation. + * * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT * and implementing the following functions: * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) - * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_deinit( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 * otherwise. - * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_deinit are + * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. * - * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and - * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac - * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac if the group is - * supported (your mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function returns 1 when - * receives it as an argument). If the group is not supported then the original - * implementation is used. The other functions and the definition of - * mbedtls_ecp_group and mbedtls_ecp_point will not change, so your - * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac and - * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable must be compatible with this definition. + * Example: In case you set MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac() + * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac() if the group + * for the operation is supported by your implementation (i.e. your + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable() function returns 1 for this group). If the + * group is not supported by your implementation, then the original mbed TLS + * implementation of ecp_double_jac() is used instead, unless this fallback + * behaviour is disabled by setting MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK (in which case + * ecp_double_jac() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE). + * + * The function prototypes and the definition of mbedtls_ecp_group and + * mbedtls_ecp_point will not change based on MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT, so your + * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp__function_name__ must be compatible + * with their definitions. * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * function. */ /* Required for all the functions in this section */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT +/* Turn off software fallback for curves not supported in hardware */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK /* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT @@ -439,23 +455,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY - * - * Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. - * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has - * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the - * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). - * - * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable - * only for development. - * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. - * - * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT * @@ -463,7 +462,8 @@ * hardware entropy collector. * * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same - * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. + * prototype as declared in library/entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first + * argument. * * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. */ @@ -562,8 +562,7 @@ * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for * encryption or channels without any security! * - * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable - * the following ciphersuites: + * To enable the following ciphersuites: * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA @@ -604,36 +603,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY * - * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. - * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for - * channels with virtually no security at all! - * - * This enables the following ciphersuites: - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - * - * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites - * - * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. + * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES - * - * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. - * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as - * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to - * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them - * explicitly. - * - * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED @@ -643,6 +618,7 @@ * * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it */ +/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED @@ -654,6 +630,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED @@ -668,6 +645,30 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + * + * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed. + * + * This allows various functions to pause by returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in + * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is + * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum + * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information. + * + * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking + * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations. + * + * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of + * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC * @@ -676,7 +677,7 @@ * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by * the deterministic variant. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C * * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA. */ @@ -699,8 +700,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED @@ -723,8 +722,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. @@ -750,8 +747,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED @@ -775,8 +770,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED @@ -802,9 +795,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED @@ -830,7 +820,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. @@ -861,8 +850,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED @@ -885,8 +872,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED @@ -895,12 +880,10 @@ * * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 @@ -919,12 +902,10 @@ * * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 @@ -1005,8 +986,7 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES * - * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, - * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. + * Do not add default entropy sources in mbedtls_entropy_init(). * * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an * application. @@ -1070,6 +1050,18 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED +/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + * + * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier. + * + * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t + * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. + * + * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed + * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + /** * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG * @@ -1126,6 +1118,114 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + * + * Enable support for platform built-in keys. If you enable this feature, + * you must implement the function mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key(). + * See the documentation of that function for more information. + * + * Built-in keys are typically derived from a hardware unique key or + * stored in a secure element. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * + * Enable support for PSA crypto client. + * + * \note This option allows to include the code necessary for a PSA + * crypto client when the PSA crypto implementation is not included in + * the library (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled). The code included is the + * code to set and get PSA key attributes. + * The development of PSA drivers partially relying on the library to + * fulfill the hardware gaps is another possible usage of this option. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + * + * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + * + * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided + * by a driver, instead of Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * If you enable this option, you must configure the type + * ::mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t in psa/crypto_platform.h + * and define a function called mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * with the following prototype: + * ``` + * psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + * mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + * uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + * ); + * ``` + * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call. + * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \p output_size bytes + * of random data and set \c *output_length to \p output_size. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If you enable this option, code that uses the PSA cryptography + * interface will not use any of the entropy sources set up for + * the entropy module, nor the NV seed that MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * enables. + * + * \note This option is experimental and may be removed without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure + * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a + * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process + * Environment). + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + * + * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is + * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG). + * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in + * entropy source. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + /** * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT * @@ -1160,6 +1260,16 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES * @@ -1174,6 +1284,34 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + * + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes + * in the underlying transport. + * + * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, + * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. + * See the corresponding documentation for more information. + * + * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. + * We make no stability promises for the availability + * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * + * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured + * through the options + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE * @@ -1185,6 +1323,33 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + * + * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the + * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). + * + * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the + * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context + * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize + * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the + * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is + * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the + * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables + * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter, + * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in + * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection. + * + * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are + * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if + * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it. + * + * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL * @@ -1211,9 +1376,7 @@ * * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC */ @@ -1221,65 +1384,46 @@ /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET * - * Enable support for Extended Master Secret, aka Session Hash - * (draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-02). + * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret + * Extension. * * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake familiy of * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE * - * Enable support for FALLBACK_SCSV (draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00). + * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake. * - * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support - * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients - * implements a fallback strategy. + * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is + * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage. * - * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which - * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to - * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. + * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still + * defined, but always returns \c NULL. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV + * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the + * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will + * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, + * for exaple by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. + * + * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate + * after the handshake. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL - * - * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of - * individual records. - * - * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING - * - * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. - * - * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk - * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. - * - * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION * - * Disable support for TLS renegotiation. + * Enable support for TLS renegotiation. * * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake. @@ -1298,26 +1442,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO - * - * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the - * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). - * - * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE - * - * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours - * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). - * - * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH * @@ -1327,42 +1451,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 - * - * Enable support for SSL 3.0. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 - * - * Enable support for TLS 1.0. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 - * - * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * @@ -1375,16 +1463,33 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * + * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts + * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of + * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide + * no other purpose. + * + * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, + * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the + * public API. In particular, features under the control + * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any + * stability guarantees. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial + * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). * - * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, - * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 - * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS */ @@ -1432,6 +1537,37 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + * + * Enable support for negotiation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) + * through the use_srtp extension. + * + * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required + * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of + * the associated SRTP packet protection key material. + * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the + * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer + * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. + * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating + * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb() should be used to implement + * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 + * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). + * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. + * + * Setting this option enables the runtime API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles() + * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection + * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at + * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE * @@ -1448,22 +1584,11 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT - * - * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. - * - * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS * * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL. - * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintainance of a + * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though). * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example @@ -1495,37 +1620,70 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH * - * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. + * When this option is enabled, the SSL buffer will be resized automatically + * based on the negotiated maximum fragment length in each direction. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN * - * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated - * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is - * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and is likely to be removed in - * a future version of the library. + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. * - * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness - * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, - * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily - * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save - * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use - * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). + * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test + * suites can then be run normally. * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will likely be removed in a - * future version of Mbed TLS. + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. * - * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for + * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be + * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when + * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + * + * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and + * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests. + * + * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product. + * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior + * is the same as when this feature is disabled. + * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added + * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier. + * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production. + * + * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more + * information. + * + * Uncomment to enable invasive tests. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS /** * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT @@ -1549,6 +1707,47 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * + * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and + * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * + * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed + * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts + * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not + * break backwards compatibility. + * + * \warning The PSA Crypto API is in beta stage. While you're welcome to + * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some + * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs that are dependent on the + * PSA Crypto API, so can't come with the same stability guarantees as the + * rest of the Mbed TLS APIs. You're welcome to experiment with them, but for + * now, access to these APIs is opt-in (via enabling the present option), in + * order to clearly differentiate them from the stable Mbed TLS APIs. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * + * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA + * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. + * + * Uncomment this to enable use of PSA Crypto configuration settings which + * can be found in include/psa/crypto_config.h. + * + * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since + * it is not completed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + /** * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES * @@ -1563,53 +1762,34 @@ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES /** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK * - * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate - * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. + * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` + * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure + * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked + * list. * - * Uncomment to prevent an error. + * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted + * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient + * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK /** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO * - * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate - * and encountering an unknown critical extension. + * Disable mbedtls_x509_*_info() and related APIs. * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Uncomment to prevent an error. + * Uncomment to omit mbedtls_x509_*_info(), as well as mbedtls_debug_print_crt() + * and other functions/constants only used by these functions, thus reducing + * the code footprint by several KB. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE - * - * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). - * - * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused - * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. - * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE - * - * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). - * - * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. - * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT @@ -1620,31 +1800,6 @@ * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT - * - * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and - * decompression of packet data. - * - * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the - * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if - * CRIME or similar exploits may be a applicable to your use case. - * - * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. - * - * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed - * in the next major revision of the library. - * - * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c - * - * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. - * - * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT /* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ /** @@ -1743,34 +1898,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C - * - * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. - * - * Module: library/arc4.c - * Caller: library/cipher.c - * - * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are - * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoidng dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C * @@ -1821,22 +1948,13 @@ * library/ecp.c * library/ecdsa.c * library/rsa.c - * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. */ #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C - * - * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. - * - * Module: library/blowfish.c - */ -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C * @@ -1942,7 +2060,7 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C @@ -1958,18 +2076,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_CCM_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C - * - * Enable the test certificates. - * - * Module: library/certs.c - * Caller: - * - * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C * @@ -2008,24 +2114,35 @@ * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block * ciphers. * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is active, meaning that the underlying + * implementation of the CMAC algorithm is provided by an alternate + * implementation, that alternate implementation may opt to not support + * AES-192 or 3DES as underlying block ciphers for the CMAC operation. + * * Module: library/cmac.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C * */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C * - * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-256-based random generator. + * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. + * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. + * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. + * + * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, + * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. + * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. * * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C * - * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES-256 random number generator. + * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C @@ -2052,19 +2169,6 @@ * Caller: library/pem.c * library/cipher.c * - * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are - * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a @@ -2120,7 +2224,9 @@ * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECDHE-ECDSA * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, + * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a + * short Weierstrass curve. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C @@ -2129,9 +2235,9 @@ * * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. * - * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the - * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification - * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * \note EC J-PAKE support is based on the Thread v1.0.0 specification. + * It has not been reviewed for compliance with newer standards such as + * Thread v1.1 or RFC 8236. * * Module: library/ecjpake.c * Caller: @@ -2141,7 +2247,7 @@ * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C @@ -2186,40 +2292,17 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C * - * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for AES. + * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). * * Module: library/gcm.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C * * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other * requisites are enabled as well. */ #define MBEDTLS_GCM_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C - * - * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. - * - * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized - * environments - * - * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific - * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as - * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool - * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add - * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. - * - * Module: library/havege.c - * Caller: - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C - * - * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C * @@ -2260,7 +2343,7 @@ * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C @@ -2274,40 +2357,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_MD_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C - * - * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. - * - * Module: library/md2.c - * Caller: - * - * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C - * - * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. - * - * Module: library/md4.c - * Caller: - * - * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C * @@ -2318,10 +2367,9 @@ * library/pem.c * library/ssl_tls.c * - * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 - * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking - * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded - * encrypted keys. + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters. + * Further, it is used for checking MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 + * when decrypting PEM-encoded encrypted keys. * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on @@ -2494,21 +2542,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C - * - * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support. - * - * Module: library/pkcs11.c - * Caller: library/pk.c - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C - * - * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. - * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C * @@ -2519,7 +2552,6 @@ * Caller: library/pkparse.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C - * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C * * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. */ @@ -2555,6 +2587,65 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. + * + * \warning The PSA Crypto API is still beta status. While you're welcome to + * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some + * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * + * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * + * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * cryptography API. + * + * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided + * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of + * the PSA ITS interface + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + * + * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture + * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files. + * + * Module: library/psa_its_file.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C * @@ -2572,7 +2663,7 @@ * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. * * Module: library/rsa.c - * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c @@ -2597,8 +2688,8 @@ * library/ssl_tls.c * library/x509write_crt.c * - * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 - * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters, + * and for SHA1-signed certificates. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies @@ -2607,10 +2698,29 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C. The library does not currently support enabling + * SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C * - * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * Enable the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA224_C. The library does not currently support enabling + * SHA-256 without SHA-224. * * Module: library/sha256.c * Caller: library/entropy.c @@ -2619,23 +2729,39 @@ * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c * - * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. + * This module adds support for SHA-256. * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Comment to disable SHA-384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C * - * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * Enable SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. * * Module: library/sha512.c * Caller: library/entropy.c * library/md.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c * - * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. + * This module adds support for SHA-512. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C @@ -2756,9 +2882,6 @@ * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS * * Module: library/timing.c - * Caller: library/havege.c - * - * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. */ #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C @@ -2873,16 +2996,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C - * - * Enable the XTEA block cipher. - * - * Module: library/xtea.c - * Caller: - */ -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C - /* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ /** @@ -2901,7 +3014,7 @@ */ /* MPI / BIGNUM options */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum windows size used. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ //#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ /* CTR_DRBG options */ @@ -2918,8 +3031,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ /* ECP options */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ /* Entropy options */ @@ -2938,7 +3050,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */ -/* Note: your snprintf must correclty zero-terminate the buffer! */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ @@ -2955,44 +3067,100 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */ -/* Note: your snprintf must correclty zero-terminate the buffer! */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ +/* PSA options */ +/** + * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the + * PSA crypto subsystem. + * + * If this option is unset: + * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG. + * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either + * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and + * on unspecified heuristics. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + * Restrict the PSA library to supporting a maximum amount of simultaneously + * loaded keys. A loaded key is a key stored by the PSA Crypto core as a + * volatile key, or a persistent key which is loaded temporarily by the + * library as part of a crypto operation in flight. + * + * If this option is unset, the library will fall back to a default value of + * 32 keys. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 + /* SSL Cache options */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ /* SSL options */ -/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - * - * Maximum fragment length in bytes. - * - * Determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers. - * - * Uncommenting MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - * will override this length by setting maximum incoming and/or outgoing - * fragment length, respectively. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 - /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN * - * Maximum incoming fragment length in bytes. + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. * - * Uncomment to set the size of the inward TLS buffer independently of the - * outward buffer. + * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * in TLS 1.3 and when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 + /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * - * Maximum outgoing fragment length in bytes. + * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments. * - * Uncomment to set the size of the outward TLS buffer independently of the - * inward buffer. + * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. * * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. @@ -3002,11 +3170,7 @@ * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. * - * For absolute minimum RAM usage, it's best to enable - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH and reduce MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. This - * reduces both incoming and outgoing buffer sizes. However this is only - * guaranteed if the other end of the connection also supports the TLS - * max_fragment_len extension. Otherwise the connection may fail. + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 @@ -3027,7 +3191,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ @@ -3049,37 +3212,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ -/** - * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for certificate signing. - * Without this build-time option, SHA-1 support must be activated explicitly - * through mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile. Turning on this option is not - * recommended because of it is possible to generate SHA-1 collisions, however - * this may be safe for legacy infrastructure where additional controls apply. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes - * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies - * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -// #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES - -/** - * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake - * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 - * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. - * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by - * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use - * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default - * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general - * warning applies nonetheless: - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes - * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies - * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE - /** * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in @@ -3100,28 +3232,32 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT -/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ - -/* Target and application specific configurations */ -//#define YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE "target_config.h" - -#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE) -#include YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -/* - * Allow user to override any previous default. +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. * - * Use two macro names for that, as: - * - with yotta the prefix YOTTA_CFG_ is forced - * - without yotta is looks weird to have a YOTTA prefix. + * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The + * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as + * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target + * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to + * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to + * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex + * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the + * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However, + * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * supplied at compile time. */ -#if defined(YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) -#include YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT -#include "check_config.h" +/** + * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest + * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH + * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access + * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also + * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ +/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md.h index bf295249..1170bc1a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md.h @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -20,26 +20,20 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_H #define MBEDTLS_MD_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5080 /**< The selected feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5100 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5180 /**< Failed to allocate memory. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200 /**< Opening or reading of file failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x5280 /**< MD hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -48,15 +42,13 @@ extern "C" { /** * \brief Supported message digests. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and + * \warning MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and * their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0, /**< None. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, /**< The MD2 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, /**< The MD4 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ @@ -72,9 +64,22 @@ typedef enum { #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */ #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#endif + /** - * Opaque struct defined in md_internal.h. + * Opaque struct. + * + * Constructed using either #mbedtls_md_info_from_string or + * #mbedtls_md_info_from_type. + * + * Fields can be accessed with #mbedtls_md_get_size, + * #mbedtls_md_get_type and #mbedtls_md_get_name. */ +/* Defined internally in library/md_wrap.h. */ typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t; /** @@ -83,19 +88,21 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t; typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t { /** Information about the associated message digest. */ - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info); /** The digest-specific context. */ - void *md_ctx; + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx); /** The HMAC part of the context. */ - void *hmac_ctx; + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx); } mbedtls_md_context_t; /** * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the * generic digest module. * + * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. + * * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. @@ -150,33 +157,6 @@ void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); */ void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); -#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, - * and allocates internal structures. - * - * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or mbedtls_md_free(). - * Makes it necessary to call mbedtls_md_free() later. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md_setup() in 2.0.0 - * - * \param ctx The context to set up. - * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm - * to use. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification - * failure. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. - */ -int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md2.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md2.h deleted file mode 100644 index a46bddb7..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md2.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,301 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md2.h - * - * \brief MD2 message digest algorithm (hash function) - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests - * instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD2_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD2_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002B /**< MD2 hardware accelerator failed */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief MD2 context structure - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_md2_context -{ - unsigned char cksum[16]; /*!< checksum of the data block */ - unsigned char state[48]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[16]; /*!< data block being processed */ - size_t left; /*!< amount of data in buffer */ -} -mbedtls_md2_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ -#include "md2_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize MD2 context - * - * \param ctx MD2 context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Clear MD2 context - * - * \param ctx MD2 context to be cleared - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD2 context - * - * \param dst The destination context - * \param src The context to be cloned - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md2_context *src ); - -/** - * \brief MD2 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief MD2 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD2 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief MD2 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md2_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose ); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* mbedtls_md2.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md4.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md4.h deleted file mode 100644 index 1672e907..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md4.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,306 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md4.h - * - * \brief MD4 message digest algorithm (hash function) - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests - * instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD4_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD4_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002D /**< MD4 hardware accelerator failed */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief MD4 context structure - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_md4_context -{ - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ -} -mbedtls_md4_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ -#include "md4_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize MD4 context - * - * \param ctx MD4 context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Clear MD4 context - * - * \param ctx MD4 context to be cleared - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD4 context - * - * \param dst The destination context - * \param src The context to be cloned - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md4_context *src ); - -/** - * \brief MD4 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - */ -int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief MD4 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD4 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief MD4 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md4_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose ); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* mbedtls_md4.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md5.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md5.h index 4c950901..e7befc34 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md5.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md5.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * digests instead. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -22,23 +22,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H #define MBEDTLS_MD5_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002F /**< MD5 hardware accelerator failed */ - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -57,9 +50,9 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_md5_context; @@ -117,7 +110,7 @@ void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); +int mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); /** * \brief MD5 process buffer @@ -133,9 +126,9 @@ int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); +int mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); /** * \brief MD5 final digest @@ -150,8 +143,8 @@ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ); +int mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) @@ -169,79 +162,6 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD5 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief MD5 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief MD5 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param output MD5 checksum result - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -/** - * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md5_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) * @@ -256,36 +176,11 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ); +int mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD5 checksum result - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine @@ -299,6 +194,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, */ int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h index 705f9a63..d4737f5c 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Buffer-based memory allocator */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,17 +18,11 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -36,7 +30,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h index 4c7ef00f..7b77329a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ * */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -34,19 +34,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H #define MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include #include @@ -86,7 +81,7 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_net_context { - int fd; /**< The underlying file descriptor */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fd); /**< The underlying file descriptor */ } mbedtls_net_context; @@ -126,6 +121,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, const char * * \return 0 if successful, or one of: * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST, * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED, * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED * @@ -145,6 +141,8 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char * can be NULL if client_ip is null * * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED, * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if buf_size is too small, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if bind_fd was set to @@ -157,6 +155,10 @@ int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, /** * \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write * + * \note The current implementation of this function uses + * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor + * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater. + * * \param ctx Socket to check * \param rw Bitflag composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ and * MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE specifying the events @@ -238,16 +240,21 @@ int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); * 'timeout' seconds. If no error occurs, the actual amount * read is returned. * + * \note The current implementation of this function uses + * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor + * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater. + * * \param ctx Socket * \param buf The buffer to write to * \param len Maximum length of the buffer * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data * 0 means no timeout (wait forever) * - * \return the number of bytes received, - * or a non-zero error code: - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out, + * \return The number of bytes received if successful. + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out. * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal. + * Another negative error code (MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_xxx) + * for other failures. * * \note This function will block (until data becomes available or * timeout is reached) even if the socket is set to @@ -257,6 +264,13 @@ int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout ); +/** + * \brief Closes down the connection and free associated data + * + * \param ctx The context to close + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + /** * \brief Gracefully shutdown the connection and free associated data * diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h index 5a0f656a..bd6c6584 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ * */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -30,14 +30,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H #define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ typedef enum * Don't make any assumptions on this context! */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ } mbedtls_nist_kw_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_NIST_key wrapping_ALT */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/oid.h index 6fbd018a..9e68e919 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/oid.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/oid.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,38 +18,51 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_OID_H #define MBEDTLS_OID_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "asn1.h" -#include "pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) -#include "cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -#include "md.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) -#include "x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -0x002E /**< OID is not found. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x000B /**< output buffer is too small */ +/* This is for the benefit of X.509, but defined here in order to avoid + * having a "backwards" include of x.509.h here */ +/* + * X.509 extension types (internal, arbitrary values for bitsets) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 1) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE (1 << 2) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES (1 << 3) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS (1 << 4) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME (1 << 5) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME (1 << 6) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS (1 << 7) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 8) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 9) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 10) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE (1 << 11) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS (1 << 12) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY (1 << 13) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16) + /* * Top level OID tuples */ @@ -104,7 +117,8 @@ * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) * security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x01\x05\x05\x07" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x07" /* * Arc for standard naming attributes @@ -128,6 +142,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_UID "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x01" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) uid(1)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */ /* @@ -149,6 +164,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x36" /**< id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x2E" /**< id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } */ +/* + * Certificate policies + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES "\x00" /**< anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } */ + /* * Netscape certificate extensions */ @@ -183,6 +203,16 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x08" /**< id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x09" /**< id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } */ +/** + * Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network + * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + * private(4) enterprise(1) WiSUN(45605) FieldAreaNetwork(1) } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x04\x01\x82\xe4\x25\x01" + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x08" /**< id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ON "\x04" /**< id-on-hardwareModuleName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 4 } */ + /* * PKCS definition OIDs */ @@ -197,8 +227,6 @@ * PKCS#1 OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x01" /**< rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x02" /**< md2WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 2 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x03" /**< md4WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x04" /**< md5WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x05" /**< sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0e" /**< sha224WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 14 } */ @@ -217,8 +245,6 @@ /* * Digest algorithms */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x02" /**< id-mbedtls_md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x04" /**< id-mbedtls_md4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x05" /**< id-mbedtls_md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 /**< id-mbedtls_sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x04" /**< id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } */ @@ -228,6 +254,8 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x03" /**< id-mbedtls_sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x02\x01" /**< id-ripemd160 OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) hashAlgorithm(2) ripemd160(1) } */ + #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x07" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x08" /**< id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } */ @@ -267,8 +295,6 @@ /* * PKCS#5 PBES1 algorithms */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x01" /**< pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x04" /**< pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x03" /**< pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x06" /**< pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0a" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} */ @@ -284,8 +310,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 "\x01" /**< pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x01" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x02" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x03" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x04" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x05" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5} */ @@ -405,10 +429,12 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t { - const char *asn1; /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ - size_t asn1_len; /*!< length of asn1 */ - const char *name; /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ - const char *description; /*!< human friendly description */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1); /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1_len); /*!< length of asn1 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(description); /*!< human friendly description */ +#endif } mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t; /** @@ -424,7 +450,6 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t */ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) /** * \brief Translate an X.509 extension OID into local values * @@ -434,7 +459,6 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_b * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, int *ext_type ); -#endif /** * \brief Translate an X.509 attribute type OID into the short name @@ -550,6 +574,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_a int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Translate Extended Key Usage OID into description * @@ -559,6 +584,17 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Translate certificate policies OID into description + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param desc place to store string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); /** * \brief Translate md_type into hash algorithm OID diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pem.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pem.h index fa82f7bd..a01a296b 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pem.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pem.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,11 +18,12 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H #define MBEDTLS_PEM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -53,9 +54,9 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context { - unsigned char *buf; /*!< buffer for decoded data */ - size_t buflen; /*!< length of the buffer */ - unsigned char *info; /*!< buffer for extra header information */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf); /*!< buffer for decoded data */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buflen); /*!< length of the buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info); /*!< buffer for extra header information */ } mbedtls_pem_context; @@ -106,17 +107,27 @@ void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ); * \brief Write a buffer of PEM information from a DER encoded * buffer. * - * \param header header string to write - * \param footer footer string to write - * \param der_data DER data to write - * \param der_len length of the DER data - * \param buf buffer to write to - * \param buf_len length of output buffer - * \param olen total length written / required (if buf_len is not enough) + * \param header The header string to write. + * \param footer The footer string to write. + * \param der_data The DER data to encode. + * \param der_len The length of the DER data \p der_data in Bytes. + * \param buf The buffer to write to. + * \param buf_len The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total length written + * or required (if \p buf_len is not enough). * - * \return 0 on success, or a specific PEM or BASE64 error code. On - * MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL olen is the required - * size. + * \note You may pass \c NULL for \p buf and \c 0 for \p buf_len + * to request the length of the resulting PEM buffer in + * `*olen`. + * + * \note This function may be called with overlapping \p der_data + * and \p buf buffers. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't large + * enough to hold the PEM buffer. In this case, `*olen` holds + * the required minimum size of \p buf. + * \return Another PEM or BASE64 error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk.h index db54c6a6..f3553ccc 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Public Key abstraction layer */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,31 +18,30 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include "ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" #endif #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ @@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x3A00 /**< Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 /**< The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3880 /**< PK hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x3880 /**< The output buffer is too small. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -81,6 +80,7 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, } mbedtls_pk_type_t; /** @@ -89,11 +89,63 @@ typedef enum { */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { - mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; - int expected_salt_len; + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mgf1_hash_id); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(expected_salt_len); } mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options; +/** + * \brief Maximum size of a signature made by mbedtls_pk_sign(). + */ +/* We need to set MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE to the maximum signature + * size among the supported signature types. Do it by starting at 0, + * then incrementally increasing to be large enough for each supported + * signature mechanism. + * + * The resulting value can be 0, for example if MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is enabled + * (which allows the pk module to be included) but neither MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * nor MBEDTLS_RSA_C nor any opaque signature mechanism (PSA or RSA_ALT). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 0 + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) ) && \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* For RSA, the signature can be as large as the bignum module allows. + * For RSA_ALT, the signature size is not necessarily tied to what the + * bignum module can do, but in the absence of any specific setting, + * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in library/pk_wrap.h will check). */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ + MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* For ECDSA, the ecdsa module exports a constant for the maximum + * signature size. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is the maximum size of a signature made + * through the PSA API in the PSA representation. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#endif + +#if PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* The Mbed TLS representation is different for ECDSA signatures: + * PSA uses the raw concatenation of r and s, + * whereas Mbed TLS uses the ASN.1 representation (SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs). + * Add the overhead of ASN.1: up to (1+2) + 2 * (1+2+1) for the + * types, lengths (represented by up to 2 bytes), and potential leading + * zeros of the INTEGERs and the SEQUENCE. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ( PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 ) +#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ + /** * \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module */ @@ -109,9 +161,9 @@ typedef enum */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item { - mbedtls_pk_debug_type type; - const char *name; - void *value; + mbedtls_pk_debug_type MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(value); } mbedtls_pk_debug_item; /** Maximum number of item send for debugging, plus 1 */ @@ -127,10 +179,24 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t; */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context { - const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key informations */ - void * pk_ctx; /**< Underlying public key context */ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */ + void * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); /**< Underlying public key context */ } mbedtls_pk_context; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Context for resuming operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */ + void * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs_ctx); /**< Underlying restart context */ +} mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) /** * Quick access to an RSA context inside a PK context. @@ -140,7 +206,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context */ static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) { - return( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).pk_ctx ); + return( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ @@ -153,7 +219,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) */ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) { - return( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).pk_ctx ); + return( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ @@ -161,12 +227,12 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) /** * \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction */ -typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, +typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)( void *ctx, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)( void *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)( void *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ @@ -181,20 +247,50 @@ typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)( void *ctx ); const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ); /** - * \brief Initialize a mbedtls_pk_context (as NONE) + * \brief Initialize a #mbedtls_pk_context (as NONE). + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief Free a mbedtls_pk_context + * \brief Free the components of a #mbedtls_pk_context. + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * + * \note For contexts that have been set up with + * mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(), this does not free the underlying + * PSA key and you still need to call psa_destroy_key() + * independently if you want to destroy that key. */ void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + /** * \brief Initialize a PK context with the information given * and allocates the type-specific PK subcontext. * - * \param ctx Context to initialize. Must be empty (type NONE). + * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set + * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). * \param info Information to use * * \return 0 on success, @@ -206,11 +302,45 @@ void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); */ int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Initialize a PK context to wrap a PSA key. + * + * \note This function replaces mbedtls_pk_setup() for contexts + * that wrap a (possibly opaque) PSA key instead of + * storing and manipulating the key material directly. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE). + * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair + * (see notes below). + * + * \note The wrapped key must remain valid as long as the + * wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between + * the point this function is called and the point + * mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped + * key might then be independently used or destroyed. + * + * \note This function is currently only available for ECC key + * pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material). + * Support for other key types may be added later. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input + * (context already used, invalid key identifier). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the key is not an + * ECC key pair. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const psa_key_id_t key ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) /** * \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context * - * \param ctx Context to initialize. Must be empty (type NONE). + * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set + * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). * \param key RSA key pointer * \param decrypt_func Decryption function * \param sign_func Signing function @@ -230,7 +360,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, /** * \brief Get the size in bits of the underlying key * - * \param ctx Context to use + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. * * \return Key size in bits, or 0 on error */ @@ -238,7 +368,8 @@ size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Get the length in bytes of the underlying key - * \param ctx Context to use + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. * * \return Key length in bytes, or 0 on error */ @@ -250,21 +381,32 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_pk_get_len( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) /** * \brief Tell if a context can do the operation given by type * - * \param ctx Context to test - * \param type Target type + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * \param type The desired type. * - * \return 0 if context can't do the operations, - * 1 otherwise. + * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type. + * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given + * type. This is always the case for a context that has + * been initialized but not set up, or that has been + * cleared with mbedtls_pk_free(). */ int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); /** * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). * - * \param ctx PK context to use - * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used. + * This can be #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if the signature algorithm + * does not rely on a hash algorithm (non-deterministic + * ECDSA, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5). + * For PKCS#1 v1.5, if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, then + * \p hash is the DigestInfo structure used by RFC 8017 + * §9.2 steps 3–6. If \p md_alg is a valid hash + * algorithm then \p hash is the digest itself, and this + * function calculates the DigestInfo encoding internally. * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param hash_len Hash length * \param sig Signature to verify * \param sig_len Signature length * @@ -276,23 +418,44 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. * Use \c mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, ... ) * to verify RSASSA_PSS signatures. - * - * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg - * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. - * - * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 */ int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_verify() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), but can + * return early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC + * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Signature to verify + * \param sig_len Signature length + * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + /** * \brief Verify signature, with options. * (Includes verification of the padding depending on type.) * * \param type Signature type (inc. possible padding type) to verify * \param options Pointer to type-specific options, or NULL - * \param ctx PK context to use + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) @@ -323,13 +486,20 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, /** * \brief Make signature, including padding if relevant. * - * \param ctx PK context to use - must hold a private key + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) - * \param sig Place to write the signature - * \param sig_len Number of bytes written - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param hash_len Hash length + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. @@ -338,27 +508,61 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, * There is no interface in the PK module to make RSASSA-PSS * signatures yet. * - * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg - * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. - * * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(), but can + * return early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC + * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + /** * \brief Decrypt message (including padding if relevant). * - * \param ctx PK context to use - must hold a private key + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. * \param input Input to decrypt * \param ilen Input size * \param output Decrypted output * \param olen Decrypted message length * \param osize Size of the output buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. @@ -373,15 +577,17 @@ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, /** * \brief Encrypt message (including padding if relevant). * - * \param ctx PK context to use + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. * \param input Message to encrypt * \param ilen Message size * \param output Encrypted output * \param olen Encrypted output length * \param osize Size of the output buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * + * \note \p f_rng is used for padding generation. + * * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. @@ -396,15 +602,24 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * * \param pub Context holding a public key. * \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * - * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not + * be checked - in that case they may or may not match. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid. + * \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match. */ -int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv ); +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + const mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Export debug information * - * \param ctx Context to use + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. * \param items Place to write debug items * * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA @@ -414,7 +629,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *item /** * \brief Access the type name * - * \param ctx Context to use + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. * * \return Type name on success, or "invalid PK" */ @@ -423,9 +638,10 @@ const char * mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Get the key type * - * \param ctx Context to use + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. * - * \return Type on success, or MBEDTLS_PK_NONE + * \return Type on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE for a context that has not been set up. */ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); @@ -434,12 +650,24 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Parse a private key in PEM or DER format * - * \param ctx key to be initialized - * \param key input buffer - * \param keylen size of the buffer - * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) - * \param pwd password for decryption (optional) - * \param pwdlen size of the password + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param key Input buffer to parse. + * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no + * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must + * contain a null-terminated string. + * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. + * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, + * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. + * \param pwd Optional password for decryption. + * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. + * Pass a string of \p pwdlen bytes if expecting an encrypted + * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. + * The empty password is not supported. + * \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes. + * Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a @@ -450,17 +678,23 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ); + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Parse a public key in PEM or DER format * - * \param ctx key to be initialized - * \param key input buffer - * \param keylen size of the buffer - * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param key Input buffer to parse. + * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no + * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must + * contain a null-terminated string. + * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. + * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, + * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a @@ -478,9 +712,16 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, /** * \brief Load and parse a private key * - * \param ctx key to be initialized + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. * \param path filename to read the private key from - * \param password password to decrypt the file (can be NULL) + * \param password Optional password to decrypt the file. + * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. + * Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted + * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. + * The empty password is not supported. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a @@ -491,13 +732,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const char *path, const char *password ); + const char *path, const char *password, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Load and parse a public key * - * \param ctx key to be initialized + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. * \param path filename to read the public key from * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised @@ -520,14 +763,14 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) * return value to determine where you should start * using the buffer * - * \param ctx private to write away + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); /** * \brief Write a public key to a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure @@ -535,37 +778,39 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_ * return value to determine where you should start * using the buffer * - * \param ctx public key to write away + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write a public key to a PEM string * - * \param ctx public key to write away - * \param buf buffer to write to - * \param size size of the buffer + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. + * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a + * terminating null byte. + * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); /** * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 PEM string * - * \param ctx private to write away - * \param buf buffer to write to - * \param size size of the buffer + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. + * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a + * terminating null byte. + * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ @@ -580,7 +825,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_ * * \param p the position in the ASN.1 data * \param end end of the buffer - * \param pk the key to fill + * \param pk The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK error code */ @@ -595,7 +841,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, * * \param p reference to current position pointer * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) - * \param key public key to write away + * \param key PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. * * \return the length written or a negative error code */ @@ -611,6 +857,32 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Turn an EC key into an opaque one. + * + * \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might + * change or be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the + * specified hash is the only allowed use of that key. + * + * \param pk Input: the EC key to import to a PSA key. + * Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key. + * \param key Output: a PSA key identifier. + * It's the caller's responsibility to call + * psa_destroy_key() on that key identifier after calling + * mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context. + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_id_t *key, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h deleted file mode 100644 index 02427ddc..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,175 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file pkcs11.h - * - * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - -#include "x509_crt.h" - -#include - -#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * Context for PKCS #11 private keys. - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs11_context -{ - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert; - int len; -} mbedtls_pkcs11_context; - -/** - * Initialize a mbedtls_pkcs11_context. - * (Just making memory references valid.) - */ -void mbedtls_pkcs11_init( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx ); - -/** - * Fill in a mbed TLS certificate, based on the given PKCS11 helper certificate. - * - * \param cert X.509 certificate to fill - * \param pkcs11h_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate - * - * \return 0 on success. - */ -int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert ); - -/** - * Set up a mbedtls_pkcs11_context storing the given certificate. Note that the - * mbedtls_pkcs11_context will take over control of the certificate, freeing it when - * done. - * - * \param priv_key Private key structure to fill. - * \param pkcs11_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate - * - * \return 0 on success - */ -int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ); - -/** - * Free the contents of the given private key context. Note that the structure - * itself is not freed. - * - * \param priv_key Private key structure to cleanup - */ -void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key ); - -/** - * \brief Do an RSA private key decrypt, then remove the message - * padding - * - * \param ctx PKCS #11 context - * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature - * \param input buffer holding the encrypted data - * \param output buffer that will hold the plaintext - * \param olen will contain the plaintext length - * \param output_max_len maximum length of the output buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code - * - * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise - * an error is thrown. - */ -int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len ); - -/** - * \brief Do a private RSA to sign a message digest - * - * \param ctx PKCS #11 context - * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature - * \param md_alg a MBEDTLS_MD_XXX (use MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data) - * \param hashlen message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only) - * \param hash buffer holding the message digest - * \param sig buffer that will hold the ciphertext - * - * \return 0 if the signing operation was successful, - * or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code - * - * \note The "sig" buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). - */ -int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig ); - -/** - * SSL/TLS wrappers for PKCS#11 functions - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len ) -{ - return mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, olen, input, output, - output_max_len ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign( void *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) -{ - ((void) f_rng); - ((void) p_rng); - return mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len( void *ctx ) -{ - return ( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx )->len; -} - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h index a621ef5b..de139ac6 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,15 +18,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H -#include "md.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include @@ -46,24 +46,7 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/** - * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) - * for pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 - * - * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12PbeParams structure - * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT - * \param pwd the password used (may be NULL if no password is used) - * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) - * \param input the input data - * \param len data length - * \param output the output buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code - */ -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *input, size_t len, - unsigned char *output ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) @@ -87,6 +70,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *input, size_t len, unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + /** * \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt * to produce pseudo-random bits for a particular "purpose". diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h index 9a3c9fdd..c339398a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * \author Mathias Olsson */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -20,14 +20,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H -#include "asn1.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #include #include @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ extern "C" { #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function * @@ -62,6 +64,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC * @@ -81,6 +85,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p unsigned int iteration_count, uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief Checkup routine * @@ -88,6 +94,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p */ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform.h index a40a64f9..277a85c7 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * dynamically configured at runtime. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -27,20 +27,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) -#include "platform_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif #ifdef __cplusplus @@ -51,21 +46,37 @@ extern "C" { * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ +/* The older Microsoft Windows common runtime provides non-conforming + * implementations of some standard library functions, including snprintf + * and vsnprintf. This affects MSVC and MinGW builds. + */ +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF +#endif + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) #include #include #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) -#if defined(_WIN32) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ #else #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ #endif #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ +#endif +#endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< The default \c printf function to use. */ #endif @@ -201,7 +212,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_printf( int (*printf_func)( const char *, ... ) ); * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when * the destination buffer is too short. */ -#if defined(_WIN32) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) /* For Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ); #endif @@ -227,6 +238,42 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +/* + * The function pointers for vsnprintf + * + * The vsnprintf implementation should conform to C99: + * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer + * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched) + * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when + * the destination buffer is too short. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include +/* For Older Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#include +extern int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, va_list arg ); + +/** + * \brief Set your own snprintf function pointer + * + * \param vsnprintf_func The \c vsnprintf function implementation + * + * \return \c 0 + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, va_list arg ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + /* * The function pointers for exit */ @@ -317,7 +364,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( */ typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context { - char dummy; /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ } mbedtls_platform_context; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h index 2ed36f56..8d4b95d1 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief mbed TLS Platform time abstraction */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,17 +18,11 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -38,7 +32,7 @@ extern "C" { * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h index 84f0732e..1a0a1351 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * library. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2018, Arm Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -19,18 +19,47 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#include +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif +/* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) do { } while( 0 ) + +/* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +/* Deliberately don't (yet) export MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED here + * to avoid conflict with other headers which define and use + * it, too. We might want to move all these definitions here at + * some point for uniformity. */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const * mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t; +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + /** * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer * @@ -55,6 +84,37 @@ extern "C" { */ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific implementation of gmtime_r() + * + * The function is a thread-safe abstraction that behaves + * similarly to the gmtime_r() function from Unix/POSIX. + * + * Mbed TLS will try to identify the underlying platform and + * make use of an appropriate underlying implementation (e.g. + * gmtime_r() for POSIX and gmtime_s() for Windows). If this is + * not possible, then gmtime() will be used. In this case, calls + * from the library to gmtime() will be guarded by the mutex + * mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is + * enabled. It is recommended that calls from outside the library + * are also guarded by this mutex. + * + * If MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, then Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the alternative implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() supplied by the user at compile time. + * + * \param tt Pointer to an object containing time (in seconds) since the + * epoch to be converted + * \param tm_buf Pointer to an object where the results will be stored + * + * \return Pointer to an object of type struct tm on success, otherwise + * NULL + */ +struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, + struct tm *tm_buf ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h index c490cdf2..7984ca4b 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ * \author Daniel King */ -/* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved. +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -26,25 +27,18 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H #define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057 /**< Invalid input parameter(s). */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0059 /**< Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x005B /**< Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -54,11 +48,11 @@ extern "C" { typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context { - uint32_t r[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ - uint32_t s[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ - uint32_t acc[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ - uint8_t queue[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ - size_t queue_len; /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(r)[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s)[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(acc)[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue)[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue_len); /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ } mbedtls_poly1305_context; @@ -78,14 +72,18 @@ mbedtls_poly1305_context; * \c mbedtls_poly1305_finish(), then finally * \c mbedtls_poly1305_free(). * - * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to initialize. + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); /** - * \brief This function releases and clears the specified Poly1305 context. + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * Poly1305 context. * - * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to clear. + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized Poly1305 context. */ void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); @@ -96,11 +94,11 @@ void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); * invocation of Poly1305. * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to which the key should be bound. - * \param key The buffer containing the 256-bit key. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if ctx or key are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ); @@ -114,13 +112,14 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, * It can be called repeatedly to process a stream of data. * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. - * \param ilen The length of the input data (in bytes). Any value is accepted. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * Any value is accepted. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This pointer can be NULL if ilen == 0. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if ctx or input are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, @@ -131,12 +130,12 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, * Authentication Code (MAC). * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. - * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. Must be big enough - * to hold the 16-byte MAC. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if ctx or mac are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16] ); @@ -148,16 +147,16 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each * invocation of Poly1305. * - * \param key The buffer containing the 256-bit key. - * \param ilen The length of the input data (in bytes). Any value is accepted. + * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * Any value is accepted. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This pointer can be NULL if ilen == 0. - * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. Must be big enough - * to hold the 16-byte MAC. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must be + * a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA - * if key, input, or mac are NULL. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], const unsigned char *input, diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/private_access.h similarity index 54% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/private_access.h index 6c13b53f..98d3419f 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/net.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/private_access.h @@ -1,12 +1,10 @@ -/** - * \file net.h + /** + * \file private_access.h * - * \brief Deprecated header file that includes net_sockets.h - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h + * \brief Macro wrapper for struct's memebrs. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -20,13 +18,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#include "net_sockets.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "Deprecated header file: Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) private_##member +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) member +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6f2e580 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ +/** + * \file psa_util.h + * + * \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library. + * + * \warning This function is not part of the public API and may + * change at any time. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +/* Translations for symmetric crypto. */ + +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher ) +{ + switch( cipher ) + { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + + /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ + /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen ) +{ + switch( mode ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: + return( PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + if( taglen == 0 ) + return( PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ); + else + return( 0 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( + mbedtls_operation_t op ) +{ + switch( op ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: + return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: + return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/* Translations for hashing. */ + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + switch( md_alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( PSA_ALG_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + return( 0 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/* Translations for ECC. */ + +static inline int mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( + psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits, + char const **oid, size_t *oid_len ) +{ + switch( curve ) + { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case 192: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case 224: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case 384: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case 521: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case 192: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case 224: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case 384: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case 512: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + } + (void) oid; + (void) oid_len; + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + + +/* Translations for PK layer */ + +static inline int mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( psa_status_t status ) +{ + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return( 0 ); + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* All other failures */ + case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + default: /* We return the same as for the 'other failures', + * but list them separately nonetheless to indicate + * which failure conditions we have considered. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } +} + +/* Translations for ECC */ + +/* This function transforms an ECC group identifier from + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8 + * into a PSA ECC group identifier. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( + uint16_t tls_ecc_grp_reg_id, size_t *bits ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_ecc_grp_reg_id ); + if( curve_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( curve_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id), bits ) ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* This function takes a buffer holding an EC public key + * exported through psa_export_public_key(), and converts + * it into an ECPoint structure to be put into a ClientKeyExchange + * message in an ECDHE exchange. + * + * Both the present and the foreseeable future format of EC public keys + * used by PSA have the ECPoint structure contained in the exported key + * as a subbuffer, and the function merely selects this subbuffer instead + * of making a copy. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( unsigned char *src, + size_t srclen, + unsigned char **dst, + size_t *dstlen ) +{ + *dst = src; + *dstlen = srclen; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* This function takes a buffer holding an ECPoint structure + * (as contained in a TLS ServerKeyExchange message for ECDHE + * exchanges) and converts it into a format that the PSA key + * agreement API understands. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( unsigned char const *src, + size_t srclen, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dstlen, + size_t *olen ) +{ + if( srclen > dstlen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( dst, src, srclen ); + *olen = srclen; + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the + * mbedtls_xxx API. The declarations and definitions here need to be + * consistent with the implementation in library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h. + * See that file for implementation documentation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* The type of a `f_rng` random generator function that many library functions + * take. + * + * This type name is not part of the Mbed TLS stable API. It may be renamed + * or moved without warning. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_f_rng_t( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +/** The random generator function for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This function is suitable as the `f_rng` random generator function + * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. Use #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE + * to obtain the \p p_rng parameter. + * + * The implementation of this function depends on the configuration of the + * library. + * + * \note Depending on the configuration, this may be a function or + * a pointer to a function. + * + * \note This function may only be used if the PSA crypto subsystem is active. + * This means that you must call psa_crypto_init() before any call to + * this function, and you must not call this function after calling + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * + * \param p_rng The random generator context. This must be + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. No other state is + * supported. + * \param output The buffer to fill. It must have room for + * \c output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The number of bytes to write to \p output. + * This function may fail if \p output_size is too + * large. It is guaranteed to accept any output size + * requested by Mbed TLS library functions. The + * maximum request size depends on the library + * configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An `MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_xxx`, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_xxx, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_xxx` or + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_xxx` on error. + */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ); + +/** The random generator state for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This macro expands to an expression which is suitable as the `p_rng` + * random generator state parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. + * It must be used in combination with the random generator function + * mbedtls_psa_get_random(). + * + * The implementation of this macro depends on the configuration of the + * library. Do not make any assumption on its nature. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +#else /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random; +#endif +extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h index 0c8e568b..9132a83b 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief RIPE MD-160 message digest */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,23 +18,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H #define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0031 /**< RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed */ - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -48,14 +41,14 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_ripemd160_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ -#include "ripemd160.h" +#include "ripemd160_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ /** @@ -88,7 +81,7 @@ void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer @@ -99,9 +92,9 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest @@ -111,8 +104,8 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) @@ -125,63 +118,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) * @@ -191,31 +127,11 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ); +int mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine @@ -224,6 +140,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, */ int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa.h index 6eea5af2..cffbe3b5 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ * */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -24,23 +24,18 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_H #define MBEDTLS_RSA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "bignum.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /* @@ -55,14 +50,10 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4380 /**< The PKCS#1 verification failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -0x4400 /**< The output buffer for decryption is not large enough. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480 /**< The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION -0x4500 /**< The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4580 /**< RSA hardware accelerator failed. */ /* * RSA constants */ -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC 0 /**< Request private key operation. */ -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE 1 /**< Request public key operation. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */ @@ -87,44 +78,44 @@ extern "C" { /** * \brief The RSA context structure. - * - * \note Direct manipulation of the members of this structure - * is deprecated. All manipulation should instead be done through - * the public interface functions. */ typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context { - int ver; /*!< Always 0.*/ - size_t len; /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< Reserved for internal purposes. + * Do not set this field in application + * code. Its meaning might change without + * notice. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ - mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The public modulus. */ - mbedtls_mpi E; /*!< The public exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N); /*!< The public modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(E); /*!< The public exponent. */ - mbedtls_mpi D; /*!< The private exponent. */ - mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The first prime factor. */ - mbedtls_mpi Q; /*!< The second prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(D); /*!< The private exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The first prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The second prime factor. */ - mbedtls_mpi DP; /*!< D % (P - 1). */ - mbedtls_mpi DQ; /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ - mbedtls_mpi QP; /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DP); /*!< D % (P - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DQ); /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(QP); /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ - mbedtls_mpi RN; /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RN); /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ - mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ - mbedtls_mpi RQ; /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RQ); /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The cached blinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The cached blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ - int padding; /*!< Selects padding mode: + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(padding); /*!< Selects padding mode: #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ - int hash_id; /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_id); /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, as specified in md.h for use in the MGF mask generating function used in the EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized iff ver != 0. */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ #endif } mbedtls_rsa_context; @@ -136,32 +127,51 @@ mbedtls_rsa_context; /** * \brief This function initializes an RSA context. * + * \note This function initializes the padding and the hash + * identifier to respectively #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 and + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. See mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() for more + * information about those parameters. + * + * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA + * context. + * * \note Set padding to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for the RSAES-OAEP * encryption scheme and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme. * * \note The \p hash_id parameter is ignored when using * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 padding. * - * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key - * operations, since there might be security concerns in + * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private + * key operations, since there might be security concerns in * mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is - * a default value, which can be overriden by calling specific - * \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions. + * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific + * \c mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_xxx + * functions. * * \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP * encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for - * making signatures, but can be overriden for verifying them. - * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overriden. + * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them. + * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden. * - * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. - * \param padding Selects padding mode: #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. - * \param hash_id The hash identifier of #mbedtls_md_type_t type, if - * \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. + * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. + * \param hash_id The hash identifier for PSS or OAEP, if \p padding is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE is accepted by this + * function but may be not suitable for some operations. + * Ignored if \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING failure: + * \p padding or \p hash_id is invalid. */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int padding, - int hash_id); +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id ); /** * \brief This function imports a set of core parameters into an @@ -183,11 +193,11 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. - * \param N The RSA modulus, or NULL. - * \param P The first prime factor of \p N, or NULL. - * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N, or NULL. - * \param D The private exponent, or NULL. - * \param E The public exponent, or NULL. + * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. + * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A non-zero error code on failure. @@ -217,16 +227,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. - * \param N The RSA modulus, or NULL. - * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N, ignored if \p N == NULL. - * \param P The first prime factor of \p N, or NULL. - * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P, ignored if \p P == NULL. - * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N, or NULL. - * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q, ignored if \p Q == NULL. - * \param D The private exponent, or NULL. - * \param D_len The Byte length of \p D, ignored if \p D == NULL. - * \param E The public exponent, or NULL. - * \param E_len The Byte length of \p E, ignored if \p E == NULL. + * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. + * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL. + * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it ns ignored if \p P == NULL. + * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL. + * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param D_len The Byte length of \p D; it is ignored if \p D == NULL. + * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param E_len The Byte length of \p E; it is ignored if \p E == NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A non-zero error code on failure. @@ -281,7 +291,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); * zero Bytes. * * Possible reasons for returning - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION:
            + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
              *
            • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should * not export it into RAM.
              • @@ -294,14 +304,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. - * \param N The MPI to hold the RSA modulus, or NULL. - * \param P The MPI to hold the first prime factor of \p N, or NULL. - * \param Q The MPI to hold the second prime factor of \p N, or NULL. - * \param D The MPI to hold the private exponent, or NULL. - * \param E The MPI to hold the public exponent, or NULL. + * \param N The MPI to hold the RSA modulus. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param P The MPI to hold the first prime factor of \p N. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param Q The MPI to hold the second prime factor of \p N. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param D The MPI to hold the private exponent. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param E The MPI to hold the public exponent. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION if exporting the + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing * functionality or because of security policies. * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. @@ -321,7 +336,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * zero Bytes. * * Possible reasons for returning - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION:
                + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
                  *
                • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should * not export it into RAM.
                  • @@ -336,21 +351,24 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * buffer pointers are NULL. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. - * \param N The Byte array to store the RSA modulus, or NULL. + * \param N The Byte array to store the RSA modulus, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param N_len The size of the buffer for the modulus. - * \param P The Byte array to hold the first prime factor of \p N, or - * NULL. + * \param P The Byte array to hold the first prime factor of \p N, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param P_len The size of the buffer for the first prime factor. - * \param Q The Byte array to hold the second prime factor of \p N, or - * NULL. + * \param Q The Byte array to hold the second prime factor of \p N, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param Q_len The size of the buffer for the second prime factor. - * \param D The Byte array to hold the private exponent, or NULL. + * \param D The Byte array to hold the private exponent, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param D_len The size of the buffer for the private exponent. - * \param E The Byte array to hold the public exponent, or NULL. + * \param E The Byte array to hold the public exponent, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param E_len The size of the buffer for the public exponent. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION if exporting the + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing * functionality or because of security policies. * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. @@ -370,9 +388,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * mbedtls_rsa_deduce_opt(). * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. - * \param DP The MPI to hold D modulo P-1, or NULL. - * \param DQ The MPI to hold D modulo Q-1, or NULL. - * \param QP The MPI to hold modular inverse of Q modulo P, or NULL. + * \param DP The MPI to hold \c D modulo `P-1`, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * \param DQ The MPI to hold \c D modulo `Q-1`, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * \param QP The MPI to hold modular inverse of \c Q modulo \c P, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A non-zero error code on failure. @@ -381,18 +402,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); -/** - * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA - * context. See mbedtls_rsa_init() for details. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context to be set. - * \param padding Selects padding mode: #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. - * \param hash_id The #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 hash identifier. - */ -void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, - int hash_id); - /** * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes. * @@ -409,11 +418,14 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); * \note mbedtls_rsa_init() must be called before this function, * to set up the RSA context. * - * \param ctx The RSA context used to hold the key. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation. + * This is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param nbits The size of the public key in bits. - * \param exponent The public exponent. For example, 65537. + * \param exponent The public exponent to use. For example, \c 65537. + * This must be odd and greater than \c 1. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -431,7 +443,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * enough information is present to perform an RSA public key * operation using mbedtls_rsa_public(). * - * \param ctx The RSA context to check. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -470,7 +482,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); * parameters, which goes beyond what is effectively checkable * by the library.
                * - * \param ctx The RSA context to check. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -482,8 +494,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); * * It checks each of the contexts, and makes sure they match. * - * \param pub The RSA context holding the public key. - * \param prv The RSA context holding the private key. + * \param pub The initialized RSA context holding the public key. + * \param prv The initialized RSA context holding the private key. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -494,18 +506,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, /** * \brief This function performs an RSA public key operation. * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * * \note This function does not handle message padding. * * \note Make sure to set \p input[0] = 0 or ensure that * input is smaller than \p N. * - * \note The input and output buffers must be large - * enough. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param input The input buffer. - * \param output The output buffer. - * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ @@ -516,9 +529,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /** * \brief This function performs an RSA private key operation. * - * \note The input and output buffers must be large - * enough. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * * \note Blinding is used if and only if a PRNG is provided. * * \note If blinding is used, both the base of exponentation @@ -530,11 +540,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Future versions of the library may enforce the presence * of a PRNG. * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for blinding. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param input The input buffer. - * \param output The output buffer. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is mandatory. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -551,28 +566,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * operation. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption - * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * operation. * - * \note The input and output buffers must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for padding, PKCS#1 v2.1 - * encoding, and #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param ilen The length of the plaintext. - * \param input The buffer holding the data to encrypt. - * \param output The buffer used to hold the ciphertext. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is used for padding generation + * and it is mandatory. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -580,7 +587,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); @@ -588,26 +595,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation * (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT). * - * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for padding and - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param ilen The length of the plaintext. - * \param input The buffer holding the data to encrypt. - * \param output The buffer used to hold the ciphertext. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is mandatory and used for + * padding generation. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); @@ -626,25 +625,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size * of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for padding and PKCS#1 v2.1 - * encoding and #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initnialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding + * generation and is mandatory. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. - * \param label_len The length of the label. - * \param ilen The length of the plaintext. - * \param input The buffer holding the data to encrypt. - * \param output The buffer used to hold the ciphertext. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len + * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. + * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext buffer \p input in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -652,7 +648,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -663,7 +658,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * message padding. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption - * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * operation. * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example, @@ -672,26 +667,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \note The input buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param olen The length of the plaintext. - * \param input The buffer holding the encrypted data. - * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. - * \param output_max_len The maximum length of the output buffer. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -699,7 +687,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); @@ -715,26 +703,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \note The input buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param olen The length of the plaintext. - * \param input The buffer holding the encrypted data. - * \param output The buffer to hold the plaintext. - * \param output_max_len The maximum length of the output buffer. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -743,7 +724,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); @@ -760,28 +741,23 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * ciphertext provided, the function returns * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \note The input buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. - * \param label_len The length of the label. - * \param olen The length of the plaintext. - * \param input The buffer holding the encrypted data. - * \param output The buffer to hold the plaintext. - * \param output_max_len The maximum length of the output buffer. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len + * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. + * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -789,7 +765,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -801,7 +776,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * a message digest using PKCS#1. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 - * signature using the \p mode from the context. + * signature. * * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. @@ -810,25 +785,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on * \p md_alg and \p hash_id. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding and for - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is mandatory and + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. Only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer to hold the ciphertext. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. * * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -836,7 +808,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -846,27 +817,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN). * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. Only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer to hold the ciphertext. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. * * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -874,7 +840,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -884,35 +849,91 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is the one used for the - * encoding. \p md_alg in the function call is the type of hash - * that is encoded. According to RFC-3447: Public-Key + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography - * Specifications it is advised to keep both hashes the - * same. + * Specifications. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \note This function enforces that the provided salt length complies + * with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 + * step 3. The constraint is that the hash length plus the salt + * length plus 2 bytes must be at most the key length. If this + * constraint is not met, this function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding and for - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. Only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer to hold the ciphertext. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param saltlen The length of the salt that should be used. + * If passed #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, the function will use + * the largest possible salt length up to the hash length, + * which is the largest permitted by some standards including + * FIPS 186-4 §5.5. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * + * \note This function always uses the maximum possible salt size, + * up to the length of the payload hash. This choice of salt + * size complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 + * v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. Furthermore this function enforces a + * minimum salt size which is the hash size minus 2 bytes. If + * this minimum size is too large given the key size (the salt + * size, plus the hash size, plus 2 bytes must be no more than + * the key size in bytes), this function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. * * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. @@ -920,7 +941,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -931,41 +951,28 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * the message digest. * * This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 - * verification using the mode from the context. - * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. + * verification. * * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \p md_alg and * \p hash_id. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA public key context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. Only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer holding the ciphertext. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -975,35 +982,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY). * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA public key context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. Only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer holding the ciphertext. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1013,46 +1007,32 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). * - * The hash function for the MGF mask generating function - * is that specified in the RSA context. - * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size - * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. - * - * \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is the one used for the - * verification. \p md_alg in the function call is the type of - * hash that is verified. According to RFC-3447: Public-Key + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography - * Specifications it is advised to keep both hashes the - * same. If \p hash_id in the RSA context is unset, - * the \p md_alg from the function call is used. + * Specifications. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx by + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg + * parameter is used. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. - * - * \param ctx The RSA public key context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. Only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer holding the ciphertext. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1062,35 +1042,37 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). * - * The hash function for the MGF mask generating function - * is that specified in \p mgf1_hash_id. - * * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * - * \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is ignored. + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is + * ignored. * - * \param ctx The RSA public key context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. - * \param mode #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. Only used if \p md_alg is - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest used for mask generation. - * \param expected_salt_len The length of the salt used in padding. Use - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length. - * \param sig The buffer holding the ciphertext. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. + * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest algorithm used for the + * verification operation and the mask generation + * function (MGF1). For more details on the encoding + * operation and the mask generation function, consult + * RFC-3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards + * (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * \param expected_salt_len The length of the salt used in padding. Use + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1101,8 +1083,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /** * \brief This function copies the components of an RSA context. * - * \param dst The destination context. - * \param src The source context. + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The source context. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation failure. @@ -1112,10 +1094,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ) /** * \brief This function frees the components of an RSA key. * - * \param ctx The RSA Context to free. + * \param ctx The RSA context to free. May be \c NULL, in which case + * this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized RSA context. */ void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief The RSA checkup routine. * @@ -1124,6 +1110,8 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); */ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha1.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha1.h index 7a19da0a..d2db67ca 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha1.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha1.h @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ * digests instead. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -25,22 +25,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0035 /**< SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0073 /**< SHA-1 input data was malformed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -60,9 +55,9 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint32_t state[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ } mbedtls_sha1_context; @@ -78,6 +73,7 @@ mbedtls_sha1_context; * stronger message digests instead. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. * */ void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); @@ -89,7 +85,10 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to clear. + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it is + * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized + * SHA-1 context. * */ void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); @@ -101,8 +100,8 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * - * \param dst The SHA-1 context to clone to. - * \param src The SHA-1 context to clone from. + * \param dst The SHA-1 context to clone to. This must be initialized. + * \param src The SHA-1 context to clone from. This must be initialized. * */ void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, @@ -115,12 +114,13 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ -int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); +int mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 @@ -130,15 +130,18 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); +int mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes @@ -148,13 +151,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. - * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ); +int mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); /** * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). @@ -163,90 +169,17 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. - * \param data The data block being processed. + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param data The data block being processed. This must be a + * readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 - * checksum calculation. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. - * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ); - -/** - * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha1_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. - * \param data The data block being processed. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. * @@ -261,48 +194,20 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, * stronger message digests instead. * * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ -int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ); +int mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. - * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-1 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-1(input buffer). - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The SHA-1 checkup routine. @@ -317,6 +222,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, */ int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha256.h index 33aff283..7f42c2c9 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha256.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha256.h @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -21,22 +21,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA256_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0037 /**< SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0074 /**< SHA-256 input data was malformed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -51,14 +46,14 @@ extern "C" { * * The structure is used both for SHA-256 and for SHA-224 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is - * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(). + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint32_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ - int is224; /*!< Determines which function to use: + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is224); /*!< Determines which function to use: 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ } mbedtls_sha256_context; @@ -70,22 +65,24 @@ mbedtls_sha256_context; /** * \brief This function initializes a SHA-256 context. * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to initialize. + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clears a SHA-256 context. * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to clear. + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized SHA-256 context. */ void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-256 context. * - * \param dst The destination context. - * \param src The context to clone. + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ); @@ -94,115 +91,63 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum * calculation. * - * \param ctx The context to initialize. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. + * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is224 This determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ); +int mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * SHA-256 checksum calculation. * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. - * \param input The buffer holding the data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); +int mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes + * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32] ); +int mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for * internal use only. * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum - * calculation. - * - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The context to initialize. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - int is224 ); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing - * SHA-256 checksum calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to initialize. - * \param input The buffer holding the data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32] ); - -/** - * \brief This function processes a single data block within - * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for - * internal use only. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 * checksum of a buffer. @@ -213,49 +158,21 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, * The SHA-256 result is calculated as * output = SHA-256(input buffer). * - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes + * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224. + * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224 ); +int mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is224 ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif - -/** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum - * of a buffer. - * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-256 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-256(input buffer). - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param input The buffer holding the data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224 ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The SHA-224 and SHA-256 checkup routine. @@ -265,6 +182,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, */ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha512.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha512.h index 01458904..c43b9075 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha512.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/sha512.h @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -20,22 +20,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA512_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0039 /**< SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0075 /**< SHA-512 input data was malformed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -50,15 +45,17 @@ extern "C" { * * The structure is used both for SHA-384 and for SHA-512 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is - * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(). + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context { - uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ - int is384; /*!< Determines which function to use: - 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is384); /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ +#endif } mbedtls_sha512_context; @@ -69,22 +66,26 @@ mbedtls_sha512_context; /** * \brief This function initializes a SHA-512 context. * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clears a SHA-512 context. * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to clear. + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized + * SHA-512 context. */ void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-512 context. * - * \param dst The destination context. - * \param src The context to clone. + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ); @@ -93,143 +94,67 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum * calculation. * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is not defined, + * \p is384 must be \c 0, or the function will return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ); +int mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * SHA-512 checksum calculation. * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. This function is for - * internal use only. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. - * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - */ -int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64] ); - -/** - * \brief This function processes a single data block within - * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - */ -int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum - * calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - int is384 ); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing - * SHA-512 checksum calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. - * \param input The buffer holding the data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ); +int mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes + * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64] ); +int mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within - * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. This function is for - * internal use only. + * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. + * This function is for internal use only. * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( - mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128] ); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 - * checksum of a buffer. - * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-512 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-512(input buffer). - * - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This + * must be a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384 ); +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 * checksum of a buffer. @@ -240,21 +165,29 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, * The SHA-512 result is calculated as * output = SHA-512(input buffer). * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input The buffer holding the data. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be + * a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use: - * 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes + * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is not defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384 ); +int mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is384 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checkup routine. * @@ -262,6 +195,7 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 83849a56..3a14a583 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief SSL/TLS functions. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,91 +18,82 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "bignum.h" -#include "ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#include "ssl_ciphersuites.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#include "x509_crt.h" -#include "x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) -#include "dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) -#include "ecdh.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and will be removed in the next major revision of the library" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and cannot be used if MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is set" -#endif - -#include "zlib.h" +/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due + * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap + * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) -#include "platform_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* * SSL Error codes */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 /**< A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080 /**< The requested feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x7100 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180 /**< Verification of the message MAC failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 /**< An invalid SSL record was received. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 /**< The connection indicated an EOF. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 /**< An unknown cipher was received. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 /**< The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR -0x7300 /**< A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error. */ +/* Error space gap */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 /**< No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 /**< No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 /**< Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 /**< The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION -0x7500 /**< Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -0x7580 /**< No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 /**< The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680 /**< No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 /**< An unexpected message was received from our peer. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 /**< A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 /**< Verification of our peer failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -0x7800 /**< No server could be identified matching the client's SNI. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 /**< The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 /**< Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 /**< Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 /**< Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -0x7A80 /**< Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7B00 /**< Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -0x7B80 /**< Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7C00 /**< Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -0x7C80 /**< Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -0x7D00 /**< Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -0x7D80 /**< Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -0x7E00 /**< Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -0x7E80 /**< Processing of the Finished handshake message failed. */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 /**< Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00 /**< Memory allocation failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80 /**< Hardware acceleration function returned with error */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80 /**< Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -0x6F00 /**< Processing of the compression / decompression failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 /**< Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x6E00 /**< Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 /**< Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -0x6E00 /**< The handshake negotiation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80 /**< Session ticket has expired. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x6D00 /**< Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -0x6C80 /**< Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity) */ @@ -111,31 +102,48 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -0x6B00 /**< Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80 /**< DTLS client must retry for hello verification */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00 /**< A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -0x6980 /**< None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages). */ +/* Error space gap */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900 /**< No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -0x6880 /**< Connection requires a write call. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -0x6800 /**< The operation timed out. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780 /**< The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 /**< Record header looks valid but is not expected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 /**< The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 /**< Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -0x6600 /**< A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 /**< Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 /**< The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 /**< Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000 /**< An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00 /**< An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80 /**< Invalid value in SSL config */ /* * Various constants */ + +/* These are the high an low bytes of ProtocolVersion as defined by: + * - RFC 5246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 3 }; // TLS v1.2 + * - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1 + */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 0 /*!< SSL v3.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ /* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */ @@ -149,17 +157,16 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK 1 - #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED 1 + #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1 @@ -189,18 +196,18 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED 1 - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED 1 - #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER 0 + /* * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds. * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds. @@ -212,14 +219,10 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ -#endif - /* * Maximum fragment length in bytes, * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers. @@ -231,16 +234,12 @@ * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your * peers are using it too! */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /**< Size of the input / output buffer */ -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 #endif /* @@ -251,22 +250,32 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 #endif +/* + * Maximum length of CIDs for incoming and outgoing messages. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 +#endif + /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ /* * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 36 -#else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12 -#endif /* * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE 0x5600 /**< RFC 7507 section 2 */ /* * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2) @@ -298,6 +307,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT 21 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE 22 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 23 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID 25 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL 2 @@ -360,6 +370,8 @@ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14 + #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */ @@ -367,6 +379,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35 +/* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of + * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* TBD */ + #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF01 @@ -559,7 +576,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config; -/* Defined in ssl_internal.h */ +/* Defined in library/ssl_misc.h */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t; @@ -570,6 +587,56 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item; #endif +/** + * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache getter + * + * The session cache is logically a key value store, with + * keys being session IDs and values being instances of + * mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * This callback retrieves an entry in this key-value store. + * + * \param data The address of the session cache structure to query. + * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes. + * \param session The address of the session structure to populate. + * It is initialized with mbdtls_ssl_session_init(), + * and the callback must always leave it in a state + * where it can safely be freed via + * mbedtls_ssl_session_free() independent of the + * return code of this function. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + * + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t( void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +/** + * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache setter + * + * The session cache is logically a key value store, with + * keys being session IDs and values being instances of + * mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * This callback sets an entry in this key-value store. + * + * \param data The address of the session cache structure to modify. + * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes. + * \param session The address of the session to be stored in the + * session cache. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t( void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** @@ -782,44 +849,163 @@ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20 +#else +/* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */ +#error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT." +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED && + !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH 4 +/* + * For code readability use a typedef for DTLS-SRTP profiles + * + * Use_srtp extension protection profiles values as defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + * + * Reminder: if this list is expanded mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + * must be updated too. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0001) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0002) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0005) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0006) +/* This one is not iana defined, but for code readability. */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ( (uint16_t) 0x0000) + +typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile; + +typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t +{ + /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chosen_dtls_srtp_profile); + /*! The length of mki_value. */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_len); + /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_value)[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; +} +mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * This structure is used for storing current session data. + * + * Note: when changing this definition, we need to check and update: + * - in tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function: + * ssl_populate_session() and ssl_serialize_session_save_load() + * - in library/ssl_tls.c: + * mbedtls_ssl_session_init() and mbedtls_ssl_session_free() + * mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and ssl_session_load() + * ssl_session_copy() */ struct mbedtls_ssl_session { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t start; /*!< starting time */ + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(start); /*!< starting time */ #endif - int ciphersuite; /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ - int compression; /*!< chosen compression */ - size_t id_len; /*!< session id length */ - unsigned char id[32]; /*!< session identifier */ - unsigned char master[48]; /*!< the master secret */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(compression); /*!< chosen compression */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); /*!< session id length */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id)[32]; /*!< session identifier */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(master)[48]; /*!< the master secret */ + + unsigned char exported; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert); /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT + * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_len); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_type); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - uint32_t verify_result; /*!< verification result */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_result); /*!< verification result */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ticket; /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ - size_t ticket_len; /*!< session ticket length */ - uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket); /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_len); /*!< session ticket length */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - unsigned char mfl_code; /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - int trunc_hmac; /*!< flag for truncated hmac activation */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< flag for EtM activation */ #endif }; +/* + * Identifiers for PRFs used in various versions of TLS. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256 +} +mbedtls_tls_prf_types; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET = 0, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +} mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type; + +/** + * \brief Callback type: Export key alongside random values for + * session identification, and PRF for + * implementation of TLS key exporters. + * + * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. + * \param type The type of the key that is being exported. + * \param secret The address of the buffer holding the secret + * that's being exporterd. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in bytes. + * \param client_random The client random bytes. + * \param server_random The server random bytes. + * \param tls_prf_type The identifier for the PRF used in the handshake + * to which the key belongs. + */ +typedef void mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t( void *p_expkey, + mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type type, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + /** * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures. */ @@ -831,371 +1017,415 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config * Pointers */ - const int *ciphersuite_list[4]; /*!< allowed ciphersuites per version */ + /** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated) */ + const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite_list); /** Callback for printing debug output */ - void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); - void *p_dbg; /*!< context for the debug function */ + void (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_dbg))(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_dbg); /*!< context for the debug function */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */ /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */ - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *); + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_cache); /** Callback to store a session into the cache */ - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *); - void *p_cache; /*!< context for cache callbacks */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_cache); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cache); /*!< context for cache callbacks */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */ - int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_sni; /*!< context for SNI callback */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_sni))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sni); /*!< context for SNI callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); - void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */ - int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_psk; /*!< context for PSK callback */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_psk))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_psk); /*!< context for PSK callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello veirifcation */ - int (*f_cookie_write)( void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_write))( void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */ - int (*f_cookie_check)( void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_check))( void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t ); - void *p_cookie; /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cookie); /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */ - int (*f_ticket_write)( void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_write))( void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, uint32_t * ); /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */ - int (*f_ticket_parse)( void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_ticket; /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_parse))( void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ticket); /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ - int (*f_export_keys)( void *, const unsigned char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t ); - void *p_export_keys; /*!< context for key export callback */ -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cid_len); /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *cert_profile; /*!< verification profile */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_profile); /*!< verification profile */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_cert); /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_chain); /*!< trusted CAs */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_crl); /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ca_cb); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ca_cb); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign_start; /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt_start; /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_sign_start); /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_decrypt_start); /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume; /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel; /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ - void *p_async_config_data; /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_resume); /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_cancel); /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_async_config_data); /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - const int *sig_hashes; /*!< allowed signature hashes */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_hashes); /*!< allowed signature hashes */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list; /*!< allowed curves */ + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_mpi dhm_P; /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ - mbedtls_mpi dhm_G; /*!< generator for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_P); /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_G); /*!< generator for DHM */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) - unsigned char *psk; /*!< pre-shared key. This field should - only be set via - mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */ - size_t psk_len; /*!< length of the pre-shared key. This - field should only be set via - mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */ - unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< identity for PSK negotiation. This - field should only be set via - mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */ - size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< length of identity. This field should - only be set via - mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */ -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_opaque); /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field + * should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been + * configured, this has value \c 0. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk); /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should + * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK + * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_len); /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ + + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity); /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * This is set if and only if either + * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity_len);/*!< The length of PSK identity. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque + * is not \c 0. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */ + const char **MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_list); /*!< ordered list of protocols */ #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list); + /*! number of supported profiles */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Numerical settings (int then char) */ - uint32_t read_timeout; /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(read_timeout); /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint32_t hs_timeout_min; /*!< initial value of the handshake + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_min); /*!< initial value of the handshake retransmission timeout (ms) */ - uint32_t hs_timeout_max; /*!< maximum value of the handshake + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_max); /*!< maximum value of the handshake retransmission timeout (ms) */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - int renego_max_records; /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ - unsigned char renego_period[8]; /*!< value of the record counters + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_max_records); /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_period)[8]; /*!< value of the record counters that triggers renegotiation */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - unsigned int badmac_limit; /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ -#endif + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_limit); /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned int dhm_min_bitlen; /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_min_bitlen); /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ #endif - unsigned char max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version used */ - unsigned char max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version used */ - unsigned char min_major_ver; /*!< min. major version used */ - unsigned char min_minor_ver; /*!< min. minor version used */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_major_ver); /*!< max. major version used */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_minor_ver); /*!< max. minor version used */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_major_ver); /*!< min. major version used */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_minor_ver); /*!< min. minor version used */ /* * Flags (bitfields) */ - unsigned int endpoint : 1; /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ - unsigned int transport : 1; /*!< stream (TLS) or datagram (DTLS) */ - unsigned int authmode : 2; /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint) : 1; /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transport) : 1; /*!< stream (TLS) or datagram (DTLS) */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(authmode) : 2; /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */ - unsigned int allow_legacy_renegotiation : 2 ; /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - unsigned int arc4_disabled : 1; /*!< blacklist RC4 ciphersuites? */ -#endif + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(allow_legacy_renegotiation) : 2 ; /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - unsigned int mfl_code : 3; /*!< desired fragment length */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code) : 3; /*!< desired fragment length */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - unsigned int encrypt_then_mac : 1 ; /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac) : 1 ; /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - unsigned int extended_ms : 1; /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extended_ms) : 1; /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - unsigned int anti_replay : 1; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - unsigned int cbc_record_splitting : 1; /*!< do cbc record splitting */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(anti_replay) : 1; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - unsigned int disable_renegotiation : 1; /*!< disable renegotiation? */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - unsigned int trunc_hmac : 1; /*!< negotiate truncated hmac? */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_renegotiation) : 1; /*!< disable renegotiation? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - unsigned int session_tickets : 1; /*!< use session tickets? */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned int fallback : 1; /*!< is this a fallback? */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_tickets) : 1; /*!< use session tickets? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - unsigned int cert_req_ca_list : 1; /*!< enable sending CA list in + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_req_ca_list) : 1; /*!< enable sending CA list in Certificate Request messages? */ + unsigned int respect_cli_pref : 1; /*!< pick the ciphersuite according to + the client's preferences rather + than ours */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ignore_unexpected_cid) : 1; /*!< Determines whether DTLS + * record with unexpected CID + * should lead to failure. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_mki_support) : 1; /* support having mki_value + in the use_srtp extension */ #endif }; - struct mbedtls_ssl_context { - const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; /*!< configuration information */ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */ /* * Miscellaneous */ - int state; /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - int renego_status; /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ - int renego_records_seen; /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_status); /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_records_seen); /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, number of retransmissions of request if renego_max_records is < 0 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */ - int minor_ver; /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0) */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(major_ver); /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(minor_ver); /*!< one of MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_x macros */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ +#endif - mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */ - mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */ - mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout; + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_send); /*!< Callback for network send */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv); /*!< Callback for network receive */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv_timeout); /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */ - void *p_bio; /*!< context for I/O operations */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_bio); /*!< context for I/O operations */ /* * Session layer */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_in; /*!< current session data (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_out; /*!< current session data (out) */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session; /*!< negotiated session data */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate; /*!< session data in negotiation */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_in); /*!< current session data (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_out); /*!< current session data (out) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< negotiated session data */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_negotiate); /*!< session data in negotiation */ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake; /*!< params required only during + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(handshake); /*!< params required only during the handshake process */ /* * Record layer transformations */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_in; /*!< current transform params (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out; /*!< current transform params (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform; /*!< negotiated transform params */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_negotiate; /*!< transform params in negotiation */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_in); /*!< current transform params (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_out); /*!< current transform params (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform); /*!< negotiated transform params */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_negotiate); /*!< transform params in negotiation */ /* * Timers */ - void *p_timer; /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_timer); /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer; /*!< set timer callback */ - mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer; /*!< get timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_timer); /*!< set timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_timer); /*!< get timer callback */ /* * Record layer (incoming data) */ - unsigned char *in_buf; /*!< input buffer */ - unsigned char *in_ctr; /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf); /*!< input buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_ctr); /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter TLS: maintained by us DTLS: read from peer */ - unsigned char *in_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ - unsigned char *in_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ - unsigned char *in_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ - unsigned char *in_msg; /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ - unsigned char *in_offt; /*!< read offset in application data */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hdr); /*!< start of record header */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_cid); /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msg); /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_offt); /*!< read offset in application data */ - int in_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ - size_t in_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ - size_t in_left; /*!< amount of data read so far */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_left); /*!< amount of data read so far */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf_len); /*!< length of input buffer */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint16_t in_epoch; /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ - size_t next_record_offset; /*!< offset of the next record in datagram + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_epoch); /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_record_offset); /*!< offset of the next record in datagram (equal to in_left if none) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - uint64_t in_window_top; /*!< last validated record seq_num */ - uint64_t in_window; /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window_top); /*!< last validated record seq_num */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window); /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length, + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hslen); /*!< current handshake message length, including the handshake header */ - int nb_zero; /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nb_zero); /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ - int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keep_current_message); /*!< drop or reuse current message on next call to record layer? */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint8_t disable_datagram_packing; /*!< Disable packing multiple records + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_datagram_packing); /*!< Disable packing multiple records * within a single datagram. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /* * Record layer (outgoing data) */ - unsigned char *out_buf; /*!< output buffer */ - unsigned char *out_ctr; /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ - unsigned char *out_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ - unsigned char *out_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ - unsigned char *out_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ - unsigned char *out_msg; /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf); /*!< output buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_ctr); /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_hdr); /*!< start of record header */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_cid); /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msg); /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ - int out_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ - size_t out_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ - size_t out_left; /*!< amount of data not yet written */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_left); /*!< amount of data not yet written */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf_len); /*!< length of output buffer */ +#endif - unsigned char cur_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mtu); /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - unsigned char *compress_buf; /*!< zlib data buffer */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - signed char split_done; /*!< current record already splitted? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ - /* * PKI layer */ - int client_auth; /*!< flag for client auth. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(client_auth); /*!< flag for client auth. */ /* * User settings */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification + char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< expected peer CN for verification (and SNI if available) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - const char *alpn_chosen; /*!< negotiated protocol */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_chosen); /*!< negotiated protocol */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + /* + * use_srtp extension + */ + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Information for DTLS hello verify */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - unsigned char *cli_id; /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ - size_t cli_id_len; /*!< length of cli_id */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id); /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id_len); /*!< length of cli_id */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ /* * Secure renegotiation */ /* needed to know when to send extension on server */ - int secure_renegotiation; /*!< does peer support legacy or + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secure_renegotiation); /*!< does peer support legacy or secure renegotiation */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - size_t verify_data_len; /*!< length of verify data stored */ - char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ - char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_data_len); /*!< length of verify data stored */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* CID configuration to use in subsequent handshakes. */ + + /*! The next incoming CID, chosen by the user and applying to + * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the + * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID + * after an initial handshake. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid)[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid_len); /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(negotiate_cid); /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should + * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. + * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED + * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */ +#endif }; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND 1 - -extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, - size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, - size_t maclen); -extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction); -extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - /** * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the * given ID @@ -1254,9 +1484,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * pointers and data. * * \param ssl SSL context - * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED or + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED */ int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); @@ -1316,13 +1545,17 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ); /** * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional). * - * If set, the verify callback is called for each - * certificate in the chain. For implementation - * information, please see \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() + * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each + * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted + * root. For more information, please see the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param f_vrfy verification function - * \param p_vrfy verification parameter + * \note For per context callbacks and contexts, please use + * mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() instead. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. + * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), @@ -1333,7 +1566,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \brief Set the random number generator callback * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function (mandatory) * \param p_rng RNG parameter */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, @@ -1379,7 +1612,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL * f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block. * - * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_sent_t, + * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t, * \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for * the conventions those callbacks must follow. * @@ -1395,6 +1628,142 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + + +/** + * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID) + * extension in the next handshake. + * + * Reference: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of + * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the + * underlying transport (changed IP and Port metadata) by + * adding explicit connection identifiers (CIDs) to the + * headers of encrypted DTLS records. The desired CIDs are + * configured by the application layer and are exchanged in + * new `ClientHello` / `ServerHello` extensions during the + * handshake, where each side indicates the CID it wants the + * peer to use when writing encrypted messages. The CIDs are + * put to use once records get encrypted: the stack discards + * any incoming records that don't include the configured CID + * in their header, and adds the peer's requested CID to the + * headers of outgoing messages. + * + * This API enables or disables the use of the CID extension + * in the next handshake and sets the value of the CID to + * be used for incoming messages. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. This must be initialized. + * \param enable This value determines whether the CID extension should + * be used or not. Possible values are: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED to enable the use of the CID. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (default) to disable the use + * of the CID. + * \param own_cid The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want + * the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us. + * This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0. + * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid. + * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * + * \note The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the + * \c len parameter passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid() + * when configuring the ::mbedtls_ssl_config that \p ssl + * is bound to. + * + * \note This CID configuration applies to subsequent handshakes + * performed on the SSL context \p ssl, but does not trigger + * one. You still have to call `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` + * (for the initial handshake) or `mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()` + * (for a renegotiation handshake) explicitly after a + * successful call to this function to run the handshake. + * + * \note This call cannot guarantee that the use of the CID + * will be successfully negotiated in the next handshake, + * because the peer might not support it. Specifically: + * - On the Client, enabling the use of the CID through + * this call implies that the `ClientHello` in the next + * handshake will include the CID extension, thereby + * offering the use of the CID to the server. Only if + * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too, + * the CID extension will actually be put to use. + * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through + * this call implies that that the server will look for + * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client, + * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its + * `ServerHello`. + * + * \note To check whether the use of the CID was negotiated + * after the subsequent handshake has completed, please + * use the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(). + * + * \warning If the use of the CID extension is enabled in this call + * and the subsequent handshake negotiates its use, Mbed TLS + * will silently drop every packet whose CID does not match + * the CID configured in \p own_cid. It is the responsibility + * of the user to adapt the underlying transport to take care + * of CID-based demultiplexing before handing datagrams to + * Mbed TLS. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the CID configuration + * applies to the next handshake. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len ); + +/** + * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension + * in the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension + * is currently in use or not. If the CID is in use, + * `*enabled` is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + * otherwise, it is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param peer_cid The address of the buffer in which to store the CID + * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). + * This may be \c NULL in case the value of peer CID + * isn't needed. If it is not \c NULL, \p peer_cid_len + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param peer_cid_len The address at which to store the size of the CID + * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). + * This is also the number of Bytes in \p peer_cid that + * have been written. + * This may be \c NULL in case the length of the peer CID + * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p peer_cid must be + * \c NULL, too. + * + * \note This applies to the state of the CID negotiated in + * the last complete handshake. If a handshake is in + * progress, this function will attempt to complete + * the handshake first. + * + * \note If CID extensions have been exchanged but both client + * and server chose to use an empty CID, this function + * sets `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED + * (the rationale for this is that the resulting + * communication is the same as if the CID extensions + * hadn't been used). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], + size_t *peer_cid_len ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + /** * \brief Set the Maximum Tranport Unit (MTU). * Special value: 0 means unset (no limit). @@ -1431,15 +1800,36 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will * result in an error when trying to send data. * - * \note Using record compression together with a non-zero MTU value - * will result in an error when trying to send data. - * * \param ssl SSL context * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set a connection-specific verification callback (optional). + * + * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each + * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted + * root. For more information, please see the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). + * + * \note This call is analogous to mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() but + * binds the verification callback and context to an SSL context + * as opposed to an SSL configuration. + * If mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() and mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() + * are both used, mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() takes precedence. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. + * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + /** * \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read() * (Default: no timeout.) @@ -1458,6 +1848,54 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ); */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ); +/** + * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record + * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only). + * + * This function does not change the user-visible state + * of the SSL context. Its sole purpose is to provide + * an indication of the legitimacy of an incoming record. + * + * This can be useful e.g. in distributed server environments + * using the DTLS Connection ID feature, in which connections + * might need to be passed between service instances on a change + * of peer address, but where such disruptive operations should + * only happen after the validity of incoming records has been + * confirmed. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param buf The address of the buffer holding the record to be checked. + * This must be a read/write buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \note This routine only checks whether the provided buffer begins + * with a valid and authentic record that has not been seen + * before, but does not check potential data following the + * initial record. In particular, it is possible to pass DTLS + * datagrams containing multiple records, in which case only + * the first record is checked. + * + * \note This function modifies the input buffer \p buf. If you need + * to preserve the original record, you have to maintain a copy. + * + * \return \c 0 if the record is valid and authentic and has not been + * seen before. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be not authentic. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be invalid for + * a reason different from authenticity checking. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be unexpected + * in the state of the SSL context, including replayed records. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * In this case, the SSL context becomes unusable and needs + * to be freed or reset before reuse. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + /** * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.) * @@ -1509,35 +1947,6 @@ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t( void *p_ticket, size_t *tlen, uint32_t *lifetime ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -/** - * \brief Callback type: Export key block and master secret - * - * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS - * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and - * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys - * should not be used directly except as an input to a key - * derivation function. - * - * \param p_expkey Context for the callback - * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes) - * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3 - * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). - * \param maclen MAC length - * \param keylen Key length - * \param ivlen IV length - * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. - */ -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t( void *p_expkey, - const unsigned char *ms, - const unsigned char *kb, - size_t maclen, - size_t keylen, - size_t ivlen ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ - /** * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket * @@ -1589,18 +1998,26 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) /** - * \brief Configure key export callback. - * (Default: none.) + * \brief Configure a key export callback. + * (Default: none.) * - * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t. + * This API can be used for two purposes: + * - Debugging: Use this API to e.g. generate an NSSKeylog + * file and use it to inspect encrypted traffic in tools + * such as Wireshark. + * - Application-specific export: Use this API to implement + * key exporters, e.g. for EAP-TLS or DTLS-SRTP. * - * \param conf SSL configuration context - * \param f_export_keys Callback for exporting keys - * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to which the export + * callback should be attached. + * \param f_export_keys The callback for the key export. + * \param p_export_keys The opaque context pointer to be passed to the + * callback \p f_export_keys. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, - void *p_export_keys ); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) @@ -1795,7 +2212,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) /** * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC * before terminating the connection. @@ -1820,7 +2236,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ); * many bogus packets. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -1928,29 +2343,126 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, * \param f_set_cache session set callback */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - void *p_cache, - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) ); + void *p_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Request resumption of session (client-side only) - * Session data is copied from presented session structure. + * \brief Load a session for session resumption. * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param session session context + * Sessions loaded through this call will be considered + * for session resumption in the next handshake. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or - * arguments are otherwise invalid + * \note Even if this call succeeds, it is not guaranteed that + * the next handshake will indeed be shortened through the + * use of session resumption: The server is always free + * to reject any attempt for resumption and fall back to + * a full handshake. + * + * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session + * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and + * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3, + * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and loading + * one or more sessions via this call will lead to their + * corresponding tickets being advertised as resumption PSKs + * by the client. + * + * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful + * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this + * function should be called at most once. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection which should + * be attempted to be setup using session resumption. This + * must be initialized via mbedtls_ssl_init() and bound to + * an SSL configuration via mbedtls_ssl_setup(), but + * the handshake must not yet have been started. + * \param session The session to be considered for session resumption. + * This must be a session previously exported via + * mbedtls_ssl_get_session(), and potentially serialized and + * deserialized through mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and + * mbedtls_ssl_session_load() in the meantime. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the session + * could not be loaded because of an implementation limitation. + * This error is non-fatal, and has no observable effect on + * the SSL context or the session that was attempted to be loaded. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_load() */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +/** + * \brief Load serialized session data into a session structure. + * On client, this can be used for loading saved sessions + * before resuming them with mbedstls_ssl_set_session(). + * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations + * of session cache or session tickets. + * + * \warning If a peer certificate chain is associated with the session, + * the serialized state will only contain the peer's + * end-entity certificate and the result of the chain + * verification (unless verification was disabled), but not + * the rest of the chain. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * \see mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + * + * \param session The session structure to be populated. It must have been + * initialised with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() but not + * populated yet. + * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized session data. It must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data + * was generated in a different version or configuration of + * Mbed TLS. + * \return Another negative value for other kinds of errors (for + * example, unsupported features in the embedded certificate). + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Save session structure as serialized data in a buffer. + * On client, this can be used for saving session data, + * potentially in non-volatile storage, for resuming later. + * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations + * of session cache or session tickets. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load() + * + * \param session The session structure to be saved. + * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a + * writeable buffer of at least \p len bytes, or may be \c + * NULL if \p len is \c 0. + * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. + * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have + * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * + * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of + * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible + * to determine the necessary size by calling this function + * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ); + /** * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference * order. First in the list has the highest preference. @@ -1959,9 +2471,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. * - * Note: The server uses its own preferences - * over the preference of the client unless - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE is defined! + * Note: By default, the server chooses its preferred + * ciphersuite among those that the client supports. If + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order() is called to prefer + * the client's preferences, the server instead chooses + * the client's preferred ciphersuite among those that + * the server supports. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites @@ -1969,28 +2484,44 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const int *ciphersuites ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1 /** - * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the - * preference order for a specific version of the protocol. - * (Only useful on the server side) + * \brief Specify the length of Connection IDs for incoming + * encrypted DTLS records, as well as the behaviour + * on unexpected CIDs. * - * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain - * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. + * By default, the CID length is set to \c 0, + * and unexpected CIDs are silently ignored. * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites - * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - * supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify. + * \param len The length in Bytes of the CID fields in encrypted + * DTLS records using the CID mechanism. This must + * not be larger than #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX. + * \param ignore_other_cids This determines the stack's behaviour when + * receiving a record with an unexpected CID. + * Possible values are: + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE + * In this case, the record is silently ignored. + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL + * In this case, the stack fails with the specific + * error code #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID. * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 - * and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * \note The CID specification allows implementations to either + * use a common length for all incoming connection IDs or + * allow variable-length incoming IDs. Mbed TLS currently + * requires a common length for all connections sharing the + * same SSL configuration; this allows simpler parsing of + * record headers. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p own_cid_len + * is too large. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites, - int major, int minor ); +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len, + int ignore_other_cids ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** @@ -2021,6 +2552,63 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/** + * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback. + * + * This API allows to register the set of trusted certificates + * through a callback, instead of a linked list as configured + * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). + * + * This is useful for example in contexts where a large number + * of CAs are used, and the inefficiency of maintaining them + * in a linked list cannot be tolerated. It is also useful when + * the set of trusted CAs needs to be modified frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t` for + * more information. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_ca_cb The trusted certificate callback to use when verifying + * certificate chains. + * \param p_ca_cb The context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb (for example, + * a reference to a trusted CA database). + * + * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(): + * Any call to this function overwrites the values set through + * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() or + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(). + * + * \note This API is incompatible with CA indication in + * CertificateRequest messages: A server-side SSL context which + * is bound to an SSL configuration that uses a CA callback + * configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), and which requires + * client authentication, will send an empty CA list in the + * corresponding CertificateRequest message. + * + * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(): + * If an SSL context is bound to an SSL configuration which uses + * CA callbacks configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), then + * calls to mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() have no effect. + * + * \note The use of this API disables the use of restartable ECC + * during X.509 CRT signature verification (but doesn't affect + * other uses). + * + * \warning This API is incompatible with the use of CRLs. Any call to + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() unsets CRLs configured through + * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). + * + * \warning In multi-threaded environments, the callback \p f_ca_cb + * must be thread-safe, and it is the user's responsibility + * to guarantee this (for example through a mutex + * contained in the callback context pointed to by \p p_ca_cb). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + /** * \brief Set own certificate chain and private key * @@ -2032,7 +2620,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one * RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate * certificate will be selected according to the client's - * advertised capabilities. In case mutliple certificates are + * advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are * adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first * call to this function, then second, etc. * @@ -2043,6 +2631,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * whether it matches those preferences - the server can then * decide what it wants to do with it. * + * \note The provided \p pk_key needs to match the public key in the + * first certificate in \p own_cert, or all handshakes using + * that certificate will fail. It is your responsibility + * to ensure that; this function will not perform any check. + * You may use mbedtls_pk_check_pair() in order to perform + * this check yourself, but be aware that this function can + * be computationally expensive on some key types. + * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param own_cert own public certificate chain * \param pk_key own private key @@ -2054,106 +2650,176 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /** - * \brief Set the Pre Shared Key (PSK) and the expected identity name + * \brief Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their + * identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * Only one PSK can be registered, through either + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function + * fails, though this may change in future versions, which + * may add support for multiple PSKs. * * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. * - * \note Currently clients can only register one pre-shared key. - * In other words, the servers' identity hint is ignored. - * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting - * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature but - * feedback is welcomed. + * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function. * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param psk pointer to the pre-shared key - * \param psk_len pre-shared key length - * \param psk_identity pointer to the pre-shared key identity - * \param psk_identity_len identity key length + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. + * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use. + * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. + * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. + * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity + * in bytes. * - * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + * \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and + * hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime + * of the SSL configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs + * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and + * their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * Only one PSK can be registered, through either + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function + * fails, though this may change in future versions, which + * may add support for multiple PSKs. + * + * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually + * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. + * + * \note An opaque PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in + * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK + * configured by this function. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. + * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. + * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully + * called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a + * key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy + * allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied + * in the handshake. + * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. + * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity + * in bytes. + * + * \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need + * not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the + * SSL configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs + * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + psa_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** - * \brief Set the Pre Shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake + * \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. * * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, - * ie the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). + * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param psk pointer to the pre-shared key - * \param psk_len pre-shared key length + * \note A PSK set by this function takes precedence over a PSK + * configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). * - * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. + * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key. + * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. + * + * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, + * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). + * + * \note An opaque PSK set by this function takes precedence over an + * opaque PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. + * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. + * For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot + * must be populated with a key of type + * PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its + * use for the key derivation algorithm + * applied in the handshake. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_key_id_t psk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /** * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only). * * If set, the PSK callback is called for each - * handshake where a PSK ciphersuite was negotiated. + * handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated. * The caller provides the identity received and wants to * receive the actual PSK data and length. * - * The callback has the following parameters: (void *parameter, - * mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *psk_identity, - * size_t identity_len) + * The callback has the following parameters: + * - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk. + * - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which + * the operation applies. + * - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity + * selected by the client. + * - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity + * selected by the client. + * * If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use - * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() on the ssl context to set the - * correct PSK and return 0. + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() + * on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0. * Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity. * - * \note If you set a PSK callback using this function, then you - * don't need to set a PSK key and identity using - * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * \note A dynamic PSK (i.e. set by the PSK callback) takes + * precedence over a static PSK (i.e. set by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). + * This means that if you set a PSK callback using this + * function, you don't need to set a PSK using + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param f_psk PSK identity function - * \param p_psk PSK identity parameter + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based + * in the PSK identity chosen by the client. + * \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to + * the callback, for example a PSK store. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_psk ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif - -/** - * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, - * read as hexadecimal strings (server-side only) - * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]) - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus - * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator - * - * \deprecated Superseded by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin. - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const char *dhm_P, - const char *dhm_G ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values * from big-endian binary presentations. @@ -2199,7 +2865,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /** * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference. - * (Default: all defined curves.) * * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve; * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the @@ -2220,6 +2885,19 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred curve first). * + * \note The default list is the same set of curves that + * #mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default allows, plus + * ECDHE-only curves selected according to the same criteria. + * The order favors curves with the lowest resource usage. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list, + * for example if new curves are added to the library. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from this list unless serious security concerns require it. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in + * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest + * resource usage. + * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves, * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. @@ -2228,10 +2906,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /** * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake. - * (Default: all available hashes except MD5.) * * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message @@ -2243,13 +2920,25 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred hash first). * + * \note By default, all supported hashes whose length is at least + * 256 bits are allowed. This is the same set as the default + * for certificate verification + * (#mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default). + * The preference order is currently unspecified and may + * change in future versions. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list, + * for example if new curves are added to the library. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from this list unless serious security concerns require it. + * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes, * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const int *hashes ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** @@ -2397,6 +3086,105 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **prot const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile profile ) +{ + switch( profile ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); + default: break; + } + return( "" ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +/** + * \brief Manage support for mki(master key id) value + * in use_srtp extension. + * MKI is an optional part of SRTP used for key management + * and re-keying. See RFC3711 section 3.1 for details. + * The default value is + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to manage mki support. + * \param support_mki_value Enable or disable mki usage. Values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED + * or #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value ); + +/** + * \brief Set the supported DTLS-SRTP protection profiles. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param profiles Pointer to a List of MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET terminated + * supported protection profiles + * in decreasing preference order. + * The pointer to the list is recorded by the library + * for later reference as required, so the lifetime + * of the table must be at least as long as the lifetime + * of the SSL configuration structure. + * The list must not hold more than + * MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH elements + * (excluding the terminating MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET). + * + * \return 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the list of + * protection profiles is incorrect. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles + ( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ); + +/** + * \brief Set the mki_value for the current DTLS-SRTP session. + * + * \param ssl SSL context to use. + * \param mki_value The MKI value to set. + * \param mki_len The length of the MKI value. + * + * \note This function is relevant on client side only. + * The server discovers the mki value during handshake. + * A mki value set on server side using this function + * is ignored. + * + * \return 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len ); +/** + * \brief Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP informations: + * Protection profile and MKI value. + * + * \warning This function must be called after the handshake is + * completed. The value returned by this function must + * not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param dtls_srtp_info The negotiated DTLS-SRTP informations: + * - Protection profile in use. + * A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection + * profile on an uint16_t. + http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + * #MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET if the use of SRTP was not negotiated + * or peer's Hello packet was not parsed yet. + * - mki size and value( if size is > 0 ). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /** * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side * and/or accepted at the server side @@ -2404,60 +3192,29 @@ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); * * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions. * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); /** * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version - * (Default: TLS 1.0) + * (Default: TLS 1.2) * * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored. * - * \note MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 (SSL v3) should be avoided. - * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -/** - * \brief Set the fallback flag (client-side only). - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK). - * - * \note Set to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK when preparing a fallback - * connection, that is a connection with max_version set to a - * lower value than the value you're willing to use. Such - * fallback connections are not recommended but are sometimes - * necessary to interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) - * servers. - * - * \warning You should NOT set this to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK for - * non-fallback connections! This would appear to work for a - * while, then cause failures when the server is upgraded to - * support a newer TLS version. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param fallback MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) /** * \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC @@ -2488,25 +3245,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ); void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -/** - * \brief Disable or enable support for RC4 - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED) - * - * \warning Use of RC4 in DTLS/TLS has been prohibited by RFC 7465 - * for security reasons. Use at your own risk. - * - * \note This function is deprecated and will likely be removed in - * a future version of the library. - * RC4 is disabled by default at compile time and needs to be - * actively enabled for use with legacy systems. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param arc4 MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in @@ -2523,13 +3261,19 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** - * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate - * (Default: the smaller of MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually 2^14 bytes) + * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate. + * (Typical: the smaller of #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually `2^14` bytes) * (Server: set maximum fragment length to emit, - * usually negotiated by the client during handshake + * usually negotiated by the client during handshake) * (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and* * negotiate with the server during handshake) + * (Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) + * + * \note On the client side, the maximum fragment length extension + * *will not* be used, unless the maximum fragment length has + * been set via this function to a value different than + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE. * * \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent * with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages. @@ -2553,32 +3297,18 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** - * \brief Activate negotiation of truncated HMAC - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) + * \brief Pick the ciphersuites order according to the second parameter + * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * (Default, if never called: MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER) * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param truncate Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) + * \param order Server or client (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -/** - * \brief Enable / Disable 1/n-1 record splitting - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED) - * - * \note Only affects SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, not higher versions. - * Does not affect non-CBC ciphersuites in any version. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param split MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** @@ -2689,7 +3419,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_ * (Default: 2^48 - 1) * * Renegotiation is automatically triggered when a record - * counter (outgoing or ingoing) crosses the defined + * counter (outgoing or incoming) crosses the defined * threshold. The default value is meant to prevent the * connection from being closed when the counter is about to * reached its maximal value (it is not allowed to wrap). @@ -2773,13 +3503,14 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Return the result of the certificate verification * - * \param ssl SSL context + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * -1 if result is not available (eg because the handshake was - * aborted too early), or - * a combination of BADCERT_xxx and BADCRL_xxx flags, see - * x509.h + * \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful. + * \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen + * e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification + * callback returned a fatal error. + * \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX + * and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h. */ uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); @@ -2793,11 +3524,11 @@ uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** - * \brief Return the current SSL version (SSLv3/TLSv1/etc) + * \brief Return the current TLS version * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return a string containing the SSL version + * \return a string containing the TLS version */ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); @@ -2805,39 +3536,21 @@ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) * - * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) - * when record compression is enabled. - * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if compression is - * enabled, which makes expansion much less predictable + * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -/** - * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes). - * This is the value negotiated with peer if any, - * or the locally configured value. - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * - * \return Current maximum fragment length. - */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - /** * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes. - * This takes into account the config.h setting \c - * MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, the configured and negotiated - * max fragment length extension if used, and for DTLS the - * path MTU as configured and current record expansion. + * + * \note The logic to determine the maximum outgoing record payload is + * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as + * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, extensions + * such as the max fragment length or record size limit extension if + * used, and for DTLS the path MTU as configured and current + * record expansion. * * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if * called with a larger length value. @@ -2846,11 +3559,7 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in * order to send the remaining bytes if any. * - * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) - * when record compression is enabled. - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() * * \param ssl SSL context @@ -2860,52 +3569,97 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** - * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection + * \brief Return the current maximum incoming record payload in bytes. * - * Note: Can be NULL in case no certificate was sent during - * the handshake. Different calls for the same connection can - * return the same or different pointers for the same - * certificate and even a different certificate altogether. - * The peer cert CAN change in a single connection if - * renegotiation is performed. + * \note The logic to determine the maximum outgoing record payload is + * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as + * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, extensions + * such as the max fragment length extension or record size limit + * extension if used, and the current record expansion. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return the current peer certificate + * \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record, + * or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup. + * + * \return The current peer certificate, if available. + * The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and + * is valid only until the next call to the SSL API. + * \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might + * be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs + * (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled, + * allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory. + * + * \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during + * the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification + * callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling + * this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at + * the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification + * process, for example by masking expected and tolerated + * verification failures. + * + * \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function + * after any further call to the SSL API, including + * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is + * because the pointer might change during renegotiation, + * which happens transparently to the user. + * If you want to use the certificate across API calls, + * you must make a copy. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Save session in order to resume it later (client-side only) - * Session data is copied to presented session structure. + * \brief Export a session in order to resume it later. * + * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection for which to + * to export a session structure for later resumption. + * \param session The target structure in which to store the exported session. + * This must have been initialized with mbedtls_ssl_init_session() + * but otherwise be unused. * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param session session context + * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session + * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and + * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3, + * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and calling + * this function multiple times will export the available + * tickets one a time until no further tickets are available, + * in which case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE will + * be returned. * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or - * arguments are otherwise invalid. + * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful + * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this + * function should be called at most once. * - * \note Only the server certificate is copied, and not the full chain, - * so you should not attempt to validate the certificate again - * by calling \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() on it. - * Instead, you should use the results from the verification - * in the original handshake by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() - * after loading the session again into a new SSL context - * using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). - * - * \note Once the session object is not needed anymore, you should - * free it by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_session_free(). + * \return \c 0 if successful. In this case, \p session can be used for + * session resumption by passing it to mbedtls_ssl_set_session(), + * and serialized for storage via mbedtls_ssl_session_save(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no further session + * is available for export. + * This error is a non-fatal, and has no observable effect on + * the SSL context or the destination session. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_save() */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ /** @@ -2913,35 +3667,50 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED (see below), or - * a specific SSL error code. + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use + * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in + * this case you must stop using the context (see below). + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). * - * If this function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, the - * handshake is unfinished and no further data is available - * from the underlying transport. In this case, you must call - * the function again at some later stage. + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. + * + * \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging + * purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an + * actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context. * * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: - * If the function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram + * If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport * signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake, * in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is * currently being processed might or might not contain further * DTLS records. - * - * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using - * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or - * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it - * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. - * - * \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging - * purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an - * actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context. */ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); @@ -2949,20 +3718,21 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake * * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at - * the next state after execution of this function. Do not + * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not * call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER. * - * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using - * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or - * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it - * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. - * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or - * a specific SSL error code. + * \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it + * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before + * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection + * must be closed. */ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); @@ -2977,13 +3747,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); * \param ssl SSL context * * \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return - * value. + * value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't + * happen during a renegotiation. + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it + * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before + * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection + * must be closed. * - * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using - * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or - * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it - * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. */ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -2995,42 +3770,63 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); * \param buf buffer that will hold the data * \param len maximum number of bytes to read * - * \return One of the following: - * - 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed, - * - the (positive) number of bytes read, or - * - a negative error code on failure. + * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful. + * \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed + * without sending a CloseNotify beforehand, which might happen + * because of various reasons (internal error of an underlying + * stack, non-conformant peer not sending a CloseNotify and + * such) - in this case you must stop using the context + * (see below). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY if the underlying + * transport is still functional, but the peer has + * acknowledged to not send anything anymore. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server + * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a + * new connection using the same source port. See below. + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). * - * If MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ is returned, no application data - * is available from the underlying transport. In this case, - * the function needs to be called again at some later stage. + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * a positive value, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. * - * If MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE is returned, a write is pending - * but the underlying transport isn't available for writing. In this - * case, the function needs to be called again at some later stage. - * - * When this function return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT * (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client * is initiating a new connection using the same source port. * You can either treat that as a connection close and wait * for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly * continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same - * context (as it has beeen reset internally). Either way, you - * should make sure this is seen by the application as a new + * context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you + * must make sure this is seen by the application as a new * connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and * most importantly the identity of the client must be checked * again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client * again, or not transmitting the new identity to the * application layer, would allow authentication bypass! * - * \note If this function returns something other than a positive value - * or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, - * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, - * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it - * before re-using it for a new connection; the current connection - * must be closed. - * * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: - * - If the function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram + * - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport * signal a new event. @@ -3059,21 +3855,39 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) * \param buf buffer holding the data * \param len how many bytes must be written * - * \return the number of bytes actually written (may be less than len), - * or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, - * or another negative error code. + * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if + * successful (may be less than \p len). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). * - * \note If this function returns something other than 0, a positive - * value or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop - * using the SSL context for reading or writing, and either - * free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before - * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection - * must be closed. + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * a non-negative value, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. * - * \note When this function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ, + * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ, * it must be called later with the *same* arguments, * until it returns a value greater that or equal to 0. When - * the function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not * yet sent. * @@ -3082,8 +3896,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) * or negotiated with the peer), then: * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written. * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned. - * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() may be used to query the - * active maximum fragment length. + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() may be used to + * query the active maximum fragment length. * * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS * application record being sent. @@ -3131,13 +3945,137 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); */ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +/** + * \brief Save an active connection as serialized data in a buffer. + * This allows the freeing or re-using of the SSL context + * while still picking up the connection later in a way that + * it entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load() + * + * \note This feature is currently only available under certain + * conditions, see the documentation of the return value + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details. + * + * \note When this function succeeds, it calls + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on \p ssl which as a result is + * no longer associated with the connection that has been + * serialized. This avoids creating copies of the connection + * state. You're then free to either re-use the context + * structure for a different connection, or call + * mbedtls_ssl_free() on it. See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() for more details. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to save. On success, it is no longer + * associated with the connection that has been serialized. + * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a + * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c + * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0. + * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. + * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have + * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * + * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of + * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible + * to determine the necessary size by calling this function + * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. However, + * the value of \p olen is only guaranteed to be correct when + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or + * \c 0. If the return value is different, then the value of + * \p olen is undefined. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * while reseting the context. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in + * progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending, + * or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD + * ciphersuite, or renegotiation is enabled. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief Load serialized connection data to an SSL context. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() + * + * \warning The same serialized data must never be loaded into more + * that one context. In order to ensure that, after + * successfully loading serialized data to an SSL context, you + * should immediately destroy or invalidate all copies of the + * serialized data that was loaded. Loading the same data in + * more than one context would cause severe security failures + * including but not limited to loss of confidentiality. + * + * \note Before calling this function, the SSL context must be + * prepared in one of the two following ways. The first way is + * to take a context freshly initialised with + * mbedtls_ssl_init() and call mbedtls_ssl_setup() on it with + * the same ::mbedtls_ssl_config structure that was used in + * the original connection. The second way is to + * call mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on a context that was + * previously prepared as above but used in the meantime. + * Either way, you must not use the context to perform a + * handshake between calling mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and calling this function. You + * may however call other setter functions in that time frame + * as indicated in the note below. + * + * \note Before or after calling this function successfully, you + * also need to configure some connection-specific callbacks + * and settings before you can use the connection again + * (unless they were already set before calling + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for + * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call + * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() and + * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). All other SSL setter functions + * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used + * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You + * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to + * share code between the cases of establishing a new + * connection and the case of loading an already-established + * connection. + * + * \note If you have new information about the path MTU, you want to + * call mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() after calling this function, as + * otherwise this function would overwrite your + * newly-configured value with the value that was active when + * the context was saved. + * + * \note When this function returns an error code, it calls + * mbedtls_ssl_free() on \p ssl. In this case, you need to + * prepare the context with the usual sequence starting with a + * call to mbedtls_ssl_init() if you want to use it again. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context structure to be populated. It must have + * been prepared as described in the note above. + * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized connection data. It must + * be a readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data + * comes from a different Mbed TLS version or build. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + /** * \brief Initialize an SSL configuration context * Just makes the context ready for * mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free(). * * \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you - * manually set all of the relevent fields yourself. + * manually set all of the relevant fields yourself. * * \param conf SSL configuration context */ @@ -3186,6 +4124,27 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); */ void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +/** + * \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation. + * + * \param prf The tls_prf type function type to be used. + * \param secret Secret for the key derivation function. + * \param slen Length of the secret. + * \param label String label for the key derivation function, + * terminated with null character. + * \param random Random bytes. + * \param rlen Length of the random bytes buffer. + * \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key. + * \param dlen Length of the output buffer. + * + * \return 0 on success. An SSL specific error on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h index ec081e6d..6a81ac99 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief SSL session cache implementation */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,23 +18,24 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -61,13 +62,16 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry; struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */ + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timestamp); /*!< entry timestamp */ #endif - mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */ -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */ + + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id)[32]; /*!< session ID */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id_len); + + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< serialized session */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_len); + + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); /*!< chain pointer */ }; /** @@ -75,11 +79,11 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry */ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context { - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *chain; /*!< start of the chain */ - int timeout; /*!< cache entry timeout */ - int max_entries; /*!< maximum entries */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chain); /*!< start of the chain */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< cache entry timeout */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_entries); /*!< maximum entries */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */ #endif }; @@ -94,19 +98,32 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ); * \brief Cache get callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * - * \param data SSL cache context - * \param session session to retrieve entry for + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * for the session to load. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * \param session The address at which to store the session + * associated with \p session_id, if present. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); /** * \brief Cache set callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * - * \param data SSL cache context - * \param session session to store entry for + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * associated to \p session. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * \param session The session to store. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) /** diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h index cda8b483..812560c8 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief SSL Ciphersuites for mbed TLS */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,15 +18,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "pk.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -38,15 +39,6 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x01 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x02 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x04 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x05 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x09 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0A - -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x15 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x16 - #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2C /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2D /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2E /**< Weak! */ @@ -69,18 +61,12 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x84 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x88 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8A -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x8C #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x8D -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8E -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x90 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x91 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x92 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x93 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x94 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x95 @@ -118,28 +104,20 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -159,15 +137,13 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC033 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC034 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC03C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC03D /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -208,14 +184,14 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC070 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC071 /**< TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07B /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -243,8 +219,8 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC097 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC098 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC099 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -306,7 +282,7 @@ typedef enum { defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests */ @@ -316,28 +292,28 @@ typedef enum { defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using ECDH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges that don't involve ephemeral keys */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges that involve ephemeral keys */ @@ -347,7 +323,7 @@ typedef enum { defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using a PSK */ @@ -355,20 +331,20 @@ typedef enum { defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using DHE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using ECDHE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED #endif typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; @@ -383,19 +359,19 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; */ struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t { - int id; - const char * name; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + const char * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher; - mbedtls_md_type_t mac; - mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_exchange; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac); + mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange); - int min_major_ver; - int min_minor_ver; - int max_major_ver; - int max_minor_ver; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_major_ver); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_minor_ver); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_major_ver); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_minor_ver); - unsigned char flags; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); }; const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ); @@ -411,10 +387,10 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphers int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { - switch( info->key_exchange ) + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: @@ -428,12 +404,12 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { - switch( info->key_exchange ) + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: @@ -446,12 +422,12 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_ return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { - switch( info->key_exchange ) + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: @@ -461,11 +437,11 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersui return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { - switch( info->key_exchange ) + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: @@ -480,10 +456,28 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( const mbedtls_ssl_ci } } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { - switch( info->key_exchange ) + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: @@ -493,12 +487,12 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuit return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { - switch( info->key_exchange ) + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: @@ -509,12 +503,12 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersu return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { - switch( info->key_exchange ) + switch( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange) ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: @@ -525,7 +519,7 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( const mbedtls_s return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h index 6a0ad4fa..86698b05 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief DTLS cookie callbacks implementation */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,23 +18,24 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#include "ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT @@ -52,15 +53,15 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx { - mbedtls_md_context_t hmac_ctx; /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx); /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - unsigned long serial; /*!< serial number for expiration */ + unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); /*!< serial number for expiration */ #endif - unsigned long timeout; /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, + unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of tickets issued */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h deleted file mode 100644 index 4b4417a5..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,757 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file ssl_internal.h - * - * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H - -#include "ssl.h" -#include "cipher.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "md5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#include "sha1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "sha256.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "sha512.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#include "ecjpake.h" -#endif - -#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -/* Determine minimum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -/* Determine maximum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ - -/* - * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 - * - * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, - * but is distinct for resends. - * - * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 - -/* - * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: - * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256) - * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if - * enabled. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ -#endif -#else -/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD \ - ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ) - -/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 - -/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for - RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes - (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \ - : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \ - ) - -/* - * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds - */ - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 -#error "Bad configuration - record content too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." -#endif - -/* Calculate buffer sizes */ - -/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes - long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the - implicit sequence number. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -/* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \ - ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) \ - ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ) -#endif - -/* - * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content - * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because - * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -/* - * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t -{ - /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable - * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's - * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - - * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures - * to hash algorithms. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; - mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ - -/* - * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -{ - /* - * Handshake specific crypto variables - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ - size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) - unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ - size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ - unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ - - unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie - Srv: unused */ - unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length - Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ - - uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ - unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ - unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ - unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the - flight being received */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for - resending messages */ - unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter - for resending messages */ - - struct - { - size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated - * buffers used for message buffering. */ - - uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has - * been seen in the current flight. */ - - struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer - { - unsigned is_valid : 1; - unsigned is_fragmented : 1; - unsigned is_complete : 1; - unsigned char *data; - size_t data_len; - } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; - - struct - { - unsigned char *data; - size_t len; - unsigned epoch; - } future_record; - - } buffering; - - uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* - * Checksum contexts - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void (*calc_verify)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *); - void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); - int (*tls_prf)(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, - unsigned char *, size_t); - - size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ - - unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */ - unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; - /*!< premaster secret */ - - int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ - int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ - int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ - int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the - * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). - * The library does not use it internally. */ - void *user_async_ctx; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -}; - -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; - -/* - * This structure contains a full set of runtime transform parameters - * either in negotiation or active. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_transform -{ - /* - * Session specific crypto layer - */ - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - /*!< Chosen cipersuite_info */ - unsigned int keylen; /*!< symmetric key length (bytes) */ - size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ - size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ - size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ - size_t maclen; /*!< MAC length */ - - unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ - unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */ - unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */ - unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ - - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ - - /* - * Session specific compression layer - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */ - z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */ -#endif -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -/* - * List of certificate + private key pairs - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -{ - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ - mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -/* - * List of handshake messages kept around for resending - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -{ - unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ - size_t len; /*!< length of p */ - unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - -/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ); -/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); -/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); - -/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ -static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear - * memory - * - * \param transform SSL transform context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear - * memory - * - * \param ssl SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/** - * \brief Update record layer - * - * This function roughly separates the implementation - * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation - * of the secure transport. - * - * \param ssl The SSL context to use. - * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest - * should be automatically updated in case - * a handshake message is found. - * - * \return 0 or non-zero error code. - * - * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here - * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: - * - * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying - * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into - * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which - * conceptually provides the following: - * - * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports - * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. - * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport - * for application data. - * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform - * securing the contents. - * - * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: - * - * a Updating - * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] - * - * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: - * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application - * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers - * provide access to the data for the user to process it. - * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically - * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers - * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application - * data (2) is user-controlled. - * - * b Reading of application data - * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] - * - * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data - * is different from the automatic consumption of control - * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. - * - * c Tracking availability of application data - * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] - * - * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for - * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer - * provides functionality for checking how much application - * data is still available in the internal buffer. - * - * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. - * - * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the - * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic - * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything - * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. - * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the - * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. - * - * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the - * record layer, but the current implementation deviates - * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of - * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record - * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which - * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility - * following the above definition. - * - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned update_hs_digest ); -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ); -int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ); -#endif - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ); -int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_md_type_t md ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - else - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - - return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key ); -} - -static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - else - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - - return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert ); -} - -/* - * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: - * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). - * - * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we - * check a cert we received from them)! - * - * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, - int cert_endpoint, - uint32_t *flags ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2] ); -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2] ); - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 13 ); -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return( 5 ); -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 12 ); -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return( 4 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif - -/* Visible for testing purposes only */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif - -/* constant-time buffer comparison */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n ) -{ - size_t i; - volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; - volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; - volatile unsigned char diff = 0; - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - { - /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. - * This avoids IAR compiler warning: - * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ - unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; - diff |= x ^ y; - } - - return( diff ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* ssl_internal.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h index b2686df0..0f4117d3 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief TLS server ticket callbacks implementation */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,11 +18,12 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" /* * This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key @@ -30,11 +31,11 @@ * secrecy, when MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME is defined. */ -#include "ssl.h" -#include "cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif #ifdef __cplusplus @@ -46,9 +47,9 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key { - unsigned char name[4]; /*!< random key identifier */ - uint32_t generation_time; /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name)[4]; /*!< random key identifier */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(generation_time); /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; @@ -57,17 +58,17 @@ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context { - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key keys[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ - unsigned char active; /*!< index of the currently active key */ + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keys)[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(active); /*!< index of the currently active key */ - uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context; @@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); * \brief Prepare context to be actually used * * \param ctx Context to be set up - * \param f_rng RNG callback function + * \param f_rng RNG callback function (mandatory) * \param p_rng RNG callback context * \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection. * Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM. @@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); * Recommended value: 86400 (one day). * * \note It is highly recommended to select a cipher that is at - * least as strong as the the strongest ciphersuite + * least as strong as the strongest ciphersuite * supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key. * * \note The lifetime of the keys is twice the lifetime of tickets. @@ -111,14 +112,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, /** * \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback * - * \note See \c mbedlts_ssl_ticket_write_t for description + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t for description */ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write; /** * \brief Implementation of the ticket parse callback * - * \note See \c mbedlts_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description */ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading.h index 5112ebb7..96cadc4d 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Threading abstraction layer */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,17 +18,12 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_H #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -36,7 +31,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x001A /**< The selected feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -0x001E /**< Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */ @@ -44,8 +38,11 @@ extern "C" { #include typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t { - pthread_mutex_t mutex; - char is_valid; + pthread_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); + /* is_valid is 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a + * successful init. This field is not considered part of the public + * API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice. */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_valid); } mbedtls_threading_mutex_t; #endif @@ -99,6 +96,17 @@ extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex; #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) +/* This mutex may or may not be used in the default definition of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(), but in order to determine that, + * we need to check POSIX features, hence modify _POSIX_C_SOURCE. + * With the current approach, this declaration is orphaned, lacking + * an accompanying definition, in case mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * doesn't need it, but that's not a problem. */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading_alt.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading_alt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c00b0e59 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/threading_alt.h @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT_H +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT_H +#include "tos_k.h" +#define mbedtls_threading_mutex_t k_mutex_t +#endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/timing.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/timing.h index a965fe0d..25db1c6a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/timing.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/timing.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Portable interface to timeouts and to the CPU cycle counter */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,17 +18,12 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_TIMING_H #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -45,7 +40,7 @@ extern "C" { */ struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time { - unsigned char opaque[32]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[32]; }; /** @@ -53,60 +48,18 @@ struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time */ typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context { - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer; - uint32_t int_ms; - uint32_t fin_ms; + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timer); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(int_ms); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fin_ms); } mbedtls_timing_delay_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #include "timing_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ -extern volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed; - -/** - * \brief Return the CPU cycle counter value - * - * \warning This is only a best effort! Do not rely on this! - * In particular, it is known to be unreliable on virtual - * machines. - * - * \note This value starts at an unspecified origin and - * may wrap around. - */ -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ); - -/** - * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds - * - * \param val points to a timer structure - * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. - * - * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When - * restarting, this is always 0. - * - * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. - * - * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not - * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence - * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = - * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately - * the delay since the first reset. - */ +/* Internal use */ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ); -/** - * \brief Setup an alarm clock - * - * \param seconds delay before the "mbedtls_timing_alarmed" flag is set - * (must be >=0) - * - * \warning Only one alarm at a time is supported. In a threaded - * context, this means one for the whole process, not one per - * thread. - */ -void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ); - /** * \brief Set a pair of delays to watch * (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().) @@ -137,15 +90,6 @@ void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ); */ int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed - */ -int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose ); -#endif - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/version.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/version.h index 17b8ba45..773da4a6 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Run-time version information */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,38 +18,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* - * This set of compile-time defines and run-time variables can be used to - * determine the version number of the mbed TLS library used. + * This set of run-time variables can be used to determine the version number of + * the Mbed TLS library used. Compile-time version defines for the same can be + * found in build_info.h */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_VERSION_H #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -/** - * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. - * Major, Minor, Patchlevel - */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 13 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0 - -/** - * The single version number has the following structure: - * MMNNPP00 - * Major version | Minor version | Patch version - */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x020D0000 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.13.0" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.13.0" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) @@ -92,7 +70,7 @@ void mbedtls_version_get_string_full( char *string ); * * \note only checks against defines in the sections "System * support", "mbed TLS modules" and "mbed TLS feature - * support" in config.h + * support" in mbedtls_config.h * * \param feature The string for the define to check (e.g. "MBEDTLS_AES_C") * diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509.h index d6db9c6e..5be4286e 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief X.509 generic defines and structures */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,23 +18,18 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "asn1.h" -#include "pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif /** @@ -77,7 +72,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 /**< Read/write of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980 /**< Destination buffer is too small. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */ /* \} name */ /** @@ -109,6 +104,28 @@ /* \} name */ /* \} addtogroup x509_module */ +/* + * X.509 v3 Subject Alternative Name types. + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME 0 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME 2 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_X400_ADDRESS_NAME 3 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME 4 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_EDI_PARTY_NAME 5 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER 6 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS 7 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_REGISTERED_ID 8 + /* * X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags * Reminder: update x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. @@ -142,24 +159,26 @@ * * Comments refer to the status for using certificates. Status can be * different for writing certificates or reading CRLs or CSRs. + * + * Those are defined in oid.h as oid.c needs them in a data structure. Since + * these were previously defined here, let's have aliases for compatibility. */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 0) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 1) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE (1 << 2) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES (1 << 3) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS (1 << 4) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME (1 << 5) /* Supported (DNS) */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME (1 << 6) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS (1 << 7) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 8) /* Supported */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 9) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 10) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE (1 << 11) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS (1 << 12) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY (1 << 13) -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14) - -#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16) +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME /* Supported (DNS) */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS /* Supported */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE /* * Storage format identifiers @@ -207,8 +226,8 @@ typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence; /** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time { - int year, mon, day; /**< Date. */ - int hour, min, sec; /**< Time. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(year), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mon), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(day); /**< Date. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hour), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sec); /**< Time. */ } mbedtls_x509_time; @@ -250,7 +269,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *se * * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check * - * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occured, + * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred, * 0 otherwise. */ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ); @@ -264,18 +283,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ); * * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check * - * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occured, + * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred, * 0 otherwise. */ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ); -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - */ -int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ); - /* * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you * know you do. @@ -301,9 +313,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const void *sig_opts ); +#endif int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ); int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name ); int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h index 08a4283a..9331827b 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief X.509 certificate revocation list parsing */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,19 +18,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -51,15 +46,15 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry { - mbedtls_x509_buf raw; + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw); - mbedtls_x509_buf serial; + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); - mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date; + mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(revocation_date); - mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext; + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entry_ext); - struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next; + struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); } mbedtls_x509_crl_entry; @@ -69,30 +64,30 @@ mbedtls_x509_crl_entry; */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl { - mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ - mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw); /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tbs); /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ - int version; /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */ - mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< CRL signature type identifier */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid); /**< CRL signature type identifier */ - mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw); /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */ - mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ + mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer); /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ - mbedtls_x509_time this_update; - mbedtls_x509_time next_update; + mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(this_update); + mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_update); - mbedtls_x509_crl_entry entry; /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */ + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entry); /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext; + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crl_ext); - mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid2; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid2); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ - struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next; + struct mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); } mbedtls_x509_crl; @@ -111,7 +106,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, /** * \brief Parse one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list * - * \note Mutliple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format + * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format * * \param chain points to the start of the chain * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in PEM or DER format @@ -126,7 +121,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, s /** * \brief Load one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list * - * \note Mutliple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format + * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format * * \param chain points to the start of the chain * \param path filename to read the CRLs from (in PEM or DER encoding) @@ -136,6 +131,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, s int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the CRL. * @@ -149,6 +145,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ); */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Initialize a CRL (chain) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h index d41ec93a..49211a94 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief X.509 certificate parsing and writing */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,20 +18,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "x509.h" -#include "x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /** * \addtogroup x509_module @@ -52,58 +48,130 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt { - mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ - mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_buffer); /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned + * by the structure or not. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw); /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tbs); /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ - int version; /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */ - mbedtls_x509_buf serial; /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid); /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */ - mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw); /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_raw); /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ - mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ - mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ + mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer); /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ + mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ - mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */ - mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */ + mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(valid_from); /**< Start time of certificate validity. */ + mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(valid_to); /**< End time of certificate validity. */ - mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_raw); + mbedtls_pk_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk); /**< Container for the public key context. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */ - mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of Subject Alternative Names (Only dNSName supported). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_id); /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_id); /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(v3_ext); /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_alt_names); /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */ - int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ - int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ - int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(certificate_policies); /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */ - unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_pathlen); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ - mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_usage); /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ - unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_key_usage); /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ns_cert_type); /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ - struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + + struct mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */ } mbedtls_x509_crt; +/** + * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name +{ + /** + * The type_id is an OID as deifned in RFC 5280. + * To check the value of the type id, you should use + * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type_id); /**< The type id. */ + union + { + /** + * From RFC 4108 section 5: + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + */ + struct + { + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(oid); /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(val); /**< The named value. */ + } + MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hardware_module_name); + } + MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(value); +} +mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; + +/** + * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name +{ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ + union { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_name); /**< The otherName supported type. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unstructured_name); /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */ + } + MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(san); /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ +} +mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; + /** * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp) * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it. */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( id ) ( 1 << ( id - 1 ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( id ) ( 1 << ( (id) - 1 ) ) /** * Security profile for certificate verification. * * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(). + * + * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be + * manipulated directly by applications. Future versions of the library may + * add extra fields or reorder existing fields. + * + * You can create custom profiles by starting from a copy of + * an existing profile, such as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default or + * mbedtls_x509_ctr_profile_none and then tune it to your needs. + * + * For example to allow SHA-224 in addition to the default: + * + * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; + * my_profile.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); + * + * Or to allow only RSA-3072+ with SHA-256: + * + * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none; + * my_profile.allowed_mds = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); + * my_profile.allowed_pks = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + * my_profile.rsa_min_bitlen = 3072; */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile { @@ -125,34 +193,177 @@ mbedtls_x509_crt_profile; #define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 #endif +/* This macro unfolds to the concatenation of macro invocations + * X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( error code, + * error code as string, + * human readable description ) + * where X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO is defined by the user. + * See x509_crt.c for an example of how to use this. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED", \ + "The certificate validity has expired" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED", \ + "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH", \ + "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED", \ + "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED", \ + "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED", \ + "The CRL is expired" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING", \ + "Certificate was missing" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY", \ + "Certificate verification was skipped" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER", \ + "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE", \ + "The certificate validity starts in the future" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE", \ + "The CRL is from the future" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE", \ + "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE", \ + "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE", \ + "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." ) \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." ) + /** * Container for writing a certificate (CRT) */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert { - int version; - mbedtls_mpi serial; - mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key; - mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; - char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_key); + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_key); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_before)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_after)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions); } mbedtls_x509write_cert; +/** + * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crt); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); +} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item; + +/** + * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) + +/** + * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain() + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(items)[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from + * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured. + * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its + * ownership to the caller. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(trust_ca_cb_result); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + /* for check_signature() */ + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk); + + /* for find_parent_in() */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent); /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_parent); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_signature_is_good); + + /* for find_parent() */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent_is_trusted); /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ + + /* for verify_chain() */ + enum { + x509_crt_rs_none, + x509_crt_rs_find_parent, + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_progress); /* none if no operation is in progress */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(self_cnt); + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver_chain); + +} mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security * and compatibility with current deployments. + * + * This profile permits: + * - SHA2 hashes with at least 256 bits: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512. + * - Elliptic curves with 255 bits and above except secp256k1. + * - RSA with 2048 bits and above. + * + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this profile, for example if + * new algorithms are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will + * not reduce this profile unless serious security concerns require it. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; /** * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments. - * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for RSA-2048. + * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for allowing RSA-2048. + * This profile may change at any time. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; @@ -162,32 +373,179 @@ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; /** - * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it - * to the chained list. - * - * \param chain points to the start of the chain - * \param buf buffer holding the certificate DER data - * \param buflen size of the buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + * Empty profile that allows nothing. Useful as a basis for constructing + * custom profiles. */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, - size_t buflen ); +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none; /** - * \brief Parse one or more certificates and add them - * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some - * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number - * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete - * correctly, the first error is returned. + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. * - * \param chain points to the start of the chain - * \param buf buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format - * \param buflen size of the buffer - * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer + * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused + * after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT + * buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints), + * use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when + * it encounters either an unsupported extension or a + * "certificate policies" extension containing any + * unsupported certificate policies. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param crt The certificate being parsed. + * \param oid The OID of the extension. + * \param critical Whether the extension is critical. + * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value + * (the content of the OCTET STRING). + * \param end End of extension value. + * + * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code + * if it can not parse or does not support the extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_crt const *crt, + mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid, + int critical, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * \param make_copy When not zero this function makes an internal copy of the + * CRT buffer \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed + * or reused after this call returns. + * When zero this function avoids duplicating the CRT buffer + * by taking temporary ownership thereof until the CRT + * is destroyed (like mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy()) + * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate + * extension. + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * + * \note This call is functionally equivalent to + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), and/or + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() + * but it calls the callback with every unsupported + * certificate extension and additionally the + * "certificate policies" extension if it contains any + * unsupported certificate policies. + * The callback must return a negative error code if it + * does not know how to handle such an extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. This is a + * variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes + * temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT + * is destroyed. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded + * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be + * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the + * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed + * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free(). + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \note This call is functionally equivalent to + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a + * copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime + * constraints. This is useful in constrained environments + * where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded + * certificates and add them to the chained list. + * + * For CRTs in PEM encoding, the function parses permissively: + * if at least one certificate can be parsed, the function + * returns the number of certificates for which parsing failed + * (hence \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully). + * If no certificate could be parsed, the function returns + * the first (negative) error encountered during parsing. + * + * PEM encoded certificates may be interleaved by other data + * such as human readable descriptions of their content, as + * long as the certificates are enclosed in the PEM specific + * '-----{BEGIN/END} CERTIFICATE-----' delimiters. + * + * \param chain The chain to which to add the parsed certificates. + * \param buf The buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format. + * For certificates in PEM encoding, this may be a concatenation + * of multiple certificates; for DER encoding, the buffer must + * comprise exactly one certificate. + * \param buflen The size of \p buf, including the terminating \c NULL byte + * in case of PEM encoded data. + * + * \return \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully. + * \return The (positive) number of certificates that couldn't + * be parsed if parsing was partly successful (see above). + * \return A negative X509 or PEM error code otherwise. * - * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number - * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); @@ -221,8 +579,39 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +/** + * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames + * extension. + * + * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject + * alternative name. + * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation + * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw. + * + * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name + * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported. + * + * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of + * subject alternative name. For example, after successful + * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the + * \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to + * this function. + * + * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the + * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the + * lifetime of the certificate. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported + * SAN type. + * \return Another negative value for any other failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * certificate. @@ -252,9 +641,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, uint32_t flags ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** - * \brief Verify the certificate signature + * \brief Verify a chain of certificates. * * The verify callback is a user-supplied callback that * can clear / modify / add flags for a certificate. If set, @@ -294,22 +684,30 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, * specific peers you know) - in that case, the self-signed * certificate doesn't need to have the CA bit set. * - * \param crt a certificate (chain) to be verified - * \param trust_ca the list of trusted CAs (see note above) - * \param ca_crl the list of CRLs for trusted CAs (see note above) - * \param cn expected Common Name (can be set to - * NULL if the CN must not be verified) - * \param flags result of the verification - * \param f_vrfy verification function - * \param p_vrfy verification parameter + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be + * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or, + * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its + * Subject name. Currently only DNS names are supported. This + * may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. * - * \return 0 (and flags set to 0) if the chain was verified and valid, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED if the chain was verified - * but found to be invalid, in which case *flags will have one - * or more MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX - * flags set, or another error (and flags set to 0xffffffff) - * in case of a fatal error encountered during the - * verification process. + * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the + * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the + * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, + * \c *flags will have one or more + * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX + * flags set. + * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error + * encountered during the verification process. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, @@ -319,7 +717,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, void *p_vrfy ); /** - * \brief Verify the certificate signature according to profile + * \brief Verify a chain of certificates with respect to + * a configurable security profile. * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(), but with explicit * security profile. @@ -328,22 +727,28 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, * for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root, * intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate. * - * \param crt a certificate (chain) to be verified - * \param trust_ca the list of trusted CAs - * \param ca_crl the list of CRLs for trusted CAs - * \param profile security profile for verification - * \param cn expected Common Name (can be set to - * NULL if the CN must not be verified) - * \param flags result of the verification - * \param f_vrfy verification function - * \param p_vrfy verification parameter + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. * - * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED - * in which case *flags will have one or more - * MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX flags - * set, - * or another error in case of a fatal error encountered - * during the verification process. + * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the + * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the + * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, + * \c *flags will have one or more + * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX + * flags set. + * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error + * encountered during the verification process. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, @@ -353,7 +758,108 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() + * but can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be set to \c NULL + * to disable restartable ECC. + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT + * verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb() + * when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate. + * + * On success, the callback returns a list of trusted + * certificates to be considered as potential signers + * for the input certificate. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer. + * This will point to a readable certificate. + * \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first + * entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers. + * This will not be \c NULL. + * + * \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a + * fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential + * signer completes without a single candidate, the + * callback must return \c 0 and set \c *candidate_cas + * to \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points + * to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of + * ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed + * to the caller. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/** + * \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which + * uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA + * certificates. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers + * of a given child certificate. See the documentation of + * ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information. + * \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb. + * \param profile The security profile for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension. * @@ -377,9 +883,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, unsigned int usage ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage. * @@ -396,7 +900,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const char *usage_oid, size_t usage_len ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /** @@ -424,6 +927,18 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); * \param crt Certificate chain to free */ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /* \} name */ @@ -625,16 +1140,13 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -647,15 +1159,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h index 0c6ccad7..674f9ce7 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief X.509 certificate signing request parsing and writing */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,19 +18,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -50,21 +45,21 @@ extern "C" { */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr { - mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */ - mbedtls_x509_buf cri; /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw); /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cri); /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */ - int version; /**< CSR version (1=v1). */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); /**< CSR version (1=v1). */ - mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). */ - mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_raw); /**< The raw subject data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ - mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + mbedtls_pk_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk); /**< Container for the public key context. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ } mbedtls_x509_csr; @@ -73,10 +68,10 @@ mbedtls_x509_csr; */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_csr { - mbedtls_pk_context *key; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions); } mbedtls_x509write_csr; @@ -123,6 +118,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, siz int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * CSR. @@ -137,6 +133,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ); */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Initialize a CSR @@ -205,6 +202,14 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_ty * \param key_usage key usage flags to set * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + * + * \note The decipherOnly flag from the Key Usage + * extension is represented by bit 8 (i.e. + * 0x8000), which cannot typically be represented + * in an unsigned char. Therefore, the flag + * decipherOnly (i.e. + * #MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY) cannot be set using this + * function. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ); @@ -227,6 +232,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param oid OID of the extension * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \param critical Set to 1 to mark the extension as critical, 0 otherwise. * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING * \param val_len length of the value data * @@ -234,6 +240,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); /** @@ -253,16 +260,13 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ); * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -276,15 +280,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/xtea.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/xtea.h deleted file mode 100644 index c70c3fe2..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/xtea.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,133 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file xtea.h - * - * \brief XTEA block cipher (32-bit) - */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_XTEA_H -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT 0 - -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0028 /**< The data input has an invalid length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0029 /**< XTEA hardware accelerator failed. */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief XTEA context structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_xtea_context -{ - uint32_t k[4]; /*!< key */ -} -mbedtls_xtea_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ -#include "xtea_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize XTEA context - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief Clear XTEA context - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be cleared - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_free( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); - -/** - * \brief XTEA key schedule - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized - * \param key the secret key - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] ); - -/** - * \brief XTEA cipher function - * - * \param ctx XTEA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT - * \param input 8-byte input block - * \param output 8-byte output block - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[8], - unsigned char output[8] ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/** - * \brief XTEA CBC cipher function - * - * \param ctx XTEA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT - * \param length the length of input, multiple of 8 - * \param iv initialization vector for CBC mode - * \param input input block - * \param output output block - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the length % 8 != 0 - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[8], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose ); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* xtea.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b3ef3631 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,4109 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto.h + * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_H + +#include "crypto_platform.h" + +#include + +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that + * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions + * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed + * documentation that includes those definitions. */ + +/** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions + * @{ + */ + +/**@}*/ +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_types.h" declares types that encode errors, + * algorithms, key types, policies, etc. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" + +/** \defgroup version API version + * @{ + */ + +/** + * The major version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 + +/** + * The minor version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 0 + +/**@}*/ + +/* The file "crypto_values.h" declares macros to build and analyze values + * of integral types defined in "crypto_types.h". */ +#include "crypto_values.h" + +/** \defgroup initialization Library initialization + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Library initialization. + * + * Applications must call this function before calling any other + * function in this module. + * + * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call + * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed. + * + * If the application calls other functions before calling psa_crypto_init(), + * the behavior is undefined. Implementations are encouraged to either perform + * the operation as if the library had been initialized or to return + * #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or some other applicable error. In particular, + * implementations should not return a success status if the lack of + * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper + * seeding of the random number generator. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \def PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure + * of type #psa_key_attributes_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure. + */ +static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void); + +/** Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier. + * + * If the attribute structure currently declares the key as volatile (which + * is the default content of an attribute structure), this function sets + * the lifetime attribute to #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param key The persistent identifier for the key. + */ +static void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +/** Set the owner identifier of a key. + * + * When key identifiers encode key owner identifiers, psa_set_key_id() does + * not allow to define in key attributes the owner of volatile keys as + * psa_set_key_id() enforces the key to be persistent. + * + * This function allows to set in key attributes the owner identifier of a + * key. It is intended to be used for volatile keys. For persistent keys, + * it is recommended to use the PSA Cryptography API psa_set_key_id() to define + * the owner of a key. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param owner_id The key owner identifier. + */ +static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id ); +#endif + +/** Set the location of a persistent key. + * + * To make a key persistent, you must give it a persistent key identifier + * with psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier + * is stored in the default storage area identifier by + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a storage + * area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param lifetime The lifetime for the key. + * If this is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, the + * key will be volatile, and the key identifier + * attribute is reset to 0. + */ +static void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The persistent identifier stored in the attribute structure. + * This value is unspecified if the attribute structure declares + * the key as volatile. + */ +static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The lifetime value stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare usage flags for a key. + * + * Usage flags are part of a key's usage policy. They encode what + * kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details, + * refer to the documentation of the type #psa_key_usage_t. + * + * This function overwrites any usage flags + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param usage_flags The usage flags to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags); + +/** Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The usage flags stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the permitted algorithm policy for a key. + * + * The permitted algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or + * algorithms are permitted to be used with this key. The following + * algorithm policies are supported: + * - 0 does not allow any cryptographic operation with the key. The key + * may be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting (if + * permitted by the usage flags). + * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm. + * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified + * signature scheme with any hash algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC allows + * any MAC algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CMAC) which + * generates/verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG + * allows any AEAD algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CCM) which + * generates/verifies a tag length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * + * This function overwrites any algorithm policy + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg The permitted algorithm policy to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + + +/** Retrieve the algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the type of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key type + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param type The key type to write. + * If this is 0, the key type in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type); + + +/** Declare the size of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key size previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param bits The key size in bits. + * If this is 0, the key size in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. Keys of size 0 are + * not supported. + */ +static void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits); + +/** Retrieve the key type from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key type stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the key size from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key size stored in the attribute structure, in bits. + */ +static size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the attributes of a key. + * + * This function first resets the attribute structure as with + * psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of + * the given key into the given attribute structure. + * + * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. + * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, + * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to query. + * \param[in,out] attributes On success, the attributes of the key. + * On failure, equivalent to a + * freshly-initialized structure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Reset a key attribute structure to a freshly initialized state. + * + * You must initialize the attribute structure as described in the + * documentation of the type #psa_key_attributes_t before calling this + * function. Once the structure has been initialized, you may call this + * function at any time. + * + * This function frees any auxiliary resources that the structure + * may contain. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes The attribute structure to reset. + */ +void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_management Key management + * @{ + */ + +/** Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory. + * + * If the key identifier designates a volatile key, this functions does not do + * anything and returns successfully. + * + * If the key identifier designates a persistent key, then this function will + * free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and the key can still be used. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to purge. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key material will have been removed from memory if it is not + * currently required. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Make a copy of a key. + * + * Copy key material from one location to another. + * + * This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location + * to another, since it populates a key using the material from + * another key which may have a different lifetime. + * + * This function may be used to share a key with a different party, + * subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing. + * + * The policy on the source key must have the usage flag + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set. + * This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without + * making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located + * in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make + * a copy of the key outside the secure element. + * + * The resulting key may only be used in a way that conforms to + * both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in + * the \p attributes parameter: + * - The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the + * usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in \p attributes. + * - If both allow the same algorithm or wildcard-based + * algorithm policy, the resulting key has the same algorithm policy. + * - If either of the policies allows an algorithm and the other policy + * allows a wildcard-based algorithm policy that includes this algorithm, + * the resulting key allows the same algorithm. + * - If the policies do not allow any algorithm in common, this function + * fails with the status #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is + * implementation-defined. + * + * \param source_key The key to copy. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is + * being copied outside of a secure element it must + * also allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * They are used as follows: + * - The key type and size may be 0. If either is + * nonzero, it must match the corresponding + * attribute of the source key. + * - The key location (the lifetime and, for + * persistent keys, the key identifier) is + * used directly. + * - The policy constraints (usage flags and + * algorithm policy) are combined from + * the source key and \p attributes so that + * both sets of restrictions apply, as + * described in the documentation of this function. + * \param[out] target_key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p source_key is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The lifetime or identifier in \p attributes are invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The policy constraints on the source and specified in + * \p attributes are incompatible. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p attributes specifies a key type or key size + * which does not match the attributes of the source key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not + * allow copying it to the target's lifetime. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key); + + +/** + * \brief Destroy a key. + * + * This function destroys a key from both volatile + * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall + * make a best effort to ensure that that the key material cannot be recovered. + * + * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees + * resources associated with the key. + * + * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the + * key will cause the multipart operation to fail. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and + * return #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p key was a valid identifier and the key material that it + * referred to has been erased. Alternatively, \p key is \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key cannot be erased because it is + * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid identifier nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * There was an failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor. + * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort + * to erase key material even in this stage, however applications + * should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the + * key material is not recoverable in such cases. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or + * a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have + * been compromised. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup import_export Key import and export + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Import a key in binary format. + * + * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys + * and to the documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for + * other key types. + * + * The key data determines the key size. The attributes may optionally + * specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined + * from the key data. A key size of 0 in \p attributes indicates that + * the key size is solely determined by the key data. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * The key size is always determined from the + * \p data buffer. + * If the key size in \p attributes is nonzero, + * it must be equal to the size from \p data. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier to the newly created key. + * For persistent keys, this is the key identifier + * defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. The content of this + * buffer is interpreted according to the type declared + * in \p attributes. + * All implementations must support at least the format + * described in the documentation + * of psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for + * the chosen type. Implementations may allow other + * formats, but should be conservative: implementations + * should err on the side of rejecting content if it + * may be erroneous (e.g. wrong type or truncated data). + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular persistent location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size + * of the key data. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + + + +/** + * \brief Export a key in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats + * beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key() + * must use the representation specified here, not the original + * representation. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * + * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the + * raw bytes of the key. + * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be + * correct. + * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the + * two or three DES keys. + * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), the format + * is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by + * PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017) as `RSAPrivateKey`, version 0. + * ``` + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER, -- must be 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * } + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR is true), the format is + * a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string + * where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size + * of the order of the curve's coordinate field. This byte string is + * in little-endian order for Montgomery curves (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), and in big-endian order for Weierstrass + * curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` + * and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`). + * For Weierstrass curves, this is the content of the `privateKey` field of + * the `ECPrivateKey` format defined by RFC 5915. For Montgomery curves, + * the format is defined by RFC 7748, and output is masked according to §5. + * For twisted Edwards curves, the private key is as defined by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR is true), the + * format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes + * (leading zeroes are not stripped). + * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is + * true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * The policy on the key must have the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. It must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public + * key. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c type, \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an object that is equivalent to the public key. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of + * the representation defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`. + * ``` + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve keys on a twisted Edwards curve (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true and #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY + * returns #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS), the public key is as defined + * by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For other elliptic curve public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed + * representation defined by SEC1 §2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint. + * Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of + * `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY is true), + * the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a + * big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the + * base prime `p` in bytes. + * + * Exporting a public key object or the public part of a key pair is + * always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is neither a public key nor a key pair. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + + + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup hash Message digests + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the hash of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a + * reference value. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object + * of type #psa_hash_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a hash operation object. + */ +static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest) + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm. + * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish(). + * To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The + * application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it muct be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then + * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** Abort a hash operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or + * psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation); + +/** Clone a hash operation. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected value. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_mac_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type + * #psa_mac_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object. + */ +static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation. + * + * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string. + * To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish + * calculating the MAC value and retrieve it. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation. + * + * This function sets up the verification of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value. + * + * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish + * calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against + * the expected value. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key is not compatible with \c alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() + * before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. This is always + * #PSA_MAC_LENGTH(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the + * MAC algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then + * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** Abort a MAC operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or + * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers + * @{ + */ + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization + * vector). Use the multipart operation interface with a + * #psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * The output contains the IV followed by + * the ciphertext proper. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to decrypt. + * This consists of the IV followed by the + * ciphertext proper. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the plaintext is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of + * type #psa_cipher_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object. + */ +static psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to + * generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use + * psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific IV value. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the + * decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call + * psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the + * beginning of the message. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate + * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written. + * \param iv_size Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated IV. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p iv buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher + * encrypt operation, with no IV set). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice + * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or + * decrypts its input. + * + * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_cipher_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_cipher_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish() + * is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) + * @{ + */ + +/** Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of \p plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p plaintext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p ciphertext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length); + +/** Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate inputs, the buffer + * must contain the encrypted data followed + * by the authentication tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of \p ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p ciphertext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The ciphertext is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p plaintext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length) can be used + * to determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations. + * + * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_aead_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of + * type #psa_aead_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object. + */ +static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to + * generate or set the nonce. You should use + * psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific nonce value. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message to encrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_finish(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the ciphertext to decrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_verify(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption + * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type + * and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] nonce Buffer where the generated nonce is to be + * written. + * \param nonce_size Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] nonce_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated nonce. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt + * operation, with no nonce set). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_size, + size_t *nonce_length); + +/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce + * set). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length); + +/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. + * + * The application must call this function before calling + * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for + * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it, + * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called + * then the implementation must enforce the lengths. + * + * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with + * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. + * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling + * this function is not required. + * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional + * authenticated data in bytes. + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and + * psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been + * called yet). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length); + +/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. + * + * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. + * + * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments + * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing + * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update(). + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that + * depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of + * additional data. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and + * psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input length overflows the additional data length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS: + * - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a + * confidential location. If you take any action that depends + * on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be + * undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore, + * if an adversary can observe that this action took place + * (for example through timing), they may be able to use this + * fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the + * same key. + * - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a + * memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to. + * + * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any + * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process + * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but + * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent + * call to psa_aead_update(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify() + * provides sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed + * in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg, \p input_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is + * the algorithm that were used to set up the + * operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * input_length) evaluates to the maximum + * output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input length overflows the plaintext length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the + * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * + * This function has two output buffers: + * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext + * is to be written. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned ciphertext. + * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is + * to be written. + * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c + * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where + * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size of the key, and \c alg is the + * algorithm that were used in the call to + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned tag. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption + * operation with a nonce set). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required \p ciphertext buffer size. #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, + * \c key_bits, \c alg) or #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to + * determine the required \p tag buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length); + +/** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message + * components: + * + * - The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs + * passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad(). + * - The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - The tag passed to this function call. + * + * If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining + * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct, + * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] plaintext Buffer where the last part of the plaintext + * is to be written. This is the remaining data + * from previous calls to psa_aead_update() + * that could not be processed until the end + * of the input. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned plaintext. + * \param[in] tag Buffer containing the authentication tag. + * \param tag_length Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is + * not correct. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption + * operation with a nonce set). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_length); + +/** Abort an AEAD operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_aead_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or + * psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use + * a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to + * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the + * hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The required signature size is + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of key. + * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum signature size of any supported + * signature algorithm. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ); + +/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification + * algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message + * and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash(). + * PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm + * to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. The key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature + * is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The + * key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was perfomed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. + * + * \param key Identifer of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_derivation Key derivation and pseudorandom generation + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of the state data structure for key derivation operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a key derivation operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation + * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object. + */ +static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a key derivation operation. + * + * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate + * a byte stream in a deterministic way. + * This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other + * cryptographic material. + * + * To derive a key: + * -# Start with an initialized object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * -# Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm. + * -# Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key() + * as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether + * they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm. + * -# Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with + * psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle + * of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory + * because the output depends on the maximum capacity. + * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(). + * Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes + * calculated by the key derivation algorithm. + * -# Clean up the key derivation operation object with + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * If this function returns an error, the key derivation operation object is + * not changed. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_key_derivation_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object + * to set up. It must + * have been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param alg The key derivation algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Retrieve the current capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can + * return. When you get *N* bytes of output from a key derivation operation, + * this reduces its capacity by *N*. + * + * \param[in] operation The operation to query. + * \param[out] capacity On success, the capacity of the operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity); + +/** Set the maximum capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes + * that the key derivation operation can return from this point onwards. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to modify. + * \param capacity The new capacity of the operation. + * It must be less or equal to the operation's + * current capacity. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity. + * In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity + * remains unchanged. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity); + +/** Use the maximum possible capacity for a key derivation operation. + * + * Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation + * to indicate that the operation should have the maximum possible capacity. + * The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key derivation + * algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY ((size_t)(-1)) + +/** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for + * non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which should be in a key + * object, call psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param[in] data Input data to use. + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step does not allow direct inputs. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** Provide a numeric input for key derivation or key agreement. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * However, when an algorithm requires a particular order, numeric inputs + * usually come first as they tend to be configuration parameters. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function is used for inputs which are fixed-size non-negative + * integers. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param[in] value The value of the numeric input. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step does not allow numeric inputs. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value); + +/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for + * secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key + * store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store, + * call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an + * appropriate type for step and must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE or + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (see note) + * and the algorithm used by the operation. + * + * \note Once all inputs steps are completed, the operations will allow: + * - psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() if each input was either a direct input + * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set; + * - psa_key_derivation_output_key() if the input for step + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD + * was from a key slot with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE and each other input was + * either a direct input or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set; + * - psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() if each input was either a direct input + * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION set; + * - psa_key_derivation_verify_key() under the same conditions as + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key allows neither #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, or it doesn't allow this + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type + * or does not allow key inputs at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key + * derivation. + * + * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key + * a public key \p peer_key. + * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation. + * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the + * resulting operation to produce keys and other cryptographic material. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() with a + * key agreement and derivation algorithm + * \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) is true + * and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) + * is false). + * The operation must be ready for an + * input of the type given by \p step. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the + * same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the + * public key type corresponding to the type of + * private_key. That is, this function performs the + * equivalent of + * #psa_import_key(..., + * `peer_key`, `peer_key_length`) where + * with key attributes indicating the public key + * type corresponding to the type of `private_key`. + * For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key + * is interpreted as a point on the curve that the + * private key is on. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with + * \c private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step does not allow an input resulting from a key agreement. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length); + +/** Read some data from a key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * return those bytes. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output will be written. + * \param output_length Number of bytes to output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, + * no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm + * and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically. + * The key's location, usage policy, type and size are taken from + * \p attributes. + * + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads as many bytes as required from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how + * the key is derived, depends on the key type and on the key size + * (denoted \c bits below): + * + * - For key types for which the key is an arbitrary sequence of bytes + * of a given size, this function is functionally equivalent to + * calling #psa_key_derivation_output_bytes + * and passing the resulting output to #psa_import_key. + * However, this function has a security benefit: + * if the implementation provides an isolation boundary then + * the key material is not exposed outside the isolation boundary. + * As a consequence, for these key types, this function always consumes + * exactly (\c bits / 8) bytes from the operation. + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. + * + * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Montgomery curve), this function always draws a byte string whose + * length is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits + * accordingly. That is: + * + * - Curve25519 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * - Curve448 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * + * - For key types for which the key is represented by a single sequence of + * \c bits bits with constraints as to which bit sequences are acceptable, + * this function draws a byte string of length (\c bits / 8) bytes rounded + * up to the nearest whole number of bytes. If the resulting byte string + * is acceptable, it becomes the key, otherwise the drawn bytes are discarded. + * This process is repeated until an acceptable byte string is drawn. + * The byte string drawn from the operation is interpreted as specified + * for the output produced by psa_export_key(). + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES. + * Force-set the parity bits, but discard forbidden weak keys. + * For 2-key and 3-key triple-DES, the three keys are generated + * successively (for example, for 3-key triple-DES, + * if the first 8 bytes specify a weak key and the next 8 bytes do not, + * discard the first 8 bytes, use the next 8 bytes as the first key, + * and continue reading output from the operation to derive the other + * two keys). + * - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(\c group) + * where \c group designates any Diffie-Hellman group) and + * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Weierstrass curve). + * For these key types, interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically + * the methods titled "key-pair generation by testing candidates" + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.1.4 for Diffie-Hellman, + * in FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2 for DSA, and + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.2.2 or + * FIPS 186-4 §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. + * + * - For other key types, including #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, + * the way in which the operation output is consumed is + * implementation-defined. + * + * In all cases, the data that is read is discarded from the operation. + * The operation's capacity is decreased by the number of bytes read. + * + * For algorithms that take an input step #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + * the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key(). + * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions + * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * If the key type to be created is + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in + * the policy must be the same as in the current + * operation. + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * There was not enough data to create the desired key. + * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to + * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a + * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * compares those bytes to an expected value in constant time. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the expected number of bytes from the + * stream before comparing them. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to the following code: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, tmp, output_length); + * if (memcmp(output, tmp, output_length) != 0) + * return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + * \endcode + * except (1) it works even if the key's policy does not allow outputting the + * bytes, and (2) the comparison will be done in constant time. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] expected_output Buffer containing the expected derivation output. + * \param output_length Length ot the expected output; this is also the + * number of bytes that will be read. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The output was read successfully, but it differs from the expected + * output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, + * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller expected output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *expected_output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value + * stored in a key object. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding the the + * length of the expected value from the stream before comparing them. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to exporting the key and calling + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() on the result, except that it + * works even if the key cannot be exported. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] expected A key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH + * containing the expected output. Its policy must + * include the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION flag + * and the permitted algorithm must match the + * operation. The value of this key was likely + * computed by a previous call to + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected + * output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * The key passed as the expected value does not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key passed as the expected value has an invalid type. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key passed as the expected value does not allow this usage or + * this algorithm; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't + * allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * the length of the expected value. In this case, + * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller expected output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_id_t expected); + +/** Abort a key derivation operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c + * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused + * for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again. + * + * This function may be called at any time after the operation + * object has been initialized as described in #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * + * In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to + * call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret. + * + * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field + * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should + * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as + * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with + * a key derivation, use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other + * functions from the key derivation interface. + * + * \param alg The key agreement algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg) + * is true). + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. It must be + * in the same format that psa_import_key() + * accepts. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation + * of psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p output_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup random Random generation + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Generate random bytes. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status + * and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return + * status is not #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \note To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead. + * + * \param[out] output Output buffer for the generated data. + * \param output_size Number of bytes to generate and output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key or key pair. + * + * The key is generated randomly. + * Its location, usage policy, type and size are taken from \p attributes. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0. + * + * The following type-specific considerations apply: + * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the public exponent is 65537. + * The modulus is a product of two probabilistic primes + * between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the + * attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation + * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */ +#include "crypto_sizes.h" + +/* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for + * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */ +#include "crypto_struct.h" + +/* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This + * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */ +#include "crypto_extra.h" + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b05660f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which need to + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'composite' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include + +/* + * MAC multi-part operation definitions. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +typedef struct +{ + /** The HMAC algorithm in use */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + /** The hash context. */ + struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx; + /** The HMAC part of the context. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opad)[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, {0}} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + union + { + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER DECLARATIONS ONLY. + */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t; +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..31f4aa6d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which do not + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'primitive' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include + +/* + * Hash multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + union + { + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + mbedtls_md5_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md5); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + mbedtls_ripemd160_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ripemd160); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + mbedtls_sha1_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sha1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + mbedtls_sha256_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sha256); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + mbedtls_sha512_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sha512); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} + +/* + * Cipher multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_XTS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +typedef struct { + /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS cipher implementation. */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_length); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_length); + union { + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER DECLARATIONS ONLY. + */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +typedef mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT + +typedef mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +typedef struct { + unsigned int initialised : 1; + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t ctx; +} mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT + +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + { 0, MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT } + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_compat.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1d3253cb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_compat.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Backward compatibility aliases + * + * This header declares alternative names for macro and functions. + * New application code should not use these names. + * These names may be removed in a future version of Mbed Crypto. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * To support both openless APIs and psa_open_key() temporarily, define + * psa_key_handle_t to be equal to mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. Do not mark the + * type and its utility macros and functions deprecated yet. This will be done + * in a subsequent phase. + */ +typedef mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_handle_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT + +/** Check whether an handle is null. + * + * \param handle Handle + * + * \return Non-zero if the handle is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null( psa_key_handle_t handle ) +{ + return( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( handle ) ); +} + +/** Open a handle to an existing persistent key. + * + * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created + * with a lifetime other than #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. A persistent key + * always has a nonzero key identifier, set with psa_set_key_id() when + * creating the key. Implementations may provide additional pre-provisioned + * keys that can be opened with psa_open_key(). Such keys have an application + * key identifier in the vendor range, as documented in the description of + * #psa_key_id_t. + * + * The application must eventually close the handle with psa_close_key() or + * psa_destroy_key() to release associated resources. If the application dies + * without calling one of these functions, the implementation should perform + * the equivalent of a call to psa_close_key(). + * + * Some implementations permit an application to open the same key multiple + * times. If this is successful, each call to psa_open_key() will return a + * different key handle. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note Applications that rely on opening a key multiple times will not be + * portable to implementations that only permit a single key handle to be + * opened. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + * + * + * \param key The persistent identifier of the key. + * \param[out] handle On success, a handle to the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The application can now use the value of `*handle` + * to access the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * The implementation does not have sufficient resources to open the + * key. This can be due to reaching an implementation limit on the + * number of open keys, the number of open key handles, or available + * memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no persistent key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid persistent key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The specified key exists, but the application does not have the + * permission to access it. Note that this specification does not + * define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible + * through implementation-specific means. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_handle_t *handle ); + +/** Close a key handle. + * + * If the handle designates a volatile key, this will destroy the key material + * and free all associated resources, just like psa_destroy_key(). + * + * If this is the last open handle to a persistent key, then closing the handle + * will free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and can be opened again later + * with a call to psa_open_key(). + * + * Closing the key handle makes the handle invalid, and the key handle + * must not be used again by the application. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note If the key handle was used to set up an active + * :ref:\`multipart operation \`, then closing the + * key handle can cause the multipart operation to fail. Applications should + * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished. + * + * \param handle The key handle to close. + * If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f95d0ef --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_config.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +/** + * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in mbedtls_config.h, + * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled + * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions). + * + * To enable a cryptographic mechanism, uncomment the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * To disable a cryptographic mechanism, comment out the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * The names of cryptographic mechanisms correspond to values + * defined in psa/crypto_values.h, with the prefix \c PSA_WANT_ instead + * of \c PSA_. + * + * Note that many cryptographic mechanisms involve two symbols: one for + * the key type (\c PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx) and one for the algorithm + * (\c PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx). Mechanisms with additional parameters may involve + * additional symbols. + */ +#else +/** + * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in mbedtls_config.h, + * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported + * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the + * mbedtls_xxx API. + */ +#endif +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +/* + * CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +/* PBKDF2-HMAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +/* + * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4249). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3541). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b6f3225 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_driver_common.h + * \brief Definitions for all PSA crypto drivers + * + * This file contains common definitions shared by all PSA crypto drivers. + * Do not include it directly: instead, include the header file(s) for + * the type(s) of driver that you are implementing. For example, if + * you are writing a dynamically registered driver for a secure element, + * include `psa/crypto_se_driver.h`. + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for + * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a + * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions + * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not + * intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H + +#include +#include + +/* Include type definitions (psa_status_t, psa_algorithm_t, + * psa_key_type_t, etc.) and macros to build and analyze values + * of these types. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_values.h" + +/** For encrypt-decrypt functions, whether the operation is an encryption + * or a decryption. */ +typedef enum { + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_DECRYPT, + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_ENCRYPT +} psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..239fdcb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'composite' + * operations, i.e. those operations which need to make use of other operations + * from the primitives (crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h) + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h" + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_mac_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..104d4bdb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'primitive' + * operations, i.e. those operations which do not rely on other contexts. + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h" + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_hash_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_cipher_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_extra.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c0b1067 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -0,0 +1,1824 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_extra.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "crypto_compat.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* UID for secure storage seed */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52 + +/* See mbedtls_config.h for definition */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 +#endif + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key. + * + * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg2 A second algorithm that the key may be used + * for, in addition to the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * + * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because + * using the same key with different algorithms can allow some + * attacks based on arithmetic relations between different + * computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless + * side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only + * if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been + * verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms + * is safe. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg2) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2) = alg2; +} + +/** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +/** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. + * + * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely + * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure + * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface + * that the secure element may have. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number containing the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number + * indicates the slot number that contains it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not permitted to query the slot number. + * Mbed Crypto currently does not return this error. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is not located in a secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ); + +/** Choose the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute + * structure. + * + * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot + * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have. + * + * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can + * cause the following errors when creating the key: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does + * not support choosing a specific slot number. + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to + * choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot. + * - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not + * valid in general or not valid for this specific key. + * - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the + * selected slot. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param slot_number The slot number to set. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) |= MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number) = slot_number; +} + +/** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure. + * + * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number(). + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + */ +static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; +} + +/** Register a key that is already present in a secure element. + * + * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the + * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with + * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure. + * This function makes the key available through the key identifier + * specified in \p attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully registered. + * Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may + * not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot + * and is compatible with the specified attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the identifier specified in + * \p attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not + * support registering a key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The identifier in \p attributes is invalid, namely the identifier is + * not in the user range. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located + * in a secure element. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * No slot number is specified in \p attributes, + * or the specified slot number is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** + * \brief Library deinitialization. + * + * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, + * including the whole key store. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void ); + +/** \brief Statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed Crypto and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s +{ + /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(volatile_slots); + /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in + * internal persistent storage. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_slots); + /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a + * secure element. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(external_slots); + /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain + * key material yet. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(half_filled_slots); + /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cache_slots); + /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(empty_slots); + /** Number of slots that are locked. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(locked_slots); + /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */ + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_internal_key_id); + /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */ + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_external_key_id); +} mbedtls_psa_stats_t; + +/** \brief Get statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note When Mbed Crypto is built as part of a service, with isolation + * between the application and the keystore, the service may or + * may not expose this function. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats ); + +/** + * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into + * secure storage. + * + * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator + * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted + * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator), + * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its + * random generator. + * + * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be + * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with + * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional. + * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any + * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in + * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function + * can no longer succeed. + * + * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state. + * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the + * error if possible. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status. + * + * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a + * factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed + * is critical to the security of the device. It must be + * *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*. + * You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically + * secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources. + * You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure + * that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the + * needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to + * the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value + * once this function returns. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + * + * \note This function is only available on the following platforms: + * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled. + * Note that you must provide compatible implementations of + * mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write. + * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side, + * if the server supports this feature. + * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject. + * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer. + * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater + * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * and the value of \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM + * in `library/entropy_poll.h` in the Mbed TLS source + * code. + * It must be less or equal to + * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator + * of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use. + * You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto + * implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p seed_size is out of range. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * There was a failure reading or writing from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The library has already been initialized. It is no longer + * possible to call this function. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +/** DSA public key. + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p` + * in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4002) + +/** DSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The + * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes + * are not stripped). + * + * Determinstic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows + * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7002) + +/** Whether a key type is an DSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000400) +/** DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000500) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG +/** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of + * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + + +/* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from + * the API definition. */ +#undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. + * + * For keys of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM), the group data comes + * from domain parameters set by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x7e) + + +/** + * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. + * + * Some key types require additional domain parameters in addition to + * the key type identifier and the key size. Use this function instead + * of psa_set_key_type() when you need to specify domain parameters. + * + * The format for the required domain parameters varies based on the key type. + * + * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the domain parameter data consists of the public exponent, + * represented as a big-endian integer with no leading zeros. + * This information is used when generating an RSA key pair. + * When importing a key, the public exponent is read from the imported + * key data and the exponent recorded in the attribute structure is ignored. + * As an exception, the public exponent 65537 is represented by an empty + * byte string. + * - For DSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the `Dss-Parms` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.2. + * ``` + * Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE { + * p INTEGER, + * q INTEGER, + * g INTEGER + * } + * ``` + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM)), the + * `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.3. + * ``` + * DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { + * p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 + * g INTEGER, -- generator, g + * q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 + * j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor + * validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL + * } + * ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE { + * seed BIT STRING, + * pgenCounter INTEGER + * } + * ``` + * + * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. + * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, + * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where the specified domain + * parameters will be stored. + * If this function fails, the content of + * \p attributes is not modified. + * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key domain parameters. + * The content of this buffer is interpreted + * according to \p type as described above. + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** + * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. + * + * Get the domain parameters for a key with this function, if any. The format + * of the domain parameters written to \p data is specified in the + * documentation for psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * \param[out] data On success, the key domain parameters. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * The buffer is guaranteed to be large + * enough if its size in bytes is at least + * the value given by + * PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(). + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key domain parameters data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_get_key_domain_parameters() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported + * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a + * sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? sizeof(int) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(key_type) ? PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) +#define PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 3 /*without optional parts*/) +#define PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 2 /*p, g*/ + 34 /*q*/) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions + * @{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve. + * + * \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized). + */ +static inline psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits ) +{ + switch( grpid ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + *bits = 192; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + *bits = 224; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + *bits = 521; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + *bits = 512; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + *bits = 255; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + *bits = 192; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + *bits = 224; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + *bits = 448; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + default: + *bits = 0; + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. + * \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up + * to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller + * to infer the exact curve from the length of a key + * which is supplied as a byte string. + * + * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not + * correct for \p curve. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator + * @{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** External random generator function, implemented by the platform. + * + * When the compile-time option #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled, + * this function replaces Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules for all + * random generation triggered via PSA crypto interfaces. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * \param[in,out] context Pointer to the random generator context. + * This is all-bits-zero on the first call + * and preserved between successive calls. + * \param[out] output Output buffer. On success, this buffer + * contains random data with a uniform + * distribution. + * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, set this value to \p output_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The output buffer contains \p output_size bytes of + * cryptographic-quality random data, and \c *output_length is + * set to \p output_size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * The random generator requires extra entropy and there is no + * way to obtain entropy under current environment conditions. + * This error should not happen under normal circumstances since + * this function is responsible for obtaining as much entropy as + * it needs. However implementations of this function may return + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY if there is no way to obtain + * entropy without blocking indefinitely. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * A failure of the random generator hardware that isn't covered + * by #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_builtin_keys Built-in keys + * @{ + */ + +/** The minimum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * The range of key identifiers from #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + * to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX within the range from + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect + * with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers. + * + * This value is part of the library's ABI since changing it would invalidate + * the values of built-in key identifiers in applications. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fff0000) + +/** The maximum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * See #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffefff) + +/** A slot number identifying a key in a driver. + * + * Values of this type are used to identify built-in keys. + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_drv_slot_number_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) +/** Test whether a key identifier belongs to the builtin key range. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a builtin key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a builtin key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_builtin( psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( ( key_id >= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ) && + ( key_id <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ) ); +} + +/** Platform function to obtain the location and slot number of a built-in key. + * + * An application-specific implementation of this function must be provided if + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled. This would typically be provided + * as part of a platform's system image. + * + * #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(\p key_id) needs to be in the range from + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX. + * + * In a multi-application configuration + * (\c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is defined), + * this function should check that #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(\p key_id) + * is allowed to use the given key. + * + * \param key_id The key ID for which to retrieve the + * location and slot attributes. + * \param[out] lifetime On success, the lifetime associated with the key + * corresponding to \p key_id. Lifetime is a + * combination of which driver contains the key, + * and with what persistence level the key is + * intended to be used. If the platform + * implementation does not contain specific + * information about the intended key persistence + * level, the persistence level may be reported as + * #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number known to the driver + * registered at the lifetime location reported + * through \p lifetime which corresponds to the + * requested built-in key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The requested key identifier designates a built-in key. + * In a multi-application configuration, the requested owner + * is allowed to access it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * The requested key identifier is not a built-in key which is known + * to this function. If a key exists in the key storage with this + * identifier, the data from the storage will be used. + * \return (any other error) + * Any other error is propagated to the function that requested the key. + * Common errors include: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: the key exists but the requested owner + * is not allowed to access it. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime, + psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +/** @} */ + +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0a000000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE) + +/** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm. + * + * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following + * parameters: + * + * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field. + * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the + * J-PAKE algorithm. + * - A cryptographic hash function. + * + * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions + * in any order: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite, + * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits)); + * psa_pake_cs_set_hash(cipher_suite, hash); + * \endcode + * + * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the + * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + * + * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call + * + * \code + * psa_pake_setup(operation, cipher_suite); + * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_password_key(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The password is read as a byte array and must be non-empty. This can be the + * password itself (in some pre-defined character encoding) or some value + * derived from the password as mandated by some higher level protocol. + * + * (The implementation converts this byte array to a number as described in + * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ + * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here + * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite. + * The \c psa_pake_set_password_xxx() functions return an error if the result + * of the reduction is 0.) + * + * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows: + * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get g1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Get g2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set g3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Set g4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get A + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get ZKP public key for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get ZKP proof for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set B + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set ZKP public key for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set ZKP proof for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To access the shared secret call + * \code + * // Get Ka=Kb=K + * psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * \endcode + * + * For more information consult the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants. + * + * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated + * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no + * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. + * + * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated + * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like + * for example accessing restricted files). + * + * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5 + * of RFC 8236 for two examples. + * + */ +#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0a000100) + +/** @} */ + +/** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * + * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of + * the official PSA Crypto API yet. + * + * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed Crypto and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + * Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and + * #PSA_ALG_JPAKE. + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of the side of PAKE + * + * Encodes which side of the algorithm is being executed. For more information + * see the documentation of individual \c PSA_PAKE_SIDE_XXX constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_side_t; + +/** Encoding of input and output indicators for PAKE. + * + * Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than just a single key share. + * This type is for encoding additional input and output data for such + * algorithms. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t; + +/** Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional types must use an encoding in this range. + * + * For more information see the documentation of individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE. + * + * For more information see the documentation of individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE. + * + * For more information see the documentation of the #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE macro. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t; + +/** The first peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_SIDE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_SIDE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_SIDE_FIRST ((psa_pake_side_t)0x01) + +/** The second peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_SIDE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_SIDE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_SIDE_SECOND ((psa_pake_side_t)0x02) + +/** The client in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_SIDE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_side_t)0x11) + +/** The server in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_SIDE_SERVER ((psa_pake_side_t)0x12) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a + * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC + * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and + * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)0x01) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify + * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for + * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and + * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)0x02) + +/** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size. + * + * \param pake_type The type of the primitive + * (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t). + * \param pake_family The family of the primitive + * (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends + * on \p type, for more information consult the + * documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t + * constants). + * \param pake_bits The bit-size of the primitive + * (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation + * of this parameter depends on \p family, for more + * information consult the documentation of individual + * ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants). + * + * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + * Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as + * ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \ + ((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 : \ + ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 | \ + (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits))) + +/** The key share being sent to or received from the peer. + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t)0x01) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP public key. + * + * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive + * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235). + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t)0x02) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP proof. + * + * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the + * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235). + * + * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than + * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on + * the group as well: + * + * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian. + * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of + * _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf). + * + * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does + * not exceed the byte length of the group order. + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t)0x03) + +/** The type of the data strucure for PAKE cipher suites. + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. + */ +typedef struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_t; + +/** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite + ); + +/** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm + * previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param algorithm The PAKE algorithm to write. + * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.) + * If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm + ); + +/** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external linkage). + * This function may be provided as a function-like macro, but in this case it + * must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite + ); + +/** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param primitive The primitive to write. If this is 0, the + * primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes + * unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive + ); + +/** Retrieve the hash algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The hash algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. The return + * value is 0 if the PAKE is not parametrised by a hash algorithm or if + * the hash algorithm is not set. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite + ); + +/** Declare the hash algorithm for a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any hash algorithm + * previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param hash The hash involved in the cipher suite. + * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\c alg) is true.) + * If this is 0, the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_hash( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t hash + ); + +/** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_pake_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t; + +/** Return an initial value for an PAKE operation object. + */ +static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the cipher suite. + * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the + * setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs + * to be called depends on the algorithm in use. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange: + * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the + * key share that needs to be sent to the peer. + * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide + * the key share that was received from the peer. + * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and + * psa_pake_input() might be necessary. + * -# Call psa_pake_get_implicit_key() for accessing the shared secret. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The + * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A call to psa_pake_abort(). + * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_implicit_key(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param cipher_suite The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully + * characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines + * the algorithm as well.) + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The \p cipher_suite is not supported or is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite); + +/** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange from key ID. + * + * Call this function when the password, or a value derived from the password, + * is already present in the key store. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the password for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the password hasn't + * been set yet (psa_pake_set_password_key() + * hasn't been called yet). + * \param password Identifier of the key holding the password or a + * value derived from the password (eg. by a + * memory-hard function). It must remain valid + * until the operation terminates. It must be of + * type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. It has to allow + * the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must have been set up.) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with the algorithm or the cipher suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password); + +/** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a + * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call + * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single + * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the user ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the user ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] user_id The user ID to authenticate with. + * \param user_id_len Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p user_id is NULL. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *user_id, + size_t user_id_len); + +/** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms + * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE + * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call + * psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the peer ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] peer_id The peer's ID to authenticate. + * \param peer_id_len Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p user_id is NULL. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *peer_id, + size_t peer_id_len); + +/** Set the side for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities. + * It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a side + * parameter. For such PAKEs the side parameter is ignored. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the side for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the side hasn't been + * set (psa_pake_set_side() hasn't been called + * yet). + * \param side A value of type ::psa_pake_side_t signaling the + * side of the algorithm that is being set up. For + * more information see the documentation of + * \c PSA_PAKE_SIDE_XXX constants. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The \p side for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_side(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_side_t side); + +/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is + * requested. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the + * format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to + * the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must + * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \c + * cipher_suite, \p type). + * + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned + * output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond that + * validity is specific to the algorithm). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step for which the input is provided. + * \param[out] input Buffer containing the input in the format + * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the + * documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param[out] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond that + * validity is specific to the algorithm). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The input is not valid for the algorithm, ciphersuite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE. + * + * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated + * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no + * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. + * + * That is, the authentication is only implicit. Since the peer is not + * authenticated yet, no action should be taken yet that assumes that the peer + * is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted files on the + * peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded. + * + * This function can be called after the key exchange phase of the operation + * has completed. It imports the shared secret output of the PAKE into the + * provided derivation operation. The input step + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when placing the shared key + * material in the key derivation operation. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation + * and \p key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by + * calling psa_pake_abort() and psa_key_derivation_abort() respectively. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param[out] output A key derivation operation that is ready + * for an input step of type + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond + * that validity is specific to the algorithm). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The state of \p output is not valid for + * the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET step. This can happen if the + * step is out of order or the application has done this step already + * and it may not be repeated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is not compatible with the output’s + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output); + +/**@}*/ + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer + * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param output_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * output, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite, + * the output type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or + * the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) 0 + +/** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input(). + * + * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any + * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified + * parameters. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param input_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient input buffer size for the specified + * input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite, + * the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or + * the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) 0 + +/** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported cipher + * suites and PAKE algorithms. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p cipher_suite, \p output). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 0 + +/** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported cipher + * suites and PAKE algorithms. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p cipher_suite, \p input). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 0 + +struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t algorithm; + psa_pake_primitive_type_t type; + psa_pake_family_t family; + uint16_t bits; + psa_algorithm_t hash; +}; + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return(cipher_suite->algorithm); +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm) +{ + if(!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) + cipher_suite->algorithm = 0; + else + cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm; +} + +static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, cipher_suite->family, + cipher_suite->bits)); +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive) +{ + cipher_suite->type = (psa_pake_primitive_type_t) (primitive >> 24); + cipher_suite->family = (psa_pake_family_t) (0xFF & (primitive >> 16)); + cipher_suite->bits = (uint16_t) (0xFFFF & primitive); +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return(cipher_suite->hash); +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_hash( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t hash) +{ + if(!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash)) + cipher_suite->hash = 0; + else + cipher_suite->hash = hash; +} + +struct psa_pake_operation_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + union + { + /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ + uint8_t dummy; + } ctx; +}; + +/* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_pake_operation_s v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; + return(v); +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_platform.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4787e44b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_platform.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS platform definitions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains platform-dependent type definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +/* Translate between classic MBEDTLS_xxx feature symbols and PSA_xxx + * feature symbols. */ +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" + +/* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */ +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +/* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA + * partition identifier. + * + * The function psa_its_identifier_of_slot() in psa_crypto_storage.c that + * translates a key identifier to a key storage file name assumes that + * mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is an 32 bits integer. This function thus needs + * reworking if mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is not defined as a 32 bits integer + * here anymore. + */ +typedef int32_t mbedtls_key_owner_id_t; + +/** Compare two key owner identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key owner identifier. + * \param id2 Second key owner identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key owner identifiers are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id1, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( id1 == id2 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/* + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM + * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two + * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing + * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be + * included. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1 +#include "crypto_spe.h" +#endif // MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** The type of the context passed to mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). + * + * Mbed TLS initializes the context to all-bits-zero before calling + * mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for the first time. + * + * The definition of this type in the Mbed TLS source code is for + * demonstration purposes. Implementers of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * are expected to replace it with a custom definition. + */ +typedef struct { + uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[2]; +} mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91a6d0be --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,1396 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_se_driver.h + * \brief PSA external cryptoprocessor driver module + * + * This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography + * drivers that access key material via opaque references. + * This is meant for cryptoprocessors that have a separate key storage from the + * space in which the PSA Crypto implementation runs, typically secure + * elements (SEs). + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver HAL (hardware abstraction layer), + * containing functions for driver developers to implement to enable hardware + * to be called in a standardized way by a PSA Cryptography API + * implementation. The functions comprising the driver HAL, which driver + * authors implement, are not intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "crypto_driver_common.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \defgroup se_init Secure element driver initialization + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief Driver context structure + * + * Driver functions receive a pointer to this structure. + * Each registered driver has one instance of this structure. + * + * Implementations must include the fields specified here and + * may include other fields. + */ +typedef struct { + /** A read-only pointer to the driver's persistent data. + * + * Drivers typically use this persistent data to keep track of + * which slot numbers are available. This is only a guideline: + * drivers may use the persistent data for any purpose, keeping + * in mind the restrictions on when the persistent data is saved + * to storage: the persistent data is only saved after calling + * certain functions that receive a writable pointer to the + * persistent data. + * + * The core allocates a memory buffer for the persistent data. + * The pointer is guaranteed to be suitably aligned for any data type, + * like a pointer returned by `malloc` (but the core can use any + * method to allocate the buffer, not necessarily `malloc`). + * + * The size of this buffer is in the \c persistent_data_size field of + * this structure. + * + * Before the driver is initialized for the first time, the content of + * the persistent data is all-bits-zero. After a driver upgrade, if the + * size of the persistent data has increased, the original data is padded + * on the right with zeros; if the size has decreased, the original data + * is truncated to the new size. + * + * This pointer is to read-only data. Only a few driver functions are + * allowed to modify the persistent data. These functions receive a + * writable pointer. These functions are: + * - psa_drv_se_t::p_init + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy + * + * The PSA Cryptography core saves the persistent data from one + * session to the next. It does this before returning from API functions + * that call a driver method that is allowed to modify the persistent + * data, specifically: + * - psa_crypto_init() causes a call to psa_drv_se_t::p_init, and may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy to complete an action + * that was interrupted by a power failure. + * - Key creation functions cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate, and may cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy in case an error occurs. + * - psa_destroy_key() causes a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy. + */ + const void *const MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data); + + /** The size of \c persistent_data in bytes. + * + * This is always equal to the value of the `persistent_data_size` field + * of the ::psa_drv_se_t structure when the driver is registered. + */ + const size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size); + + /** Driver transient data. + * + * The core initializes this value to 0 and does not read or modify it + * afterwards. The driver may store whatever it wants in this field. + */ + uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transient_data); +} psa_drv_se_context_t; + +/** \brief A driver initialization function. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param location The location value for which this driver + * is registered. The driver will be invoked + * for all keys whose lifetime is in this + * location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver is operational. + * The core will update the persistent data in storage. + * \return + * Any other return value prevents the driver from being used in + * this session. + * The core will NOT update the persistent data in storage. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_init_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_location_t location); + +#if defined(__DOXYGEN_ONLY__) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed Crypto with secure element support enabled defines this type in + * crypto_types.h because it is also visible to applications through an + * implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +/** An internal designation of a key slot between the core part of the + * PSA Crypto implementation and the driver. The meaning of this value + * is driver-dependent. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ || !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_mac Secure Element Message Authentication Codes + * Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using + * a secure element can be done either as a single function call (via the + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t` functions), or in + * parts using the following sequence: + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element MAC operation needs to be terminated, + * it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t`. Failure to do so may + * result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined + * behavior. + */ +/**@{*/ +/** \brief A function that starts a secure element MAC operation for a PSA + * Crypto Driver implementation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific MAC context + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used to underly the MAC + * operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously-established MAC operation to be + * updated + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended + * to the MAC operation + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length); + +/** \brief a function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by returning the resulting MAC. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started MAC operation to be + * finished + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been + * allocated for the `output` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_mac` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by comparing the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be fiinished + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC + * will be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previous started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be aborted + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and returns the calculated MAC + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `p_input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and compares the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will + * be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of `mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to + * perform secure element MAC operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate the table as appropriate + * upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t`), it should be set to NULL. + * + * Driver implementers should ensure that they implement all of the functions + * that make sense for their hardware, and that they provide a full solution + * (for example, if they support `p_setup`, they should also support + * `p_update` and at least one of `p_finish` or `p_finish_verify`). + * + */ +typedef struct { + /**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element MAC context + * structure + */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); + /** Function that performs a MAC setup operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); + /** Function that performs a MAC update operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update); + /** Function that completes a MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish); + /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish_verify); + /** Function that aborts a previoustly started MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort); + /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac); + /** Function that performs a MAC and verify operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac_verify); +} psa_drv_se_mac_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_cipher Secure Element Symmetric Ciphers + * + * Encryption and Decryption using secure element keys in block modes other + * than ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow: + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode) + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element Cipher operation needs to be + * terminated, it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t`. Failure + * to do so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in other + * undefined behavior. + * + * In situations where a PSA Cryptographic API implementation is using a block + * mode not-supported by the underlying hardware or driver, it can construct + * the block mode itself, while calling the `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t` function + * for the cipher operations. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that provides the cipher setup function for a + * secure element driver + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific cipher context. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher + * operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt + * or decrypt + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction); + +/** \brief A function that sets the initialization vector (if + * necessary) for an secure element cipher operation + * + * Rationale: The `psa_se_cipher_*` operation in the PSA Cryptographic API has + * two IV functions: one to set the IV, and one to generate it internally. The + * generate function is not necessary for the drivers to implement as the PSA + * Crypto implementation can do the generation using its RNG features. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that contains the previously set up + * hardware-specific cipher context + * \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vector + * \param[in] iv_length The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to + * by `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the + * output will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the + * `p_output` buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number + * of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs the ECB block mode for secure element + * cipher operations + * + * Note: this function should only be used with implementations that do not + * provide a needed higher-level operation. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt or + * decrypt + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by + * `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * cipher operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t`), it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element cipher + * context structure + */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); + /** Function that performs a cipher setup operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); + /** Function that sets a cipher IV (if necessary) */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_set_iv); + /** Function that performs a cipher update operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update); + /** Function that completes a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish); + /** Function that aborts a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort); + /** Function that performs ECB mode for a cipher operation + * (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA + * Crypto Client API) + */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ecb); +} psa_drv_se_cipher_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_asymmetric Secure Element Asymmetric Cryptography + * + * Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using + * asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using + * keys in a secure element must be done in single function calls. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** + * \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a private key in + * a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible + * with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash to sign + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *p_signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using + * an asymmetric public key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash whose signature is to be verified + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that encrypts a short message with an asymmetric public + * key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that decrypts a short message with an asymmetric private + * key in a secure element. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * asymmetric cryptographic operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs an asymmetric sign operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sign); + /** Function that performs an asymmetric verify operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_verify); + /** Function that performs an asymmetric encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt); + /** Function that performs an asymmetric decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt); +} psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_aead Secure Element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data + * Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with secure + * elements must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden for + * implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire + * message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the + * authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element authenticated encryption + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use. + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that will be + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted + * \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `p_plaintext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is + * not part of this output. For algorithms + * where the encrypted data and the + * authentication tag are defined as + * separate outputs, the authentication + * tag is appended to the encrypted data. + * \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `p_ciphertext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_ciphertext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *p_ciphertext_length); + +/** A function that peforms a secure element authenticated decryption operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that has been + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. + * For algorithms where the encrypted data + * and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer must + * contain the encrypted data followed by + * the authentication tag. + * \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `p_ciphertext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data + * \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `p_plaintext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_plaintext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *p_plaintext_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * secure element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt); + /** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt); +} psa_drv_se_aead_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_key_management Secure Element Key Management + * Currently, key management is limited to importing keys in the clear, + * destroying keys, and exporting keys in the clear. + * Whether a key may be exported is determined by the key policies in place + * on the key slot. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** An enumeration indicating how a key is created. + */ +typedef enum +{ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, /**< During psa_import_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, /**< During psa_generate_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, /**< During psa_key_derivation_output_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, /**< During psa_copy_key() */ + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ + /** A key is being registered with mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(). + * + * The core only passes this value to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number, not to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate. The call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` is not followed by any other call to the + * driver: the key is considered successfully registered if the call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` succeeds, or if `p_validate_slot_number` is + * null. + * + * With this creation method, the driver must return #PSA_SUCCESS if + * the given attributes are compatible with the existing key in the slot, + * and #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST if the driver can determine that there + * is no key with the specified slot number. + * + * This is an Mbed Crypto extension. + */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, +#endif +} psa_key_creation_method_t; + +/** \brief A function that allocates a slot for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to determine a valid slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * In nominal conditions (that is, if no error occurs), + * the effect of a call to a key creation function in the PSA Cryptography + * API with a lifetime that places the key in a secure element is the + * following: + * -# The core calls psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * (or in some implementations + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number). The driver + * selects (or validates) a suitable slot number given the key attributes + * and the state of the secure element. + * -# The core calls a key creation function in the driver. + * + * The key creation functions in the PSA Cryptography API are: + * - psa_import_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_generate_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_key_derivation_output_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t::p_derive. + * - psa_copy_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_export. + * + * In case of errors, other behaviors are possible. + * - If the PSA Cryptography subsystem dies after the first step, + * for example because the device has lost power abruptly, + * the second step may never happen, or may happen after a reset + * and re-initialization. Alternatively, after a reset and + * re-initialization, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * - If an error occurs, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * + * Errors and system resets also have an impact on the driver's persistent + * data. If a reset happens before the overall key creation process is + * completed (before or after the second step above), it is unspecified + * whether the persistent data after the reset is identical to what it + * was before or after the call to `p_allocate` (or `p_validate_slot_number`). + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[out] key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * The core will record \c *key_slot as the key slot where the key + * is stored and will update the persistent data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t *key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that determines whether a slot number is valid + * for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to validate the choice of slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * See the documentation of #psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more details. + * + * As of the PSA Cryptography API specification version 1.0, there is no way + * for applications to trigger a call to this function. However some + * implementations offer the capability to create or declare a key in + * a specific slot via implementation-specific means, generally for the + * sake of initial device provisioning or onboarding. Such a mechanism may + * be added to a future version of the PSA Cryptography API specification. + * + * This function may update the driver's persistent data through + * \p persistent_data. The core will save the updated persistent data at the + * end of the key creation process. See the description of + * ::psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot where the key is to be stored. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The given slot number is valid for a key with the given + * attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The given slot number is not valid for a key with the + * given attributes. This includes the case where the slot + * number is not valid at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the specified slot number. + * Drivers may choose to return this error from the key + * creation function instead. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that imports a key into a secure element in binary format + * + * This function can support any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and the usage policy. + * Drivers should not access the key size stored + * in the attributes: it may not match the + * data passed in \p data. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits On success, the key size in bits. The driver + * must determine this value after parsing the + * key according to the key type. + * This value is not used if the function fails. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_import_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *bits); + +/** + * \brief A function that destroys a secure element key and restore the slot to + * its default state + * + * This function destroys the content of the key from a secure element. + * Implementations shall make a best effort to ensure that any previous content + * of the slot is unrecoverable. + * + * This function returns the specified slot to its default state. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param key_slot The key slot to erase. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The slot's content, if any, has been erased. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** + * \brief A function that exports a secure element key in binary format + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If a key is created with `psa_import_key()` and then exported with + * this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is + * identical: the implementation may choose a different representation + * of the same key if the format permits it. + * + * This function should generate output in the same format that + * `psa_export_key()` does. Refer to the + * documentation of `psa_export_key()` for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must + * be an occupied key slot. + * \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the `p_data` buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_export_key_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key, + uint8_t *p_data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *p_data_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that generates a symmetric or asymmetric key on a secure + * element + * + * If the key type \c type recorded in \p attributes + * is asymmetric (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(\c type) = 1), + * the driver may export the public key at the time of generation, + * in the format documented for psa_export_public_key() by writing it + * to the \p pubkey buffer. + * This is optional, intended for secure elements that output the + * public key at generation time and that cannot export the public key + * later. Drivers that do not need this feature should leave + * \p *pubkey_length set to 0 and should + * implement the psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public function. + * Some implementations do not support this feature, in which case + * \p pubkey is \c NULL and \p pubkey_size is 0. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and size, and the usage policy. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), psa_get_key_bits(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[out] pubkey A buffer where the driver can write the + * public key, when generating an asymmetric + * key pair. + * This is \c NULL when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param pubkey_size The size of the `pubkey` buffer in bytes. + * This is 0 when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param[out] pubkey_length On entry, this is always 0. + * On success, the number of bytes written to + * \p pubkey. If this is 0 or unchanged on return, + * the core will not read the \p pubkey buffer, + * and will instead call the driver's + * psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public + * function to export the public key when needed. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_generate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, size_t *pubkey_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key management + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that allocates a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_allocate); + /** Function that checks the validity of a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_validate_slot_number); + /** Function that performs a key import operation */ + psa_drv_se_import_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_import); + /** Function that performs a generation */ + psa_drv_se_generate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_generate); + /** Function that performs a key destroy operation */ + psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_destroy); + /** Function that performs a key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export); + /** Function that performs a public key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_public); +} psa_drv_se_key_management_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup driver_derivation Secure Element Key Derivation and Agreement + * Key derivation is the process of generating new key material using an + * existing key and additional parameters, iterating through a basic + * cryptographic function, such as a hash. + * Key agreement is a part of cryptographic protocols that allows two parties + * to agree on the same key value, but starting from different original key + * material. + * The flows are similar, and the PSA Crypto Driver Model uses the same functions + * for both of the flows. + * + * There are two different final functions for the flows, + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` and `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export`. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` is used when the key material should be + * placed in a slot on the hardware and not exposed to the caller. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export` is used when the key material should be + * returned to the PSA Cryptographic API implementation. + * + * Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs. + * Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which + * can be problemmatic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed + * to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that + * is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key + * derivation algorithm that required 3 parameter inputs, the flow would look + * something like: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_0, + * p_collateral_0, + * collateral_0_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_1, + * p_collateral_1, + * collateral_1_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_2, + * p_collateral_2, + * collateral_2_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive(); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * key agreement example: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(alg, source_key. dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(DHE_PUBKEY, p_pubkey, pubkey_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export(p_session_key, + * session_key_size, + * &session_key_length); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that Sets up a secure element key derivation operation by + * specifying the algorithm and the source key sot + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] kdf_alg The algorithm to be used for the key derivation + * \param[in] source_key The key to be used as the source material for + * the key derivation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_slot_number_t source_key); + +/** \brief A function that provides collateral (parameters) needed for a secure + * element key derivation or key agreement operation + * + * Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is + * expected that this function may be called multiple times for the same + * operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id` + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] collateral_id An ID for the collateral being provided + * \param[in] p_collateral A buffer containing the collateral data + * \param[in] collateral_size The size in bytes of the collateral + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t)(void *op_context, + uint32_t collateral_id, + const uint8_t *p_collateral, + size_t collateral_size); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final secure element key derivation + * step and place the generated key material in a slot + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] dest_key The slot where the generated key material + * should be placed + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t)(void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t dest_key); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final step of a secure element key + * agreement and place the generated key material in a buffer + * + * \param[out] p_output Buffer in which to place the generated key + * material + * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of `p_output` + * \param[out] p_output_length Upon success, contains the number of bytes of + * key material placed in `p_output` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key derivation and agreement + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The driver-specific size of the key derivation context */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); + /** Function that performs a key derivation setup */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); + /** Function that sets key derivation collateral */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_collateral); + /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_derive); + /** Function that perforsm a final key derivation or agreement and + * exports the key */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export); +} psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_registration Secure element driver registration + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** A structure containing pointers to all the entry points of a + * secure element driver. + * + * Future versions of this specification may add extra substructures at + * the end of this structure. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The version of the driver HAL that this driver implements. + * This is a protection against loading driver binaries built against + * a different version of this specification. + * Use #PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION. + */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hal_version); + + /** The size of the driver's persistent data in bytes. + * + * This can be 0 if the driver does not need persistent data. + * + * See the documentation of psa_drv_se_context_t::persistent_data + * for more information about why and how a driver can use + * persistent data. + */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size); + + /** The driver initialization function. + * + * This function is called once during the initialization of the + * PSA Cryptography subsystem, before any other function of the + * driver is called. If this function returns a failure status, + * the driver will be unusable, at least until the next system reset. + * + * If this field is \c NULL, it is equivalent to a function that does + * nothing and returns #PSA_SUCCESS. + */ + psa_drv_se_init_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_init); + + const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_management); + const psa_drv_se_mac_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac); + const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + const psa_drv_se_aead_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aead); + const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asymmetric); + const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(derivation); +} psa_drv_se_t; + +/** The current version of the secure element driver HAL. + */ +/* 0.0.0 patchlevel 5 */ +#define PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION 0x00000005 + +/** Register an external cryptoprocessor (secure element) driver. + * + * This function is only intended to be used by driver code, not by + * application code. In implementations with separation between the + * PSA cryptography module and applications, this function should + * only be available to callers that run in the same memory space as + * the cryptography module, and should not be exposed to applications + * running in a different memory space. + * + * This function may be called before psa_crypto_init(). It is + * implementation-defined whether this function may be called + * after psa_crypto_init(). + * + * \note Implementations store metadata about keys including the lifetime + * value, which contains the driver's location indicator. Therefore, + * from one instantiation of the PSA Cryptography + * library to the next one, if there is a key in storage with a certain + * lifetime value, you must always register the same driver (or an + * updated version that communicates with the same secure element) + * with the same location value. + * + * \param location The location value through which this driver will + * be exposed to applications. + * This driver will be used for all keys such that + * `location == #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime )`. + * The value #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE is reserved + * and may not be used for drivers. Implementations + * may reserve other values. + * \param[in] methods The method table of the driver. This structure must + * remain valid for as long as the cryptography + * module keeps running. It is typically a global + * constant. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver was successfully registered. Applications can now + * use \p location to access keys through the methods passed to + * this function. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * This function was called after the initialization of the + * cryptography module, and this implementation does not support + * driver registration at this stage. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a registered driver for this value of \p location. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p location is a reserved value. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * `methods->hal_version` is not supported by this implementation. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods); + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2811c237 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h @@ -0,0 +1,1129 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_sizes.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to + * compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros + * are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on + * the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances + * on buffer sizes. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + * + * Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the + * implementation are in crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7) / 8) +#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8) + +#define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \ + (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size)) + +/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects. + * + * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm + * (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a + * hash algorithm). + * + * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm. + * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 : \ + 0) + +/** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a hash. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes. + */ +/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-226, + * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for + * HMAC-SHA3-512. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64 +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#else +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32 +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#endif + +/** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a MAC. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a MAC in bytes. + */ +/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the + * minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */ +/* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value + * to 64 bytes. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + +/** The length of a tag for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to store the + * tag output from psa_aead_finish(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type The type of the AEAD key. + * \param key_bits The size of the AEAD key in bits. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The tag length for the specified algorithm and key. + * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified + * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of + * the ciphertext, return 0. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + ((void) (key_bits), 0)) + +/** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. + * + * Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key + * whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can + * induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other + * auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the + * library is configured, this macro defines how the library is + * configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an + * RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here. + * + * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different + * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */ +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096 + +/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0 +#endif + +/** This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the + * TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation + * (#PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(\c hash_alg)). + * + * The maximum supported length does not depend on the chosen hash algorithm. + * + * Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3: + * TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support + * arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary + * PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and + * keys is RECOMMENDED. + * + * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64 + * for #PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE. + */ +#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128 + +/** The maximum size of a block cipher. */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type The type of the MAC key. + * \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits. + * \param alg A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The MAC size for the specified algorithm with + * the specified key parameters. + * \return 0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized. + * \return Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that + * the implementation recognizes, but does not support. + * \return Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent + * with the algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + ((void)(key_type), (void)(key_bits), 0)) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the ciphertext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length). + * + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \ + ((plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE) + + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the plaintext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ? \ + (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length). + * + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the ciphertext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \ + (ciphertext_length) + +/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the default size that is generated by #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with + * algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 ? \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13 : \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12 : \ + 0 : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12 : \ + 0) + +/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and + * AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() + * may return. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the largest size that may be generated by + * #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13 + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller + * in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible + * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be + * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the + * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), (input_length)) : \ + (input_length) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length))) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an + * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an + * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + 2 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \ + 11 /*PKCS#1v1.5*/) + +/** + * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size + * + * \param curve_bits Curve size in bits. + * \return Signature size in bytes. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + */ +#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2) + +/** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a signature using a key + * of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller + * (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature). + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The signature algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_sign_hash() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + ((void)alg, 0)) + +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +/** \def PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of an asymmetric signature. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a ciphertext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +/* This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the plaintext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric decryption. + * + * This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified + * number of bits. + * + * This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field + * is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the + * bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus: + * - 1 type byte; + * - 1 to 3 length bytes; + * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \ + ((bits) / 8 + 5) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key. + * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32. + * + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - n : INTEGER; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair. + * Assumes thatthe public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size + * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit. + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- N-bit + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- 32-bit + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- N-bit + * prime1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * prime2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * coefficient INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs, + * overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (9 * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2 + 1) + 14) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key. + * + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains DSAPublicKey + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters Dss-Parms } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs + * DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y + * + * - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID); + * - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 59) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair. + * + * DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * prime INTEGER, -- p + * subprime INTEGER, -- q + * generator INTEGER, -- g + * public INTEGER, -- y + * private INTEGER, -- x + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 75) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key. + * + * The representation of an ECC public key is: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve. + * + * - 1 byte + 2 * point size. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair. + * + * An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A public key or key pair key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not + * supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + * + * If the parameters are valid and supported, + * return the same result as + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + * \p #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\p key_type), + * \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() to export any + * asymmetric key pair, regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key, + * regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that + * is not supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + */ +/* FFDH is not yet supported in PSA. */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is the + * maximum size of the output any raw key agreement algorithm, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes. + * + * The IV that is generated as part of a call to #psa_cipher_encrypt() is always + * the default IV length for the algorithm. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the IV output from #psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using + * a multi-part cipher operation. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0. + * If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1 && \ + ((alg) == PSA_ALG_CTR || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_OFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_XTS || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12 : \ + 0) + +/** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + (input_length) + 1) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \ + 0)) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \ + (input_length) + 1) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \ + ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + (input_length) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (input_length) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + input_length) : \ + (input_length)) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, input_length)) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient + * ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in + * any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_struct.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..381abf96 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -0,0 +1,479 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_struct.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS structured type implementations + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with + * implementation-specific definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end + * would have different versions of this file. + * + *

                Design notes about multipart operation structures

                + * + * For multipart operations without driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains a `psa_algorithm_t alg` field which indicates + * which specific algorithm the structure is for. When the structure is not in + * use, `alg` is 0. Most of the structure consists of a union which is + * discriminated by `alg`. + * + * For multipart operations with driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains an `unsigned int id` field indicating which + * driver got assigned to do the operation. When the structure is not in use, + * 'id' is 0. The structure contains also a driver context which is the union + * of the contexts of all drivers able to handle the type of multipart + * operation. + * + * Note that when `alg` or `id` is 0, the content of other fields is undefined. + * In particular, it is not guaranteed that a freshly-initialized structure + * is all-zero: we initialize structures to something like `{0, 0}`, which + * is only guaranteed to initializes the first member of the union; + * GCC and Clang initialize the whole structure to 0 (at the time of writing), + * but MSVC and CompCert don't. + * + * In Mbed Crypto, multipart operation structures live independently from + * the key. This allows Mbed Crypto to free the key objects when destroying + * a key slot. If a multipart operation needs to remember the key after + * the setup function returns, the operation structure needs to contain a + * copy of the key. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h" + +struct psa_hash_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h. + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + psa_driver_hash_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +}; + +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } +static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_cipher_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_required) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_set) : 1; + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(default_iv_length); + + psa_driver_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +}; + +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the composite + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h" + +struct psa_mac_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac_size); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_sign) : 1; + psa_driver_mac_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +}; + +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_aead_operation_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_set) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_set) : 1; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size); + union + { + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +}; + +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_length); + psa_mac_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prk)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(offset_in_block); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) : 2; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_set) : 1; +} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +typedef enum +{ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t; + +typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s +{ +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + + /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have + * not yet been read by the user. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(left_in_block); + + /* The 1-based number of the block. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); + + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); + + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret_length); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed_length); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label_length); + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Ai)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A( i ) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +struct psa_key_derivation_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(can_output_key) : 1; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(capacity); + union + { + /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hkdf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls12_prf); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +}; + +/* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( + void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_key_policy_s +{ + psa_key_usage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2); +}; +typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT { 0, 0, 0 } +static inline struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_policy_s v = PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +/* The type used internally for key sizes. + * Public interfaces use size_t, but internally we use a smaller type. */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t; +/* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes. + * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */ +#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ( ( psa_key_bits_t ) -1 ) +/* The maximum size of a key in bits. + * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down + * to a whole number of bytes. + * This is an uncast value so that it can be used in preprocessor + * conditionals. */ +#define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8 + +/** A mask of flags that can be stored in key attributes. + * + * This type is also used internally to store flags in slots. Internal + * flags are defined in library/psa_crypto_core.h. Internal flags may have + * the same value as external flags if they are properly handled during + * key creation and in psa_get_key_attributes. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_attributes_flag_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER \ + ( (psa_key_attributes_flag_t) 0x0001 ) + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used externally only. + * Only meant for internal checks inside the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ( \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER | \ + 0 ) + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used both internally and externally. + * Currently there aren't any. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ( \ + 0 ) + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + psa_key_bits_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits); + psa_key_lifetime_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + psa_key_policy_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy); + psa_key_attributes_flag_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); +} psa_core_key_attributes_t; + +#define PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, \ + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, \ + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, \ + PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0 } + +struct psa_key_attributes_s +{ + psa_core_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_key_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters_size); +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, 0, NULL, 0 } +#else +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, NULL, 0 } +#endif + +static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_attributes_s v = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); + + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = key; + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) ); + } +} + +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + return( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) ); +} + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +static inline void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner ) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner; +} +#endif + +static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) = lifetime; + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = 0; +#else + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = 0; +#endif + } +} + +static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + return( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) ); +} + +static inline void psa_extend_key_usage_flags( psa_key_usage_t *usage_flags ) +{ + if( *usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + + if( *usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags) +{ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags( &usage_flags ); + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage) = usage_flags; +} + +static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + return( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage) ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg) = alg; +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + return( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg) ); +} + +/* This function is declared in crypto_extra.h, which comes after this + * header file, but we need the function here, so repeat the declaration. */ +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ); + +static inline void psa_set_key_type( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type ) +{ + if( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters) == NULL ) + { + /* Common case: quick path */ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) = type; + } + else + { + /* Call the bigger function to free the old domain paramteres. + * Ignore any errors which may arise due to type requiring + * non-default domain parameters, since this function can't + * report errors. */ + (void) psa_set_key_domain_parameters( attributes, type, NULL, 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + return( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_bits( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits ) +{ + if( bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE; + else + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; +} + +static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + return( attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) ); +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_types.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2cf965d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_types.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties + * of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and + * error codes returned by the library. + * + * This header file does not declare any function. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "crypto_platform.h" + +/* If MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined, make sure MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * is defined as well to include all PSA code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#include + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Function return status. + * + * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success, + * or a small negative value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are + * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here. */ +/* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t + * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple + * definition. + */ +#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS +typedef int32_t psa_status_t; +#endif + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of a key type. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t; + +/** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers. + * + * The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t; + +/** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers. + * + * The group identifier is required to create an Diffie-Hellman key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm. + * + * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type + * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers + * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher + * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded + * via #psa_key_type_t. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/** Encoding of key lifetimes. + * + * The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and what system actions + * may create and destroy it. + * + * Lifetime values have the following structure: + * - Bits 0-7 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(\c lifetime)): + * persistence level. This value indicates what device management + * actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates + * whether the key is _volatile_ or _persistent_. + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + * - Bits 8-31 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(\c lifetime)): + * location indicator. This value indicates which part of the system + * has access to the key material and can perform operations using the key. + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + * + * Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance + * terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * integration-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * Persistent keys have a key identifier of type #mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. + * This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key, + * even if the application instance that created the key terminates. + * The application can call psa_open_key() to open a persistent key that + * it created previously. + * + * The default lifetime of a key is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. The lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT is supported if persistent storage is + * available. Other lifetime values may be supported depending on the + * library configuration. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t; + +/** Encoding of key persistence levels. + * + * What distinguishes different persistence levels is what device management + * events may cause keys to be destroyed. _Volatile_ keys are destroyed + * by a power reset. Persistent keys may be destroyed by events such as + * a transfer of ownership or a factory reset. What management events + * actually affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the + * scope of the PSA Cryptography specification. + * + * The PSA Cryptography specification defines the following values of + * persistence levels: + * - \c 0 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE: volatile key. + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * - \c 1 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT: + * persistent key with a default lifetime. + * - \c 2-254: currently not supported by Mbed TLS. + * - \c 255 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY: + * read-only or write-once key. + * A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed. + * Mbed TLS does not currently offer a way to create such keys, but + * integrations of Mbed TLS can use it for built-in keys that the + * application cannot modify (for example, a hardware unique key (HUK)). + * + * \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t; + +/** Encoding of key location indicators. + * + * If an integration of Mbed TLS can make calls to external + * cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key + * indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key. + * Depending on the design of the secure element, the key + * material may be stored either in the secure element, or + * in wrapped (encrypted) form alongside the key metadata in the + * primary local storage. + * + * The PSA Cryptography API specification defines the following values of + * location indicators: + * - \c 0: primary local storage. + * This location is always available. + * The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that + * contains the key metadata. + * - \c 1: primary secure element. + * Integrations of Mbed TLS should support this value if there is a secure + * element attached to the operating environment. + * As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against + * side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may + * have restrictions on supported key types, sizes, policies and operations + * and may have different performance characteristics. + * - \c 2-0x7fffff: other locations defined by a PSA specification. + * The PSA Cryptography API does not currently assign any meaning to these + * locations, but future versions of that specification or other PSA + * specifications may do so. + * - \c 0x800000-0xffffff: vendor-defined locations. + * No PSA specification will assign a meaning to locations in this range. + * + * \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t; + +/** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys. + * + * - Applications may freely choose key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX. + * - The implementation may define additional key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX. + * - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier. + * - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) +typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ +/* Implementation-specific: The Mbed Cryptography library can be built as + * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptograpy API in each + * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of + * functions such as psa_open_key(). + */ +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id); + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner); +} mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup attributes Key attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of a structure containing key attributes. + * + * This is an opaque structure that can represent the metadata of a key + * object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes: + * - The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier + * and its lifetime. + * - The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of + * the permitted algorithm(s). + * - Information about the key itself: the key type and its size. + * - Additional implementation-defined attributes. + * + * The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key. + * Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered + * highly confidential. + * + * An attribute structure works like a simple data structure where each function + * `psa_set_key_xxx` sets a field and the corresponding function + * `psa_get_key_xxx` retrieves the value of the corresponding field. + * However, a future version of the library may report values that are + * equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. Invalid + * values may be mapped to different, also invalid values. + * + * An attribute structure may contain references to auxiliary resources, + * for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to + * pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application + * must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling + * psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute structure is optional if + * the structure has only been modified by the following functions + * since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes(): + * - psa_set_key_id() + * - psa_set_key_lifetime() + * - psa_set_key_type() + * - psa_set_key_bits() + * - psa_set_key_usage_flags() + * - psa_set_key_algorithm() + * + * Before calling any function on a key attribute structure, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + * \endcode + * + * A freshly initialized attribute structure contains the following + * values: + * + * - lifetime: #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. + * - key identifier: 0 (which is not a valid key identifier). + * - type: \c 0 (meaning that the type is unspecified). + * - key size: \c 0 (meaning that the size is unspecified). + * - usage flags: \c 0 (which allows no usage except exporting a public key). + * - algorithm: \c 0 (which allows no cryptographic usage, but allows + * exporting). + * + * A typical sequence to create a key is as follows: + * -# Create and initialize an attribute structure. + * -# If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id(). + * Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default + * location. + * -# Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * -# Set the key type with psa_set_key_type(). + * Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key(). + * -# When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or deriving a key + * with psa_key_derivation_output_key(), set the desired key size with + * psa_set_key_bits(). + * -# Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). This function reads + * the attribute structure, creates a key with these attributes, and + * outputs a key identifier to the newly created key. + * -# The attribute structure is now no longer necessary. + * You may call psa_reset_key_attributes(), although this is optional + * with the workflow presented here because the attributes currently + * defined in this specification do not require any additional resources + * beyond the structure itself. + * + * A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows: + * -# Call psa_get_key_attributes(). + * -# Call `psa_get_key_xxx` functions to retrieve the attribute(s) that + * you are interested in. + * -# Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that may be + * used by the attribute structure. + * + * Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_t; + + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed Crypto defines this type in crypto_types.h because it is also + * visible to applications through an implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#endif /* !__DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation. */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t; + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_values.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..daef9416 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -0,0 +1,2396 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_values.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze + * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys, + * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by + * the library. + * + * This header file only defines preprocessor macros. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/* PSA error codes */ + +/** The action was completed successfully. */ +#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0) + +/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined + * failure cause. + * + * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard + * error codes are applicable. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132) + +/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported + * by this implementation. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration + * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized. + * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as + * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134) + +/** The requested action is denied by a policy. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters + * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly + * denies the requested operation. + * + * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a + * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are + * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function + * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or + * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133) + +/** An output buffer is too small. + * + * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function + * description to determine a sufficient buffer size. + * + * Implementations should preferably return this error code only + * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output + * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this + * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition + * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138) + +/** Asking for an item that already exists + * + * Implementations should return this error, when attempting + * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139) + +/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist + * + * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like + * a key) does not exist. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140) + +/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state. + * + * Multipart operations return this error when one of the + * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function + * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate + * that a key either exists or not, + * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * as applicable. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137) + +/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid. + * + * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or + * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135) + +/** There is not enough runtime memory. + * + * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this + * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141) + +/** There is not enough persistent storage. + * + * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if + * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition, + * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this + * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for + * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142) + +/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation. + * + * This can indicate a communication failure between the application + * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and + * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure + * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause. + * + * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined + * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations + * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever + * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external + * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before + * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145) + +/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted. + * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory + * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error + * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use + * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is + * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE). + * + * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure + * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global + * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other + * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but + * its integrity cannot be guaranteed. + * + * Implementations should only use this error code to report a + * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should + * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be + * reported using this error code. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146) + +/** A hardware failure was detected. + * + * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the + * cause. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147) + +/** A tampering attempt was detected. + * + * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee + * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains + * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function + * and should enter a safe failure state. + * + * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid + * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates + * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending + * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals, + * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application. + * + * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach + * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still + * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code + * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that + * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed, + * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now + * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code + * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to + * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code + * instead). + * + * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations + * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of + * the application itself. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151) + +/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed + * for the requested action. + * + * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator. + * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not + * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such + * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute + * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that + * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure + * to certain attacks. + * + * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init() + * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient + * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically + * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return + * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded + * during normal operation. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148) + +/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect. + * + * Verification functions return this error if the verification + * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified + * was determined to be incorrect. + * + * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return + * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) + +/** The decrypted padding is incorrect. + * + * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that + * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding + * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer + * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain + * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of + * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not + * to reveal whether the padding is invalid. + * + * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding + * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer. + * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not + * depend on the validity of the padding. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150) + +/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting + * to read from a resource. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) + +/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) + +/** Stored data has been corrupted. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption. + * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error + * codes: + * + * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED. + * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external + * storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE. + * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE. + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE. + * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID. + * + * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the + * global integrity of the keystore. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) + +/** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation. + * + * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid + * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific + * error codes: + * + * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/** An invalid key type value. + * + * Zero is not the encoding of any key type. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t)0x0000) + +/** Vendor-defined key type flag. + * + * Key types defined by this standard will never have the + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types + * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should + * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t)0x8000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t)0x1000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t)0x2000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x3000) + +/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes. + * + * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) + +/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \ + & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public + * part. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR) +/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. + * + * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding key pair type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) +/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. + * + * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding public key type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) + +/** Raw data. + * + * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation. + * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t)0x1001) + +/** HMAC key. + * + * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be + * used for. + * + * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash. + * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where + * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t)0x1100) + +/** A secret for key derivation. + * + * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets, + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead. + * + * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t)0x1200) + +/** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation. + * + * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically + * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to + * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with + * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable + * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy, + * such as numerical PINs. + * + * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of + * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were + * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or + * key stretching algorithms. + * + * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of + * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect + * it to be high-entropy. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be + * used for, among the permissible subset defined above. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t)0x1203) + +/** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t)0x1205) + +/** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t)0x1206) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher. + * + * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or + * 32 bytes (AES-256). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2400) + +/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES). + * + * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or + * 192 bits (3-key 3DES). + * + * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly + * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES + * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2301) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the + * Camellia block cipher. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2403) + +/** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539. + * + * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, + * and should reject other sizes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2004) + +/** RSA public key. + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4001) +/** RSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7001) +/** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) +/** Elliptic curve key pair. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve, + * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *Fq*. + * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details. + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve)) +/** Elliptic curve public key. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding + * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families). + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve)) + +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17) + +/** SEC random curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12) +/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27) + +/** SEC random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22) + +/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curve: + * sect163r2. + * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b) + +/** Brainpool P random curves. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, + * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1. + * It is defined in RFC 5639. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30) + +/** Curve25519 and Curve448. + * + * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves: + * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al., + * _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve. + * - 448-bit: Hamburg, + * _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41) + +/** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448. + * + * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves, + * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve, + * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve). + * + * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves: + * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve25519. + * Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008. + * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve448. + * Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) +/** Diffie-Hellman key pair. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group)) +/** Diffie-Hellman public key. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group)) + +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A. + * + * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits): + * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support + * all of these sizes or only a subset. + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03) + +#define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \ + (((type) >> 8) & 7) +/** The block size of a block cipher. + * + * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t). + * + * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher. + * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported + * cipher key type. + * + * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block + * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR). + * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be + * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update() + * might buffer for future processing in general. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times. + */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + 1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \ + 0u) + +/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag. + * + * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG + * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with + * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure + * used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x80000000) + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x7f000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09000000) + +/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption + * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm, + * also known as public-key signature algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, + * also known as public-key encryption algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing + * algorithm. + * + * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm + * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password. + * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0 + * otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) && \ + (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG) + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff) +/** MD5 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000003) +/** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */ +#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000004) +/** SHA1 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000005) +/** SHA2-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000008) +/** SHA2-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000009) +/** SHA2-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000a) +/** SHA2-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000b) +/** SHA2-512/224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000c) +/** SHA2-512/256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000d) +/** SHA3-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000010) +/** SHA3-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000011) +/** SHA3-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000012) +/** SHA3-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000013) +/** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other + * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512 + * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000015) + +/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm. + * + * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy + * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key + * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature + * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash. + * + * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros: + * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, + * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. + * Then you may create and use a key as follows: + * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example: + * ``` + * psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY + * psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); + * ``` + * - Import or generate key material. + * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing + * an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each + * call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash. + * ``` + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...); + * ``` + * + * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are + * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build + * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true. + * + * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to + * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x020000ff) + +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00c00000) +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03800000) +/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm. + * + * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm. + * + * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE) + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is + * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm, + * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can + * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation + * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation + * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or + * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm. + * + * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC + * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm + * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value + * for the untruncated algorithm. + * + * \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that + * are not valid, either because the specified length is larger + * than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is + * smaller than permitted by the implementation. + * + * \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that + * is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated + * algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm + * for policy comparison purposes. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * This must be at most the full length of the MAC + * and must be at least an implementation-specified + * minimum. The implementation-specified minimum + * shall not be zero. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ + (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)) + +/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ + ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) + +/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * \return 0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \ + (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET) + +/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC + * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard + * algorithm's minimum MAC length. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the + * smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication + * code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated + * length of the MAC and must be at least 1. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC + * algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00000) +/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher + * + * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases. + * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00100) +/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */ +#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00200) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00800000) +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher. + * + * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages + * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated + * from a key. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) + +/** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm. + * + * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. + * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800100) + +/** The CTR stream cipher mode. + * + * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with + * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01000) + +/** The CFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01100) + +/** The OFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01200) + +/** The XTS cipher mode. + * + * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at + * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input + * does not need to be a whole number of blocks. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0440ff00) + +/** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding. + * + * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data + * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications + * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the + * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide + * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access + * to ECB. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a + * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher. + * + * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a + * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404400) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths + * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404000) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) §10.3. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404100) + +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on + * a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) + +/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500100) + +/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500200) + +/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539. + * + * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, + * and should reject other sizes. + * + * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100500) + +/* In the encoding of a AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag. + * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one + * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm. + * + * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD + * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes. + * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation + * of the ciphertext. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid + * for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \ + (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK)) + +/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ + (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \ + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET ) + +/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default + * tag length for that algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \ + 0) +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) == \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \ + ref : + +/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific + * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the + * wildcard algorithm. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the + * smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in + * bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest + * allowed tag length of the algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1 + * or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000200) +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. + * + * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by + * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), §9.2 + * steps 3–6. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000300) +/** RSA PSS signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with + * a salt length equal to the length of the hash. The specified + * hash algorithm is used to hash the input message, to create the + * salted hash, and for the mask generation. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000600) +/** ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of + * the concatentation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of + * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length + * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented + * in big-endian order (most significant octet first). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** ECDSA signature without hashing. + * + * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but + * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be + * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an + * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with + * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit + * the curve size. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000700) +/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979. + * + * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(). + * + * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures + * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the + * same private key are accepted. In other words, + * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from + * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00000100) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA), + * using standard parameters. + * + * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification + * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the + * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add + * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts. + * + * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve. + * In this specification, the following curves are supported: + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and + * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used + * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(). + * + * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by + * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte + * string for Ed448). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000800) + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000900) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The prehash is SHA-512. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with + * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header + * file. */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0 + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm. + * + * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms + * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that + * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the + * hash value and the key. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used + * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a + * message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used + * to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature + * algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ) + +/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm. + * + * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is + * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use + * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing + * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message + * itself. + * + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign + * algorithm. + * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not + * follow the hash-and-sign structure. + * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or + * if it is not supported by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == 0 ? /*"raw" algorithm*/ 0 : \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000200) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000300) +/** RSA OAEP encryption. + * + * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use + * for MGF1. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000100) +/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. + * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step. + * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. + * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before + * starting to generate output. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm. + * + * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash + * function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000200) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule, + * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be + * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the + * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random, + * and the label is "key expansion". + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the + * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000300) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm. + * + * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived + * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding + * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5). + * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 + * or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is + * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the + * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random, + * and the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret". + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the + * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for + * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also + * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the + * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD. + * + * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00800000) + +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08800100) +/** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm. + * + * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). + * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on + * HMAC with the specified hash. + * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` specifies PBKDF2 + * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * provided in the following order: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count. + * This input step must be used exactly once. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. + * This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the + * inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt + * from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper). + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed. + * This input step must be used exactly once. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE) + +/** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm. + * + * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). + * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the + * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as + * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08800200) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xfe00ffff) +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xffff0000) + +/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with + * a key derivation. + * + * \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true). + * \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a + * supported key derivation algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \ + ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg)) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm. + * + * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify + * a key derivation function. + * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with + * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are + * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \ + PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg))) + +/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is + * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format. + * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p` + * in bits. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09010000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH) + +/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of + * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where + * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the + * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8, + * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret + * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian + * or big-endian depending on the curve type. + * + * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in little-endian byte order. + * The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519. + * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`. + * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09020000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard. + * + * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in + * a policy, not to perform an operation. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding. + * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for + * an operation). + * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +/** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that + * uses a hash algorithm. + * + * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t)0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff)) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/** The default lifetime for volatile keys. + * + * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed. + * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset. + * + * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the + * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice. + * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory, + * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the + * key material if the calling application terminates. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000000) + +/** The default lifetime for persistent keys. + * + * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or + * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does + * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may + * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset, + * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application). + * + * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling + * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes. + * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000001) + +/** The persistence level of volatile keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x00) + +/** The default persistence level for persistent keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x01) + +/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t)0xff) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_persistence_t)((lifetime) & 0x000000ff)) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_location_t)((lifetime) >> 8)) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile. + * + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * + * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only. + * + * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API. + * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API. + * + * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example, + * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a + * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy + * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only + * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the + * application sees the key as read-only. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY) + +/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location. + * + * \param persistence The persistence level + * (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t). + * \param location The location indicator + * (value of type ::psa_key_location_t). + * + * \return The constructed lifetime value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \ + ((location) << 8 | (persistence)) + +/** The local storage area for persistent keys. + * + * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent + * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor. + * + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t)0x000000) + +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t)0x800000) + +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x00000001) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x3fffffff) +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x40000000) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffffff) + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (psa_key_id_t)0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( id ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( 0 ) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param unused Unused parameter. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + (void)unused; + + return( key_id ); +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( id1 == id2 ); +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + return( key == 0 ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 } ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( ( id ).key_id ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( ( id ).owner ) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id, + .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id } ); +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( ( id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) ) && + mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) ) ); +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + return( key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/** Whether the key may be exported. + * + * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported + * regardless of the value of this permission flag. + * + * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not + * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor, + * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface. + * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form + * where it is encrypted by another key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001) + +/** Whether the key may be copied. + * + * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key + * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy. + * + * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which + * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure + * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it. + * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY + * is sufficient to permit the copy. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000002) + +/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation, + * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation, + * or for an asymmetric encryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100) + +/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation, + * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation, + * or for an asymmetric decryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the + * key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise + * permitted by the key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation + * or for an asymmetric signature operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00001000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation + * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation, + * if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00002000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password + * hash. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for + * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and + * policy. + * + * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it + * permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00004000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation, + * including password hashing. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used: + * + * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if + * otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy. + * + * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it + * permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00008000) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/** A secret input for key derivation. + * + * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE + * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key()) + * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement + * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()). + * + * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to + * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation + * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101) + +/** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching. + * + * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can + * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or + * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement. + * + * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to + * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation + * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0102) + +/** A label for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201) + +/** A salt for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202) + +/** An information string for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203) + +/** A seed for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0204) + +/** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching. + * + * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0205) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros + * @{ + */ + +/* Helper macros */ + +/** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm + * regardless of the tag length they encode. + * + * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * + * \return 1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are + * a supported AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \ + (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \ + ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))) + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/.gitignore b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6fde1f5e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +*.o +libmbed* +*.sln +*.vcxproj + +# Automatically generated files +/error.c +/version_features.c diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/CMakeLists.txt b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cd5589c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +option(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS static library." ON) +option(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS shared library." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD "Explicitly link mbed TLS library to pthread." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE "Explicitly link mbed TLS library to trusted_storage." OFF) + +# Set the project root directory if it's not already defined, as may happen if +# the library folder is included directly by a parent project, without +# including the top level CMakeLists.txt. +if(NOT DEFINED MBEDTLS_DIR) + set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}) +endif() + +set(src_crypto + aes.c + aesni.c + aria.c + asn1parse.c + asn1write.c + base64.c + bignum.c + camellia.c + ccm.c + chacha20.c + chachapoly.c + cipher.c + cipher_wrap.c + cmac.c + ctr_drbg.c + des.c + dhm.c + ecdh.c + ecdsa.c + ecjpake.c + ecp.c + ecp_curves.c + entropy.c + entropy_poll.c + error.c + gcm.c + hkdf.c + hmac_drbg.c + md.c + md5.c + memory_buffer_alloc.c + mps_reader.c + mps_trace.c + nist_kw.c + oid.c + padlock.c + pem.c + pk.c + pk_wrap.c + pkcs12.c + pkcs5.c + pkparse.c + pkwrite.c + platform.c + platform_util.c + poly1305.c + psa_crypto.c + psa_crypto_aead.c + psa_crypto_cipher.c + psa_crypto_client.c + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c + psa_crypto_ecp.c + psa_crypto_hash.c + psa_crypto_mac.c + psa_crypto_rsa.c + psa_crypto_se.c + psa_crypto_slot_management.c + psa_crypto_storage.c + psa_its_file.c + ripemd160.c + rsa.c + rsa_alt_helpers.c + sha1.c + sha256.c + sha512.c + threading.c + timing.c + version.c + version_features.c +) + +set(src_x509 + x509.c + x509_create.c + x509_crl.c + x509_crt.c + x509_csr.c + x509write_crt.c + x509write_csr.c +) + +set(src_tls + debug.c + net_sockets.c + ssl_cache.c + ssl_ciphersuites.c + ssl_cli.c + ssl_cookie.c + ssl_msg.c + ssl_srv.c + ssl_ticket.c + ssl_tls.c + ssl_tls13_keys.c +) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes -Wdocumentation -Wno-documentation-deprecated-sync -Wunreachable-code") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(WIN32) + set(libs ${libs} ws2_32) +endif(WIN32) + +if(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES "Darwin") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") +endif() + +if(HAIKU) + set(libs ${libs} network) +endif(HAIKU) + +if(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD) + set(libs ${libs} pthread) +endif() + +if(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE) + set(libs ${libs} trusted_storage) +endif() + +if (NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + message(FATAL_ERROR "Need to choose static or shared mbedtls build!") +endif(NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +set(mbedtls_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedtls") +set(mbedx509_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedx509") +set(mbedcrypto_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedcrypto") + +set(mbedtls_target ${mbedtls_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedx509_target ${mbedx509_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedcrypto_target ${mbedcrypto_target} PARENT_SCOPE) + +if (USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + set(mbedtls_static_target ${mbedtls_target}) + set(mbedx509_static_target ${mbedx509_target}) + set(mbedcrypto_static_target ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endif() + +set(target_libraries ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + string(APPEND mbedtls_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedx509_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedcrypto_static_target "_static") + + list(APPEND target_libraries + ${mbedcrypto_static_target} + ${mbedx509_static_target} + ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + if(TARGET everest) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC everest) + endif() + + add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target}) +endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.0.0 SOVERSION 10) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + if(TARGET everest) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC everest) + endif() + + add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.0.0 SOVERSION 4) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.0.0 SOVERSION 16) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target}) +endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +foreach(target IN LISTS target_libraries) + # Include public header files from /include and other directories + # declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. Include private header files + # from /library and others declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. + # /library needs to be listed explicitly when building .c files outside + # of /library (which currently means: under /3rdparty). + target_include_directories(${target} + PUBLIC $ + $ + PRIVATE ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/) + install( + TARGETS ${target} + EXPORT MbedTLSTargets + DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR} + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) +endforeach(target) + +set(lib_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}lib") + +add_custom_target(${lib_target} DEPENDS ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_dependencies(${lib_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/Makefile b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ee6e4f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ + +# Also see "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" + +CFLAGS ?= -O2 +WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral +LDFLAGS ?= + +# Include ../include for public headers and . for private headers. +# Note that . needs to be included explicitly for the sake of library +# files that are not in the /library directory (which currently means +# under /3rdparty). +LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I. -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_LDFLAGS = + +ifdef DEBUG +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -g3 +endif + +# MicroBlaze specific options: +# CFLAGS += -mno-xl-soft-mul -mxl-barrel-shift + +# To compile on Plan9: +# CFLAGS += -D_BSD_EXTENSION + +PERL ?= perl + +# if were running on Windows build for Windows +ifdef WINDOWS +WINDOWS_BUILD=1 +else ifeq ($(shell uname -s),Darwin) +ifeq ($(AR),ar) +APPLE_BUILD ?= 1 +endif +endif + +# To compile as a shared library: +ifdef SHARED +# all code is position-indep with mingw, avoid warning about useless flag +ifndef WINDOWS_BUILD +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -fPIC -fpic +endif +endif + +SOEXT_TLS=so.16 +SOEXT_X509=so.4 +SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.10 + +# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept +# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar) +AR_DASH ?= - + +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)src +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)Src +RLFLAGS = -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c +RL ?= ranlib +endif +endif + +DLEXT ?= so +ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +# Windows shared library extension: +DLEXT = dll +else ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +# Mac OS X shared library extension: +DLEXT = dylib +endif +endif + +OBJS_CRYPTO= \ + aes.o \ + aesni.o \ + aria.o \ + asn1parse.o \ + asn1write.o \ + base64.o \ + bignum.o \ + camellia.o \ + ccm.o \ + chacha20.o \ + chachapoly.o \ + cipher.o \ + cipher_wrap.o \ + cmac.o \ + ctr_drbg.o \ + des.o \ + dhm.o \ + ecdh.o \ + ecdsa.o \ + ecjpake.o \ + ecp.o \ + ecp_curves.o \ + entropy.o \ + entropy_poll.o \ + error.o \ + gcm.o \ + hkdf.o \ + hmac_drbg.o \ + md.o \ + md5.o \ + memory_buffer_alloc.o \ + mps_reader.o \ + mps_trace.o \ + nist_kw.o \ + oid.o \ + padlock.o \ + pem.o \ + pk.o \ + pk_wrap.o \ + pkcs12.o \ + pkcs5.o \ + pkparse.o \ + pkwrite.o \ + platform.o \ + platform_util.o \ + poly1305.o \ + psa_crypto.o \ + psa_crypto_aead.o \ + psa_crypto_cipher.o \ + psa_crypto_client.o \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.o \ + psa_crypto_ecp.o \ + psa_crypto_hash.o \ + psa_crypto_mac.o \ + psa_crypto_rsa.o \ + psa_crypto_se.o \ + psa_crypto_slot_management.o \ + psa_crypto_storage.o \ + psa_its_file.o \ + ripemd160.o \ + rsa.o \ + rsa_alt_helpers.o \ + sha1.o \ + sha256.o \ + sha512.o \ + threading.o \ + timing.o \ + version.o \ + version_features.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc +LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) +OBJS_CRYPTO+=$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) + +OBJS_X509= \ + x509.o \ + x509_create.o \ + x509_crl.o \ + x509_crt.o \ + x509_csr.o \ + x509write_crt.o \ + x509write_csr.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +OBJS_TLS= \ + debug.o \ + net_sockets.o \ + ssl_cache.o \ + ssl_ciphersuites.o \ + ssl_cli.o \ + ssl_cookie.o \ + ssl_msg.o \ + ssl_srv.o \ + ssl_ticket.o \ + ssl_tls.o \ + ssl_tls13_keys.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +.SILENT: + +.PHONY: all static shared clean + +ifndef SHARED +all: static +else +all: shared static +endif + +static: libmbedcrypto.a libmbedx509.a libmbedtls.a + +shared: libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) + +# tls +libmbedtls.a: $(OBJS_TLS) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_TLS) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS): $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -L. -lmbedcrypto -lmbedx509 $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) + +libmbedtls.so: libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedtls.dylib: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -L. -lmbedcrypto -lmbedx509 $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) + +libmbedtls.dll: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -lmbedx509 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# x509 +libmbedx509.a: $(OBJS_X509) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_X509) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) + +libmbedx509.so: libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedx509.dylib: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) + +libmbedx509.dll: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# crypto +libmbedcrypto.a: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO): $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + +libmbedcrypto.so: libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedcrypto.dylib: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + +libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +.c.o: + echo " CC $<" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $< + +.PHONY: generated_files +GENERATED_FILES = error.c version_features.c +generated_files: $(GENERATED_FILES) + +error.c: ../scripts/generate_errors.pl +error.c: ../scripts/data_files/error.fmt +error.c: $(filter-out %config%,$(wildcard ../include/mbedtls/*.h)) +error.c: + echo " Gen $@" + $(PERL) ../scripts/generate_errors.pl + +version_features.c: ../scripts/generate_features.pl +version_features.c: ../scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt +## The generated file only depends on the options that are present in mbedtls_config.h, +## not on which options are set. To avoid regenerating this file all the time +## when switching between configurations, don't declare mbedtls_config.h as a +## dependency. Remove this file from your working tree if you've just added or +## removed an option in mbedtls_config.h. +#version_features.c: ../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h +version_features.c: + echo " Gen $@" + $(PERL) ../scripts/generate_features.pl + +clean: +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -f *.o libmbed* + rm -f $(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) +else + if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o + if exist libmbed* del /Q /F libmbed* + del /Q /F del_errors_out_if_the_file_list_is_empty_but_not_if_a_file_does_not_exist $(subst /,\,$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS)) +endif + +neat: clean +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -f $(GENERATED_FILES) +else + for %f in ($(subst /,\,$(GENERATED_FILES))) if exist %f del /Q /F %f +endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aes.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aes.c similarity index 84% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aes.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aes.c index 59728c9b..a15a8092 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aes.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aes.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. @@ -25,23 +23,21 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) #include #include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#include "padlock.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) @@ -55,6 +51,12 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define AES_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define AES_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + /* * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) */ @@ -388,17 +390,17 @@ static uint32_t RCON[10]; /* * Tables generation code */ -#define ROTL8(x) ( ( x << 8 ) & 0xFFFFFFFF ) | ( x >> 24 ) -#define XTIME(x) ( ( x << 1 ) ^ ( ( x & 0x80 ) ? 0x1B : 0x00 ) ) -#define MUL(x,y) ( ( x && y ) ? pow[(log[x]+log[y]) % 255] : 0 ) +#define ROTL8(x) ( ( (x) << 8 ) & 0xFFFFFFFF ) | ( (x) >> 24 ) +#define XTIME(x) ( ( (x) << 1 ) ^ ( ( (x) & 0x80 ) ? 0x1B : 0x00 ) ) +#define MUL(x,y) ( ( (x) && (y) ) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0 ) static int aes_init_done = 0; static void aes_gen_tables( void ) { int i, x, y, z; - static int pow[256]; - static int log[256]; + int pow[256]; + int log[256]; /* * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8) @@ -510,6 +512,8 @@ static void aes_gen_tables( void ) void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) { + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); } @@ -524,12 +528,17 @@ void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) { + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->crypt ); mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->tweak ); } void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) { + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->crypt ); mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->tweak ); } @@ -545,14 +554,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int i; uint32_t *RK; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) - if( aes_init_done == 0 ) - { - aes_gen_tables(); - aes_init_done = 1; - - } -#endif + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); switch( keybits ) { @@ -562,6 +565,14 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + if( aes_init_done == 0 ) + { + aes_gen_tables(); + aes_init_done = 1; + } +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) if( aes_padlock_ace == -1 ) aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE ); @@ -661,6 +672,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, uint32_t *RK; uint32_t *SK; + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &cty ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) @@ -716,6 +730,7 @@ exit: return( ret ); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( const unsigned char *key, @@ -747,10 +762,13 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, &key2, &key2bits ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -769,10 +787,13 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, &key2, &key2bits ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -788,53 +809,53 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ +#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y0) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( ( (Y1) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( ( (Y2) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( ( (Y3) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y1) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( ( (Y2) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( ( (Y3) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( ( (Y0) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y2) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( ( (Y3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( ( (Y0) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( ( (Y1) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y3) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( ( (Y0) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( ( (Y1) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( ( (Y2) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + } while( 0 ) -#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ -{ \ - X0 = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - X1 = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - X2 = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - X3 = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} - -#define AES_RROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ -{ \ - X0 = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - X1 = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - X2 = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - X3 = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} +#define AES_RROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y0) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( ( (Y3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( ( (Y2) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( ( (Y1) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y1) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( ( (Y0) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( ( (Y3) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( ( (Y2) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y2) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( ( (Y1) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( ( (Y0) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( ( (Y3) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y3) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( ( (Y2) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( ( (Y1) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( ( (Y0) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + } while( 0 ) /* * AES-ECB block encryption @@ -845,65 +866,61 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ) { int i; - uint32_t *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + struct + { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; - RK = ctx->rk; - - GET_UINT32_LE( X0, input, 0 ); X0 ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( X1, input, 4 ); X1 ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( X2, input, 8 ); X2 ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( X3, input, 12 ); X3 ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) { - AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 ); - AES_FROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 ); + AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + AES_FROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); } - AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 ); + AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); - X0 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - X1 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - X2 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - X3 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X0, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X1, output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X2, output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X3, output, 12 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); return( 0 ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * AES-ECB block decryption */ @@ -913,80 +930,82 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ) { int i; - uint32_t *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + struct + { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; - RK = ctx->rk; - - GET_UINT32_LE( X0, input, 0 ); X0 ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( X1, input, 4 ); X1 ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( X2, input, 8 ); X2 ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( X3, input, 12 ); X3 ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) { - AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 ); - AES_RROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 ); + AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + AES_RROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); } - AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 ); + AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); - X0 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - X1 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - X2 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - X3 = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X0, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X1, output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X2, output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( X3, output, 12 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); return( 0 ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) { + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) return( mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) - if( aes_padlock_ace ) + if( aes_padlock_ace > 0) { if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -1017,11 +1036,18 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int i; unsigned char temp[16]; + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + if( length % 16 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) - if( aes_padlock_ace ) + if( aes_padlock_ace > 0 ) { if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output ) == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -1135,18 +1161,25 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t blocks = length / 16; size_t leftover = length % 16; unsigned char tweak[16]; unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; unsigned char tmp[16]; - /* Sectors must be at least 16 bytes. */ + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( data_unit != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ if( length < 16 ) return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; - /* NIST SP 80-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */ + /* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */ if( length > ( 1 << 20 ) * 16 ) return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; @@ -1241,7 +1274,20 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int c; - size_t n = *iv_off; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) { @@ -1279,15 +1325,21 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * AES-CFB8 buffer encryption/decryption */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) { unsigned char c; unsigned char ov[17]; + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); while( length-- ) { memcpy( ov, iv, 16 ); @@ -1320,7 +1372,18 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int ret = 0; - size_t n = *iv_off; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); while( length-- ) { @@ -1355,7 +1418,16 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int c, i; - size_t n = *nc_off; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; if ( n > 0x0F ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1736,7 +1808,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-ECB-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memset( buf, 0, 16 ); @@ -1757,7 +1829,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 ) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) { mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); continue; @@ -1798,7 +1870,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-CBC-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memset( iv , 0, 16 ); @@ -1821,7 +1893,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 ) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) { mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); continue; @@ -1873,7 +1945,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-CFB128-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memcpy( iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16 ); @@ -1886,7 +1958,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 ) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) { mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); continue; @@ -1936,7 +2008,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-OFB-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memcpy( iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16 ); @@ -1949,7 +2021,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 ) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) { mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); continue; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aesni.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aesni.c similarity index 98% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aesni.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aesni.c index 062708b0..be226c9c 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aesni.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aesni.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * AES-NI support functions * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -24,11 +22,7 @@ * [CLMUL-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode/ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) @@ -38,7 +32,7 @@ #endif #endif -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" #include diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aesni.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aesni.h similarity index 58% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aesni.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aesni.h index 746baa0e..3359cfe9 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/aesni.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aesni.h @@ -2,9 +2,12 @@ * \file aesni.h * * \brief AES-NI for hardware AES acceleration on some Intel processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,13 +21,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H -#include "aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u @@ -42,7 +45,10 @@ extern "C" { #endif /** - * \brief AES-NI features detection routine + * \brief Internal function to detect the AES-NI feature in CPUs. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param what The feature to detect * (MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES or MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL) @@ -52,7 +58,10 @@ extern "C" { int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ); /** - * \brief AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param ctx AES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT @@ -62,12 +71,15 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ); * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) */ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ); + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); /** - * \brief GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param c Result * \param a First operand @@ -77,21 +89,29 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. */ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( unsigned char c[16], - const unsigned char a[16], - const unsigned char b[16] ); + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16] ); /** - * \brief Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes + * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) */ void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, - const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr ); + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr ); /** - * \brief Perform key expansion (for encryption) + * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written * \param key Encryption key @@ -100,8 +120,8 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH */ int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( unsigned char *rk, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t bits ); + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits ); #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aria.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aria.c similarity index 93% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aria.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aria.c index ca9e147f..a5786b37 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/aria.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/aria.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * ARIA implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2017, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -25,11 +23,7 @@ * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5794 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) @@ -55,6 +49,12 @@ #define inline __inline #endif +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ARIA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + /* * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) */ @@ -449,9 +449,11 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t w[4][4], *w2; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); if( keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); /* Copy key to W0 (and potential remainder to W1) */ GET_UINT32_LE( w[0][0], key, 0 ); @@ -503,6 +505,8 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) { int i, j, k, ret; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( ctx, key, keybits ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -539,6 +543,9 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t a, b, c, d; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); GET_UINT32_LE( a, input, 0 ); GET_UINT32_LE( b, input, 4 ); @@ -586,6 +593,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, /* Initialize context */ void mbedtls_aria_init( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ) { + ARIA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_aria_context ) ); } @@ -612,6 +620,13 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + if( length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); @@ -665,7 +680,23 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { unsigned char c; - size_t n = *iv_off; + size_t n; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this + * outside of parameter validation. */ + if( n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ) { @@ -713,7 +744,21 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int c, i; - size_t n = *nc_off; + size_t n; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this + * outside of parameter validation. */ + if( n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); while( length-- ) { @@ -876,7 +921,7 @@ static const uint8_t aria_test2_ctr_ct[3][48] = // CTR ciphertext { \ if( verbose ) \ mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ - return( 1 ); \ + goto exit; \ } else { \ if( verbose ) \ mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); \ @@ -890,6 +935,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ) int i; uint8_t blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + int ret = 1; #if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) size_t j; @@ -901,6 +947,8 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ) uint8_t buf[48], iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; #endif + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + /* * Test set 1 */ @@ -1020,7 +1068,11 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - return( 0 ); + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/asn1parse.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/asn1parse.c similarity index 65% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/asn1parse.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/asn1parse.c index 171c340b..83c7c58a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/asn1parse.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/asn1parse.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Generic ASN.1 parsing * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,20 +15,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -124,7 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *val ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN ) ) != 0 ) @@ -139,21 +134,41 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - int *val ) +static int asn1_get_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int tag, int *val ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, tag ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( len == 0 || len > sizeof( int ) || ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + /* + * len==0 is malformed (0 must be represented as 020100 for INTEGER, + * or 0A0100 for ENUMERATED tags + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + /* This is a cryptography library. Reject negative integers. */ + if( ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + /* Skip leading zeros. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0 ) + { + ++( *p ); + --len; + } + + /* Reject integers that don't fit in an int. This code assumes that + * the int type has no padding bit. */ + if( len > sizeof( int ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + if( len == sizeof( int ) && ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); *val = 0; - while( len-- > 0 ) { *val = ( *val << 8 ) | **p; @@ -163,12 +178,26 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } +int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER, val) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED, val) ); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_mpi *X ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) @@ -185,7 +214,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* Certificate type is a single byte bitstring */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &bs->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) @@ -212,24 +241,125 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return( 0 ); } +/* + * Traverse an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " + * and call a callback for each entry found. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ), + void *ctx ) +{ + int ret; + size_t len; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + unsigned char const tag = *(*p)++; + + if( ( tag & tag_must_mask ) != tag_must_val ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( tag & tag_may_mask ) == tag_may_val ) + { + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( ctx, tag, *p, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } + + *p += len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + /* * Get a bit string without unused bits */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t *len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( (*len)-- < 2 || *(*p)++ != 0 ) + if( *len == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + --( *len ); + + if( **p != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + ++( *p ); return( 0 ); } +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ) +{ + while( seq != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq, sizeof( *seq ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq ); + seq = next; + } +} +typedef struct +{ + int tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur; +} asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t; + +static int asn1_get_sequence_of_cb( void *ctx, + int tag, + unsigned char *start, + size_t len ) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *cb_ctx = + (asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *) ctx; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = + cb_ctx->cur; + + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + cur->next = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + cur->buf.p = start; + cur->buf.len = len; + cur->buf.tag = tag; + + cb_ctx->cur = cur; + return( 0 ); +} /* * Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " @@ -239,56 +369,18 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, int tag) { - int ret; - size_t len; - mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; - - /* Get main sequence tag */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( *p + len != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - while( *p < end ) - { - buf = &(cur->buf); - buf->tag = **p; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &buf->len, tag ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - buf->p = *p; - *p += buf->len; - - /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ - if( *p < end ) - { - cur->next = (mbedtls_asn1_sequence*)mbedtls_calloc( 1, - sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); - - if( cur->next == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - cur = cur->next; - } - } - - /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ - cur->next = NULL; - - if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - return( 0 ); + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t cb_ctx = { tag, cur }; + memset( cur, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + return( mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + p, end, 0xFF, tag, 0, 0, + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb, &cb_ctx ) ); } int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, @@ -332,7 +424,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf params; memset( ¶ms, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); @@ -369,7 +461,7 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head ) } } -mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, +const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, const char *oid, size_t len ) { while( list != NULL ) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/asn1write.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/asn1write.c similarity index 58% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/asn1write.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/asn1write.c index 72acdf30..0289e894 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/asn1write.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/asn1write.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * ASN.1 buffer writing functionality * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,19 +15,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -39,7 +34,7 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif -int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, size_t len ) { if( len < 0x80 ) { @@ -103,7 +98,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len #endif } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag ) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag ) { if( *p - start < 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); @@ -113,7 +108,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned ch return( 1 ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { size_t len = 0; @@ -129,9 +124,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; // Write the MPI @@ -166,9 +161,9 @@ cleanup: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; // Write NULL @@ -179,10 +174,10 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ) return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, @@ -193,11 +188,11 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( par_len == 0 ) @@ -214,9 +209,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *s return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean ) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int boolean ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( *p - start < 1 ) @@ -231,82 +226,147 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolea return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +static int asn1_write_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val, int tag ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; - if( *p - start < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - - len += 1; - *--(*p) = val; - - if( val > 0 && **p & 0x80 ) + do { if( *p - start < 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + len += 1; + *--(*p) = val & 0xff; + val >>= 8; + } + while( val > 0 ); + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); *--(*p) = 0x00; len += 1; } MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) ); return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int tag, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len ) { - int ret; - size_t len = 0; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, - (const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) ); - - return( (int) len ); + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, text_len) ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len ) { - int ret; - size_t len = 0; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, - (const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING ) ); - - return( (int) len ); + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len) ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits ) +{ + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + const unsigned char *cur_byte; + unsigned char cur_byte_shifted; + unsigned char bit; + + byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits; + + /* + * Named bitstrings require that trailing 0s are excluded in the encoding + * of the bitstring. Trailing 0s are considered part of the 'unused' bits + * when encoding this value in the first content octet + */ + if( bits != 0 ) + { + cur_byte = buf + byte_len - 1; + cur_byte_shifted = *cur_byte >> unused_bits; + + for( ; ; ) + { + bit = cur_byte_shifted & 0x1; + cur_byte_shifted >>= 1; + + if( bit != 0 ) + break; + + bits--; + if( bits == 0 ) + break; + + if( bits % 8 == 0 ) + cur_byte_shifted = *--cur_byte; + } + } + + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( p, start, buf, bits ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ) { - int ret; - size_t len = 0, size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; - size = ( bits / 8 ) + ( ( bits % 8 ) ? 1 : 0 ); + byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits; - // Calculate byte length - // - if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size + 1 ) + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < byte_len + 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - len = size + 1; - (*p) -= size; - memcpy( *p, buf, size ); + len = byte_len + 1; - // Write unused bits - // - *--(*p) = (unsigned char) (size * 8 - bits); + /* Write the bitstring. Ensure the unused bits are zeroed */ + if( byte_len > 0 ) + { + byte_len--; + *--( *p ) = buf[byte_len] & ~( ( 0x1 << unused_bits ) - 1 ); + ( *p ) -= byte_len; + memcpy( *p, buf, byte_len ); + } + + /* Write unused bits */ + *--( *p ) = (unsigned char)unused_bits; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); @@ -314,10 +374,10 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, buf, size ) ); @@ -328,14 +388,36 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return( (int) len ); } -mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, + +/* This is a copy of the ASN.1 parsing function mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), + * which is replicated to avoid a dependency ASN1_WRITE_C on ASN1_PARSE_C. */ +static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len ) +{ + while( list != NULL ) + { + if( list->oid.len == len && + memcmp( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 ) + { + break; + } + + list = list->next; + } + + return( list ); +} + +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) { mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; - if( ( cur = mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( *head, oid, oid_len ) ) == NULL ) + if( ( cur = asn1_find_named_data( *head, oid, oid_len ) ) == NULL ) { // Add new entry if not present yet based on OID // @@ -355,18 +437,26 @@ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data memcpy( cur->oid.p, oid, oid_len ); cur->val.len = val_len; - cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); - if( cur->val.p == NULL ) + if( val_len != 0 ) { - mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); - mbedtls_free( cur ); - return( NULL ); + cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); + if( cur->val.p == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); + } } cur->next = *head; *head = cur; } - else if( cur->val.len < val_len ) + else if( val_len == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + cur->val.p = NULL; + } + else if( cur->val.len != val_len ) { /* * Enlarge existing value buffer if needed diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/base64.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/base64.c similarity index 61% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/base64.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/base64.c index f06b57b3..1a05226e 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/base64.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/base64.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) @@ -71,6 +65,99 @@ static const unsigned char base64_dec_map[128] = #define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ +/* + * Constant flow conditional assignment to unsigned char + */ +static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( unsigned char * dest, const unsigned char * const src, + unsigned char condition ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFF or 0 */ + unsigned char mask = ( condition | -condition ); + mask >>= 7; + mask = -mask; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + *dest = ( ( *src ) & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask ); +} + +/* + * Constant flow conditional assignment to uint_32 + */ +static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( uint32_t * dest, const uint32_t src, + uint32_t condition ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFFFFFFFF or 0 */ + uint32_t mask = ( condition | -condition ); + mask >>= 31; + mask = -mask; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + *dest = ( src & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask ); +} + +/* + * Constant flow check for equality + */ +static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_eq( size_t in_a, size_t in_b ) +{ + size_t difference = in_a ^ in_b; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + difference |= -difference; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* cope with the varying size of size_t per platform */ + difference >>= ( sizeof( difference ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return (unsigned char) ( 1 ^ difference ); +} + +/* + * Constant flow lookup into table. + */ +static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( const unsigned char * const table, + const size_t table_size, const size_t table_index ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char result = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < table_size; ++i ) + { + mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( &result, &table[i], mbedtls_base64_eq( i, table_index ) ); + } + + return result; +} + /* * Encode a buffer into base64 format */ @@ -111,10 +198,17 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, C2 = *src++; C3 = *src++; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C2 & 15) << 2) + (C3 >> 6)) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[C3 & 0x3F]; + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( C3 & 0x3F ) ); } if( i < slen ) @@ -122,11 +216,15 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, C1 = *src++; C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F]; + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) ); if( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) - *p++ = base64_enc_map[((C2 & 15) << 2) & 0x3F]; + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ) ); else *p++ = '='; *p++ = '='; @@ -147,6 +245,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, size_t i, n; uint32_t j, x; unsigned char *p; + unsigned char dec_map_lookup; /* First pass: check for validity and get output length */ for( i = n = j = 0; i < slen; i++ ) @@ -177,10 +276,12 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, if( src[i] == '=' && ++j > 2 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); - if( src[i] > 127 || base64_dec_map[src[i]] == 127 ) + dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), src[i] ); + + if( src[i] > 127 || dec_map_lookup == 127 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); - if( base64_dec_map[src[i]] < 64 && j != 0 ) + if( dec_map_lookup < 64 && j != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); n++; @@ -210,8 +311,10 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, if( *src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ' ) continue; - j -= ( base64_dec_map[*src] == 64 ); - x = ( x << 6 ) | ( base64_dec_map[*src] & 0x3F ); + dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), *src ); + + mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( &j, j - 1, mbedtls_base64_eq( dec_map_lookup, 64 ) ); + x = ( x << 6 ) | ( dec_map_lookup & 0x3F ); if( ++n == 4 ) { diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/bignum.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/bignum.c similarity index 55% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/bignum.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/bignum.c index 423e375f..dfc78c9e 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/bignum.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/bignum.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Multi-precision integer library * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -35,17 +33,14 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -59,6 +54,11 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define MPI_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ #define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ #define biH (ciL << 2) /* half limb size */ @@ -83,8 +83,7 @@ static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n ) */ void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ) { - if( X == NULL ) - return; + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); X->s = 1; X->n = 0; @@ -116,6 +115,7 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ) int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); @@ -147,10 +147,15 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - /* Actually resize up in this case */ + if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */ if( X->n <= nblimbs ) return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) ); + /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */ for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) if( X->p[i] != 0 ) @@ -176,20 +181,53 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) return( 0 ); } +/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */ +static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs ) +{ + if( limbs == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + else if( X->n == limbs ) + { + memset( X->p, 0, limbs * ciL ); + X->s = 1; + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); + } +} + /* - * Copy the contents of Y into X + * Copy the contents of Y into X. + * + * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. + * + * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, + * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example + * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). */ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) { int ret = 0; size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); if( X == Y ) return( 0 ); - if( Y->p == NULL ) + if( Y->n == 0 ) { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + if( X->n != 0 ) + { + X->s = 1; + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + } return( 0 ); } @@ -222,12 +260,75 @@ cleanup: void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ) { mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE( Y != NULL ); memcpy( &T, X, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); memcpy( X, Y, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); } +/** + * Select between two sign values in constant-time. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to second ? a : b but uses only bit + * operations in order to avoid branches. + * + * \param[in] a The first sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * \param[in] b The second sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * \param[in] second Must be either 1 (return b) or 0 (return a). + * + * \return The selected sign value. + */ +static int mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( int a, int b, unsigned char second ) +{ + /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonnably assume about + * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned + * by taking advantage of the fact that a and b are either +1 or -1. */ + unsigned ua = a + 1; + unsigned ub = b + 1; + + /* second was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are ua and ub */ + const unsigned mask = second << 1; + + /* select ua or ub */ + unsigned ur = ( ua & ~mask ) | ( ub & mask ); + + /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */ + return( (int) ur - 1 ); +} + +/* + * Conditionally assign dest = src, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * dest and src must be arrays of limbs of size n. + * assign must be 0 or 1. + */ +static void mpi_safe_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char assign ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -assign; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); +} + /* * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information * about whether the assignment was made or not. @@ -237,19 +338,34 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned { int ret = 0; size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif /* make sure assign is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */ - assign = (assign | (unsigned char)-assign) >> 7; + assign = (assign | (unsigned char)-assign) >> (sizeof( assign ) * 8 - 1); + /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ + limb_mask = -assign; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); - X->s = X->s * ( 1 - assign ) + Y->s * assign; + X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, assign ); - for( i = 0; i < Y->n; i++ ) - X->p[i] = X->p[i] * ( 1 - assign ) + Y->p[i] * assign; + mpi_safe_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign ); - for( ; i < X->n; i++ ) - X->p[i] *= ( 1 - assign ); + for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ ) + X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; cleanup: return( ret ); @@ -265,27 +381,43 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char sw { int ret, s; size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); if( X == Y ) return( 0 ); + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + /* make sure swap is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */ - swap = (swap | (unsigned char)-swap) >> 7; + swap = (swap | (unsigned char)-swap) >> (sizeof( swap ) * 8 - 1); + /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ + limb_mask = -swap; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) ); s = X->s; - X->s = X->s * ( 1 - swap ) + Y->s * swap; - Y->s = Y->s * ( 1 - swap ) + s * swap; + X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, swap ); + Y->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( Y->s, s, swap ); for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) { tmp = X->p[i]; - X->p[i] = X->p[i] * ( 1 - swap ) + Y->p[i] * swap; - Y->p[i] = Y->p[i] * ( 1 - swap ) + tmp * swap; + X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask ); + Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask ); } cleanup: @@ -297,7 +429,8 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, 1 ) ); memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); @@ -315,12 +448,18 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ) { + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + if( X->n * biL <= pos ) return( 0 ); return( ( X->p[pos / biL] >> ( pos % biL ) ) & 0x01 ); } +/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ +#define GET_BYTE( X, i ) \ + ( ( ( X )->p[( i ) / ciL] >> ( ( ( i ) % ciL ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff ) + /* * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 */ @@ -329,6 +468,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ) int ret = 0; size_t off = pos / biL; size_t idx = pos % biL; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); if( val != 0 && val != 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -355,6 +495,7 @@ cleanup: size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) { size_t i, j, count = 0; + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL, 0 ); for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) for( j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++ ) @@ -431,16 +572,31 @@ static int mpi_get_digit( mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c ) */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, j, slen, n; + int sign = 1; mbedtls_mpi_uint d; mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + if( s[0] == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( s[0] == '-' ) + { + ++s; + sign = -1; + } + slen = strlen( s ); if( radix == 16 ) @@ -455,12 +611,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) for( i = slen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ ) { - if( i == 1 && s[i - 1] == '-' ) - { - X->s = -1; - break; - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i - 1] ) ); X->p[j / ( 2 * ciL )] |= d << ( ( j % ( 2 * ciL ) ) << 2 ); } @@ -471,26 +621,15 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) for( i = 0; i < slen; i++ ) { - if( i == 0 && s[i] == '-' ) - { - X->s = -1; - continue; - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i] ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T, X, radix ) ); - - if( X->s == 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, &T, d ) ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( X, &T, d ) ); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, &T, d ) ); } } + if( sign < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) != 0 ) + X->s = -1; + cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); @@ -499,26 +638,38 @@ cleanup: } /* - * Helper to write the digits high-order first + * Helper to write the digits high-order first. */ -static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, char **p ) +static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char **p, const size_t buflen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + size_t length = 0; + char *p_end = *p + buflen; - if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + do + { + if( length >= buflen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) ); + /* + * Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character. + */ + if( r < 0xA ) + *(--p_end) = (char)( '0' + r ); + else + *(--p_end) = (char)( 'A' + ( r - 0xA ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( X, radix, p ) ); + length++; + } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 ); - if( r < 10 ) - *(*p)++ = (char)( r + 0x30 ); - else - *(*p)++ = (char)( r + 0x37 ); + memmove( *p, p_end, length ); + *p += length; cleanup: @@ -535,19 +686,27 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, size_t n; char *p; mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); - if( radix >= 4 ) n >>= 1; - if( radix >= 16 ) n >>= 1; - /* - * Round up the buffer length to an even value to ensure that there is - * enough room for hexadecimal values that can be represented in an odd - * number of digits. - */ - n += 3 + ( ( n + 1 ) & 1 ); + n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); /* Number of bits necessary to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 4 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of 4-adic digits necessary to present + * `n`. If radix > 4, this might be a strict + * overapproximation of the number of + * radix-adic digits needed to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 16 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of hexadecimal digits necessary to + * present `n`. */ + + n += 1; /* Terminating null byte */ + n += 1; /* Compensate for the divisions above, which round down `n` + * in case it's not even. */ + n += 1; /* Potential '-'-sign. */ + n += ( n & 1 ); /* Make n even to have enough space for hexadecimal writing, + * which always uses an even number of hex-digits. */ if( buflen < n ) { @@ -559,7 +718,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); if( X->s == -1 ) + { *p++ = '-'; + buflen--; + } if( radix == 16 ) { @@ -588,7 +750,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, if( T.s == -1 ) T.s = 1; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p, buflen ) ); } *p++ = '\0'; @@ -616,6 +778,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) */ char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( fin != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); if( fgets( s, sizeof( s ) - 1, fin ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); @@ -640,13 +808,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n, slen, plen; /* * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, * newline characters and '\0' */ char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); @@ -674,49 +846,240 @@ cleanup: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint + * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */ + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ + uint8_t i; + unsigned char *x_ptr; + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0; + + for( i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char*) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++ ) + { + tmp <<= CHAR_BIT; + tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr; + } + + return( tmp ); +} + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ +#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) + +/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ ) + return( x ); +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */ + +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ ) + +/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \ + __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(have_bswap) + /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */ + switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) ) + { + case 4: + return( __builtin_bswap32(x) ); + case 8: + return( __builtin_bswap64(x) ); + } +#endif +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */ +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */ + + /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order + * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */ + return( mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( x ) ); +} + +static void mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; + if( limbs == 0 ) + return; + + /* + * Traverse limbs and + * - adapt byte-order in each limb + * - swap the limbs themselves. + * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right + * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger + * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the + * indices coincide in the last iteration). + */ + for( cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + ( limbs - 1 ); + cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; + cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right-- ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, + * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ + tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_left ); + *cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_right ); + *cur_limb_right = tmp; + } +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < buflen; i++ ) + X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + /* * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - int ret; - size_t i, j; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - buflen; + unsigned char *Xp; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ - if( X->n != limbs ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, + * even if buflen is 0. */ + if( buflen != 0 ) { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); + Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; + memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen ); + + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); - - for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ ) - X->p[j / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i - 1]) << ((j % ciL) << 3); - cleanup: + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ return( ret ); } +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + size_t i; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } + else + { + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + buf[i] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset( buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + /* * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian */ -int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - size_t i, j, n; + size_t stored_bytes; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + unsigned char *p; + size_t i; - n = mbedtls_mpi_size( X ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); - if( buflen < n ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; - memset( buf, 0, buflen ); + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial + * null bytes and record the position at which to start + * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution + * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the + * number. */ + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes; + memset( buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + else + { + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + p = buf; + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } - for( i = buflen - 1, j = 0; n > 0; i--, j++, n-- ) - buf[i] = (unsigned char)( X->p[j / ciL] >> ((j % ciL) << 3) ); + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); return( 0 ); } @@ -726,9 +1089,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t b */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, v0, t1; mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); v0 = count / (biL ); t1 = count & (biL - 1); @@ -778,6 +1142,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) { size_t i, v0, v1; mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); v0 = count / biL; v1 = count & (biL - 1); @@ -820,6 +1185,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) { size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) @@ -850,6 +1217,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) { size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) @@ -877,6 +1246,107 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) return( 0 ); } +/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. + * + * \param x First integer. + * \param y Second integer. + * + * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, 0 otherwise + */ +static unsigned ct_lt_mpi_uint( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; + mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; + + /* + * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. + */ + cond = ( x ^ y ); + /* + * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and + * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> ( biL - 1 ); + + return (unsigned) ret; +} + +/* + * Compare signed values in constant time + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret ) +{ + size_t i; + /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ + unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL ); + + if( X->n != Y->n ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* + * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. + * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. + */ + X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1; + Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1; + + /* + * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. + * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it + * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). + */ + cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative ); + *ret = cond & X_is_negative; + + /* + * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still + * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. + */ + done = cond; + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + { + /* + * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are negative. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative; + done |= cond; + + /* + * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are positive. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative ); + done |= cond; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + /* * Compare signed values */ @@ -884,6 +1354,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) { mbedtls_mpi Y; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); *p = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z; Y.s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; @@ -898,9 +1369,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) */ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, j; mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); if( X == B ) { @@ -949,67 +1423,92 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -/* - * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction +/** + * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. + * + * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. + * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * d may be aliased to l or r. + * + * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. + * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] l The left operand. + * \param[in] r The right operand. + * + * \return 1 if `l < r`. + * 0 if `l >= r`. */ -static void mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d ) +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) { size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint c, z; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; - for( i = c = 0; i < n; i++, s++, d++ ) + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) { - z = ( *d < c ); *d -= c; - c = ( *d < *s ) + z; *d -= *s; + z = ( l[i] < c ); t = l[i] - c; + c = ( t < r[i] ) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; } - while( c != 0 ) - { - z = ( *d < c ); *d -= c; - c = z; d++; - } + return( c ); } /* - * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9) + * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) */ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - mbedtls_mpi TB; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); - - if( X == B ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); - B = &TB; - } - - if( X != A ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); - - /* - * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. - */ - X->s = 1; - - ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); for( n = B->n; n > 0; n-- ) if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 ) break; + if( n > A->n ) + { + /* B >= (2^ciL)^n > A */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } - mpi_sub_hlp( n, B->p, X->p ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, A->n ) ); + + /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs + * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the + * significant digits of B. */ + if( A->n > n ) + memcpy( X->p + n, A->p + n, ( A->n - n ) * ciL ); + if( X->n > A->n ) + memset( X->p + A->n, 0, ( X->n - A->n ) * ciL ); + + carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, A->p, B->p ); + if( carry != 0 ) + { + /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ + for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ ) + --X->p[n]; + /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result + * is negative. */ + if( n == X->n ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + --X->p[n]; + } + + /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ + X->s = 1; cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); - return( ret ); } @@ -1018,8 +1517,12 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret, s = A->s; + int ret, s; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + s = A->s; if( A->s * B->s < 0 ) { if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) @@ -1049,8 +1552,12 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret, s = A->s; + int ret, s; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + s = A->s; if( A->s * B->s > 0 ) { if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) @@ -1082,6 +1589,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint { mbedtls_mpi _B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; _B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; @@ -1098,6 +1607,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint { mbedtls_mpi _B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; _B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; @@ -1107,8 +1618,21 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint return( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, &_B ) ); } -/* - * Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication +/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. + * + * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. + * + * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. + * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. + * It may overlap with \p d, but only if + * \p d <= \p s. + * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. + * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. + * It must be sufficiently large to store the + * result of the multiplication. This means + * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b + * is not known a priori. + * \param b A scalar to multiply. */ static #if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) @@ -1118,7 +1642,10 @@ static */ __attribute__ ((noinline)) #endif -void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) { mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; @@ -1173,10 +1700,10 @@ void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, mbedtls_mp t++; - do { + while( c != 0 ) + { *d += c; c = ( *d < c ); d++; } - while( c != 0 ); } /* @@ -1184,9 +1711,13 @@ void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, mbedtls_mp */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, j; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + int result_is_zero = 0; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); @@ -1196,10 +1727,14 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi for( i = A->n; i > 0; i-- ) if( A->p[i - 1] != 0 ) break; + if( i == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) break; + if( j == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + j ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); @@ -1207,7 +1742,14 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi for( ; j > 0; j-- ) mpi_mul_hlp( i, A->p, X->p + j - 1, B->p[j - 1] ); - X->s = A->s * B->s; + /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces + * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do + * need to take care to set the sign bit properly since the library does + * not fully support an MPI object with a value of 0 and s == -1. */ + if( result_is_zero ) + X->s = 1; + else + X->s = A->s * B->s; cleanup: @@ -1221,15 +1763,37 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) { - mbedtls_mpi _B; - mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - _B.s = 1; - _B.n = 1; - _B.p = p; - p[0] = b; + /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ + size_t n = A->n; + while( n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0 ) + --n; - return( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( X, A, &_B ) ); + /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance + * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ + if( b == 0 || n == 0 ) + { + return( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + } + + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If + * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same + * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since + * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally, + * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer + * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the + * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly + * grow to its final size. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, A->p, X->p, b - 1 ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); } /* @@ -1331,17 +1895,31 @@ static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, /* * Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R (HAC 14.20) */ -int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n, t, k; mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; + mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); + /* + * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2. + * + * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly, + * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack + * buffer. + */ + T2.s = 1; + T2.n = sizeof( TP2 ) / sizeof( *TP2 ); + T2.p = TP2; if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) { @@ -1356,8 +1934,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, c MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &Z, A->n + 2 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Z, 0 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, 2 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T2, 3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, A->n + 2 ) ); k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &Y ) % biL; if( k < biL - 1 ) @@ -1389,6 +1966,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, c Y.p[t], NULL); } + T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; + T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; + T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; + Z.p[i - t - 1]++; do { @@ -1398,11 +1979,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, c T1.p[0] = ( t < 1 ) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1]; T1.p[1] = Y.p[t]; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &T2, 0 ) ); - T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; - T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; - T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T1, &T2 ) > 0 ); @@ -1438,7 +2014,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, c cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( TP2, sizeof( TP2 ) ); return( ret ); } @@ -1446,10 +2023,13 @@ cleanup: /* * Division by int: A = Q * b + R */ -int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) { mbedtls_mpi _B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; _B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; @@ -1464,7 +2044,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, m */ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) < 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); @@ -1489,6 +2072,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_ { size_t i; mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); if( b == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); @@ -1556,18 +2141,34 @@ static void mpi_montg_init( mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) *mm = ~x + 1; } -/* - * Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) +/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must have at least as many limbs as N + * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. + * On successful completion, A contains the result of + * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where + * R = (2^ciL)^n. + * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N + * (B->n <= N->n). + * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. + * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. + * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. + * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. + * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 + * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library + * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. */ -static int mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, +static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) { size_t i, n, m; mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; - if( T->n < N->n + 1 || T->p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - memset( T->p, 0, T->n * ciL ); d = T->p; @@ -1588,21 +2189,34 @@ static int mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; } - memcpy( A->p, d, ( n + 1 ) * ciL ); + /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result + * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the + * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, N ) >= 0 ) - mpi_sub_hlp( n, N->p, A->p ); - else - /* prevent timing attacks */ - mpi_sub_hlp( n, A->p, T->p ); - - return( 0 ); + /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that + * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ + memcpy( A->p, d, n * ciL ); + /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, + * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ + /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ + d[n] += 1; + d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, d, N->p ); + /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. + * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction + * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. + * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ + mpi_safe_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); } /* * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N + * + * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters. */ -static int mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) { mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; mbedtls_mpi U; @@ -1610,34 +2224,111 @@ static int mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint m U.n = U.s = (int) z; U.p = &z; - return( mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ) ); + mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ); +} + +/* + * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: + * return x == y + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with + * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit(). + * + * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y ) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const size_t diff = x ^ y; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ + const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff ); + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return( 1 ^ diff1 ); +} + +/** + * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it + * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an + * attacker able to observe memory access patterns. + * + * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI. + * \param[in] T The table to read from. + * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table. + * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select; + * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +static int mpi_select( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i], + (unsigned char) mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); } /* * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85) */ -int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *_RR ) +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *_RR ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t wbits, wsize, one = 1; size_t i, j, nblimbs; size_t bufsize, nbits; mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state; - mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 2 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], Apos; + mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], WW, Apos; int neg; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( E != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || ( N->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) < 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* * Init temps and window size */ mpi_montg_init( &mm, N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &WW ); memset( W, 0, sizeof( W ) ); i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ); @@ -1645,10 +2336,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi wsize = ( i > 671 ) ? 6 : ( i > 239 ) ? 5 : ( i > 79 ) ? 4 : ( i > 23 ) ? 3 : 1; +#if( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) if( wsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) wsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif j = N->n + 1; + /* All W[i] and X must have at least N->n limbs for the mpi_montmul() + * and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that W[1] and X are + * large enough, and later we'll grow other W[i] to the same length. + * They must not be shrunk midway through this function! + */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], j ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T, j * 2 ) ); @@ -1683,17 +2381,25 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( A, N ) >= 0 ) + { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &W[1], A, N ) ); + /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow + * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], N->n + 1 ) ); + } else MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ) ); + /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs + * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ + mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ); /* * X = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &RR ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); if( wsize > 1 ) { @@ -1706,7 +2412,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) ); for( i = 0; i < wsize - 1; i++ ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ); /* * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] @@ -1716,7 +2422,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ); } } @@ -1753,7 +2459,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi /* * out of window, square X */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); continue; } @@ -1771,12 +2477,13 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi * X = X^wsize R^-1 mod N */ for( i = 0; i < wsize; i++ ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); /* * X = X * W[wbits] R^-1 mod N */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, &W[wbits], N, mm, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, (size_t) 1 << wsize, wbits ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, &WW, N, mm, &T ); state--; nbits = 0; @@ -1789,18 +2496,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi */ for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ ) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); wbits <<= 1; if( ( wbits & ( one << wsize ) ) != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ); } /* * X = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) { @@ -1814,6 +2521,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[i] ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[1] ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &WW ); if( _RR == NULL || _RR->p == NULL ) mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); @@ -1826,11 +2534,15 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t lz, lzt; - mbedtls_mpi TG, TA, TB; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TG ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); @@ -1838,19 +2550,67 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B lz = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ); lzt = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ); + /* The loop below gives the correct result when A==0 but not when B==0. + * So have a special case for B==0. Leverage the fact that we just + * calculated the lsb and lsb(B)==0 iff B is odd or 0 to make the test + * slightly more efficient than cmp_int(). */ + if( lzt == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &TB, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, A ); + goto cleanup; + } + if( lzt < lz ) lz = lzt; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, lz ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, lz ) ); - TA.s = TB.s = 1; + /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some + * minor differences: + * - Sequences of multiplications or divisions by 2 are grouped into a + * single shift operation. + * - The procedure in HAC assumes that 0 < TB <= TA. + * - The condition TB <= TA is not actually necessary for correctness. + * TA and TB have symmetric roles except for the loop termination + * condition, and the shifts at the beginning of the loop body + * remove any significance from the ordering of TA vs TB before + * the shifts. + * - If TA = 0, the loop goes through 0 iterations and the result is + * correctly TB. + * - The case TB = 0 was short-circuited above. + * + * For the correctness proof below, decompose the original values of + * A and B as + * A = sa * 2^a * A' with A'=0 or A' odd, and sa = +-1 + * B = sb * 2^b * B' with B'=0 or B' odd, and sb = +-1 + * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'), + * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0. + * + * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB). + * The code maintains the following invariant: + * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I) + */ + + /* Proof that the loop terminates: + * At each iteration, either the right-shift by 1 is made on a nonzero + * value and the nonnegative integer bitlen(TA) + bitlen(TB) decreases + * by at least 1, or the right-shift by 1 is made on zero and then + * TA becomes 0 which ends the loop (TB cannot be 0 if it is right-shifted + * since in that case TB is calculated from TB-TA with the condition TB>TA). + */ while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TA, 0 ) != 0 ) { + /* Divisions by 2 preserve the invariant (I). */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ) ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ) ) ); + /* Set either TA or TB to |TA-TB|/2. Since TA and TB are both odd, + * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result. + * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB + * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2 + * also divides TB, and any odd divisior of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also + * divides TA. + */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TA, &TA, &TB ) ); @@ -1861,18 +2621,55 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TB, &TB, &TA ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, 1 ) ); } + /* Note that one of TA or TB is still odd. */ } + /* By invariant (I), gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k. + * At the loop exit, TA = 0, so gcd(TA,TB) = TB. + * - If there was at least one loop iteration, then one of TA or TB is odd, + * and TA = 0, so TB is odd and gcd(TA,TB) = gcd(A',B'). In this case, + * lz = min(a,b) so gcd(A,B) = 2^lz * TB. + * - If there was no loop iteration, then A was 0, and gcd(A,B) = B. + * In this case, lz = 0 and B = TB so gcd(A,B) = B = 2^lz * TB as well. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &TB, lz ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, &TB ) ); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TG ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); return( ret ); } +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). + * The size and sign of X are unchanged. + * n_bytes must not be 0. + */ +static int mpi_fill_random_internal( + mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( n_bytes ); + const size_t overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - n_bytes; + + if( X->n < limbs ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( X->p, 0, overhead ); + memset( (unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, ( X->n - limbs ) * ciL ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes ) ); + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + /* * Fill X with size bytes of random. * @@ -1884,17 +2681,95 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size ); - if( size > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, buf, size ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, buf, size ) ); + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + ret = mpi_fill_random_internal( X, size, f_rng, p_rng ); cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + int count; + unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ); + size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8; + mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; + + if( min < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, min ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &lower_bound ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs + * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. + * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &lower_bound, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &lower_bound, min ) ); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random_internal( X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits ) ); + + if( --count == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, &lower_bound, <_lower ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, N, <_upper ) ); + } + while( lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0 ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &lower_bound ); return( ret ); } @@ -1903,8 +2778,11 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -2056,15 +2934,19 @@ cleanup: /* * Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24) */ -static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, +static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { int ret, count; - size_t i, j, k, n, s; + size_t i, j, k, s; mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); /* @@ -2076,28 +2958,11 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R, &W ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &R, s ) ); - i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); - /* - * HAC, table 4.4 - */ - n = ( ( i >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( i >= 850 ) ? 3 : - ( i >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( i >= 350 ) ? 8 : - ( i >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( i >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 ); - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + for( i = 0; i < rounds; i++ ) { /* * pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 ) - { - j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ) - mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &A, j + 1 ) ); - } - A.p[0] |= 3; - count = 0; do { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); @@ -2105,11 +2970,12 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ); k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W ); if (j > k) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &A, j - k ) ); + A.p[A.n - 1] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( k - ( A.n - 1 ) * biL - 1 ) ) - 1; } if (count++ > 30) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; } } while ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 || @@ -2151,7 +3017,8 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, } cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); return( ret ); @@ -2160,12 +3027,14 @@ cleanup: /* * Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin */ -int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi XX; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); XX.s = 1; XX.n = X->n; @@ -2186,17 +3055,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, return( ret ); } - return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ); } /* * Prime number generation * - * If dh_flag is 0 and nbits is at least 1024, then the procedure - * follows the RSA probably-prime generation method of FIPS 186-4. - * NB. FIPS 186-4 only allows the specific bit lengths of 1024 and 1536. + * To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must + * be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain + * MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR. */ -int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag, +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { @@ -2209,9 +3078,13 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag, #endif int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; size_t k, n; + int rounds; mbedtls_mpi_uint r; mbedtls_mpi Y; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + if( nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -2219,6 +3092,27 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag, n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( nbits ); + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR ) == 0 ) + { + /* + * 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 3 : + ( nbits >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 350 ) ? 8 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 ); + } + else + { + /* + * 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC, + * fact 4.48 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1450 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 1150 ) ? 5 : + ( nbits >= 1000 ) ? 6 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 7 : + ( nbits >= 750 ) ? 8 : ( nbits >= 500 ) ? 13 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 28 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 40 : 51 ); + } + while( 1 ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); @@ -2229,9 +3123,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag, if( k > nbits ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, k - nbits ) ); X->p[0] |= 1; - if( dh_flag == 0 ) + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) == 0 ) { - ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( X, f_rng, p_rng ); + ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ); if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) goto cleanup; @@ -2264,8 +3158,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag, */ if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( X ) ) == 0 && ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &Y ) ) == 0 && - ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 && - ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 ) + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 ) goto cleanup; if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) @@ -2452,7 +3348,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ) cleanup: if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", ret ); + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/bn_mul.h similarity index 90% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/bn_mul.h index b587317d..6ddffc47 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/bn_mul.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Multi-precision integer library */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result @@ -38,7 +36,49 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H #define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H -#include "bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + + +/* + * Conversion macros for embedded constants: + * build lists of mbedtls_mpi_uint's from lists of unsigned char's grouped by 8, 4 or 2 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, 0, 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ), \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( e, f, g, h ) + +#else /* 64-bits */ + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (e) << 32 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (f) << 40 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (g) << 48 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (h) << 56 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) + +#endif /* bits in mbedtls_mpi_uint */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) @@ -170,19 +210,19 @@ #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ - "xorq %%r8, %%r8 \n\t" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" #define MULADDC_CORE \ - "movq (%%rsi), %%rax \n\t" \ - "mulq %%rbx \n\t" \ - "addq $8, %%rsi \n\t" \ - "addq %%rcx, %%rax \n\t" \ - "movq %%r8, %%rcx \n\t" \ - "adcq $0, %%rdx \n\t" \ - "nop \n\t" \ - "addq %%rax, (%%rdi) \n\t" \ - "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx \n\t" \ - "addq $8, %%rdi \n\t" + "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ + "mulq %%rbx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ + "addq %%rcx, %%rax\n" \ + "movq %%r8, %%rcx\n" \ + "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" \ + "nop \n" \ + "addq %%rax, (%%rdi)\n" \ + "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rdi\n" #define MULADDC_STOP \ : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s) \ @@ -192,6 +232,30 @@ #endif /* AMD64 */ +#if defined(__aarch64__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr x4, [%2], #8 \n\t" \ + "ldr x5, [%1] \n\t" \ + "mul x6, x4, %3 \n\t" \ + "umulh x7, x4, %3 \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ + "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ + "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "str x5, [%1], #8 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "+r" (c), "+r" (d), "+r" (s) \ + : "r" (b) \ + : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ + ); + +#endif /* Aarch64 */ + #if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ @@ -565,9 +629,8 @@ #endif /* TriCore */ /* - * gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about our - * use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. Unfortunately, - * passing that option is not easy when building with yotta. + * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about + * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. * * On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by @@ -637,6 +700,24 @@ "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \ ); +#elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ + defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \ + "umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \ + : "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \ + : "r0", "r1", "memory" \ + ); + #else #define MULADDC_INIT \ @@ -734,7 +815,7 @@ "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15" \ + : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \ ); #endif /* MIPS */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/camellia.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/camellia.c similarity index 91% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/camellia.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/camellia.c index 41b7da0f..f7e01361 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/camellia.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/camellia.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Camellia implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The Camellia block cipher was designed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric @@ -25,11 +23,7 @@ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/01espec.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -49,6 +43,12 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + /* * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) */ @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static void camellia_feistel( const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2], void mbedtls_camellia_init( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ) { + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_camellia_context ) ); } @@ -335,8 +336,9 @@ void mbedtls_camellia_free( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ) /* * Camellia key schedule (encryption) */ -int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ) +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) { int idx; size_t i; @@ -346,6 +348,9 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned c uint32_t KC[16]; uint32_t TK[20]; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + RK = ctx->rk; memset( t, 0, 64 ); @@ -356,7 +361,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned c case 128: ctx->nr = 3; idx = 0; break; case 192: case 256: ctx->nr = 4; idx = 1; break; - default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } for( i = 0; i < keybits / 8; ++i ) @@ -440,14 +445,17 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned c /* * Camellia key schedule (decryption) */ -int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ) +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) { int idx, ret; size_t i; mbedtls_camellia_context cty; uint32_t *RK; uint32_t *SK; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); mbedtls_camellia_init( &cty ); @@ -495,6 +503,11 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, { int NR; uint32_t *RK, X[4]; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); ( (void) mode ); @@ -552,14 +565,20 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, * Camellia-CBC buffer encryption/decryption */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) { int i; unsigned char temp[16]; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); if( length % 16 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); @@ -614,7 +633,18 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int c; - size_t n = *iv_off; + size_t n; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + if( n >= 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) { @@ -662,7 +692,17 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int c, i; - size_t n = *nc_off; + size_t n; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + if( n >= 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); while( length-- ) { @@ -902,9 +942,11 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; unsigned char stream_block[16]; #endif + int ret = 1; mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); memset( key, 0, 32 ); for( j = 0; j < 6; j++ ) { @@ -934,8 +976,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( 1 ); + goto exit; } } @@ -987,8 +1028,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( 1 ); + goto exit; } } @@ -1031,8 +1071,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( 1 ); + goto exit; } } else @@ -1047,8 +1086,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( 1 ); + goto exit; } } @@ -1060,7 +1098,11 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - return( 0 ); + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ccm.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ccm.c similarity index 75% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ccm.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ccm.c index 90cab8e1..424ee77b 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ccm.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ccm.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * NIST SP800-38C compliant CCM implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -28,16 +26,13 @@ * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) #include "mbedtls/ccm.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -52,6 +47,11 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) +#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ) +#define CCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #define CCM_ENCRYPT 0 #define CCM_DECRYPT 1 @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ */ void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ) { + CCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); } @@ -68,10 +69,14 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); if( cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); @@ -97,6 +102,8 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, */ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ) { + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); } @@ -123,11 +130,17 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ) * This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst. */ #define CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, len ) \ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, 16, b, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \ - return( ret ); \ - \ - for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) \ - dst[i] = src[i] ^ b[i]; + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, \ + 16, b, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + \ + for( i = 0; i < (len); i++ ) \ + (dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i]; \ + } while( 0 ) /* * Authenticated encryption or decryption @@ -138,7 +151,7 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char i; unsigned char q; size_t len_left, olen; @@ -162,7 +175,7 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); - if( add_len > 0xFF00 ) + if( add_len >= 0xFF00 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; @@ -310,6 +323,12 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); } @@ -320,6 +339,12 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); if( tag_len == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); @@ -336,11 +361,18 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; unsigned char i; int diff; + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) @@ -367,6 +399,13 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( tag_len == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); @@ -386,34 +425,34 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, /* * The data is the same for all tests, only the used length changes */ -static const unsigned char key[] = { +static const unsigned char key_test_data[] = { 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f }; -static const unsigned char iv[] = { +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[] = { 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b }; -static const unsigned char ad[] = { +static const unsigned char ad_test_data[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 }; -static const unsigned char msg[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = { +static const unsigned char msg_test_data[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = { 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, }; -static const size_t iv_len [NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 }; -static const size_t add_len[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 }; -static const size_t msg_len[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 }; -static const size_t tag_len[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 }; +static const size_t iv_len_test_data [NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 }; +static const size_t add_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 }; +static const size_t msg_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 }; +static const size_t tag_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 }; -static const unsigned char res[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = { +static const unsigned char res_test_data[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = { { 0x71, 0x62, 0x01, 0x5b, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x25, 0x5d }, { 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0x51, 0xea, 0x5f, 0x62, 0x08, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x92, 0x07, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x3d, @@ -435,11 +474,12 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) unsigned char plaintext[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN]; unsigned char ciphertext[CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN]; size_t i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); - if( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, 8 * sizeof key ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key_test_data, + 8 * sizeof key_test_data ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " CCM: setup failed" ); @@ -454,15 +494,18 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); memset( ciphertext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN ); - memcpy( plaintext, msg, msg_len[i] ); + memcpy( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ); - ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len[i], - iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i], + ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], plaintext, ciphertext, - ciphertext + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] ); + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 || - memcmp( ciphertext, res[i], msg_len[i] + tag_len[i] ) != 0 ) + memcmp( ciphertext, res_test_data[i], + msg_len_test_data[i] + tag_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); @@ -471,13 +514,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) } memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); - ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len[i], - iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i], + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], ciphertext, plaintext, - ciphertext + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] ); + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 || - memcmp( plaintext, msg, msg_len[i] ) != 0 ) + memcmp( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/chacha20.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/chacha20.c similarity index 91% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/chacha20.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/chacha20.c index d14a51e0..78467d3f 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/chacha20.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/chacha20.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * * \author Daniel King * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -19,20 +19,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include #include @@ -53,15 +48,21 @@ #define inline __inline #endif +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #define BYTES_TO_U32_LE( data, offset ) \ - ( (uint32_t) data[offset] \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) data[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) data[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) data[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + ( (uint32_t) (data)[offset] \ + | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ ) #define ROTL32( value, amount ) \ - ( (uint32_t) ( value << amount ) | ( value >> ( 32 - amount ) ) ) + ( (uint32_t) ( (value) << (amount) ) | ( (value) >> ( 32 - (amount) ) ) ) #define CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX ( 12U ) @@ -181,14 +182,13 @@ static void chacha20_block( const uint32_t initial_state[16], void mbedtls_chacha20_init( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ) { - if( ctx != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->state, sizeof( ctx->state ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->keystream8, sizeof( ctx->keystream8 ) ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); - /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ - ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; - } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->state, sizeof( ctx->state ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->keystream8, sizeof( ctx->keystream8 ) ); + + /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; } void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ) @@ -202,10 +202,8 @@ void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ) { - if( ( ctx == NULL ) || ( key == NULL ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); /* ChaCha20 constants - the string "expand 32-byte k" */ ctx->state[0] = 0x61707865; @@ -230,10 +228,8 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], uint32_t counter ) { - if( ( ctx == NULL ) || ( nonce == NULL ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); /* Counter */ ctx->state[12] = counter; @@ -259,15 +255,9 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, size_t offset = 0U; size_t i; - if( ctx == NULL ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else if( ( size > 0U ) && ( ( input == NULL ) || ( output == NULL ) ) ) - { - /* input and output pointers are allowed to be NULL only if size == 0 */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( size == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( size == 0 || output != NULL ); /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */ while( size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ) @@ -330,7 +320,12 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], unsigned char* output ) { mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( data_len == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( data_len == 0 || output != NULL ); mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx ); @@ -519,6 +514,9 @@ static const size_t test_lengths[2] = 375U }; +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + #define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ do \ { \ @@ -536,7 +534,7 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( int verbose ) { unsigned char output[381]; unsigned i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) { diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/chachapoly.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/chachapoly.c similarity index 84% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/chachapoly.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/chachapoly.c index 860f8776..77d54773 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/chachapoly.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/chachapoly.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * \brief ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction based on RFC 7539. * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -17,19 +17,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -44,6 +39,12 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT ( 0 ) #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ( 1 ) #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ( 2 ) /* Encrypting or decrypting */ @@ -90,39 +91,35 @@ static int chachapoly_pad_ciphertext( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) void mbedtls_chachapoly_init( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) { - if( ctx != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); - mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); - ctx->aad_len = 0U; - ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; - ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; - ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; - } + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); + mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; } void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) { - if( ctx != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); - mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); - ctx->aad_len = 0U; - ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; - ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; - ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; - } + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); + mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; } int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ) { - int ret; - - if( ( ctx == NULL ) || ( key == NULL ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, key ); @@ -133,13 +130,10 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char poly1305_key[64]; - - if( ( ctx == NULL ) || ( nonce == NULL ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); /* Set counter = 0, will be update to 1 when generating Poly1305 key */ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, nonce, 0U ); @@ -176,19 +170,11 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len ) { - if( ctx == NULL ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else if( ( aad_len > 0U ) && ( aad == NULL ) ) - { - /* aad pointer is allowed to be NULL if aad_len == 0 */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else if( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) - { + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + + if( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); - } ctx->aad_len += aad_len; @@ -200,19 +186,13 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || output != NULL ); - if( ctx == NULL ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else if( ( len > 0U ) && ( ( input == NULL ) || ( output == NULL ) ) ) - { - /* input and output pointers are allowed to be NULL if len == 0 */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else if( ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) && - ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ) ) + if( ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) && + ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ) ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); } @@ -255,14 +235,12 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char len_block[16]; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); - if( ( ctx == NULL ) || ( mac == NULL ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT ) + if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); } @@ -321,7 +299,7 @@ static int chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned char tag[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( ctx, nonce, mode ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -350,6 +328,13 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned char tag[16] ) { + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + return( chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, length, nonce, aad, aad_len, input, output, tag ) ); @@ -364,13 +349,16 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; size_t i; int diff; - - if( tag == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); if( ( ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT, length, nonce, @@ -482,6 +470,9 @@ static const unsigned char test_mac[1][16] = } }; +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + #define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ do \ { \ @@ -499,7 +490,7 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( int verbose ) { mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; unsigned i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output[200]; unsigned char mac[16]; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/check_crypto_config.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/check_crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7ad16a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/check_crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/** + * \file check_crypto_config.h + * + * \brief Consistency checks for PSA configuration options + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * It is recommended to include this file from your crypto_config.h + * in order to catch dependency issues early. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cipher.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher.c similarity index 55% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cipher.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher.c index 7ae6c4ac..546cace5 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cipher.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * * \author Adriaan de Jong * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -19,21 +19,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" -#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "cipher_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include #include @@ -58,6 +53,15 @@ #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -65,13 +69,19 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +#define CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CIPHER_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) /* Compare the contents of two buffers in constant time. * Returns 0 if the contents are bitwise identical, otherwise returns * a non-zero value. * This is currently only used by GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. */ -static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2, size_t len ) +static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2, + size_t len ) { const unsigned char *p1 = (const unsigned char*) v1; const unsigned char *p2 = (const unsigned char*) v2; @@ -81,7 +91,7 @@ static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2, size_t for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < len; i++ ) diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i]; - return (int)diff; + return( (int)diff ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ @@ -108,7 +118,8 @@ const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ) return( mbedtls_cipher_supported ); } -const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -119,7 +130,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher return( NULL ); } -const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name ) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( + const char *cipher_name ) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -133,9 +145,10 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher return( NULL ); } -const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, - int key_bitlen, - const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( + const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -150,6 +163,7 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_ciph void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { + CIPHER_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); } @@ -158,6 +172,29 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) if( ctx == NULL ) return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + if( ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + if( cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED ) + { + /* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */ + (void) psa_destroy_key( cipher_psa->slot ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cipher_psa, sizeof( *cipher_psa ) ); + mbedtls_free( cipher_psa ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) if( ctx->cmac_ctx ) { @@ -173,9 +210,11 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); } -int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ) +int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ) { - if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); @@ -199,12 +238,108 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_in return( 0 ); } -int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_operation_t operation ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa; + + if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are + * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */ + alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( cipher_info->mode, taglen ); + if( alg == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + if( mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( cipher_info->type ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); + + cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa ) ); + if( cipher_psa == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + cipher_psa->alg = alg; + ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa; + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + ctx->psa_enabled = 1; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_operation_t operation ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || + operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + size_t const key_bytelen = ( (size_t) key_bitlen + 7 ) / 8; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + /* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */ + if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */ + if( cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + ctx->cipher_info->type ); + if( key_type == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + /* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation + * (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption + * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this + * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + /* mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */ + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, cipher_psa->alg ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, key, key_bytelen, + &cipher_psa->slot ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + break; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to + * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */ + cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED; + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN ) == 0 && (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen ) { @@ -222,24 +357,36 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *k MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { - return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_enc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, - ctx->key_bitlen ); + return( ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_enc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen ) ); } if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation ) - return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_dec_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, - ctx->key_bitlen ); + return( ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_dec_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len ) + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ) { size_t actual_iv_size; - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || NULL == iv ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */ if( iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH ) @@ -268,17 +415,39 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif - memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size ); - ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( mbedtls_gcm_starts( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + iv, iv_len ) ); + } +#endif + + if ( actual_iv_size != 0 ) + { + memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size ); + ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size; + } return( 0 ); } int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* We don't support resetting PSA-based + * cipher contexts, yet. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; return( 0 ); @@ -288,14 +457,26 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { - return mbedtls_gcm_starts( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->operation, - ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, ad, ad_len ); + return( mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len ) ); } #endif @@ -315,8 +496,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if ( result != 0 ) return( result ); - return mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, - ad, ad_len ); + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len ) ); } #endif @@ -327,16 +508,32 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; - size_t block_size = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size; - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || NULL == olen ) - { + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ *olen = 0; block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ); + if ( 0 == block_size ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + } if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ) { @@ -357,9 +554,9 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ) { - *olen = ilen; - return mbedtls_gcm_update( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input, - output ); + return( mbedtls_gcm_update( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen ) ); } #endif @@ -367,16 +564,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) { *olen = ilen; - return mbedtls_chachapoly_update( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, - ilen, input, output ); + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, output ) ); } #endif - if ( 0 == block_size ) - { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; - } - if( input == output && ( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size ) ) { @@ -435,11 +627,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i */ if( 0 != ilen ) { - if( 0 == block_size ) - { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; - } - /* Encryption: only cache partial blocks * Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block * Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks @@ -738,9 +925,22 @@ static int get_no_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || NULL == olen ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + *olen = 0; if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || @@ -808,8 +1008,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* Set output size for decryption */ if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == ctx->operation ) - return ctx->get_padding( output, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ), - olen ); + return( ctx->get_padding( output, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ), + olen ) ); /* Set output size for encryption */ *olen = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ); @@ -823,14 +1023,29 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) -int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ) +int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ) { - if( NULL == ctx || - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( NULL == ctx->cipher_info || MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding + * schemes, we currently don't make them + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + if( mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + switch( mode ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -874,15 +1089,34 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_ciph int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || NULL == tag ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) - return mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag, tag_len ); + { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ + return( mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, + tag, tag_len ) ); + } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) @@ -892,8 +1126,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if ( tag_len != 16U ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, - tag ); + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag ) ); } #endif @@ -904,22 +1138,42 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { unsigned char check_tag[16]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || - MBEDTLS_DECRYPT != ctx->operation ) + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT != ctx->operation ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ + if( tag_len > sizeof( check_tag ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, - check_tag, tag_len ) ) ) + if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( + (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, + check_tag, tag_len ) ) ) { return( ret ); } @@ -939,8 +1193,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if ( tag_len != sizeof( check_tag ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, - check_tag ); + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag ); if ( ret != 0 ) { return( ret ); @@ -966,19 +1220,85 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t finish_olen; + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t part_len; + + if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* In the following, we can immediately return on an error, + * because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations + * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(), + * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_cipher_update( &cipher_op, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &cipher_op, + output + *olen, ilen - *olen, + &part_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen += part_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( ctx, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, output, olen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, &finish_olen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, + &finish_olen ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); *olen += finish_olen; @@ -988,22 +1308,55 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) /* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( output == NULL || tag != output + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_encrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, + output, ilen + tag_len, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen -= tag_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { *olen = ilen; - return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen, - iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, - tag_len, tag ) ); + return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag_len, tag ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) @@ -1035,19 +1388,53 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } /* - * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( input == NULL || tag != input + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_decrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen + tag_len, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + else if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; ret = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, @@ -1063,7 +1450,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, @@ -1079,7 +1466,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ if ( ( iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size ) || @@ -1103,4 +1490,116 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( output_len < ilen + tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + output + ilen, tag_len ); + *olen += tag_len; + return( ret ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( ilen < tag_len || output_len < ilen - tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen - tag_len, output, olen, + input + ilen - tag_len, tag_len ) ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cipher_wrap.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher_wrap.c similarity index 88% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cipher_wrap.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher_wrap.c index 893490ac..5776d5e4 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cipher_wrap.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher_wrap.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * * \author Adriaan de Jong * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -19,19 +19,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) -#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "cipher_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" @@ -41,10 +36,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) #include "mbedtls/camellia.h" #endif @@ -57,10 +48,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/des.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" #endif @@ -73,6 +60,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/ccm.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #include #endif @@ -258,7 +249,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 128, "AES-128-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &aes_info @@ -269,7 +260,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 192, "AES-192-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &aes_info @@ -280,7 +271,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 256, "AES-256-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &aes_info @@ -754,7 +745,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 128, "CAMELLIA-128-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &camellia_info @@ -765,7 +756,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 192, "CAMELLIA-192-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &camellia_info @@ -776,7 +767,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 256, "CAMELLIA-256-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &camellia_info @@ -1130,7 +1121,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 128, "ARIA-128-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &aria_info @@ -1141,7 +1132,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 192, "ARIA-192-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &aria_info @@ -1152,7 +1143,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, 256, "ARIA-256-ECB", - 16, + 0, 0, 16, &aria_info @@ -1554,7 +1545,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, "DES-ECB", - 8, + 0, 0, 8, &des_info @@ -1605,7 +1596,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, "DES-EDE-ECB", - 8, + 0, 0, 8, &des_ede_info @@ -1656,7 +1647,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_ecb_info = { MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, "DES-EDE3-ECB", - 8, + 0, 0, 8, &des_ede3_info @@ -1675,225 +1666,6 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_cbc_info = { #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - -static int blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, input, - output ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static int blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - size_t length, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, - input, output ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -static int blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, - iv_off, iv, input, output ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -static int blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, - nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -static int blowfish_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int key_bitlen ) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); -} - -static void * blowfish_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx; - ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); - - if( ctx == NULL ) - return( NULL ); - - mbedtls_blowfish_init( ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void blowfish_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_blowfish_free( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t blowfish_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, - blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - NULL, -#endif - blowfish_setkey_wrap, - blowfish_setkey_wrap, - blowfish_ctx_alloc, - blowfish_ctx_free -}; - -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-ECB", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CBC", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cfb64_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CFB64", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CTR", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -static int arc4_crypt_stream_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_arc4_crypt( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, length, input, output ) ); -} - -static int arc4_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int key_bitlen ) -{ - /* we get key_bitlen in bits, arc4 expects it in bytes */ - if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_arc4_setup( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen / 8 ); - return( 0 ); -} - -static void * arc4_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx; - ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); - - if( ctx == NULL ) - return( NULL ); - - mbedtls_arc4_init( ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void arc4_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_arc4_free( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t arc4_base_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, - NULL, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - arc4_crypt_stream_wrap, -#endif - arc4_setkey_wrap, - arc4_setkey_wrap, - arc4_ctx_alloc, - arc4_ctx_free -}; - -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t arc4_128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, - 128, - "ARC4-128", - 0, - 0, - 1, - &arc4_base_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) static int chacha20_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, @@ -1912,7 +1684,7 @@ static int chacha20_stream_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( ctx, length, input, output ); if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) @@ -2119,6 +1891,131 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = { }; #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +static void *kw_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void kw_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 1 ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_unwrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 0 ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + kw_aes_setkey_wrap, + kw_aes_setkey_unwrap, + kw_ctx_alloc, + kw_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 128, + "AES-128-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 192, + "AES-192-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 256, + "AES-256-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 128, + "AES-128-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 192, + "AES-192-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 256, + "AES-256-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) @@ -2161,23 +2058,6 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, &arc4_128_info }, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, &blowfish_ecb_info }, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, &blowfish_cbc_info }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, &blowfish_cfb64_info }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, &blowfish_ctr_info }, -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, &camellia_128_ecb_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, &camellia_192_ecb_info }, @@ -2259,6 +2139,15 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &chachapoly_info }, #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info }, +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ @@ -2266,7 +2155,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL } }; -#define NUM_CIPHERS sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions / sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0] +#define NUM_CIPHERS ( sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \ + sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]) ) int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS]; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher_wrap.h similarity index 73% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher_wrap.h index c6def0be..90563d85 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cipher_wrap.h @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ /** - * \file cipher_internal.h + * \file cipher_wrap.h * * \brief Cipher wrappers. * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -20,19 +20,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -114,6 +112,29 @@ typedef struct const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info; } mbedtls_cipher_definition_t; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */ + /* use raw key material internally imported */ + /* as a volatile key, and which hence need */ + /* to destroy that key when the context is */ + /* freed. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */ + /* which use a key provided by the */ + /* user, and which hence will not be */ + /* destroyed when the context is freed. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership; + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t slot; + mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state; +} mbedtls_cipher_context_psa; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[]; extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[]; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cmac.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cmac.c similarity index 94% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cmac.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cmac.c index 5d101e1c..3cc49d10 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/cmac.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/cmac.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -40,32 +38,17 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* @@ -136,7 +119,7 @@ static int cmac_multiply_by_u( unsigned char *output, static int cmac_generate_subkeys( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char* K1, unsigned char* K2 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; size_t olen, block_size; @@ -315,7 +298,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen, block_size; if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL || @@ -393,7 +376,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac( const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, unsigned char *output ) { mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -425,9 +408,9 @@ exit: */ int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length, const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *output ) + unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; unsigned char zero_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char int_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -783,7 +766,7 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) { if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC subkey #%u: ", testname, i + 1 ); + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC subkey #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); @@ -798,6 +781,18 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key, keybits, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 may be unavailable. This should not cause the selftest + * function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + goto next_test; + } + if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "test execution failed\n" ); @@ -825,6 +820,7 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +next_test: mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); } @@ -864,11 +860,24 @@ static int cmac_test_wth_cipher( int verbose, for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) { if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC #%u: ", testname, i + 1 ); + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, key, keybits, messages, message_lengths[i], output ) ) != 0 ) { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 and/or 3DES may be unavailable. This should not cause + * the selftest function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + ( cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB || + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB ) ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); goto exit; @@ -894,12 +903,12 @@ exit: static int test_aes128_cmac_prf( int verbose ) { int i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; for( i = 0; i < NB_PRF_TESTS; i++ ) { - mbedtls_printf( " AES CMAC 128 PRF #%u: ", i ); + mbedtls_printf( " AES CMAC 128 PRF #%d: ", i ); ret = mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, 20, output ); if( ret != 0 || memcmp( output, PRFT[i], MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) != 0 ) @@ -921,7 +930,7 @@ static int test_aes128_cmac_prf( int verbose ) int mbedtls_cmac_self_test( int verbose ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) /* AES-128 */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/common.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2c8a1e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/** + * \file common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. + * + * If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be + * declared `static` to allow the compiler to optimize for code size, + * but that function has unit tests, define it with + * ``` + * MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_foo(...) { ... } + * ``` + * and declare it in a header in the `library/` directory with + * ``` + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + * int mbedtls_foo(...); + * #endif + * ``` + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +#else +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static +#endif + +/** Allow library to access its structs' private members. + * + * Although structs defined in header files are publicly available, + * their members are private and should not be accessed by the user. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ctr_drbg.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ctr_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b664fb0f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,888 @@ +/* + * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +/* + * CTR_DRBG context initialization + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); + /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. + * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; + + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +/* + * This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->aes_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ) +{ + ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) +{ + ctx->entropy_len = len; +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) +{ + /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's + * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX + /* This shouldn't be an issue because + * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible + * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ + if( len > INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#endif + + /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the + * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't + * used until after the initial seeding. */ + /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */ + ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len; + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ) +{ + ctx->reseed_interval = interval; +} + +static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + unsigned char *p, *iv; + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; + int ret = 0; + + int i, j; + size_t buf_len, use_len; + + if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); + + /* + * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer + * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes + * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) || + * data || 0x80 + * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes) + */ + p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + *p++ = ( data_len >> 24 ) & 0xff; + *p++ = ( data_len >> 16 ) & 0xff; + *p++ = ( data_len >> 8 ) & 0xff; + *p++ = ( data_len ) & 0xff; + p += 3; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; + memcpy( p, data, data_len ); + p[data_len] = 0x80; + + buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ ) + key[i] = i; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data + */ + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + p = buf; + memset( chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + use_len = buf_len; + + while( use_len > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + chain[i] ^= p[i]; + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + chain, chain ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + } + + memcpy( tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + + /* + * Update IV + */ + buf[3]++; + } + + /* + * Do final encryption with reduced data + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; + p = output; + + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + iv, iv ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + memcpy( p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx ); + /* + * tidy up the stack + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( chain, sizeof( chain ) ); + if( 0 != ret ) + { + /* + * wipe partial seed from memory + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.2) + * ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V) + * with inputs and outputs + * ctx->aes_ctx = Key + * ctx->counter = V + */ +static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] ) +{ + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char *p = tmp; + int i, j; + int ret = 0; + + memset( tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + /* + * Increase counter + */ + for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++ ) + tmp[i] ^= data[i]; + + /* + * Update key and counter + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx->counter = all-bits-0 + * ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key + * additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( add_len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input) + * -> new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * additional[:len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes + * and with output + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t len, + size_t nonce_len ) +{ + unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + + /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */ + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */ + if( nonce_len != 0 ) + { + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += nonce_len; + } + + /* Add additional data if provided. */ + if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); + seedlen += len; + } + + /* Reduce to 384 bits. */ + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Update state. */ + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ctx->reseed_counter = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, sizeof( seed ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); +} + +/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length + * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key + * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial + * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and + * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */ +static size_t good_nonce_len( size_t entropy_len ) +{ + if( entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( ( entropy_len + 1 ) / 2 ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string + * where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for ctx->entropy_len bytes + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + size_t nonce_len; + + memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); + + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->aes_ctx ); + + ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; + ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; + + if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) + ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; + /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to + * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set + * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */ + nonce_len = ( ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ? + (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter : + good_nonce_len( ctx->entropy_len ) ); + + /* Initialize with an empty key. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Do the initial seeding. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, custom, len, + nonce_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.5.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len]) + * -> working_state_after_reseed + * if required, then + * CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed, + * requested_number_of_bits, additional_input) + * -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len + * additional[:add_len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * and with outputs + * status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally) + * returned_bits = output[:output_len] + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char *p = output; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + int i; + size_t use_len; + + if( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); + + if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + + if( ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || + ctx->prediction_resistance ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + add_len = 0; + } + + if( add_len > 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + while( output_len > 0 ) + { + /* + * Increase counter + */ + for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; + /* + * Copy random block to destination + */ + memcpy( p, tmp, use_len ); + p += use_len; + output_len -= use_len; + } + + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ctx->reseed_counter++; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + else + { + ret = 0; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + fclose( f ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + unsigned char c; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; + } + if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + f = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at + * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip + * + * The parameters used to derive the test data are: + * + * [AES-128 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 128] + * [NonceLen = 64] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + * [AES-256 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 256] + * [NonceLen = 128] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb, + 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92, + 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8, + 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20, + 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0, + 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad, + 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45, + 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9, + 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20, + 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f, + 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a, + 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c, + 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66, + 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10, + 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30, + 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4, + 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc, + 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06, + 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13, + 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0, + 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf, + 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2, + 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7, + 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2, + 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02, + 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 }; +#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49, + 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a, + 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85, + 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e, + 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15, + 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45, + 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8, + 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c, + 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3, + 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce, + 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e, + 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76, + 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77, + 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d, + 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0, + 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73, + 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c, + 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2, + 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1, + 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a, + 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb, + 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a, + 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33, + 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e, + 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0, + 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29, + 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf, + 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb, + 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85, + 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d, + 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62, + 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d, + 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb, + 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39, + 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40, + 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad, + 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3, + 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b, + 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14, + 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54, + 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30, + 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a, + 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static size_t test_offset; +static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = data; + memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); + test_offset += len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + return( 1 ); \ + } + +#define SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64 + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[ sizeof( result_pr ) ]; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True) + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : " ); + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_pr, + pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE) + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): " ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_nopr, + pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/debug.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/debug.c similarity index 66% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/debug.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/debug.c index db3924ac..fa60d13f 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/debug.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/debug.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Debugging routines * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) @@ -35,9 +29,11 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #define mbedtls_time_t time_t #define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf #endif #include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include #include @@ -78,32 +74,25 @@ static inline void debug_send_line( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, #endif } +MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6) void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ... ) { va_list argp; char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( NULL == ssl || NULL == ssl->conf || NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || level > debug_threshold ) + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { return; + } va_start( argp, format ); -#if defined(_WIN32) -#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__) - ret = _vsnprintf_s( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, _TRUNCATE, format, argp ); -#else - ret = _vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); - if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == DEBUG_BUF_SIZE ) - { - str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE-1] = '\0'; - ret = -1; - } -#endif -#else - ret = vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); -#endif + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); va_end( argp ); if( ret >= 0 && ret < DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1 ) @@ -121,8 +110,13 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, { char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; - if( ssl->conf == NULL || ssl->conf->f_dbg == NULL || level > debug_threshold ) + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { return; + } /* * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately, @@ -133,7 +127,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, return; mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s() returned %d (-0x%04x)\n", - text, ret, -ret ); + text, ret, (unsigned int) -ret ); debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); } @@ -146,8 +140,13 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_buf( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, char txt[17]; size_t i, idx = 0; - if( ssl->conf == NULL || ssl->conf->f_dbg == NULL || level > debug_threshold ) + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { return; + } mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "dumping '%s' (%u bytes)\n", text, (unsigned int) len ); @@ -199,8 +198,13 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, { char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; - if( ssl->conf == NULL || ssl->conf->f_dbg == NULL || level > debug_threshold ) + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { return; + } mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s(X)", text ); mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->X ); @@ -216,65 +220,59 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) { char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; - int j, k, zeros = 1; - size_t i, n, idx = 0; + size_t bitlen; + size_t idx = 0; - if( ssl->conf == NULL || ssl->conf->f_dbg == NULL || X == NULL || level > debug_threshold ) - return; - - for( n = X->n - 1; n > 0; n-- ) - if( X->p[n] != 0 ) - break; - - for( j = ( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) << 3 ) - 1; j >= 0; j-- ) - if( ( ( X->p[n] >> j ) & 1 ) != 0 ) - break; - - mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "value of '%s' (%d bits) is:\n", - text, (int) ( ( n * ( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) << 3 ) ) + j + 1 ) ); - - debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); - - idx = 0; - for( i = n + 1, j = 0; i > 0; i-- ) + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == X || + level > debug_threshold ) { - if( zeros && X->p[i - 1] == 0 ) - continue; - - for( k = sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) - 1; k >= 0; k-- ) - { - if( zeros && ( ( X->p[i - 1] >> ( k << 3 ) ) & 0xFF ) == 0 ) - continue; - else - zeros = 0; - - if( j % 16 == 0 ) - { - if( j > 0 ) - { - mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); - debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); - idx = 0; - } - } - - idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %02x", (unsigned int) - ( X->p[i - 1] >> ( k << 3 ) ) & 0xFF ); - - j++; - } - + return; } - if( zeros == 1 ) - idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " 00" ); + bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); - mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n", + text, (unsigned) bitlen ); debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + if( bitlen == 0 ) + { + str[0] = ' '; str[1] = '0'; str[2] = '0'; + idx = 3; + } + else + { + int n; + for( n = (int) ( ( bitlen - 1 ) / 8 ); n >= 0; n-- ) + { + size_t limb_offset = n / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + size_t offset_in_limb = n % sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + unsigned char octet = + ( X->p[limb_offset] >> ( offset_in_limb * 8 ) ) & 0xff; + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %02x", octet ); + idx += 3; + /* Wrap lines after 16 octets that each take 3 columns */ + if( idx >= 3 * 16 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + idx = 0; + } + } + } + + if( idx != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) static void debug_print_pk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) @@ -345,8 +343,14 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; int i = 0; - if( ssl->conf == NULL || ssl->conf->f_dbg == NULL || crt == NULL || level > debug_threshold ) + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == crt || + level > debug_threshold ) + { return; + } while( crt != NULL ) { @@ -363,6 +367,56 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, crt = crt->next; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +static void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, + int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + const mbedtls_ecdh_context* ctx = ecdh; +#else + const mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed* ctx = &ecdh->ctx.mbed_ecdh; +#endif + + switch( attr ) + { + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Q", + &ctx->Q ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Qp", + &ctx->Qp ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z: + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: z", + &ctx->z ); + break; + default: + break; + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, attr ); +#else + switch( ecdh->var ) + { + default: + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, + attr ); + } +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/des.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/des.c similarity index 89% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/des.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/des.c index ca9e071f..eddf55e7 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/des.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/des.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel @@ -25,11 +23,7 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) @@ -257,50 +251,57 @@ static const uint32_t RHs[16] = /* * Initial Permutation macro */ -#define DES_IP(X,Y) \ -{ \ - T = ((X >> 4) ^ Y) & 0x0F0F0F0F; Y ^= T; X ^= (T << 4); \ - T = ((X >> 16) ^ Y) & 0x0000FFFF; Y ^= T; X ^= (T << 16); \ - T = ((Y >> 2) ^ X) & 0x33333333; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 2); \ - T = ((Y >> 8) ^ X) & 0x00FF00FF; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 8); \ - Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ - T = (X ^ Y) & 0xAAAAAAAA; Y ^= T; X ^= T; \ - X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ -} +#define DES_IP(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 1) | ((Y) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= T; \ + (X) = (((X) << 1) | ((X) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + } while( 0 ) /* * Final Permutation macro */ -#define DES_FP(X,Y) \ -{ \ - X = ((X << 31) | (X >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ - T = (X ^ Y) & 0xAAAAAAAA; X ^= T; Y ^= T; \ - Y = ((Y << 31) | (Y >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ - T = ((Y >> 8) ^ X) & 0x00FF00FF; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 8); \ - T = ((Y >> 2) ^ X) & 0x33333333; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 2); \ - T = ((X >> 16) ^ Y) & 0x0000FFFF; Y ^= T; X ^= (T << 16); \ - T = ((X >> 4) ^ Y) & 0x0F0F0F0F; Y ^= T; X ^= (T << 4); \ -} +#define DES_FP(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + (X) = (((X) << 31) | ((X) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= T; \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 31) | ((Y) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + } while( 0 ) /* * DES round macro */ -#define DES_ROUND(X,Y) \ -{ \ - T = *SK++ ^ X; \ - Y ^= SB8[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ - SB6[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ - SB4[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ - SB2[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ - \ - T = *SK++ ^ ((X << 28) | (X >> 4)); \ - Y ^= SB7[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ - SB5[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ - SB3[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ - SB1[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ -} +#define DES_ROUND(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = *SK++ ^ (X); \ + (Y) ^= SB8[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB6[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB4[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB2[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ + \ + T = *SK++ ^ (((X) << 28) | ((X) >> 4)); \ + (Y) ^= SB7[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB5[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB3[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB1[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ + } while( 0 ) -#define SWAP(a,b) { uint32_t t = a; a = b; b = t; t = 0; } +#define SWAP(a,b) \ + do \ + { \ + uint32_t t = (a); (a) = (b); (b) = t; t = 0; \ + } while( 0 ) void mbedtls_des_init( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ) { @@ -827,16 +828,16 @@ static const unsigned char des3_test_buf[8] = static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_dec[3][8] = { - { 0xCD, 0xD6, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x5D }, - { 0x69, 0x96, 0xC8, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xA2, 0xAB, 0xEB }, - { 0x83, 0x25, 0x39, 0x76, 0x44, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x0A } + { 0x37, 0x2B, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x52, 0x65, 0xB0, 0x59 }, + { 0xC2, 0x10, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x65, 0xA1 }, + { 0xA2, 0x70, 0x56, 0x68, 0x69, 0xE5, 0x15, 0x1D } }; static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_enc[3][8] = { - { 0x6A, 0x2A, 0x19, 0xF4, 0x1E, 0xCA, 0x85, 0x4B }, - { 0x03, 0xE6, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xFA, 0x58, 0xEB, 0x42 }, - { 0xDD, 0x17, 0xE8, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x32 } + { 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x97, 0xEA, 0x84, 0x26, 0x73, 0xFB }, + { 0xB3, 0x92, 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB5, 0x42, 0x93 }, + { 0xDA, 0x37, 0x64, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x6F, 0x62, 0x6F } }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -847,16 +848,16 @@ static const unsigned char des3_test_iv[8] = static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_dec[3][8] = { - { 0x12, 0x9F, 0x40, 0xB9, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x56, 0xB3 }, - { 0x47, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0x9A, 0x6B, 0x8E, 0xE3, 0x93 }, - { 0xC5, 0xCE, 0xCF, 0x63, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x4C } + { 0x58, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xEF, 0x85, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9A }, + { 0x5F, 0xC8, 0x78, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x92, 0xD9, 0x54 }, + { 0x25, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x85, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x48, 0xBF } }; static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_enc[3][8] = { - { 0x54, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0xEB, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xB4 }, - { 0x35, 0x76, 0x11, 0x56, 0x5F, 0xA1, 0x8E, 0x4D }, - { 0xCB, 0x19, 0x1F, 0x85, 0xD1, 0xED, 0x84, 0x39 } + { 0x91, 0x1C, 0x6D, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA7, 0xC3, 0x4D }, + { 0x60, 0x1A, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x66, 0xF1 }, + { 0xA1, 0x50, 0x0F, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x64, 0x76 } }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -921,7 +922,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) return( 1 ); } - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) { if( u == 0 ) mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, buf, buf ); @@ -998,7 +999,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) if( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) { - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) { if( u == 0 ) mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); @@ -1008,7 +1009,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) } else { - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) { unsigned char tmp[8]; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/dhm.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/dhm.c similarity index 64% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/dhm.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/dhm.c index 82cbb0ce..29ce7559 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/dhm.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/dhm.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation @@ -27,16 +25,13 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -60,6 +55,11 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) +#define DHM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define DHM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + /* * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it */ @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ) ); (*p) += n; @@ -100,30 +100,71 @@ static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X, */ static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P ) { - mbedtls_mpi L, U; + mbedtls_mpi U; int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &L, 2 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &L ) < 0 || + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( param, 2 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); return( ret ); } void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) { + DHM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); } +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->P ) ); +} + +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_dhm_get_value( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_dhm_parameter param, + mbedtls_mpi *dest ) +{ + const mbedtls_mpi *src = NULL; + switch( param ) + { + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P: + src = &ctx->P; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G: + src = &ctx->G; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X: + src = &ctx->X; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX: + src = &ctx->GX; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY: + src = &ctx->GY; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K: + src = &ctx->K; + break; + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + return( mbedtls_mpi_copy( dest, src ) ); +} + /* * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters */ @@ -131,7 +172,10 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL && *p != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); if( ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->P, p, end ) ) != 0 || ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->G, p, end ) ) != 0 || @@ -141,40 +185,48 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); - return( 0 ); } /* - * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters + * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation. */ -int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) +static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret, count = 0; - size_t n1, n2, n3; - unsigned char *p; + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( R, R, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +static int dhm_make_common( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( x_size < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - /* - * Generate X as large as possible ( < P ) - */ - do + if( (unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ) ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) ); - - if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ); } - while( dhm_check_range( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) != 0 ); + else + { + /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */ + ret = dhm_random_below( &ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } /* * Calculate GX = G^X mod P @@ -185,8 +237,33 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + size_t n1, n2, n3; + unsigned char *p; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + /* - * export P, G, GX + * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are + * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness. */ #define DHM_MPI_EXPORT( X, n ) \ do { \ @@ -209,14 +286,10 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, *olen = p - output; - ctx->len = n1; - cleanup: - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED + ret ); - - return( 0 ); + if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); } /* @@ -226,18 +299,17 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *G ) { - int ret; - - if( ctx == NULL || P == NULL || G == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->G, G ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret ) ); } - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); return( 0 ); } @@ -247,13 +319,15 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - if( ctx == NULL || ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len ) + if( ilen < 1 || ilen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len( ctx ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->GY, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -266,45 +340,29 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret, count = 0; + int ret; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - if( ctx == NULL || olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len ) + if( olen < 1 || olen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len( ctx ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * generate X and calculate GX = G^X mod P - */ - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) ); - - if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED ); - } - while( dhm_check_range( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) != 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X, - &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) ); - - if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->GX, output, olen ) ); cleanup: - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret ); - - return( 0 ); + if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); } + /* * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of: * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, @@ -314,7 +372,10 @@ cleanup: static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret, count; + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); /* * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used, @@ -348,25 +409,24 @@ static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, * We need to generate blinding values from scratch */ - /* Vi = random( 2, P-1 ) */ - count = 0; - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vi, mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ), f_rng, p_rng ) ); + /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) ); + /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P + * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod), + * then elevate to the Xth power. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); - if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) <= 0 ); - - /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + return( ret ); } @@ -378,10 +438,16 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi GYb; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - if( ctx == NULL || output_size < ctx->len ) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( output_size < mbedtls_dhm_get_len( ctx ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) @@ -390,35 +456,28 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init( &GYb ); /* Blind peer's value */ - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) ); - } - else - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &GYb, &ctx->GY ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) ); /* Do modular exponentiation */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); /* Unblind secret value */ - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) ); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) ); + /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory + * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->K ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->K, output, *olen ) ); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &GYb ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -428,11 +487,19 @@ cleanup: */ void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) { - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->pX ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->K ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GY ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GX ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->X ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->G ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->pX ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GY ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GX ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); } @@ -444,12 +511,17 @@ void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, size_t dhminlen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; unsigned char *p, *end; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhmin != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ @@ -487,7 +559,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); goto exit; } @@ -496,7 +568,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->P ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->G ) ) != 0 ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); goto exit; } @@ -510,21 +582,19 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, mbedtls_mpi_free( &rec ); if ( ret != 0 ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); goto exit; } if ( p != end ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); goto exit; } } ret = 0; - dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm->P ); - exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); @@ -593,9 +663,11 @@ static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) */ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); if( ( ret = load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -613,12 +685,28 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n" "MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n" "1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n" "9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n" "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = { + 0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44, + 0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d, + 0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3, + 0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1, + 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18, + 0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a, + 0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1, + 0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6, + 0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64, + 0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8, + 0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f, + 0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_params ); @@ -627,7 +715,7 @@ static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_param */ int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdh.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdh.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9dfa8680 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,729 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + * RFC 4492 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECDH_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +typedef mbedtls_ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; +#endif + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ctx->grp.id ); +#else + return( ctx->grp_id ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + /* At this time, all groups support ECDH. */ + (void) gid; + return( 1 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) +/* + * Generate public key (restartable version) + * + * Note: this internal function relies on its caller preserving the value of + * the output parameter 'd' across continuation calls. This would not be + * acceptable for a public function but is OK here as we control call sites. + */ +static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL ) +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, Q, d, &grp->G, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + return( ecdh_gen_public_restartable( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &P, d, Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &P ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( z, &P.X ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( z != NULL ); + return( ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( grp, z, Q, d, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ + +static void ecdh_init_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->z ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->rs ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + ecdh_init_internal( ctx ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->_d ); +#else + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdh_context ) ); + + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; +#endif + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ctx->restart_enabled = 0; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_setup_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, grp_id ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_setup_internal( ctx, grp_id ) ); +#else + switch( grp_id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + return( mbedtls_everest_setup( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, grp_id ) ); +#endif + default: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + ecdh_init_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh ); + return( ecdh_setup_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, grp_id ) ); + } +#endif +} + +static void ecdh_free_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->rs ); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Enable restartable operations for context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->restart_enabled = 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->_d ); + ecdh_free_internal( ctx ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + mbedtls_everest_free( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh ); + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + ecdh_free_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh ); + break; + default: + break; + } + + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; + ctx->grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t grp_len, pt_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf, + blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + buf += grp_len; + blen -= grp_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, + &pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + *olen = grp_len + pt_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_make_params_internal( ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_make_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf, + end - *buf ) ); +} + +/* + * Read the ServerKeyExhange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &grp_id, buf, end - *buf ) ) + != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( ctx, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_read_params_internal( ctx, buf, end ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, end) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_read_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, end ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_get_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* If it's not our key, just import the public part as Qp */ + if( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Qp, &key->Q ) ); + + /* Our key: import public (as Q) and private parts */ + if( side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get parameters from a keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS || + side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ); + + if( mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( ctx ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + { + /* This is the first call to get_params(). Set up the context + * for use with the group. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( ctx, key->grp.id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else + { + /* This is not the first call to get_params(). Check that the + * current key's group is the same as the context's, which was set + * from the first key's group. */ + if( mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( ctx ) != key->grp.id ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_get_params_internal( ctx, key, side ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + { + mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side s = side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ? + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS : + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_THEIRS; + return( mbedtls_everest_get_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + key, s) ); + } +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_get_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + key, side ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, olen, + buf, blen ); +} + +/* + * Setup and export the client public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_make_public_internal( ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_make_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, &p, + blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( (size_t)( p - buf ) != blen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse and import the client's public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_read_public_internal( ctx, buf, blen ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, blen ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_read_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, blen ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_calc_secret_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, + size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng, + rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->z ) > blen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *olen = ctx->grp.pbits / 8 + ( ( ctx->grp.pbits % 8 ) != 0 ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &ctx->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); + + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); +} + +/* + * Derive and export the shared secret + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_calc_secret_internal( ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_calc_secret( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_calc_secret_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, buf, + blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdsa.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0b612ce8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecdsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,929 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve DSA + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECDSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_verify() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver +{ + mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u2 ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u2 ); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig +{ + int sign_tries; + int key_tries; + mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */ + mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */ + ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ctx->sign_tries = 0; + ctx->key_tries = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->k ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->r ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->k ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->r ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign_det sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx->rng_ctx ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx->rng_ctx ); + + ecdsa_restart_det_init( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP ( rs_ctx == NULL ? NULL : &rs_ctx->ecp ) + +/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ +#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, ECDSA_RS_ECP, ops ) ); + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0 ) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \ + if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \ + { \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \ +} while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL + +#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len + * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3 + */ +static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) ); + if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) ); + + /* While at it, reduce modulo N */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC || !ECDSA_SIGN_ALT || !ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret, key_tries, sign_tries; + int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi k, e, t; + mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r; + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries; + p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries; + pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k; + pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul ) + goto mul; + if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn ) + goto modn; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + *p_sign_tries = 0; + do + { + if( (*p_sign_tries)++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair + * and set r = xR mod n + */ + *p_key_tries = 0; + do + { + if( (*p_key_tries)++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul; + +mul: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G, + f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind, + ECDSA_RS_ECP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn; + +modn: +#endif + /* + * Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop + * (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t) + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 ); + + /* + * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); + + /* + * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step, + * avoiding a potential timing leak. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind ) ); + + /* + * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pk, pk, &grp->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr ); +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + switch( gid ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0; +#endif +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0; +#endif + default: return 1; + } +} + +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Deterministic signature wrapper + * + * note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL. + * + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx; + unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_mpi h; + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign ) + goto sign; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL ) + rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign; + +sign: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) f_rng_blind; + (void) p_rng_blind; + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng ); +#else + ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Deterministic signature wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng_blind ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng_blind != NULL ); + + return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) + */ +static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 ); + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1; + pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd ) + goto muladd; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* + * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); + + /* + * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu1, &e, &s_inv ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu1, pu1, &grp->N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu2, r, &s_inv ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu2, pu2, &grp->N ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd; + +muladd: +#endif + /* + * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, + &R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op) + * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); + + /* + * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( ver ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + return( ecdsa_verify_restartable( grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +/* + * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 + */ +static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *slen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0}; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf ); + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + if( len > sig_size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( sig, p, len ); + *slen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#else + (void) md_alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#else + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, sig_size, slen ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, sig_size, slen, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Restartable read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig; + const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; + size_t len; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p + len != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#else + if( ( ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + + /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature. + * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific + * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */ + if( p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) +/* + * Generate key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, + &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ + +/* + * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->ecp ); + + ctx->ver = NULL; + ctx->sig = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp ); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->ver ); + ctx->ver = NULL; + + ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->sig ); + ctx->sig = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->det ); + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecjpake.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecjpake.c similarity index 90% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecjpake.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecjpake.c index ec5a4007..d2293114 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecjpake.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecjpake.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Elliptic curve J-PAKE * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -24,20 +22,24 @@ * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) #include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + /* * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string */ @@ -54,8 +56,7 @@ static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = { */ void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) { - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); ctx->md_info = NULL; mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp ); @@ -104,7 +105,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *secret, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT || + role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( secret != NULL || len == 0 ); ctx->role = role; @@ -122,11 +128,27 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } +int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + int point_format ) +{ + switch( point_format ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED: + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED: + ctx->point_format = point_format; + return( 0 ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + /* * Check if context is ready for use */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) { + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || ctx->s.p == NULL ) @@ -146,7 +168,7 @@ static int ecjpake_write_len_point( unsigned char **p, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; /* Need at least 4 for length plus 1 for point */ @@ -186,7 +208,7 @@ static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *id, mbedtls_mpi *h ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN]; unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + sizeof( buf ); @@ -213,7 +235,7 @@ static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, p += id_len; /* Compute hash */ - mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) ); /* Turn it into an integer mod n */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash, @@ -236,7 +258,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point V, VV; mbedtls_mpi r, h; size_t r_len; @@ -265,7 +287,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, r_len = *(*p)++; - if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < r_len ) + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < r_len || r_len == 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; @@ -311,7 +333,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point V; mbedtls_mpi v; mbedtls_mpi h; /* later recycled to hold r */ @@ -369,7 +391,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( end < *p ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -409,7 +431,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( end < *p ) @@ -444,7 +466,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; @@ -482,7 +504,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; @@ -504,6 +526,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + return( ecjpake_kkpp_read( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &ctx->grp.G, &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER, @@ -518,6 +543,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + return( ecjpake_kkpp_write( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &ctx->grp.G, &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2, @@ -532,7 +562,7 @@ static int ecjpake_ecp_add3( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *B, const mbedtls_ecp_point *C ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi one; mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); @@ -554,12 +584,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); @@ -615,7 +648,7 @@ static int ecjpake_mul_secret( mbedtls_mpi *R, int sign, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi b; /* Blinding value, then s + N * blinding */ mbedtls_mpi_init( &b ); @@ -644,7 +677,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GA, S: GB */ mbedtls_ecp_point Xm; /* C: Xc, S: Xs */ mbedtls_mpi xm; /* C: xc, S: xs */ @@ -652,6 +685,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *end = buf + len; size_t ec_len; + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Xm ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xm ); @@ -721,12 +759,17 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point K; mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; size_t x_bytes; + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); if( len < *olen ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); @@ -791,6 +834,8 @@ static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_password[] = { 0x65, 0x73, 0x74 }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x1[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, @@ -917,24 +962,48 @@ static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = { 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51 }; -/* Load my private keys and generate the correponding public keys */ +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng( void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */ static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm1, xm1, len1 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm2, xm2, len2 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1, - &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2, - &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL ) ); cleanup: return( ret ); } +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + /* For tests we don't need a secure RNG; * use the LGC from Numerical Recipes for simplicity */ static int ecjpake_lgc( void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) @@ -970,7 +1039,7 @@ static int ecjpake_lgc( void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecjpake_context cli; mbedtls_ecjpake_context srv; unsigned char buf[512], pms[32]; @@ -1030,6 +1099,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + /* 'reference handshake' tests can only be run against implementations + * for which we have 100% control over how the random ephemeral keys + * are generated. This is only the case for the internal mbed TLS + * implementation, so these tests are skipped in case the internal + * implementation is swapped out for an alternative one. */ if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #2 (reference handshake): " ); @@ -1078,6 +1153,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ cleanup: mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &cli ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8df7ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,3440 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + * GECC = Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone + * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf + * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants + * RFC 7748 for the Curve448 and Curve25519 curve definitions + * + * [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Function level alternative implementation. + * + * The MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT macro enables alternative implementations to + * replace certain functions in this module. The alternative implementations are + * typically hardware accelerators and need to activate the hardware before the + * computation starts and deactivate it after it finishes. The + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() functions serve + * this purpose. + * + * To preserve the correct functionality the following conditions must hold: + * + * - The alternative implementation must be activated by + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() before any of the replaceable functions is + * called. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() must \b only be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() must \b not be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - Public functions must not return while the alternative implementation is + * activated. + * - Replaceable functions are guarded by \c MBEDTLS_ECP_XXX_ALT macros and + * before calling them an \code if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + * \endcode ensures that the alternative implementation supports the current + * group. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "ecp_internal_alt.h" + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. + * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. + */ +static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row. + * + * Default value 0 means that ECC operations will not yield. + * Note that regardless of the value of ecp_max_ops, always at + * least one step is performed before yielding. + * + * Setting ecp_max_ops=1 can be suitable for testing purposes + * as it will interrupt computation at all possible points. + */ +static unsigned ecp_max_ops = 0; + +/* + * Set ecp_max_ops + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ) +{ + ecp_max_ops = max_ops; +} + +/* + * Check if restart is enabled + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ) +{ + return( ecp_max_ops != 0 ); +} + +/* + * Restart sub-context for ecp_mul_comb() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* current intermediate result */ + size_t i; /* current index in various loops, 0 outside */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /* table for precomputed points */ + unsigned char T_size; /* number of points in table T */ + enum { /* what were we doing last time we returned? */ + ecp_rsm_init = 0, /* nothing so far, dummy initial state */ + ecp_rsm_pre_dbl, /* precompute 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl, /* normalize precomputed 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_add, /* precompute remaining points by adding */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add, /* normalize all precomputed points */ + ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */ + ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->i = 0; + ctx->T = NULL; + ctx->T_size = 0; + ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + unsigned char i; + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + if( ctx->T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < ctx->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( ctx->T + i ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->T ); + } + + ecp_restart_rsm_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Restart context for ecp_muladd() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; /* mP value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* R intermediate result */ + enum { /* what should we do next? */ + ecp_rsma_mul1 = 0, /* first multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_mul2, /* second multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_add, /* addition */ + ecp_rsma_norm, /* normalization */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->state = ecp_rsma_mul1; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + ecp_restart_ma_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + ctx->ops_done = 0; + ctx->depth = 0; + ctx->rsm = NULL; + ctx->ma = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + ecp_restart_rsm_free( ctx->rsm ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->rsm ); + + ecp_restart_ma_free( ctx->ma ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->ma ); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Check if we can do the next step + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0 ) + { + /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit, + * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */ + if( grp->pbits >= 512 ) + ops *= 4; + else if( grp->pbits >= 384 ) + ops *= 2; + + /* Avoid infinite loops: always allow first step. + * Because of that, however, it's not generally true + * that ops_done <= ecp_max_ops, so the check + * ops_done > ecp_max_ops below is mandatory. */ + if( ( rs_ctx->ops_done != 0 ) && + ( rs_ctx->ops_done > ecp_max_ops || + ops > ecp_max_ops - rs_ctx->ops_done ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + + /* update running count */ + rs_ctx->ops_done += ops; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) \ + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \ + if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \ + { \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \ + rs_ctx->depth--; \ +} while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * List of supported curves: + * - internal ID + * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2, RFC 8446 sec. 4.2.7) + * - size in bits + * - readable name + * + * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, + * fastest curves first. + * + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c and ssl_tls.c when adding a new curve! + */ +static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, 25, 521, "secp521r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, 28, 512, "brainpoolP512r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, 24, 384, "secp384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, 27, 384, "brainpoolP384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, 23, 256, "secp256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, 22, 256, "secp256k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, 26, 256, "brainpoolP256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, 21, 224, "secp224r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, 20, 224, "secp224k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, 19, 192, "secp192r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 29, 256, "x25519" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 30, 448, "x448" }, +#endif + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ECP_NB_CURVES sizeof( ecp_supported_curves ) / \ + sizeof( ecp_supported_curves[0] ) + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_supported_grp_id[ECP_NB_CURVES]; + +/* + * List of supported curves and associated info + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ) +{ + return( ecp_supported_curves ); +} + +/* + * List of supported curves, group ID only + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ) +{ + static int init_done = 0; + + if( ! init_done ) + { + size_t i = 0; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + ecp_supported_grp_id[i++] = curve_info->grp_id; + } + ecp_supported_grp_id[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + + init_done = 1; + } + + return( ecp_supported_grp_id ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info for the internal identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->grp_id == grp_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the TLS identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->tls_id == tls_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the name + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + if( name == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( strcmp( curve_info->name, name ) == 0 ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + if( grp->G.X.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE ); + + if( grp->G.Y.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( pt != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Z ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( grp != NULL ); + + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->N ); + grp->pbits = 0; + grp->nbits = 0; + grp->h = 0; + grp->modp = NULL; + grp->t_pre = NULL; + grp->t_post = NULL; + grp->t_data = NULL; + grp->T = NULL; + grp->T_size = 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + if( pt == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->X ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Y ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Z ) ); +} + +/* + * Check that the comb table (grp->T) is static initialized. + */ +static int ecp_group_is_static_comb_table( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + return grp->T != NULL && grp->T_size == 0; +#else + (void) grp; + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + size_t i; + + if( grp == NULL ) + return; + + if( grp->h != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->N ); + } + + if( !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp) && grp->T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->T[i] ); + mbedtls_free( grp->T ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( grp, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_group ) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + if( key == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->X, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a group object + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( dst, src->id ) ); +} + +/* + * Set point to zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->X , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Y , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z , 0 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Tell if a point is zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two points lazily + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &Q->X ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Import a non-zero point from ASCII strings + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, + const char *x, const char *y ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( x != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( y != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->X, radix, x ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->Y, radix, y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + *olen = plen; + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &P->X, buf, plen ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* + * Common case: P == 0 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( buflen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x00; + *olen = 1; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = 2 * plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x04; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + } + else if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &P->Y, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ilen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( plen != ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &pt->X, buf, plen ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &pt->Y ); + + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + /* Set most significant bit to 0 as prescribed in RFC7748 §5 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &pt->X, plen * 8 - 1, 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + if( buf[0] == 0x00 ) + { + if( ilen == 1 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pt ) ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( buf[0] != 0x04 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ilen != 2 * plen + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->Y, + buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + unsigned char data_len; + const unsigned char *buf_start; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) + */ + if( buf_len < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + data_len = *(*buf)++; + if( data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Save buffer start for read_binary and update buf + */ + buf_start = *buf; + *buf += data_len; + + return( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, pt, buf_start, data_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Export a point as a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + /* + * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte + */ + if( blen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, pt, format, + olen, buf + 1, blen - 1) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * write length to the first byte and update total length + */ + buf[0] = (unsigned char) *olen; + ++*olen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set a group from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &grp_id, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, grp_id ) ); +} + +/* + * Read a group id from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) and convert it to + * mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We expect at least three bytes (see below) + */ + if( len < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled + */ + if( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + tls_id = *(*buf)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*buf)++; + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + *grp = curve_info->grp_id; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write the ECParameters record corresponding to a group (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp->id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * We are going to write 3 bytes (see below) + */ + *olen = 3; + if( blen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + buf[0] = curve_info->tls_id >> 8; + buf[1] = curve_info->tls_id & 0xFF; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Wrapper around fast quasi-modp functions, with fall-back to mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi. + * See the documentation of struct mbedtls_ecp_group. + * + * This function is in the critial loop for mbedtls_ecp_mul, so pay attention to perf. + */ +static int ecp_modp( mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( grp->modp == NULL ) + return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + if( ( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > 2 * grp->pbits ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( grp->modp( N ) ); + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + while( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( N, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) + /* we known P, N and the result are positive */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Fast mod-p functions expect their argument to be in the 0..p^2 range. + * + * In order to guarantee that, we need to ensure that operands of + * mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi are in the 0..p range. So, after each operation we will + * bring the result back to this range. + * + * The following macros are shortcuts for doing that. + */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, general case, to use after mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#define INC_MUL_COUNT mul_count++; +#else +#define INC_MUL_COUNT +#endif + +#define MOD_MUL( N ) \ + do \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_modp( &(N), grp ) ); \ + INC_MUL_COUNT \ + } while( 0 ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_MUL( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi + * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 + */ +#define MOD_SUB( N ) \ + while( (N).s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &(N), 0 ) != 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) ) || \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) ) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_SUB( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. + * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and + * a bit faster. + */ +#define MOD_ADD( N ) \ + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &(N), &grp->P ) >= 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( X, count ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with coutermeasueres against + * SPA, hence timing attacks. + */ + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1 (GECC 3.2.1) + * Cost: 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pt ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); + + /* + * X = X / Z^2 mod p + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi ) ); + + /* + * Y = Y / Z^3 mod p + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi ) ); + + /* + * Z = 1 + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) points, + * using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P. + * (See for example Cohen's "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number + * Theory", Algorithm 10.3.4.) + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Cost: 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t T_size ) +{ + if( T_size < 2 ) + return( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, *T ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, T, T_size ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; + + if( ( c = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &c[i] ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); + + /* + * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &c[0], &T[0]->Z ) ); + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z ) ); + } + + /* + * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &u, &c[T_size-1], &grp->P ) ); + + for( i = T_size - 1; ; i-- ) + { + /* + * Zi = 1 / Z_i mod p + * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_i) mod P + */ + if( i == 0 ) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Zi, &u ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Zi, &u, &c[i-1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &u, &u, &T[i]->Z ) ); + } + + /* + * proceed as in normalize() + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi ) ); + + /* + * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates + * - not storing Z (always 1) + * - shrinking other coordinates, but still keeping the same number of + * limbs as P, as otherwise it will too likely be regrown too fast. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->X, grp->P.n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->Y, grp->P.n ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T[i]->Z ); + + if( i == 0 ) + break; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &c[i] ); + mbedtls_free( c ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Conditional point inversion: Q -> -Q = (Q.X, -Q.Y, Q.Z) without leak. + * "inv" must be 0 (don't invert) or 1 (invert) or the result will be invalid + */ +static int ecp_safe_invert_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + unsigned char inv ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char nonzero; + mbedtls_mpi mQY; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mQY ); + + /* Use the fact that -Q.Y mod P = P - Q.Y unless Q.Y == 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mQY, &grp->P, &Q->Y ) ); + nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Y, 0 ) != 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &Q->Y, &mQY, inv & nonzero ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mQY ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates + * + * Based on http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian.html#doubling-dbl-1998-cmo-2 . + * + * We follow the variable naming fairly closely. The formula variations that trade a MUL for a SQR + * (plus a few ADDs) aren't useful as our bignum implementation doesn't distinguish squaring. + * + * Standard optimizations are applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + */ +static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + dbl_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + /* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &T, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &U, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &U ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); + } + else + { + /* M = 3.X^2 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); + + /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &grp->A, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + /* M += A.Z^4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &S, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &grp->A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &M, &M, &S ) ); + } + } + + /* S = 4.X.Y^2 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &P->Y, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &S, 1 ) ); + + /* U = 8.Y^4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &T, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); + + /* T = M^2 - 2.S */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &M, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); + + /* S = M(S - T) - U */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &S, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &U ) ); + + /* U = 2.Y.Z */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &P->Y, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &U ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates (GECC 3.22) + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor + * being less than its order, so none of them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even multiple, + * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as meaning 1. + * + * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S + */ +static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + add_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, P, Q ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; + + /* + * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, Q ) ); + + if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + + /* + * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized + */ + if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T4 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T1, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &P->Y ) ); + + /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T1, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T2, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ); + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Z, &P->Z, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T1, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T3, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &T3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &X, &T2, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T4 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T4, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &Y, &T3, &T4 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &Z ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T4 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_jac(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + */ +static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l, ll; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ll ); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Z = l * Z */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l ) ); + + /* X = l^2 * X */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &l, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll ) ); + + /* Y = l^3 * Y */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &ll, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ll ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Check and define parameters used by the comb method (see below for details) + */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 2 || MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE > 7 +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE out of bounds" +#endif + +/* d = ceil( n / w ) */ +#define COMB_MAX_D ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 1 ) / 2 + +/* number of precomputed points */ +#define COMB_MAX_PRE ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) + +/* + * Compute the representation of m that will be used with our comb method. + * + * The basic comb method is described in GECC 3.44 for example. We use a + * modified version that provides resistance to SPA by avoiding zero + * digits in the representation as in [3]. We modify the method further by + * requiring that all K_i be odd, which has the small cost that our + * representation uses one more K_i, due to carries, but saves on the size of + * the precomputed table. + * + * Summary of the comb method and its modifications: + * + * - The goal is to compute m*P for some w*d-bit integer m. + * + * - The basic comb method splits m into the w-bit integers + * x[0] .. x[d-1] where x[i] consists of the bits in m whose + * index has residue i modulo d, and computes m * P as + * S[x[0]] + 2 * S[x[1]] + .. + 2^(d-1) S[x[d-1]], where + * S[i_{w-1} .. i_0] := i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + i_0 P. + * + * - If it happens that, say, x[i+1]=0 (=> S[x[i+1]]=0), one can replace the sum by + * .. + 2^{i-1} S[x[i-1]] - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} S[x[i]] + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * thereby successively converting it into a form where all summands + * are nonzero, at the cost of negative summands. This is the basic idea of [3]. + * + * - More generally, even if x[i+1] != 0, we can first transform the sum as + * .. - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} ( S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] ) + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * and then replace S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] = S[x[i] ^ x[i+1]] + 2 S[x[i] & x[i+1]]. + * Performing and iterating this procedure for those x[i] that are even + * (keeping track of carry), we can transform the original sum into one of the form + * S[x'[0]] +- 2 S[x'[1]] +- .. +- 2^{d-1} S[x'[d-1]] + 2^d S[x'[d]] + * with all x'[i] odd. It is therefore only necessary to know S at odd indices, + * which is why we are only computing half of it in the first place in + * ecp_precompute_comb and accessing it with index abs(i) / 2 in ecp_select_comb. + * + * - For the sake of compactness, only the seven low-order bits of x[i] + * are used to represent its absolute value (K_i in the paper), and the msb + * of x[i] encodes the sign (s_i in the paper): it is set if and only if + * if s_i == -1; + * + * Calling conventions: + * - x is an array of size d + 1 + * - w is the size, ie number of teeth, of the comb, and must be between + * 2 and 7 (in practice, between 2 and MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) + * - m is the MPI, expected to be odd and such that bitlength(m) <= w * d + * (the result will be incorrect if these assumptions are not satisfied) + */ +static void ecp_comb_recode_core( unsigned char x[], size_t d, + unsigned char w, const mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + size_t i, j; + unsigned char c, cc, adjust; + + memset( x, 0, d+1 ); + + /* First get the classical comb values (except for x_d = 0) */ + for( i = 0; i < d; i++ ) + for( j = 0; j < w; j++ ) + x[i] |= mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i + d * j ) << j; + + /* Now make sure x_1 .. x_d are odd */ + c = 0; + for( i = 1; i <= d; i++ ) + { + /* Add carry and update it */ + cc = x[i] & c; + x[i] = x[i] ^ c; + c = cc; + + /* Adjust if needed, avoiding branches */ + adjust = 1 - ( x[i] & 0x01 ); + c |= x[i] & ( x[i-1] * adjust ); + x[i] = x[i] ^ ( x[i-1] * adjust ); + x[i-1] |= adjust << 7; + } +} + +/* + * Precompute points for the adapted comb method + * + * Assumption: T must be able to hold 2^{w - 1} elements. + * + * Operation: If i = i_{w-1} ... i_1 is the binary representation of i, + * sets T[i] = i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + P. + * + * Cost: d(w-1) D + (2^{w-1} - 1) A + 1 N(w-1) + 1 N(2^{w-1} - 1) + * + * Note: Even comb values (those where P would be omitted from the + * sum defining T[i] above) are not needed in our adaption + * the comb method. See ecp_comb_recode_core(). + * + * This function currently works in four steps: + * (1) [dbl] Computation of intermediate T[i] for 2-power values of i + * (2) [norm_dbl] Normalization of coordinates of these T[i] + * (3) [add] Computation of all T[i] + * (4) [norm_add] Normalization of all T[i] + * + * Step 1 can be interrupted but not the others; together with the final + * coordinate normalization they are the largest steps done at once, depending + * on the window size. Here are operation counts for P-256: + * + * step (2) (3) (4) + * w = 5 142 165 208 + * w = 4 136 77 160 + * w = 3 130 33 136 + * w = 2 124 11 124 + * + * So if ECC operations are blocking for too long even with a low max_ops + * value, it's useful to set MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE to a lower value in order + * to minimize maximum blocking time. + */ +static int ecp_precompute_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point T[], const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + unsigned char w, size_t d, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t j = 0; + const unsigned char T_size = 1U << ( w - 1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl ) + goto dbl; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl ) + goto norm_dbl; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_add ) + goto add; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add ) + goto norm_add; + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_dbl; + + /* initial state for the loop */ + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + } + +dbl: +#endif + /* + * Set T[0] = P and + * T[2^{l-1}] = 2^{dl} P for l = 1 .. w-1 (this is not the final value) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &T[0], P ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0 ) + j = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + else +#endif + j = 0; + + for( ; j < d * ( w - 1 ); j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL ); + + i = 1U << ( j / d ); + cur = T + i; + + if( j % d == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( cur, T + ( i >> 1 ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, cur, cur ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl; + +norm_dbl: +#endif + /* + * Normalize current elements in T. As T has holes, + * use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + */ + j = 0; + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1 ) + TT[j++] = T + i; + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, j ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_add; + +add: +#endif + /* + * Compute the remaining ones using the minimal number of additions + * Be careful to update T[2^l] only after using it! + */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ( T_size - 1 ) * MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1 ) + { + j = i; + while( j-- ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i] ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add; + +norm_add: +#endif + /* + * Normalize final elements in T. Even though there are no holes now, we + * still need the auxiliary array for homogeneity with the previous + * call. Also, skip T[0] which is already normalised, being a copy of P. + */ + for( j = 0; j + 1 < T_size; j++ ) + TT[j] = T + j + 1; + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, j ) ); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl ) + rs_ctx->rsm->i = j; + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Select precomputed point: R = sign(i) * T[ abs(i) / 2 ] + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background + */ +static int ecp_select_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char i ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char ii, j; + + /* Ignore the "sign" bit and scale down */ + ii = ( i & 0x7Fu ) >> 1; + + /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */ + for( j = 0; j < T_size; j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii ) ); + } + + /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, R, i >> 7 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Core multiplication algorithm for the (modified) comb method. + * This part is actually common with the basic comb method (GECC 3.44) + * + * Cost: d A + d D + 1 R + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + const unsigned char x[], size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Txi ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + rs_ctx->rsm->state != ecp_rsm_comb_core ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } + + /* new 'if' instead of nested for the sake of the 'else' branch */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0 ) + { + /* restore current index (R already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R) */ + i = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + } + else +#endif + { + /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */ + i = d; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, T_size, x[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) ); + if( f_rng != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + } + + while( i != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + --i; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, R, R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, &Txi, T, T_size, x[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, R, &Txi ) ); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Txi ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = i; + /* no need to save R, already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R */ + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Recode the scalar to get constant-time comb multiplication + * + * As the actual scalar recoding needs an odd scalar as a starting point, + * this wrapper ensures that by replacing m by N - m if necessary, and + * informs the caller that the result of multiplication will be negated. + * + * This works because we only support large prime order for Short Weierstrass + * curves, so N is always odd hence either m or N - m is. + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background. + */ +static int ecp_comb_recode_scalar( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1], + size_t d, + unsigned char w, + unsigned char *parity_trick ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, mm; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mm ); + + /* N is always odd (see above), just make extra sure */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &grp->N, 0 ) != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* do we need the parity trick? */ + *parity_trick = ( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 0 ) == 0 ); + + /* execute parity fix in constant time */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &M, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mm, &grp->N, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &M, &mm, *parity_trick ) ); + + /* actual scalar recoding */ + ecp_comb_recode_core( k, d, w, &M ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mm ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform comb multiplication (for short Weierstrass curves) + * once the auxiliary table has been pre-computed. + * + * Scalar recoding may use a parity trick that makes us compute -m * P, + * if that is the case we'll need to recover m * P at the end. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T, + unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char w, + size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char parity_trick; + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; + mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + RR = &rs_ctx->rsm->R; + + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_final_norm ) + goto final_norm; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_comb_recode_scalar( grp, m, k, d, w, + &parity_trick ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb_core( grp, RR, T, T_size, k, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, RR, parity_trick ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_final_norm; + +final_norm: + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV ); +#endif + /* + * Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + if( f_rng != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, RR ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Pick window size based on curve size and whether we optimize for base point + */ +static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + unsigned char p_eq_g ) +{ + unsigned char w; + + /* + * Minimize the number of multiplications, that is minimize + * 10 * d * w + 18 * 2^(w-1) + 11 * d + 7 * w, with d = ceil( nbits / w ) + * (see costs of the various parts, with 1S = 1M) + */ + w = grp->nbits >= 384 ? 5 : 4; + + /* + * If P == G, pre-compute a bit more, since this may be re-used later. + * Just adding one avoids upping the cost of the first mul too much, + * and the memory cost too. + */ + if( p_eq_g ) + w++; + + /* + * If static comb table may not be used (!p_eq_g) or static comb table does + * not exists, make sure w is within bounds. + * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) + * + * The user reduces MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE does not changes the size of + * static comb table, because the size of static comb table is fixed when + * it is generated. + */ +#if( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) + if( (!p_eq_g || !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp)) && w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE ) + w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif + if( w >= grp->nbits ) + w = 2; + + return( w ); +} + +/* + * Multiplication using the comb method - for curves in short Weierstrass form + * + * This function is mainly responsible for administrative work: + * - managing the restart context if enabled + * - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two + * functions): allocation, computation, ownership tranfer, freeing. + * + * It delegates the actual arithmetic work to: + * ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp() + * + * See comments on ecp_comb_recode_core() regarding the computation strategy. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char w, p_eq_g, i; + size_t d; + unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL; + + ECP_RS_ENTER( rsm ); + + /* Is P the base point ? */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + p_eq_g = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &grp->G.Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &grp->G.X ) == 0 ); +#else + p_eq_g = 0; +#endif + + /* Pick window size and deduce related sizes */ + w = ecp_pick_window_size( grp, p_eq_g ); + T_size = 1U << ( w - 1 ); + d = ( grp->nbits + w - 1 ) / w; + + /* Pre-computed table: do we have it already for the base point? */ + if( p_eq_g && grp->T != NULL ) + { + /* second pointer to the same table, will be deleted on exit */ + T = grp->T; + T_ok = 1; + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* Pre-computed table: do we have one in progress? complete? */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->T != NULL ) + { + /* transfer ownership of T from rsm to local function */ + T = rs_ctx->rsm->T; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = NULL; + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = 0; + + /* This effectively jumps to the call to mul_comb_after_precomp() */ + T_ok = rs_ctx->rsm->state >= ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } + else +#endif + /* Allocate table if we didn't have any */ + { + T = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_point ) ); + if( T == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &T[i] ); + + T_ok = 0; + } + + /* Compute table (or finish computing it) if not done already */ + if( !T_ok ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_precompute_comb( grp, T, P, w, d, rs_ctx ) ); + + if( p_eq_g ) + { + /* almost transfer ownership of T to the group, but keep a copy of + * the pointer to use for calling the next function more easily */ + grp->T = T; + grp->T_size = T_size; + } + } + + /* Actual comb multiplication using precomputed points */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( grp, R, m, + T, T_size, w, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + + /* does T belong to the group? */ + if( T == grp->T ) + T = NULL; + + /* does T belong to the restart context? */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && T != NULL ) + { + /* transfer ownership of T from local function to rsm */ + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = T_size; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = T; + T = NULL; + } +#endif + + /* did T belong to us? then let's destroy it! */ + if( T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &T[i] ); + mbedtls_free( T ); + } + + /* don't free R while in progress in case R == P */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) +#endif + /* prevent caller from using invalid value */ + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( R ); + + ECP_RS_LEAVE( rsm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/* + * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective + * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is + * internaly represented as X / Z. + * + * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder. + */ + +/* + * Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1 + * Cost: 1M + 1I + */ +static int ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, P ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_mxz(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + * Cost: 2M + */ +static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->Z, &P->Z, &l ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Double-and-add: R = 2P, S = P + Q, with d = X(P - Q), + * for Montgomery curves in x/z coordinates. + * + * http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/montgom/xz/ladder/mladd-1987-m.op3 + * with + * d = X1 + * P = (X2, Z2) + * Q = (X3, Z3) + * R = (X4, Z4) + * S = (X5, Z5) + * and eliminating temporary variables tO, ..., t4. + * + * Cost: 5M + 4S + */ +static int ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, S, P, Q, d ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &CB ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &A, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &AA, &A, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &B, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &BB, &B, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &E, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &DA, &D, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &CB, &C, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &S->X, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->X, &S->X, &S->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S->Z, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, d, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->X, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &grp->A, &E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &E, &R->Z ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &B ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &CB ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Multiplication with Montgomery ladder in x/z coordinates, + * for curves in Montgomery form + */ +static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + unsigned char b; + mbedtls_ecp_point RP; + mbedtls_mpi PX; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &PX ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &PX, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &RP, P ) ); + + /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->X, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 0 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y ); + + /* RP.X might be sligtly larger than P, so reduce it */ + MOD_ADD( RP.X ); + + /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( m ); /* one past the (zero-based) most significant bit */ + while( i-- > 0 ) + { + b = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i ); + /* + * if (b) R = 2R + P else R = 2R, + * which is: + * if (b) double_add( RP, R, RP, R ) + * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP ) + * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); + } + + /* + * Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &PX ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + * + * This internal function can be called without an RNG in case where we know + * the inputs are not sensitive. + */ +static int ecp_mul_restartable_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* skip argument check when restarting */ + if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL ) +#endif + { + /* check_privkey is free */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK ); + + /* Common sanity checks */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ); + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( is_grp_capable ) + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) + rs_ctx->depth--; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( ecp_mul_restartable_internal( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +} + +/* + * Multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key, + * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1) + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS; + + /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Y, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->X, &grp->P ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->Y, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RHS ); + + /* + * YY = Y^2 + * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &RHS, &RHS, 3 ) ); MOD_SUB( RHS ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RHS ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 + * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass! + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, -1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R->Y, 0 ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &R->Y, &grp->P, &R->Y ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_restartable_internal( grp, R, m, P, + NULL, NULL, rs_ctx ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Restartable linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &mP ); + + ECP_RS_ENTER( ma ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + { + /* redirect intermediate results to restart context */ + pmP = &rs_ctx->ma->mP; + pR = &rs_ctx->ma->R; + + /* jump to next operation */ + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_mul2 ) + goto mul2; + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_add ) + goto add; + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_norm ) + goto norm; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pmP, m, P, rs_ctx ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_mul2; + +mul2: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pR, n, Q, rs_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_add; + +add: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, pR, pmP, pR ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_norm; + +norm: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pR ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, pR ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( is_grp_capable ) + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &mP ); + + ECP_RS_LEAVE( ma ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) +/* + * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in + * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate + * See ecp_check_pubkey_x25519(). + */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_1[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_2[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_1 ); +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_2 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that the input point is not one of the low-order points. + * This is recommended by the "May the Fourth" paper: + * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf + * Those points are never sent by an honest peer. + */ +static int ecp_check_bad_points_mx( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi XmP; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &XmP ); + + /* Reduce X mod P so that we only need to check values less than P. + * We know X < 2^256 so we can proceed by subtraction. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &XmP, X ) ); + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &XmP, &XmP, P ) ); + + /* Check against the known bad values that are less than P. For Curve448 + * these are 0, 1 and -1. For Curve25519 we check the values less than P + * from the following list: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XmP, 1 ) <= 0 ) /* takes care of 0 and 1 */ + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#else + (void) grp_id; +#endif + + /* Final check: check if XmP + 1 is P (final because it changes XmP!) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &XmP, &XmP, 1 ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &XmP ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + /* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ + /* Allow any public value, if it's too big then we'll just reduce it mod p + * (RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 3). */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* Implicit in all standards (as they don't consider negative numbers): + * X must be non-negative. This is normally ensured by the way it's + * encoded for transmission, but let's be extra sure. */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( ecp_check_bad_points_mx( &pt->X, &grp->P, grp->id ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that a point is valid as a public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + /* Must use affine coordinates */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) ); +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Check that an mbedtls_mpi is valid as a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 1 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1 != grp->nbits ) /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* see [Curve25519] page 5 */ + if( grp->nbits == 254 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 2 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* see SEC1 3.2 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + else + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t high_bit, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1; + + /* [Curve25519] page 5 */ + /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough + * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary + * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_random_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, high_bit, 1 ) ); + + /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for + Curve25519 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) ); + if( high_bit == 254 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( + const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + default: + return( ret ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generate a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( &grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair with configurable base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate key pair, wrapper for conventional base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair, prettier wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +/* + * Read a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* + * If it is Curve25519 curve then mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 + */ + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + /* Set the three least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 2, 0 ) ); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 0 ) + ); + + /* Set the second most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1 ) + ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &key->grp, &key->d ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Write a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen < ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + + +/* + * Check a public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + /* mbedtls_ecp_mul() needs a non-const group... */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &grp, &prv->grp ); + + /* Also checks d is valid */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng( void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. + * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents + * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ +static int self_test_adjust_exponent( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + int ret = 0; + switch( grp->id ) + { + /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the + * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */ +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is + * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, 254, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits, 1 ) ); + /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not + * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits - 1, + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 253 ) ) ); + break; +#endif +#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */ + default: + /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */ + (void) grp; + (void) m; + goto cleanup; + } +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of + * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */ +static int self_test_point( int verbose, + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const char *const *exponents, + size_t n_exponents ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i = 0; + unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL ) ); + + for( i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++ ) + { + add_c_prev = add_count; + dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; + mul_c_prev = mul_count; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL ) ); + + if( add_count != add_c_prev || + dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || + mul_count != mul_c_prev ) + { + ret = 1; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; + mbedtls_mpi m; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest + * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger + * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */ + const char *sw_exponents[] = + { + "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */ + "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */ + "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */ + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */ + "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */ + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + const char *m_exponents[] = + { + /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448 + * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in + * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */ + "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30", + "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8", + "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460", + "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550", + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8", + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &m ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) ); +#else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id ) ); +#endif + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " ); + /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL ) ); + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " ); + /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */ + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &P, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): " ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) ); +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test" +#endif + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + m_exponents, + sizeof( m_exponents ) / sizeof( m_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +cleanup: + + if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &m ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_curves.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_curves.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..421a067b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -0,0 +1,5459 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(1, 0, NULL) } +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(1, 1, mpi_one) } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = {1}; +#endif + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x51, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xC6, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x18, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp521r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x03, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192k1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x05, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x07, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len ) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = len / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} + +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = mpi_one; +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T) +{ + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->P, p, plen ); + if( a != NULL ) + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->A, a, alen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->B, b, blen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->N, n, nlen ); + + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.X, gx, gxlen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.Y, gy, gylen ); + ecp_mpi_set1( &grp->G.Z ); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); + + grp->h = 1; + + grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T; + /* + * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free. + */ + grp->T_size = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP( P ) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP( P ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + G ## _a, sizeof( G ## _a ), \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ), \ + G ## _T \ + ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ), \ + G ## _T \ + ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; +static const unsigned char curve25519_part_of_n[] = { + 0x14, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0xF7, 0x9C, 0xD6, + 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x1A, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xED, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve25519_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^255 - 19 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 255 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 19 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->N, + curve25519_part_of_n, sizeof( curve25519_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 252, 1 ) ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 9 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; +static const unsigned char curve448_part_of_n[] = { + 0x83, 0x35, 0xDC, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x24, + 0xB6, 0x51, 0x29, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0x93, + 0x3D, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x70, 0xAA, 0xDC, + 0x87, 0x3D, 0x6D, 0x54, 0xA7, 0xBB, 0x0D, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Ns; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ns ); + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve448_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 5 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 446, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Ns, + curve448_part_of_n, sizeof( curve448_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &grp->N, &grp->N, &Ns ) ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Ns ); + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + grp->id = id; + + switch( id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP( p192 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp192r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP( p224 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp224r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP( p256 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP( p384 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP( p521 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp521r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp192k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp224k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp256k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP512r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; + return( ecp_use_curve25519( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; + return( ecp_use_curve448( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++, src++ ) + { + *dst += c; c = ( *dst < c ); + *dst += *src; c += ( *dst < *src ); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++ ) + { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = ( *dst < *carry ); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) +#define A( i ) N->p + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD( i ) add64( p, A( i ), &c ) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64( p, &c ) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; *p = c; while( ++p < end ) *p = 0 + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, 6 * WIDTH ) ); + + p = N->p; + end = p + N->n; + + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); LAST; // A2 += A4 + A5 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A( i ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n +#define A( j ) N->p[j] +#define STORE32 N->p[i] = cur; + +#else /* 64-bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n * 2 +#define A( j ) (j) % 2 ? (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] >> 32 ) : \ + (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] ) +#define STORE32 \ + if( i % 2 ) { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + N->p[i/2] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + N->p[i/2] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; \ + } + +#endif /* sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) */ + +/* + * Helpers for addition and subtraction of chunks, with signed carry. + */ +static inline void add32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *dst += src; + *carry += ( *dst < src ); +} + +static inline void sub32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *carry -= ( *dst < src ); + *dst -= src; +} + +#define ADD( j ) add32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); +#define SUB( j ) sub32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT( b ) \ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; \ + signed char c = 0, cc; \ + uint32_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0, bits = (b); \ + /* N is the size of the product of two b-bit numbers, plus one */ \ + /* limb for fix_negative */ \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, ( b ) * 2 / biL + 1 ) ); \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + cc = c; c = 0; \ + if( cc < 0 ) \ + sub32( &cur, -cc, &c ); \ + else \ + add32( &cur, cc, &c ); \ + +#define LAST \ + STORE32; i++; \ + cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \ + cur = 0; while( ++i < MAX32 ) { STORE32; } \ + if( c < 0 ) mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( N, c, bits ); + +/* + * If the result is negative, we get it in the form + * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Set N := 2^bits - 1 - N. We know that 0 <= N < 2^bits, so + * set the absolute value to 0xfff...fff - N. There is no carry + * since we're subtracting from all-bits-one. */ + for( i = 0; i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++ ) + { + N->p[i] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint)0 - N->p[i]; + } + /* Add 1, taking care of the carry. */ + i = 0; + do + ++N->p[i]; + while( N->p[i++] == 0 && i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + /* Invert the sign. + * Now N = N0 - 2^bits where N0 is the initial value of N. */ + N->s = -1; + + /* Add |c| * 2^bits to the absolute value. Since c and N are + * negative, this adds c * 2^bits. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint msw = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + if( bits == 224 ) + msw <<= 32; +#endif + N->p[bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint)] += msw; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 224 ); + + SUB( 7 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 12 ); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 13 ); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB( 10 ); ADD( 7 ); ADD( 11 ); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB( 11 ); ADD( 8 ); ADD( 12 ); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB( 12 ); ADD( 9 ); ADD( 13 ); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB( 13 ); ADD( 10 ); LAST; // A6 += -A13 + A10 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 256 ); + + ADD( 8 ); ADD( 9 ); + SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 9 ); ADD( 10 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD( 10 ); ADD( 11 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 11 ); ADD( 11 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 10 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 8 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); LAST; // A7 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 384 ); + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 20 ); + SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 21 ); + SUB( 14 ); SUB( 22 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 23 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 16 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 23 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 17 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 19 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 18 ); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD( 20 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 16 ); + SUB( 19 ); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 17 ); + SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 19 ); ADD( 18 ); + SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 19 ); + SUB( 22 ); LAST; // A11 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef A +#undef LOAD32 +#undef STORE32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward. + * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits). + */ + +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH ( 521 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1]; + /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits: + * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is + * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */ + + if( N->n < P521_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P521_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1 ) + M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1; + M.p = Mp; + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 521 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + for( i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH ( 255 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^255 A1, return A0 + 19 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; + + if( N->n < P255_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P255_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P255_WIDTH + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P255_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 255 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + M.n++; /* Make room for multiplication by 19 */ + + /* N = A0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( N, 255, 0 ) ); + for( i = P255_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + 19 * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &M, 19 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH ( 448 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP( X, Y ) ( ( ( X ) + ( Y ) - 1 ) / ( Y ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN ( 28 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP( 28, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ( ( P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 ) - 224 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write N as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference + * implementation of Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather + * than a generic bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on + * 32-bit machines by splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the + * arithmetic using the limbs directly as we do for the NIST primes above, + * but for 64-bit targets it should use half the number of operations if we do + * the reduction with 224-bit limbs, since mpi_add_mpi will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, Q; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH]; + + if( N->n <= P448_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P448_WIDTH ); + if( M.n > P448_WIDTH ) + /* Shouldn't be called with N larger than 2^896! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof( Mp ) ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P448_WIDTH, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + for( i = P448_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N += A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Q = B1, N += B1 */ + Q = M; + Q.p = Qp; + memcpy( Qp, Mp, sizeof( Qp ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Q, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &Q ) ); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224, N += M */ + if( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) > 4 ) + Mp[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1 ) >> ( P224_UNUSED_BITS ); + for( i = P224_WIDTH_MAX; i < M.n; ++i ) + Mp[i] = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &Q ) ); + M.n = P448_WIDTH + 1; /* Make room for shifted carry bit from the addition */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &M, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write N as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + * Actually do two passes, since R is big. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX ( 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Max limbs in P +#define P_KOBLITZ_R ( 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Limbs in R +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz( mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, + size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, R; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1]; + + if( N->n < p_limbs ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Init R */ + R.s = 1; + R.p = Rp; + R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; + + /* Common setup for M */ + M.s = 1; + M.p = Mp; + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Second pass */ + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x0100001119 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 192 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 4, 1, 32, 0xFFFFFFFF ) ); +#else + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 224 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_internal_alt.h similarity index 96% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_internal_alt.h index 18040697..a7544aaf 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_internal_alt.h @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ /** - * \file ecp_internal.h + * \file ecp_internal_alt.h * * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve * point arithmetic. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -61,6 +59,8 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) /** @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); */ void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) /** @@ -239,9 +239,9 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); #endif -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, @@ -285,9 +285,9 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); #endif -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ -#endif /* ecp_internal.h */ +#endif /* ecp_internal_alt.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_invasive.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..71c77027 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ecp_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_invasive.h + * + * \brief ECP module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* Preconditions: + * - bits is a multiple of 64 or is 224 + * - c is -1 or -2 + * - 0 <= N < 2^bits + * - N has room for bits plus one limb + * + * Behavior: + * Set N to c * 2^bits + old_value_of_N. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448). + * + * This function implements key generation for the set of secret keys + * specified in [Curve25519] p. 5 and in [Curve448]. The resulting value + * has the lower bits masked but is not necessarily canonical. + * + * \note - [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * - [RFC7748] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748 + * + * \p high_bit The position of the high-order bit of the key to generate. + * This is the bit-size of the key minus 1: + * 254 for Curve25519 or 447 for Curve448. + * \param d The randomly generated key. This is a number of size + * exactly \p n_bits + 1 bits, with the least significant bits + * masked as specified in [Curve25519] and in [RFC7748] §5. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_xxx or MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t n_bits, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/entropy.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy.c similarity index 84% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/entropy.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy.c index f8db1a55..9e31f849 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/entropy.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Entropy accumulator implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,27 +15,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -#warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " -#warning "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES " -#warning "**** THIS BUILD IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE " -#endif - #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -56,9 +45,6 @@ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif #define ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP 256 /**< Maximum amount to loop before error */ @@ -77,34 +63,16 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) #else mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_init( &ctx->havege_data ); -#endif /* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files * when adding more strong entropy sources here. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_null_entropy_poll, NULL, - 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_havege_poll, &ctx->havege_data, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE, @@ -121,9 +89,11 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_free( &ctx->havege_data ); -#endif + /* If the context was already free, don't call free() again. + * This is important for mutexes which don't allow double-free. */ + if( ctx->accumulator_started == -1 ) + return; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); #endif @@ -137,7 +107,7 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) #endif ctx->source_count = 0; mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->source, sizeof( ctx->source ) ); - ctx->accumulator_started = 0; + ctx->accumulator_started = -1; } int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, @@ -189,10 +159,10 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id if( use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; #else - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; #endif p = tmp; @@ -209,22 +179,22 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) if( ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && - ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; else ctx->accumulator_started = 1; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); #else if( ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && - ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; else ctx->accumulator_started = 1; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); #endif cleanup: @@ -236,7 +206,7 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) @@ -258,7 +228,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, */ static int entropy_gather_internal( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) { - int ret, i, have_one_strong = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + int i; + int have_one_strong = 0; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER]; size_t olen; @@ -306,7 +278,7 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) @@ -325,7 +297,8 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) { - int ret, count = 0, i, done; + int ret, count = 0, i, thresholds_reached; + size_t strong_size; mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -363,12 +336,17 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) if( ( ret = entropy_gather_internal( ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - done = 1; + thresholds_reached = 1; + strong_size = 0; for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + { if( ctx->source[i].size < ctx->source[i].threshold ) - done = 0; + thresholds_reached = 0; + if( ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) + strong_size += ctx->source[i].size; + } } - while( ! done ); + while( ! thresholds_reached || strong_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); @@ -378,7 +356,7 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) * in a previous call to entropy_update(). If this is not guaranteed, the * code below will fail. */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; /* @@ -386,20 +364,20 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) */ mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx->accumulator ); mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx->accumulator ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx->accumulator, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; /* * Perform second SHA-512 on entropy */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, buf, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; #else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; /* @@ -407,16 +385,16 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) */ mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx->accumulator ); mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx->accumulator, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; /* * Perform second SHA-256 on entropy */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, buf, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ @@ -463,15 +441,21 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; - FILE *f; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f = NULL; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; - if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; goto exit; + } + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f ) != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) { @@ -484,7 +468,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *p exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - fclose( f ); + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + return( ret ); } @@ -522,7 +508,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char * #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) /* * Dummy source function */ @@ -536,7 +521,6 @@ static int entropy_dummy_source( void *data, unsigned char *output, return( 0 ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) @@ -644,17 +628,14 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose ) { int ret = 1; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; size_t i, j; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " ENTROPY test: " ); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); /* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */ @@ -702,7 +683,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose ) cleanup: mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ if( verbose != 0 ) { diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/entropy_poll.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy_poll.c similarity index 62% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/entropy_poll.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy_poll.c index 040aa117..058c307d 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/entropy_poll.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,34 +15,26 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if defined(__linux__) +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) /* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #include "mbedtls/timing.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #endif @@ -51,8 +43,8 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) -#error "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in config.h" + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h" #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) @@ -94,11 +86,12 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len * Since there is no wrapper in the libc yet, use the generic syscall wrapper * available in GNU libc and compatible libc's (eg uClibc). */ -#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__) +#if ((defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__)) || defined(__midipix__)) #include #include #if defined(SYS_getrandom) #define HAVE_GETRANDOM +#include static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) { @@ -108,49 +101,60 @@ static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) memset( buf, 0, buflen ); #endif #endif - return( syscall( SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags ) ); } +#endif /* SYS_getrandom */ +#endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */ -#include -/* Check if version is at least 3.17.0 */ -static int check_version_3_17_plus( void ) +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) +#include +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || \ + (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) +#include +#include +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) { - int minor; - struct utsname un; - const char *ver; + return getrandom( buf, buflen, flags ); +} +#endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || + (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */ - /* Get version information */ - uname(&un); - ver = un.release; +/* + * Some BSD systems provide KERN_ARND. + * This is equivalent to reading from /dev/urandom, only it doesn't require an + * open file descriptor, and provides up to 256 bytes per call (basically the + * same as getentropy(), but with a longer history). + * + * Documentation: https://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?sysctl+7 + */ +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) +#include +#include +#if defined(KERN_ARND) +#define HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND - /* Check major version; assume a single digit */ - if( ver[0] < '3' || ver[0] > '9' || ver [1] != '.' ) - return( -1 ); +static int sysctl_arnd_wrapper( unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int name[2]; + size_t len; - if( ver[0] - '0' > 3 ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Ok, so now we know major == 3, check minor. - * Assume 1 or 2 digits. */ - if( ver[2] < '0' || ver[2] > '9' ) - return( -1 ); - - minor = ver[2] - '0'; - - if( ver[3] >= '0' && ver[3] <= '9' ) - minor = 10 * minor + ver[3] - '0'; - else if( ver [3] != '.' ) - return( -1 ); - - if( minor < 17 ) - return( -1 ); + name[0] = CTL_KERN; + name[1] = KERN_ARND; + while( buflen > 0 ) + { + len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; + if( sysctl(name, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1 ) + return( -1 ); + buflen -= len; + buf += len; + } return( 0 ); } -static int has_getrandom = -1; -#endif /* SYS_getrandom */ -#endif /* __linux__ */ +#endif /* KERN_ARND */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __NetBSD__ */ #include @@ -159,24 +163,32 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, { FILE *file; size_t read_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ((void) data); #if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) - if( has_getrandom == -1 ) - has_getrandom = ( check_version_3_17_plus() == 0 ); - - if( has_getrandom ) + ret = getrandom_wrapper( output, len, 0 ); + if( ret >= 0 ) { - int ret; - - if( ( ret = getrandom_wrapper( output, len, 0 ) ) < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); - *olen = ret; return( 0 ); } + else if( errno != ENOSYS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + /* Fall through if the system call isn't known. */ +#else + ((void) ret); #endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND) + ((void) file); + ((void) read_len); + if( sysctl_arnd_wrapper( output, len ) == -1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + *olen = len; + return( 0 ); +#else + *olen = 0; file = fopen( "/dev/urandom", "rb" ); @@ -194,61 +206,11 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, *olen = len; return( 0 ); +#endif /* HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND */ } #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) -{ - ((void) data); - ((void) output); - *olen = 0; - - if( len < sizeof(unsigned char) ) - return( 0 ); - - *olen = sizeof(unsigned char); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) -{ - unsigned long timer = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - ((void) data); - *olen = 0; - - if( len < sizeof(unsigned long) ) - return( 0 ); - - memcpy( output, &timer, sizeof(unsigned long) ); - *olen = sizeof(unsigned long); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -int mbedtls_havege_poll( void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) -{ - mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) data; - *olen = 0; - - if( mbedtls_havege_random( hs, output, len ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); - - *olen = len; - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy_poll.h similarity index 63% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy_poll.h index 94dd657e..aef1a097 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/entropy_poll.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,17 +18,11 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -40,20 +34,10 @@ extern "C" { * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE 32 /**< Minimum for HAVEGE */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK 4 /**< Minimum for mbedtls_timing_hardclock() */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ #endif -/** - * \brief Entropy poll callback that provides 0 entropy. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) - int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) /** * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback @@ -62,30 +46,12 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -/** - * \brief HAVEGE based entropy poll callback - * - * Requires an HAVEGE state as its data pointer. - */ -int mbedtls_havege_poll( void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -/** - * \brief mbedtls_timing_hardclock-based entropy poll callback - */ -int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) /** * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source * * \warning This is not provided by mbed TLS! - * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in config.h. + * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in mbedtls_config.h. * * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/gcm.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/gcm.c similarity index 63% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/gcm.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/gcm.c index 57b02793..835b1b28 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/gcm.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/gcm.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -29,28 +27,24 @@ * [MGV] 4.1, pp. 12-13, to enhance speed without using too much memory. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) #include "mbedtls/aes.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include #define mbedtls_printf printf #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ @@ -58,6 +52,12 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define GCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ) +#define GCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + /* * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) */ @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ */ void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) { + GCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); } @@ -162,10 +163,15 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256 ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); if( cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); @@ -235,7 +241,7 @@ static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], for( i = 15; i >= 0; i-- ) { lo = x[i] & 0xf; - hi = x[i] >> 4; + hi = ( x[i] >> 4 ) & 0xf; if( i != 15 ) { @@ -263,26 +269,22 @@ static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], } int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char *iv, - size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, - size_t add_len ) + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char work_buf[16]; size_t i; const unsigned char *p; size_t use_len, olen = 0; - /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + + /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ - if( iv_len == 0 || - ( (uint64_t) iv_len ) >> 61 != 0 || - ( (uint64_t) add_len ) >> 61 != 0 ) - { + if( iv_len == 0 || (uint64_t) iv_len >> 61 != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); - } memset( ctx->y, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->y) ); memset( ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf) ); @@ -321,101 +323,246 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, - &olen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, + ctx->base_ectr, &olen ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } - ctx->add_len = add_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/** + * mbedtls_gcm_context::buf contains the partial state of the computation of + * the authentication tag. + * mbedtls_gcm_context::add_len and mbedtls_gcm_context::len indicate + * different stages of the computation: + * * len == 0 && add_len == 0: initial state + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 != 0: the first `add_len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of AD that has been + * xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + * * len % 16 != 0: the first `len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of ciphertext that has + * been xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len > 0 && len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + size_t use_len, i, offset; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + + /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ + if( (uint64_t) add_len >> 61 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + offset = ctx->add_len % 16; p = add; - while( add_len > 0 ) + + if( offset != 0 ) { - use_len = ( add_len < 16 ) ? add_len : 16; + use_len = 16 - offset; + if( use_len > add_len ) + use_len = add_len; for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) - ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + ctx->buf[i+offset] ^= p[i]; - gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + if( offset + use_len == 16 ) + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + ctx->add_len += use_len; add_len -= use_len; p += use_len; } + ctx->add_len += add_len; + + while( add_len >= 16 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + add_len -= 16; + p += 16; + } + + if( add_len > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < add_len; i++ ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Increment the counter. */ +static void gcm_incr( unsigned char y[16] ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- ) + if( ++y[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; +} + +/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data, + * starting at position offset in the mask block. */ +static int gcm_mask( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char ectr[16], + size_t offset, size_t use_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + size_t i; + size_t olen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ectr, 16 ); + return( ret ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) + { + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT ) + ctx->buf[offset + i] ^= input[i]; + output[i] = ectr[offset + i] ^ input[i]; + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT ) + ctx->buf[offset + i] ^= output[i]; + } return( 0 ); } int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) { - int ret; - unsigned char ectr[16]; - size_t i; - const unsigned char *p; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = input; unsigned char *out_p = output; - size_t use_len, olen = 0; + size_t offset; + unsigned char ectr[16]; - if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < length ) + if( output_size < input_length ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( output_length != NULL ); + *output_length = input_length; + + /* Exit early if input_length==0 so that we don't do any pointer arithmetic + * on a potentially null pointer. + * Returning early also means that the last partial block of AD remains + * untouched for mbedtls_gcm_finish */ + if( input_length == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < input_length ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes * Also check for possible overflow */ - if( ctx->len + length < ctx->len || - (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull ) + if( ctx->len + input_length < ctx->len || + (uint64_t) ctx->len + input_length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); } - ctx->len += length; - - p = input; - while( length > 0 ) + if( ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0 ) { - use_len = ( length < 16 ) ? length : 16; - - for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- ) - if( ++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, - &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) - { - if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT ) - ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; - out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; - if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT ) - ctx->buf[i] ^= out_p[i]; - } - gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + } - length -= use_len; + offset = ctx->len % 16; + if( offset != 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = 16 - offset; + if( use_len > input_length ) + use_len = input_length; + + if( ( ret = gcm_mask( ctx, ectr, offset, use_len, p, out_p ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( offset + use_len == 16 ) + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + ctx->len += use_len; + input_length -= use_len; p += use_len; out_p += use_len; } + ctx->len += input_length; + + while( input_length >= 16 ) + { + gcm_incr( ctx->y ); + if( ( ret = gcm_mask( ctx, ectr, 0, 16, p, out_p ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + input_length -= 16; + p += 16; + out_p += 16; + } + + if( input_length > 0 ) + { + gcm_incr( ctx->y ); + if( ( ret = gcm_mask( ctx, ectr, 0, input_length, p, out_p ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ectr, sizeof( ectr ) ); return( 0 ); } int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - unsigned char *tag, - size_t tag_len ) + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { unsigned char work_buf[16]; size_t i; - uint64_t orig_len = ctx->len * 8; - uint64_t orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; + uint64_t orig_len; + uint64_t orig_add_len; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + + /* We never pass any output in finish(). The output parameter exists only + * for the sake of alternative implementations. */ + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + *output_length = 0; + + orig_len = ctx->len * 8; + orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; + + if( ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0 ) + { + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + } if( tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + if( ctx->len % 16 != 0 ) + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + memcpy( tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len ); if( orig_len || orig_add_len ) @@ -451,15 +598,27 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t tag_len, unsigned char *tag ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( ctx, length, input, output ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( ctx, add, add_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( ctx, input, length, + output, length, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); return( 0 ); @@ -476,11 +635,18 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; size_t i; int diff; + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, tag_len, check_tag ) ) != 0 ) @@ -503,6 +669,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) { + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); } @@ -517,10 +685,10 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) */ #define MAX_TESTS 6 -static const int key_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char key[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, @@ -532,13 +700,13 @@ static const unsigned char key[MAX_TESTS][32] = 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }, }; -static const size_t iv_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 12, 12, 12, 12, 8, 60 }; -static const int iv_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; -static const unsigned char iv[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -554,13 +722,13 @@ static const unsigned char iv[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }, }; -static const size_t add_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 20, 20, 20 }; -static const int add_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char additional[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char additional_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, @@ -568,13 +736,13 @@ static const unsigned char additional[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }, }; -static const size_t pt_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 16, 64, 60, 60, 60 }; -static const int pt_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char pt[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -588,7 +756,7 @@ static const unsigned char pt[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, }; -static const unsigned char ct[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = +static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, @@ -697,7 +865,7 @@ static const unsigned char ct[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, }; -static const unsigned char tag[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = +static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = { { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, @@ -744,6 +912,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) unsigned char tag_buf[16]; int i, j, ret; mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + size_t olen; for( j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { @@ -757,14 +926,15 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); /* * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && key_len == 192 ) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && key_len == 192 ) { mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); break; @@ -775,15 +945,28 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) } ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, - pt_len[i], - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i], - pt[pt_index[i]], buf, 16, tag_buf ); + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf, 16, tag_buf ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + /* Allow alternative implementations to only support 12-byte nonces. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && + iv_len_test_data[i] != 12 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + break; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) */ if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if ( memcmp( buf, ct[j * 6 + i], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if ( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; @@ -800,22 +983,26 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "dec" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, - pt_len[i], - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i], - ct[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf ); + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( memcmp( buf, pt[pt_index[i]], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; @@ -832,42 +1019,64 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i] ); + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( pt_len[i] > 32 ) + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( &ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) { - size_t rest_len = pt_len[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, pt[pt_index[i]], buf ); + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + 32, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; + if( olen != 32 ) + goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, pt[pt_index[i]] + 32, - buf + 32 ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof( buf ) - 32, &olen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; + if( olen != rest_len ) + goto exit; } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len[i], pt[pt_index[i]], buf ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; + if( olen != pt_len_test_data[i] ) + goto exit; } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( memcmp( buf, ct[j * 6 + i], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; @@ -884,43 +1093,62 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", key_len, i, "dec" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i] ); + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( &ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( pt_len[i] > 32 ) + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) { - size_t rest_len = pt_len[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, ct[j * 6 + i], buf ); + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], 32, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; + if( olen != 32 ) + goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, ct[j * 6 + i] + 32, - buf + 32 ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof( buf ) - 32, &olen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; + if( olen != rest_len ) + goto exit; } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len[i], ct[j * 6 + i], - buf ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; + if( olen != pt_len_test_data[i] ) + goto exit; } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( memcmp( buf, pt[pt_index[i]], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/hkdf.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/hkdf.c similarity index 93% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/hkdf.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/hkdf.c index 82d8a429..5013729d 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/hkdf.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/hkdf.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * HKDF implementation -- RFC 5869 * - * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,27 +15,22 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) #include #include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char prk[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk ); @@ -114,7 +109,7 @@ int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, n = okm_len / hash_len; - if( (okm_len % hash_len) != 0 ) + if( okm_len % hash_len != 0 ) { n++; } @@ -130,11 +125,13 @@ int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); - if( (ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md, 1) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { goto exit; } + memset( t, 0, hash_len ); + /* * Compute T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N) * Where T(N) is defined in RFC 5869 Section 2.3 diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/hmac_drbg.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/hmac_drbg.c similarity index 66% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/hmac_drbg.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/hmac_drbg.c index dad55ff8..ab353bfd 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/hmac_drbg.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -25,16 +23,13 @@ * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -58,37 +53,55 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); -#endif + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; } /* * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) */ -void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) { size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1; unsigned char sep[1]; unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ ) { /* Step 1 or 4 */ - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, sep, 1 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + sep, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; if( rounds == 2 ) - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, additional, add_len ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ); + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; /* Step 2 or 5 */ - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K, sizeof( K ) ); + return( ret ); } /* @@ -98,47 +111,91 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + /* * Set initial working state. * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. */ - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); memset( ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, data, data_len ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); return( 0 ); } /* - * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 (arabic) + 9.2 (Roman) + * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG. + * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4 + * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2. */ -int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len, + int use_nonce ) { unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; - size_t seedlen; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* III. Check input length */ - if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || - ctx->entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + size_t total_entropy_len; + + if( use_nonce == 0 ) + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len; + else + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2; + + /* III. Check input length */ + if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || + total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + } } memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ - if( ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, + seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 ) + { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated + * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */ + if( use_nonce ) + { + /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order + * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy() + * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not + * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which + * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own + * entropy source implementation can emit in a single + * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */ + if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, + seed + seedlen, + ctx->entropy_len / 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2; + } - seedlen = ctx->entropy_len; /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */ if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) @@ -148,17 +205,32 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, } /* 2. Update state */ - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, seed, seedlen ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */ ctx->reseed_counter = 1; +exit: /* 4. Done */ - return( 0 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2 + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +{ + return( hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); } /* * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1) + * + * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted + * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, @@ -167,12 +239,17 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) { - int ret; - size_t entropy_len, md_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t md_size; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); /* @@ -180,35 +257,32 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. */ - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_size ); ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; - ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) + { + /* + * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by + * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, + * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. + * + * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) + */ + ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ + md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ + 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ + } - /* - * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by - * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, - * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. - * - * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) - */ - entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ - md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ - 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ - - /* - * For initialisation, use more entropy to emulate a nonce - * (Again, matches test vectors.) - */ - ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len * 3 / 2; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, custom, len ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, custom, len, + 1 /* add nonce */ ) ) != 0 ) + { return( ret ); - - ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len; + } return( 0 ); } @@ -223,7 +297,7 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx } /* - * Set entropy length grabbed for reseeds + * Set entropy length grabbed for seeding */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) { @@ -246,7 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); size_t left = out_len; @@ -273,16 +347,24 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, /* 2. Use additional data if any */ if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len ); + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ while( left != 0 ) { size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len ); out += use_len; @@ -290,13 +372,16 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, } /* 6. Update */ - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; /* 7. Update reseed counter */ ctx->reseed_counter++; +exit: /* 8. Done */ - return( 0 ); + return( ret ); } /* @@ -304,7 +389,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -323,7 +408,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len } /* - * Free an HMAC_DRBG context + * This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) { @@ -331,16 +417,19 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) return; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ + if( ctx->md_ctx.md_info != NULL ) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); #endif mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->md_ctx ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; FILE *f; unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; @@ -368,35 +457,36 @@ exit: int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) { int ret = 0; - FILE *f; + FILE *f = NULL; size_t n; unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + unsigned char c; if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); - n = (size_t) ftell( f ); - fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); - - if( n > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) { - fclose( f ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; } - - if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n ) + if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) + { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; - else - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n ); - + goto exit; + } fclose( f ); + f = NULL; + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n ); + +exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); - return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2287896 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md.c @@ -0,0 +1,812 @@ +/** + * \file md.c + * + * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "md_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { + "MD5", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, + 16, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { + "RIPEMD160", + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { + "SHA1", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { + "SHA224", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + 28, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { + "SHA256", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + 32, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { + "SHA384", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + 48, + 128, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { + "SHA512", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + 64, + 128, +}; +#endif + +/* + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! + */ +static const int supported_digests[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; + +const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ) +{ + return( supported_digests ); +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ) +{ + if( NULL == md_name ) + return( NULL ); + + /* Get the appropriate digest information */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + if( !strcmp( "MD5", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + if( !strcmp( "RIPEMD160", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA1", md_name ) || !strcmp( "SHA", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA224", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA256", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA384", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA512", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); +#endif + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ) +{ + switch( md_type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} + +void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return; + + if( ctx->md_ctx != NULL ) + { + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + break; + } + mbedtls_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + } + + if( ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->hmac_ctx, + 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->hmac_ctx ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ) +{ + if( dst == NULL || dst->md_info == NULL || + src == NULL || src->md_info == NULL || + dst->md_info != src->md_info ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + switch( src->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define ALLOC( type ) \ + do { \ + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_##type##_context ) ); \ + if( ctx->md_ctx == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + mbedtls_##type##_init( ctx->md_ctx ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ctx->md_info = md_info; + ctx->md_ctx = NULL; + ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; + + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + ALLOC( md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + ALLOC( ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + ALLOC( sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + ALLOC( sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + ALLOC( sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + ALLOC( sha512 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + ALLOC( sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( hmac != 0 ) + { + ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 2, md_info->block_size ); + if( ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_md_free( ctx ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#undef ALLOC + +int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_starts( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_starts( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f; + size_t n; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + while( ( n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) ) > 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, buf, n ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ferror( f ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; + else + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *ipad, *opad; + size_t i; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + keylen = ctx->md_info->size; + key = sum; + } + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + memset( ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size ); + memset( opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size ); + + for( i = 0; i < keylen; i++ ) + { + ipad[i] = (unsigned char)( ipad[i] ^ key[i] ); + opad[i] = (unsigned char)( opad[i] ^ key[i] ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sum, sizeof( sum ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, input, ilen ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *opad; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, opad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, tmp, + ctx->md_info->size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *ipad; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, ctx->md_info->block_size ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return md_info->size; +} + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + + return md_info->type; +} + +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return md_info->name; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md5.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md5.c similarity index 52% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md5.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md5.c index 2a740cda..d7f8cee4 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md5.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md5.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. @@ -24,16 +22,13 @@ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -93,7 +88,7 @@ void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst, /* * MD5 context setup */ -int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +int mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) { ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -106,157 +101,152 @@ int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( ctx ); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ) { - uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + struct + { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[15], data, 60 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); -#define S(x,n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) +#define S(x,n) \ + ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( ( (x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> ( 32 - (n) ) ) ) -#define P(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) \ -{ \ - a += F(b,c,d) + X[k] + t; a = S(a,s) + b; \ -} +#define P(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + local.X[(k)] + (t); \ + (a) = S((a),(s)) + (b); \ + } while( 0 ) - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; -#define F(x,y,z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) +#define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) - P( A, B, C, D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB ); - P( B, C, D, A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE ); - P( A, B, C, D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF ); - P( D, A, B, C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A ); - P( C, D, A, B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF ); - P( C, D, A, B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE ); - P( A, B, C, D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E ); - P( B, C, D, A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821 ); #undef F -#define F(x,y,z) (y ^ (z & (x ^ y))) +#define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((z) & ((x) ^ (y)))) - P( A, B, C, D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA ); - P( A, B, C, D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D ); - P( D, A, B, C, 10, 9, 0x02441453 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED ); - P( A, B, C, D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 10, 9, 0x02441453 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A ); #undef F -#define F(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) - P( A, B, C, D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C ); - P( A, B, C, D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA ); - P( C, D, A, B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665 ); #undef F -#define F(x,y,z) (y ^ (x | ~z)) +#define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((x) | ~(z))) - P( A, B, C, D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D ); - P( B, C, D, A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F ); - P( D, A, B, C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314 ); - P( B, C, D, A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1 ); - P( A, B, C, D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82 ); - P( D, A, B, C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235 ); - P( C, D, A, B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB ); - P( B, C, D, A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391 ); #undef F - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, data ); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * MD5 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, +int mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; @@ -300,22 +290,13 @@ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); -} -#endif - /* * MD5 final digest */ -int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, +int mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; @@ -366,35 +347,27 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( ctx, output ); -} -#endif - #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ /* * output = MD5( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, +int mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md5_context ctx; mbedtls_md5_init( &ctx ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; exit: @@ -403,15 +376,6 @@ exit: return( ret ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_ret( input, ilen, output ); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * RFC 1321 test vectors @@ -424,8 +388,7 @@ static const unsigned char md5_test_buf[7][81] = { "message digest" }, { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012" - "345678901234567890" } + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } }; static const size_t md5_test_buflen[7] = @@ -464,7 +427,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " MD5 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); - ret = mbedtls_md5_ret( md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum ); + ret = mbedtls_md5( md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum ); if( ret != 0 ) goto fail; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md_wrap.h similarity index 60% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md_wrap.h index 04de4829..90c79573 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/md_wrap.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file md_internal.h + * \file md_wrap.h * * \brief Message digest wrappers. * @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -22,19 +22,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -46,50 +40,19 @@ extern "C" { */ struct mbedtls_md_info_t { - /** Digest identifier */ - mbedtls_md_type_t type; - /** Name of the message digest */ const char * name; + /** Digest identifier */ + mbedtls_md_type_t type; + /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ - int size; + unsigned char size; /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ - int block_size; - - /** Digest initialisation function */ - int (*starts_func)( void *ctx ); - - /** Digest update function */ - int (*update_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); - - /** Digest finalisation function */ - int (*finish_func)( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ); - - /** Generic digest function */ - int (*digest_func)( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ); - - /** Allocate a new context */ - void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); - - /** Free the given context */ - void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); - - /** Clone state from a context */ - void (*clone_func)( void *dst, const void *src ); - - /** Internal use only */ - int (*process_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input ); + unsigned char block_size; }; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info; #endif @@ -99,12 +62,16 @@ extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info; #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c similarity index 98% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/memory_buffer_alloc.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c index 51ea7c41..0d5d27d3 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/memory_buffer_alloc.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Buffer-based memory allocator * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) #include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_common.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d20776f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_common.h + * + * \brief Common functions and macros used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H + +#include "mps_error.h" + +#include + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Configuration + * + * \{ + */ + +/*! This flag controls whether the MPS-internal components + * (reader, writer, Layer 1-3) perform validation of the + * expected abstract state at the entry of API calls. + * + * Context: All MPS API functions impose assumptions/preconditions on the + * context on which they operate. For example, every structure has a notion of + * state integrity which is established by `xxx_init()` and preserved by any + * calls to the MPS API which satisfy their preconditions and either succeed, + * or fail with an error code which is explicitly documented to not corrupt + * structure integrity (such as WANT_READ and WANT_WRITE); + * apart from `xxx_init()` any function assumes state integrity as a + * precondition (but usually more). If any of the preconditions is violated, + * the function's behavior is entirely undefined. + * In addition to state integrity, all MPS structures have a more refined + * notion of abstract state that the API operates on. For example, all layers + * have a notion of 'abtract read state' which indicates if incoming data has + * been passed to the user, e.g. through mps_l2_read_start() for Layer 2 + * or mps_l3_read() in Layer 3. After such a call, it doesn't make sense to + * call these reading functions again until the incoming data has been + * explicitly 'consumed', e.g. through mps_l2_read_consume() for Layer 2 or + * mps_l3_read_consume() on Layer 3. However, even if it doesn't make sense, + * it's a design choice whether the API should fail gracefully on such + * non-sensical calls or not, and that's what this option is about: + * + * This option determines whether the expected abstract state + * is part of the API preconditions or not: If the option is set, + * then the abstract state is not part of the precondition and is + * thus required to be validated by the implementation. If an unexpected + * abstract state is encountered, the implementation must fail gracefully + * with error #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED. + * Conversely, if this option is not set, then the expected abstract state + * is included in the preconditions of the respective API calls, and + * an implementation's behaviour is undefined if the abstract state is + * not as expected. + * + * For example: Enabling this makes mps_l2_read_done() fail if + * no incoming record is currently open; disabling this would + * lead to undefined behavior in this case. + * + * Comment this to remove state validation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION + +/*! This flag enables/disables assertions on the internal state of MPS. + * + * Assertions are sanity checks that should never trigger when MPS + * is used within the bounds of its API and preconditions. + * + * Enabling this increases security by limiting the scope of + * potential bugs, but comes at the cost of increased code size. + * + * Note: So far, there is no guiding principle as to what + * expected conditions merit an assertion, and which don't. + * + * Comment this to disable assertions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + +/*! This flag controls whether tracing for MPS should be enabled. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + ( cond ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) do {} while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Configuration */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Common types + * + * Various common types used throughout MPS. + * \{ + */ + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in MPS structures. + * + * This is an unsigned integer type that should be large enough to + * hold the length of any buffer or message processed by MPS. + * + * The reason to pick a value as small as possible here is + * to reduce the size of MPS structures. + * + * \warning Care has to be taken when using a narrower type + * than ::mbedtls_mps_size_t here because of + * potential truncation during conversion. + * + * \warning Handshake messages in TLS may be up to 2^24 ~ 16Mb in size. + * If mbedtls_mps_[opt_]stored_size_t is smaller than that, the + * maximum handshake message is restricted accordingly. + * + * For now, we use the default type of size_t throughout, and the use of + * smaller types or different types for ::mbedtls_mps_size_t and + * ::mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t is not yet supported. + * + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t) -1 ) + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API + * and implementation. + * + * This must be at least as wide as ::mbedtls_stored_size_t but + * may be chosen to be strictly larger if more suitable for the + * target architecture. + * + * For example, in a test build for ARM Thumb, using uint_fast16_t + * instead of uint16_t reduced the code size from 1060 Byte to 962 Byte, + * so almost 10%. + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1 ) + +#if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX +#error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t." +#endif + +/* \} SECTION: Common types */ + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_error.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_error.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f78d9a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_error.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_error.h + * + * \brief Error codes used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H + + +/* TODO: The error code allocation needs to be revisited: + * + * - Should we make (some of) the MPS Reader error codes public? + * If so, we need to adjust MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR() to hit + * a gap in the Mbed TLS public error space. + * If not, we have to make sure we don't forward those errors + * at the level of the public API -- no risk at the moment as + * long as MPS is an experimental component not accessible from + * public API. + */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS general error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE ( 0 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS general error codes */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE ( 1 << 8 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because + * the user hasn't yet read and committed all of it. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) + +/*! An invalid argument was passed to the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/*! An attempt to move a reader to consuming mode through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * after pausing failed because the provided data is not sufficient to serve the + * read requests that led to the pausing. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x3 ) + +/*! A get request failed because not enough data is available in the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x4 ) + +/*!< A get request after pausing and reactivating the reader failed because + * the request is not in line with the request made prior to pausing. The user + * must not change it's 'strategy' after pausing and reactivating a reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x5 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the reader + * has no accumulator it can use to backup the data that hasn't been processed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x6 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the + * accumulator passed to the reader is not large enough to hold both the + * data that hasn't been processed and the excess of the last read-request. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x7 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9af5073c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.c @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Reader implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_reader.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) +static int mbedtls_mps_trace_id = MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ + +/* + * GENERAL NOTE ON CODING STYLE + * + * The following code intentionally separates memory loads + * and stores from other operations (arithmetic or branches). + * This leads to the introduction of many local variables + * and significantly increases the C-code line count, but + * should not increase the size of generated assembly. + * + * The reason for this is twofold: + * (1) It will ease verification efforts using the VST + * (Verified Software Toolchain) + * whose program logic cannot directly reason + * about instructions containing a load or store in + * addition to other operations (e.g. *p = *q or + * tmp = *p + 42). + * (2) Operating on local variables and writing the results + * back to the target contexts on success only + * allows to maintain structure invariants even + * on failure - this in turn has two benefits: + * (2.a) If for some reason an error code is not caught + * and operation continues, functions are nonetheless + * called with sane contexts, reducing the risk + * of dangerous behavior. + * (2.b) Randomized testing is easier if structures + * remain intact even in the face of failing + * and/or non-sensical calls. + * Moreover, it might even reduce code-size because + * the compiler need not write back temporary results + * to memory in case of failure. + * + */ + +static inline int mps_reader_is_accumulating( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining; + if( rd->acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + return( acc_remaining > 0 ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_producing( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *frag = rd->frag; + return( frag == NULL ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_consuming( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + return( !mps_reader_is_producing( rd ) ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset; + + if( acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + frag_offset = rd->acc_share.frag_offset; + return( frag_offset ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset, end; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + end = rd->end; + + return( end < frag_offset ); +} + +static inline void mps_reader_zero( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + /* A plain memset() would likely be more efficient, + * but the current way of zeroing makes it harder + * to overlook fields which should not be zero-initialized. + * It's also more suitable for FV efforts since it + * doesn't require reasoning about structs being + * interpreted as unstructured binary blobs. */ + static mbedtls_mps_reader const zero = + { .frag = NULL, + .frag_len = 0, + .commit = 0, + .end = 0, + .pending = 0, + .acc = NULL, + .acc_len = 0, + .acc_available = 0, + .acc_share = { .acc_remaining = 0 } + }; + *rd = zero; +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_init" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Accumulator size: %u bytes", (unsigned) acc_len ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + rd->acc = acc; + rd->acc_len = acc_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_free" ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *new_frag, + mbedtls_mps_size_t new_frag_len ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t copy_to_acc; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Fragment length: %u bytes", (unsigned) new_frag_len ); + + if( new_frag == NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_producing( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() requires reader to be in producing mode" ); + + if( mps_reader_is_accumulating( rd ) ) + { + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available = rd->acc_available; + + /* Skip over parts of the accumulator that have already been filled. */ + acc += acc_available; + + copy_to_acc = acc_remaining; + if( copy_to_acc > new_frag_len ) + copy_to_acc = new_frag_len; + + /* Copy new contents to accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc, new_frag, copy_to_acc ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Copy new data of size %u of %u into accumulator at offset %u", + (unsigned) copy_to_acc, (unsigned) new_frag_len, (unsigned) acc_available ); + + /* Check if, with the new fragment, we have enough data. */ + acc_remaining -= copy_to_acc; + if( acc_remaining > 0 ) + { + /* We need to accumulate more data. Stay in producing mode. */ + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = acc_remaining; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + } + + /* We have filled the accumulator: Move to consuming mode. */ + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Enough data available to serve user request" ); + + /* Remember overlap of accumulator and fragment. */ + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = acc_available; + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + } + else /* Not accumulating */ + { + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = 0; + } + + rd->frag = new_frag; + rd->frag_len = new_frag_len; + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ) +{ + unsigned char *frag; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_len, frag_offset, end, frag_fetched, frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_get" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Bytes requested: %u", (unsigned) desired ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_get() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + /* Check if we're still serving from the accumulator. */ + if( mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( rd ) ) + { + /* Illustration of supported and unsupported cases: + * + * - Allowed #1 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +-----v-------v-------------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Allowed #2 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +----------v----------------v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Not allowed #1 (could be served, but we don't actually use it): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +------v-------------v------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * + * - Not allowed #2 (can't be served with a contiguous buffer): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end + desired + * | | + * +------v--------------------+ v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * In case of Allowed #2 we're switching to serve from + * `frag` starting from the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + */ + + unsigned char *acc; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the accumulator" ); + if( frag_offset - end < desired ) + { + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available; + acc_available = rd->acc_available; + if( acc_available - end != desired ) + { + /* It might be possible to serve some of these situations by + * making additional space in the accumulator, removing those + * parts that have already been committed. + * On the other hand, this brings additional complexity and + * enlarges the code size, while there doesn't seem to be a use + * case where we don't attempt exactly the same `get` calls when + * resuming on a reader than what we tried before pausing it. + * If we believe we adhere to this restricted usage throughout + * the library, this check is a good opportunity to + * validate this. */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS ); + } + } + + acc = rd->acc; + acc += end; + + *buffer = acc; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); + } + + /* Attempt to serve the request from the current fragment */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the current fragment." ); + + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + frag_fetched = end - frag_offset; /* The amount of data from the current + * fragment that has already been passed + * to the user. */ + frag_remaining = frag_len - frag_fetched; /* Remaining data in fragment */ + + /* Check if we can serve the read request from the fragment. */ + if( frag_remaining < desired ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There's not enough data in the current fragment " + "to serve the request." ); + /* There's not enough data in the current fragment, + * so either just RETURN what we have or fail. */ + if( buflen == NULL ) + { + if( frag_remaining > 0 ) + { + rd->pending = desired - frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Remember to collect %u bytes before re-opening", + (unsigned) rd->pending ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + } + + desired = frag_remaining; + } + + /* There's enough data in the current fragment to serve the + * (potentially modified) read request. */ + + frag = rd->frag; + frag += frag_fetched; + + *buffer = frag; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t end; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + rd->commit = end; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + int *paused ) +{ + unsigned char *frag, *acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t pending, commit; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len, frag_offset, frag_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim" ); + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + frag = rd->frag; + acc = rd->acc; + pending = rd->pending; + commit = rd->commit; + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + if( pending == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No unsatisfied read-request has been logged." ); + + /* Check if there's data left to be consumed. */ + if( commit < frag_offset || commit - frag_offset < frag_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There is data left to be consumed." ); + rd->end = commit; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT ); + } + + rd->acc_available = 0; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment has been fully processed and committed." ); + } + else + { + int overflow; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_len; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len_needed; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There has been an unsatisfied read with %u bytes overhead.", + (unsigned) pending ); + + if( acc == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No accumulator present" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR ); + } + acc_len = rd->acc_len; + + /* Check if the upper layer has already fetched + * and committed the contents of the accumulator. */ + if( commit < frag_offset ) + { + /* No, accumulator is still being processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = 0; + frag_backup_len = frag_len; + acc_backup_offset = commit; + acc_backup_len = frag_offset - commit; + } + else + { + /* Yes, the accumulator is already processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = commit - frag_offset; + frag_backup_len = frag_len - frag_backup_offset; + acc_backup_offset = 0; + acc_backup_len = 0; + } + + backup_len = acc_backup_len + frag_backup_len; + acc_len_needed = backup_len + pending; + + overflow = 0; + overflow |= ( backup_len < acc_backup_len ); + overflow |= ( acc_len_needed < backup_len ); + + if( overflow || acc_len < acc_len_needed ) + { + /* Except for the different return code, we behave as if + * there hadn't been a call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * since the last commit. */ + rd->end = commit; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "The accumulator is too small to handle the backup." ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Size: %u", (unsigned) acc_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Needed: %u (%u + %u)", + (unsigned) acc_len_needed, + (unsigned) backup_len, (unsigned) pending ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment backup: %u", (unsigned) frag_backup_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Accumulator backup: %u", (unsigned) acc_backup_len ); + + /* Move uncommitted parts from the accumulator to the front + * of the accumulator. */ + memmove( acc, acc + acc_backup_offset, acc_backup_len ); + + /* Copy uncmmitted parts of the current fragment to the + * accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc + acc_backup_len, + frag + frag_backup_offset, frag_backup_len ); + + rd->acc_available = backup_len; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = pending; + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 1; + } + + rd->frag = NULL; + rd->frag_len = 0; + + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Final state: aa %u, al %u, ar %u", + (unsigned) rd->acc_available, (unsigned) rd->acc_len, + (unsigned) rd->acc_share.acc_remaining ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..427c1bd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_reader.h @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_reader.h + * + * \brief This file defines reader objects, which together with their + * sibling writer objects form the basis for the communication + * between the various layers of the Mbed TLS messaging stack, + * as well as the communication between the messaging stack and + * the (D)TLS handshake protocol implementation. + * + * Readers provide a means of transferring incoming data from + * a 'producer' providing it in chunks of arbitrary size, to + * a 'consumer' which fetches and processes it in chunks of + * again arbitrary, and potentially different, size. + * + * Readers can thus be seen as datagram-to-stream converters, + * and they abstract away the following two tasks from the user: + * 1. The pointer arithmetic of stepping through a producer- + * provided chunk in smaller chunks. + * 2. The merging of incoming data chunks in case the + * consumer requests data in larger chunks than what the + * producer provides. + * + * The basic abstract flow of operation is the following: + * - Initially, the reader is in 'producing mode'. + * - The producer hands an incoming data buffer to the reader, + * moving it from 'producing' to 'consuming' mode. + * - The consumer subsequently fetches and processes the buffer + * content. Once that's done -- or partially done and a consumer's + * request can't be fulfilled -- the producer revokes the reader's + * access to the incoming data buffer, putting the reader back to + * producing mode. + * - The producer subsequently gathers more incoming data and hands + * it to the reader until it switches back to consuming mode + * if enough data is available for the last consumer request to + * be satisfiable. + * - Repeat the above. + * + * The abstract states of the reader from the producer's and + * consumer's perspective are as follows: + * + * - From the perspective of the consumer, the state of the + * reader consists of the following: + * - A byte stream representing (concatenation of) the data + * received through calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * - A marker within that byte stream indicating which data + * can be considered processed, and hence need not be retained, + * when the reader is passed back to the producer via + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * The marker is set via mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() + * which places it at the end of the current byte stream. + * The consumer need not be aware of the distinction between consumer + * and producer mode, because it only interfaces with the reader + * when the latter is in consuming mode. + * + * - From the perspective of the producer, the reader's state is one of: + * - Attached: The reader is in consuming mode. + * - Unset: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the reader, + * and all previously handed incoming data buffers have been + * fully processed. More data needs to be fed into the reader + * via mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * + * - Accumulating: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the + * reader, but some data from the previous incoming data + * buffer hasn't been processed yet and is internally + * held back. + * The Attached state belongs to consuming mode, while the Unset and + * Accumulating states belong to producing mode. + * + * Transitioning from the Unset or Accumulating state to Attached is + * done via successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(), while + * transitioning from Attached to either Unset or Accumulating (depending + * on what has been processed) is done via mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * + * The following diagram depicts the producer-state progression: + * + * +------------------+ reclaim + * | Unset +<-------------------------------------+ get + * +--------|---------+ | +------+ + * | | | | + * | | | | + * | feed +---------+---+--+ | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | Attached | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | feed, enough data available +---------+---+--+ | + * | to serve previous consumer request | | | + * | | | | + * +--------+---------+ | +------+ + * +----> Accumulating |<-------------------------------------+ commit + * | +---+--------------+ reclaim, previous read request + * | | couldn't be fulfilled + * | | + * +--------+ + * feed, need more data to serve + * previous consumer request + * | + * | + * producing mode | consuming mode + * | + * + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_READER_H +#define MBEDTLS_READER_H + +#include + +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_error.h" + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader; +typedef struct mbedtls_mps_reader mbedtls_mps_reader; + +/* + * Structure definitions + */ + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader +{ + unsigned char *frag; /*!< The fragment of incoming data managed by + * the reader; it is provided to the reader + * through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). The reader + * does not own the fragment and does not + * perform any allocation operations on it, + * but does have read and write access to it. + * + * The reader is in consuming mode if + * and only if \c frag is not \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_len; + /*!< The length of the current fragment. + * Must be 0 if \c frag == \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t commit; + /*!< The offset of the last commit, relative + * to the first byte in the fragment, if + * no accumulator is present. If an accumulator + * is present, it is viewed as a prefix to the + * current fragment, and this variable contains + * an offset from the beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t end; + /*!< The offset of the end of the last chunk + * passed to the user through a call to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), relative to the first + * byte in the fragment, if no accumulator is + * present. If an accumulator is present, it is + * viewed as a prefix to the current fragment, and + * this variable contains an offset from the + * beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t pending; + /*!< The amount of incoming data missing on the + * last call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In particular, it is \c 0 if the last call + * was successful. + * If a reader is reclaimed after an + * unsuccessful call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * this variable is used to have the reader + * remember how much data should be accumulated + * so that the call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * succeeds next time. + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + + /* The accumulator is only needed if we need to be able to pause + * the reader. A few bytes could be saved by moving this to a + * separate struct and using a pointer here. */ + + unsigned char *acc; /*!< The accumulator is used to gather incoming + * data if a read-request via mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * cannot be served from the current fragment. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_len; + /*!< The total size of the accumulator. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_available; + /*!< The number of bytes currently gathered in + * the accumulator. This is both used in + * producing and in consuming mode: + * While producing, it is increased until + * it reaches the value of \c acc_remaining below. + * While consuming, it is used to judge if a + * get request can be served from the + * accumulator or not. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_len. */ + union + { + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_remaining; + /*!< This indicates the amount of data still + * to be gathered in the accumulator. It is + * only used in producing mode. + * Must be at most acc_len - acc_available. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_offset; + /*!< If an accumulator is present and in use, this + * field indicates the offset of the current + * fragment from the beginning of the + * accumulator. If no accumulator is present + * or the accumulator is not in use, this is \c 0. + * It is only used in consuming mode. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_available. */ + } acc_share; +}; + +/* + * API organization: + * A reader object is usually prepared and maintained + * by some lower layer and passed for usage to an upper + * layer, and the API naturally splits according to which + * layer is supposed to use the respective functions. + */ + +/* + * Maintenance API (Lower layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be initialized. + * \param acc The buffer to be used as a temporary accumulator + * in case get requests through mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * exceed the buffer provided by mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * This buffer is owned by the caller and exclusive use + * for reading and writing is given to the reader for the + * duration of the reader's lifetime. It is thus the caller's + * responsibility to maintain (and not touch) the buffer for + * the lifetime of the reader, and to properly zeroize and + * free the memory after the reader has been destroyed. + * \param acc_len The size in Bytes of \p acc. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ); + +/** + * \brief Free a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be freed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +/** + * \brief Pass chunk of data for the reader to manage. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in producing mode. + * \param buf The buffer to be managed by the reader. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the reader will be + * moved to consuming mode and obtains read access + * of \p buf until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() + * is called. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to ensure that the \p buf persists and is not changed + * between successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * and mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE if more input data is + * required to fulfill a previous request to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In this case, the reader remains in producing mode and + * takes no ownership of the provided buffer (an internal copy + * is made instead). + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on + * different kinds of failures. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *buf, + mbedtls_mps_size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Reclaim reader's access to the current input buffer. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in consuming mode. + * \param paused If not \c NULL, the integer at address \p paused will be + * modified to indicate whether the reader has been paused + * (value \c 1) or not (value \c 0). Pausing happens if there + * is uncommitted data and a previous request to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has exceeded the bounds of the + * input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + int *paused ); + +/* + * Usage API (Upper layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Request data from the reader. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must + * be in consuming mode. + * \param desired The desired amount of data to be read, in Bytes. + * \param buffer The address to store the buffer pointer in. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buflen The address to store the actual buffer + * length in, or \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *buf holds the + * address of a buffer of size \c *buflen + * (if \c buflen != \c NULL) or \c desired + * (if \c buflen == \c NULL). The user has read access + * to the buffer and guarantee of stability of the data + * until the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA if there is not enough + * data available to serve the get request. In this case, the + * reader remains intact and in consuming mode, and the consumer + * should retry the call after a successful cycle of + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * If, after such a cycle, the consumer requests a different + * amount of data, the result is implementation-defined; + * progress is guaranteed only if the same amount of data + * is requested after a mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and + * mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() cycle. + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error + * code for different kinds of failure. + * + * \note Passing \c NULL as \p buflen is a convenient way to + * indicate that fragmentation is not tolerated. + * It's functionally equivalent to passing a valid + * address as buflen and checking \c *buflen == \c desired + * afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Mark data obtained from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() as processed. + * + * This call indicates that all data received from prior calls to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has been or will have been + * processed when mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called, + * and thus need not be backed up. + * + * This function has no user observable effect until + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. In particular, + * buffers received from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() remain + * valid until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_READER_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6026a071 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Trace module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +#include "mps_trace.h" +#include + +static int trace_depth = 0; + +#define color_default "\x1B[0m" +#define color_red "\x1B[1;31m" +#define color_green "\x1B[1;32m" +#define color_yellow "\x1B[1;33m" +#define color_blue "\x1B[1;34m" +#define color_magenta "\x1B[1;35m" +#define color_cyan "\x1B[1;36m" +#define color_white "\x1B[1;37m" + +static char const * colors[] = +{ + color_default, + color_green, + color_yellow, + color_magenta, + color_cyan, + color_blue, + color_white +}; + +#define MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE 100 + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ) +{ + int ret; + char str[MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE]; + va_list argp; + va_start( argp, format ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + if( ret >= 0 && ret < MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE ) + { + str[ret] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( "[%d|L%d]: %s\n", id, line, str ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth() +{ + return trace_depth; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth() +{ + trace_depth--; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth() +{ + trace_depth++; +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ) +{ + if( id > (int) ( sizeof( colors ) / sizeof( *colors ) ) ) + return; + printf( "%s", colors[ id ] ); +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ) +{ + if( level > 0 ) + { + while( --level ) + printf( "| " ); + + printf( "| " ); + } + + switch( ty ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT: + mbedtls_printf( "@ " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL: + mbedtls_printf( "+--> " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR: + mbedtls_printf( "E " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN: + mbedtls_printf( "< " ); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c236011 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/mps_trace.h @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_trace.h + * + * \brief Tracing module for MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +/* + * Adapt this to enable/disable tracing output + * from the various layers of the MPS. + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER + +/* + * To use the existing trace module, only change + * MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_XXX above, but don't modify the + * rest of this file. + */ + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN +} mbedtls_mps_trace_type; + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER 5 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER 6 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER ) + +/* We have to avoid globals because E-ACSL chokes on them... + * Wrap everything in stub functions. */ +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth( void ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ); + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(), type ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( mbedtls_mps_trace_id ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( mbedtls_mps_trace_id, __LINE__, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( 0 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( val ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN, "%d (-%#04x)", \ + (int) (val), -((unsigned)(val)) ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) \ + do { \ + /* Breaks tail recursion. */ \ + int ret__ = val; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( ret__ ); \ + return( ret__ ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END do { } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) return( val ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/net_sockets.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/net_sockets.c similarity index 88% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/net_sockets.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/net_sockets.c index 816b1303..17a9e4a5 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/net_sockets.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/net_sockets.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,27 +15,26 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must - * be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * be set before mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. * Harmless on other platforms. */ +#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif +#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */ +#endif + +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) -#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in config.h" + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in mbedtls_config.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) @@ -45,6 +44,7 @@ #endif #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -53,8 +53,7 @@ #define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == WSAEINTR ) -#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) || (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) -#undef _WIN32_WINNT +#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) /* Enables getaddrinfo() & Co */ #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 #endif @@ -63,6 +62,9 @@ #include #include +#if (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) +#include +#endif #if defined(_MSC_VER) #if defined(_WIN32_WCE) @@ -133,6 +135,31 @@ static int net_prepare( void ) return( 0 ); } +/* + * Return 0 if the file descriptor is valid, an error otherwise. + * If for_select != 0, check whether the file descriptor is within the range + * allowed for fd_set used for the FD_xxx macros and the select() function. + */ +static int check_fd( int fd, int for_select ) +{ + if( fd < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + (void) for_select; +#else + /* A limitation of select() is that it only works with file descriptors + * that are strictly less than FD_SETSIZE. This is a limitation of the + * fd_set type. Error out early, because attempting to call FD_SET on a + * large file descriptor is a buffer overflow on typical platforms. */ + if( for_select && fd >= FD_SETSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + /* * Initialize a context */ @@ -147,7 +174,7 @@ void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, const char *port, int proto ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) @@ -284,7 +311,7 @@ static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) int err = errno; /* - * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a non-blocking socket + * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a blocking socket */ if( ( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & O_NONBLOCK ) != O_NONBLOCK ) { @@ -313,13 +340,14 @@ int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int type; struct sockaddr_storage client_addr; #if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \ - defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) + defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) || \ + defined(socklen_t) || (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof( client_addr ); socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof( type ); #else @@ -455,7 +483,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; struct timeval tv; fd_set read_fds; @@ -463,8 +491,9 @@ int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ) int fd = ctx->fd; - if( fd < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) @@ -540,11 +569,12 @@ void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ) */ int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; - if( fd < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); ret = (int) read( fd, buf, len ); @@ -577,13 +607,14 @@ int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; struct timeval tv; fd_set read_fds; int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; - if( fd < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); FD_SET( fd, &read_fds ); @@ -620,11 +651,12 @@ int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, */ int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; - if( fd < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); ret = (int) write( fd, buf, len ); @@ -651,6 +683,19 @@ int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) return( ret ); } +/* + * Close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + /* * Gracefully close the connection */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/nist_kw.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/nist_kw.c similarity index 97% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/nist_kw.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/nist_kw.c index 176af9fe..5054ca20 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/nist_kw.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/nist_kw.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Implementation of NIST SP 800-38F key wrapping, supporting KW and KWP modes * only * - * Copyright (C) 2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * Definition of Key Wrapping: @@ -29,16 +27,13 @@ * the wrapping and unwrapping operation than the definition in NIST SP 800-38F. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) #include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include #include @@ -116,7 +111,7 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, unsigned int keybits, const int is_wrap ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, @@ -194,8 +189,6 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, uint64_t t = 0; unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; - unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; - unsigned char *A = output; *out_len = 0; /* @@ -271,6 +264,9 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, } else { + unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + unsigned char *A = output; + /* * Do the wrapping function W, as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.1 */ @@ -311,7 +307,7 @@ cleanup: } mbedtls_platform_zeroize( inbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ); - mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, &olen ); + return( ret ); } @@ -334,7 +330,7 @@ static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, uint64_t t = 0; unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; - unsigned char *R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + unsigned char *R = NULL; *out_len = 0; if( semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT ) @@ -344,6 +340,7 @@ static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, memcpy( A, input, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); memmove( output, input + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; /* Calculate intermediate values */ for( t = s; t >= 1; t-- ) @@ -528,7 +525,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &bad_padding, sizeof( bad_padding) ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &diff, sizeof( diff ) ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( A, sizeof( A ) ); - mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, &olen ); + return( ret ); } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/oid.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/oid.c similarity index 59% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/oid.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/oid.c index edea950f..f70ceea5 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/oid.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/oid.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -17,20 +17,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include #include @@ -41,36 +36,46 @@ #define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" -#endif - /* * Macro to automatically add the size of #define'd OIDs */ #define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s) +/* + * Macro to generate mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s), name, description } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL } +#else +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s) } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0 } +#endif + /* * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by * the other functions) */ -#define FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1( TYPE_T, NAME, LIST ) \ -static const TYPE_T * oid_ ## NAME ## _from_asn1( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) \ -{ \ - const TYPE_T *p = LIST; \ - const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ - if( p == NULL || oid == NULL ) return( NULL ); \ - while( cur->asn1 != NULL ) { \ - if( cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \ - memcmp( cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) { \ - return( p ); \ - } \ - p++; \ - cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ - } \ - return( NULL ); \ -} +#define FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1( TYPE_T, NAME, LIST ) \ + static const TYPE_T * oid_ ## NAME ## _from_asn1( \ + const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *p = (LIST); \ + const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *cur = \ + (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + if( p == NULL || oid == NULL ) return( NULL ); \ + while( cur->asn1 != NULL ) { \ + if( cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \ + memcmp( cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) { \ + return( p ); \ + } \ + p++; \ + cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + } \ + return( NULL ); \ + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. @@ -83,6 +88,7 @@ int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \ return( 0 ); \ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an @@ -103,12 +109,13 @@ int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) */ #define FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ -int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2 ) \ +int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2 ) \ { \ const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ - if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ - *ATTR1 = data->ATTR1; \ - *ATTR2 = data->ATTR2; \ + if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + *(ATTR1) = data->ATTR1; \ + *(ATTR2) = data->ATTR2; \ return( 0 ); \ } @@ -119,16 +126,16 @@ int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2 #define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, const char **oid, size_t *olen ) \ { \ - const TYPE_T *cur = LIST; \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ - if( cur->ATTR1 == ATTR1 ) { \ + if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) ) { \ *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ return( 0 ); \ } \ cur++; \ } \ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ } /* @@ -140,9 +147,9 @@ int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, const char **oid, size_t *olen ) \ int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid , \ size_t *olen ) \ { \ - const TYPE_T *cur = LIST; \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ - if( cur->ATTR1 == ATTR1 && cur->ATTR2 == ATTR2 ) { \ + if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) && cur->ATTR2 == (ATTR2) ) { \ *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ return( 0 ); \ @@ -152,7 +159,6 @@ int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid , \ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) /* * For X520 attribute types */ @@ -164,83 +170,87 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] = { { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN ), "id-at-commonName", "Common Name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, "id-at-commonName", "Common Name" ), "CN", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY ), "id-at-countryName", "Country" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, "id-at-countryName", "Country" ), "C", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY ), "id-at-locality", "Locality" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, "id-at-locality", "Locality" ), "L", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE ), "id-at-state", "State" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, "id-at-state", "State" ), "ST", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION ),"id-at-organizationName", "Organization" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION,"id-at-organizationName", "Organization" ), "O", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT ), "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit" ), "OU", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL ), "emailAddress", "E-mail address" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, "emailAddress", "E-mail address" ), "emailAddress", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER ),"id-at-serialNumber", "Serial number" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER,"id-at-serialNumber", "Serial number" ), "serialNumber", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS ),"id-at-postalAddress", "Postal address" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS,"id-at-postalAddress", "Postal address" ), "postalAddress", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE ), "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code" ), "postalCode", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME ), "id-at-surName", "Surname" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, "id-at-surName", "Surname" ), "SN", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME ), "id-at-givenName", "Given name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, "id-at-givenName", "Given name" ), "GN", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS ), "id-at-initials", "Initials" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, "id-at-initials", "Initials" ), "initials", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER ), "id-at-generationQualifier", "Generation qualifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, "id-at-generationQualifier", "Generation qualifier" ), "generationQualifier", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE ), "id-at-title", "Title" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, "id-at-title", "Title" ), "title", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER ),"id-at-dnQualifier", "Distinguished Name qualifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER,"id-at-dnQualifier", "Distinguished Name qualifier" ), "dnQualifier", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM ), "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" ), "pseudonym", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT ), "id-domainComponent", "Domain component" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_UID, "id-uid", "User Id" ), + "uid", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, "id-domainComponent", "Domain component" ), "DC", }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER ), "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", "Unique Identifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER, "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", "Unique Identifier" ), "uniqueIdentifier", }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, NULL, } }; @@ -259,27 +269,31 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = { { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), "id-ce-basicConstraints", "Basic Constraints" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, "id-ce-basicConstraints", "Basic Constraints" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-extKeyUsage", "Extended Key Usage" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-extKeyUsage", "Extended Key Usage" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ), "id-ce-subjectAltName", "Subject Alt Name" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, "id-ce-subjectAltName", "Subject Alt Name" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), "id-netscape-certtype", "Netscape Certificate Type" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, "id-netscape-certtype", "Netscape Certificate Type" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, "id-ce-certificatePolicies", "Certificate Policies" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, 0, }, }; @@ -287,20 +301,31 @@ static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext) FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ), "id-kp-serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ), "id-kp-clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING ), "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION ), "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING ), "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING ), "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" }, - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, "id-kp-serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication" ), + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH, "id-kp-clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication" ), + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING, "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" ), + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION, "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" ), + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING, "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" ), + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING, "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" ), + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN, "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" ), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, const char *, description) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ + +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = +{ + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, "anyPolicy", "Any Policy" ), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, const char *, description) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /* @@ -315,53 +340,45 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 ), "md2WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD2" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 ), "md4WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD4" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 ), "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5, "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5" ), MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 ), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 ), "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224, "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 ), "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256, "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 ), "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384, "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 ), "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512, "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS ), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -369,45 +386,53 @@ static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1, "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224, "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256, "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384, "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512, "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS ), "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS, "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS" ), MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, }, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, const char *, description) +#endif + FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, oid_sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ @@ -423,19 +448,19 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA ), "rsaEncryption", "RSA" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA, "rsaEncryption", "RSA" ), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED ), "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED, "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key" ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH ), "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH, "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH" ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, }, }; @@ -457,72 +482,72 @@ static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 ), "secp192r1", "secp192r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", "secp192r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 ), "secp224r1", "secp224r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", "secp224r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 ), "secp256r1", "secp256r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", "secp256r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 ), "secp384r1", "secp384r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", "secp384r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 ), "secp521r1", "secp521r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", "secp521r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 ), "secp192k1", "secp192k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", "secp192k1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 ), "secp224k1", "secp224k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", "secp224k1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 ), "secp256k1", "secp256k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", "secp256k1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 ), "brainpoolP256r1","brainpool256r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1","brainpool256r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 ), "brainpoolP384r1","brainpool384r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1","brainpool384r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 ), "brainpoolP512r1","brainpool512r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1","brainpool512r1" ), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, }, }; @@ -544,15 +569,15 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC ), "desCBC", "DES-CBC" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC, "desCBC", "DES-CBC" ), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC ), "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC" ), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, }, }; @@ -572,52 +597,50 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 ), "id-md2", "MD2" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 ), "id-md4", "MD4" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 ), "id-md5", "MD5" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5, "id-md5", "MD5" ), MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 ), "id-sha1", "SHA-1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, "id-sha1", "SHA-1" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 ), "id-sha224", "SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, "id-sha224", "SHA-224" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 ), "id-sha256", "SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, "id-sha256", "SHA-256" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 ), "id-sha384", "SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, "id-sha384", "SHA-384" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 ), "id-sha512", "SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, "id-sha512", "SHA-512" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160, "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160" ), + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, }, }; @@ -638,32 +661,36 @@ static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 ), "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1, "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 ), "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224, "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256 ), "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256, "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384 ), "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384, "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 ), "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512, "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, }, }; @@ -685,15 +712,15 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC ), "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC, "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC ), "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC, "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES" ), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, }, }; @@ -715,7 +742,7 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pb int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n; unsigned int value; char *p; @@ -743,7 +770,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, if( !( oid->p[i] & 0x80 ) ) { /* Last byte */ - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ".%d", value ); + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ".%u", value ); OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; value = 0; } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/padlock.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/padlock.c similarity index 92% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/padlock.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/padlock.c index b85ff9cd..b8ba1058 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/padlock.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/padlock.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * VIA PadLock support functions * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * This implementation is based on the VIA PadLock Programming Guide: @@ -25,15 +23,11 @@ * programming_guide.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#include "padlock.h" #include @@ -58,10 +52,10 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ) "cpuid \n\t" "cmpl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" "movl $0, %%edx \n\t" - "jb unsupported \n\t" + "jb 1f \n\t" "movl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" "cpuid \n\t" - "unsupported: \n\t" + "1: \n\t" "movl %%edx, %1 \n\t" "movl %2, %%ebx \n\t" : "=m" (ebx), "=m" (edx) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/padlock.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/padlock.h similarity index 64% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/padlock.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/padlock.h index 677936eb..1506ee0c 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/padlock.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/padlock.h @@ -3,9 +3,12 @@ * * \brief VIA PadLock ACE for HW encryption/decryption supported by some * processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -19,13 +22,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H -#include "aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 /**< Input data should be aligned. */ @@ -50,23 +53,29 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE 0x0C00 #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM 0x3000 -#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(x) (uint32_t *) (16 + ((int32_t) x & ~15)) +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(x) (uint32_t *) (16 + ((int32_t) (x) & ~15)) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** - * \brief PadLock detection routine + * \brief Internal PadLock detection routine + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param feature The feature to detect * - * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + * \return non-zero if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise */ int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ); /** - * \brief PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param ctx AES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT @@ -76,12 +85,15 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ); * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed */ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ); + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); /** - * \brief PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param ctx AES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT @@ -93,11 +105,11 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed */ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ); + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pem.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pem.c similarity index 91% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pem.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pem.c index 6069a23d..1b40e5e5 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pem.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pem.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) @@ -34,6 +28,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -85,20 +80,20 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1( unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, mbedtls_md5_context md5_ctx; unsigned char md5sum[16]; size_t use_len; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md5_init( &md5_ctx ); /* * key[ 0..15] = MD5(pwd || IV) */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( keylen <= 16 ) @@ -112,15 +107,15 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1( unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, /* * key[16..23] = MD5(key[ 0..15] || pwd || IV]) */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum, 16 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update( &md5_ctx, md5sum, 16 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; use_len = 16; @@ -146,7 +141,7 @@ static int pem_des_decrypt( unsigned char des_iv[8], { mbedtls_des_context des_ctx; unsigned char des_key[8]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_des_init( &des_ctx ); @@ -174,7 +169,7 @@ static int pem_des3_decrypt( unsigned char des3_iv[8], { mbedtls_des3_context des3_ctx; unsigned char des3_key[24]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_des3_init( &des3_ctx ); @@ -204,7 +199,7 @@ static int pem_aes_decrypt( unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen, { mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; unsigned char aes_key[32]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); @@ -348,7 +343,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( NULL, 0, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ); if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); if( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED ); @@ -357,7 +352,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); mbedtls_free( buf ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); } if( enc != 0 ) @@ -423,9 +418,11 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ) { - if( ctx->buf != NULL ) + if ( ctx->buf != NULL ) + { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->buf, ctx->buflen ); - mbedtls_free( ctx->buf ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->buf ); + } mbedtls_free( ctx->info ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pem_context ) ); @@ -437,7 +434,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *encode_buf = NULL, *c, *p = buf; size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0; @@ -481,8 +478,12 @@ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, *p++ = '\0'; *olen = p - buf; + /* Clean any remaining data previously written to the buffer */ + memset( buf + *olen, 0, buf_len - *olen ); + mbedtls_free( encode_buf ); return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ea4869c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk.c @@ -0,0 +1,649 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->pk_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free (the components of) a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + if ( ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->pk_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL || + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func == NULL ) + { + return; + } + + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func( ctx->rs_ctx ); + + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Get pk_info structure from type + */ +const mbedtls_pk_info_t * mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ) +{ + switch( pk_type ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( &mbedtls_rsa_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return( &mbedtls_eckey_info ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + return( &mbedtls_eckeydh_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( &mbedtls_ecdsa_info ); +#endif + /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */ + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} + +/* + * Initialise context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const psa_key_id_t key ) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t *pk_ctx; + psa_key_type_t type; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + /* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */ + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ; + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + pk_ctx = (psa_key_id_t *) ctx->pk_ctx; + *pk_ctx = key; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Initialize an RSA-alt context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx->pk_ctx; + + rsa_alt->key = key; + rsa_alt->decrypt_func = decrypt_func; + rsa_alt->sign_func = sign_func; + rsa_alt->key_len_func = key_len_func; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given type + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything. + * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context + * pointer. */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->can_do( type ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + */ +static inline int pk_hashlen_helper( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + if( *hash_len != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Helper to set up a restart context if needed + */ +static int pk_restart_setup( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx, + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) +{ + /* Don't do anything if already set up or invalid */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Should never happen when we're called */ + if( info->rs_alloc_func == NULL || info->rs_free_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->rs_ctx = info->rs_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Verify a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL || + pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); + + return( ret ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature with options + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx, type ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + if( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + if( options == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + + if( sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ), + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, + pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, + pss_opts->expected_salt_len, + sig ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + } + + /* General case: no options */ + if( options != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_pk_verify( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Make a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL || + pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); + + return( ret ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Make a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + return( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Decrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL || ilen == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL || osize == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Encrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL || ilen == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL || osize == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Check public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + const mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( pub->pk_info == NULL || + prv->pk_info == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT ) + { + if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + else + { + if( pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Get key size in bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + /* For backward compatibility, accept NULL or a context that + * isn't set up yet, and return a fake value that should be safe. */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen( ctx->pk_ctx ) ); +} + +/* + * Export debug information + */ +int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->debug_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + ctx->pk_info->debug_func( ctx->pk_ctx, items ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Access the PK type name + */ +const char *mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( "invalid PK" ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->name ); +} + +/* + * Access the PK type + */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->type ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Load the key to a PSA key slot, + * then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot. + * + * Currently only works for EC private keys. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_id_t *key, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + ((void) pk); + ((void) key); + ((void) hash_alg); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); +#else + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec; + unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t d_len; + psa_ecc_family_t curve_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + size_t bits; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ); + d_len = ( ec->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, d, d_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + curve_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ec->grp.id, &bits ); + key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( curve_id ); + + /* prepare the key attributes */ + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) ); + + /* import private key into PSA */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_import_key( &attributes, d, d_len, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* make PK context wrap the key slot */ + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + + return( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( pk, *key ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk_wrap.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80c0aad2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1080 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ); +} + +static size_t rsa_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + return( 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ); +} + +static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + if( sig_len < rsa_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data. + * We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can + * use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a + * valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid + * signature?". */ + if( sig_len > rsa_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + if( sig_size < *sig_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig ) ); +} + +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + + if( ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + olen, input, output, osize ) ); +} + +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + if( *olen > osize ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + ilen, input, output ) ); +} + +static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub, + (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv ) ); +} + +static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_rsa_init( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_free( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* Not supported */ + (void) ctx; + (void) items; +#else + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.N"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N ); + + items++; + + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.E"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E ); +#endif +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + "RSA", + rsa_get_bitlen, + rsa_can_do, + rsa_verify_wrap, + rsa_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_decrypt_wrap, + rsa_encrypt_wrap, + rsa_check_pair_wrap, + rsa_alloc_wrap, + rsa_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_debug, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Generic EC key + */ +static int eckey_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +static size_t eckey_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + return( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +/* Forward declarations */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) + ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) + ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* Forward declarations */ +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ); + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ); + +/* + * Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context + * + * We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to + * the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time. + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx; +} eckey_restart_ctx; + +static void *eckey_rs_alloc( void ) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( eckey_restart_ctx ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + { + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx ); + } + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_rs_free( void *ctx ) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + if( ctx == NULL) + return; + + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx ); + + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if( rs == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if( rs == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub, + (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +static void *eckey_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP; + items->name = "eckey.Q"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + "EC", + eckey_get_bitlen, + eckey_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + eckey_verify_wrap, + eckey_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + eckey_verify_rs_wrap, + eckey_sign_rs_wrap, +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL, + NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, + eckey_alloc_wrap, + eckey_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + eckey_rs_alloc, + eckey_rs_free, +#endif + eckey_debug, +}; + +/* + * EC key restricted to ECDH + */ +static int eckeydh_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + "EC_DH", + eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ + eckeydh_can_do, + NULL, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, + eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of + * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int( unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *to, size_t to_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( from, end, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + while( unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00 ) + { + ( *from )++; + unpadded_len--; + } + + if( unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len; + memset( to, 0x00, padding_len ); + memcpy( to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len ); + ( *from ) += unpadded_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers + * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least + * twice as big as int_size. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tmp_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &tmp_size, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Extract r */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + /* Extract s */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig + int_size, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_pk_context key; + int key_len; + /* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */ + unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits ); + const size_t signature_part_size = ( ctx->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + ((void) md_alg); + + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context; + * re-construct one to make it happy */ + key.pk_info = &pk_info; + key.pk_ctx = ctx; + p = buf + sizeof( buf ); + key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, buf, &key ); + if( key_len <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, psa_sig_md ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can + * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */ + if( 2 * signature_part_size > sizeof( buf ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + p = (unsigned char*) sig; + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig( &p, sig + sig_len, buf, + signature_part_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + if( psa_verify_hash( key_id, psa_sig_md, + hash, hash_len, + buf, 2 * signature_part_size ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p != sig + sig_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + return( ret ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ) ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ecdsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ecdsa_rs_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + "ECDSA", + eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ + ecdsa_can_do, + ecdsa_verify_wrap, + ecdsa_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, + ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, +#endif + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */ + ecdsa_alloc_wrap, + ecdsa_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ecdsa_rs_alloc, + ecdsa_rs_free, +#endif + eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Support for alternative RSA-private implementations + */ + +static int rsa_alt_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); +} + +static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + + return( 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ); +} + +static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ); + if( *sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( *sig_len > sig_size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); +} + +static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if( ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( rsa_alt->decrypt_func( rsa_alt->key, + olen, input, output, osize ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char hash[32]; + size_t sig_len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + + memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof( hash ) ); + + if( ( ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap( (void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sizeof( sig ), &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( rsa_verify_wrap( (void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof( hash ), sig, sig_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_alt_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + "RSA-alt", + rsa_alt_get_bitlen, + rsa_alt_can_do, + NULL, + rsa_alt_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + rsa_alt_check_pair, +#else + NULL, +#endif + rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, + rsa_alt_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + NULL, +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + + /* no _init() function to call, an calloc() already zeroized */ + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void pk_opaque_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + size_t bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ) ) + return( 0 ); + + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( bits ); +} + +static int pk_opaque_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + /* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs, + * as checked by setup_psa(). + * Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +/* + * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer + * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer. + * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(). + * + * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer + * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end + * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start + */ +static int asn1_write_mpibuf( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + size_t n_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( (size_t)( *p - start ) < n_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = n_len; + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect + * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0x00 ) + { + ++(*p); + --len; + } + + /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. + * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */ + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence. + * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of + * MPIs, and in-place. + * + * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding + * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding + * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer + */ +static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + size_t buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2; + unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig + rs_len, rs_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig, rs_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, sig, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, sig, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + memmove( sig, p, len ); + *sig_len = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ((void) ctx); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) hash); + ((void) hash_len); + ((void) sig); + ((void) sig_size); + ((void) sig_len); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) ); + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + /* make the signature */ + status = psa_sign_hash( *key, alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) ); + + /* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */ + return( pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( sig, sig_len, sig_size ) ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + "Opaque", + pk_opaque_get_bitlen, + pk_opaque_can_do, + NULL, /* verify - will be done later */ + pk_opaque_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */ + pk_opaque_alloc_wrap, + pk_opaque_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */ +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk_wrap.h similarity index 67% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk_wrap.h index 3dae0fc5..6f5addf7 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pk_wrap.h @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /** - * \file pk_internal.h + * \file pk_wrap.h * * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -18,20 +18,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { @@ -55,10 +49,25 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t /** Make signature */ int (*sign_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Verify signature (restartable) */ + int (*verify_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ); + + /** Make signature (restartable) */ + int (*sign_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + /** Decrypt message */ int (*decrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, @@ -72,7 +81,9 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t void *p_rng ); /** Check public-private key pair */ - int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv ); + int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); /** Allocate a new context */ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); @@ -80,6 +91,14 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t /** Free the given context */ void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Allocate the restart context */ + void * (*rs_alloc_func)( void ); + + /** Free the restart context */ + void (*rs_free_func)( void *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + /** Interface with the debug module */ void (*debug_func)( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ); @@ -112,4 +131,8 @@ extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info; extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs12.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkcs12.c similarity index 83% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs12.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkcs12.c index 16a15cb6..04b1a6da 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs12.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkcs12.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard v1.1 @@ -25,11 +23,7 @@ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1-1.asn */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) @@ -37,21 +31,20 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) #include "mbedtls/des.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char **p = ¶ms->p; const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; @@ -63,21 +56,21 @@ static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, * */ if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); salt->p = *p; *p += salt->len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -128,47 +121,6 @@ static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_ty #undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t len, - unsigned char *output ) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - ((void) pbe_params); - ((void) mode); - ((void) pwd); - ((void) pwdlen); - ((void) data); - ((void) len); - ((void) output); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); -#else - int ret; - unsigned char key[16]; - mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; - ((void) mode); - - mbedtls_arc4_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( pbe_params, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - pwd, pwdlen, - key, 16, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - mbedtls_arc4_setup( &ctx, key, 16 ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_arc4_crypt( &ctx, len, data, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); - mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ -} - int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, @@ -226,6 +178,8 @@ exit: return( ret ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + static void pkcs12_fill_buffer( unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len ) { @@ -246,7 +200,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int id, int iterations ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned int j; unsigned char diversifier[128]; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs5.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkcs5.c similarity index 76% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs5.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkcs5.c index f04f0ab2..2b014d91 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs5.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkcs5.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * * \author Mathias Olsson * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * PKCS#5 includes PBKDF2 and more @@ -29,15 +27,12 @@ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6070 (Test vectors) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) #include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" @@ -54,34 +49,19 @@ #define mbedtls_printf printf #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - ((void) pbe_params); - ((void) mode); - ((void) pwd); - ((void) pwdlen); - ((void) data); - ((void) datalen); - ((void) output); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); -} -#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations, int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid; unsigned char *p = params->p; const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); /* * PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE { * salt OCTET STRING, @@ -91,14 +71,15 @@ static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, * } * */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &salt->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); salt->p = p; p += salt->len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -106,21 +87,21 @@ static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, keylen ) ) != 0 ) { if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( p == end ) return( 0 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( &p, end, &prf_alg_oid ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( &prf_alg_oid, md_type ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -153,11 +134,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * } */ if( pbe_params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &kdf_alg_oid, &kdf_alg_params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &kdf_alg_oid, + &kdf_alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); // Only PBKDF2 supported at the moment // @@ -178,7 +160,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &enc_scheme_oid, &enc_scheme_params ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg( &enc_scheme_oid, &cipher_alg ) != 0 ) @@ -217,7 +199,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len, @@ -232,12 +215,14 @@ exit: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *password, +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, unsigned int iteration_count, uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret, j; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int j; unsigned int i; unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; @@ -254,21 +239,23 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); #endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); while( key_length ) { // U1 ends up in work // - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, work ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; memcpy( md1, work, md_size ); @@ -276,14 +263,14 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p { // U2 ends up in md1 // - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, md1, md_size ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, md1 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; // U1 xor U2 // @@ -302,7 +289,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p break; } - return( 0 ); +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( work, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md1, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + + return( ret ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) @@ -319,10 +311,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) #define MAX_TESTS 6 -static const size_t plen[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t plen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 8, 8, 8, 24, 9 }; -static const unsigned char password[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char password_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = { "password", "password", @@ -331,10 +323,10 @@ static const unsigned char password[MAX_TESTS][32] = "pass\0word", }; -static const size_t slen[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t slen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 4, 4, 4, 36, 5 }; -static const unsigned char salt[MAX_TESTS][40] = +static const unsigned char salt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][40] = { "salt", "salt", @@ -343,13 +335,13 @@ static const unsigned char salt[MAX_TESTS][40] = "sa\0lt", }; -static const uint32_t it_cnt[MAX_TESTS] = +static const uint32_t it_cnt_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 1, 2, 4096, 4096, 4096 }; -static const uint32_t key_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const uint32_t key_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 20, 20, 20, 25, 16 }; -static const unsigned char result_key[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = { { 0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x71, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x12, 0x06, @@ -395,10 +387,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i ); - ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &sha1_ctx, password[i], plen[i], salt[i], - slen[i], it_cnt[i], key_len[i], key ); + ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &sha1_ctx, password_test_data[i], + plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], + slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], + key_len_test_data[i], key ); if( ret != 0 || - memcmp( result_key[i], key, key_len[i] ) != 0 ) + memcmp( result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkparse.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkparse.c similarity index 74% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkparse.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkparse.c index d6ac987e..fe6aaca3 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkparse.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkparse.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) @@ -31,6 +25,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -61,6 +56,12 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /* * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. @@ -74,6 +75,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) FILE *f; long size; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); @@ -118,20 +123,24 @@ int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) * Load and parse a private key */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const char *path, const char *pwd ) + const char *path, const char *pwd, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( pwd == NULL ) - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0 ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0, f_rng, p_rng ); else ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, - (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen( pwd ) ); + (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen( pwd ), f_rng, p_rng ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); mbedtls_free( buf ); @@ -144,10 +153,13 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -172,11 +184,11 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if ( end - *p < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); /* Tag may be either OID or SEQUENCE */ params->tag = **p; @@ -186,21 +198,21 @@ static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #endif ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } params->p = *p; *p += params->len; if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -227,7 +239,7 @@ static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = params->p; const unsigned char * const end = params->p + params->len; const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; @@ -236,7 +248,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ /* SpecifiedECDomainVersion ::= INTEGER { 1, 2, 3 } */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &ver ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ver < 1 || ver > 3 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); @@ -274,13 +286,13 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ /* Prime-p ::= INTEGER -- Field of size p. */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end_field, &grp->P ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); if( p != end_field ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* * Curve ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -304,7 +316,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->A, p, len ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -312,7 +324,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->B, p, len ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -322,14 +334,14 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ p += len; if( p != end_curve ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* * ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, &grp->G, ( const unsigned char *) p, len ) ) != 0 ) @@ -355,7 +367,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ * order INTEGER */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &grp->N ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); @@ -417,7 +429,7 @@ cleanup: static int pk_group_id_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); @@ -444,7 +456,7 @@ cleanup: */ static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; if( params->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) @@ -484,7 +496,7 @@ static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *g static int pk_get_ecpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &key->grp, &key->Q, (const unsigned char *) *p, end - *p ) ) == 0 ) @@ -512,20 +524,20 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( *p + len != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* Import N */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) @@ -535,7 +547,7 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, /* Import E */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, *p, len ) ) != 0 ) @@ -550,8 +562,8 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, } if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -567,13 +579,13 @@ static int pk_get_pk_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; memset( params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, &alg_oid, params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( &alg_oid, pk_alg ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); @@ -599,16 +611,21 @@ static int pk_get_pk_alg( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( *p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = *p + len; @@ -617,11 +634,11 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( *p + len != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); @@ -646,8 +663,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; if( ret == 0 && *p != end ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); if( ret != 0 ) mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); @@ -656,6 +673,32 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + return( 0 ); +} + /* * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key */ @@ -692,14 +735,14 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( version != 0 ) @@ -708,59 +751,89 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, } /* Import N */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - p += len; /* Import E */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - p += len; /* Import D */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - p, len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - p += len; /* Import P */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, p, len, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - p += len; /* Import Q */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, p, len, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - p += len; - - /* Complete the RSA private key */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - /* Check optional parameters */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import DQ */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import QP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#else + /* Verify existance of the CRT params */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { goto cleanup; + } if( p != end ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); } cleanup: @@ -771,7 +844,7 @@ cleanup: { /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ if( ( ret & 0xff80 ) == 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); else ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; @@ -787,10 +860,10 @@ cleanup: * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key */ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen ) + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int version, pubkey_done; size_t len; mbedtls_asn1_buf params; @@ -811,24 +884,24 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( version != 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &eck->d, p, len ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -852,7 +925,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } } @@ -868,11 +941,11 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, end2 = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( &p, end2, &len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( p + len != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); if( ( ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( &p, end2, eck ) ) == 0 ) pubkey_done = 1; @@ -889,16 +962,16 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } } if( ! pubkey_done && ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul( &eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, - NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &eck->grp, &eck->d ) ) != 0 ) @@ -925,9 +998,9 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, * */ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( - mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - const unsigned char* key, - size_t keylen ) + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char* key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { int ret, version; size_t len; @@ -937,6 +1010,11 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; +#endif + /* * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208) * @@ -956,26 +1034,28 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( version != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( &p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + { + return( ret ); + } if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( len < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); @@ -997,7 +1077,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) { if( ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 ) + ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), p, len, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); return( ret ); @@ -1020,9 +1100,10 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( - mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { int ret, decrypted = 0; size_t len; @@ -1058,16 +1139,16 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &pbe_alg_oid, &pbe_params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); buf = p; @@ -1089,24 +1170,6 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( decrypted = 1; } - else if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128, &pbe_alg_oid ) == 0 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( &pbe_params, - MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, - pwd, pwdlen, - p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - // Best guess for password mismatch when using RC4. If first tag is - // not MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE - // - if( *buf != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); - - decrypted = 1; - } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) @@ -1132,7 +1195,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( if( decrypted == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - return( pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, buf, len ) ); + return( pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, buf, len, f_rng, p_rng ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ @@ -1141,20 +1204,27 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) size_t len; mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif - mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ - if( keylen == 0 || key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; else ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, @@ -1185,7 +1255,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ - if( keylen == 0 || key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; else ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, @@ -1198,7 +1268,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), - pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + pem.buf, pem.buflen, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); } @@ -1215,7 +1286,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ - if( keylen == 0 || key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; else ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, @@ -1225,7 +1296,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, if( ret == 0 ) { if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, - pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + pem.buf, pem.buflen, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); } @@ -1238,7 +1309,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ - if( keylen == 0 || key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; else ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, @@ -1247,9 +1318,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, key, NULL, 0, &len ); if( ret == 0 ) { - if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, - pem.buf, pem.buflen, - pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, pem.buf, pem.buflen, + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); } @@ -1276,16 +1346,13 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, { unsigned char *key_copy; - if( keylen == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); - if( ( key_copy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, keylen ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); memcpy( key_copy, key, keylen ); ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, key_copy, keylen, - pwd, pwdlen ); + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_copy, keylen ); mbedtls_free( key_copy ); @@ -1295,6 +1362,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return( 0 ); mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) { @@ -1302,43 +1370,49 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ - if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, key, keylen ) ) == 0 ) + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( + pk, key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 ) + { return( 0 ); + } mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), - key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); - } - else + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), key, keylen ) == 0 ) { return( 0 ); } + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), - key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); - } - else + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), + key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng ) == 0 ) { return( 0 ); } - + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't, + * it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not + * freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init() + * before calling this function, and to call pk_free() + * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called + * twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is + * also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls + * on failed PEM parsing attempts. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); } @@ -1348,7 +1422,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p; #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; @@ -1356,11 +1430,18 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) size_t len; mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL || keylen == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ - if( keylen == 0 || key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; else ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, @@ -1391,7 +1472,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ - if( keylen == 0 || key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; else ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, @@ -1432,7 +1513,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return( ret ); } mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); - if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) ) { return( ret ); } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkwrite.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkwrite.c similarity index 72% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkwrite.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkwrite.c index 8eabd889..71cc0f0c 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkwrite.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/pkwrite.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Public Key layer for writing key files and structures * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,21 +15,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -37,7 +33,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" @@ -46,6 +44,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -54,6 +56,12 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) /* * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -64,7 +72,7 @@ static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_mpi T; @@ -103,7 +111,7 @@ end_of_export: static int pk_write_ec_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; @@ -131,7 +139,7 @@ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, static int pk_write_ec_param( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; const char *oid; size_t oid_len; @@ -143,14 +151,39 @@ static int pk_write_ec_param( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return( (int) len ); } + +/* + * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + */ +static int pk_write_ec_private( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ec, tmp, byte_length ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, byte_length ); + return( ret ); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( *p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( start != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_rsa_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *key ) ) ); @@ -161,18 +194,47 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); else #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + size_t buffer_size; + psa_key_id_t* key_id = (psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx; + + if ( *p < start ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + buffer_size = (size_t)( *p - start ); + if ( psa_export_public_key( *key_id, start, buffer_size, &len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else + { + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *c; size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; const char *oid; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + c = buf + size; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, key ) ); @@ -191,18 +253,52 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ), - &oid, &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) { MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, pk_write_ec_param( &c, buf, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + size_t bits; + + key_id = *((psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx ); + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( key_type ); + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + ret = mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( curve, bits, &oid, &oid_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* Write EC algorithm parameters; that's akin + * to pk_write_ec_param() above. */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( &c, buf, + oid, oid_len ) ); + + /* The rest of the function works as for legacy EC contexts. */ + pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( pk_type, &oid, + &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, oid, oid_len, par_len ) ); @@ -214,12 +310,19 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; - unsigned char *c = buf + size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *c; size_t len = 0; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + c = buf + size; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) { @@ -340,9 +443,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ); len += par_len; - /* privateKey: write as MPI then fix tag */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &ec->d ) ); - *c = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_private( &c, buf, ec ) ); /* version */ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 1 ) ); @@ -385,7 +487,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_ * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 * } */ -#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) /* * RSA private keys: @@ -402,10 +504,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_ * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) * } */ -#define MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2 -#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ - + 5 * MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 +#define MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 ( MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2 ) +#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ + + 5 * MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 ) #else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ @@ -426,7 +528,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_ * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] * } */ -#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) /* * EC private keys: @@ -437,7 +539,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_ * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above * } */ -#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) #else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ @@ -446,17 +548,20 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ - RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES -#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ - RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES +#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ) +#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ) -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output_buf[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; size_t olen = 0; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || size == 0 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( key, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf) ) ) < 0 ) { @@ -473,13 +578,16 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si return( 0 ); } -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output_buf[PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; const char *begin, *end; size_t olen = 0; + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || size == 0 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( key, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf) ) ) < 0 ) return( ret ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/platform.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/platform.c similarity index 79% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/platform.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/platform.c index b24b2fa6..e742fde7 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/platform.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/platform.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Platform abstraction layer * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,22 +15,24 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* The compile time configuration of memory allocation via the macros + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO takes precedence over the runtime + * configuration via mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(). So, omit everything + * related to the latter if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO are defined. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) static void *platform_calloc_uninit( size_t n, size_t size ) { @@ -71,30 +73,19 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ), mbedtls_free_func = free_func; return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */ -#if defined(_WIN32) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) #include int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; va_list argp; - /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ - if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - va_start( argp, fmt ); -#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__) - ret = _vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, argp ); -#else - ret = _vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp ); - if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n ) - { - s[n-1] = '\0'; - ret = -1; - } -#endif + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp ); va_end( argp ); return( ret ); @@ -131,6 +122,62 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ + if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(_TRUNCATE) + ret = vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, arg ); +#else + ret = vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, arg ); + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n ) + { + s[n-1] = '\0'; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_vsnprintf_uninit( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, va_list arg ) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + ((void) arg); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF platform_vsnprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) ) +{ + mbedtls_vsnprintf = vsnprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) /* diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/platform_util.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/platform_util.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4e97e4d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/platform_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS + * library. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#include +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) +/* + * This implementation should never be optimized out by the compiler + * + * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin + * Percival's blog article at: + * + * http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html + * + * It uses a volatile function pointer to the standard memset(). Because the + * pointer is volatile the compiler expects it to change at + * any time and will not optimize out the call that could potentially perform + * other operations on the input buffer instead of just setting it to 0. + * Nevertheless, as pointed out by davidtgoldblatt on Hacker News + * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for + * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: + * + * if( memset_func != memset ) + * memset_func( buf, 0, len ); + * + * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers + * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration + * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their + * platform and needs. + */ +static void * (* const volatile memset_func)( void *, int, size_t ) = memset; + +void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( len == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + if( len > 0 ) + memset_func( buf, 0, len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__))) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + +#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ +#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) +#define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME +#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, + struct tm *tm_buf ) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + return( ( gmtime_s( tm_buf, tt ) == 0 ) ? tm_buf : NULL ); +#elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) + return( gmtime_r( tt, tm_buf ) ); +#else + struct tm *lt; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + lt = gmtime( tt ); + + if( lt != NULL ) + { + memcpy( tm_buf, lt, sizeof( struct tm ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return( ( lt == NULL ) ? NULL : tm_buf ); +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/poly1305.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/poly1305.c similarity index 91% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/poly1305.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/poly1305.c index e22d3afb..492d1457 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/poly1305.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/poly1305.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * \brief Poly1305 authentication algorithm. * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -17,19 +17,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) #include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -49,13 +44,19 @@ #define inline __inline #endif +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define POLY1305_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ( 16U ) #define BYTES_TO_U32_LE( data, offset ) \ - ( (uint32_t) data[offset] \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) data[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) data[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) data[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + ( (uint32_t) (data)[offset] \ + | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ ) /* @@ -276,27 +277,24 @@ static void poly1305_compute_mac( const mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ) { - if( ctx != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); - } + POLY1305_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); } void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ) { - if( ctx != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); - } + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); } int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ) { - if( ctx == NULL || key == NULL ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); /* r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ ctx->r[0] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 0 ) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; @@ -331,16 +329,8 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, size_t remaining = ilen; size_t queue_free_len; size_t nblocks; - - if( ctx == NULL ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else if( ( ilen > 0U ) && ( input == NULL ) ) - { - /* input pointer is allowed to be NULL only if ilen == 0 */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); if( ( remaining > 0U ) && ( ctx->queue_len > 0U ) ) { @@ -398,10 +388,8 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16] ) { - if( ( ctx == NULL ) || ( mac == NULL ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); /* Process any leftover data */ if( ctx->queue_len > 0U ) @@ -430,7 +418,10 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], unsigned char mac[16] ) { mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx ); @@ -516,6 +507,9 @@ static const unsigned char test_mac[2][16] = } }; +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + #define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ do \ { \ @@ -533,7 +527,7 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( int verbose ) { unsigned char mac[16]; unsigned i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) { diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e73d12c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,5322 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "check_crypto_config.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +/* Include internal declarations that are useful for implementing persistently + * stored keys. */ +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "md_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Global data, support functions and library management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static int key_type_is_raw_bytes( psa_key_type_t type ) +{ + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ); +} + +/* Values for psa_global_data_t::rng_state */ +#define RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 +#define RNG_INITIALIZED 1 +#define RNG_SEEDED 2 + +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_psa_random_context_t rng; + unsigned initialized : 1; + unsigned rng_state : 2; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state = + &global_data.rng.drbg; +#endif + +#define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \ + if( global_data.initialized == 0 ) \ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret ) +{ + /* Mbed TLS error codes can combine a high-level error code and a + * low-level error code. The low-level error usually reflects the + * root cause better, so dispatch on that preferably. */ + int low_level_ret = - ( -ret & 0x007f ); + switch( low_level_ret != 0 ? low_level_ret : ret ) + { + case 0: + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + +#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) ) + /* Only check CTR_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a CTR_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + /* Only check HMAC_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a HMAC_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + } +} + + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +static inline int psa_key_slot_is_external( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( slot->attr.lifetime ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/* For now the MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ guards are also used here since the + * current test driver in key_management.c is using this function + * when accelerators are used for ECC key pair and public key. + * Once that dependency is resolved these guards can be removed. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy ) +{ + switch( curve ) + { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) + case 192: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) + case 224: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case 384: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case 521: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); + case 528: + if( bits_is_sloppy ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); + break; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) + case 384: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) + case 512: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ); +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) + case 255: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); + case 256: + if( bits_is_sloppy ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) + case 448: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ); +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) + case 192: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) + case 224: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ); +#endif + } + break; + } + + (void) bits_is_sloppy; + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +static psa_status_t validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits ) +{ + /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */ + switch( type ) + { + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: + break; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + if( bits != 64 && bits != 128 && bits != 192 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + if( bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Check whether a given key type is valid for use with a given MAC algorithm + * + * Upon successful return of this function, the behavior of #PSA_MAC_LENGTH + * when called with the validated \p algorithm and \p key_type is well-defined. + * + * \param[in] algorithm The specific MAC algorithm (can be wildcard). + * \param[in] key_type The key type of the key to be used with the + * \p algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The \p key_type is valid for use with the \p algorithm + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p key_type is not valid for use with the \p algorithm + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ) +{ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( algorithm ) ) + { + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC( algorithm ) ) + { + /* Check that we're calling PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH with a cipher + * key. */ + if( ( key_type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ) == + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ) + { + /* PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH returns 1 for stream ciphers and + * the block length (larger than 1) for block ciphers. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) > 1 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length ) +{ + if( slot->key.data != NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + + slot->key.data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buffer_length ); + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + slot->key.bytes = buffer_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t* data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, + data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + memcpy( slot->key.data, data, data_length ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + /* zero-length keys are never supported. */ + if( data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ); + + /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion hasn't overflown. */ + if( data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit + * size fits in its representation type. */ + if( ( *bits ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, *bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Copy the key material. */ + memcpy( key_buffer, data, data_length ); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + (void)key_buffer_size; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits ) ); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits ) ); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +/** Calculate the intersection of two algorithm usage policies. + * + * Return 0 (which allows no operation) on incompatibility. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg1, + psa_algorithm_t alg2 ) +{ + /* Common case: both sides actually specify the same policy. */ + if( alg1 == alg2 ) + return( alg1 ); + /* If the policies are from the same hash-and-sign family, check + * if one is a wildcard. If so the other has the specific algorithm. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg1 ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg2 ) && + ( alg1 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == ( alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg1 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + return( alg2 ); + if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg2 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + return( alg1 ); + } + /* If the policies are from the same AEAD family, check whether + * one of them is a minimum-tag-length wildcard. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg1, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg2, 0 ) ) ) + { + size_t alg1_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + /* If only one is a wildcard, return specific algorithm if compatible. */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ) + { + return( alg2 ); + } + if( ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ) + { + return( alg1 ); + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same MAC family, check whether one + * of them is a minimum-MAC-length policy. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg1 ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg2 ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the base + * algorithm of alg1 and alg2 are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( alg1, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get the (exact or at-least) output lengths for both sides of the + * requested intersection. None of the currently supported algorithms + * have an output length dependent on the actual key size, so setting it + * to a bogus value of 0 is currently OK. + * + * Note that for at-least-this-length wildcard algorithms, the output + * length is set to the shortest allowed length, which allows us to + * calculate the most restrictive tag length for the intersection. */ + size_t alg1_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + + /* If only one is an at-least-this-length policy, the intersection would + * be the other (fixed-length) policy as long as said fixed length is + * equal to or larger than the shortest allowed length. */ + if( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ? alg2 : 0 ); + } + if( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ? alg1 : 0 ); + } + + /* If none of them are wildcards, check whether they define the same tag + * length. This is still possible here when one is default-length and + * the other specific-length. Ensure to always return the + * specific-length version for the intersection. */ + if( alg1_len == alg2_len ) + return( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg1, alg1_len ) ); + } + /* If the policies are incompatible, allow nothing. */ + return( 0 ); +} + +static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, + psa_algorithm_t requested_alg ) +{ + /* Common case: the policy only allows requested_alg. */ + if( requested_alg == policy_alg ) + return( 1 ); + /* If policy_alg is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and requested_alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then requested_alg is compliant with policy_alg. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( requested_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( policy_alg ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + { + return( ( policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == + ( requested_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ); + } + /* If policy_alg is a wildcard AEAD algorithm of the same base as + * the requested algorithm, check the requested tag length to be + * equal-length or longer than the wildcard-specified length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( requested_alg, 0 ) ) && + ( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( requested_alg ) ); + } + /* If policy_alg is a MAC algorithm of the same base as the requested + * algorithm, check whether their MAC lengths are compatible. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the policy + * and requested algorithms are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( policy_alg, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get both the requested output length for the algorithm which is to be + * verified, and the default output length for the base algorithm. + * Note that none of the currently supported algorithms have an output + * length dependent on actual key size, so setting it to a bogus value + * of 0 is currently OK. */ + size_t requested_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, requested_alg ); + size_t default_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ); + + /* If the policy is default-length, only allow an algorithm with + * a declared exact-length matching the default. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == 0 ) + return( requested_output_length == default_output_length ); + + /* If the requested algorithm is default-length, allow it if the policy + * length exactly matches the default length. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( requested_alg ) == 0 && + PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == default_output_length ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + /* If policy_alg is an at-least-this-length wildcard MAC algorithm, + * check for the requested MAC length to be equal to or longer than the + * minimum allowed length. */ + if( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + requested_output_length ); + } + } + /* If policy_alg is a generic key agreement operation, then using it for + * a key derivation with that key agreement should also be allowed. This + * behaviour is expected to be defined in a future specification version. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( requested_alg ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( requested_alg ) == + policy_alg ); + } + /* If it isn't explicitly permitted, it's forbidden. */ + return( 0 ); +} + +/** Test whether a policy permits an algorithm. + * + * The caller must test usage flags separately. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being validated, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \retval PSA_SUCCESS When \p alg is a specific algorithm + * allowed by the \p policy. + * \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT When \p alg is not a specific algorithm + * \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED When \p alg is a specific algorithm, but + * the \p policy does not allow it. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_policy_permits( const psa_key_policy_t *policy, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + /* '0' is not a valid algorithm */ + if( alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* A requested algorithm cannot be a wildcard. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg, alg ) || + psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg2, alg ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); +} + +/** Restrict a key policy based on a constraint. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being restricted, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \param[in] key_type The key type for which to restrict the policy + * \param[in,out] policy The policy to restrict. + * \param[in] constraint The policy constraint to apply. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \c *policy contains the intersection of the original value of + * \c *policy and \c *constraint. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key_type, \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. + * \c *policy is unchanged. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_key_policy_t *policy, + const psa_key_policy_t *constraint ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg, + constraint->alg ); + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg2 = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg2, + constraint->alg2 ); + if( intersection_alg == 0 && policy->alg != 0 && constraint->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( intersection_alg2 == 0 && policy->alg2 != 0 && constraint->alg2 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + policy->usage &= constraint->usage; + policy->alg = intersection_alg; + policy->alg2 = intersection_alg2; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints + * and lock it. + * + * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is + * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is + * zero, the algorithm is not checked. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + slot = *p_slot; + + /* Enforce that usage policy for the key slot contains all the flags + * required by the usage parameter. There is one exception: public + * keys can always be exported, so we treat public key objects as + * if they had the export flag. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) ) + usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + + if( ( slot->attr.policy.usage & usage ) != usage ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto error; + } + + /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algortihm. */ + if( alg != 0 ) + { + status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy, + slot->attr.type, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto error; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +/** Get a key slot containing a transparent key and lock it. + * + * A transparent key is a key for which the key material is directly + * available, as opposed to a key in a secure element. + * + * This is a temporary function to use instead of + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() until secure element support is + * fully implemented. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the + * caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, p_slot, + usage, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( psa_key_slot_is_external( *p_slot ) ) + { + psa_unlock_key_slot( *p_slot ); + *p_slot = NULL; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +/* With no secure element support, all keys are transparent. */ +#define psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( key, p_slot, usage, alg ) \ + psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, p_slot, usage, alg ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + /* Data pointer will always be either a valid pointer or NULL in an + * initialized slot, so we can just free it. */ + if( slot->key.data != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + + mbedtls_free( slot->key.data ); + slot->key.data = NULL; + slot->key.bytes = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * Persistent storage is not affected. */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + + if( slot->lock_count != 1 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe + * because all multipart operation objects are independent from + * the key slot: if they need to access the key after the setup + * phase, they have a copy of the key. Note that this means that + * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ + /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has + * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not + * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */ + memset( slot, 0, sizeof( *slot ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_status_t status; /* status of the last operation */ + psa_status_t overall_status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + /* + * Get the description of the key in a key slot. In case of a persistent + * key, this will load the key description from persistent memory if not + * done yet. We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if + * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by + * the current implementation. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* + * If the key slot containing the key description is under access by the + * library (apart from the present access), the key cannot be destroyed + * yet. For the time being, just return in error. Eventually (to be + * implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have + * stopped. + */ + if( slot->lock_count > 1 ) + { + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + } + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work + * if we attempt it, depending on whether the key is merely read-only + * by policy or actually physically read-only). + * Just do the best we can, which is to wipe the copy in memory + * (done in this function's cleanup code). */ + overall_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( slot->attr.lifetime ); + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things: + * remove the key file in internal storage, destroy the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. Start a transaction that will encompass these + * three actions. */ + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + /* We should still try to destroy the key in the secure + * element and the key metadata in storage. This is especially + * important if the error is that the storage is full. + * But how to do it exactly without risking an inconsistent + * state after a reset? + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/215 + */ + overall_status = status; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_destroy_se_key( driver, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + status = psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + + /* TODO: other slots may have a copy of the same key. We should + * invalidate them. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/214 + */ + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +exit: + status = psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + return( overall_status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +static psa_status_t psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi mpi; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t *buffer = NULL; + size_t buflen; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mpi ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &mpi ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &mpi, 65537 ) == 0 ) + { + /* It's the default value, which is reported as an empty string, + * so there's nothing to do. */ + goto exit; + } + + buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &mpi ); + buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ); + if( buffer == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &mpi, buffer, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + attributes->domain_parameters = buffer; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = buflen; + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mpi ); + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +/** Retrieve all the publicly-accessible attributes of a key. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + attributes->core = slot->attr; + attributes->core.flags &= ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( psa_key_slot_is_external( slot ) ) + psa_set_key_slot_number( attributes, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( slot->attr.type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* TODO: reporting the public exponent for opaque keys + * is not yet implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/216 + */ + if( psa_key_slot_is_external( slot ) ) + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + break; + + status = psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( rsa, + attributes ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + } + break; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + default: + /* Nothing else to do. */ + break; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + if( attributes->core.flags & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER ) + { + *slot_number = attributes->slot_number; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_export_key_buffer_internal( const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + if( key_buffer_size > data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + memcpy( data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); + memset( data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size ); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } + else + { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if( data_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Export requires the EXPORT flag. There is an exception for public keys, + * which don't require any flag, but + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() takes care of this. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Exporting public -> public */ + return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + } + else + { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if( data_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Exporting a public key doesn't require a usage flag. */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +#if defined(static_assert) +static_assert( ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both external-only and dual-use" ); +static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and dual-use" ); +static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and external-only" ); +#endif + +/** Validate that a key policy is internally well-formed. + * + * This function only rejects invalid policies. It does not validate the + * consistency of the policy with respect to other attributes of the key + * such as the key type. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy( const psa_key_policy_t *policy ) +{ + if( ( policy->usage & ~( PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Validate the internal consistency of key attributes. + * + * This function only rejects invalid attribute values. If does not + * validate the consistency of the attributes with any key data that may + * be involved in the creation of the key. + * + * Call this function early in the key creation process. + * + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = psa_get_key_id( attributes ); + + status = psa_validate_key_location( lifetime, p_drv ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_validate_key_persistence( lifetime ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + if( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + if( !psa_is_valid_key_id( psa_get_key_id( attributes ), 0 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + status = psa_validate_key_policy( &attributes->core.policy ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Refuse to create overly large keys. + * Note that this doesn't trigger on import if the attributes don't + * explicitly specify a size (so psa_get_key_bits returns 0), so + * psa_import_key() needs its own checks. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Reject invalid flags. These should not be reachable through the API. */ + if( attributes->core.flags & ~ ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Prepare a key slot to receive key material. + * + * This function allocates a key slot and sets its metadata. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * This function is intended to be used as follows: + * -# Call psa_start_key_creation() to allocate a key slot, prepare + * it with the specified attributes, and in case of a volatile key assign it + * a volatile key identifier. + * -# Populate the slot with the key material. + * -# Call psa_finish_key_creation() to finalize the creation of the slot. + * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call + * psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * On success, the key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param method An identification of the calling function. + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the prepared slot. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key slot is ready to receive key material. + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) method; + *p_drv = NULL; + + status = psa_validate_key_attributes( attributes, p_drv ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_get_empty_key_slot( &volatile_key_id, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + slot = *p_slot; + + /* We're storing the declared bit-size of the key. It's up to each + * creation mechanism to verify that this information is correct. + * It's automatically correct for mechanisms that use the bit-size as + * an input (generate, device) but not for those where the bit-size + * is optional (import, copy). In case of a volatile key, assign it the + * volatile key identifier associated to the slot returned to contain its + * definition. */ + + slot->attr = attributes->core; + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id; +#else + slot->attr.id.key_id = volatile_key_id; +#endif + } + + /* Erase external-only flags from the internal copy. To access + * external-only flags, query `attributes`. Thanks to the check + * in psa_validate_key_attributes(), this leaves the dual-use + * flags and any internal flag that psa_get_empty_key_slot() + * may have set. */ + slot->attr.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things + * when creating or registering a persistent key: + * create the key file in internal storage, create the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. This is done by starting a transaction that will + * encompass these three actions. + * For registering a volatile key, we just need to find an appropriate + * slot number inside the SE. Since the key is designated volatile, creating + * a transaction is not required. */ + /* The first thing to do is to find a slot number for the new key. + * We save the slot number in persistent storage as part of the + * transaction data. It will be needed to recover if the power + * fails during the key creation process, to clean up on the secure + * element side after restarting. Obtaining a slot number from the + * secure element driver updates its persistent state, but we do not yet + * save the driver's persistent state, so that if the power fails, + * we can roll back to a state where the key doesn't exist. */ + if( *p_drv != NULL ) + { + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + status = psa_find_se_slot_for_key( attributes, method, *p_drv, + &slot_number ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( attributes->core.lifetime ) ) + { + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = slot_number; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + return( status ); + } + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, (uint8_t *)( &slot_number ), sizeof( slot_number ) ); + } + + if( *p_drv == NULL && method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER ) + { + /* Key registration only makes sense with a secure element. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Finalize the creation of a key once its key material has been set. + * + * This entails writing the key to persistent storage. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * If the finalization succeeds, the function unlocks the key slot (it was + * locked by psa_start_key_creation()) and the key slot cannot be accessed + * anymore as part of the key creation process. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + * \param[out] key On success, identifier of the key. Note that the + * key identifier is also stored in the key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully created. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + (void) slot; + (void) driver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t data; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ; + +#if defined(static_assert) + static_assert( sizeof( slot_number ) == + sizeof( data.slot_number ), + "Slot number size does not match psa_se_key_data_storage_t" ); +#endif + memcpy( &data.slot_number, &slot_number, sizeof( slot_number ) ); + status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + (uint8_t*) &data, + sizeof( data ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + { + /* Key material is saved in export representation in the slot, so + * just pass the slot buffer for storage. */ + status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes ); + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Finish the transaction for a key creation. This does not + * happen when registering an existing key. Detect this case + * by checking whether a transaction is in progress (actual + * creation of a persistent key in a secure element requires a transaction, + * but registration or volatile key creation doesn't use one). */ + if( driver != NULL && + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type == PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ) + { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); + return( status ); + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *key = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + + return( status ); +} + +/** Abort the creation of a key. + * + * You may call this function after calling psa_start_key_creation(), + * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this + * function may not clean up persistent storage. + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + */ +static void psa_fail_key_creation( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + (void) driver; + + if( slot == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* TODO: If the key has already been created in the secure + * element, and the failure happened later (when saving metadata + * to internal storage), we need to destroy the key in the secure + * element. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/217 + */ + + /* Abort the ongoing transaction if any (there may not be one if + * the creation process failed before starting one, or if the + * key creation is a registration of a key in a secure element). + * Earlier functions must already have done what it takes to undo any + * partial creation. All that's left is to update the transaction data + * itself. */ + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); +} + +/** Validate optional attributes during key creation. + * + * Some key attributes are optional during key creation. If they are + * specified in the attributes structure, check that they are consistent + * with the data in the slot. + * + * This function should be called near the end of key creation, after + * the slot in memory is fully populated but before saving persistent data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + if( attributes->core.type != 0 ) + { + if( attributes->core.type != slot->attr.type ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi actual, required; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &required ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &actual ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto rsa_exit; + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &required, + attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto rsa_exit; + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &actual, &required ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + rsa_exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &required ); + if( ret != 0) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + if( attributes->core.bits != 0 ) + { + if( attributes->core.bits != slot->attr.bits ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t bits; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject zero-length symmetric keys (including raw data key objects). + * This also rejects any key which might be encoded as an empty string, + * which is never valid. */ + if( data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to + * hold the generated key material. */ + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + { + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + bits = slot->attr.bits; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( slot->attr.bits == 0 ) + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + else if( bits != slot->attr.bits ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( slot, attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Leaving attributes unspecified is not currently supported. + * It could make sense to query the key type and size from the + * secure element, but not all secure elements support this + * and the driver HAL doesn't currently support it. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, &key ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + /* Registration doesn't keep the key in RAM. */ + psa_close_key( key ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material( const psa_key_slot_t *source, + psa_key_slot_t *target ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( target, + source->key.data, + source->key.bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + target->attr.type = source->attr.type; + target->attr.bits = source->attr.bits; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *source_slot = NULL; + psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( source_slot, + specified_attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_restrict_key_policy( source_slot->attr.type, + &actual_attributes.core.policy, + &source_slot->attr.policy ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, &actual_attributes, + &target_slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( actual_attributes.core.lifetime ) ) + { + /* + * Copying through an opaque driver is not implemented yet, consider + * a lifetime with an external location as an invalid parameter for + * now. + */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material( source_slot, target_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( target_slot, driver, target_key ); +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( target_slot, driver ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( source_slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Message digests */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort( psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( operation ); + operation->id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure all of the context is zeroized, since PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT only + * directly zeroes the int-sized dummy member of the context union. */ + memset( &operation->ctx, 0, sizeof( operation->ctx ) ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( operation, alg ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_update( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if( input_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( operation, input, input_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + *hash_length = 0; + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish( + operation, + actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ), + &actual_hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort(operation); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + *hash_length = 0; + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, + actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), + &actual_hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone( const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + if( source_operation->id == 0 || + target_operation->id != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( source_operation, + target_operation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( target_operation ); + + return( status ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* MAC */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( operation ); + operation->mac_size = 0; + operation->is_sign = 0; + operation->id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *mac_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( attributes ); + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */ + status = psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, key_type ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination */ + *mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + + if( *mac_size < 4 ) + { + /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be + * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, + * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still + * too small for security. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( *mac_size > PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) ) + { + /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length + * of the algorithm. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + int is_sign ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, + &operation->mac_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + operation->is_sign = is_sign; + /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */ + if( is_sign ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 1 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_update( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if( input_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( operation, + input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ! operation->is_sign ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Sanity check. This will guarantee that mac_size != 0 (and so mac != NULL) + * once all the error checks are done. */ + if( operation->mac_size == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( mac_size < operation->mac_size ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( operation, + mac, operation->mac_size, + mac_length ); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation->mac_size = 0; + } + + if( mac_size > operation->mac_size ) + memset( &mac[operation->mac_size], '!', + mac_size - operation->mac_size ); + + abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->is_sign ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->mac_size != mac_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( operation, + mac, mac_length ); + +exit: + abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length, + int is_sign ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, + &operation_mac_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( mac_size < operation_mac_size ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + input, input_length, + mac, operation_mac_size, mac_length ); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation_mac_size = 0; + } + if( mac_size > operation_mac_size ) + memset( &mac[operation_mac_size], '!', mac_size - operation_mac_size ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + return( psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_mac_length; + + status = psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, + input, input_length, + actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ), + &actual_mac_length, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( mac_length != actual_mac_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length ) != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) ); + + return ( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg( int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( input_is_message ) + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *signature_length = 0; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees + * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input + * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have + * to be a hash.) */ + if( signature_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_is_message ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + else + { + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + + +exit: + /* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error, + * the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature + * (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( signature + *signature_length, '!', + signature_size - *signature_length ); + else + memset( signature, '!', signature_size ); + /* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call + * memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */ + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_is_message ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); + +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_internal( + key, 1, alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_internal( + key, 1, alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_size; + (void)signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_internal( + key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_internal( + key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +static int psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( ! ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto rsa_exit; + + if( output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + input_length, + input, + output ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto rsa_exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + input_length, + input, + output ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto rsa_exit; + } +rsa_exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto rsa_exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto rsa_exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +rsa_exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Symmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t usage = ( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, usage, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member + * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, + * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been + * allocated/initialized. */ + operation->iv_set = 0; + if( alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) + operation->iv_required = 0; + else + operation->iv_required = 1; + operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ + if( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + else + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *iv_length = 0; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( iv_size < operation->default_iv_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random( iv, operation->default_iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( operation, + iv, + operation->default_iv_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + operation->iv_set = 1; + *iv_length = operation->default_iv_length; + } + else + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( operation, + iv, + iv_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->iv_set = 1; + else + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( operation, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( operation, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( psa_cipher_abort( operation ) ); + else + { + *output_length = 0; + (void) psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( operation ); + + operation->id = 0; + operation->iv_set = 0; + operation->iv_required = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + size_t iv_length; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + key_type = slot->attr.type; + iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( key_type, alg ); + + if( iv_length > 0 ) + { + if( output_size < iv_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random( output, iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* AEAD */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0 ) + memset( ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size ); + + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0 ) + memset( plaintext, 0, plaintext_size ); + + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Generators */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF +#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *hmac_key, + size_t hmac_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( hmac_key_length ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + + operation->is_sign = 1; + operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation, + &attributes, + hmac_key, hmac_key_length, + PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ) ); + + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */ + +#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */ +#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */ +#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */ +#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */ + +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( operation->alg ) ); + else + return( operation->alg ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + if( kdf_alg == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.hkdf.info ); + status = psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */ + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret ); + } + + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed ); + } + + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label ); + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + /* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */ + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* This is a blank key derivation operation. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + *capacity = operation->capacity; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + if( capacity > operation->capacity ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + operation->capacity = capacity; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. This performs a chunk + * of the expand phase of the HKDF algorithm. */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status; + + if( hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || ! hkdf->info_set ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT; + + while( output_length != 0 ) + { + /* Copy what remains of the current block */ + uint8_t n = hash_length - hkdf->offset_in_block; + if( n > output_length ) + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + memcpy( output, hkdf->output_block + hkdf->offset_in_block, n ); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + hkdf->offset_in_block += n; + if( output_length == 0 ) + break; + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if( hkdf->block_number == 0xff ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* We need a new block */ + ++hkdf->block_number; + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + hkdf->prk, + hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( hkdf->block_number != 1 ) + { + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->info, + hkdf->info_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + &hkdf->block_number, 1 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + sizeof( hkdf->output_block ), + &hmac_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg ); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status, cleanup_status; + + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if( tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + /* We need a new block */ + ++tls12_prf->block_number; + tls12_prf->left_in_block = hash_length; + + /* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246: + * + * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) + * + * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... + * + * A(0) = seed + * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) + * + * The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structure saves the block + * `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output + * is currently extracted as `output_block` and where i is + * `block_number`. + */ + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Calculate A(i) where i = tls12_prf->block_number. */ + if( tls12_prf->block_number == 1 ) + { + /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads + * the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the + * P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */ + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, + tls12_prf->label, + tls12_prf->label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, + tls12_prf->seed, + tls12_prf->seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac, + tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length ); + if( hmac_output_length != hash_length ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac, + tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + +cleanup: + cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort( &hmac ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = cleanup_status; + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH( alg ); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t offset, length; + + switch( tls12_prf->state ) + { + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET: + tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + while( output_length != 0 ) + { + /* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */ + if( tls12_prf->left_in_block == 0 ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( tls12_prf, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + continue; + } + + if( tls12_prf->left_in_block > output_length ) + length = (uint8_t) output_length; + else + length = tls12_prf->left_in_block; + + offset = hash_length - tls12_prf->left_in_block; + memcpy( output, tls12_prf->output_block + offset, length ); + output += length; + output_length -= length; + tls12_prf->left_in_block -= length; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* This is a blank operation. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + if( output_length > operation->capacity ) + { + operation->capacity = 0; + /* Go through the error path to wipe all confidential data now + * that the operation object is useless. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + if( output_length == 0 && operation->capacity == 0 ) + { + /* Edge case: this is a finished operation, and 0 bytes + * were requested. The right error in this case could + * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return + * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished + * operation, for consistency with the case when + * output_length > 0. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + } + operation->capacity -= output_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ); + status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( &operation->ctx.hkdf, hash_alg, + output, output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + kdf_alg, output, + output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + { + (void) kdf_alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state. + * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted operations and + * blank operations, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank + * operations. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg = operation->alg; + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + operation->alg = alg; + memset( output, '!', output_length ); + } + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) +static void psa_des_set_key_parity( uint8_t *data, size_t data_size ) +{ + if( data_size >= 8 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data ); + if( data_size >= 16 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data + 8 ); + if( data_size >= 24 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data + 16 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + uint8_t *data = NULL; + size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ); + psa_status_t status; + + if( ! key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, bytes ); + if( data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( operation, data, bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ) + psa_des_set_key_parity( data, bytes ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( &attributes, + data, bytes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits ); + if( bits != slot->attr.bits ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( ! operation->can_output_key ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* Deriving a key in a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_generate_derived_key_internal( slot, + attributes->core.bits, + operation ); + } + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key derivation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg ) +{ + int is_kdf_alg_supported; + + /* Make sure that operation->ctx is properly zero-initialised. (Macro + * initialisers for this union leave some bytes unspecified.) */ + memset( &operation->ctx, 0, sizeof( operation->ctx ) ); + + /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + is_kdf_alg_supported = 1; + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ) + is_kdf_alg_supported = 1; + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + is_kdf_alg_supported = 1; + else +#endif + is_kdf_alg_supported = 0; + + if( is_kdf_alg_supported ) + { + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ); + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + if( hash_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( ( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) && + ! ( hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ); + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( operation, kdf_alg ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( operation, alg ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } + else + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->alg = alg; + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + else + { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + data, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + /* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */ + if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + NULL, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + } + if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + data, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->prk, + sizeof( hkdf->prk ), + &data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + hkdf->block_number = 0; + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + if( hkdf->info_set ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + hkdf->info_length = data_length; + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( hkdf->info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( hkdf->info, data, data_length ); + } + hkdf->info_set = 1; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->seed = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->seed == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->seed, data, data_length ); + prf->seed_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->secret == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->secret, data, data_length ); + prf->secret_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->label = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->label == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->label, data, data_length ); + prf->label_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( prf, data, data_length ) ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, data, data_length ) ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_label( prf, data, data_length ) ); + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ]; + uint8_t *cur = pms; + + if( data_length > PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2: + * + * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets + * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second + * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. + */ + + *cur++ = ( data_length >> 8 ) & 0xff; + *cur++ = ( data_length >> 0 ) & 0xff; + memset( cur, 0, data_length ); + cur += data_length; + *cur++ = pms[0]; + *cur++ = pms[1]; + memcpy( cur, data, data_length ); + cur += data_length; + + status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, pms, cur - pms ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pms, sizeof( pms ) ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + { + return( psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( prf, + data, data_length ) ); + } + + return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, step, data, data_length ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +/** Check whether the given key type is acceptable for the given + * input step of a key derivation. + * + * Secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. + * Non-secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + * Both secret and non-secret inputs can alternatively have the type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, which is never the type of a key object, meaning + * that the input was passed as a buffer rather than via a key object. + */ +static int psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type ) +{ + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + break; + } + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( step, key_type ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_hkdf_input( &operation->ctx.hkdf, + PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ), + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_tls12_prf_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + { + /* This can't happen unless the operation object was not initialized */ + (void) data; + (void) data_length; + (void) kdf_alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + return( psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, + data, data_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + return( status ); + } + + /* Passing a key object as a SECRET input unlocks the permission + * to output to a key object. */ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + operation->can_output_key = 1; + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, + step, slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_ecdh( const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *our_key, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + psa_status_t status; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( our_key->grp.id, &bits ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve), + bits, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + &their_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh, + shared_secret_length, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + if( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) != *shared_secret_length ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_size ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key ); + mbedtls_free( their_key ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + +#define PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( private_key->attr.type ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + private_key->attr.type, + private_key->attr.bits, + private_key->key.data, + private_key->key.bytes, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_agreement_ecdh( peer_key, peer_key_length, + ecp, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + default: + (void) private_key; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort() + * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE]; + size_t shared_secret_length = 0; + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( operation->alg ); + + /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared + * secret. */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( ka_alg, + private_key, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + sizeof( shared_secret ), + &shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from + * the shared secret. A shared secret is permitted wherever a key + * of type DERIVE is permitted. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_length ); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_length ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_agreement_internal( operation, step, + slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + else + { + /* If a private key has been added as SECRET, we allow the derived + * key material to be used as a key in PSA Crypto. */ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement( psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( alg, slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + output, output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* If an error happens and is not handled properly, the output + * may be used as a key to protect sensitive data. Arrange for such + * a key to be random, which is likely to result in decryption or + * verification errors. This is better than filling the buffer with + * some constant data such as zeros, which would result in the data + * being protected with a reproducible, easily knowable key. + */ + psa_generate_random( output, output_size ); + *output_length = output_size; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/** Initialize the PSA random generator. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_init( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset( rng, 0, sizeof( *rng ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Set default configuration if + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources() hasn't been called. */ + if( rng->entropy_init == NULL ) + rng->entropy_init = mbedtls_entropy_init; + if( rng->entropy_free == NULL ) + rng->entropy_free = mbedtls_entropy_free; + + rng->entropy_init( &rng->entropy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + /* The PSA entropy injection feature depends on using NV seed as an entropy + * source. Add NV seed as an entropy source for PSA entropy injection. */ + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &rng->entropy, + mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif + + mbedtls_psa_drbg_init( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA random generator. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_free( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset( rng, 0, sizeof( *rng ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + mbedtls_psa_drbg_free( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); + rng->entropy_free( &rng->entropy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Seed the PSA random generator. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_random_seed( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + /* Do nothing: the external RNG seeds itself. */ + (void) rng; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA"; + int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed( &rng->entropy, + drbg_seed, sizeof( drbg_seed ) - 1 ); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_random( uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size ) +{ + GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( &global_data.rng, + output, output_size, + &output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported + * for the extrernal RNG interface. */ + if( output_length != output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + while( output_size > 0 ) + { + size_t request_size = + ( output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ? + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST : + output_size ); + int ret = mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output, request_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + output_size -= request_size; + output += request_size; + } + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG. + * + * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls + * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the + * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state. + * + * In the non-external case, psa_generate_random() calls an + * `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random` function which has exactly the same signature + * and semantics as mbedtls_psa_get_random(). As an optimization, + * instead of doing this back-and-forth between the PSA API and the + * classic API, psa_crypto_random_impl.h defines `mbedtls_psa_get_random` + * as a constant function pointer to `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random`. + */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ) +{ + /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what + * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages + * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state. + * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass + * NULL. */ + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random( output, output_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +#include "entropy_poll.h" + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size ) +{ + if( global_data.initialized ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + if( ( ( seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM ) || + ( seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) || + ( seed_size > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( seed, seed_size ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +/** Validate the key type and size for key generation + * + * \param type The key type + * \param bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + else +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Accept only byte-aligned keys, for the same reasons as + * in psa_import_rsa_key(). */ + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + /* To avoid empty block, return successfully here. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( ( attributes->domain_parameters == NULL ) && + ( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + status = psa_generate_random( key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ) + psa_des_set_key_parity( key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + } + else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + if ( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + if ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + { + (void)key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t key_buffer_size; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to + * hold the generated key material. */ + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + { + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ) == + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + { + status = psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + attributes, &key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &slot->key.bytes ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Module setup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ), + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) ) +{ + if( global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + global_data.rng.entropy_init = entropy_init; + global_data.rng.entropy_free = entropy_free; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void ) +{ + psa_wipe_all_key_slots( ); + if( global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED ) + { + mbedtls_psa_random_free( &global_data.rng ); + } + /* Wipe all remaining data, including configuration. + * In particular, this sets all state indicator to the value + * indicating "uninitialized". */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &global_data, sizeof( global_data ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Unregister all secure element drivers, so that we restart from + * a pristine state. */ + psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +} + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) +/** Recover a transaction that was interrupted by a power failure. + * + * This function is called during initialization, before psa_crypto_init() + * returns. If this function returns a failure status, the initialization + * fails. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_recover_transaction( + const psa_crypto_transaction_t *transaction ) +{ + switch( transaction->unknown.type ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY: + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY: + /* TODO - fall through to the failure case until this + * is implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/218 + */ + default: + /* We found an unsupported transaction in the storage. + * We don't know what state the storage is in. Give up. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + } +} +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + /* Double initialization is explicitly allowed. */ + if( global_data.initialized != 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + /* Initialize and seed the random generator. */ + mbedtls_psa_random_init( &global_data.rng ); + global_data.rng_state = RNG_INITIALIZED; + status = mbedtls_psa_random_seed( &global_data.rng ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + global_data.rng_state = RNG_SEEDED; + + status = psa_initialize_key_slots( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + status = psa_init_all_se_drivers( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + status = psa_crypto_load_transaction( ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_crypto_recover_transaction( &psa_crypto_transaction ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + } + else if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + { + /* There's no transaction to complete. It's all good. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + /* All done. */ + global_data.initialized = 1; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..356679c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" + +typedef struct +{ + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + mbedtls_ccm_context ccm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + mbedtls_gcm_context gcm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + mbedtls_chachapoly_context chachapoly; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } ctx; + psa_algorithm_t core_alg; + uint8_t tag_length; +} aead_operation_t; + +#define AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {{0}, 0, 0} + +static void psa_aead_abort_internal( aead_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->core_alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &operation->ctx.ccm ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + mbedtls_gcm_free( &operation->ctx.gcm ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &operation->ctx.chachapoly ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( + aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id; + size_t full_tag_length = 0; + + key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, + attributes->core.type, key_bits, + &cipher_id ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + switch( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CCM; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( attributes->core.type ) != 16 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &operation->ctx.ccm ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &operation->ctx.ccm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( attributes->core.type ) != 16 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &operation->ctx.gcm ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &operation->ctx.gcm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if( alg != PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &operation->ctx.chachapoly ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &operation->ctx.chachapoly, + key_buffer ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( attributes->core.type, + key_bits, alg ) + > full_tag_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + operation->tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( attributes->core.type, + key_bits, + alg ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t *tag; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* For all currently supported modes, the tag is at the end of the + * ciphertext. */ + if( ciphertext_size < ( plaintext_length + operation.tag_length ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + tag = ciphertext + plaintext_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.ccm, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + tag, operation.tag_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.gcm, + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + operation.tag_length, tag ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + if( nonce_length != 12 || operation.tag_length != 16 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.chachapoly, + plaintext_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, + ciphertext, + tag ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) tag; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *ciphertext_length = plaintext_length + operation.tag_length; + +exit: + psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +/* Locate the tag in a ciphertext buffer containing the encrypted data + * followed by the tag. Return the length of the part preceding the tag in + * *plaintext_length. This is the size of the plaintext in modes where + * the encrypted data has the same size as the plaintext, such as + * CCM and GCM. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag( size_t tag_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + size_t plaintext_size, + const uint8_t **p_tag ) +{ + size_t payload_length; + if( tag_length > ciphertext_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + payload_length = ciphertext_length - tag_length; + if( payload_length > plaintext_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + *p_tag = ciphertext + payload_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + const uint8_t *tag = NULL; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag( operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext_size, &tag ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.ccm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + ciphertext, plaintext, + tag, operation.tag_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.gcm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, plaintext ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + if( nonce_length != 12 || operation.tag_length != 16 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.chachapoly, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, + ciphertext, + plaintext ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + +exit: + psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aab0f835 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H + +#include + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_encrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag are + * defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * plaintext_length) where key_type is the type + * of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * ciphertext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ); + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_decrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the encrypted + * data and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer contains + * encrypted data followed by the authentication + * tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the plaintext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * ciphertext_length) where key_type is the + * type of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The cipher is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * plaintext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d8c722bb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,723 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#endif + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t* cipher_id ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ) + alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ) + { + switch( alg ) + { + case PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM; + break; + case PSA_ALG_CTR: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR; + break; + case PSA_ALG_CFB: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB; + break; + case PSA_ALG_OFB: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB; + break; + case PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM; + break; + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM; + break; + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY; + break; + default: + return( NULL ); + } + } + else if( alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + else + return( NULL ); + + switch( key_type ) + { + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + /* key_bits is 64 for Single-DES, 128 for two-key Triple-DES, + * and 192 for three-key Triple-DES. */ + if( key_bits == 64 ) + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES; + else + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES; + /* mbedtls doesn't recognize two-key Triple-DES as an algorithm, + * but two-key Triple-DES is functionally three-key Triple-DES + * with K1=K3, so that's how we present it to mbedtls. */ + if( key_bits == 128 ) + key_bits = 192; + break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA; + break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20; + break; + default: + return( NULL ); + } + if( cipher_id != NULL ) + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + + return( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher_id_tmp, + (int) key_bits, mode ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +static psa_status_t cipher_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = NULL; + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; + + (void)key_buffer_size; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cipher ); + + operation->alg = alg; + key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, key_type, + key_bits, NULL ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cipher, cipher_info ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && key_bits == 128 ) + { + /* Two-key Triple-DES is 3-key Triple-DES with K1=K3 */ + uint8_t keys[24]; + memcpy( keys, key_buffer, 16 ); + memcpy( keys + 16, key_buffer, 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher, + keys, + 192, cipher_operation ); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher, key_buffer, + (int) key_bits, cipher_operation ); + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + switch( alg ) + { + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ); + break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 ); + break; + default: + /* The algorithm doesn't involve padding. */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + + operation->block_length = ( PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER( alg ) ? 1 : + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) ); + operation->iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( key_type, alg ); + +exit: + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( cipher_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( cipher_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ) +{ + if( iv_length != operation->iv_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.cipher, + iv, iv_length ) ) ); +} + +/* Process input for which the algorithm is set to ECB mode. This requires + * manual processing, since the PSA API is defined as being able to process + * arbitrary-length calls to psa_cipher_update() with ECB mode, but the + * underlying mbedtls_cipher_update only takes full blocks. */ +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_update_ecb( + mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + size_t internal_output_length = 0; + *output_length = 0; + + if( input_length == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + goto exit; + } + + if( ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 ) + { + /* Fill up to block size, and run the block if there's a full one. */ + size_t bytes_to_copy = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + if( input_length < bytes_to_copy ) + bytes_to_copy = input_length; + + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), + input, bytes_to_copy ); + input_length -= bytes_to_copy; + input += bytes_to_copy; + ctx->unprocessed_len += bytes_to_copy; + + if( ctx->unprocessed_len == block_size ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length ) ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + output += internal_output_length; + output_size -= internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + } + + while( input_length >= block_size ) + { + /* Run all full blocks we have, one by one */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length ) ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + input_length -= block_size; + input += block_size; + + output += internal_output_length; + output_size -= internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + } + + if( input_length > 0 ) + { + /* Save unprocessed bytes for later processing */ + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), + input, input_length ); + ctx->unprocessed_len += input_length; + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_update( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_output_size; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER( operation->alg ) ) + { + /* Take the unprocessed partial block left over from previous + * update calls, if any, plus the input to this call. Remove + * the last partial block, if any. You get the data that will be + * output in this call. */ + expected_output_size = + ( operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len + input_length ) + / operation->block_length * operation->block_length; + } + else + { + expected_output_size = input_length; + } + + if( output_size < expected_output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) + { + /* mbedtls_cipher_update has an API inconsistency: it will only + * process a single block at a time in ECB mode. Abstract away that + * inconsistency here to match the PSA API behaviour. */ + status = psa_cipher_update_ecb( &operation->ctx.cipher, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + } + else + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.cipher, input, + input_length, output, output_length ) ); + + if( *output_length > output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_finish( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + uint8_t temp_output_buffer[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + + if( operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len != 0 ) + { + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.cipher, + temp_output_buffer, + output_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( *output_length == 0 ) + ; /* Nothing to copy. Note that output may be NULL in this case. */ + else if( output_size >= *output_length ) + memcpy( output, temp_output_buffer, *output_length ); + else + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( temp_output_buffer, + sizeof( temp_output_buffer ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_abort( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cipher ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t olength, accumulated_length; + + status = cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + accumulated_length = 0; + if( operation.iv_length > 0 ) + { + status = cipher_set_iv( &operation, output, operation.iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + accumulated_length = operation.iv_length; + } + + status = cipher_update( &operation, input, input_length, + output + operation.iv_length, + output_size - operation.iv_length, + &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + accumulated_length += olength; + + status = cipher_finish( &operation, output + accumulated_length, + output_size - accumulated_length, &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *output_length = accumulated_length + olength; + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = cipher_abort( &operation ); + else + cipher_abort( &operation ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_decrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t olength, accumulated_length; + + status = cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( operation.iv_length > 0 ) + { + status = cipher_set_iv( &operation, input, operation.iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = cipher_update( &operation, input + operation.iv_length, + input_length - operation.iv_length, + output, output_size, &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + accumulated_length = olength; + + status = cipher_finish( &operation, output + accumulated_length, + output_size - accumulated_length, &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *output_length = accumulated_length + olength; + +exit: + if ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = cipher_abort( &operation ); + else + cipher_abort( &operation ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER || PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( cipher_encrypt_setup( + operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( cipher_decrypt_setup( + operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + return( cipher_set_iv( operation, iv, iv_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_update( operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_finish( operation, output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + return( cipher_abort( operation ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_encrypt( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_decrypt( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( cipher_encrypt_setup( + operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( cipher_decrypt_setup( + operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ) +{ + return( cipher_set_iv( operation, iv, iv_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_update( operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_finish( operation, output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + return( cipher_abort( operation ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_encrypt( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + return( cipher_decrypt( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +} +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5971e8d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H + +#include +#include + +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param key_type PSA key type + * \param key_bits Size of the key in bits + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS cipher information of the cipher algorithm. + * \c NULL if the PSA cipher algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_set_iv entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_set_iv entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. It is guaranteed by + * the core to be less or equal to + * PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_update entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_update entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in,out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * The core has generated and written the IV + * at the beginning of this buffer before + * this function is called. The size of the IV + * is PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( key_type, alg ) where + * \c key_type is the type of the key identified + * by \p key and \p alg is the cipher algorithm + * to compute. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the iv and the ciphertext. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_client.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..629feb7d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto client code + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +void psa_reset_key_attributes( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + mbedtls_free( attributes->domain_parameters ); + memset( attributes, 0, sizeof( *attributes ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + uint8_t *copy = NULL; + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + copy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( copy == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( copy, data, data_length ); + } + /* After this point, this function is guaranteed to succeed, so it + * can start modifying `*attributes`. */ + + if( attributes->domain_parameters != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( attributes->domain_parameters ); + attributes->domain_parameters = NULL; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = 0; + } + + attributes->domain_parameters = copy; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = data_length; + attributes->core.type = type; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size > data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + *data_length = attributes->domain_parameters_size; + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + memcpy( data, attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_core.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91757b5f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,531 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto core internal interfaces + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison + * + * \param[in] a Left-hand buffer for comparison. + * \param[in] b Right-hand buffer for comparison. + * \param n Amount of bytes to compare. + * + * \return 0 if the buffer contents are equal, non-zero otherwise + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( + const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t n ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char diff = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + diff |= a[i] ^ b[i]; + + return( diff ); +} + +/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material + * and metadata for one key. + */ +typedef struct +{ + psa_core_key_attributes_t attr; + + /* + * Number of locks on the key slot held by the library. + * + * This counter is incremented by one each time a library function + * retrieves through one of the dedicated internal API a pointer to the + * key slot. + * + * This counter is decremented by one each time a library function stops + * accessing the key slot and states it by calling the + * psa_unlock_key_slot() API. + * + * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library + * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following + * scenarios: + * . In case of key slot starvation, all key slots contain the description + * of a key, and the library asks for the description of a persistent + * key not present in the key slots, the key slots currently accessed by + * the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the + * persistent key. + * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close + * or purge or destroy a key while it is in used by the library through + * another thread. + */ + size_t lock_count; + + /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer. + * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */ + struct key_data + { + uint8_t *data; + size_t bytes; + } key; +} psa_key_slot_t; + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally. + * Currently there aren't any. */ +#define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \ + 0 ) + +/** Test whether a key slot is occupied. + * + * A key slot is occupied iff the key type is nonzero. This works because + * no valid key can have 0 as its key type. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot is occupied, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_is_key_slot_occupied( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( slot->attr.type != 0 ); +} + +/** Test whether a key slot is locked. + * + * A key slot is locked iff its lock counter is strictly greater than 0. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot is locked, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_is_key_slot_locked( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( slot->lock_count > 0 ); +} + +/** Retrieve flags from psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. + * \param mask The mask of bits to extract. + * + * \return The key attribute flags in the given slot, + * bitwise-anded with \p mask. + */ +static inline uint16_t psa_key_slot_get_flags( const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + return( slot->attr.flags & mask ); +} + +/** Set flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to modify. + * \param value The new value of the selected bits. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_set_flags( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask, + uint16_t value ) +{ + slot->attr.flags = ( ( ~mask & slot->attr.flags ) | + ( mask & value ) ); +} + +/** Turn on flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to set. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_set_bits_in_flags( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + slot->attr.flags |= mask; +} + +/** Turn off flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to clear. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_clear_bits( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + slot->attr.flags &= ~mask; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** Get the SE slot number of a key from the key slot storing its description. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. This must be a key slot storing + * the description of a key of a dynamically registered + * secure element, otherwise the behaviour is undefined. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)( slot->key.data ) ) ); +} +#endif + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * + * Persistent storage is not affected. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was + * already fully wiped. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Try to allocate a buffer to an empty key slot. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to attach buffer to. + * \param[in] buffer_length Requested size of the buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The buffer has been successfully allocated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * Trying to allocate a buffer to a non-empty key slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length ); + +/** Wipe key data from a slot. Preserves metadata such as the policy. */ +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Copy key data (in export format) into an empty key slot. + * + * This function assumes that the slot does not contain + * any key material yet. On failure, the slot content is unchanged. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to copy the key into. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key material. + * \param data_length Size of the key buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key has been copied successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation of the + * copy buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There was other key material already present in the slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ); + +/** Convert an mbed TLS error code to a PSA error code + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param ret An mbed TLS-thrown error code + * + * \return The corresponding PSA error code + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret ); + +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param key_type PSA key type + * \param key_bits Size of the key in bits + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS cipher information of the cipher algorithm. + * \c NULL if the PSA cipher algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id ); + +/** Import a key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer to contain the key data in output + * format upon successful return. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export a key in binary format + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver export_key + * entry point. This function behaves as an export_key entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_message entry point. This function behaves as a sign_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_sign_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_message entry point. This function behaves as a verify_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_verify_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..38d0e300 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c @@ -0,0 +1,1814 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + +/* Include test driver definition when running tests */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Repeat above block for each JSON-declared driver during autogeneration */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID (3) +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +/* Start delegation functions */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +/** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver without storage. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been + * returned successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; + size_t key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Emulate property 'builtin_key_size' */ + if( psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + psa_get_key_id( attributes ) ) ) ) + { + *key_buffer_size = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_size_function( key_type, key_bits ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)key_bits; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + size_t pubkey_length = 0; /* We don't support this feature yet */ + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_generate == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined as being in SE, but we have no way to generate it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->key_management->p_generate( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, NULL, 0, &pubkey_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + /* Transparent drivers are limited to generating asymmetric keys */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + /* Cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software fallback */ + status = psa_generate_key_internal( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_import == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* The driver should set the number of key bits, however in + * case it doesn't, we initialize bits to an invalid value. */ + *bits = PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1; + status = drv->key_management->p_import( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, data, data_length, bits ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( (*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key( + attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_import_key_into_slot( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); + + default: + /* Importing a key with external storage in not yet supported. + * Return in error indicating that the lifetime is not valid. */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + return( psa_export_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export_public == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export_public( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_export_public_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + default: + (void) slot_number; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } +} + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + iv, + iv_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + (void) status; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try setup on accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + /* Nothing left to try if we fall through here */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( &source_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + &source_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + (void) status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..38a6ee82 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +/* + * Function signatures for functionality that can be provided by + * cryptographic accelerators. + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* + * Signature functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +/* + * Key handling functions + */ + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * AEAD functions + */ + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ); + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H */ + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ce232c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,668 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + size_t curve_bytes = data_length; + int explicit_bits = ( curve_bits != 0 ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ) != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* A Weierstrass public key is represented as: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * So its data length is 2m+1 where m is the curve size in bits. + */ + if( ( data_length & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + curve_bytes = data_length / 2; + + /* Montgomery public keys are represented in compressed format, meaning + * their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + + /* Private keys are represented in uncompressed private random integer + * format, meaning their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + } + + if( explicit_bits ) + { + /* With an explicit bit-size, the data must have the matching length. */ + if( curve_bytes != PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( curve_bits ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + /* We need to infer the bit-size from the data. Since the only + * information we have is the length in bytes, the value of curve_bits + * at this stage is rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8. */ + curve_bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( curve_bytes ); + } + + /* Allocate and initialize a key representation. */ + ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) ); + if( ecp == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp ); + + /* Load the group. */ + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ), + curve_bits, !explicit_bits ); + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + { + /* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination + * (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a + * well-regarded curve that Mbed TLS just doesn't know about (which + * would warrant PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED). For uniformity with how + * curves that Mbed TLS knows about but for which support is disabled + * at build time, return NOT_SUPPORTED. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp->grp, grp_id ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Load the key material. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Load the public value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + data, + data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Check that the point is on the curve. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + /* Load and validate the secret value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_read_key( ecp->grp.id, + ecp, + data, + data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + *p_ecp = ecp; +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + } + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + +static psa_status_t ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + data, + data_length, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type ) == + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits + 1; + else + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits; + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format. There is currently no support + * for other input formats then the export format, so this is a 1-1 + * copy operation. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( attributes->core.type, + ecp, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); +exit: + /* Always free the PK object (will also free contained ECP context) */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Check whether the public part is loaded */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) ) + { + /* Calculate the public key */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + data_length, + data, + data_size ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + + return( status ); + } + else + { + if( data_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ecp, + data, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) ) ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *data_length = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ); + else + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + + return( status ); + } +} + +static psa_status_t ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type ) ), + ecp, data, data_size, data_length ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +static psa_status_t ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + attributes->core.type ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( curve, attributes->core.bits, 0 ); + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp; + + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || curve_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &ecp ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( grp_id, &ecp, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key( &ecp, key_buffer, key_buffer_size ) ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size; + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDSA sign/verify */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +static psa_status_t ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( + &ecp->grp, &r, &s, + &ecp->d, hash, + hash_length, md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); +#else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + (void) alg; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d, + hash, hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &r, + signature, + curve_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes ) ); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + if( ret == 0 ) + *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + (void)alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r, + signature, + curve_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes ) ); + + /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ecp->grp, hash, hash_length, + &ecp->Q, &r, &s ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + return( ecp_import_key( attributes, data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + return( ecp_export_public_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + return( ecp_generate_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + + return( ecdsa_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + return( ecdsa_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + return( ecp_import_key( attributes, data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + return( ecp_export_public_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + return( ecp_generate_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + return( ecdsa_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#else + (void)attributes; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_size; + (void)signature_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + return( ecdsa_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#else + (void)attributes; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c2b9289 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal ECP representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] curve_bits The nominal bit-size of the curve. + * It must be consistent with the representation + * passed in \p data. + * This can be 0, in which case the bit-size + * is inferred from \p data_length (which is possible + * for all key types and representation formats + * formats that are currently supported or will + * be in the foreseeable future). + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_ecp Returns a pointer to an ECP context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, + size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp ); + +/** Import an ECP key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export an ECP key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] ecp The internal ECP representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export an ECP public key or the public part of an ECP key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate an ECP key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the ECP key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with ECDSA. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the ECC key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify an ECDSA hash or short message signature. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..92dcbba9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,617 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Use builtin defines specific to this compilation unit, since the test driver + * relies on the software driver. */ +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#endif +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +/* Implement the PSA driver hash interface on top of mbed TLS if either the + * software driver or the test driver requires it. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +static psa_status_t hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->alg ) + { + case 0: + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + break; +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + operation->alg = 0; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_init( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + ret = mbedtls_md5_starts( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_init( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_init( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &operation->ctx.sha256, 1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_init( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &operation->ctx.sha256, 0 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_init( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &operation->ctx.sha512, 1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_init( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &operation->ctx.sha512, 0 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ? + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + if( ret == 0 ) + operation->alg = alg; + else + hash_abort( operation ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->alg ) + { + case 0: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md5, + &source_operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( &target_operation->ctx.ripemd160, + &source_operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha1, + &source_operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) source_operation; + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + target_operation->alg = source_operation->alg; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->alg ) + { +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_update( &operation->ctx.md5, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update( &operation->ctx.ripemd160, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update( &operation->ctx.sha1, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t actual_hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( operation->alg ); + + /* Fill the output buffer with something that isn't a valid hash + * (barring an attack on the hash and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + *hash_length = hash_size; + /* If hash_size is 0 then hash may be NULL and then the + * call to memset would have undefined behavior. */ + if( hash_size != 0 ) + memset( hash, '!', hash_size ); + + if( hash_size < actual_hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + switch( operation->alg ) + { +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_finish( &operation->ctx.md5, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( &operation->ctx.ripemd160, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish( &operation->ctx.sha1, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &operation->ctx.sha256, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &operation->ctx.sha256, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &operation->ctx.sha512, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &operation->ctx.sha512, hash ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *hash_length = actual_hash_length; + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *hash_length = hash_size; + status = hash_setup( &operation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = hash_update( &operation, input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = hash_finish( &operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +exit: + abort_status = hash_abort( &operation ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( abort_status ); + else + return( status ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH || PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + return( hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( hash_setup( operation, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + return( hash_clone( source_operation, target_operation ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + return( hash_update( operation, input, input_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + return( hash_finish( operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + return( hash_abort( operation ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + + /* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +static int is_hash_accelerated( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + return( 1 ); +#endif + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + if( is_hash_accelerated( alg ) ) + return( hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( is_hash_accelerated( alg ) ) + return( hash_setup( operation, alg ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + if( is_hash_accelerated( source_operation->alg ) ) + return( hash_clone( source_operation, target_operation ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( is_hash_accelerated( operation->alg ) ) + return( hash_update( operation, input, input_length ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + if( is_hash_accelerated( operation->alg ) ) + return( hash_finish( operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + return( hash_abort( operation ) ); +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66556439 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H + +#include + +#include "md_wrap.h" + +/** Get Mbed TLS MD information of a hash algorithm given its PSA identifier + * + * \param[in] alg PSA hash algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS MD information of the hash algorithm. \c NULL if the + * PSA hash algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). The + * core may call mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the core must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or mbedtls_psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized to all-zero and not yet be in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Clone an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_clone + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_clone entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * mbedtls_psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the Mbed TLS-calculated hash of a message. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +/** Abort an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(), mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or + * mbedtls_psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1dd95793 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_invasive.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: invasive interfaces for test only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They MUST NOT be made available to clients over IPC in integrations + * with isolation, and they SHOULD NOT be made available in library + * integrations except when building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** \brief Configure entropy sources. + * + * This function may only be called before a call to psa_crypto_init(), + * or after a call to mbedtls_psa_crypto_free() and before any + * subsequent call to psa_crypto_init(). + * + * This function is only intended for test purposes. The functionality + * it provides is also useful for system integrators, but + * system integrators should configure entropy drivers instead of + * breaking through to the Mbed TLS API. + * + * \param entropy_init Function to initialize the entropy context + * and set up the desired entropy sources. + * It is called by psa_crypto_init(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_init(). + * This function cannot report failures directly. + * To indicate a failure, set the entropy context + * to a state where mbedtls_entropy_func() will + * return an error. + * \param entropy_free Function to free the entropy context + * and associated resources. + * It is called by mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_free(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller does not have the permission to configure + * entropy sources. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has already been initialized. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ), + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_its.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_its.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a3f49a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_its.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_its.h + * \brief Interface of trusted storage that crypto is built on. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \brief Flags used when creating a data entry + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_storage_create_flags_t; + +/** \brief A type for UIDs used for identifying data + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_storage_uid_t; + +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE 0 /**< No flags to pass */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE (1 << 0) /**< The data associated with the uid will not be able to be modified or deleted. Intended to be used to set bits in `psa_storage_create_flags_t`*/ + +/** + * \brief A container for metadata associated with a specific uid + */ +struct psa_storage_info_t +{ + uint32_t size; /**< The size of the data associated with a uid **/ + psa_storage_create_flags_t flags; /**< The flags set when the uid was created **/ +}; + +/** Flag indicating that \ref psa_storage_create and \ref psa_storage_set_extended are supported */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_SUPPORT_SET_EXTENDED (1 << 0) + +/** \brief PSA storage specific error codes + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) + +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 /**< The major version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented on significant updates that may include breaking changes */ +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MINOR 1 /**< The minor version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented in small updates that are unlikely to include breaking changes */ + +/** + * \brief create a new or modify an existing uid/value pair + * + * \param[in] uid the identifier for the data + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of the data in `p_data` + * \param[in] p_data A buffer containing the data + * \param[in] create_flags The flags that the data will be stored with + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was already created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The operation failed because one or more of the flags provided in `create_flags` is not supported or is not valid + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE The operation failed because there was insufficient space on the storage medium + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the value associated with a provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[in] data_offset The starting offset of the data requested + * \param[in] data_length the amount of data requested (and the minimum allocated size of the `p_data` buffer) + * \param[out] p_data The buffer where the data will be placed upon successful completion + * \param[out] p_data_length The amount of data returned in the p_data buffer + * + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`, `p_data_length`) + * is invalid. For example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access. + * In addition, this can also happen if an invalid offset was provided. + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the metadata about the provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[out] p_info A pointer to the `psa_storage_info_t` struct that will be populated with the metadata + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided uid value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_info`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info); + +/** + * \brief Remove the provided key and its associated data from the storage + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided key value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided key value was created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c079d43 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,797 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include + +#include +#include + +/* Use builtin defines specific to this compilation unit, since the test driver + * relies on the software driver. */ +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#endif +#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +static size_t psa_get_hash_block_size( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + return( 64 ); + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + return( 64 ); + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + return( 64 ); + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + return( 64 ); + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + return( 64 ); + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + return( 128 ); + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + return( 128 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hmac->opad, sizeof( hmac->opad ) ); + return( psa_hash_abort( &hmac->hash_ctx ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ) +{ + uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t i; + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + + hmac->alg = hash_alg; + + /* Sanity checks on block_size, to guarantee that there won't be a buffer + * overflow below. This should never trigger if the hash algorithm + * is implemented correctly. */ + /* The size checks against the ipad and opad buffers cannot be written + * `block_size > sizeof( ipad ) || block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad )` + * because that triggers -Wlogical-op on GCC 7.3. */ + if( block_size > sizeof( ipad ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( block_size < hash_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( key_length > block_size ) + { + status = psa_hash_compute( hash_alg, key, key_length, + ipad, sizeof( ipad ), &key_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + /* A 0-length key is not commonly used in HMAC when used as a MAC, + * but it is permitted. It is common when HMAC is used in HKDF, for + * example. Don't call `memcpy` in the 0-length because `key` could be + * an invalid pointer which would make the behavior undefined. */ + else if( key_length != 0 ) + memcpy( ipad, key, key_length ); + + /* ipad contains the key followed by garbage. Xor and fill with 0x36 + * to create the ipad value. */ + for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ ) + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + memset( ipad + key_length, 0x36, block_size - key_length ); + + /* Copy the key material from ipad to opad, flipping the requisite bits, + * and filling the rest of opad with the requisite constant. */ + for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ ) + hmac->opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C; + memset( hmac->opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length ); + + status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ipad, sizeof( ipad ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_update_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + return( psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, data, data_length ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size ) +{ + uint8_t tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg; + size_t hash_size = 0; + size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + /* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */ + + status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, hmac->opad, block_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, hash_size ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) +static psa_status_t cmac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + /* Mbed TLS CMAC does not accept 3DES with only two keys, nor does it accept + * to do CMAC with pure DES, so return NOT_SUPPORTED here. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && + ( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 64 || + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 128 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t * cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + PSA_ALG_CMAC, + psa_get_key_type( attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ), + NULL ); + + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac, + key_buffer, + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) ); +exit: + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +/* Implement the PSA driver MAC interface on top of mbed TLS if either the + * software driver or the test driver requires it. */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + +/* Initialize this driver's MAC operation structure. Once this function has been + * called, mbedtls_psa_mac_abort can run and will do the right thing. */ +static psa_status_t mac_init( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + operation->alg = alg; + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cmac ); + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + /* We'll set up the hash operation later in psa_hmac_setup_internal. */ + operation->ctx.hmac.alg = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t mac_abort( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cmac ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + goto bad_state; + } + + operation->alg = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +bad_state: + /* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust + * anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data. + * This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten, + * but it's too late to do anything about this. */ + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +static psa_status_t mac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + status = mac_init( operation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + /* Key buffer size for CMAC is dictated by the key bits set on the + * attributes, and previously validated by the core on key import. */ + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = cmac_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) ) + { + status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ) ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &operation->ctx.cmac, + input, input_length ) ) ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + return( psa_hmac_update_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + input, input_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static psa_status_t mac_finish_internal( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size ) +{ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &operation->ctx.cmac, tmp ); + if( ret == 0 ) + memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + return( psa_hmac_finish_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + mac, mac_size ) ); + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static psa_status_t mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + status = mac_finish_internal( operation, mac, mac_size ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *mac_length = mac_size; + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Consistency check: requested MAC length fits our local buffer */ + if( mac_length > sizeof( actual_mac ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = mac_finish_internal( operation, actual_mac, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, mac_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + + status = mac_setup( &operation, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( input_length > 0 ) + { + status = mac_update( &operation, input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = mac_finish_internal( &operation, mac, mac_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *mac_length = mac_size; + +exit: + mac_abort( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC || BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + return( mac_compute( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + return( mac_update( operation, input, input_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + return( mac_sign_finish( operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + return( mac_verify_finish( operation, mac, mac_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + return( mac_abort( operation ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + + /* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +static int is_mac_accelerated( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + + switch( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) + case PSA_ALG_CMAC: + return( 1 ); +#endif + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + if( is_mac_accelerated( alg ) ) + return( mac_compute( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( is_mac_accelerated( alg ) ) + return( mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( is_mac_accelerated( alg ) ) + return( mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( is_mac_accelerated( operation->alg ) ) + return( mac_update( operation, input, input_length ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + if( is_mac_accelerated( operation->alg ) ) + return( mac_sign_finish( operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + if( is_mac_accelerated( operation->alg ) ) + return( mac_verify_finish( operation, mac, mac_length ) ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + return( mac_abort( operation ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */ + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */ + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */ + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_update( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */ + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */ + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */ + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_abort( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */ + (void) operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b81e73e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H + +#include + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_verify_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_verify_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core aborts the + * operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Output size requested for the MAC algorithm. The PSA + * core guarantees this is a valid MAC length for the + * algorithm and key combination passed to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(). It also guarantees the + * \p mac buffer is large enough to contain the + * requested output size. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes output to buffer + * \p mac, which will be equal to the requested length + * \p mac_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. A sufficient buffer size + * can be determined by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * mac_verify_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * mac_verify_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this + * function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by + * concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). It then compares the calculated MAC with the + * expected MAC passed as a parameter to this function. + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Length in bytes of the expected MAC value. The PSA + * core guarantees that this length is a valid MAC + * length for the algorithm and key combination passed + * to mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +/** Abort a MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in + * #mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(), + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and + * has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_update( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_abort( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c4c09a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_random_impl.h + * + * \brief PSA crypto random generator implementation abstraction. + * + * The definitions here need to be consistent with the declarations + * in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h. This file contains some redundant + * declarations to increase the chance that a compiler will detect + * inconsistencies if one file is changed without updating the other, + * but not all potential inconsistencies can be enforced, so make sure + * to check the public declarations and contracts in + * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h if you modify this file. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +#include +#include // only for error codes +#include + +typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/* Trivial wrapper around psa_generate_random(). */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ); + +/* The PSA RNG API doesn't need any externally maintained state. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +/* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff +/* Looks like a 64-bit system, so prefer SHA-512. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#else +/* Looks like a 32-bit system, so prefer SHA-256. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#endif +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#else +#error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG." +#endif + +#else +#error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module." +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +/** Initialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_init( mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( p_rng ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( p_rng ); +#endif +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_free( mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( p_rng ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( p_rng ); +#endif +} + +/** The type of the PSA random generator context. + * + * The random generator context is composed of an entropy context and + * a DRBG context. + */ +typedef struct +{ + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg; +} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/* Defined in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that it's visible to + * application code. The declaration here is redundant, but included + * as a safety net to make it more likely that a future change that + * accidentally causes the implementation to diverge from the interface + * will be noticed. */ +/* Do not include the declaration under MSVC because it doesn't accept it + * ("error C2370: 'mbedtls_psa_get_random' : redefinition; different storage class"). + * Observed with Visual Studio 2013. A known bug apparently: + * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8146541/duplicate-external-static-declarations-not-allowed-in-visual-studio + */ +#if !defined(_MSC_VER) +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random; +#endif + +/** The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to + * return. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#endif + +/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. + * + * This variable is only intended to be used through the macro + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. + */ +/* psa_crypto.c sets this variable to a pointer to the DRBG state in the + * global PSA crypto state. */ +/* The type `mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t` is defined in + * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that `mbedtls_psa_random_state` can be + * declared there and be visible to application code. */ +extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; + +/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. + * + * This macro expands to an expression that is suitable as the \c p_rng + * parameter to pass to mbedtls_psa_get_random(). + * + * This macro exists in all configurations where the psa_crypto module is + * enabled. Its expansion depends on the configuration. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state + +/** Seed the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param entropy An entropy context to read the seed from. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code (\c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx) on failure. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed( + mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + mbedtls_entropy_func, + entropy, + custom, len ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE ); + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + md_info, + mbedtls_entropy_func, + entropy, + custom, len ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d85b86c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,706 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include "pk_wrap.h" + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#endif + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) ) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +/* Mbed TLS doesn't support non-byte-aligned key sizes (i.e. key sizes + * that are not a multiple of 8) well. For example, there is only + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(), which returns a number of bytes, and no + * way to return the exact bit size of a key. + * To keep things simple, reject non-byte-aligned key sizes. */ +static psa_status_t psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi n; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &n ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &n, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &n ) % 8 != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free( &n ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_pk_context ctx; + size_t bits; + mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx ); + + /* Parse the data. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + else + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &ctx, data, data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a + * valid RSA key, store it. */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &ctx ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS + * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example, + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */ + bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) ) ); + if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Copy out the pointer to the RSA context, and reset the PK context + * such that pk_free doesn't free the RSA context we just grabbed. */ + *p_rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ); + ctx.pk_info = NULL; + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +static psa_status_t rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + data, + data_length, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *bits = (psa_key_bits_t) PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ); + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format, such that we can store export + * representation in the key slot. Export representation in case of RSA is + * the smallest representation that's allowed as input, so a straight-up + * allocation of the same size as the input buffer will be large enough. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( attributes->core.type, + rsa, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); +exit: + /* Always free the RSA object */ + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + int ret; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + uint8_t *pos = data + data_size; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; + pk.pk_ctx = rsa; + + /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded + * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a + * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, data, data_size ); + else + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &pos, data, &pk ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + /* Clean up in case pk_write failed halfway through. */ + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + + /* The mbedtls_pk_xxx functions write to the end of the buffer. + * Move the data to the beginning and erase remaining data + * at the original location. */ + if( 2 * (size_t) ret <= data_size ) + { + memcpy( data, data + data_size - ret, ret ); + memset( data + data_size - ret, 0, ret ); + } + else if( (size_t) ret < data_size ) + { + memmove( data, data + data_size - ret, ret ); + memset( data + ret, 0, data_size - ret ); + } + + *data_length = ret; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else + (void) type; + (void) rsa; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + (void) data_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +} + +static psa_status_t rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + attributes->core.type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY, + rsa, + data, + data_size, + data_length ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent( const uint8_t *domain_parameters, + size_t domain_parameters_size, + int *exponent ) +{ + size_t i; + uint32_t acc = 0; + + if( domain_parameters_size == 0 ) + { + *exponent = 65537; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + /* Mbed TLS encodes the public exponent as an int. For simplicity, only + * support values that fit in a 32-bit integer, which is larger than + * int on just about every platform anyway. */ + if( domain_parameters_size > sizeof( acc ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + for( i = 0; i < domain_parameters_size; i++ ) + acc = ( acc << 8 ) | domain_parameters[i]; + if( acc > INT_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + *exponent = acc; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int exponent; + + status = psa_rsa_read_exponent( attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size, + &exponent ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + (unsigned int)attributes->core.bits, + exponent ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( attributes->core.type, + &rsa, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Sign/verify hashes */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + +/* Decode the hash algorithm from alg and store the mbedtls encoding in + * md_alg. Verify that the hash length is acceptable. */ +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type( psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t hash_length, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + *md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + + /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length + * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an + * overflow later. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( hash_length > UINT_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +#endif + + /* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */ + if( alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW ) + { + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) != hash_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( signature_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + *signature_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( signature_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + } + else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Mbed TLS distinguishes "invalid padding" from "valid padding but + * the rest of the signature is invalid". This has little use in + * practice and PSA doesn't report this distinction. */ + status = ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ) ? + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE : + mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + return( rsa_import_key( attributes, data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + return( rsa_export_public_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + return( rsa_generate_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + return( rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + return( rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + return( rsa_import_key( attributes, data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + return( rsa_export_public_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + return( rsa_generate_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)) + return( rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#else + (void)attributes; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_size; + (void)signature_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)) + return( rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#else + (void)attributes; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..41a90f78 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal RSA representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_rsa Returns a pointer to an RSA context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa ); + +/** Import an RSA key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export an RSA key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] rsa The internal RSA representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export a public RSA key or the public part of an RSA key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate an RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the RSA key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the RSA key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +/* + * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..56678d6a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.c @@ -0,0 +1,383 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver lookup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* This structure is identical to psa_drv_se_context_t declared in + * `crypto_se_driver.h`, except that some parts are writable here + * (non-const, or pointer to non-const). */ +typedef struct +{ + void *persistent_data; + size_t persistent_data_size; + uintptr_t transient_data; +} psa_drv_se_internal_context_t; + +struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s +{ + psa_key_location_t location; + const psa_drv_se_t *methods; + union + { + psa_drv_se_internal_context_t internal; + psa_drv_se_context_t context; + } u; +}; + +static psa_se_drv_table_entry_t driver_table[PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS]; + +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + size_t i; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + /* In the driver table, location=0 means an entry that isn't used. + * No driver has a location of 0 because it's a reserved value + * (which designates transparent keys). Make sure we never return + * a driver entry for location 0. */ + if( location == 0 ) + return( NULL ); + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].location == location ) + return( &driver_table[i] ); + } + return( NULL ); +} + +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + return( driver->methods ); +} + +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + return( &driver->u.context ); +} + +int psa_get_se_driver( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context) +{ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( lifetime ); + if( p_methods != NULL ) + *p_methods = ( driver ? driver->methods : NULL ); + if( p_drv_context != NULL ) + *p_drv_context = ( driver ? &driver->u.context : NULL ); + return( driver != NULL ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Persistent data management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_storage_uid_t *uid ) +{ + if( driver->location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX + /* ITS file sizes are limited to 32 bits. */ + if( driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size > UINT32_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif + + /* See the documentation of PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. */ + *uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + driver->location; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + size_t length; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( driver, &uid ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Read the amount of persistent data that the driver requests. + * If the data in storage is larger, it is truncated. If the data + * in storage is smaller, silently keep what is already at the end + * of the output buffer. */ + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return( psa_its_get( uid, 0, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + &length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( driver, &uid ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return( psa_its_set( uid, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + if( location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + location; + return( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_location_t key_location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* If the location is wrong, it's a bug in the library. */ + if( driver->location != key_location ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + /* If the driver doesn't support key creation in any way, give up now. */ + if( driver->methods->key_management == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( psa_get_key_slot_number( attributes, slot_number ) == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* The application wants to use a specific slot. Allow it if + * the driver supports it. On a system with isolation, + * the crypto service must check that the application is + * permitted to request this slot. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number = + driver->methods->key_management->p_validate_slot_number; + if( p_validate_slot_number == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + status = p_validate_slot_number( &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + *slot_number ); + } + else if( method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER ) + { + /* The application didn't specify a slot number. This doesn't + * make sense when registering a slot. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + /* The application didn't tell us which slot to use. Let the driver + * choose. This is the normal case. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate = + driver->methods->key_management->p_allocate; + if( p_allocate == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + status = p_allocate( &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + slot_number ); + } + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key( psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t storage_status; + /* Normally a missing method would mean that the action is not + * supported. But psa_destroy_key() is not supposed to return + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: if you can create a key, you should + * be able to destroy it. The only use case for a driver that + * does not have a way to destroy keys at all is if the keys are + * locked in a read-only state: we can use the keys but not + * destroy them. Hence, if the driver doesn't support destroying + * keys, it's really a lack of permission. */ + if( driver->methods->key_management == NULL || + driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + status = driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + slot_number ); + storage_status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? storage_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = &driver_table[i]; + if( driver->location == 0 ) + continue; /* skipping unused entry */ + const psa_drv_se_t *methods = psa_get_se_driver_methods( driver ); + if( methods->p_init != NULL ) + { + psa_status_t status = methods->p_init( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + driver->location ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + } + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver registration */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods) +{ + size_t i; + psa_status_t status; + + if( methods->hal_version != PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + /* Driver table entries are 0-initialized. 0 is not a valid driver + * location because it means a transparent key. */ +#if defined(static_assert) + static_assert( PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE == 0, + "Secure element support requires 0 to mean a local key" ); +#endif + if( location == PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].location == 0 ) + break; + /* Check that location isn't already in use up to the first free + * entry. Since entries are created in order and never deleted, + * there can't be a used entry after the first free entry. */ + if( driver_table[i].location == location ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + } + if( i == PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + driver_table[i].location = location; + driver_table[i].methods = methods; + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data_size = + methods->persistent_data_size; + + if( methods->persistent_data_size != 0 ) + { + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, methods->persistent_data_size ); + if( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data == NULL ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + /* Load the driver's persistent data. On first use, the persistent + * data does not exist in storage, and is initialized to + * all-bits-zero by the calloc call just above. */ + status = psa_load_se_persistent_data( &driver_table[i] ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + goto error; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +error: + memset( &driver_table[i], 0, sizeof( driver_table[i] ) ); + return( status ); +} + +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data != NULL ) + mbedtls_free( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data ); + } + memset( driver_table, 0, sizeof( driver_table ) ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..549dfb69 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_se.h @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** The maximum location value that this implementation supports + * for a secure element. + * + * This is not a characteristic that each PSA implementation has, but a + * limitation of the current implementation due to the constraints imposed + * by storage. See #PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. + * + * The minimum location value for a secure element is 1, like on any + * PSA implementation (0 means a transparent key). + */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION 255 + +/** The base of the range of ITS file identifiers for secure element + * driver persistent data. + * + * We use a slice of the implementation reserved range 0xffff0000..0xffffffff, + * specifically the range 0xfffffe00..0xfffffeff. The length of this range + * drives the value of #PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION. The identifier 0xfffffe00 is + * actually not used since it corresponds to #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + * which doesn't have a driver. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE ( (psa_key_id_t) 0xfffffe00 ) + +/** The maximum number of registered secure element driver locations. */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS 4 + +/** Unregister all secure element drivers. + * + * \warning Do not call this function while the library is in the initialized + * state. This function is only intended to be called at the end + * of mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + */ +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( void ); + +/** Initialize all secure element drivers. + * + * Called from psa_crypto_init(). + */ +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers( void ); + +/** A structure that describes a registered secure element driver. + * + * A secure element driver table entry contains a pointer to the + * driver's method table as well as the driver context structure. + */ +typedef struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s psa_se_drv_table_entry_t; + +/** Return the secure element driver information for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * \param[out] p_methods On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *methods points to its method table. + * Otherwise \c *methods is \c NULL. + * \param[out] p_drv_context On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *drv_context points to its context + * structure. + * Otherwise \c *drv_context is \c NULL. + * + * \retval 1 + * \p lifetime corresponds to a registered driver. + * \retval 0 + * \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +int psa_get_se_driver( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context); + +/** Return the secure element driver table entry for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * + * \return The driver table entry for \p lifetime, or + * \p NULL if \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ); + +/** Return the method table for a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return The driver's method table. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Return the context of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return A pointer to the driver context. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Find a free slot for a key that is to be created. + * + * This function calls the relevant method in the driver to find a suitable + * slot for a key with the given attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes Metadata about the key that is about to be created. + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, a slot number that is free in this + * secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ); + +/** Destoy a key in a secure element. + * + * This function calls the relevant driver method to destroy a key + * and updates the driver's persistent data. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key( psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ); + +/** Load the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to load from storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Save the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to save to storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Destroy the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * This is currently only used for testing. + * + * \param[in] location The location identifier for the driver whose + * persistent data is to be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location ); + + +/** The storage representation of a key whose data is in a secure element. + */ +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t slot_number[sizeof( psa_key_slot_number_t )]; +} psa_se_key_data_storage_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4131e3cc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -0,0 +1,574 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; + unsigned key_slots_initialized : 1; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +int psa_is_valid_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok ) +{ + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ); + + if( ( PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN <= key_id ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ) ) + return( 1 ); + + if( vendor_ok && + ( PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= key_id ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** Get the description in memory of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are + * stored in key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot + * containing the description of a key given its identifier. + * + * The function searches the key slots containing the description of the key + * with \p key identifier. The function does only read accesses to the key + * slots. The function does not load any persistent key thus does not access + * any storage. + * + * For volatile key identifiers, only one key slot is queried as a volatile + * key with identifier key_id can only be stored in slot of index + * ( key_id - #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ). + * + * On success, the function locks the key slot. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The pointer to the key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key was returned. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key in the key slots. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ); + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( psa_key_id_is_volatile( key_id ) ) + { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[ key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ]; + + /* + * Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner + * identifier of key match those of the key slot. + * + * Note that, if the key slot is not occupied, its PSA key identifier + * is equal to zero. This is an invalid value for a PSA key identifier + * and thus cannot be equal to the valid PSA key identifier key_id. + */ + status = mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key, slot->attr.id ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + else + { + if ( !psa_is_valid_key_id( key, 1 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key, slot->attr.id ) ) + break; + } + status = ( slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_lock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *p_slot = slot; + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void ) +{ + /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both + * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which + * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. */ + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void ) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + slot->lock_count = 1; + (void) psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); + } + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; +} + +psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot( psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + + if( ! global_data.key_slots_initialized ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto error; + } + + selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot = NULL; + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( ! psa_is_key_slot_occupied( slot ) ) + { + selected_slot = slot; + break; + } + + if( ( unlocked_persistent_key_slot == NULL ) && + ( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) && + ( ! psa_is_key_slot_locked( slot ) ) ) + unlocked_persistent_key_slot = slot; + } + + /* + * If there is no unused key slot and there is at least one unlocked key + * slot containing the description of a persistent key, recycle the first + * such key slot we encountered. If we later need to operate on the + * persistent key we are evicting now, we will reload its description from + * storage. + */ + if( ( selected_slot == NULL ) && + ( unlocked_persistent_key_slot != NULL ) ) + { + selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + selected_slot->lock_count = 1; + psa_wipe_key_slot( selected_slot ); + } + + if( selected_slot != NULL ) + { + status = psa_lock_key_slot( selected_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto error; + + *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + + ( (psa_key_id_t)( selected_slot - global_data.key_slots ) ); + *p_slot = selected_slot; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + *volatile_key_id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) +static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_data_length = 0; + + status = psa_load_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + &key_data, &key_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Special handling is required for loading keys associated with a + * dynamically registered SE interface. */ + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + if( psa_get_se_driver( slot->attr.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t *data; + + if( key_data_length != sizeof( *data ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + data = (psa_se_key_data_storage_t *) key_data; + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, data->slot_number, sizeof( data->slot_number ) ); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( slot, key_data, key_data_length ); + +exit: + psa_free_persistent_key_data( key_data, key_data_length ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + +static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE; + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = 0; + size_t key_buffer_size = 0; + size_t key_buffer_length = 0; + + if( ! psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ) ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } + + /* Check the platform function to see whether this key actually exists */ + status = mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + slot->attr.id, &lifetime, &slot_number ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Set required key attributes to ensure get_builtin_key can retrieve the + * full attributes. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, slot->attr.id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + + /* Get the full key attributes from the driver in order to be able to + * calculate the required buffer size. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + NULL, 0, NULL ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + { + /* Builtin keys cannot be defined by the attributes alone */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + return( status ); + } + + /* If the key should exist according to the platform, then ask the driver + * what its expected size is. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( &attributes, + &key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Allocate a buffer of the required size and load the builtin key directly + * into the (now properly sized) slot buffer. */ + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &key_buffer_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */ + slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length; + slot->attr = attributes.core; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *p_slot = NULL; + if( ! global_data.key_slots_initialized ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* + * On success, the pointer to the slot is passed directly to the caller + * thus no need to unlock the key slot here. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( key, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( status ); + + /* Loading keys from storage requires support for such a mechanism */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + + status = psa_get_empty_key_slot( &volatile_key_id, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + (*p_slot)->attr.id = key; + (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT; + + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Load keys in the 'builtin' range through their own interface */ + status = psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot( *p_slot ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( *p_slot ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_wipe_key_slot( *p_slot ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + /* Add implicit usage flags. */ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags( &(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage ); + + return( status ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + if( slot == NULL ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + if( slot->lock_count > 0 ) + { + slot->lock_count--; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + if ( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( lifetime ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Check whether a driver is registered against this lifetime */ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( lifetime ); + if( driver != NULL ) + { + if (p_drv != NULL) + *p_drv = driver; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + (void) p_drv; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + /* Key location for external keys gets checked by the wrapper */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + /* No support for external lifetimes at all, or dynamic interface + * did not find driver for requested lifetime. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + } + else + /* Local/internal keys are always valid */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + /* Volatile keys are always supported */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else + { + /* Persistent keys require storage support */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY( lifetime ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + else + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ) + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + + return( status ); + } + + *handle = key; + + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); + +#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + (void) key; + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_close_key( psa_key_handle_t handle ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if( psa_key_handle_is_null( handle ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( handle, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + + return( status ); + } + if( slot->lock_count <= 1 ) + return( psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ) ); + else + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_purge_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) && + ( slot->lock_count <= 1 ) ) + return( psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ) ); + else + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats ) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + memset( stats, 0, sizeof( *stats ) ); + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( psa_is_key_slot_locked( slot ) ) + { + ++stats->locked_slots; + } + if( ! psa_is_key_slot_occupied( slot ) ) + { + ++stats->empty_slots; + continue; + } + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + ++stats->volatile_slots; + else + { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ); + ++stats->persistent_slots; + if( id > stats->max_open_internal_key_id ) + stats->max_open_internal_key_id = id; + } + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( slot->attr.lifetime ) != + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ); + ++stats->external_slots; + if( id > stats->max_open_external_key_id ) + stats->max_open_external_key_id = id; + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d539bdd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +/** Range of volatile key identifiers. + * + * The last #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation + * range of key identifiers are reserved for volatile key identifiers. + * A volatile key identifier is equal to #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN plus the + * index of the key slot containing the volatile key definition. + */ + +/** The minimum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ( PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX - \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1 ) + +/** The maximum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** Test whether a key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a volatile key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile( psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( ( key_id >= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX ) ); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are stored in + * key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of a key given its identifier. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p *p_slot contains a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of the key identified by \p key. + * The key slot counter has been incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been initialized. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \p key is a persistent key identifier. The implementation does not + * have sufficient resources to load the persistent key. This can be + * due to a lack of empty key slot, or available memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ); + +/** Initialize the key slot structures. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Currently this function always succeeds. + */ +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void ); + +/** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * + * This does not affect persistent storage. */ +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void ); + +/** Find a free key slot. + * + * This function returns a key slot that is available for use and is in its + * ground state (all-bits-zero). On success, the key slot is locked. It is + * the responsibility of the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not + * access it anymore. + * + * \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier + * associated to the returned slot. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot( psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ); + +/** Lock a key slot. + * + * This function increments the key slot lock counter by one. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot lock counter was incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The lock counter already reached its maximum value and was not + * increased. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + if( slot->lock_count >= SIZE_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + slot->lock_count++; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Unlock a key slot. + * + * This function decrements the key slot lock counter by one. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot lock counter has been + * decremented successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The lock counter was equal to 0. + * + */ +psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The lifetime designates an external key. There should be a + * registered driver for this lifetime, otherwise the key cannot + * be created or manipulated. + * \retval 0 + * The lifetime designates a key that is volatile or in internal + * storage. + */ +static inline int psa_key_lifetime_is_external( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + return( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) + != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ); +} + +/** Validate a key's location. + * + * This function checks whether the key's attributes point to a location that + * is known to the PSA Core, and returns the driver function table if the key + * is to be found in an external location. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * \param[out] p_drv On success, when a key is located in external + * storage, returns a pointer to the driver table + * associated with the key's storage location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ); + +/** Validate the persistence of a key. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The key is persistent but persistent keys + * are not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ); + +/** Validate a key identifier. + * + * \param[in] key The key identifier. + * \param[in] vendor_ok Non-zero to indicate that key identifiers in the + * vendor range are allowed, volatile key identifiers + * excepted \c 0 otherwise. + * + * \retval <> 0 if the key identifier is valid, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_is_valid_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..09cbab4c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.c @@ -0,0 +1,532 @@ +/* + * PSA persistent key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key storage */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Determine a file name (ITS file identifier) for the given key identifier. + * The file name must be distinct from any file that is used for a purpose + * other than storing a key. Currently, the only such file is the random seed + * file whose name is PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID and whose value is + * 0xFFFFFF52. */ +static psa_storage_uid_t psa_its_identifier_of_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + /* Encode the owner in the upper 32 bits. This means that if + * owner values are nonzero (as they are on a PSA platform), + * no key file will ever have a value less than 0x100000000, so + * the whole range 0..0xffffffff is available for non-key files. */ + uint32_t unsigned_owner_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( key ); + return( ( (uint64_t) unsigned_owner_id << 32 ) | + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) ); +#else + /* Use the key id directly as a file name. + * psa_is_key_id_valid() in psa_crypto_slot_management.c + * is responsible for ensuring that key identifiers do not have a + * value that is reserved for non-key files. */ + return( key ); +#endif +} + +/** + * \brief Load persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function reads data from a storage backend and returns the data in a + * buffer. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be loaded. This + * should be an occupied storage location. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \c data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + size_t data_length = 0; + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_its_get( data_identifier, 0, (uint32_t) data_size, data, &data_length ); + if( data_size != data_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + return( status ); +} + +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + + if( ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( 0 ); + return( 1 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Store persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function stores the given data buffer to a persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be stored. This + * should be an unoccupied storage location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the data to be stored. + * \param data_length The number of bytes + * that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + if( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key ) == 1 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + + status = psa_its_set( data_identifier, (uint32_t) data_length, data, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + } + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( data_identifier_info.size != data_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* Remove the file in case we managed to create it but something + * went wrong. It's ok if the file doesn't exist. If the file exists + * but the removal fails, we're already reporting an error so there's + * nothing else we can do. */ + (void) psa_its_remove( data_identifier ); + } + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + if( psa_its_remove( data_identifier ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( ret != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** + * \brief Get data length for given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier whose stored data length + * is to be obtained. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + *data_length = (size_t) data_identifier_info.size; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE +#define GET_UINT32_LE( n, b, i ) \ +{ \ + (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE +#define PUT_UINT32_LE( n, b, i ) \ +{ \ + (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ +} +#endif + +/* + * 16-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_UINT16_LE +#define GET_UINT16_LE( n, b, i ) \ +{ \ + (n) = ( (uint16_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ + | ( (uint16_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ); \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_UINT16_LE +#define PUT_UINT16_LE( n, b, i ) \ +{ \ + (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Persistent key storage magic header. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY" +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ( sizeof( PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER ) ) + +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH]; + uint8_t version[4]; + uint8_t lifetime[sizeof( psa_key_lifetime_t )]; + uint8_t type[2]; + uint8_t bits[2]; + uint8_t policy[sizeof( psa_key_policy_t )]; + uint8_t data_len[4]; + uint8_t key_data[]; +} psa_persistent_key_storage_format; + +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data ) +{ + psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data; + + memcpy( storage_format->magic, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( 0, storage_format->version, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->lifetime, storage_format->lifetime, 0 ); + PUT_UINT16_LE( (uint16_t) attr->type, storage_format->type, 0 ); + PUT_UINT16_LE( (uint16_t) attr->bits, storage_format->bits, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.usage, storage_format->policy, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg2, storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0 ); + memcpy( storage_format->key_data, data, data_length ); +} + +static psa_status_t check_magic_header( const uint8_t *data ) +{ + if( memcmp( data, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, + PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *)storage_data; + uint32_t version; + + if( storage_data_length < sizeof(*storage_format) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + status = check_magic_header( storage_data ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + GET_UINT32_LE( version, storage_format->version, 0 ); + if( version != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + GET_UINT32_LE( *key_data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0 ); + if( *key_data_length > ( storage_data_length - sizeof(*storage_format) ) || + *key_data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + if( *key_data_length == 0 ) + { + *key_data = NULL; + } + else + { + *key_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *key_data_length ); + if( *key_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( *key_data, storage_format->key_data, *key_data_length ); + } + + GET_UINT32_LE( attr->lifetime, storage_format->lifetime, 0 ); + GET_UINT16_LE( attr->type, storage_format->type, 0 ); + GET_UINT16_LE( attr->bits, storage_format->bits, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.usage, storage_format->policy, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + GET_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg2, storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length ) +{ + size_t storage_data_length; + uint8_t *storage_data; + psa_status_t status; + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if( data == NULL || data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ); + storage_data_length = data_length + sizeof( psa_persistent_key_storage_format ); + + storage_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length ); + if( storage_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + psa_format_key_data_for_storage( data, data_length, attr, storage_data ); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_store( attr->id, + storage_data, storage_data_length ); + + mbedtls_free( storage_data ); + + return( status ); +} + +void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length ) +{ + if( key_data != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_data, key_data_length ); + } + mbedtls_free( key_data ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *loaded_data; + size_t storage_data_length = 0; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = attr->id; + + status = psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( key, &storage_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + loaded_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length ); + + if( loaded_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_load( key, loaded_data, storage_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( loaded_data, storage_data_length, + data, data_length, attr ); + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && + ( *data == NULL || *data_length == 0 ) ) + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + +exit: + mbedtls_free( loaded_data ); + return( status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Transactions */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction( void ) +{ + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + psa_status_t status; + status = psa_its_get_info( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, &p_info ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* This shouldn't happen: we're trying to start a transaction while + * there is still a transaction that hasn't been replayed. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + else if( status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( status ); + return( psa_its_set( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, + sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ), + &psa_crypto_transaction, + 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t length; + status = psa_its_get( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, 0, + sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ), + &psa_crypto_transaction, &length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( length != sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ); + /* Whether or not updating the storage succeeded, the transaction is + * finished now. It's too late to go back, so zero out the in-memory + * data. */ + memset( &psa_crypto_transaction, 0, sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ) ); + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generator state */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, &p_info ); + + if( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST == status ) /* No seed exists */ + { + status = psa_its_set( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, seed_size, seed, 0 ); + } + else if( PSA_SUCCESS == status ) + { + /* You should not be here. Seed needs to be injected only once */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..970e1083 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_crypto_storage.h @@ -0,0 +1,399 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_storage.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Limit the maximum key size in storage. This should have no effect + * since the key size is limited in memory. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) ) +/* Sanity check: a file size must fit in 32 bits. Allow a generous + * 64kB of metadata. */ +#if PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#error PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#endif + +/** The maximum permitted persistent slot number. + * + * In Mbed Crypto 0.1.0b: + * - Using the file backend, all key ids are ok except 0. + * - Using the ITS backend, all key ids are ok except 0xFFFFFF52 + * (#PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID) for which the file contains the + * device's random seed (if this feature is enabled). + * - Only key ids from 1 to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT are actually used. + * + * Since we need to preserve the random seed, avoid using that key slot. + * Reserve a whole range of key slots just in case something else comes up. + * + * This limitation will probably become moot when we implement client + * separation for key storage. + */ +#define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** + * \brief Checks if persistent data is stored for the given key slot number + * + * This function checks if any key data or metadata exists for the key slot in + * the persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier to check. + * + * \retval 0 + * No persistent data present for slot number + * \retval 1 + * Persistent data present for slot number + */ +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** + * \brief Format key data and metadata and save to a location for given key + * slot. + * + * This function formats the key data and metadata and saves it to a + * persistent storage backend. The storage location corresponding to the + * key slot must be empty, otherwise this function will fail. This function + * should be called after loading the key into an internal slot to ensure the + * persistent key is not saved into a storage location corresponding to an + * already occupied non-persistent key, as well as ensuring the key data is + * validated. + * + * Note: This function will only succeed for key buffers which are not + * empty. If passed a NULL pointer or zero-length, the function will fail + * with #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * \param[in] attr The attributes of the key to save. + * The key identifier field in the attributes + * determines the key's location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Parses key data and metadata and load persistent key for given + * key slot number. + * + * This function reads from a storage backend, parses the key data and + * metadata and writes them to the appropriate output parameters. + * + * Note: This function allocates a buffer and returns a pointer to it through + * the data parameter. On successful return, the pointer is guaranteed to be + * valid and the buffer contains at least one byte of data. + * psa_free_persistent_key_data() must be called on the data buffer + * afterwards to zeroize and free this buffer. + * + * \param[in,out] attr On input, the key identifier field identifies + * the key to load. Other fields are ignored. + * On success, the attribute structure contains + * the key metadata that was loaded from storage. + * \param[out] data Pointer to an allocated key data buffer on return. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Remove persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to remove + * from persistent storage. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully removed, + * or the key did not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** + * \brief Free the temporary buffer allocated by psa_load_persistent_key(). + * + * This function must be called at some point after psa_load_persistent_key() + * to zeroize and free the memory allocated to the buffer in that function. + * + * \param key_data Buffer for the key data. + * \param key_data_length Size of the key data buffer. + * + */ +void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Formats key data and metadata for persistent storage + * + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length Length of the key data buffer. + * \param[in] attr The core attributes of the key. + * \param[out] storage_data Output buffer for the formatted data. + * + */ +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data ); + +/** + * \brief Parses persistent storage data into key data and metadata + * + * \param[in] storage_data Buffer for the storage data. + * \param storage_data_length Length of the storage data buffer + * \param[out] key_data On output, pointer to a newly allocated buffer + * containing the key data. This must be freed + * using psa_free_persistent_key_data() + * \param[out] key_data_length Length of the key data buffer + * \param[out] attr On success, the attribute structure is filled + * with the loaded key metadata. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** This symbol is defined if transaction support is required. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +/** The type of transaction that is in progress. + */ +/* This is an integer type rather than an enum for two reasons: to support + * unknown values when loading a transaction file, and to ensure that the + * type has a known size. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_crypto_transaction_type_t; + +/** No transaction is in progress. + * + * This has the value 0, so zero-initialization sets a transaction's type to + * this value. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_NONE ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0000 ) + +/** A key creation transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are created atomically in storage + * (simple file creation), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0001 ) + +/** A key destruction transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are destroyed atomically in storage + * (simple file deletion), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0002 ) + +/** Transaction data. + * + * This type is designed to be serialized by writing the memory representation + * and reading it back on the same device. + * + * \note The transaction mechanism is designed for a single active transaction + * at a time. The transaction object is #psa_crypto_transaction. + * + * \note If an API call starts a transaction, it must complete this transaction + * before returning to the application. + * + * The lifetime of a transaction is the following (note that only one + * transaction may be active at a time): + * + * -# Call psa_crypto_prepare_transaction() to initialize the transaction + * object in memory and declare the type of transaction that is starting. + * -# Fill in the type-specific fields of #psa_crypto_transaction. + * -# Call psa_crypto_save_transaction() to start the transaction. This + * saves the transaction data to internal storage. + * -# Perform the work of the transaction by modifying files, contacting + * external entities, or whatever needs doing. Note that the transaction + * may be interrupted by a power failure, so you need to have a way + * recover from interruptions either by undoing what has been done + * so far or by resuming where you left off. + * -# If there are intermediate stages in the transaction, update + * the fields of #psa_crypto_transaction and call + * psa_crypto_save_transaction() again when each stage is reached. + * -# When the transaction is over, call psa_crypto_stop_transaction() to + * remove the transaction data in storage and in memory. + * + * If the system crashes while a transaction is in progress, psa_crypto_init() + * calls psa_crypto_load_transaction() and takes care of completing or + * rewinding the transaction. This is done in psa_crypto_recover_transaction() + * in psa_crypto.c. If you add a new type of transaction, be + * sure to add code for it in psa_crypto_recover_transaction(). + */ +typedef union +{ + /* Each element of this union must have the following properties + * to facilitate serialization and deserialization: + * + * - The element is a struct. + * - The first field of the struct is `psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type`. + * - Elements of the struct are arranged such a way that there is + * no padding. + */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_unknown_s + { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + uint32_t unused2; + uint64_t unused3; + uint64_t unused4; + } unknown; + /* ::type is #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY or + * #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY. */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_key_s + { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + } key; +} psa_crypto_transaction_t; + +/** The single active transaction. + */ +extern psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +/** Prepare for a transaction. + * + * There must not be an ongoing transaction. + * + * \param type The type of transaction to start. + */ +static inline void psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type ) +{ + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type = type; +} + +/** Save the transaction data to storage. + * + * You may call this function multiple times during a transaction to + * atomically update the transaction state. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction( void ); + +/** Load the transaction data from storage, if any. + * + * This function is meant to be called from psa_crypto_init() to recover + * in case a transaction was interrupted by a system crash. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The data about the ongoing transaction has been loaded to + * #psa_crypto_transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no ongoing transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction( void ); + +/** Indicate that the current transaction is finished. + * + * Call this function at the very end of transaction processing. + * This function does not "commit" or "abort" the transaction: the storage + * subsystem has no concept of "commit" and "abort", just saving and + * removing the transaction information in storage. + * + * This function erases the transaction data in storage (if any) and + * resets the transaction data in memory. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * There was transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There was no transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * It was impossible to determine whether there was transaction data + * in storage, or the transaction data could not be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction( void ); + +/** The ITS file identifier for the transaction data. + * + * 0xffffffNN = special file; 0x74 = 't' for transaction. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ( (psa_key_id_t) 0xffffff74 ) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +/** Backend side of mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(). + * + * This function stores the supplied data into the entropy seed file. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The entropy seed file already exists. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_its_file.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_its_file.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..492be1c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/psa_its_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +/* + * PSA ITS simulator over stdio files. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "" +#endif + +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08x%08x" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ".psa_its" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \ + ( sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX ) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \ + 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \ + sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ) - 1 + /*suffix without terminating 0*/ \ + 1 /*terminating null byte*/ ) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP \ + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX + +/* The maximum value of psa_storage_info_t.size */ +#define PSA_ITS_MAX_SIZE 0xffffffff + +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING "PSA\0ITS\0" +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH 8 + +/* As rename fails on Windows if the new filepath already exists, + * use MoveFileExA with the MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING flag instead. + * Returns 0 on success, nonzero on failure. */ +#if defined(_WIN32) +#define rename_replace_existing( oldpath, newpath ) \ + ( ! MoveFileExA( oldpath, newpath, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING ) ) +#else +#define rename_replace_existing( oldpath, newpath ) rename( oldpath, newpath ) +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t magic[PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH]; + uint8_t size[sizeof( uint32_t )]; + uint8_t flags[sizeof( psa_storage_create_flags_t )]; +} psa_its_file_header_t; + +static void psa_its_fill_filename( psa_storage_uid_t uid, char *filename ) +{ + /* Break up the UID into two 32-bit pieces so as not to rely on + * long long support in snprintf. */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH, + "%s" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%s", + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX, + (unsigned) ( uid >> 32 ), + (unsigned) ( uid & 0xffffffff ), + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_its_read_file( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info, + FILE **p_stream ) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + *p_stream = NULL; + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + *p_stream = fopen( filename, "rb" ); + if( *p_stream == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + + n = fread( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), *p_stream ); + if( n != sizeof( header ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ); + if( memcmp( header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, + PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ); + + p_info->size = ( header.size[0] | + header.size[1] << 8 | + header.size[2] << 16 | + header.size[3] << 24 ); + p_info->flags = ( header.flags[0] | + header.flags[1] << 8 | + header.flags[2] << 16 | + header.flags[3] << 24 ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + status = psa_its_read_file( uid, p_info, &stream ); + if( stream != NULL ) + fclose( stream ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + size_t n; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + + status = psa_its_read_file( uid, &info, &stream ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if( data_offset + data_length < data_offset ) + goto exit; +#if SIZE_MAX < 0xffffffff + if( data_offset + data_length > SIZE_MAX ) + goto exit; +#endif + if( data_offset + data_length > info.size ) + goto exit; + + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#if LONG_MAX < 0xffffffff + while( data_offset > LONG_MAX ) + { + if( fseek( stream, LONG_MAX, SEEK_CUR ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + data_offset -= LONG_MAX; + } +#endif + if( fseek( stream, data_offset, SEEK_CUR ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + n = fread( p_data, 1, data_length, stream ); + if( n != data_length ) + goto exit; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if( p_data_length != NULL ) + *p_data_length = n; + +exit: + if( stream != NULL ) + fclose( stream ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_set( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream = NULL; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + memcpy( header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH ); + header.size[0] = data_length & 0xff; + header.size[1] = ( data_length >> 8 ) & 0xff; + header.size[2] = ( data_length >> 16 ) & 0xff; + header.size[3] = ( data_length >> 24 ) & 0xff; + header.flags[0] = create_flags & 0xff; + header.flags[1] = ( create_flags >> 8 ) & 0xff; + header.flags[2] = ( create_flags >> 16 ) & 0xff; + header.flags[3] = ( create_flags >> 24 ) & 0xff; + + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + stream = fopen( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, "wb" ); + if( stream == NULL ) + goto exit; + + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + n = fwrite( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), stream ); + if( n != sizeof( header ) ) + goto exit; + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + n = fwrite( p_data, 1, data_length, stream ); + if( n != data_length ) + goto exit; + } + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + if( stream != NULL ) + { + int ret = fclose( stream ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + } + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( rename_replace_existing( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, filename ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + /* The temporary file may still exist, but only in failure cases where + * we're already reporting an error. So there's nothing we can do on + * failure. If the function succeeded, and in some error cases, the + * temporary file doesn't exist and so remove() is expected to fail. + * Thus we just ignore the return status of remove(). */ + (void) remove( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_remove( psa_storage_uid_t uid ) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream; + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + stream = fopen( filename, "rb" ); + if( stream == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + fclose( stream ); + if( remove( filename ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ripemd160.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ripemd160.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2ccbbec --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ripemd160.c @@ -0,0 +1,519 @@ +/* + * RIPE MD-160 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The RIPEMD-160 algorithm was designed by RIPE in 1996 + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html + * http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/RIPEMD-160 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE +#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ +{ \ + (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE +#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ +{ \ + (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_free( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, + const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) +/* + * Process one block + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; + } local; + + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); + GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); + + local.A = local.Ap = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = local.Bp = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = local.Cp = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = local.Dp = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = local.Ep = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F1( x, y, z ) ( (x) ^ (y) ^ (z) ) +#define F2( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) & (y) ) | ( ~(x) & (z) ) ) +#define F3( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) | ~(y) ) ^ (z) ) +#define F4( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) & (z) ) | ( (y) & ~(z) ) ) +#define F5( x, y, z ) ( (x) ^ ( (y) | ~(z) ) ) + +#define S( x, n ) ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( (x) >> (32 - (n)) ) ) + +#define P( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, f, k ) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += f( (b), (c), (d) ) + local.X[r] + (k); \ + (a) = S( (a), (s) ) + (e); \ + (c) = S( (c), 10 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define P2( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, rp, sp ) \ + do \ + { \ + P( (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (r), (s), F, K ); \ + P( a ## p, b ## p, c ## p, d ## p, e ## p, \ + (rp), (sp), Fp, Kp ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define F F1 +#define K 0x00000000 +#define Fp F5 +#define Kp 0x50A28BE6 + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 11, 5, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 14, 14, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 15, 7, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 12, 0, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 5, 9, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 5, 8, 2, 15 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 7, 11, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 9, 4, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 11, 13, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 13, 6, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 14, 15, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 15, 8, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 6, 1, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 7, 10, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 9, 3, 12 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 15, 8, 12, 6 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F2 +#define K 0x5A827999 +#define Fp F4 +#define Kp 0x5C4DD124 + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 7, 6, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 6, 11, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 8, 3, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 13, 7, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 11, 0, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 9, 13, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 7, 5, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 15, 10, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 7, 14, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 12, 15, 7 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 15, 8, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 9, 12, 7 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 11, 4, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 7, 9, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 13, 1, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 12, 2, 11 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F3 +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 +#define Fp F3 +#define Kp 0x6D703EF3 + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 11, 15, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 10, 13, 5, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 6, 1, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 7, 3, 11 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 14, 7, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 9, 14, 6 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 13, 6, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 15, 9, 14 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 14, 11, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 8, 8, 13 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 13, 12, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 6, 6, 2, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 5, 10, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 12, 0, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 7, 4, 7 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 5, 13, 5 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F4 +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC +#define Fp F2 +#define Kp 0x7A6D76E9 + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 11, 8, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 12, 6, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 14, 4, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 15, 1, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 14, 3, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 15, 11, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 9, 15, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 8, 0, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 9, 5, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 14, 12, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 5, 2, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 15, 6, 13, 9 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 14, 8, 9, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 6, 7, 5 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 5, 10, 15 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 12, 14, 8 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F5 +#define K 0xA953FD4E +#define Fp F1 +#define Kp 0x00000000 + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 9, 12, 8 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 15, 15, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 10, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 11, 4, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 6, 1, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 8, 5, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 13, 8, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 12, 7, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 5, 6, 8 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 12, 2, 13 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 3, 13, 13, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 8, 14, 14, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 11, 0, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 8, 3, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 15, 5, 9, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 6, 11, 11 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + + local.C = ctx->state[1] + local.C + local.Dp; + ctx->state[1] = ctx->state[2] + local.D + local.Ep; + ctx->state[2] = ctx->state[3] + local.E + local.Ap; + ctx->state[3] = ctx->state[4] + local.A + local.Bp; + ctx->state[4] = ctx->state[0] + local.B + local.Cp; + ctx->state[0] = local.C; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = +{ + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t last, padn; + uint32_t high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update( ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update( ctx, msglen, 8 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +/* + * output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; + + mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Test vectors from the RIPEMD-160 paper and + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html#HMAC + */ +#define TESTS 8 +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_str[TESTS][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" }, +}; + +static const size_t ripemd160_test_strlen[TESTS] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 56, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_md[TESTS][20] = +{ + { 0x9c, 0x11, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x54, 0x61, 0x28, + 0x08, 0x97, 0x7e, 0xe8, 0xf5, 0x48, 0xb2, 0x25, 0x8d, 0x31 }, + { 0x0b, 0xdc, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x6b, 0x3e, 0xe9, 0xda, 0xae, + 0x34, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0xf4, 0xdc, 0x83, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xfe }, + { 0x8e, 0xb2, 0x08, 0xf7, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x7a, 0x9b, 0x04, + 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x98, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x87, 0xf1, 0x5a, 0x0b, 0xfc }, + { 0x5d, 0x06, 0x89, 0xef, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xfa, 0xe5, 0x72, 0xb8, + 0x81, 0xb1, 0x23, 0xa8, 0x5f, 0xfa, 0x21, 0x59, 0x5f, 0x36 }, + { 0xf7, 0x1c, 0x27, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xbb, + 0xdc, 0xeb, 0x5b, 0x9d, 0x28, 0x65, 0xb3, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xbc }, + { 0x12, 0xa0, 0x53, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x88, 0xe4, 0x05, + 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x27, 0xdc, 0xf4, 0x9a, 0xda, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x2b }, + { 0xb0, 0xe2, 0x0b, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x16, 0x64, 0x02, 0x86, 0xed, + 0x3a, 0x87, 0xa5, 0x71, 0x30, 0x79, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0x51, 0x89 }, + { 0x9b, 0x75, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x57, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0x39, 0xf4, 0xdb, + 0xd3, 0x32, 0x3c, 0xab, 0x82, 0xbf, 0x63, 0x32, 0x6b, 0xfb }, +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char output[20]; + + memset( output, 0, sizeof output ); + + for( i = 0; i < TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " RIPEMD-160 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160( ripemd160_test_str[i], + ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( output, ripemd160_test_md[i], 20 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/rsa.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa.c similarity index 68% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/rsa.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa.c index 88c1cf10..ed1632a3 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/rsa.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * The RSA public-key cryptosystem * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* @@ -37,18 +35,15 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -56,7 +51,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/md.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) #include #endif @@ -71,6 +66,12 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define RSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) /* constant-time buffer comparison */ static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n ) @@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N, N ) ) != 0 ) || ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 ) || @@ -100,7 +102,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D, D ) ) != 0 ) || ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E, E ) ) != 0 ) ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } if( N != NULL ) @@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ) { int ret = 0; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); if( N != NULL ) { @@ -139,7 +142,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, cleanup: if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -240,12 +243,25 @@ static int rsa_check_context( mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv, int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) { int ret = 0; + int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP; +#endif + int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; - const int have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 ); - const int have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 ); - const int have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 ); - const int have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 ); - const int have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 ); +#endif /* * Check whether provided parameters are enough @@ -257,13 +273,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) * */ - const int n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E; - const int pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E; - const int d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E; - const int is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E; + pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E; + d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E; /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */ - const int is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing; + is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing; if( !is_priv && !is_pub ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -277,7 +293,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); @@ -292,7 +308,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } else if( d_missing ) @@ -302,7 +318,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) &ctx->E, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } } @@ -312,12 +328,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - if( is_priv ) + if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) ) { ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ @@ -336,9 +352,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ) { int ret = 0; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); /* Check if key is private or public */ - const int is_priv = + is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && @@ -378,10 +396,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); /* Check if key is private or public */ - int is_priv = + is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && @@ -420,10 +440,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); /* Check if key is private or public */ - int is_priv = + is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && @@ -439,13 +461,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) || ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } #else if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } #endif @@ -455,15 +477,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Initialize an RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int padding, - int hash_id ) +void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) { + RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( ctx, padding, hash_id ); + ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15; + ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been + * initialized and will need to be freed. */ + ctx->ver = 1; mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); #endif } @@ -471,10 +497,38 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Set padding for an existing RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, int hash_id ) +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id ) { + switch( padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } + + if( ( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) && + ( hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } + ctx->padding = padding; ctx->hash_id = hash_id; + + return( 0 ); } /* @@ -500,19 +554,30 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, void *p_rng, unsigned int nbits, int exponent ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; + int prime_quality = 0; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - if( f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( nbits % 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* + * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of + * the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error + * rate of 2^-80 is sufficient. + */ + if( nbits > 1024 ) + prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR; mbedtls_mpi_init( &H ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + if( nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + /* * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that: * 1. |P-Q| > 2^( nbits / 2 - 100 ) @@ -523,11 +588,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, do { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, 0, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, 0, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); @@ -590,7 +655,10 @@ cleanup: if( ret != 0 ) { mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED + ret ); + + if( ( -ret & ~0x7f ) == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); } return( 0 ); @@ -603,6 +671,8 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) { + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); @@ -626,6 +696,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) { + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) != 0 || rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */ ) != 0 ) { @@ -655,6 +727,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ) { + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( pub ) != 0 || mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 ) { @@ -677,9 +752,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; mbedtls_mpi T; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -712,7 +790,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -727,6 +805,9 @@ static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { int ret, count = 0; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL ) { @@ -742,18 +823,40 @@ static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */ do { if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) ); - } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 ); - /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) ); + /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R + * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know + * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them. + * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */ + ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N + * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + return( ret ); } @@ -787,7 +890,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; /* Temporary holding the result */ @@ -822,8 +925,15 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ mbedtls_mpi I, C; - if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, - f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */ ) != 0 ) + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, + 1 /* blinding on */ ) != 0 ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } @@ -840,15 +950,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind ); #else - mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind ); #endif - } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) mbedtls_mpi_init( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TQ ); @@ -868,57 +975,54 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) ); - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { - /* - * Blinding - * T = T * Vi mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); + /* + * Blinding + * T = T * Vi mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); - /* - * Exponent blinding - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* - * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) ); + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) ); - D = &D_blind; + D = &D_blind; #else - /* - * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind, - &ctx->DP ) ); + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP ) ); - DP = &DP_blind; + DP = &DP_blind; - /* - * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, - &ctx->DQ ) ); + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ ) ); - DQ = &DQ_blind; + DQ = &DQ_blind; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); @@ -947,15 +1051,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &TQ, &TP ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { - /* - * Unblind - * T = T * Vf mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); - } + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E, @@ -979,15 +1080,12 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind ); #else - mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind ); #endif - } mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); @@ -998,10 +1096,10 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &I ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret ); + if( ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret ) ); - return( 0 ); + return( ret ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) @@ -1069,21 +1167,22 @@ exit: int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { size_t olen; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; unsigned int hlen; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); if( f_rng == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1105,7 +1204,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Generate a random octet string seed */ if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); p += hlen; @@ -1115,7 +1214,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen; *p++ = 1; - memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1137,9 +1237,7 @@ exit: if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); - return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) - : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); + return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1149,21 +1247,17 @@ exit: */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + void *p_rng, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { size_t nb_pad, olen; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - // We don't check p_rng because it won't be dereferenced here - if( f_rng == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); olen = ctx->len; @@ -1174,39 +1268,32 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; *p++ = 0; - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + int rng_dl = 100; - while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) - { - int rng_dl = 100; + do { + ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 ); + } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 ); - do { - ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 ); - } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 ); + /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ + if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); - /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ - if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); - - p++; - } - } - else - { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - - while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) - *p++ = 0xFF; + p++; } *p++ = 0; - memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); - return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) - : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); + return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ @@ -1216,22 +1303,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + switch( ctx->padding ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen, - input, output ); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + ilen, input, output ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, - ilen, input, output ); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, + ilen, input, output ); #endif default: @@ -1246,14 +1337,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t ilen, i, pad_len; unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; @@ -1262,10 +1352,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + /* * Parameters sanity checks */ - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); ilen = ctx->len; @@ -1286,9 +1382,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * RSA operation */ - ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) - : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto cleanup; @@ -1366,7 +1460,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } *olen = ilen - (p - buf); - memcpy( output, p, *olen ); + if( *olen != 0 ) + memcpy( output, p, *olen ); ret = 0; cleanup: @@ -1378,94 +1473,240 @@ cleanup: #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +/** Check whether a size is out of bounds, without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `size > max`, but is likely to be compiled to + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param size Size to check. + * \param max Maximum desired value for \p size. + * \return \c 0 if `size <= max`. + * \return \c 1 if `size > max`. + */ +static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max ) +{ + /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */ + return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) ); +} + +/** Choose between two integer values, without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `cond ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param cond Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p cond is nonzero. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p cond is zero. + * \return \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 ) +{ + unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond ); + return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) ); +} + +/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking + * the length of the data through side channels. + * + * `mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally equivalent to + * ``` + * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); + * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); + * ``` + * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) + * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at + * the expense of performance. + * + * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param total Total size of the buffer. + * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. + */ +static void mem_move_to_left( void *start, + size_t total, + size_t offset ) +{ + volatile unsigned char *buf = start; + size_t i, n; + if( total == 0 ) + return; + for( i = 0; i < total; i++ ) + { + unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i ); + /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last + * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and + * zero out the last byte. */ + for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ ) + { + unsigned char current = buf[n]; + unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; + buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next ); + } + buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 ); + } +} + /* * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len) + size_t output_max_len ) { - int ret; - size_t ilen, pad_count = 0, i; - unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen, i, plaintext_max_size; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + unsigned bad = 0; + unsigned char pad_done = 0; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + unsigned output_too_large; - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); ilen = ctx->len; + plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ? + ilen - 11 : + output_max_len ); + + if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) - : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto cleanup; - p = buf; - bad = 0; + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad |= buf[0]; - /* - * Check and get padding len in "constant-time" - */ - bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ - /* This test does not depend on secret data */ - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ) + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) { - bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - - /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer - * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */ - for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ ) - { - pad_done |= ((p[i] | (unsigned char)-p[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; - pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; - } - - p += pad_count; - bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */ - } - else - { - bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - - /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer - * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */ - for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ ) - { - pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF ); - pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 ); - } - - p += pad_count; - bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */ + pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; + pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; } - bad |= ( pad_count < 8 ); - if( bad ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto cleanup; - } + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 ); - if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; - goto cleanup; - } + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count ); - *olen = ilen - (p - buf); - memcpy( output, p, *olen ); - ret = 0; + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = if_int( bad, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) ); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, + 0 ) ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large ); + for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ ) + buf[i] &= ~bad; + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size ); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size ); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if( output_max_len != 0 ) + memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); @@ -1480,22 +1721,27 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len) { + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + switch( ctx->padding ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, input, output, output_max_len ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, olen, input, output, output_max_len ); #endif @@ -1506,28 +1752,30 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, unsigned char *sig ) { size_t olen; unsigned char *p = sig; - unsigned char salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0; - int ret; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t msb; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( f_rng == NULL ) @@ -1542,7 +1790,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if( md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); @@ -1550,22 +1799,45 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - slen = hlen; - if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 ) + if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) + { + /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. + * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length + * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not + * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is + * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most + * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */ + min_slen = hlen - 2; + if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 ) + slen = hlen; + else + slen = olen - hlen - 2; + } + else if ( (saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen) ) + { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else + { + slen = (size_t) saltlen; + } memset( sig, 0, olen ); - /* Generate salt of length slen */ - if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); - /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */ msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; - p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2; + p += olen - hlen - slen - 2; *p++ = 0x01; - memcpy( p, salt, slen ); + + /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */ + salt = p; + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + p += slen; mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); @@ -1599,17 +1871,46 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; *p++ = 0xBC; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( salt, sizeof( salt ) ); - exit: mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); - return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) - : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) ); + return mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ); +} + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with + * the option to pass in the salt length. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig ); +} + + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1625,14 +1926,13 @@ exit: * Parameters: * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. - * - hashlen: Length of hash in case hashlen is MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE. * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. * * Assumptions: - * - hash has size hashlen if md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * - hash has size corresponding to md_alg if md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash has size hashlen. * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. * */ @@ -1657,7 +1957,8 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ @@ -1722,6 +2023,8 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, * TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ] * TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ] */ + if( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen >= 0x80 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; @@ -1754,16 +2057,21 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); /* @@ -1774,16 +2082,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, ctx->len, sig ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - /* - * Call respective RSA primitive - */ - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - { - /* Skip verification on a public key operation */ - return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) ); - } - /* Private key operation * * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a @@ -1826,24 +2124,29 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) { + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + switch( ctx->padding ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); #endif default: @@ -1856,9 +2159,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1866,7 +2166,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int expected_salt_len, const unsigned char *sig ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t siglen; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *hash_start; @@ -1878,17 +2178,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); siglen = ctx->len; if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf ) - : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -1905,7 +2206,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if( md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id ); @@ -1998,22 +2300,27 @@ exit: * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig ) { - mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id : md_alg; - return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, - md_alg, hashlen, hash, - mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, - sig ) ); + return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, + mgf1_hash_id, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + sig ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -2023,20 +2330,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig ) { int ret = 0; - const size_t sig_len = ctx->len; + size_t sig_len; unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + sig_len = ctx->len; /* * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. @@ -2057,9 +2366,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. */ - ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded ) - : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded ); if( ret != 0 ) goto cleanup; @@ -2096,26 +2403,29 @@ cleanup: * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig ) { + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + switch( ctx->padding ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); #endif default: @@ -2128,9 +2438,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); - dst->ver = src->ver; dst->len = src->len; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) ); @@ -2168,19 +2479,33 @@ cleanup: */ void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) { - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N ); + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DP ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); + /* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */ + if( ctx->ver != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); + ctx->ver = 0; + } #endif } @@ -2232,7 +2557,7 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) { -#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) +#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) size_t i; if( rng_state != NULL ) @@ -2245,7 +2570,7 @@ static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) rng_state = NULL; arc4random_buf( output, len ); -#endif /* !OpenBSD */ +#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */ return( 0 ); } @@ -2270,7 +2595,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_mpi K; mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_N ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); @@ -2303,7 +2628,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN ); - if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) { @@ -2317,7 +2642,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " ); - if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 ) { @@ -2344,7 +2669,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " PKCS#1 data sign : " ); - if( mbedtls_sha1_ret( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_sha1( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); @@ -2353,7 +2678,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) } if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) @@ -2366,8 +2691,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " ); - if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/rsa_internal.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c similarity index 97% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/rsa_internal.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c index 507009f1..dff2d934 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/rsa_internal.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Helper functions for the RSA module * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2017, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -16,21 +16,15 @@ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" /* * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents @@ -243,90 +237,36 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -/* - * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, - const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) { int ret = 0; - - mbedtls_mpi K, L; + mbedtls_mpi K; mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); - /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ + /* DP = D mod P-1 */ if( DP != NULL ) { - if( P == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DP, D ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DP, D, &K ) ); } - /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ + /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ if( DQ != NULL ) { - if( Q == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DQ, D ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DQ, D, &K ) ); } - /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ + /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ if( QP != NULL ) { - if( P == NULL || Q == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, QP, Q ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, P ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( QP, Q, P ) ); } cleanup: - - /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ - if( ret != 0 && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) - { - ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - } - mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); return( ret ); } @@ -351,15 +291,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + /* + * When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error + * rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as + * well. + */ if( f_rng != NULL && P != NULL && - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( P, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( P, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; goto cleanup; } if( f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL && - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; goto cleanup; @@ -450,36 +395,90 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, - mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +/* + * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ) { int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi K; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - /* DP = D mod P-1 */ + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ if( DP != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DP, D, &K ) ); + if( P == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DP, D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } - /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ + /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ if( DQ != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DQ, D, &K ) ); + if( Q == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DQ, D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } - /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ + /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ if( QP != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( QP, Q, P ) ); + if( P == NULL || Q == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, QP, Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, P ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } cleanup: + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if( ret != 0 && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); return( ret ); } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h similarity index 96% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h index 53abd3c5..d6fc8e59 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file rsa_internal.h + * \file rsa_alt_helpers.h * * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions * @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ * */ /* - * Copyright (C) 2006-2017, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -50,20 +50,14 @@ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" -#include "bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -223,4 +217,4 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, } #endif -#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ +#endif /* rsa_alt_helpers.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha1.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..545d0931 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha1.c @@ -0,0 +1,536 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. + * + * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE +#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ +{ \ + (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE +#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ +{ \ + (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-1 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; + } local; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 0], data, 0 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 1], data, 4 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 2], data, 8 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 3], data, 12 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 4], data, 16 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 5], data, 20 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 6], data, 24 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 7], data, 28 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 8], data, 32 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 9], data, 36 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[10], data, 40 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[11], data, 44 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[12], data, 48 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[13], data, 52 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[14], data, 56 ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[15], data, 60 ); + +#define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.temp = local.W[( (t) - 3 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 8 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 14 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[ (t) & 0x0F], \ + ( local.W[(t) & 0x0F] = S(local.temp,1) ) \ + ) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,x) \ + do \ + { \ + (e) += S((a),5) + F((b),(c),(d)) + K + (x); \ + (b) = S((b),30); \ + } while( 0 ) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) +#define K 0x5A827999 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[0] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[1] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[2] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[3] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[4] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[5] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[6] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[7] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[8] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[9] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[10] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[11] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[12] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[13] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[14] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[15] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(16) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(17) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(18) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(19) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(20) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(21) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(22) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(23) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(24) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(25) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(26) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(27) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(28) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(29) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(30) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(31) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(32) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(33) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(34) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(35) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(36) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(37) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(38) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(39) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(40) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(41) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(42) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(43) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(44) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(45) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(46) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(47) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(48) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(49) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(50) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(51) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(52) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(53) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(54) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(55) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(56) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(57) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(58) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(59) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0xCA62C1D6 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(60) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(61) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(62) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(63) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(64) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(65) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(66) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(67) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(68) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(69) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(70) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(71) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(72) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(73) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(74) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(75) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(76) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(77) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(78) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(79) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + ctx->state[4] += local.E; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-1 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * SHA-1 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 56 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * FIPS-180-1 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha1_test_buf[3][57] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha1_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 56, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha1_test_sum[3][20] = +{ + { 0xA9, 0x99, 0x3E, 0x36, 0x47, 0x06, 0x81, 0x6A, 0xBA, 0x3E, + 0x25, 0x71, 0x78, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x9D }, + { 0x84, 0x98, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xAE, + 0x4A, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x29, 0xE5, 0xE5, 0x46, 0x70, 0xF1 }, + { 0x34, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x3C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x1E, + 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xDB, 0xAD, 0x27, 0x31, 0x65, 0x34, 0x01, 0x6F } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * SHA-1 + */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " SHA-1 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( i == 2 ) + { + memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update( &ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], + sha1_test_buflen[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish( &ctx, sha1sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( sha1sum, sha1_test_sum[i], 20 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + goto exit; + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha256.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha256.c similarity index 64% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha256.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha256.c index dbb4a898..6ec6da29 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha256.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha256.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-256 implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The SHA-256 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. @@ -24,16 +22,13 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -49,6 +44,10 @@ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#define SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA256_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) /* @@ -76,6 +75,8 @@ do { \ void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) { + SHA256_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); } @@ -90,14 +91,25 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ) { + SHA256_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-256 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) +int mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) { + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); +#else + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 ); +#endif + ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -115,6 +127,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) /* SHA-224 */ ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8; ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507; @@ -124,6 +137,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511; ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7; ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4; +#endif } ctx->is224 = is224; @@ -131,14 +145,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - int is224 ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx, is224 ); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) static const uint32_t K[] = { @@ -160,8 +166,8 @@ static const uint32_t K[] = 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2, }; -#define SHR(x,n) ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> n) -#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR(x,n) | (x << (32 - n))) +#define SHR(x,n) (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR(x,n) | ((x) << (32 - (n)))) #define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 7) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ SHR(x, 3)) #define S1(x) (ROTR(x,17) ^ ROTR(x,19) ^ SHR(x,10)) @@ -169,100 +175,127 @@ static const uint32_t K[] = #define S2(x) (ROTR(x, 2) ^ ROTR(x,13) ^ ROTR(x,22)) #define S3(x) (ROTR(x, 6) ^ ROTR(x,11) ^ ROTR(x,25)) -#define F0(x,y,z) ((x & y) | (z & (x | y))) -#define F1(x,y,z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) +#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) -#define R(t) \ -( \ - W[t] = S1(W[t - 2]) + W[t - 7] + \ - S0(W[t - 15]) + W[t - 16] \ -) +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.W[t] = S1(local.W[(t) - 2]) + local.W[(t) - 7] + \ + S0(local.W[(t) - 15]) + local.W[(t) - 16] \ + ) -#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ -{ \ - temp1 = h + S3(e) + F1(e,f,g) + K + x; \ - temp2 = S2(a) + F0(a,b,c); \ - d += temp1; h = temp1 + temp2; \ -} +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while( 0 ) int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ) { - uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; - uint32_t A[8]; + struct + { + uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; + uint32_t A[8]; + } local; + unsigned int i; + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) for( i = 0; i < 64; i++ ) { if( i < 16 ) - GET_UINT32_BE( W[i], data, 4 * i ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[i], data, 4 * i ); else R( i ); - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], W[i], K[i] ); + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); - temp1 = A[7]; A[7] = A[6]; A[6] = A[5]; A[5] = A[4]; A[4] = A[3]; - A[3] = A[2]; A[2] = A[1]; A[1] = A[0]; A[0] = temp1; + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; } #else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - GET_UINT32_BE( W[i], data, 4 * i ); + GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[i], data, 4 * i ); for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 8 ) { - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], W[i+0], K[i+0] ); - P( A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], W[i+1], K[i+1] ); - P( A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], W[i+2], K[i+2] ); - P( A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], W[i+3], K[i+3] ); - P( A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], W[i+4], K[i+4] ); - P( A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], W[i+5], K[i+5] ); - P( A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], W[i+6], K[i+6] ); - P( A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], W[i+7], K[i+7] ); + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i+0], K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i+1], K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i+2], K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i+3], K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i+4], K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i+5], K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i+6], K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i+7], K[i+7] ); } for( i = 16; i < 64; i += 8 ) { - P( A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0] ); - P( A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1] ); - P( A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2] ); - P( A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3] ); - P( A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4] ); - P( A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5] ); - P( A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6] ); - P( A[1], A[2], A[3], A[4], A[5], A[6], A[7], A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7] ); + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7] ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - ctx->state[i] += A[i]; + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, data ); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * SHA-256 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, +int mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + if( ilen == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -302,25 +335,19 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-256 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32] ) +int mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length */ @@ -368,42 +395,45 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 20 ); PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 24 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) if( ctx->is224 == 0 ) +#endif PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 28 ); return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32] ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx, output ); -} -#endif - #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-256( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, +int mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], + unsigned char *output, int is224 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); +#else + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 ); +#endif + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx, is224 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ctx, is224 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; exit: @@ -412,16 +442,6 @@ exit: return( ret ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224 ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, is224 ); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * FIPS-180-2 test vectors @@ -502,7 +522,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - k * 32, j + 1 ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) goto fail; if( j == 2 ) @@ -511,7 +531,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ) for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx, buf, buflen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto fail; } @@ -519,13 +539,13 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ) } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, sha256_test_buf[j], + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx, sha256_test_buf[j], sha256_test_buflen[j] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto fail; } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx, sha256sum ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &ctx, sha256sum ) ) != 0 ) goto fail; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha512.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha512.c similarity index 67% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha512.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha512.c index a9440e8a..6511c6e3 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha512.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/sha512.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-384/512 implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The SHA-512 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. @@ -24,16 +22,13 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__WATCOMC__) #define UL64(x) x##ui64 @@ -55,6 +50,10 @@ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#define SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA512_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) /* @@ -88,8 +87,19 @@ } #endif /* PUT_UINT64_BE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) +static void sha512_put_uint64_be( uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i ) +{ + PUT_UINT64_BE(n, b, i); +} +#else +#define sha512_put_uint64_be PUT_UINT64_BE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) { + SHA512_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); } @@ -104,14 +114,24 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ) { + SHA512_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-512 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) +int mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) { + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif + ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -129,6 +149,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) } else { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#else /* SHA-384 */ ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); @@ -138,21 +161,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) ctx->is384 = is384; +#endif return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - int is384 ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx, is384 ); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) /* @@ -206,11 +224,17 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[128] ) { int i; - uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; - uint64_t A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H; + struct + { + uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; + uint64_t A[8]; + } local; -#define SHR(x,n) (x >> n) -#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR(x,n) | (x << (64 - n))) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + +#define SHR(x,n) ((x) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR((x),(n)) | ((x) << (64 - (n)))) #define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 1) ^ ROTR(x, 8) ^ SHR(x, 7)) #define S1(x) (ROTR(x,19) ^ ROTR(x,61) ^ SHR(x, 6)) @@ -218,82 +242,102 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, #define S2(x) (ROTR(x,28) ^ ROTR(x,34) ^ ROTR(x,39)) #define S3(x) (ROTR(x,14) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ ROTR(x,41)) -#define F0(x,y,z) ((x & y) | (z & (x | y))) -#define F1(x,y,z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) +#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) -#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ -{ \ - temp1 = h + S3(e) + F1(e,f,g) + K + x; \ - temp2 = S2(a) + F0(a,b,c); \ - d += temp1; h = temp1 + temp2; \ -} +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while( 0 ) + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + for( i = 0; i < 80; i++ ) + { + if( i < 16 ) + { + GET_UINT64_BE( local.W[i], data, i << 3 ); + } + else + { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) { - GET_UINT64_BE( W[i], data, i << 3 ); + GET_UINT64_BE( local.W[i], data, i << 3 ); } for( ; i < 80; i++ ) { - W[i] = S1(W[i - 2]) + W[i - 7] + - S0(W[i - 15]) + W[i - 16]; + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; } - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; - E = ctx->state[4]; - F = ctx->state[5]; - G = ctx->state[6]; - H = ctx->state[7]; i = 0; - do { - P( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; } while( i < 80 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; - ctx->state[4] += E; - ctx->state[5] += F; - ctx->state[6] += G; - ctx->state[7] += H; + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, data ); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * SHA-512 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, +int mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; unsigned int left; + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + if( ilen == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -332,25 +376,19 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-512 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64] ) +int mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned used; uint64_t high, low; + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length */ @@ -381,8 +419,8 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 112 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 120 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( high, ctx->buffer, 112 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( low, ctx->buffer, 120 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -390,52 +428,54 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, /* * Output final state */ - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 16 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 24 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 32 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 40 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[1], output, 8 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[2], output, 16 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[3], output, 24 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[4], output, 32 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[5], output, 40 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) if( ctx->is384 == 0 ) +#endif { - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 48 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 56 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[6], output, 48 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[7], output, 56 ); } return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64] ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx, output ); -} -#endif - #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-512( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, +int mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], + unsigned char *output, int is384 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx, is384 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ctx, is384 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; exit: @@ -444,16 +484,6 @@ exit: return( ret ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384 ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, is384 ); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* @@ -462,8 +492,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = { { "abc" }, - { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmn" - "hijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu" }, + { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu" }, { "" } }; @@ -472,8 +501,9 @@ static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] = 3, 112, 1000 }; -static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[6][64] = +static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) /* * SHA-384 test vectors */ @@ -495,6 +525,7 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[6][64] = 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ /* * SHA-512 test vectors @@ -525,6 +556,8 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[6][64] = 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } }; +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( a ) ( sizeof( a ) / sizeof( ( a )[0] ) ) + /* * Checkup routine */ @@ -546,15 +579,19 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + for( i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++ ) { j = i % 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) k = i < 3; +#else + k = 0; +#endif if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - k * 128, j + 1 ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) goto fail; if( j == 2 ) @@ -563,20 +600,20 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ) for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx, buf, buflen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto fail; } } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, sha512_test_buf[j], + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx, sha512_test_buf[j], sha512_test_buflen[j] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto fail; } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx, sha512sum ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &ctx, sha512sum ) ) != 0 ) goto fail; if( memcmp( sha512sum, sha512_test_sum[i], 64 - k * 16 ) != 0 ) @@ -605,6 +642,8 @@ exit: return( ret ); } +#undef ARRAY_LENGTH + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cache.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cache.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe4f30cf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +/* + * SSL session cache implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * These session callbacks use a simple chained list + * to store and retrieve the session information. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" + +#include + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) +{ + memset( cache, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context ) ); + + cache->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT; + cache->max_entries = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &cache->mutex ); +#endif +} + +static int ssl_cache_find_entry( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst ) +{ + int ret = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + + for( cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) + continue; +#endif + + if( session_id_len != cur->session_id_len || + memcmp( session_id, cur->session_id, + cur->session_id_len ) != 0 ) + { + continue; + } + + break; + } + + if( cur != NULL ) + { + *dst = cur; + ret = 0; + } + + return( ret ); +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = 1; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_find_entry( cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( session, + entry->session, + entry->session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = 1; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +static int ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ), oldest = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; + int count = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *last; + + /* Check 1: Is there already an entry with the given session ID? + * + * If yes, overwrite it. + * + * If not, `count` will hold the size of the session cache + * at the end of this loop, and `last` will point to the last + * entry, both of which will be used later. */ + + last = NULL; + for( cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + count++; + if( session_id_len == cur->session_id_len && + memcmp( session_id, cur->session_id, cur->session_id_len ) == 0 ) + { + goto found; + } + last = cur; + } + + /* Check 2: Is there an outdated entry in the cache? + * + * If so, overwrite it. + * + * If not, remember the oldest entry in `old` for later. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + for( cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + if( cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) + { + goto found; + } + + if( oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest ) + { + oldest = cur->timestamp; + old = cur; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* Check 3: Is there free space in the cache? */ + + if( count < cache->max_entries ) + { + /* Create new entry */ + cur = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry) ); + if( cur == NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + /* Append to the end of the linked list. */ + if( last == NULL ) + cache->chain = cur; + else + last->next = cur; + + goto found; + } + + /* Last resort: The cache is full and doesn't contain any outdated + * elements. In this case, we evict the oldest one, judged by timestamp + * (if present) or cache-order. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( old == NULL ) + { + /* This should only happen on an ill-configured cache + * with max_entries == 0. */ + return( 1 ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + /* Reuse first entry in chain, but move to last place. */ + if( cache->chain == NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + old = cache->chain; + cache->chain = old->next; + old->next = NULL; + last->next = old; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* Now `old` points to the oldest entry to be overwritten. */ + cur = old; + +found: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + cur->timestamp = t; +#endif + + /* If we're reusing an entry, free it first. */ + if( cur->session != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->session ); + cur->session = NULL; + cur->session_len = 0; + memset( cur->session_id, 0, sizeof( cur->session_id ) ); + cur->session_id_len = 0; + } + + *dst = cur; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = 1; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + + size_t session_serialized_len; + unsigned char *session_serialized = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot( cache, + session_id, session_id_len, + &cur ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Check how much space we need to serialize the session + * and allocate a sufficiently large buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session, NULL, 0, &session_serialized_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + session_serialized = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session_serialized_len ); + if( session_serialized == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + /* Now serialize the session into the allocated buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session, + session_serialized, + session_serialized_len, + &session_serialized_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( session_id_len > sizeof( cur->session_id ) ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + cur->session_id_len = session_id_len; + memcpy( cur->session_id, session_id, session_id_len ); + + cur->session = session_serialized; + cur->session_len = session_serialized_len; + session_serialized = NULL; + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = 1; +#endif + + if( session_serialized != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_serialized, session_serialized_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout ) +{ + if( timeout < 0 ) timeout = 0; + + cache->timeout = timeout; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max ) +{ + if( max < 0 ) max = 0; + + cache->max_entries = max; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; + + cur = cache->chain; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + + mbedtls_free( prv->session ); + mbedtls_free( prv ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &cache->mutex ); +#endif + cache->chain = NULL; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c similarity index 85% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_ciphersuites.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c index 745474ef..be0acb78 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_ciphersuites.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * \brief SSL ciphersuites for mbed TLS * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -17,15 +17,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) @@ -37,17 +31,18 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include /* * Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security. * - * Current rule (except rc4, weak and null which come last): + * Current rule (except weak and null which come last): * 1. By key exchange: * Forward-secure non-PSK > forward-secure PSK > ECJPAKE > other non-PSK > other PSK * 2. By key length and cipher: - * ChaCha > AES-256 > Camellia-256 > ARIA-256 > AES-128 > Camellia-128 > ARIA-128 > 3DES + * ChaCha > AES-256 > Camellia-256 > ARIA-256 > AES-128 > Camellia-128 > ARIA-128 * 3. By cipher mode when relevant GCM > CCM > CBC > CCM_8 * 4. By hash function used when relevant * 5. By key exchange/auth again: EC > non-EC @@ -126,11 +121,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - /* All remaining >= 128-bit ephemeral suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - /* The PSK ephemeral suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, @@ -162,9 +152,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - /* The ECJPAKE suite */ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, @@ -228,11 +215,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - /* All remaining >= 128-bit suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - /* The RSA PSK suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, @@ -251,8 +233,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - /* The PSK suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, @@ -275,24 +255,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - - /* RC4 suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - - /* Weak suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - /* NULL suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, @@ -422,7 +384,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -437,7 +399,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -471,13 +433,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -488,38 +450,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", @@ -563,7 +503,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, @@ -578,7 +518,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -590,13 +530,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -607,38 +547,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", @@ -652,13 +570,14 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -688,13 +607,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -742,13 +661,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -762,38 +681,28 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -823,13 +732,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -877,13 +786,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -898,45 +807,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -971,7 +851,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, @@ -986,7 +866,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -998,13 +878,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1015,38 +895,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", @@ -1090,7 +948,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, @@ -1105,7 +963,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -1117,13 +975,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1134,38 +992,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", @@ -1188,13 +1024,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -1206,24 +1042,24 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -1262,13 +1098,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1280,37 +1116,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -1324,13 +1139,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -1342,24 +1157,24 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -1398,13 +1213,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1416,37 +1231,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -1461,13 +1255,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", @@ -1495,37 +1289,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -1539,13 +1312,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -1557,13 +1330,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", @@ -1591,13 +1364,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1609,37 +1382,16 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1654,13 +1406,12 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif @@ -1668,7 +1419,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif @@ -1686,7 +1437,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -1699,20 +1450,20 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ @@ -1725,13 +1476,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -1751,13 +1502,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -1777,46 +1528,21 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, @@ -1824,7 +1550,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, @@ -1853,7 +1579,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, @@ -1861,7 +1587,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, @@ -1890,7 +1616,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, @@ -1898,7 +1624,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, @@ -1927,7 +1653,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, @@ -1935,7 +1661,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, @@ -1964,7 +1690,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, @@ -1972,7 +1698,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, @@ -2001,7 +1727,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, @@ -2022,7 +1748,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -2030,7 +1756,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -2059,7 +1785,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, @@ -2067,7 +1793,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, @@ -2096,7 +1822,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, @@ -2104,7 +1830,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, @@ -2133,7 +1859,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, @@ -2141,7 +1867,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, @@ -2187,6 +1913,13 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ) static int supported_ciphersuites[MAX_CIPHERSUITES]; static int supported_init = 0; +static int ciphersuite_is_removed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info ) +{ + (void)cs_info; + + return( 0 ); +} + const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ) { /* @@ -2202,14 +1935,12 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ) *p != 0 && q < supported_ciphersuites + MAX_CIPHERSUITES - 1; p++ ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info; if( ( cs_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( *p ) ) != NULL && - cs_info->cipher != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) -#else - if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( *p ) != NULL ) -#endif + !ciphersuite_is_removed( cs_info ) ) + { *(q++) = *p; + } } *q = 0; @@ -2340,7 +2071,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) @@ -2355,6 +2086,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cli.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cli.c similarity index 57% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cli.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cli.c index 83857201..ef391b30 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cli.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cli.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions + * TLS client-side functions * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) @@ -35,9 +29,14 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include @@ -51,30 +50,65 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t hostname_len; *olen = 0; if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s", - ssl->hostname ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s", + ssl->hostname ) ); hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < hostname_len + 9 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, hostname_len + 9 ); /* * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) @@ -118,16 +152,18 @@ static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len ); *olen = hostname_len + 9; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; @@ -135,21 +171,20 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */ if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len ); /* * Secure renegotiation */ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ) & 0xFF; @@ -158,6 +193,8 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -165,15 +202,16 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t sig_alg_len = 0; const int *md; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6; #endif @@ -181,9 +219,13 @@ static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ ) { @@ -193,13 +235,19 @@ static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) sig_alg_len += 2; #endif + if( sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } } - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < sig_alg_len + 6 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + /* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( sig_alg_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, sig_alg_len + 6 ); /* * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2) @@ -245,75 +293,75 @@ static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len ) & 0xFF ); *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6; size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0; const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id; -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif *olen = 0; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ ) -#else - for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ ) -#endif + if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); -#endif if( info == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) ); - return; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); } - elliptic_curve_len += 2; + + if( elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } } - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + elliptic_curve_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + /* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len ); elliptic_curve_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ ) -#else - for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ ) -#endif + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); -#endif elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id >> 8; elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id & 0xFF; } - if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 ) - return; - - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF ); @@ -322,27 +370,28 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) ) & 0xFF ); *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; + + return( 0 ); } -static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */ *olen = 0; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } - - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 2; @@ -351,33 +400,32 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; *olen = 6; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t kkpp_len; *olen = 0; /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); - if( end - p < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF ); @@ -393,19 +441,20 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) ); ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); - return; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , + "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); + return( ret ); } ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len ); if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) ); - return; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); } memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len ); @@ -416,12 +465,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) ); kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len; - - if( (size_t)( end - p - 2 ) < kkpp_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p + 2, end, kkpp_len ); memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len ); } @@ -430,33 +474,79 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF ); *olen = kkpp_len + 4; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static int ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + *olen = 0; + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) ); + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ); + + /* Add extension ID + size */ + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID ) & 0xFF ); + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; - if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) { - return; - } + if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 1; @@ -464,64 +554,28 @@ static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code; *olen = 5; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - - *olen = 0; - - if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) - { - return; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) ); - - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } - - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF ); - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; - if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - return; - } + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac " - "extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF ); @@ -530,65 +584,62 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) -static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; - if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - return; - } + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret " - "extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len; *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 + tlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF ); @@ -599,44 +650,40 @@ static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 4; if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) ); memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen ); *olen += tlen; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t alpnlen = 0; const char **cur; *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) - alpnlen += (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ) + 1; + alpnlen += strlen( *cur ) + 1; - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + alpnlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + alpnlen ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF ); @@ -654,7 +701,11 @@ static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) { - *p = (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ); + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of + * protocol names is less than 255. + */ + *p = (unsigned char)strlen( *cur ); memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p ); p += 1 + *p; } @@ -668,15 +719,137 @@ static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF ); + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length, + * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ), + * 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value + */ + ext_len = 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes + * - the extension tag (2 bytes) + * - the extension length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, ext_len + 4 ); + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP ) & 0xFF ); + + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( ext_len & 0xFF00 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ext_len & 0xFF ); + + /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */ + /* micro-optimization: + * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0 + * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments + * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + * >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + & 0xFF ); + + for( protection_profiles_index=0; + protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; + protection_profiles_index++ ) + { + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x", + profile_value ) ); + *p++ = ( ( profile_value >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = ( profile_value & 0xFF ); + } + else + { + /* + * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles + * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, " + "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d", + ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] + ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + } + + *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF; + + if( mki_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + /* + * Increment p to point to the current position. + */ + p += mki_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + /* + * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes) + * + extension length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + 2 * number of protection profiles + * + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte) + * + mki value + */ + *olen = p - buf; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Generate random bytes for ClientHello */ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t; @@ -700,7 +873,8 @@ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( t ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %lu", t ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); #else if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -724,9 +898,10 @@ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * * \return 0 if valid, else 1 */ -static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info, - const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl, - int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver ) +static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info, + const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl, + int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver ) { (void) ssl; if( suite_info == NULL ) @@ -742,28 +917,33 @@ static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_inf return( 1 ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) - return( 1 ); -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) return( 1 ); #endif + /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && + ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + return( 0 ); } static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; + unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *q; - unsigned char offer_compress; + const unsigned char *end; + const int *ciphersuites; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ @@ -789,23 +969,41 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "configured max major version is invalid, " - "consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } + buf = ssl->out_msg; + end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + /* - * 0 . 0 handshake type - * 1 . 3 handshake length + * Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello + * consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at + * most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte). + * + * Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values + * to allow the compiler to optimize this away. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 ); + + /* + * The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello: + * 0 . 0 handshake type (written later) + * 1 . 3 handshake length (written later) * 4 . 5 highest version supported * 6 . 9 current UNIX time * 10 . 37 random bytes + * + * The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written + * by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then + * copied from there into the output buffer. */ - buf = ssl->out_msg; - p = buf + 4; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p = buf + 4; + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); p += 2; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, max version: [%d:%d]", @@ -825,7 +1023,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * 38 . 38 session id length * 39 . 39+n session id * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTSL only: cookie + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) * .. . .. ciphersuitelist * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) @@ -856,7 +1054,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL && ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0 ) { - ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 ); + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, + ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -866,20 +1065,41 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + /* + * The first check of the output buffer size above ( + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );) + * has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the + * session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32). + */ *p++ = (unsigned char) n; for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i]; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); + /* + * With 'n' being the length of the session identifier + * + * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression methods + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. extensions + */ + /* * DTLS cookie */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 1 ); + if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no verify cookie to send" ) ); @@ -892,6 +1112,9 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; @@ -902,11 +1125,13 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * Ciphersuite list */ - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */ n = 0; q = p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); p += 2; for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) @@ -918,20 +1143,23 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) != 0 ) continue; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x", - ciphersuites[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int)ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info ); #endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + n++; *p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); /* * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV @@ -941,79 +1169,57 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ); n++; } - /* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - if( ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ); - n++; - } -#endif - *q++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 7 ); *q++ = (unsigned char)( n << 1 ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - offer_compress = 1; -#else - offer_compress = 0; -#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); - /* - * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come - * in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one. - * We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is - * an actual need for it. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - offer_compress = 0; -#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - if( offer_compress ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 2 ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + /* First write extensions, then the total length */ - *p++ = 2; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); - *p++ = 1; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } - - // First write extensions, then the total length - // #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -1021,57 +1227,113 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( uses_ec ) { - ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; - ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif /* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */ ((void) olen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %d", - ext_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len ) ); if( ext_len > 0 ) { + /* No need to check for space here, because the extension + * writing functions already took care of that. */ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); p += ext_len; @@ -1124,9 +1386,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } } else @@ -1134,10 +1398,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -1159,37 +1426,74 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, len != 1 || buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) { - if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || - len != 0 ) + size_t peer_cid_len; + + if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */ + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); } - ((void) buf); + if( len == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + } + + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -1197,13 +1501,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t len ) { if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); } ((void) buf); @@ -1220,13 +1526,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t len ) { if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); } ((void) buf); @@ -1245,10 +1553,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED || len != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); } ((void) buf); @@ -1273,7 +1584,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } list_size = buf[0]; @@ -1287,7 +1598,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0] ); #endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); return( 0 ); @@ -1300,7 +1612,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ @@ -1310,9 +1622,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); @@ -1328,8 +1640,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( ret ); } @@ -1348,9 +1662,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); } /* @@ -1368,7 +1684,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; @@ -1376,7 +1692,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } name_len = buf[2]; @@ -1384,7 +1700,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ @@ -1401,10 +1717,127 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i, mki_len = 0; + uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + * + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* + * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile (2 bytes) + * + mki_len(1 byte) + * and optional srtp_mki + */ + if( ( len < 5 ) || ( len != ( buf[4] + 5u ) ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + + /* + * get the server protection profile + */ + + /* + * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only + * one protection profile in server Hello + */ + if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + + server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; + server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + server_protection_profile_value ); + if( server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* + * Check we have the server profile in our list + */ + for( i=0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + + /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */ + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + } + + /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep + * one as negotiated */ + if( len == 5 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0; + } + + /* + * RFC5764: + * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response + * that is different than the one the client offered, then the client + * MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert. + */ + if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len || + ( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + } +#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( len > 5 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +#endif + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type. */ @@ -1417,6 +1850,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) ); + /* Check that there is enough room for: + * - 2 bytes of version + * - 1 byte of cookie_len + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + /* * struct { * ProtocolVersion server_version; @@ -1441,20 +1887,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); } cookie_len = *p++; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); - if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie ); @@ -1487,9 +1932,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) size_t ext_len; unsigned char *buf, *ext; unsigned char comp; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - int accept_comp; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; #endif @@ -1498,8 +1940,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) ); - buf = ssl->in_msg; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { /* No alert on a read error. */ @@ -1507,6 +1947,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } + buf = ssl->in_msg; + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) @@ -1517,12 +1959,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 && ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " - "but not honored by server" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation requested, but not honored by server" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-handshake message during renego" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-handshake message during renegotiation" ) ); ssl->keep_current_message = 1; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO ); @@ -1530,8 +1973,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -1560,7 +2005,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* @@ -1585,23 +2030,25 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server version out of bounds - " - " min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_major_ver, ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", - ( (uint32_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | - ( (uint32_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | - ( (uint32_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | - ( (uint32_t) buf[5] ) ) ); + ( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) ); memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 ); @@ -1614,7 +2061,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n ) @@ -1626,9 +2073,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } } else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n ) @@ -1640,7 +2089,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* ciphersuite (used later) */ @@ -1651,43 +2100,33 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) */ comp = buf[37 + n]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - accept_comp = 0; - else -#endif - accept_comp = 1; - - if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL && - ( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE || accept_comp == 0 ) ) -#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) -#endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); } /* * Initialize update checksum functions */ - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); - - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info ); + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n ); /* @@ -1719,8 +2158,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( ret ); } } @@ -1728,8 +2169,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", buf[37 + n] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", + buf[37 + n] ) ); /* * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello. @@ -1737,48 +2179,63 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) i = 0; while( 1 ) { - if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0 ) + if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } - if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] == + if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] == ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) { break; } } - suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); - if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 ) + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1; + } +#endif if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - && comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE -#endif ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; ext = buf + 40 + n; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) ); while( ext_len ) { @@ -1790,9 +2247,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } switch( ext_id ) @@ -1811,7 +2269,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) ); if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1822,18 +2281,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated_hmac extension" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); - if( ( ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, + ext_size ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: @@ -1850,7 +2310,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) ); if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1877,7 +2338,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) ); if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1912,9 +2374,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", - ext_id ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); } ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; @@ -1923,7 +2395,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } } @@ -1931,9 +2403,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * Renegotiation security checks */ if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) @@ -1941,12 +2415,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; } else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; @@ -1955,16 +2431,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ if( handshake_failure == 1 ) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) ); @@ -1974,10 +2453,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, +static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t dhm_actual_bitlen; /* * Ephemeral DH parameters: @@ -1988,18 +2469,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char * * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; * } ServerDHParams; */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, p, end ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p, end ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret ); return( ret ); } - if( ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8 < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) + dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ); + if( dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %d < %d", - ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8, + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", + dhm_actual_bitlen, ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); @@ -2019,8 +2502,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char * static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; +#else + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; +#endif - curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id ); + curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); if( curve_info == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); @@ -2030,14 +2519,15 @@ static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 ) #else if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 || ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521 ) #endif return( -1 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); return( 0 ); } @@ -2047,6 +2537,68 @@ static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + size_t ecdh_bits = 0; + uint8_t ecpoint_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* + * Parse ECC group + */ + + if( end - *p < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + + /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ + if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + + /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ + tls_id = *(*p)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*p)++; + + /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */ + if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type = + mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + } + if( ecdh_bits > 0xffff ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits; + + /* + * Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA. + */ + + ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; + if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( + *p, ecpoint_len, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ), + &handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + *p += ecpoint_len; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -2068,13 +2620,18 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, (const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif return( ret ); } if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } return( ret ); @@ -2083,13 +2640,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - size_t len; + uint16_t len; ((void) ssl); /* @@ -2097,20 +2654,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; */ - if( (*p) > end - 2 ) + if( end - (*p) < 2 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message " - "(psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; *p += 2; - if( (*p) > end - len ) + if( end - (*p) < len ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message " - "(psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* @@ -2123,7 +2680,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( ret ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -2134,9 +2691,10 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t offset, size_t *olen, size_t pms_offset ) { - int ret; - size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len_bytes = 2; unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) { @@ -2151,8 +2709,9 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * opaque random[46]; * } PreMasterSecret; */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p ); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -2162,23 +2721,28 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /* * Now write it out, encrypted */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk, p, ssl->handshake->pmslen, ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes, @@ -2188,8 +2752,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( ret ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( len_bytes == 2 ) { ssl->out_msg[offset+0] = (unsigned char)( *olen >> 8 ); @@ -2198,6 +2761,10 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || @@ -2224,26 +2791,28 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } if( (*p) + 2 > end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); /* * Get hash algorithm */ - if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Server used unsupported " - "HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } /* * Get signature algorithm */ - if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used unsupported " - "SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } /* @@ -2251,13 +2820,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", - *(p)[0] ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", (*p)[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[0] ) ); *p += 2; return( 0 ); @@ -2271,23 +2842,29 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } - peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk ); + peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 ) @@ -2299,9 +2876,16 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE ); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || @@ -2309,9 +2893,9 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) ); @@ -2335,8 +2919,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( ret ); } @@ -2349,6 +2935,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing ) + { + goto start_processing; + } +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); @@ -2358,8 +2952,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2378,19 +2974,27 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) goto exit; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must " - "not be skipped" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server key exchange message must not be skipped" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing; + +start_processing: +#endif p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || @@ -2399,12 +3003,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } } /* FALLTROUGH */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -2422,14 +3028,36 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) @@ -2440,9 +3068,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } } else @@ -2457,9 +3087,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } } else @@ -2469,7 +3101,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) { size_t sig_len, hashlen; @@ -2478,6 +3110,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); size_t params_len = p - params; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; /* * Handle the digitally-signed structure @@ -2488,34 +3123,29 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end, &md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } - if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) ) + if( pk_alg != + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); - - /* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */ - if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - else -#endif { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); @@ -2528,9 +3158,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( p > end - 2 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; p += 2; @@ -2538,9 +3170,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( p != end - sig_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len ); @@ -2548,21 +3182,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * Compute the hash that has been signed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - hashlen = 36; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params, - params_len ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen, @@ -2572,8 +3192,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); @@ -2581,35 +3200,62 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /* * Verify signature */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif return( ret ); } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ exit: ssl->state++; @@ -2619,11 +3265,11 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } -#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); @@ -2637,15 +3283,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *buf; size_t n = 0; size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); @@ -2665,8 +3311,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2715,7 +3363,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )]; n = cert_type_len; @@ -2735,15 +3383,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* supported_signature_algorithms */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { - size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) - | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); + size_t sig_alg_len = + ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) unsigned char* sig_alg; size_t i; @@ -2761,20 +3410,24 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], * which is one less than we need the buf to be. */ - if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len ) + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + + 3 + n + sig_alg_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n; for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d" - ",%d", sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", + sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); } #endif @@ -2792,7 +3445,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } exit: @@ -2800,11 +3453,11 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) ); @@ -2826,7 +3479,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } ssl->state++; @@ -2843,10 +3496,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; - size_t i, n; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t header_len; + size_t content_len; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) ); @@ -2856,16 +3511,16 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P */ - n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ); - ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( n ); - i = 6; + ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( content_len >> 8 ); + ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( content_len ); + header_len = 6; ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), - &ssl->out_msg[i], n, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret ); @@ -2876,10 +3531,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - ssl->handshake->premaster, - MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, - &ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -2889,6 +3544,93 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t own_pubkey_len; + unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint; + size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + + header_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) ); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits ); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes, + &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA + * and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */ + status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, sizeof( own_pubkey ), + &own_pubkey_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( own_pubkey, + own_pubkey_len, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */ + ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1, + own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ); + content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1; + + /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ), + &ssl->handshake->pmslen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ @@ -2901,76 +3643,118 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value */ - i = 4; + header_len = 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + { + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret ) + goto ecdh_calc_secret; + + mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx ); + } +#endif ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - &n, - &ssl->out_msg[i], 1000, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif return( ret ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret; + } + +ecdh_calc_secret: + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n; +#endif if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - &ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->handshake->premaster, - MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif return( ret ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "ECDH: z", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.z ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; */ - if( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + if( ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for PSK" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - i = 4; - n = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + header_len = 4; + content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; - if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or " - "SSL buffer too short" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); } - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len >> 8 ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len ); - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, ssl->conf->psk_identity, ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ); - i += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len, + ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ); + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) { - n = 0; + content_len = 0; } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) { - if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 2 ) ) != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); } else @@ -2978,24 +3762,31 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) */ - n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ); - if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long" - " or SSL buffer too short" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); } - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len >> 8 ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len ); ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), - &ssl->out_msg[i], n, + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { @@ -3008,11 +3799,19 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; */ - ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &n, - &ssl->out_msg[i], MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i, + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { @@ -3020,7 +3819,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ @@ -3029,20 +3829,34 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, + "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); return( ret ); } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) { - i = 4; - if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + header_len = 4; + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); } else @@ -3050,10 +3864,12 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) { - i = 4; + header_len = 4; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - ssl->out_msg + i, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i, &n, + ssl->out_msg + header_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + &content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { @@ -3078,7 +3894,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - ssl->out_msglen = i + n; + ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; @@ -3095,17 +3911,12 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - int ret; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); @@ -3115,11 +3926,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -3129,31 +3936,41 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; size_t n = 0, offset = 0; unsigned char hash[48]; unsigned char *hash_start = hash; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - unsigned int hashlen; + size_t hashlen; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf ); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf ); +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign ) + { + goto sign; + } +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); return( ret ); } - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -3174,42 +3991,17 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } /* - * Make an RSA signature of the handshake digests + * Make a signature of the handshake digests */ - ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque md5_hash[16]; - * opaque sha_hash[20]; - * }; - * - * md5_hash - * MD5(handshake_messages); - * - * sha_hash - * SHA(handshake_messages); - */ - hashlen = 36; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; +sign: +#endif + + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen ); - /* - * For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only - */ - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) - { - hash_start += 16; - hashlen -= 16; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { @@ -3225,11 +4017,11 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this * shortcut. * - * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and SHA224 - * in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server side. + * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and + * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server + * side. */ - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac == - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) { md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; @@ -3252,11 +4044,23 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, - ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), + md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, + ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, + out_buf_len - 6 - offset, + &n, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif return( ret ); } @@ -3279,17 +4083,12 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t lifetime; size_t ticket_len; unsigned char *ticket; @@ -3306,8 +4105,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -3327,7 +4128,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); @@ -3342,10 +4143,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", ticket_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) ); /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; @@ -3358,6 +4159,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ticket_len == 0 ) return( 0 ); + if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket, + ssl->session->ticket_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket ); + ssl->session->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket ); diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cookie.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cookie.c similarity index 86% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cookie.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cookie.c index 56e9bdd2..40b8913b 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cookie.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * DTLS cookie callbacks implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,19 +15,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * These session callbacks use a simple chained list * to store and retrieve the session information. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) @@ -39,21 +33,21 @@ #endif #include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include /* * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 is - * available. Try SHA-256 first, 512 wastes resources since we need to stay - * with max 32 bytes of cookie for DTLS 1.0 + * available. Try SHA-256 first, 512 wastes resources */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) #define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 #define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 32 #define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) #define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 #define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 48 #define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 @@ -104,7 +98,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, key, sizeof( key ) ) ) != 0 ) @@ -133,8 +127,7 @@ static int ssl_cookie_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *hmac_ctx, { unsigned char hmac_out[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; - if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ); if( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( hmac_ctx ) != 0 || mbedtls_md_hmac_update( hmac_ctx, time, 4 ) != 0 || @@ -157,15 +150,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; unsigned long t; if( ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < COOKIE_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_LEN ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) t = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time( NULL ); @@ -181,7 +173,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); #endif ret = ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, *p - 4, @@ -189,8 +181,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + - MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ) ); #endif return( ret ); @@ -217,7 +209,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check( void *p_ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); #endif if( ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, cookie, @@ -227,8 +219,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check( void *p_ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + - MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ) ); #endif if( ret != 0 ) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_invasive.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..babbc276 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_invasive.h + * + * \brief SSL module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) +/** \brief Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p + * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not + * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p + * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p + * max_data_len bytes from \p data. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured + * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the + * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. + * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after + * the computation is complete to prepare for the + * next computation. + * \param add_data The additional data prepended to \p data. This + * must point to a readable buffer of \p add_data_len + * bytes. + * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. + * \param data The data appended to \p add_data. This must point + * to a readable buffer of \p max_data_len bytes. + * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. + * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no + * greater than \p max_data_len. + * \param min_data_len The minimal length of \p data in bytes. + * \param max_data_len The maximal length of \p data in bytes. + * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to + * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the + * HMAC value. + * + * \retval 0 + * Success. + * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED + * The hardware accelerator failed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( + mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** \brief Copy data from a secret position with constant flow. + * + * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p + * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p + * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. + * + * \param dst The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param src_base The base of the source buffer. This must point to a + * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len + * bytes. + * \param offset_secret The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. + * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater + * than \p offset_max. + * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset_secret. + * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset_secret. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst, + const unsigned char *src_base, + size_t offset_secret, + size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max, + size_t len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_misc.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_misc.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c93c88df --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,1279 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_misc.h + * + * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* Legacy minor version numbers as defined by: + * - RFC 2246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 1 }; // TLS v1.0 + * - RFC 4346: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 2 }; // TLS v1.1 + * + * We no longer support these versions, but some code still references those + * constants, for keep them for now until we clean up that code. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 + +/* Determine minimum supported version */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +/* Determine maximum supported version */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ + +/* + * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 + * + * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, + * but is distinct for resends. + * + * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 + +/* + * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: + * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a + * stream cipher can be used. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ +/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ + ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ) + +/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 + +/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for + RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes + (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \ + : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \ + ) + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + +/* + * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds + */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." +#endif + +/* Calculate buffer sizes */ + +/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes + long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the + implicit sequence number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) ) +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured + * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the + * configured value and the negotiated one. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment + * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. + * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function + * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} +#endif + +/* + * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content + * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because + * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) + +/** + * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero + * otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need ) +{ + return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) ); +} + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, + * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \ + do { \ + if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t +{ + /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable + * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's + * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - + * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures + * to hash algorithms. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; + mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); + +/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from + * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those + * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled + * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is + * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. + * + * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, + * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} + * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into + * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. + * + * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH + * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here + * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations + * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the + * computation of the maximum key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/** + * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) + * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set +{ + /*! The key for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; + /*! The key for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; + /*! The IV for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; + /*! The IV for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; + + size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and + * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ + size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and + * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ +}; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; + +/* + * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +{ + /* + * Handshake specific crypto variables + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ +#endif +/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due + * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap + * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type; + uint16_t ecdh_bits; + psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey; + unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ + size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ + enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ + ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ + } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ + size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ + unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ + + unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie + Srv: unused */ + unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length + Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ + + uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ + unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ + unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ + unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the + flight being received */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for + resending messages */ + unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter + for resending messages */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ + + uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension + * has been negotiated. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */ + uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of + * \c peer_cid. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + struct + { + size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated + * buffers used for message buffering. */ + + uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has + * been seen in the current flight. */ + + struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer + { + unsigned is_valid : 1; + unsigned is_fragmented : 1; + unsigned is_complete : 1; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_len; + } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; + + struct + { + unsigned char *data; + size_t len; + unsigned epoch; + } future_record; + + } buffering; + + uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Checksum contexts + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); + void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; + + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; + + size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ + + unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */ + unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; + /*!< premaster secret */ + + int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ + int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ + int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ + int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the + * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). + * The library does not use it internally. */ + void *user_async_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +}; + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; + +/* + * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records + * + * There are the following general types of record transformations: + * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only) + * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher + * to the authenticated message. + * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only) + * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and + * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the + * handling in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For TLS 1.0, + * the final IV after processing a record is used + * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained + * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted + * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no + * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted + * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted. + * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only) + * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one + * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second + * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. + * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained + * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte + * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number + * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation + * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction + * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the + * latter to the encrypted record. + * + * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext + * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true + * content type. + * + * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: + * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. + * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. + * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. + * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. + * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, + * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. + * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in TLS 1.0) + * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC) + * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- + * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). + * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. + * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. + * - The length of the authentication tag. + * + * Note: Except for CBC in TLS 1.0, these parameters are + * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations. + * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each + * operation. + * + * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: + * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in + * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the + * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines + * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if + * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM + * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. + * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but + * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts + * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts + * are unused for AEAD transformations. + * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions >= TLS 1.0, the + * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within + * md_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations or + * transformations >= TLS 1.0. + * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within + * the transformation context, its contents are stored within + * iv_{enc/dec}. + * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. + * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations + * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the + * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be + * different from the underlying cipher's block length + * in this case. + * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only + * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is + * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in + * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. + * Note: For CBC in TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec} + * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations, + * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are + * not being used! + * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version + * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. + * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. + * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the + * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused + * in other transformations. + * + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_transform +{ + /* + * Session specific crypto layer + */ + size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ + size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ + size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ + size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ + size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ + + unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ + unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ + int minor_ver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t in_cid_len; + uint8_t out_cid_len; + unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the + * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */ + unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +}; + +/* + * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. + * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 ); +#else + (void) transform; + return( 1 ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Internal representation of record frames + * + * Instances come in two flavors: + * (1) Encrypted + * These always have data_offset = 0 + * (2) Unencrypted + * These have data_offset set to the amount of + * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, + * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV + * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used + * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers). + * + * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case + * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to + * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the + * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to + * make space for the fixed IV. + * + */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. + * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by + * the 6-byte sequence number. + * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array + * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely + * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do + * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of + * MAC computations. */ + uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ + uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. + * Convert to internal presentation of versions + * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and + * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). + * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ + + unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ + size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ + size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ + unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +} mbedtls_record; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * List of certificate + private key pairs + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * List of handshake messages kept around for resending + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +{ + unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ + size_t len; /*!< length of p */ + unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ); +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear + * memory + * + * \param transform SSL transform context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear + * memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Update record layer + * + * This function roughly separates the implementation + * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation + * of the secure transport. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest + * should be automatically updated in case + * a handshake message is found. + * + * \return 0 or non-zero error code. + * + * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here + * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: + * + * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying + * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into + * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which + * conceptually provides the following: + * + * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports + * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. + * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport + * for application data. + * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform + * securing the contents. + * + * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: + * + * a Updating + * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] + * + * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: + * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application + * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers + * provide access to the data for the user to process it. + * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically + * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers + * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application + * data (2) is user-controlled. + * + * b Reading of application data + * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] + * + * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data + * is different from the automatic consumption of control + * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. + * + * c Tracking availability of application data + * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] + * + * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for + * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer + * provides functionality for checking how much application + * data is still available in the internal buffer. + * + * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. + * + * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the + * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic + * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything + * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. + * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the + * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. + * + * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the + * record layer, but the current implementation deviates + * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of + * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record + * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which + * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility + * following the above definition. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest ); +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ); +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ); + +/** + * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() + * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 ) + { + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + } + + else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 ) + { + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + } + + else + { + *psk = NULL; + *psk_len = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK + * callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * Return an opaque PSK + */ +static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ); + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ); + + return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ); +#endif + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ); +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_md_type_t md ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + ( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value ) +{ + switch( srtp_profile_value ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return srtp_profile_value; + default: break; + } + return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + else + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + else + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert ); +} + +/* + * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: + * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). + * + * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we + * check a cert we received from them)! + * + * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, + unsigned char ver[2] ); +void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, + const unsigned char ver[2] ); + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + return( 13 ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + return( 5 ); + } +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) ); +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 12 ); +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return( 4 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +/* Visible for testing purposes only */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ); + +/* constant-time buffer comparison */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n ) +{ + size_t i; + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; + volatile unsigned char diff = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. + * This avoids IAR compiler warning: + * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + diff |= x ^ y; + } + + return( diff ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec ); + +/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 2 ); +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ); +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#endif /* ssl_misc.h */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_msg.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_msg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11896ca7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -0,0 +1,5651 @@ +/* + * Generic SSL/TLS messaging layer functions + * (record layer + retransmission state machine) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" + +#include "ssl_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); + +/* + * Start a timer. + * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ) +{ + if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) ); + ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs ); +} + +/* + * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) ); + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen ); + + /* We don't support record checking in TLS because + * (a) there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it, and + * (b) In TLS 1.0, CBC record decryption has state + * and we'd need to backup the transform here. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + else + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, buf, buflen, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +exit: + /* On success, we have decrypted the buffer in-place, so make + * sure we don't leak any plaintext data. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buflen ); + + /* For the purpose of this API, treat messages with unexpected CID + * as well as such from future epochs as unexpected. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 +#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */ +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ); +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ); +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + if( mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len ) + return( mtu ); + + return( out_buf_len ); +} + +static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left; + size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl ); + + /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone + * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */ + if( bytes_written > mtu ) + { + /* Should never happen... */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) ); +} + +static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t remaining, expansion; + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; + + /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension + * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory + * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size + * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's + * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer. + * + * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never + * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead. + */ + if( max_len <= ssl->out_left ) + return( 0 ); + + max_len -= ssl->out_left; +#endif + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + remaining = (size_t) ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + expansion = (size_t) ret; + + if( remaining <= expansion ) + return( 0 ); + + remaining -= expansion; + if( remaining >= max_len ) + remaining = max_len; + + return( (int) remaining ); +} + +/* + * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range, + * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached. + */ +static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t new_timeout; + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + return( -1 ); + + /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1 + * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first + * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes. + * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be + * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work + * on most non-IP stacks too. */ + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min ) + { + ssl->handshake->mtu = 508; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) ); + } + + new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + + /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */ + if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout || + new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + { + new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max; + } + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Encryption/decryption functions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length( size_t len, + size_t granularity ) +{ + return( ( granularity - ( len + 1 ) % granularity ) % granularity ); +} + +/* This functions transforms a (D)TLS plaintext fragment and a record content + * type into an instance of the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. This is used + * in DTLS 1.2 + CID and within TLS 1.3 to allow flexible padding and to protect + * a record's content type. + * + * struct { + * opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length]; + * ContentType real_type; + * uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]; + * } (D)TLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * Input: + * - `content`: The beginning of the buffer holding the + * plaintext to be wrapped. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * - `max_len`: The number of Bytes available starting from + * `content`. This must be `>= *content_size`. + * - `rec_type`: The desired record content type. + * + * Output: + * - `content`: The beginning of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * + * Returns: + * - `0` on success. + * - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space + * for the expansion. + */ +static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content, + size_t *content_size, + size_t remaining, + uint8_t rec_type, + size_t pad ) +{ + size_t len = *content_size; + + /* Write real content type */ + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + content[ len ] = rec_type; + len++; + remaining--; + + if( remaining < pad ) + return( -1 ); + memset( content + len, 0, pad ); + len += pad; + remaining -= pad; + + *content_size = len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */ +static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content, + size_t *content_size, + uint8_t *rec_type ) +{ + size_t remaining = *content_size; + + /* Determine length of padding by skipping zeroes from the back. */ + do + { + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + remaining--; + } while( content[ remaining ] == 0 ); + + *content_size = remaining; + *rec_type = content[ remaining ]; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled, + * and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */ +static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data, + size_t *add_data_len, + mbedtls_record *rec, + unsigned minor_ver ) +{ + /* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; + * + * For the CID extension, this is extended as follows + * (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type + + * DTLSPlaintext.version + + * cid + + * cid_length + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD + * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead. + */ + + unsigned char *cur = add_data; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + ((void) minor_ver); + memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ctr ); + } + + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + cur += rec->cid_len; + + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + + cur[0] = ( rec->data_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF; + cur[1] = ( rec->data_len >> 0 ) & 0xFF; + cur += 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + cur[0] = ( rec->data_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF; + cur[1] = ( rec->data_len >> 0 ) & 0xFF; + cur += 2; + } + + *add_data_len = cur - add_data; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + return( transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +/* Compute IV := ( fixed_iv || 0 ) XOR ( 0 || dynamic_IV ) + * + * Concretely, this occurs in two variants: + * + * a) Fixed and dynamic IV lengths add up to total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv || dynamic_iv + * + * This variant is used in TLS 1.2 when used with GCM or CCM. + * + * b) Fixed IV lengths matches total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv XOR ( 0 || dynamic_iv ) + * + * This variant occurs in TLS 1.3 and for TLS 1.2 when using ChaChaPoly. + * + * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_transform. + * + * This function has the precondition that + * + * dst_iv_len >= max( fixed_iv_len, dynamic_iv_len ) + * + * which has to be ensured by the caller. If this precondition + * violated, the behavior of this function is undefined. + */ +static void ssl_build_record_nonce( unsigned char *dst_iv, + size_t dst_iv_len, + unsigned char const *fixed_iv, + size_t fixed_iv_len, + unsigned char const *dynamic_iv, + size_t dynamic_iv_len ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */ + memset( dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len ); + memcpy( dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len ); + + dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len; + for( i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++ ) + dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i]; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int auth_done = 0; + unsigned char * data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + size_t post_avail; + + /* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used + * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.2. */ +#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + if( rec == NULL + || rec->buf == NULL + || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset + || rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + || rec->cid_len != 0 +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload", + data, rec->data_len ); + + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->data_len, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext + * structure present in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 + CID. + * + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + * + * Note also that the two code paths cannot occur simultaneously + * since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There + * is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Add CID information + */ + rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + /* + * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + */ + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + + /* + * Add MAC before if needed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED +#endif + ) ) + { + if( post_avail < transform->maclen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + /* + * Encrypt + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %d bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, 0 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + int dynamic_iv_is_explicit = + ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ); + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( post_avail < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Build nonce for AEAD encryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + * However, since ChaChaPoly as well as all AEAD modes + * in TLS 1.3 use the record sequence number as the + * dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the + * record sequence number here in all cases. + */ + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_enc, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)", + iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)", + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including 0 bytes of padding", + rec->data_len ) ); + + /* + * Encrypt and authenticate + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + &rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", + data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, + transform->taglen ); + /* Account for authentication tag. */ + post_avail -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit. + */ + if( dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0 ) + { + if( rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len ); + rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len; + } + + auth_done++; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t padlen, i; + size_t olen; + + /* Currently we're always using minimal padding + * (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */ + padlen = transform->ivlen - ( rec->data_len + 1 ) % transform->ivlen; + if( padlen == transform->ivlen ) + padlen = 0; + + /* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */ + if( post_avail < padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ ) + data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen; + + rec->data_len += padlen + 1; + post_avail -= padlen + 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 as per + * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Generate IV + */ + ret = f_rng( p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen ); + + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + /* + * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + + * TLSCipherText.type + + * TLSCipherText.version + + * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + + * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 + * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); + */ + + if( post_avail < transform->maclen) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, + rec, transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) +/* + * Turn a bit into a mask: + * - if bit == 1, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1 + * - if bit == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( size_t bit ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return -bit; +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +/* + * Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: + * - if x < y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y ) +{ + /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ + const size_t sub = x - y; + + /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 ); + + /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( sub1 ); + + return( mask ); +} + +/* + * Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison: + * - if x >= y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y ) +{ + return( ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( x, y ) ); +} + +/* + * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: + * return x == y + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with + * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit(). + * + * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y ) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const size_t diff = x ^ y; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ + const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff ); + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return( 1 ^ diff1 ); +} + +/* + * Constant-flow conditional memcpy: + * - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len), + * - otherwise, a no-op, + * but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2. + * + * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ +static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, size_t c2 ) +{ + /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( c1, c2 ); + const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( equal ); + + /* dst[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dst[i] */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + dst[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dst[i] & ~mask ); +} + +/* + * Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384. + * (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.) + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( + mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info ); + /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &aux ); + +#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if( ret != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) + + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) ); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) ); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ ) + { + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) ); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size, + offset, data_len_secret ); + + if( offset < max_data_len ) + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) ); + } + + /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) ); + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer. + * - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len) + * - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( + unsigned char *dst, + const unsigned char *src_base, + size_t offset_secret, + size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t offset; + + for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len, + offset, offset_secret ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + size_t olen; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int ret, auth_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; +#endif + unsigned char* data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) ); + if( rec == NULL || + rec->buf == NULL || + rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset || + rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Match record's CID with incoming CID. + */ + if( rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len || + memcmp( rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + padlen = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + + /* + * Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + */ + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + if( ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ) == 1 ) + { + if( rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + dynamic_iv_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + dynamic_iv = data; + + data += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_offset += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len; + } + else + { + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + } + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( rec->data_len < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + rec->data_len -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prepare nonce from dynamic and static parts. + */ + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_dec, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + + /* Because of the check above, we know that there are + * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen + * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies + * the debug message and the invocation of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ); + + /* + * Decrypt and authenticate + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + + return( ret ); + } + auth_done++; + + /* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */ + if( olen != rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + size_t minlen = 0; + + /* + * Check immediate ciphertext sanity + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ + minlen += transform->ivlen; + } +#endif + + /* Size considerations: + * + * - The CBC cipher text must not be empty and hence + * at least of size transform->ivlen. + * + * Together with the potential IV-prefix, this explains + * the first of the two checks below. + * + * - The record must contain a MAC, either in plain or + * encrypted, depending on whether Encrypt-then-MAC + * is used or not. + * - If it is, the message contains the IV-prefix, + * the CBC ciphertext, and the MAC. + * - If it is not, the padded plaintext, and hence + * the CBC ciphertext, has at least length maclen + 1 + * because there is at least the padding length byte. + * + * As the CBC ciphertext is not empty, both cases give the + * lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which + * we test for in the second check below. + */ + if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen || + rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") " + "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len, + transform->ivlen, + transform->maclen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + + /* + * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + + /* Update data_len in tandem with add_data. + * + * The subtraction is safe because of the previous check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1. + * + * Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at + * least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to + * mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp() below. + * + * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + /* Calculate expected MAC. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, + add_data_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + data, rec->data_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, + transform->maclen ); + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + auth_done++; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + + /* + * Check length sanity + */ + + /* We know from above that data_len > minlen >= 0, + * so the following check in particular implies that + * data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */ + if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen ); + + data += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */ + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having + * subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point, + * data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually + * >= ivlen ). */ + padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1]; + + if( auth_done == 1 ) + { + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")", + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + } +#endif + + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + + padlen++; + + /* Regardless of the validity of the padding, + * we have data_len >= padlen here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 + * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record + * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and + * validity of the padding, always perform exactly + * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account + * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + volatile unsigned char* const check = data; + + /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above + * that the subtraction is safe. */ + size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; + size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; + size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; + size_t idx; + + for( idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++ ) + { + /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && + * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); + */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx ); + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( check[idx], + padlen - 1 ); + pad_count += mask & equal; + } + correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) ); +#endif + padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( correct ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0 + * and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid, + * padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion + * data_len >= padlen still holds. */ + rec->data_len -= padlen; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption", + data, rec->data_len ); +#endif + + /* + * Authenticate if not done yet. + * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + /* If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen + * got reset to 1, and the initial check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1 + * guarantees that at this point we still + * have at least data_len >= maclen. + * + * If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len >= maclen + padlen + 1, then we have + * subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct) + * or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then, + * hence data_len >= maclen in any case. + */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of + * data_len over all padlen values. + * + * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did + * data_len -= padlen. + * + * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer + * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. + */ + const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; + const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data, + rec->data_len, + min_len, max_len, + transform->maclen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); +#endif + correct = 0; + } + auth_done++; + } + + /* + * Finally check the correct flag + */ + if( correct == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + /* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */ + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#undef MAC_NONE +#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT +#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT + +/* + * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. + * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. + * + * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are + * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code + * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). + * + * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but + * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, + * since we always read a whole datagram at once. + * + * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when + * they're done reading a record. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " + "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + uint32_t timeout; + + /* + * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we + * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. + * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the + * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. + */ + + /* + * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable + */ + if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 ) + { + if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; + + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->next_record_offset ) ); + memmove( ssl->in_hdr, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset, + ssl->in_left ); + } + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + /* + * Done if we already have enough data. + */ + if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but + * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something + * wrong. + */ + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Don't even try to read if time's out already. + * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages + * that will end up being dropped. + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } + else + { + len = in_buf_len - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + else + timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, + timeout ); + else + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->in_left = ret; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + while( ssl->in_left < nb_want ) + { + len = nb_want - ssl->in_left; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + else + { + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len, + ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + else + { + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested", + ret, len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left += ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Flush any data not yet written + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_send == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " + "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */ + if( ssl->out_left == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + while( ssl->out_left > 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) ); + + buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left; + ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent", + ret, ssl->out_left ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->out_left -= ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + } + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight + */ +static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + /* Allocate space for current message */ + if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + mbedtls_free( msg ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy current handshake message with headers */ + memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + msg->len = ssl->out_msglen; + msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype; + msg->next = NULL; + + /* Append to the current flight */ + if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL ) + ssl->handshake->flight = msg; + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight; + while( cur->next != NULL ) + cur = cur->next; + cur->next = msg; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free the current flight of handshake messages + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight; + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + + mbedtls_free( cur->p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + + cur = next; + } +} + +/* + * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones + */ +static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; + unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; + + if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) ); + + /* Swap transforms */ + tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out; + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; + + /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ + memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 ); + + /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Retransmit the current flight of messages. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages. + * + * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns + * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later. + * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) ); + + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; + } + + while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL ) + { + size_t max_frag_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg; + + int const is_finished = + ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ); + + uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? + SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; + + /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after + * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. + * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */ + if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) ); + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + max_frag_len = (size_t) ret; + + /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */ + if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( max_frag_len == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur->len; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len; + } + else + { + const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; + const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; + const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 ); + const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; + size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; + + if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) ) + { + if( is_finished ) + { + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12; + + cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? + max_hs_frag_len : rem_len; + + if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)", + (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len, + (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) ); + } + + /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented, + * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields. + * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 ); + + ssl->out_msg[6] = ( ( frag_off >> 16 ) & 0xff ); + ssl->out_msg[7] = ( ( frag_off >> 8 ) & 0xff ); + ssl->out_msg[8] = ( ( frag_off ) & 0xff ); + + ssl->out_msg[ 9] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 16 ) & 0xff ); + ssl->out_msg[10] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 8 ) & 0xff ); + ssl->out_msg[11] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len ) & 0xff ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 ); + + /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len; + } + + /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */ + if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12; + } + else + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL; + } + } + + /* Actually send the message out */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Update state and set timer */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + else + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* We won't need to resend that one any more */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight ); + ssl->handshake->flight = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + + /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */ + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + + /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */ + ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + + /* Clear future message buffering structure. */ + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); + + /* Cancel timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Handshake layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. + * + * - fill in handshake headers + * - update handshake checksum + * - DTLS: save message for resending + * - then pass to the record layer + * + * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be + * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend(). + * + * Inputs: + * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len + * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS) + * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc) + * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body + * + * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record(): + * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents + * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; + const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) ); + + /* + * Sanity checks + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Whenever we send anything different from a + * HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */ + if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) && + ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } +#endif + + /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds + * of the outgoing record buffer. + * This should never fail as the various message + * writing functions must obey the bounds of the + * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe. + * + * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here. + */ + if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_msglen, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Fill handshake headers + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + ssl->out_msg[1] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 16 ); + ssl->out_msg[2] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 8 ); + ssl->out_msg[3] = (unsigned char)( hs_len ); + + /* + * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer, + * between the length field and the actual payload: + * uint16 message_seq; + * uint24 fragment_offset; + * uint24 fragment_length; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */ + if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + hs_len, + (size_t) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len ); + ssl->out_msglen += 8; + + /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + { + ssl->out_msg[4] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq >> 8 ) & 0xFF; + ssl->out_msg[5] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ) & 0xFF; + ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ); + } + else + { + ssl->out_msg[4] = 0; + ssl->out_msg[5] = 0; + } + + /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation, + * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */ + memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 ); + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + } + + /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Record layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write current record. + * + * Uses: + * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS) + * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: record content + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; + uint8_t flush = force_flush; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) ); + + if( !done ) + { + unsigned i; + size_t protected_record_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption, + * as it may change when using the CID extension. */ + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 ); + + memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); + ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len ); + + if( ssl->transform_out != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + rec.buf = ssl->out_iv; + rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf ); + rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen; + rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf; + + memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver ); + rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The CID is set by mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(). */ + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec.data_offset != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Update the record content type and CID. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID ) + memcpy( ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len; + ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len >> 8 ); + ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len ); + } + + protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed + * the remaining space in the datagram. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */ + ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], + ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size ); + + ssl->out_left += protected_record_size; + ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size; + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH ) + { + size_t remaining; + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + remaining = (size_t) ret; + if( remaining == 0 ) + { + flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[11] ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[8] ); +} + +static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; + + msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( frag_off > msg_len ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly) + */ +static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned int start_bits, end_bits; + + start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 ); + if( start_bits != 8 ) + { + size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8; + + /* Special case */ + if( len <= start_bits ) + { + for( ; len != 0; len-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len ); + + /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */ + return; + } + + offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */ + len -= start_bits; + + for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 ); + } + + end_bits = len % 8; + if( end_bits != 0 ) + { + size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8; + + len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */ + + for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- ) + mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits ); + } + + memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 ); +} + +/* + * Check that bitmask is full + */ +static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ ) + if( mask[i] != 0xFF ) + return( -1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ ) + if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */ +static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len, + unsigned add_bitmap ) +{ + size_t alloc_len; + + alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */ + alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */ + + if( add_bitmap ) + alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */ + + return( alloc_len ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[3] ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen =" + " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + + if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) || + ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid + * too many retransmissions. + * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */ + if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, " + "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: " + "message_seq = %u, expected = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */ + + /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future + * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and + * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the + * handshake logic layer. */ + if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen ); + } + + /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + + /* Increment handshake sequence number */ + hs->in_msg_seq++; + + /* + * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure. + */ + + /* Free first entry */ + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 ); + + /* Shift all other entries */ + for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; + offset++, hs_buf++ ) + { + *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1); + } + + /* Create a fresh last entry */ + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6 + * + * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb). + * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen. + * + * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of + * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0 + * not seen yet). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->in_window_top = 0; + ssl->in_window = 0; +} + +static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf ) +{ + return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) ); +} + +static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *original_in_ctr; + + // save original in_ctr + original_in_ctr = ssl->in_ctr; + + // use counter from record + ssl->in_ctr = record_in_ctr; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context const *) ssl ); + + // restore the counter + ssl->in_ctr = original_in_ctr; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + uint64_t bit; + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + return( 0 ); + + bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit >= 64 ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Update replay window on new validated record + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return; + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + { + /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */ + uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top; + + if( shift >= 64 ) + ssl->in_window = 1; + else + { + ssl->in_window <<= shift; + ssl->in_window |= 1; + } + + ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum; + } + else + { + /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */ + uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */ + ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with + * a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message. + * Both input and output include full DTLS headers. + * + * - if cookie is valid, return 0 + * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not, + * fill obuf and set olen, then + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED + * - otherwise return a specific error code + */ +static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, + void *p_cookie, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t sid_len, cookie_len; + unsigned char *p; + + /* + * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers, + * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be + * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks + * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0 + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored) + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored) + * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored) + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0 + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored) + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored) + * 27-58 Random random; (ignored) + * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content + * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content + * ... + * + * Minimum length is 61 bytes. + */ + if( in_len < 61 || + in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || + in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + sid_len = in[59]; + if( sid_len > in_len - 61 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + + cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len]; + if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + + if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 ) + { + /* Valid cookie */ + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13 + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request + * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25 + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25 + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff + * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie + * + * Minimum length is 28. + */ + if( buf_len < 28 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Copy most fields and adapt others */ + memcpy( obuf, in, 25 ); + obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + obuf[25] = 0xfe; + obuf[26] = 0xff; + + /* Generate and write actual cookie */ + p = obuf + 28; + if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie, + &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + *olen = p - obuf; + + /* Go back and fill length fields */ + obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 ); + + obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 16 ); + obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 8 ); + obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) ); + + obuf[11] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) >> 8 ); + obuf[12] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); +} + +/* + * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet + * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8). + * + * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record + * that looks like a ClientHello. + * + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies, + * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then return 0 + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * reset the session of the current context, and + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code + * + * This function is called (through ssl_check_client_reconnect()) when an + * unexpected record is found in ssl_get_next_record(), which will discard the + * record if we return 0, and bubble up the return value otherwise (this + * includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected + * errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases). + */ +static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL ) + { + /* If we can't use cookies to verify reachability of the peer, + * drop the record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no cookie callbacks, " + "can't check reconnect validity" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + ssl->conf->f_cookie_write, + ssl->conf->f_cookie_check, + ssl->conf->p_cookie, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, + ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left, + ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + int send_ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_buf, len ); + /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. + * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, + * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ + send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret ); + (void) send_ret; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type ) +{ + if( record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * ContentType type; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only + * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only + * uint16 length; + * + * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected) + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected. + * + * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will: + * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0 + * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD + * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value + * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else. + * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received + * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others. + */ +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int major_ver, minor_ver; + + size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0; + size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1; + + size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset = rec_hdr_type_offset + + rec_hdr_type_len; + size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2; + + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t rec_epoch; + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + + rec_hdr_version_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */ + size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2; + + /* + * Check minimum lengths for record header. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len; + } + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record content type + */ + + rec->type = buf[ rec_hdr_type_offset ]; + + /* Check record content type */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec->cid_len = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 && + rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID ) + { + /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID + * struct { + * ContentType special_type = tls12_cid; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; + * uint48 sequence_number; + * opaque cid[cid_length]; // Additional field compared to + * // default DTLS record format + * uint16 length; + * opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length]; + * } DTLSCiphertext; + */ + + /* So far, we only support static CID lengths + * fixed in the configuration. */ + rec_hdr_cid_len = ssl->conf->cid_len; + rec_hdr_len_offset += rec_hdr_cid_len; + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* configured CID len is guaranteed at most 255, see + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX in check_config.h */ + rec->cid_len = (uint8_t) rec_hdr_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type %u", + (unsigned) rec->type ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record version + */ + + rec->ver[0] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 0 ]; + rec->ver[1] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 1 ]; + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, + &rec->ver[0] ); + + if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* + * Parse/Copy record sequence number. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Copy explicit record sequence number from input buffer. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset, + rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + /* Copy implicit record sequence number from SSL context structure. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + + /* + * Parse record length. + */ + + rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len; + rec->data_len = ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 0 ] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 1 ] << 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->type, + major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len ) ); + + rec->buf = buf; + rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len; + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + + /* + * DTLS-related tests. + * Check epoch before checking length constraint because + * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec + * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message, + * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs + * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than + * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform. + * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently, + * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid + * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_epoch = ( rec->ctr[0] << 8 ) | rec->ctr[1]; + + /* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record + * of the advertised length. */ + if( len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* Records from other, non-matching epochs are silently discarded. + * (The case of same-port Client reconnects must be considered in + * the caller). */ + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: " + "expected %u, received %lu", + ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch ) ); + + /* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering + * (concretely: early Finished messages). */ + if( rec_epoch == (unsigned) ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + /* For records from the correct epoch, check whether their + * sequence number has been seen before. */ + else if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl, + &rec->ctr[0] ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +static int ssl_check_client_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; + + /* + * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to + * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we + * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the + * fact that the record header len is 13 instead. + */ + if( rec_epoch == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_left > 13 && + ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect " + "from the same port" ) ); + return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * If applicable, decrypt record content + */ +static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network", + rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, + rec ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && + ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid + == MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ignoring unexpected CID" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( ret ); + } + + if( old_msg_type != rec->type ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", + old_msg_type, rec->type ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt", + rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* We have already checked the record content type + * in ssl_parse_record_header(), failing or silently + * dropping the record in the case of an unknown type. + * + * Since with the use of CIDs, the record content type + * might change during decryption, re-check the record + * content type, but treat a failure as fatal this time. */ + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + ssl->nb_zero++; + + /* + * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack + * (excessive CPU consumption). + */ + if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty " + "messages, possible DoS attack" ) ); + /* Treat the records as if they were not properly authenticated, + * thereby failing the connection if we see more than allowed + * by the configured bad MAC threshold. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + } + else + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */ + } + else +#endif + { + unsigned i; + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); + } +#endif + + /* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Read a record. + * + * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well, + * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found. + * + */ + +/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */ +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) ); + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 ) + { + do { + + ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + int have_buffered = 0; + + /* We only check for buffered messages if the + * current datagram is fully consumed. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 ) + have_buffered = 1; + } + + if( have_buffered == 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ) + continue; + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + /* Buffer future message */ + ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret || + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret ); + + if( 0 != ret ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + update_hs_digest == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) ); + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf; + int ret = 0; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before. + * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */ + if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) ); + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) ); + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->in_msglen = 1; + ssl->in_msg[0] = 1; + + /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */ + ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + /* Debug only */ + { + unsigned offset; + for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + { + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset]; + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.", + hs->in_msg_seq + offset, + hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the + * next handshake message. */ + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) ) + { + /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ + size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) | + ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) | + hs_buf->data[3]; + + /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered + * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)", + hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 ); + + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12; + ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12; + memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen ); + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered", + hs->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + ret = -1; + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t desired ) +{ + int offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available", + (unsigned) desired ) ); + + /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */ + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake + * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space, + * starting with the most distant one. */ + for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; + offset >= 0; offset-- ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message", + offset ) ); + + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + + switch( ssl->in_msgtype ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) ); + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: + { + unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; + unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; + + /* We should never receive an old handshake + * message - double-check nonetheless. */ + if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + { + /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, " + "buffering window %u - %u", + recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) ); + + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ", + recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) ); + + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ]; + + /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */ + if( !hs_buf->is_valid ) + { + size_t reassembly_buf_sz; + + hs_buf->is_fragmented = + ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ); + + /* We copy the message back into the input buffer + * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large. + * This is an implementation-specific limitation + * and not one from the standard, hence it is not + * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + /* Ignore message */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */ + if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered > + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len, + hs_buf->is_fragmented ); + + if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 ) + { + /* If we can't buffer a future message because + * of space limitations -- ignore. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + } + + if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " with bitmap) would exceed" + " the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- fail\n", + msg_len, + reassembly_buf_sz, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + msg_len ) ); + + hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz ); + if( hs_buf->data == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz; + + /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq, + * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */ + memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 ); + memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 ); + memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 ); + + hs_buf->is_valid = 1; + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz; + } + else + { + /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */ + if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) ); + /* Ignore */ + goto exit; + } + } + + if( !hs_buf->is_complete ) + { + size_t frag_len, frag_off; + unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12; + + /* + * Check and copy current fragment + */ + + /* Validation of header fields already done in + * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */ + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + frag_off, frag_len ) ); + memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len ); + + if( hs_buf->is_fragmented ) + { + unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len; + ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len ); + hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask, + msg_len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + hs_buf->is_complete = 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete", + hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) ); + } + + break; + } + + default: + /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */ + break; + } + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Consume last content-layer message and potentially + * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' + * consumption state. + * + * (1) Handshake messages: + * Remove last handshake message, move content + * and adapt in_msglen. + * + * (2) Alert messages: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (3) Change cipher spec: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (4) Application data: + * Don't do anything - the record layer provides + * the application data as a stream transport + * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. + * + */ + + /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ + if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) + { + /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data + * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during + * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Get next Handshake message in the current record + */ + + /* Notes: + * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the + * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake + * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment + * size instead. Using the total handshake message + * size here is faulty and should be changed at + * some point. + * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one + * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen + * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. + * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. + * The following check is therefore mandatory, and + * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. + * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of + * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected + * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; + memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, + ssl->in_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + } + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + } + /* Case (4): Application data */ + else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= + hs->buffering.future_record.len; + + mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data ); + hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL; + } +} + +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char * rec; + size_t rec_len; + unsigned rec_epoch; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 0 ); + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data; + rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len; + rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch; + + if( rec == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only consider loading future records if the + * input buffer is empty. */ + if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) ); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) ); + + /* Double-check that the record is not too large */ + if( rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len ); + ssl->in_left = rec_len; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */ + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested + * in Finished messages). */ + if( rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */ + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */ + if( rec->buf_len > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Buffer record */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u", + ssl->in_epoch + 1U ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records + * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */ + hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1; + hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len; + + hs->buffering.future_record.data = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len ); + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL ) + { + /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a + * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */ + return( 0 ); + } + + memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += rec->buf_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_record rec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* We might have buffered a future record; if so, + * and if the epoch matches now, load it. + * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to + * the length of the buffered record, so that + * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will + * essentially be no-ops. */ + ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Ensure that we have enough space available for the default form + * of TLS / DTLS record headers (5 Bytes for TLS, 13 Bytes for DTLS, + * with no space for CIDs counted in). */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + + /* Setup internal message pointers from record structure. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + + ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect( ssl ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + else + { + /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */ + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + + /* Get next record */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + else +#endif + { + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Remember offset of next record within datagram. */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + /* + * Fetch record contents from underlying transport. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, rec.buf_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + + /* + * Decrypt record contents. + */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl, &rec ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Silently discard invalid records */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here + * probably means something went wrong in the handshake + * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && + ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + + /* As above, invalid records cause + * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif + { + /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + } + + + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + + /* The record content type may change during decryption, + * so re-read it. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; + /* Also update the input buffer, because unfortunately + * the server-side ssl_parse_client_hello() reparses the + * record header when receiving a ClientHello initiating + * a renegotiation. */ + ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type; + ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len >> 8 ); + ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Handle particular types of records + */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x", + ssl->in_msg[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 ) + { + /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert + to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't + currently support this. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]", + ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + + /* + * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)", + ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a no renegotiation alert" ) ); + /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, + * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char level, + unsigned char message ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message )); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; + ssl->out_msglen = 2; + ssl->out_msg[0] = level; + ssl->out_msg[1] = message; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) ); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->out_msglen = 1; + ssl->out_msg[0] = 1; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1', + * so we don't need to check this here. */ + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) ); + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); +#endif + + /* Increment epoch */ + if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so + treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid; + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len; +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len; +#endif + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5; + } + + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv; + /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */ + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( transform ); +} + +/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* This function sets the pointers to match the case + * of unprotected TLS/DTLS records, with both ssl->in_iv + * and ssl->in_msg pointing to the beginning of the record + * content. + * + * When decrypting a protected record, ssl->in_msg + * will be shifted to point to the beginning of the + * record plaintext. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* This sets the header pointers to match records + * without CID. When we receive a record containing + * a CID, the fields are shifted accordingly in + * ssl_parse_record_header(). */ + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len; +#endif + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5; + } + + /* This will be adjusted at record decryption time. */ + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv; +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_buf; + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; + } + + /* Derive other internal pointers. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl ); +} + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Case A: We're currently holding back + * a message for further processing. + */ + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Case C: A handshake message is being processed. + */ + + if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case D: An application data message is being processed + */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped. + * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if + * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records. + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t transform_expansion = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; + unsigned block_size; + + size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + return( (int) out_hdr_len ); + + switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( transform->out_cid_len != 0 ) + transform_expansion += MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( (int)( out_hdr_len + transform_expansion ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/* + * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit. + */ +static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); + int in_ctr_cmp; + int out_ctr_cmp; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + + if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* This function is called from mbedtls_ssl_read() when a handshake message is + * received after the initial handshake. In this context, handshake messages + * may only be sent for the purpose of initiating renegotiations. + * + * This function is introduced as a separate helper since the handling + * of post-handshake handshake messages changes significantly in TLS 1.3, + * and having a helper function allows to distinguish between TLS <= 1.2 and + * TLS 1.3 in the future without bloating the logic of mbedtls_ssl_read(). + */ +static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ + if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) ) + { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + } +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is + * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through + * if an unexpected packet is received while the client + * is waiting for the ServerHello. + * + * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on + * the server-side as it is not treated as within + * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello + * after a renegotiation request.) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */ + while( ssl->in_offt == NULL ) + { + /* Start timer if not already running */ + if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && + ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* + * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + ret = ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( ssl ); + if( ret != 0) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation triggered + * by the post-handshake message has been completed or not. The cases + * to consider are the following: + * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record + * has been read yet. + * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. + * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting + * the ServerHello. + * + * In each of these cases, looping will be the proper action: + * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check + * if it's application data. + * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data + * is present, hence continue is the same as break + * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record + * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client + * when expecting the ServerHello. + */ + + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 ) + { + if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " + "but not honored by client" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + + /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, + * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest. + * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch + * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + } + + n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen ) + ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n ); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n ); + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) + { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + else + { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) ); + + return( (int) n ); +} + +/* + * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max + * fragment length and buffer size. + * + * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1: + * + * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are + * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. + * + * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the + * corresponding return code is 0 on success. + */ +static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl ); + const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret; + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( len > max_len ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) " + "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + len, max_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else +#endif + len = max_len; + } + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + /* + * The user has previously tried to send the data and + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially + * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function + * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + /* + * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to + * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure + * to keep track of partial writes + */ + ssl->out_msglen = len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) ); + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) ); + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ + if( transform == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset ); +} + +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot]; + + if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + return; + + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len ); + mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data ); + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Convert version numbers to/from wire format + * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. + * + * For TLS this is the identity. + * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: + * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) + * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, + unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + + ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) ); + ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) ); + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; + ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, + const unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; + *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; + + if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + *major = ver[0]; + *minor = ver[1]; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_srv.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_srv.c similarity index 80% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_srv.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_srv.c index 36ca0d69..ad98850f 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_srv.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_srv.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions + * TLS server-side functions * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) @@ -35,9 +29,10 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -85,7 +80,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; const unsigned char *p; @@ -96,7 +91,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } servername_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); if( servername_list_size + 2 != len ) @@ -104,7 +99,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } p = buf + 2; @@ -116,7 +111,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) @@ -128,7 +123,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME ); } return( 0 ); } @@ -141,14 +136,56 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->f_psk != NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + if( conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) @@ -165,7 +202,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } } else @@ -176,7 +213,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -186,7 +223,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: @@ -216,7 +253,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } sig_alg_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || @@ -225,7 +262,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according @@ -261,20 +298,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" - " match sig %d and hash %d", - sig_cur, md_cur ) ); + " match sig %u and hash %u", + (unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur ) ); } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " - "hash alg %d not supported", md_cur ) ); + "hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur ) ); } } return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -290,7 +327,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); if( list_size + 2 != len || @@ -299,7 +336,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ @@ -307,8 +344,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, @@ -356,7 +393,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } list_size = buf[0]; @@ -370,7 +407,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0] ); #endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); return( 0 ); @@ -390,7 +428,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) { @@ -424,7 +462,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; @@ -433,27 +471,77 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) { - if( len != 0 ) + size_t peer_cid_len; + + /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + } + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + if( len < 1 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } - ((void) buf); + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; - if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ + if( ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default + * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -465,13 +553,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } ((void) buf); - if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; } @@ -490,13 +577,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } ((void) buf); - if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED ) { ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; } @@ -510,7 +596,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_session session; mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); @@ -524,7 +610,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len ) ); if( len == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -604,7 +690,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; @@ -612,7 +698,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* @@ -629,7 +715,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ @@ -637,7 +723,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } } @@ -663,10 +749,130 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* If we get there, no match was found */ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i,j; + size_t profile_length; + uint16_t mki_length; + /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */ + const size_t size_of_lengths = 3; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + + /* + * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte) + * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length + * and one of srtp_mki length + */ + if( len < size_of_lengths ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */ + profile_length = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + buf += 2; + + /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */ + if( profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || + profile_length % 2 != 0 ) /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + /* + * parse the extension list values are defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + */ + for( j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2 ) + { + uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1]; + client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( protection_profile_value ); + + if( client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + } + else + { + continue; + } + /* check if suggested profile is in our list */ + for( i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + break; + } + buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */ + mki_length = *buf; + buf++; + + if( mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || + mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED && + mki_length > 0 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length; + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions */ @@ -725,6 +931,7 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) { + flags = 0; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", cur->cert ); @@ -806,7 +1013,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; #endif @@ -817,7 +1024,8 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name ) ); if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver ) @@ -832,15 +1040,6 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, return( 0 ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: rc4" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK ) == 0 ) @@ -863,13 +1062,11 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && - ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && - ( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || - ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) + ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) ); return( 0 ); @@ -877,7 +1074,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) @@ -887,13 +1084,13 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " - "for signature algorithm %d", sig_type ) ); + "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) ); return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* @@ -915,269 +1112,6 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, return( 0 ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) -static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret, got_common_suite; - unsigned int i, j; - size_t n; - unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len; - unsigned char *buf, *p; - const int *ciphersuites; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello v2" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - - buf = ssl->in_hdr; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, 5 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message type: %d", - buf[2] ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message len.: %d", - ( ( buf[0] & 0x7F ) << 8 ) | buf[1] ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]", - buf[3], buf[4] ) ); - - /* - * SSLv2 Client Hello - * - * Record layer: - * 0 . 1 message length - * - * SSL layer: - * 2 . 2 message type - * 3 . 4 protocol version - */ - if( buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || - buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - n = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1] ) & 0x7FFF; - - if( n < 17 || n > 512 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - ssl->minor_ver = ( buf[4] <= ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) - ? buf[4] : ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; - - if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" - " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); - } - - ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3]; - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4]; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 2 + n ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf + 2, n ); - - buf = ssl->in_msg; - n = ssl->in_left - 5; - - /* - * 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length - * 2 . 3 session id length - * 4 . 5 challenge length - * 6 . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. session id - * .. . .. challenge - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, n ); - - ciph_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; - sess_len = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; - chal_len = ( buf[4] << 8 ) | buf[5]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %d, sess_len: %d, chal_len: %d", - ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) ); - - /* - * Make sure each parameter length is valid - */ - if( ciph_len < 3 || ( ciph_len % 3 ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - if( sess_len > 32 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - if( chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - if( n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", - buf + 6, ciph_len ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", - buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, challenge", - buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len ); - - p = buf + 6 + ciph_len; - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; - memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, - sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); - memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); - - p += sess_len; - memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 ); - memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ); - - /* - * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV - */ - for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) - { - if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " - "during renegotiation" ) ); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; - break; - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) - { - if( p[0] == 0 && - p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && - p[2] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); - - if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - break; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ - - got_common_suite = 0; - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; - ciphersuite_info = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) - for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) -#else - for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) - for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) -#endif - { - if( p[0] != 0 || - p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || - p[2] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) - continue; - - got_common_suite = 1; - - if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) - goto have_ciphersuite_v2; - } - - if( got_common_suite ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " - "but none of them usable" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); - } - -have_ciphersuite_v2: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); - - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; - - /* - * SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks - */ - if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - ssl->in_left = 0; - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello v2" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ - /* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ @@ -1203,10 +1137,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed * signature-hash pairs. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) ); @@ -1232,18 +1166,10 @@ read_record_header: buf = ssl->in_hdr; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) -#endif - if( ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 ) - return( ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ) ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); /* - * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello + * TLS Client Hello * * Record layer: * 0 . 0 message type @@ -1251,19 +1177,19 @@ read_record_header: * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number * 3 . 4 message length */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message type: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, message type: %d", buf[0] ) ); if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message len.: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, message len.: %d", ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1] ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]", buf[1], buf[2] ) ); mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1 ); @@ -1275,7 +1201,7 @@ read_record_header: if( major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); } /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence @@ -1291,7 +1217,7 @@ read_record_header: if( ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 ); @@ -1325,11 +1251,11 @@ read_record_header: if( msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -1338,7 +1264,7 @@ read_record_header: /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); + ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ); else #endif ssl->in_left = 0; @@ -1361,7 +1287,7 @@ read_record_header: if( msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0] ) ); @@ -1369,7 +1295,7 @@ read_record_header: if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake len.: %d", @@ -1380,7 +1306,7 @@ read_record_header: msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ( ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -1400,9 +1326,9 @@ read_record_header: if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: " - "%d (expected %d)", cli_msg_seq, + "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; @@ -1449,14 +1375,14 @@ read_record_header: */ /* - * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions ommitted) is + * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can * read at least up to session id length without worrying. */ if( msg_len < 38 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* @@ -1479,7 +1405,7 @@ read_record_header: ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); } if( ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ) @@ -1508,7 +1434,7 @@ read_record_header: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len ); @@ -1532,8 +1458,8 @@ read_record_header: { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", @@ -1567,7 +1493,7 @@ read_record_header: { /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) ); @@ -1592,7 +1518,7 @@ read_record_header: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", @@ -1612,35 +1538,18 @@ read_record_header: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, compression", buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len ); ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - for( i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i ) - { - if( buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) - { - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; - break; - } - } -#endif - /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; #endif - - /* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) - { -#endif /* * Check the extension length */ @@ -1652,19 +1561,18 @@ read_record_header: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } ext_len = ( buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8 ) | ( buf[ext_offset + 1] ); - if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) || - msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) + if( msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } } else @@ -1681,7 +1589,7 @@ read_record_header: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) | ( ext[1] ) ); ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) | ( ext[3] ) ); @@ -1691,7 +1599,7 @@ read_record_header: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } switch( ext_id ) { @@ -1719,7 +1627,7 @@ read_record_header: break; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) ); @@ -1730,7 +1638,7 @@ read_record_header: sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1773,15 +1681,15 @@ read_record_header: break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated hmac extension" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); - ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: @@ -1823,51 +1731,27 @@ read_record_header: break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); } ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; ext += 4 + ext_size; - - if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) - { - if( p[0] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && - p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); - - if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - break; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client @@ -1884,7 +1768,7 @@ read_record_header: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV @@ -1901,7 +1785,7 @@ read_record_header: "during renegotiation" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } #endif ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -1946,7 +1830,7 @@ read_record_header: { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } /* @@ -1955,29 +1839,45 @@ read_record_header: * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.) */ got_common_suite = 0; - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; ciphersuite_info = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) - for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) -#else - for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + + if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) + { for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) -#endif - { - if( p[0] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || - p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) - continue; + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + { + if( p[0] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || + p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) + continue; - got_common_suite = 1; + got_common_suite = 1; - if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); - if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) - goto have_ciphersuite; - } + if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) + goto have_ciphersuite; + } + } else { + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) + { + if( p[0] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || + p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) + continue; + + got_common_suite = 1; + + if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) + goto have_ciphersuite; + } + } if( got_common_suite ) { @@ -1985,21 +1885,21 @@ read_record_header: "but none of them usable" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } have_ciphersuite: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; ssl->state++; @@ -2011,7 +1911,7 @@ have_ciphersuite: /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( ciphersuite_info ); @@ -2025,7 +1925,7 @@ have_ciphersuite: else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " - "%d - should not happen", sig_alg ) ); + "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg ) ); } } #endif @@ -2035,30 +1935,53 @@ have_ciphersuite: return( 0 ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - if( ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if + * the client hasn't offered it. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + return; + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ) { - *olen = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); return; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding truncated hmac extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding CID extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF ); + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID ) & 0xFF ); + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); - *olen = 4; + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -2069,8 +1992,7 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; - if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ) { *olen = 0; return; @@ -2110,8 +2032,7 @@ static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { unsigned char *p = buf; - if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ) { *olen = 0; return; @@ -2258,7 +2179,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t kkpp_len; @@ -2266,7 +2187,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) return; @@ -2333,10 +2254,82 @@ static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t profile_value = 0; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) ) + { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* The extension total size is 9 bytes : + * - 2 bytes for the extension tag + * - 2 bytes for the total size + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile + * - 1 byte for the mki length + * + the actual mki length + * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */ + if( (size_t)( end - buf ) < mki_len + 9 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + /* extension */ + buf[0] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + buf[1] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP ) & 0xFF ); + /* + * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki ) + */ + ext_len = 5 + mki_len; + buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ext_len & 0xFF ); + + /* protection profile length: 2 */ + buf[4] = 0x00; + buf[5] = 0x02; + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + buf[6] = (unsigned char)( ( profile_value >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + buf[7] = (unsigned char)( profile_value & 0xFF ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "use_srtp extension invalid profile" ) ); + return; + } + + buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF; + memcpy( &buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + + *olen = 9 + mki_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; @@ -2405,12 +2398,60 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ +static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp; + mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). + * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 1 ) + return; + if( session->id_len == 0 ) + return; + if( ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL ) + return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + return; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session_tmp ); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, + session->id, + session->id_len, + &session_tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite || + session->compression != session_tmp.compression ) + { + /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Move semantics */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + *session = session_tmp; + memset( &session_tmp, 0, sizeof( session_tmp ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + +exit: + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session_tmp ); +} + static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t; #endif - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; unsigned char *buf, *p; @@ -2457,7 +2498,8 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( t ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", t ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); #else if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -2474,22 +2516,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 ); - /* - * Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). - * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). - * If not, try looking up session ID in our cache. - */ - if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 && -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE && -#endif - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != 0 && - ssl->conf->f_get_cache != NULL && - ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session_negotiate ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); - ssl->handshake->resume = 1; - } + ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( ssl ); if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) { @@ -2545,7 +2572,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); @@ -2557,13 +2584,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", - ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); - - /* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) - { -#endif + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); /* * First write extensions, then the total length @@ -2576,8 +2597,8 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ext_len += olen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -2616,7 +2637,13 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ext_len += olen; #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len ) ); if( ext_len > 0 ) { @@ -2625,10 +2652,6 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) p += ext_len; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - } -#endif - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; @@ -2640,24 +2663,15 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -2667,13 +2681,13 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ unsigned char *buf, *p; const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; @@ -2691,11 +2705,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) || authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); @@ -2791,6 +2801,11 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED ) { + /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned + * via a CA callback (configured through + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the + * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; @@ -2800,11 +2815,11 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) { - dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; + /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length + * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */ + dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len; - if( end < p || - (size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size || - (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); break; @@ -2834,18 +2849,13 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) { @@ -2866,7 +2876,7 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *signature_len ) @@ -2889,7 +2899,7 @@ static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret ); return( ret ); } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including @@ -2899,17 +2909,26 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *signature_len ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) (void) signature_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf ); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf ); +#endif +#endif ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ @@ -2925,7 +2944,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( @@ -2962,10 +2981,10 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * - DHE key exchanges */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL ) @@ -2993,7 +3012,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ), ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -3001,7 +3020,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( ret ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif @@ -3012,12 +3031,12 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */ /* * - ECDHE key exchanges */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* @@ -3030,7 +3049,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ @@ -3043,13 +3062,13 @@ curve_matching_done: if( curve == NULL || *curve == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no matching curve for ECDHE" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp, - (*curve)->grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + (*curve)->grp_id ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -3065,15 +3084,16 @@ curve_matching_done: return( ret ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif ssl->out_msglen += len; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ /* * @@ -3081,21 +3101,18 @@ curve_matching_done: * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. * */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) { size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; size_t hashlen = 0; unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: - * A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension - * to choose appropriate hash. - * B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1 - * (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4) - * C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3) + * For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * to choose appropriate hash. */ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; @@ -3105,7 +3122,7 @@ curve_matching_done: mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { - /* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + /* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || ( md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, @@ -3118,43 +3135,18 @@ curve_matching_done: } } else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) - { - /* B: Default hash SHA1 */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - { - /* C: MD5 + SHA1 */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %d for signing", md_alg ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg ) ); /* * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - hashlen = 36; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, - dig_signed, - dig_signed_len ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen, @@ -3165,8 +3157,7 @@ curve_matching_done: return( ret ); } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); @@ -3241,6 +3232,7 @@ curve_matching_done: if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), md_alg, hash, hashlen, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, + out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2, signature_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) @@ -3249,7 +3241,7 @@ curve_matching_done: return( ret ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ return( 0 ); } @@ -3260,28 +3252,28 @@ curve_matching_done: * machine. */ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t signature_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange * is not needed. */ if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters * from certificate at this point. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) ) { ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ @@ -3289,9 +3281,9 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->state++; return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing * signature operation, resume signing. */ @@ -3301,7 +3293,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); } else -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ { /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ @@ -3324,7 +3316,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* If there is a signature, write its length. * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if( signature_len != 0 ) { ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = (unsigned char)( signature_len >> 8 ); @@ -3337,7 +3329,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* Skip over the already-written signature */ ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ /* Add header and send. */ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; @@ -3357,7 +3349,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) ); @@ -3406,7 +3398,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char * if( *p + 2 > end ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; @@ -3415,13 +3407,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char * if( *p + n > end ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } *p += n; @@ -3461,7 +3453,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *peer_pmslen, size_t peer_pmssize ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ); mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl )->pk; size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key ); @@ -3480,27 +3472,23 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if ( p + 2 > end ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + if( *p++ != ( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || + *p++ != ( ( len ) & 0xFF ) ) { - if ( p + 2 > end ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); - } - if( *p++ != ( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || - *p++ != ( ( len ) & 0xFF ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } #endif if( p + len != end ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* @@ -3550,7 +3538,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *end, size_t pms_offset ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; unsigned char ver[2]; unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; @@ -3561,11 +3549,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to - * peer_pmslen being less than 48, and we only care whether diff is 0. - * But do initialize peer_pms for robustness anyway. This also makes - * memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, even - * if it's an unsigned char). */ + * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0. + * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This + * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, + * even if it's an unsigned char). */ peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0; + peer_pmslen = 0; ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, peer_pms, @@ -3641,16 +3630,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { int ret = 0; - size_t n; + uint16_t n; - if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && - ( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || - ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) + if( ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); @@ -3662,16 +3649,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha if( end - *p < 2 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; *p += 2; - if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) ) + if( n == 0 || n > end - *p ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) @@ -3702,15 +3689,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; unsigned char *p, *end; - ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) ); @@ -3740,13 +3727,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -3761,7 +3748,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( p != end ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, @@ -3771,7 +3758,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); @@ -3791,10 +3778,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) p, end - p) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, @@ -3803,10 +3791,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "ECDH: z ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.z ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || @@ -3825,9 +3814,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( p != end ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation atomatically + * and skip the intermediate PMS. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -3859,6 +3855,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret ); @@ -3888,10 +3890,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + if( p != end ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, @@ -3916,10 +3924,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) p, end - p ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) @@ -3949,7 +3964,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, @@ -3981,24 +3996,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -4008,7 +4014,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -4021,22 +4027,34 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; return( 0 ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ ); if( 0 != ret ) @@ -4052,43 +4070,35 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* * struct { * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; * } DigitallySigned; */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - hashlen = 36; - - /* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) - { - hash_start += 16; - hashlen -= 16; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* @@ -4100,7 +4110,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" " for verify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) @@ -4121,16 +4131,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" " for verify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } /* * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); } i++; @@ -4145,7 +4155,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } sig_len = ( ssl->in_msg[i] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; @@ -4154,13 +4164,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); } /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ - ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash ); + { + size_t dummy_hlen; + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen ); + } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( peer_pk, md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -4174,17 +4187,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t tlen; uint32_t lifetime; @@ -4372,4 +4380,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order ) +{ + conf->respect_cli_pref = order; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_ticket.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_ticket.c similarity index 64% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_ticket.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_ticket.c index a2b30486..940e1a67 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_ticket.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * TLS server tickets callbacks implementation * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) @@ -35,7 +29,9 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -54,13 +50,26 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) #define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */ +#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 +#define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12 +#define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2 +#define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16 + +#define TICKET_MIN_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES + \ + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) +#define TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES ) + /* * Generate/update a key */ static int ssl_ticket_gen_key( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, unsigned char index ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES]; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index; @@ -97,7 +106,7 @@ static int ssl_ticket_update_keys( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) uint32_t current_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time( NULL ); uint32_t key_time = ctx->keys[ctx->active].generation_time; - if( current_time > key_time && + if( current_time >= key_time && current_time - key_time < ctx->ticket_lifetime ) { return( 0 ); @@ -120,7 +129,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, uint32_t lifetime ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; ctx->f_rng = f_rng; @@ -141,11 +150,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, if( cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) - { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + /* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA, + * so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - } if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 0 ) ) != 0 || ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 1 ) ) != 0 ) @@ -156,115 +181,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, return( 0 ); } -/* - * Serialize a session in the following format: - * 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) - * n . n+2 peer_cert length = m (0 if no certificate) - * n+3 . n+2+m peer cert ASN.1 - */ -static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen ) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t left = buf_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - if( left < sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - memcpy( p, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); - p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); - left -= sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) - cert_len = 0; - else - cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; - - if( left < 3 + cert_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 16 & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 8 & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len & 0xFF ); - - if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) - memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len ); - - p += cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - *olen = p - buf; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Unserialise session, see ssl_save_session() - */ -static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - const unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - if( p + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memcpy( session, p, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); - p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( p + 3 > end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; - p += 3; - - if( cert_len == 0 ) - { - session->peer_cert = NULL; - } - else - { - int ret; - - if( p + cert_len > end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); - - if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert, - p, cert_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); - mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - return( ret ); - } - - p += cert_len; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( 0 ); -} - /* * Create session ticket, with the following structure: * @@ -278,6 +194,7 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, * The key_name, iv, and length of encrypted_state are the additional * authenticated data. */ + int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *start, @@ -285,14 +202,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, size_t *tlen, uint32_t *ticket_lifetime ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; unsigned char *key_name = start; - unsigned char *iv = start + 4; - unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + 12; - unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + 2; - unsigned char *tag; + unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; size_t clear_len, ciph_len; *tlen = 0; @@ -302,8 +218,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, /* We need at least 4 bytes for key_name, 12 for IV, 2 for len 16 for tag, * in addition to session itself, that will be checked when writing it. */ - if( end - start < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( start, end, TICKET_MIN_LEN ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) @@ -317,14 +232,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, *ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; - memcpy( key_name, key->name, 4 ); + memcpy( key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES ); - if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, 12 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; /* Dump session state */ - if( ( ret = ssl_save_session( session, - state, end - state, &clear_len ) ) != 0 || + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session, + state, end - state, + &clear_len ) ) != 0 || (unsigned long) clear_len > 65535 ) { goto cleanup; @@ -333,20 +249,23 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, state_len_bytes[1] = ( clear_len ) & 0xff; /* Encrypt and authenticate */ - tag = state + clear_len; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &key->ctx, - iv, 12, key_name, 4 + 12 + 2, - state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, &ciph_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } - if( ciph_len != clear_len ) + if( ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } - *tlen = 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 + ciph_len; + *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len - TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES; cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -381,21 +300,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; unsigned char *key_name = buf; - unsigned char *iv = buf + 4; - unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 12; - unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + 2; - unsigned char *tag; + unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; size_t enc_len, clear_len; if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - /* See mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write() */ - if( len < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 ) + if( len < TICKET_MIN_LEN ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -407,9 +324,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1]; - tag = ticket + enc_len; - if( len != 4 + 12 + 2 + enc_len + 16 ) + if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; @@ -425,9 +341,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, } /* Decrypt and authenticate */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx, iv, 12, - key_name, 4 + 12 + 2, ticket, enc_len, - ticket, &clear_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; @@ -441,7 +361,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, } /* Actually load session */ - if( ( ret = ssl_load_session( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cfda4a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,6774 @@ +/* + * TLS shared functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +/* Top-level Connection ID API */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + size_t len, + int ignore_other_cid ) +{ + if( len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL && + ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->ignore_unexpected_cid = ignore_other_cid; + conf->cid_len = len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->negotiate_cid = enable; + if( enable == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Disable use of CID extension." ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Enable use of CID extension." ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Own CID", own_cid, own_cid_len ); + + if( own_cid_len != ssl->conf->cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "CID length %u does not match CID length %u in config", + (unsigned) own_cid_len, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->cid_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->own_cid, own_cid, own_cid_len ); + /* Truncation is not an issue here because + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */ + ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], + size_t *peer_cid_len ) +{ + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; + + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID extensions + * were used, but client and server requested the empty CID. + * This is indistinguishable from not using the CID extension + * in the first place. */ + if( ssl->transform_in->in_cid_len == 0 && + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( peer_cid_len != NULL ) + { + *peer_cid_len = ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len; + if( peer_cid != NULL ) + { + memcpy( peer_cid, ssl->transform_in->out_cid, + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len ); + } + } + + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/* + * Convert max_fragment_length codes to length. + * RFC 6066 says: + * enum{ + * 2^9(1), 2^10(2), 2^11(3), 2^12(4), (255) + * } MaxFragmentLength; + * and we add 0 -> extension unused + */ +static unsigned int ssl_mfl_code_to_length( int mfl ) +{ + switch( mfl ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE: + return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512: + return 512; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024: + return 1024; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048: + return 2048; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096: + return 4096; + default: + return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( dst ); + memcpy( dst, src, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( src->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ); + if( dst->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( dst->peer_cert ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( dst->peer_cert, src->peer_cert->raw.p, + src->peer_cert->raw.len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( dst->peer_cert ); + dst->peer_cert = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( src->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + dst->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( dst->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( dst->peer_cert_digest, src->peer_cert_digest, + src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + dst->peer_cert_digest_type = src->peer_cert_digest_type; + dst->peer_cert_digest_len = src->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( src->ticket != NULL ) + { + dst->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->ticket_len ); + if( dst->ticket == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( dst->ticket, src->ticket, src->ticket_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static int resize_buffer( unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old ) +{ + unsigned char* resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len_new ); + if( resized_buffer == NULL ) + return -1; + + /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and + * len_old bytes when upsizing, so we choose the smaller of two sizes, + * to fit one buffer into another. Size checks, ensuring that no data is + * lost, are done outside of this function. */ + memcpy( resized_buffer, *buffer, + ( len_new < *len_old ) ? len_new : *len_old ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buffer, *len_old ); + mbedtls_free( *buffer ); + + *buffer = resized_buffer; + *len_old = len_new; + + return 0; +} + +static void handle_buffer_resizing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing, + size_t in_buf_new_len, + size_t out_buf_new_len ) +{ + int modified = 0; + size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0; + size_t written_out = 0, iv_offset_out = 0, len_offset_out = 0; + if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) + { + written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + iv_offset_in = ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf; + len_offset_in = ssl->in_len - ssl->in_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->in_buf_len > in_buf_new_len && ssl->in_left < in_buf_new_len : + ssl->in_buf_len < in_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->in_buf, in_buf_new_len, &ssl->in_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "input buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + in_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + + if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) + { + written_out = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + iv_offset_out = ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf; + len_offset_out = ssl->out_len - ssl->out_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->out_buf_len > out_buf_new_len && ssl->out_left < out_buf_new_len : + ssl->out_buf_len < out_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->out_buf, out_buf_new_len, &ssl->out_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "output buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + out_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + if( modified ) + { + /* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */ + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + /* Fields below might not be properly updated with record + * splitting or with CID, so they are manually updated here. */ + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_buf + len_offset_out; + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_buf + iv_offset_out; + + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + written_in; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_buf + len_offset_in; + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_buf + iv_offset_in; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t* derivation, + psa_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char* seed, size_t seed_length, + const unsigned char* label, size_t label_length, + size_t capacity ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup( derivation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + seed, seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + NULL, 0 ); + } + else + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key ); + } + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + label, label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( derivation, capacity ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to + * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But + * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, + * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". + * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, + * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands + * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ + if( slen != 0 ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, + master_key, alg, + random, rlen, + (unsigned char const *) label, + (size_t) strlen( label ), + dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, dstbuf, dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( master_key ) ) + status = psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + size_t nb; + size_t i, j, k, md_len; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + tmp_len = md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len ); + if( tmp == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + nb = strlen( label ); + memcpy( tmp + md_len, label, nb ); + memcpy( tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen ); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] + */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, secret, slen ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + + for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len ) + { + mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); + + mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + + k = ( i + md_len > dlen ) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; + + for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); + + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static int tls_prf_sha256( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +static int tls_prf_sha384( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char *, int ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type( mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384 ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 ); + } + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; + + switch( prf ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( tls_prf( secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} + +/* Type for the TLS PRF */ +typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, + unsigned char *, size_t); + +/* + * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other + * necessary information. + * + * Parameters: + * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate + * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() + * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() + * - [in] ciphersuite + * - [in] master + * - [in] encrypt_then_mac + * - [in] trunc_hmac + * - [in] compression + * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation + * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random + * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version + * - [in] endpoint: client or server + * - [in] ssl: optionally used for: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys + * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg + */ +static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + int minor_ver, + unsigned endpoint, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int psa_fallthrough; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char keyblk[256]; + unsigned char *key1; + unsigned char *key2; + unsigned char *mac_enc; + unsigned char *mac_dec; + size_t mac_key_len = 0; + size_t iv_copy_len; + unsigned keylen; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + /* + * Some data just needs copying into the structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + transform->minor_ver = minor_ver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + memcpy( transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof( transform->randbytes ) ); +#endif + + /* + * Get various info structures + */ + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite ); + if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID + * extension has been negotiated. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" ) ); + + transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, + transform->in_cid_len ); + + transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, + transform->out_cid_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Compute key block using the PRF + */ + ret = tls_prf( master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite = %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ciphersuite ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", master, 48 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "key block", keyblk, 256 ); + + /* + * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. + */ + + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + size_t explicit_ivlen; + + transform->maclen = 0; + mac_key_len = 0; + transform->taglen = + ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + + /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary + * with mode and version: + * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes + * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) + * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's + * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record + * sequence number). + */ + transform->ivlen = 12; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + else + transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } + + /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ + explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; + transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + transform->maclen = mac_key_len; + + /* IV length */ + transform->ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size; + + /* Minimum length */ + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + transform->minlen = transform->maclen; + else + { + /* + * GenericBlockCipher: + * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC + * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen + * 2. IV except for TLS 1.0 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + cipher_info->block_size; + } + else +#endif + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + cipher_info->block_size + - transform->maclen % cipher_info->block_size; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", + (unsigned) keylen, + (unsigned) transform->minlen, + (unsigned) transform->ivlen, + (unsigned) transform->maclen ) ); + + /* + * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + + mac_enc = keyblk; + mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; + + /* + * This is not used in TLS v1.1. + */ + iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + + mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; + mac_dec = keyblk; + + /* + * This is not used in TLS v1.1. + */ + iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. + For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ + if( mac_key_len != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len ); + mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + ((void) mac_dec); + ((void) mac_enc); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( ssl->f_export_keys != NULL ) + { + ssl->f_export_keys( ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET, + master, 48, + randbytes + 32, + randbytes, + tls_prf_get_type( tls_prf ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } + } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if( psa_fallthrough == 1 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } + } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if( psa_fallthrough == 1 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, + cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, + cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + +end: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS1.2 functions + * + * Inputs: + * - SSL/TLS minor version + * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) + * + * Outputs: + * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure + */ +static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + int minor_ver, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + (void) hash; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + } + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compute master secret if needed + * + * Parameters: + * [in/out] handshake + * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf + * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque + * [out] premaster (cleared) + * [out] master + * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK + * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg + * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + session_negotiate) + * PSA-PSA: minor_ver, conf + */ +static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + unsigned char *master, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: + * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + unsigned char session_hash[48]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + + /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. + * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" + * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension + * is used. */ + char const *lbl = "master secret"; + + /* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion. + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, + * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random + * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, + * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. + * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ + unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes; + size_t salt_len = 64; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + if( handshake->resume != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED ) + { + lbl = "extended master secret"; + salt = session_hash; + handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash, &salt_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash for extended master secret", + session_hash, salt_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t psk; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion" ) ); + + psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( ssl ); + + if( hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, psk, alg, + salt, salt_len, + (unsigned char const *) lbl, + (size_t) strlen( lbl ), + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, + lbl, salt, salt_len, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster, + sizeof(handshake->premaster) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) ); + + /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ + ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs( ssl->handshake, + ssl->minor_ver, + ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Compute master secret if needed */ + ret = ssl_compute_master( ssl->handshake, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compute_master", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Swap the client and server random values: + * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) + * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ + { + unsigned char tmp[64]; + memcpy( tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + } + + /* Populate transform structure */ + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform_negotiate, + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + ssl->handshake->tls_prf, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, + ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_populate_transform", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->randbytes ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= derive keys" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha256" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 32; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha256" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); + mbedtls_sha256_finish( &sha256, hash ); + + *hlen = 32; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha384" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 48; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; + + mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha384" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); + mbedtls_sha512_finish( &sha512, hash ); + + *hlen = 48; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ) +{ + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *end = p + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ); + const unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ) + { + /* + * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always + * checked before calling this function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * PMS = struct { + * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) + { + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len >> 8 ); + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len ); + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( p, 0, psk_len ); + p += psk_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { + /* + * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, + * and is 48 bytes long + */ + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 48; + p += 48; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( len ); + p += len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t zlen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, + p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( zlen >> 8 ); + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( zlen ); + p += zlen; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len >> 8 ); + *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len ); + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( p, psk, psk_len ); + p += psk_len; + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = p - ssl->handshake->premaster; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max + * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0 ) + { + uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; + unsigned char doublings = 1; + + while( ratio != 0 ) + { + ++doublings; + ratio >>= 1; + } + + if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "no longer retransmitting hello request" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + + return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_clear_peer_cert( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert_digest ); + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; + session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Handshake functions + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, n; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + if( ssl->client_auth == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen because we shouldn't have picked the + * ciphersuite if we don't have a certificate. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) ); + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 6 length of all certs + * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 + * 10 . n-1 peer certificate + * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 + * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. + */ + i = 7; + crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ); + + while( crt != NULL ) + { + n = crt->raw.len; + if( n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl->out_msg[i ] = (unsigned char)( n >> 16 ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = (unsigned char)( n ); + + i += 3; memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n ); + i += n; crt = crt->next; + } + + ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) >> 16 ); + ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) >> 8 ); + ssl->out_msg[6] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) ); + + ssl->out_msglen = i; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + + if( peer_crt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len ) ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; + mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( peer_cert_digest_type ); + unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; + size_t digest_len; + + if( peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info ); + if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN ) + return( -1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and + * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller + */ +static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + int crt_cnt=0; +#endif + size_t i, n; + uint8_t alert; + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + 3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + /* + * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() + */ + n = ( ssl->in_msg[i+1] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+2]; + + if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || + ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ + i += 3; + + /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ + while( i < ssl->in_hslen ) + { + /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ + if ( i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ + if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ + n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 ) + | (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2]; + i += 3; + + if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( crt_cnt++ == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's + * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, + * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse + * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) ); + if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl, + &ssl->in_msg[i], + n ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#else + /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse + * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + switch( ret ) + { + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + i += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", chain ); + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* Check if a certificate message is expected. + * Return either + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP + * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 +static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + } + } +#else + ((void) authmode); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED ); +} + +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int have_ca_chain = 0; + + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->f_vrfy != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use context-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use configuration-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + ((void) rs_ctx); + have_ca_chain = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" ) ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( + chain, + ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) + { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } + else +#endif + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + if( ca_chain != NULL ) + have_ca_chain = 1; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( + chain, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ); +#endif + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + { + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; + + /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) && + mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( chain, + ciphersuite_info, + ! ssl->conf->endpoint, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE ) ) + { + ret = 0; + } + + if( have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + uint8_t alert; + + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; + else + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ); + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE ), + start, len, + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; + + return( ret ); +} + +static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned char *end = start + len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &start, end, + &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int crt_expected; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET + ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode + : ssl->conf->authmode; +#else + const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; +#endif + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); + + crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( ssl, authmode ); + if( crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify ) + { + chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; + goto crt_verify; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + + if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to + * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + chain = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( chain == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( chain ); + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl, chain ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; + +crt_verify: + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; +#endif + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, authmode, + chain, rs_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + { + unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; + size_t crt_len, pk_len; + + /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so + * these pointers point into the input buffer, + * and are hence still valid after freeing the + * CRT chain. */ + + crt_start = chain->raw.p; + crt_len = chain->raw.len; + + pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; + pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; + + /* Free the CRT structures before computing + * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + chain = NULL; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( ssl, crt_start, crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( ssl, pk_start, pk_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) ); + +exit: + + if( ret == 0 ) + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; + } +#endif + + if( chain != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ) +{ + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); +#endif +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); +#endif +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + unsigned char padbuf[32]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha256" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32 ); +#else + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha256" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); + + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha2 state", (unsigned char *) + sha256.state, sizeof( sha256.state ) ); +#endif + + mbedtls_sha256_finish( &sha256, padbuf ); + mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 32, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + unsigned char padbuf[48]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha384" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha384" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); + + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *) + sha512.state, sizeof( sha512.state ) ); +#endif + mbedtls_sha512_finish( &sha512, padbuf ); + + mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); +#endif + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 48, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); + + /* + * Free our handshake params + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + + /* + * Free the previous transform and swith in the current one + */ + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + } + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + } +#endif + + /* + * Free the previous session and switch in the current one + */ + if( ssl->session ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + /* + * Add cache entry + */ + if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && + ssl->session->id_len != 0 && + resume == 0 ) + { + if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, + ssl->session->id, + ssl->session->id_len, + ssl->session ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cache did not store session" ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->flight != NULL ) + { + /* Cancel handshake timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: + * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip freeing handshake and transform" ) ); + } + else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup" ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, hash_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); + + ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint ); + + /* + * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites + * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined + * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has + * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. + */ + hash_len = 12; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy( ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len ); +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; + + /* + * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server + * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; +#endif + } + else + ssl->state++; + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for outbound data" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + unsigned char i; + + /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + + /* Set sequence_number to zero */ + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, 0, 6 ); + + /* Increment epoch */ + for( i = 2; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, 8 ); + + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write finished" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int hash_len; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse finished" ) ); + + ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + hash_len = 12; + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + hash_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); + } + + if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), + buf, hash_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy( ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len ); +#endif + + if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; +#endif + } + else + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse finished" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake ) +{ + memset( handshake, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_init( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); + mbedtls_sha256_starts( &handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_init( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); + mbedtls_sha512_starts( &handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( &handshake->hash_algs ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_init( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_init( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ + memset( transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + memset( session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); +} + +static int ssl_handshake_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Clear old handshake information if present */ + if( ssl->transform_negotiate ) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + if( ssl->session_negotiate ) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + if( ssl->handshake ) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + + /* + * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. + * Now allocate missing structures. + */ + if( ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL ) + { + ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); + } + + if( ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params) ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ + + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); +#endif + + /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || + ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed" ) ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + ssl->handshake = NULL; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + /* Initialize structures */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( ssl->session_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + ssl_handshake_params_init( ssl->handshake ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ +static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy( void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) p); + ((void) end); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) cookie); + ((void) cookie_len); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Initialize an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + memset( ssl, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + + ssl->conf = conf; + + /* + * Prepare base structures + */ + + /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_buf_len ); + if( ssl->in_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, out_buf_len ); + if( ssl->out_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + memset( &ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info) ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + goto error; + + return( 0 ); + +error: + mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); + + ssl->conf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = 0; + ssl->out_buf_len = 0; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + + ssl->in_hdr = NULL; + ssl->in_ctr = NULL; + ssl->in_len = NULL; + ssl->in_iv = NULL; + ssl->in_msg = NULL; + + ssl->out_hdr = NULL; + ssl->out_ctr = NULL; + ssl->out_len = NULL; + ssl->out_iv = NULL; + ssl->out_msg = NULL; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + * + * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. + * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + ((void) partial); +#endif + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + + /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + + ssl->verify_data_len = 0; + memset( ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); + memset( ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + + ssl->in_msgtype = 0; + ssl->in_msglen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_epoch = 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); +#endif + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + + ssl->out_msgtype = 0; + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + ssl->out_left = 0; + + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) ); + + ssl->transform_in = NULL; + ssl->transform_out = NULL; + + ssl->session_in = NULL; + ssl->session_out = NULL; + + memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( partial == 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + ssl->in_left = 0; + memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len ); + } + + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + ssl->transform = NULL; + } + + if( ssl->session ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + ssl->session = NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + if( partial == 0 ) +#endif + { + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); + ssl->cli_id = NULL; + ssl->cli_id_len = 0; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * SSL set accessors + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint ) +{ + conf->endpoint = endpoint; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport ) +{ + conf->transport = transport; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ) +{ + conf->anti_replay = mode; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ) +{ + conf->badmac_limit = limit; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing ) +{ + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint32_t min, uint32_t max ) +{ + conf->hs_timeout_min = min; + conf->hs_timeout_max = max; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ) +{ + conf->authmode = authmode; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + conf->f_rng = f_rng; + conf->p_rng = p_rng; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg ) +{ + conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; + conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ) +{ + ssl->p_bio = p_bio; + ssl->f_send = f_send; + ssl->f_recv = f_recv; + ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ) +{ + ssl->mtu = mtu; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + conf->read_timeout = timeout; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer ) +{ + ssl->p_timer = p_timer; + ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; + ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; + + /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache ) +{ + conf->p_cache = p_cache; + conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; + conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || + session == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, + session ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites ) +{ + conf->ciphersuite_list = ciphersuites; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) +{ + conf->cert_profile = profile; +} + +/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ +static int ssl_append_key_cert( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; + + new_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert ) ); + if( new_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + new_cert->cert = cert; + new_cert->key = key; + new_cert->next = NULL; + + /* Update head is the list was null, else add to the end */ + if( *head == NULL ) + { + *head = new_cert; + } + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; + while( cur->next != NULL ) + cur = cur->next; + cur->next = new_cert; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) +{ + return( ssl_append_key_cert( &conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) +{ + conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; + conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; + conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb ) +{ + conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; + conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; + + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->ca_chain = NULL; + conf->ca_crl = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) +{ + return( ssl_append_key_cert( &ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, + own_cert, pk_key ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +/* + * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + else + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + + return( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + pw, pw_len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + +static int ssl_conf_psk_is_configured( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( !mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( conf->psk != NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void ssl_conf_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + { + /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + /* This and the following branch should never + * be taken simultaenously as we maintain the + * invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never + * configured simultaneously. As a safeguard, + * though, `else` is omitted here. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( conf->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); + + mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ + if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +} + +/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. + * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts + * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. + * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ +static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned char const *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ + if( psk_identity == NULL || + ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 || + psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ); + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; + memcpy( conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if( ssl_conf_psk_is_configured( conf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* Check and set raw PSK */ + if( psk == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( psk_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + conf->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len ); + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void ssl_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + { + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk, + ssl->handshake->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk ); + ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; + } +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ) +{ + if( psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); + + if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + psa_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if( ssl_conf_psk_is_configured( conf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* Check and set opaque PSK */ + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + conf->psk_opaque = psk; + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, + psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_key_id_t psk ) +{ + if( ( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) || + ( ssl->handshake == NULL ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk ) +{ + conf->f_psk = f_psk; + conf->p_psk = p_psk; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value( dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, + &conf->dhm_P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value( dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, + &conf->dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/* + * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen ) +{ + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes ) +{ + conf->sig_hashes = hashes; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Set the allowed elliptic curves + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list ) +{ + conf->curve_list = curve_list; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname ) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; + + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if( hostname != NULL ) + { + hostname_len = strlen( hostname ); + + if( hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ + + if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); + } + + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ + + if( hostname == NULL ) + { + ssl->hostname = NULL; + } + else + { + ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc( 1, hostname_len + 1 ); + if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len ); + + ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, + const unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_sni ) +{ + conf->f_sni = f_sni; + conf->p_sni = p_sni; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos ) +{ + size_t cur_len, tot_len; + const char **p; + + /* + * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings + * MUST NOT be truncated." + * We check lengths now rather than later. + */ + tot_len = 0; + for( p = protos; *p != NULL; p++ ) + { + cur_len = strlen( *p ); + tot_len += cur_len; + + if( ( cur_len == 0 ) || + ( cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN ) || + ( tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->alpn_list = protos; + + return( 0 ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( ssl->alpn_chosen ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value ) +{ + conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len ) +{ + if( mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len ); + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; + size_t list_size = 0; + + /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, + * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ + for( p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && + list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; + p++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( *p ) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + list_size++; + } + else + { + /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ + list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + } + } + + if( list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH ) + { + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ) +{ + dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ + if( dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; + } + else + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + memcpy( dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) +{ + conf->max_major_ver = major; + conf->max_minor_ver = minor; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) +{ + conf->min_major_ver = major; + conf->min_minor_ver = minor; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list ) +{ + conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ) +{ + conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ) +{ + conf->extended_ms = ems; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ) +{ + if( mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( mfl_code ) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy ) +{ + conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation ) +{ + conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records ) +{ + conf->renego_max_records = max_records; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8] ) +{ + memcpy( conf->renego_period, period, 8 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets ) +{ + conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket ) +{ + conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; + conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; + conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys ) +{ + ssl->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; + ssl->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *async_config_data ) +{ + conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; + conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; + conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; + conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; + conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + return( conf->p_async_config_data ); +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + else + return( ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->session != NULL ) + return( ssl->session->verify_result ); + + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) + return( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ); + + return( 0xFFFFFFFF ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session->ciphersuite ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + switch( ssl->minor_ver ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: + return( "DTLSv1.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: + return( "DTLSv1.2" ); + + default: + return( "unknown (DTLS)" ); + } + } +#endif + + switch( ssl->minor_ver ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1: + return( "TLSv1.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: + return( "TLSv1.1" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: + return( "TLSv1.2" ); + + default: + return( "unknown" ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t read_mfl; + + /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) + { + return ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); + } + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_out != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + // During a handshake, use the value being negotiated + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + return( max_len ); +} + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len; + + /* + * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set + */ + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_out != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ) < max_len ) + { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); + } + + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ) < max_len ) + { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); + } + + return( max_len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) ) + return ( 0 ); + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0 ) + return( ssl->mtu ); + + if( ssl->mtu == 0 ) + return( ssl->handshake->mtu ); + + return( ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? + ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + (void) ssl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); + const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); + const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mtu <= overhead ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "MTU too low for record expansion" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( max_len > mtu - overhead ) + max_len = mtu - overhead; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + return( (int) max_len ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + (void) ssl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; +#endif + + return( (int) max_len ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + return( ssl->session->peer_cert ); +#else + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *dst ) +{ + int ret; + + if( ssl == NULL || + dst == NULL || + ssl->session == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Since Mbed TLS 3.0, mbedtls_ssl_get_session() is no longer + * idempotent: Each session can only be exported once. + * + * (This is in preparation for TLS 1.3 support where we will + * need the ability to export multiple sessions (aka tickets), + * which will be achieved by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + * multiple times until it fails.) + * + * Check whether we have already exported the current session, + * and fail if so. + */ + if( ssl->session->exported == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Remember that we've exported the session. */ + ssl->session->exported = 1; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version + * and structure of the ticket. + */ + +/* + * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing + * structure of serialized SSL sessions. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint16_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT ) ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 8 ) & 0xFF, + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 0 ) & 0xFF, +}; + +/* + * Serialize a session in the following format: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque session_format[2]; // version-specific 16-bit field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep + * these version+format bytes. + * + * // In this version, `session_format` determines + * // the setting of those compile-time + * // configuration options which influence + * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. + * uint64 start_time; + * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard + * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * + * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except + * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come + * together in one block. + */ +static int ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Add version identifier + */ + + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + used += 8; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + start = (uint64_t) session->start; + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 56 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 48 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 40 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 32 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start ) & 0xFF ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + used += 2 /* ciphersuite */ + + 1 /* compression */ + + 1 /* id_len */ + + sizeof( session->id ) + + sizeof( session->master ) + + 4; /* verify_result */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ciphersuite >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ciphersuite ) & 0xFF ); + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( session->compression & 0xFF ); + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( session->id_len & 0xFF ); + memcpy( p, session->id, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( p, session->master, 48 ); + p += 48; + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result ) & 0xFF ); + } + + /* + * Peer's end-entity certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + cert_len = 0; + else + cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + + used += 3 + cert_len; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len ) & 0xFF ); + + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len ); + p += cert_len; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert_digest, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } + } + else + { + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *p++ = 0; + } + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_len ) & 0xFF ); + + if( session->ticket != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime ) & 0xFF ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = session->mfl_code; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->encrypt_then_mac ) & 0xFF ); +#endif + + /* Done */ + *olen = used; + + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + return( ssl_session_save( session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen ) ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + */ +static int ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( 8 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + start = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + session->start = (time_t) start; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + if( 2 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ciphersuite = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; + + session->compression = *p++; + + session->id_len = *p++; + memcpy( session->id, p, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( session->master, p, 48 ); + p += 48; + + session->verify_result = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + + /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case + * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + session->peer_cert = NULL; +#else + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + session->ticket = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Peer certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( cert_len != 0 ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert, + p, cert_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + + p += cert_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 2 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( session->peer_cert_digest_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->peer_cert_digest, p, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket and associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( session->ticket_len != 0 ) + { + if( session->ticket_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->ticket_len ); + if( session->ticket == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + if( 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_lifetime = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->mfl_code = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; +#endif + + /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = ssl_session_load( session, 0, buf, len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( ssl ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( ssl ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Sanity checks */ + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "You must use " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> handshake" ) ); + + /* Main handshake loop */ + while( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( ssl ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + break; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= handshake" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server + */ +static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello request" ) ); + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: + * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), + * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), + * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after + * the initial handshake is completed. + * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue + * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> renegotiate" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and + * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; + else + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; + } +#endif + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= renegotiate" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Renegotiate current connection on client, + * or request renegotiation on server + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* On server, just send the request */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + + /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + + return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /* + * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, + * if already in progress, continue the handshake + */ + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_key_cert_free( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if( handshake == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + ssl->conf->f_async_cancel( ssl ); + handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_free( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_free( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_free( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecjpake_cache ); + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ + mbedtls_free( (void *) handshake->curves ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->psk ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* + * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves + * since the belong to the SNI callback + */ + if( handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); + if( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_free( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie ); + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight ); + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake, + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS + * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have + * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not + * empty at this stage */ + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( ssl ), + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( ssl ) ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + if( session == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_clear_peer_cert( session ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( session->ticket ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint32_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT ) | \ + 0u ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 8 ) & 0xFF, + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 0 ) & 0xFF, + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 16 ) & 0xFF, + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 8 ) & 0xFF, + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 0 ) & 0xFF, +}; + +/* + * Serialize a full SSL context + * + * The format of the serialized data is: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * // header + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these + * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * + * // session sub-structure + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not + * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * + * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) + * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) + * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) + * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) + * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t session_len; + int ret = 0; + + /* + * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in + * this function's documentation. + * + * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of + * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away + * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. + */ + /* The initial handshake must be over */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Initial handshake isn't over" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Handshake isn't completed" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ + if( ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Serialised structures aren't ready" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending incoming data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending outgoing data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Protocol must be DLTS, not TLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only DTLS is supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Version must be 1.2 */ + if( ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( ssl->transform ) != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only AEAD ciphersuites supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Renegotiation must not be enabled" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif + + /* + * Version and format identifier + */ + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + } + + /* + * Session (length + data) + */ + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + return( ret ); + + used += 4 + session_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len ) & 0xFF ); + + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, + p, session_len, &session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += session_len; + } + + /* + * Transform + */ + used += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + used += 2 + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ + used += 4; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen ) & 0xFF ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + used += 16; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 56 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 48 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 40 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 32 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top ) & 0xFF ); + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 56 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 48 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 40 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 32 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window ) & 0xFF ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 1; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + used += 8; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + p += 8; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->mtu >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->mtu ) & 0xFF ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen + ? (uint8_t) strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ) + : 0; + + used += 1 + alpn_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = alpn_len; + + if( ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len ); + p += alpn_len; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Done + */ + *olen = used; + + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "saved context", buf, used ); + + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite + * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) + */ +typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( int ciphersuite_id ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id ); + + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + return( tls_prf_sha384 ); +#else + (void) ciphersuite_id; +#endif + return( tls_prf_sha256 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error. + */ +static int ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t session_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. + * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. + * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're + * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) + */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->session != NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at + * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->conf->max_major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_major_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || +#endif + 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "context to load", buf, len ); + + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + + /* + * Session + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session_len = ( (size_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (size_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < session_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ssl_session_load( ssl->session, 1, p, session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + return( ret ); + } + + p += session_len; + + /* + * Transform + */ + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform, + ssl->session->ciphersuite, + ssl->session->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( ssl->session->ciphersuite ), + p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Read connection IDs and store them */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->badmac_seen = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->in_window_top = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + ssl->in_window = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8 ); + p += 8; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->mtu = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + uint8_t alpn_len; + const char **cur; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + alpn_len = *p++; + + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL ) + { + /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + { + if( strlen( *cur ) == alpn_len && + memcmp( p, cur, alpn_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; + break; + } + } + } + + /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * + * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and + * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. + */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + + ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + ssl->minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + + /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to + * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->in_epoch = 1; +#endif + + /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, + * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform + * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() + * inappropriately. */ + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + } + + /* + * Done - should have consumed entire buffer + */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *context, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = ssl_context_load( context, buf, len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_free( context ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +/* + * Free an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> free" ) ); + + if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + } + + if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + } + + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + } + + if( ssl->session ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= free" ) ); + + /* Actually clear after last debug message */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Initialze mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in + * x509_crt.c. Here, the order matters. Currently we favor stronger hashes, + * for no fundamental reason. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise + * about this list. */ +static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, +#endif + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in + * x509_crt.c, plus Montgomery curves for ECDHE. Here, the order matters: + * curves with a lower resource usage come first. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise + * about this list. + */ +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_default_curves[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE +}; +#endif + +static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + 0 +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE +}; +#endif + +/* + * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + + /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, + * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( conf, endpoint ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( conf, transport ); + + /* + * Things that are common to all presets + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; +#endif + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; + conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; + conf->respect_cli_pref = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; + conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; + memset( conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2 ); + memset( conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + const unsigned char dhm_p[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; + const unsigned char dhm_g[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( conf, + dhm_p, sizeof( dhm_p ), + dhm_g, sizeof( dhm_g ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Preset-specific defaults + */ + switch( preset ) + { + /* + * NSA Suite B + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: + conf->min_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; /* TLS 1.2 */ + conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + + conf->ciphersuite_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_curves; +#endif + break; + + /* + * Default + */ + default: + conf->min_major_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION > + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION : + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->min_minor_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION > + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION : + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION; + conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; +#endif + conf->ciphersuite_list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_default_curves; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; +#endif + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( conf->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); + mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_key_cert_free( conf->key_cert ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) ) +/* + * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + switch( type ) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); + } +} + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ) +{ + switch( sig ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( set->rsa ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( set->ecdsa ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + } +} + +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + if( set->rsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->rsa = md_alg; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + if( set->ecdsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->ecdsa = md_alg; + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + set->rsa = md_alg; + set->ecdsa = md_alg; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ) +{ + switch( hash ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + } +} + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ) +{ + switch( md ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; + + if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) + if( *gid == grp_id ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_md_type_t md ) +{ + const int *cur; + + if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + for( cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++ ) + if( *cur == (int) md ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int usage = 0; + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; + + if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + /* Server part of the key exchange */ + switch( ciphersuite->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + break; + + /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + usage = 0; + } + } + else + { + /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + } + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( cert, usage ) != 0 ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ); + } + else + { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ); + } + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( cert, ext_oid, ext_len ) != 0 ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return( -1 ); + + switch( md ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + break; +#endif + default: + return( -1 ); + } + + return 0; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + (void) ssl; + (void) md; + + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + + if( ( status = psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, + hash_alg ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_setup", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, ssl->handshake->randbytes, + 64 ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, + data, data_len ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE, + hashlen ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_finish", status ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#else + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque client_random[32]; + * opaque server_random[32]; + * ServerDHParams params; + * }; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_starts", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f1c8a12d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,702 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + .name = string, + +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = +{ + /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one + * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; + +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +/* + * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows: + * + * struct HkdfLabel { + * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material + * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 " + * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash + * }; + * + * Parameters: + * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material + * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to + * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than + * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most + * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by + * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. + * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix + * The label length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 + * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). + * - (ctx, clen): context + context length + * The context length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, + * This MUST be a writable buffer of size + * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. + * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of + * the HkdfLabel structure on success. + */ + +static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( label_len, context_len ) \ + ( 2 /* expansion length */ \ + + 1 /* label length */ \ + + label_len \ + + 1 /* context length */ \ + + context_len ) + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + +static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( + size_t desired_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen ) +{ + size_t total_label_len = + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen; + size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( total_label_len, clen ); + + unsigned char *p = dst; + + /* Add the size of the expanded key material. + * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use + * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 +#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ + value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" +#endif + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( desired_length >> 0 ) & 0xFF ); + + /* Add label incl. prefix */ + *p++ = (unsigned char)( total_label_len & 0xFF ); + memcpy( p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) ); + p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix); + memcpy( p, label, llen ); + p += llen; + + /* Add context value */ + *p++ = (unsigned char)( clen & 0xFF ); + if( clen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, ctx, clen ); + + /* Return total length to the caller. */ + *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ]; + size_t hkdf_label_len; + + if( llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN ) + { + /* Should never happen since this is an internal + * function, and we know statically which labels + * are allowed. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( blen, + label, llen, + ctx, clen, + hkdf_label, + &hkdf_label_len ); + + return( mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, + secret, slen, + hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len, + buf, blen ) ); +} + +/* + * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs: + * + * - One secret value per sender. + * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated + * - The desired lengths of key and IV. + * + * The expansion itself is based on HKDF: + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length ) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length ) + * + * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided + * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side + * keys in a single function call. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + keys->key_len = key_len; + keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char hashed_context[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md( md, ctx, clen, hashed_context ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + clen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + } + else + { + if( clen > sizeof(hashed_context) ) + { + /* This should never happen since this function is internal + * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. + * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk + * of getting a stack overflow. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( hashed_context, ctx, clen ); + } + + return( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + secret, slen, + label, llen, + hashed_context, clen, + dstbuf, buflen ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t hlen, ilen; + unsigned char tmp_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + unsigned char tmp_input [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") + * on the old secret. */ + if( secret_old != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + secret_old, hlen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( derived ), + NULL, 0, /* context */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + tmp_secret, hlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + + if( input != NULL ) + { + memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len ); + ilen = input_len; + } + else + { + ilen = hlen; + } + + /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material. + * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material + * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */ + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, + tmp_secret, hlen, + tmp_input, ilen, + secret_new ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = 0; + + cleanup: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_early_secrets( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_early_secrets *derived ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if( md_info == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * | = early_exporter_master_secret + * v + */ + + /* Create client_early_traffic_secret */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + early_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( c_e_traffic ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_early_traffic_secret, + md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Create early exporter */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + early_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( e_exp_master ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->early_exporter_master_secret, + md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_handshake_secrets( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_handshake_secrets *derived ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if( md_info == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + /* + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * + */ + + /* + * Compute client_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + handshake_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( c_hs_traffic ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Compute server_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + handshake_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( s_hs_traffic ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_application_secrets( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets *derived ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if( md_info == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + /* Generate {client,server}_application_traffic_secret_0 + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * | ClientHello...server Finished) + * | = exporter_master_secret + * + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + application_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( c_ap_traffic ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + application_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( s_ap_traffic ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + application_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( exp_master ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->exporter_master_secret, + md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Generate resumption_master_secret for use with the ticket exchange. + * + * This is not integrated with mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_application_secrets() + * because it uses the transcript hash up to and including ClientFinished. */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_resumption_master_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets *derived ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if( md_info == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + application_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( res_master ), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->resumption_master_secret, + md_size ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_tls1_3_calc_finished_core( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *base_key, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *dst ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t* const md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + unsigned char finished_key[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret; + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if( md_info == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + /* TLS 1.3 Finished message + * + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + * + * verify_data = + * HMAC( finished_key, + * Hash( Handshake Context + + * Certificate* + + * CertificateVerify* ) + * ) + * + * finished_key = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + md_type, base_key, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( finished ), + NULL, 0, + finished_key, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( md_info, finished_key, md_size, transcript, md_size, dst ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( finished_key, sizeof( finished_key ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_create_psk_binder( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result ) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_secret[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_info_t const *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if( md_info == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") + * | = binder_key + * v + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( md_type, + NULL, /* Old secret */ + psk, psk_len, /* Input */ + early_secret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( psk_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + early_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( res_binder ), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, md_size ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "Derive Early Secret with 'res binder'" ) ); + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( md_type, + early_secret, md_size, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( ext_binder ), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, md_size ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "Derive Early Secret with 'ext binder'" ) ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * The binding_value is computed in the same way as the Finished message + * but with the BaseKey being the binder_key. + */ + + ret = ssl_tls1_3_calc_finished_core( md_type, binder_key, transcript, result ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "psk binder", result, md_size ); + +exit: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( early_secret, sizeof( early_secret ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( binder_key, sizeof( binder_key ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b96998a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h @@ -0,0 +1,501 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H + +/* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at + * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union + * below. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( finished , "finished" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( resumption , "resumption" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( traffic_upd , "traffic upd" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exporter , "exporter" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( key , "key" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( iv , "iv" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_hs_traffic, "c hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_ap_traffic, "c ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_e_traffic , "c e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_hs_traffic, "s hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_ap_traffic, "s ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_e_traffic , "s e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( e_exp_master, "e exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_master , "res master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exp_master , "exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( ext_binder , "ext binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_binder , "res binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( derived , "derived" ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + const unsigned char name [ sizeof(string) - 1 ]; + +union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels; + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( LABEL ) \ + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL, \ + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN \ + sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union ) + +/* The maximum length of HKDF contexts used in the TLS 1.3 standard. + * Since contexts are always hashes of message transcripts, this can + * be approximated from above by the maximum hash size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN \ + MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char binder_key [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_early_secrets; + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_handshake_secrets; + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + unsigned char exporter_master_secret [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + unsigned char resumption_master_secret [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets; + +/* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated + * by HKDF-Expand-Label. + * + * Warning: If this ever needs to be increased, the implementation + * ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be + * adjusted since it currently assumes that HKDF key expansion + * is never used with more than 255 Bytes of output. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN 255 + +/** + * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from + * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = + * HKDF-Expand( Secret, HkdfLabel, Length ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p clen Bytes. + * \param clen The length of \p context in Bytes. + * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function is part of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * It extracts key and IV for the actual client/server traffic + * from the client/server traffic secrets. + * + * From RFC 8446: + * + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "key", "", key_length) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "iv", "", iv_length)* + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to be used + * for the HKDF-based expansion of the secret. + * \param client_secret The client traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param server_secret The server traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param slen Length of the secrets \p client_secret and + * \p server_secret in Bytes. + * \param key_len The desired length of the key to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param iv_len The desired length of the IV to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param keys The address of the structure holding the generated + * keys and IVs. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ); + + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 + +/** + * \brief The \c Derive-Secret function from the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * Derive-Secret( Secret, Label, Messages ) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, + * Hash( Messages ), + * Hash.Length ) ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The hash of the \c Messages argument to the + * \c Derive-Secret function, or the \c Messages argument + * itself, depending on \p context_already_hashed. + * \param clen The length of \p hash. + * \param ctx_hashed This indicates whether the \p ctx contains the hash of + * the \c Messages argument in the application of the + * \c Derive-Secret function + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED), or whether + * it is the content of \c Messages itself, in which case + * the function takes care of the hashing + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED). + * \param dstbuf The target buffer to write the output of + * \c Derive-Secret to. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 early data key material from early secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels. + * + * + * Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * . = early_exporter_master_secret + * . + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the early data traffic, + * the client secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \note The binder key, which is also generated from the early secret, + * is omitted here. Its calculation is part of the separate routine + * mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_create_psk_binder(). + * + * \param md_type The hash algorithm associated with the PSK for which + * early data key material is being derived. + * \param early_secret The early secret from which the early data key material + * should be derived. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated with + * respect to \p md_type. This must be a readable buffer + * whose length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to store + * the early data key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_early_secrets( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_early_secrets *derived ); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 handshake key material from the handshake secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * . ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * . = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the encrypted handshake traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param md_type The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param handshake_secret The handshake secret from which the handshake key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated + * with respect to \p md_type. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the handshake key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_handshake_secrets( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_handshake_secrets *derived ); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 application key material from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * . ClientHello...server Finished) + * . = exporter_master_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the (0-th) application traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param md_type The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param master_secret The master secret from which the application key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ServerFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p md_type. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_type. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the application key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_application_secrets( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *master_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets *derived ); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 resumption master secret from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * \param md_type The hash algorithm used in the application for which + * key material is being derived. + * \param application_secret The application secret from which the resumption master + * secret should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ClientFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p md_type. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_type. + * \param transcript_len The length of \p transcript in Bytes. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the resumption master secret. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_resumption_master_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets *derived ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the next secret in the TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule proceeds as follows to compute + * the three main secrets during the handshake: The early + * secret for early data, the handshake secret for all + * other encrypted handshake messages, and the master + * secret for all application traffic. + * + * + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret + * + * + * Each of the three secrets in turn is the basis for further + * key derivations, such as the derivation of traffic keys and IVs; + * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * This function implements one step in this evolution of secrets: + * + * + * old_secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * input -> HKDF-Extract = new_secret + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret_old The address of the buffer holding the old secret + * on function entry. If not \c NULL, this must be a + * readable buffer whose size matches the output size + * of the hash function represented by \p hash_alg. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input The address of the buffer holding the additional + * input for the key derivation (e.g., the PSK or the + * ephemeral (EC)DH secret). If not \c NULL, this must be + * a readable buffer whose size \p input_len Bytes. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input_len The length of \p input in Bytes. + * \param secret_new The address of the buffer holding the new secret + * on function exit. This must be a writable buffer + * whose size matches the output size of the hash + * function represented by \p hash_alg. + * This may be the same as \p secret_old. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ); + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION 1 + +/** + * \brief Calculate a TLS 1.3 PSK binder. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context. This is used for debugging only and may + * be \c NULL if MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is disabled. + * \param md_type The hash algorithm associated to the PSK \p psk. + * \param psk The buffer holding the PSK for which to create a binder. + * \param psk_len The size of \p psk in bytes. + * \param psk_type This indicates whether the PSK \p psk is externally + * provisioned (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL) or a + * resumption PSK (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION). + * \param transcript The handshake transcript up to the point where the + * PSK binder calculation happens. This must be readable, + * and its size must be equal to the digest size of + * the hash algorithm represented by \p md_type. + * \param result The address at which to store the PSK binder on success. + * This must be writable, and its size must be equal to the + * digest size of the hash algorithm represented by + * \p md_type. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_create_psk_binder( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/threading.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/threading.c similarity index 62% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/threading.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/threading.c index 7a32e672..bae6644f 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/threading.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/threading.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Threading abstraction layer * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,26 +15,64 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L #endif +#include "common.h" + #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) + +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__))) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + +#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ + +#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) +#define THREADING_USE_GMTIME +#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) static void threading_mutex_init_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) { if( mutex == NULL ) return; + /* A nonzero value of is_valid indicates a successfully initialized + * mutex. This is a workaround for not being able to return an error + * code for this function. The lock/unlock functions return an error + * if is_valid is nonzero. The Mbed TLS unit test code uses this field + * to distinguish more states of the mutex; see + * tests/src/threading_helpers for details. */ mutex->is_valid = pthread_mutex_init( &mutex->mutex, NULL ) == 0; } @@ -114,6 +152,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ); #endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ); +#endif } /* @@ -124,6 +165,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ); #endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ); +#endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ @@ -136,5 +180,8 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT; #endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/timing.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/timing.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8a02c00d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/timing.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Portable interface to the CPU cycle counter + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in mbedtls_config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#include +#include + +struct _hr_time +{ + LARGE_INTEGER start; +}; + +#else + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +struct _hr_time +{ + struct timeval start; +}; + +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/** + * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds + * + * \warning May change without notice + * + * \param val points to a timer structure + * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. + * + * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When + * restarting, this is always 0. + * + * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. + * + * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not + * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence + * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = + * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately + * the delay since the first reset. + */ +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) +{ + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if( reset ) + { + QueryPerformanceCounter( &t->start ); + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + unsigned long delta; + LARGE_INTEGER now, hfreq; + QueryPerformanceCounter( &now ); + QueryPerformanceFrequency( &hfreq ); + delta = (unsigned long)( ( now.QuadPart - t->start.QuadPart ) * 1000ul + / hfreq.QuadPart ); + return( delta ); + } +} + +#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) +{ + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if( reset ) + { + gettimeofday( &t->start, NULL ); + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + unsigned long delta; + struct timeval now; + gettimeofday( &now, NULL ); + delta = ( now.tv_sec - t->start.tv_sec ) * 1000ul + + ( now.tv_usec - t->start.tv_usec ) / 1000; + return( delta ); + } +} + +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Set delays to watch + */ +void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + + ctx->int_ms = int_ms; + ctx->fin_ms = fin_ms; + + if( fin_ms != 0 ) + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 1 ); +} + +/* + * Get number of delays expired + */ +int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + unsigned long elapsed_ms; + + if( ctx->fin_ms == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + elapsed_ms = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 0 ); + + if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->fin_ms ) + return( 2 ); + + if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->int_ms ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/version.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/version.c similarity index 83% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/version.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/version.c index fd967508..32a0d7d5 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/version.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/version.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Version information * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,15 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509.c similarity index 77% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509.c index 2e6795f7..2e11c7fc 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * X.509 common functions for parsing and verification * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -29,20 +27,13 @@ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf */ -/* Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be included before - * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. */ -#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include @@ -67,11 +58,19 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include #endif -#define CHECK(code) if( ( ret = code ) != 0 ){ return( ret ); } -#define CHECK_RANGE(min, max, val) if( val < min || val > max ){ return( ret ); } +#define CHECK(code) if( ( ret = ( code ) ) != 0 ){ return( ret ); } +#define CHECK_RANGE(min, max, val) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( val ) < ( min ) || ( val ) > ( max ) ) \ + { \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) /* * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER @@ -79,21 +78,21 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); if( **p != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE | 2 ) && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); serial->tag = *(*p)++; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &serial->len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, ret ) ); serial->p = *p; *p += serial->len; @@ -110,24 +109,24 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *alg ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } /* - * Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) paramaters + * Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) parameters */ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -144,7 +143,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *end; mbedtls_x509_buf md_oid; @@ -152,39 +151,39 @@ static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md /* Make sure we got a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ if( alg->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); - p = (unsigned char *) alg->p; + p = alg->p; end = p + alg->len; if( p >= end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); /* Parse md_oid */ md_oid.tag = *p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &md_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); md_oid.p = p; p += md_oid.len; /* Get md_alg from md_oid */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &md_oid, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); /* Make sure params is absent of NULL */ if( p == end ) return( 0 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 || len != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -205,7 +204,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, int *salt_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *end, *end2; size_t len; @@ -218,8 +217,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, /* Make sure params is a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); p = (unsigned char *) params->p; end = p + params->len; @@ -240,14 +239,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &alg_id, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -266,19 +265,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, /* Only MFG1 is recognised for now */ if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1, &alg_id ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ) ); /* Parse HashAlgorithm */ if( ( ret = x509_get_hash_alg( &alg_params, mgf_md ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -292,14 +291,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, end2 = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, salt_len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -315,21 +314,21 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, end2 = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, &trailer_field ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); if( trailer_field != 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -348,48 +347,56 @@ static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; mbedtls_x509_buf *oid; mbedtls_x509_buf *val; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + end = *p + len; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); oid = &cur->oid; oid->tag = **p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &oid->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); oid->p = *p; *p += oid->len; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); if( **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); val = &cur->val; val->tag = *(*p)++; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &val->len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); val->p = *p; *p += val->len; + if( *p != end ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + cur->next = NULL; return( 0 ); @@ -421,7 +428,7 @@ static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t set_len; const unsigned char *end_set; @@ -433,7 +440,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &set_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); end_set = *p + set_len; @@ -527,7 +534,7 @@ static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t ) static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* * Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen @@ -592,13 +599,13 @@ static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len, year_len; unsigned char tag; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); tag = **p; @@ -607,32 +614,32 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, else if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) year_len = 4; else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); (*p)++; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); return x509_parse_time( p, len, year_len, tm ); } int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; int tag_type; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); tag_type = **p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, ret ) ); sig->tag = tag_type; sig->len = len; @@ -650,13 +657,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x50 mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, void **sig_opts ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( *sig_opts != NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( sig_oid, md_alg, pk_alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG, ret ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) @@ -696,38 +703,33 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x50 * be either manually updated or extensions should be parsed!) */ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ) + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; - if( *p == end ) - return( 0 ); + /* Extension structure use EXPLICIT tagging. That is, the actual + * `Extensions` structure is wrapped by a tag-length pair using + * the respective context-specific tag. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); - ext->tag = **p; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ext->p = *p; - end = *p + ext->len; + ext->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag; + ext->p = *p; + end = *p + ext->len; /* * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension - * - * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { - * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, - * extnValue OCTET STRING } */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( end != *p + len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -738,7 +740,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n; unsigned char c, merge = 0; const mbedtls_x509_name *name; @@ -779,7 +781,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) break; c = name->val.p[i]; - if( c < 32 || c == 127 || ( c > 128 && c < 160 ) ) + if( c < 32 || c >= 127 ) s[i] = '?'; else s[i] = c; } @@ -800,7 +802,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) */ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n, nr; char *p; @@ -829,6 +831,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *se return( (int) ( size - n ) ); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Helper for writing signature algorithms */ @@ -836,7 +839,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *s mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const void *sig_opts ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; char *p = buf; size_t n = size; const char *desc = NULL; @@ -862,7 +865,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *s ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)", md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ) : "???", mgf_md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( mgf_md_info ) : "???", - pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); + (unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; } #else @@ -873,6 +876,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *s return( (int)( size - n ) ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Helper for writing "RSA key size", "EC key size", etc @@ -881,7 +885,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ) { char *p = buf; size_t n = buf_size; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s key size", name ); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; @@ -901,11 +905,7 @@ static int x509_get_current_time( mbedtls_x509_time *now ) int ret = 0; tt = mbedtls_time( NULL ); -#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - lt = gmtime_s( &tm_buf, &tt ) == 0 ? &tm_buf : NULL; -#else - lt = gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf ); -#endif + lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf ); if( lt == NULL ) ret = -1; @@ -997,75 +997,4 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ) return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" -#include "mbedtls/certs.h" - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - int ret; - uint32_t flags; - mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; - mbedtls_x509_crt clicert; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " X.509 certificate load: " ); - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &clicert ); - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &clicert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt, - mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( ret ); - } - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_ca_crt, - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( ret ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n X.509 signature verify: "); - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( &clicert, &cacert, NULL, NULL, &flags, NULL, NULL ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( ret ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n"); - - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert ); - - return( 0 ); -#else - ((void) verbose); - return( 0 ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_create.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_create.c similarity index 57% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_create.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_create.c index df20ec8e..056bbaa7 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_create.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_create.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * X.509 base functions for creating certificates / CSRs * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,66 +15,97 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include +/* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their + * string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */ typedef struct { - const char *name; - size_t name_len; - const char*oid; + const char *name; /* String representation of AttributeType, e.g. + * "CN" or "emailAddress". */ + size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */ + const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType, + * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ + int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the + * given attribute type, e.g. + * MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */ } x509_attr_descriptor_t; #define ADD_STRLEN( s ) s, sizeof( s ) - 1 +/* X.509 DN attributes from RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ static const x509_attr_descriptor_t x509_attrs[] = { - { ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "C" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "O" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "L" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "R" ), MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ), MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "title" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ), MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT }, - { ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ), MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT }, - { NULL, 0, NULL } + { ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "C" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "O" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "L" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "R" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "title" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL } }; -static const char *x509_at_oid_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len ) +static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len ) { const x509_attr_descriptor_t *cur; @@ -83,7 +114,10 @@ static const char *x509_at_oid_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len ) strncmp( cur->name, name, name_len ) == 0 ) break; - return( cur->oid ); + if ( cur->name == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return( cur ); } int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name ) @@ -92,6 +126,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na const char *s = name, *c = s; const char *end = s + strlen( s ); const char *oid = NULL; + const x509_attr_descriptor_t* attr_descr = NULL; int in_tag = 1; char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; char *d = data; @@ -103,12 +138,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na { if( in_tag && *c == '=' ) { - if( ( oid = x509_at_oid_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL ) + if( ( attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID; goto exit; } + oid = attr_descr->oid; s = c + 1; in_tag = 0; d = data; @@ -127,13 +163,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na } else if( !in_tag && ( *c == ',' || c == end ) ) { - if( mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ), - (unsigned char *) data, - d - data ) == NULL ) + mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur = + mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ), + (unsigned char *) data, + d - data ); + + if(cur == NULL ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); } + // set tagType + cur->val.tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + while( c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ' ) c++; @@ -192,56 +234,48 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, * * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType */ -static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len ) +static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur_name) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; + const char *oid = (const char*)cur_name->oid.p; + size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len; + const unsigned char *name = cur_name->val.p; + size_t name_len = cur_name->val.len; - // Write PrintableString for all except MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL - // - if( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL ) == oid_len && - memcmp( oid, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, oid_len ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( p, start, - (const char *) name, - name_len ) ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( p, start, - (const char *) name, - name_len ) ); - } - + // Write correct string tag and value + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( p, start, + cur_name->val.tag, + (const char *) name, + name_len ) ); // Write OID // - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, oid_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, + oid_len ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ); return( (int) len ); } int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = first; while( cur != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, (char *) cur->oid.p, - cur->oid.len, - cur->val.p, cur->val.len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, cur ) ); cur = cur->next; } @@ -256,7 +290,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size ) @@ -286,7 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, static int x509_write_extension( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data *ext ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, ext->val.p + 1, @@ -324,7 +358,7 @@ static int x509_write_extension( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur_ext = first; diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_crl.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_crl.c similarity index 87% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_crl.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_crl.c index 8450f87e..e6efdca5 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_crl.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_crl.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * X.509 Certidicate Revocation List (CRL) parsing * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -29,15 +27,12 @@ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -74,7 +69,7 @@ static int x509_crl_get_version( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *ver ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -84,7 +79,7 @@ static int x509_crl_get_version( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -101,19 +96,19 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); /* * crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL * -- if present, version MUST be v2 */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, ext, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( 0 ); - return( ret ); - } + + end = ext->p + ext->len; while( *p < end ) { @@ -130,7 +125,7 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, /* Get enclosing sequence tag */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); end_ext_data = *p + len; @@ -138,7 +133,7 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); } *p += len; @@ -147,29 +142,29 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); } /* Data should be octet string type */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); /* Ignore data so far and just check its length */ *p += len; if( *p != end_ext_data ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* Abort on (unsupported) critical extensions */ if( is_critical ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); } if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -181,7 +176,7 @@ static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* OPTIONAL */ @@ -203,27 +198,27 @@ static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext( unsigned char **p, ext->p = NULL; return( 0 ); } - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); } end = *p + ext->len; if( end != *p + ext->len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); while( *p < end ) { if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); *p += len; } if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -235,7 +230,7 @@ static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t entry_len; mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur_entry = entry; @@ -258,13 +253,13 @@ static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p, size_t len2; const unsigned char *end2; + cur_entry->raw.tag = **p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len2, MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } - cur_entry->raw.tag = **p; cur_entry->raw.p = *p; cur_entry->raw.len = len2; end2 = *p + len2; @@ -300,7 +295,7 @@ static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; @@ -369,8 +364,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } /* @@ -382,7 +377,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; @@ -426,7 +421,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crl->issuer ) ) != 0 ) @@ -449,10 +444,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( &p, end, &crl->next_update ) ) != 0 ) { - if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) && - ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ) + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) && + ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ) ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); return( ret ); @@ -491,8 +486,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } end = crl->raw.p + crl->raw.len; @@ -526,8 +521,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -539,8 +534,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - int ret; - size_t use_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len = 0; mbedtls_pem_context pem; int is_pem = 0; @@ -603,7 +598,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, s */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; @@ -619,6 +614,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Return an informational string about the certificate. */ @@ -630,7 +626,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ) int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; char *p; const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry; @@ -698,6 +694,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, return( (int) ( size - n ) ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Initialize a CRL chain diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_crt.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_crt.c similarity index 57% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_crt.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_crt.c index a390f81c..c8654445 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_crt.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_crt.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * X.509 certificate parsing and verification * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -31,28 +29,30 @@ * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else +#include #include #define mbedtls_free free #define mbedtls_calloc calloc @@ -74,7 +74,11 @@ #if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) #include #include +#if defined(__MBED__) +#include +#else #include +#endif /* __MBED__ */ #endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ #endif @@ -91,37 +95,43 @@ typedef struct { */ #define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) -/* - * Default profile - */ +/* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security + * concerns. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) - /* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */ - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) | -#endif - /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) | - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), - 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ - 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ - 2048, -}; - -/* - * Next-default profile - */ -const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = -{ - /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_hashes in ssl_tls.c. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */ + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_curves in ssl_tls.c. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ) | + 0, +#else + 0, +#endif + 2048, +}; + +/* Next-generation profile. Currently identical to the default, but may + * be tightened at any time. */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = +{ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ) | @@ -156,6 +166,17 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = 0, }; +/* + * Empty / all-forbidden profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none = +{ + 0, + 0, + 0, + (uint32_t) -1, +}; + /* * Check md_alg against profile * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise @@ -227,1518 +248,6 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, return( -1 ); } -/* - * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } - */ -static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - int *ver ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - { - *ver = 0; - return( 0 ); - } - - return( ret ); - } - - end = *p + len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); - - if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { - * notBefore Time, - * notAfter Time } - */ -static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_time *from, - mbedtls_x509_time *to ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + ret ); - - end = *p + len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, from ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, to ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed) - */ -static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n ) -{ - int ret; - - if( *p == end ) - return( 0 ); - - uid->tag = **p; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &uid->len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | n ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( 0 ); - - return( ret ); - } - - uid->p = *p; - *p += uid->len; - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - int *ca_istrue, - int *max_pathlen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - - /* - * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { - * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, - * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } - */ - *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ - *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */ - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - if( *p == end ) - return( 0 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, ca_istrue ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - if( *ca_istrue != 0 ) - *ca_istrue = 1; - } - - if( *p == end ) - return( 0 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - (*max_pathlen)++; - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *ns_cert_type) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - if( bs.len != 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); - - /* Get actual bitstring */ - *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; - return( 0 ); -} - -static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned int *key_usage) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - if( bs.len < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); - - /* Get actual bitstring */ - *key_usage = 0; - for( i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof( unsigned int ); i++ ) - { - *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId - * - * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER - */ -static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ - if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames - * - * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName - * - * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { - * otherName [0] OtherName, - * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, - * dNSName [2] IA5String, - * x400Address [3] ORAddress, - * directoryName [4] Name, - * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, - * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, - * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, - * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } - * - * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { - * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } - * - * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { - * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, - * partyName [1] DirectoryString } - * - * NOTE: we only parse and use dNSName at this point. - */ -static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len, tag_len; - mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; - unsigned char tag; - mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; - - /* Get main sequence tag */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - if( *p + len != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - while( *p < end ) - { - if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); - - tag = **p; - (*p)++; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) != - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); - } - - /* Skip everything but DNS name */ - if( tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2 ) ) - { - *p += tag_len; - continue; - } - - /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ - if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) - { - if( cur->next != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); - - cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); - - if( cur->next == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - cur = cur->next; - } - - buf = &(cur->buf); - buf->tag = tag; - buf->p = *p; - buf->len = tag_len; - *p += buf->len; - } - - /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ - cur->next = NULL; - - if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * X.509 v3 extensions - * - */ -static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3 ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( 0 ); - - return( ret ); - } - - while( *p < end ) - { - /* - * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { - * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, - * extnValue OCTET STRING } - */ - mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL}; - int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ - int ext_type = 0; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - end_ext_data = *p + len; - - /* Get extension ID */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - extn_oid.p = *p; - *p += extn_oid.len; - - /* Get optional critical */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && - ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - /* Data should be octet string type */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); - - end_ext_octet = *p + len; - - if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - /* - * Detect supported extensions - */ - ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - { - /* No parser found, skip extension */ - *p = end_ext_octet; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) - if( is_critical ) - { - /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); - } -#endif - continue; - } - - /* Forbid repeated extensions */ - if( ( crt->ext_types & ext_type ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); - - crt->ext_types |= ext_type; - - switch( ext_type ) - { - case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: - /* Parse basic constraints */ - if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: - /* Parse key usage */ - if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: - /* Parse extended key usage */ - if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: - /* Parse subject alt name */ - if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: - /* Parse netscape certificate type */ - if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - break; - - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - } - } - - if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format - */ -static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *buf, - size_t buflen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; - - memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); - memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); - memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); - - /* - * Check for valid input - */ - if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - // Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length - p = (unsigned char*) buf; - len = buflen; - end = p + len; - - /* - * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { - * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, - * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, - * signatureValue BIT STRING } - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); - } - - if( len > (size_t) ( end - p ) ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - } - crt_end = p + len; - - // Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field - crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; - crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len ); - if( p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - memcpy( p, buf, crt->raw.len ); - - // Direct pointers to the new buffer - p += crt->raw.len - len; - end = crt_end = p + len; - - /* - * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { - */ - crt->tbs.p = p; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); - } - - end = p + len; - crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p; - - /* - * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } - * - * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER - * - * signature AlgorithmIdentifier - */ - if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid, - &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); - } - - crt->version++; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, - &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, - &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * issuer Name - */ - crt->issuer_raw.p = p; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p; - - /* - * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { - * notBefore Time, - * notAfter Time } - * - */ - if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from, - &crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * subject Name - */ - crt->subject_raw.p = p; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); - } - - if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p; - - /* - * SubjectPublicKeyInfo - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, - * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 - * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, - * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 - * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL - * -- If present, version shall be v3 - */ - if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) - { - ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) - { - ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) - if( crt->version == 3 ) -#endif - { - ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - if( p != end ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - } - - end = crt_end; - - /* - * } - * -- end of TBSCertificate - * - * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, - * signatureValue BIT STRING - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || - memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || - sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || - ( sig_params1.len != 0 && - memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( p != end ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a - * chained list - */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, - size_t buflen ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; - - /* - * Check for valid input - */ - if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - while( crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL ) - { - prev = crt; - crt = crt->next; - } - - /* - * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed. - */ - if( crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL ) - { - crt->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); - - if( crt->next == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - prev = crt; - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( crt->next ); - crt = crt->next; - } - - if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( prev ) - prev->next = NULL; - - if( crt != chain ) - mbedtls_free( crt ); - - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained - * list - */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; - int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER; -#endif - - /* - * Check for valid input - */ - if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or - * one or more PEM certificates. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' && - strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL ) - { - buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM; - } - - if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER ) - return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); -#else - return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM ) - { - int ret; - mbedtls_pem_context pem; - - /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ - while( buflen > 1 ) - { - size_t use_len; - mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); - - /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */ - ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----", - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----", - buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); - - if( ret == 0 ) - { - /* - * Was PEM encoded - */ - buflen -= use_len; - buf += use_len; - } - else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) - { - return( ret ); - } - else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) - { - mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); - - /* - * PEM header and footer were found - */ - buflen -= use_len; - buf += use_len; - - if( first_error == 0 ) - first_error = ret; - - total_failed++; - continue; - } - else - break; - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); - - mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - { - /* - * Quit parsing on a memory error - */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ) - return( ret ); - - if( first_error == 0 ) - first_error = ret; - - total_failed++; - continue; - } - - success = 1; - } - } - - if( success ) - return( total_failed ); - else if( first_error ) - return( first_error ); - else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -/* - * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list - */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n; - unsigned char *buf; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( chain, buf, n ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); - mbedtls_free( buf ); - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) -{ - int ret = 0; -#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - int w_ret; - WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH]; - char filename[MAX_PATH]; - char *p; - size_t len = strlen( path ); - - WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; - HANDLE hFind; - - if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memset( szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir) ); - memset( filename, 0, MAX_PATH ); - memcpy( filename, path, len ); - filename[len++] = '\\'; - p = filename + len; - filename[len++] = '*'; - - w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir, - MAX_PATH - 3 ); - if( w_ret == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - hFind = FindFirstFileW( szDir, &file_data ); - if( hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - len = MAX_PATH - len; - do - { - memset( p, 0, len ); - - if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY ) - continue; - - w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, - lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ), - p, (int) len - 1, - NULL, NULL ); - if( w_ret == 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; - goto cleanup; - } - - w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename ); - if( w_ret < 0 ) - ret++; - else - ret += w_ret; - } - while( FindNextFileW( hFind, &file_data ) != 0 ); - - if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; - -cleanup: - FindClose( hFind ); -#else /* _WIN32 */ - int t_ret; - int snp_ret; - struct stat sb; - struct dirent *entry; - char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN]; - DIR *dir = opendir( path ); - - if( dir == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 ) - { - closedir( dir ); - return( ret ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ - - while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL ) - { - snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name, - "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name ); - - if( snp_ret < 0 || (size_t)snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - goto cleanup; - } - else if( stat( entry_name, &sb ) == -1 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( !S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) ) - continue; - - // Ignore parse errors - // - t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, entry_name ); - if( t_ret < 0 ) - ret++; - else - ret += t_ret; - } - -cleanup: - closedir( dir ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ - -#endif /* _WIN32 */ - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) -{ - size_t i; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; - const char *sep = ""; - size_t sep_len = 0; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - if( cur->buf.len + sep_len >= n ) - { - *p = '\0'; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - } - - n -= cur->buf.len + sep_len; - for( i = 0; i < sep_len; i++ ) - *p++ = sep[i]; - for( i = 0; i < cur->buf.len; i++ ) - *p++ = cur->buf.p[i]; - - sep = ", "; - sep_len = 2; - - cur = cur->next; - } - - *p = '\0'; - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ - { \ - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \ - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ - sep = ", "; \ - } - -#define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \ - if( ns_cert_type & type ) \ - PRINT_ITEM( name ); - -static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned char ns_cert_type ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const char *sep = ""; - - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client" ); - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server" ); - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email" ); - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing" ); - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved" ); - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA" ); - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA" ); - CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA" ); - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \ - if( key_usage & code ) \ - PRINT_ITEM( name ); - -static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned int key_usage ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const char *sep = ""; - - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" ); - KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" ); - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage ) -{ - int ret; - const char *desc; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage; - const char *sep = ""; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) - desc = "???"; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - sep = ", "; - - cur = cur->next; - } - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Return an informational string about the certificate. - */ -#define BEFORE_COLON 18 -#define BC "18" -int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, - const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n; - char *p; - char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; - - p = buf; - n = size; - - if( NULL == crt ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n" ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - return( (int) ( size - n ) ); - } - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n", - prefix, crt->version ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sserial number : ", - prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->issuer ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \ - "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, - crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon, - crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour, - crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \ - "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, - crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon, - crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour, - crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk, - crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - /* Key size */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, - mbedtls_pk_get_name( &crt->pk ) ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str, - (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &crt->pk ) ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - /* - * Optional extensions - */ - - if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix, - crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false" ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - if( crt->max_pathlen > 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1 ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } - } - - if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name : ", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n, - &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_type( &p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - if( ( ret = x509_info_key_usage( &p, &n, crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - if( ( ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage( &p, &n, - &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - return( (int) ( size - n ) ); -} - -struct x509_crt_verify_string { - int code; - const char *string; -}; - -static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, - { 0, NULL } -}; - -int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, - uint32_t flags ) -{ - int ret; - const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; - char *p = buf; - size_t n = size; - - for( cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL ; cur++ ) - { - if( ( flags & cur->code ) == 0 ) - continue; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - flags ^= cur->code; - } - - if( flags != 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sUnknown reason " - "(this should not happen)\n", prefix ); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } - - return( (int) ( size - n ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) -int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, - unsigned int usage ) -{ - unsigned int usage_must, usage_may; - unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY - | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; - - if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - usage_must = usage & ~may_mask; - - if( ( ( crt->key_usage & ~may_mask ) & usage_must ) != usage_must ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - usage_may = usage & may_mask; - - if( ( ( crt->key_usage & may_mask ) | usage_may ) != usage_may ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) -int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, - const char *usage_oid, - size_t usage_len ) -{ - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; - - /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */ - if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - /* - * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list - */ - for( cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) - { - const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf; - - if( cur_oid->len == usage_len && - memcmp( cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len ) == 0 ) - { - return( 0 ); - } - - if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid ) == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) -/* - * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) -{ - const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry; - - while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 ) - { - if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len && - memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 ) - { - if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &cur->revocation_date ) ) - return( 1 ); - } - - cur = cur->next; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL. - * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present. - */ -static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, - mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) -{ - int flags = 0; - unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - - if( ca == NULL ) - return( flags ); - - while( crl_list != NULL ) - { - if( crl_list->version == 0 || - crl_list->issuer_raw.len != ca->subject_raw.len || - memcmp( crl_list->issuer_raw.p, ca->subject_raw.p, - crl_list->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 ) - { - crl_list = crl_list->next; - continue; - } - - /* - * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 ) - { - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; - break; - } -#endif - - /* - * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA - */ - if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_md ) != 0 ) - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD; - - if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_pk ) != 0 ) - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; - - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md ); - if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) - { - /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; - break; - } - - if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &ca->pk ) != 0 ) - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; - - if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, - crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), - crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 ) - { - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; - break; - } - - /* - * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) - */ - if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crl_list->next_update ) ) - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; - - if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crl_list->this_update ) ) - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; - - /* - * Check if certificate is revoked - */ - if( mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( crt, crl_list ) ) - { - flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED; - break; - } - - crl_list = crl_list->next; - } - - return( flags ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ - /* * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different */ @@ -1870,31 +379,2097 @@ static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b } /* - * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent + * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain */ -static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, - mbedtls_x509_crt *parent ) +static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain ) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t i; - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md ); - if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ ) { - /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ - return( -1 ); + ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL; + ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1; } - if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, - child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), - child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 ) + ver_chain->len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ +static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) != 0 ) { - return( -1 ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + *ver = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + */ +static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *from, + mbedtls_x509_time *to ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, from ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, to ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed) + */ +static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + uid->tag = **p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &uid->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | n ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( 0 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + uid->p = *p; + *p += uid->len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ca_istrue, + int *max_pathlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { + * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } + */ + *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, ca_istrue ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *ca_istrue != 0 ) + *ca_istrue = 1; + } + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer + * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */ + if( *max_pathlen == INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + (*max_pathlen)++; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( bs.len != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( bs.len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *key_usage = 0; + for( i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof( unsigned int ); i++ ) + { + *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); } return( 0 ); } +/* + * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * + * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ + if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + * + * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName + * + * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + * + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { + * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, + * partyName [1] DirectoryString } + * + * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName + * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point. + */ +static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len, tag_len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + unsigned char tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf; + memset( &dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof( dummy_san_buf ) ); + + tag = **p; + (*p)++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) != + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + /* + * Check that the SAN is structured correctly. + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf ); + /* + * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, + * and clear the allocated sequences. + */ + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &(cur->buf); + buf->tag = tag; + buf->p = *p; + buf->len = tag_len; + *p += buf->len; + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } + * + * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } + * + * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation + * + * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, + * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } + * + * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, + * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } + * + * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers + * + * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } + * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } + * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } + * + * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) + * + * Qualifier ::= CHOICE { + * cPSuri CPSuri, + * userNotice UserNotice } + * + * CPSuri ::= IA5String + * + * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { + * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, + * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL } + * + * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + * organization DisplayText, + * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } + * + * DisplayText ::= CHOICE { + * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), + * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), + * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), + * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } + * + * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point + * as defined in RFC 5280. + */ +static int x509_get_certificate_policies( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret, parse_ret = 0; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Cannot be an empty sequence. + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid; + const unsigned char *policy_end; + + /* + * Get the policy sequence + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + policy_oid.len = len; + policy_oid.p = *p; + + /* + * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this + * extension is critical. + */ + parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &( cur->buf ); + buf->tag = policy_oid.tag; + buf->p = policy_oid.p; + buf->len = policy_oid.len; + + *p += len; + + /* + * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end + * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. + */ + if( *p < policy_end ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + /* + * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. + */ + *p += len; + } + + if( *p != policy_end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( parse_ret ); +} + +/* + * X.509 v3 extensions + * + */ +static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len; + while( *p < end ) + { + /* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING } + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL}; + int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + int ext_type = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get extension ID */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + extn_oid.p = *p; + *p += extn_oid.len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && + ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + start_ext_octet = *p; + end_ext_octet = *p + len; + + if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Detect supported extensions + */ + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet ); + if( ret != 0 && is_critical ) + return( ret ); + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + + /* No parser found, skip extension */ + *p = end_ext_octet; + + if( is_critical ) + { + /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + continue; + } + + /* Forbid repeated extensions */ + if( ( crt->ext_types & ext_type ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + crt->ext_types |= ext_type; + + switch( ext_type ) + { + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: + /* Parse basic constraints */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse key usage */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse extended key usage */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: + /* Parse subject alt name */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: + /* Parse netscape certificate type */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: + /* Parse certificate policies type */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_certificate_policies( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension + * if it contains unsupported policies */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL && + cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, + start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet ) == 0 ) + break; + + if( is_critical ) + return( ret ); + else + /* + * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we + * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to + * the user to choose how to enforce the policies, + * unless the extension is critical. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + } + break; + + default: + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ + if( is_critical ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + else + *p = end_ext_octet; + } + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format + */ +static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; + + memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */ + p = (unsigned char*) buf; + len = buflen; + end = p + len; + + /* + * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { + * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + end = crt_end = p + len; + crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; + if( make_copy != 0 ) + { + /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ + crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len ); + if( crt->raw.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len ); + crt->own_buffer = 1; + + p += crt->raw.len - len; + end = crt_end = p + len; + } + else + { + crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf; + crt->own_buffer = 0; + } + + /* + * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + crt->tbs.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p; + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + * + * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + * + * signature AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid, + &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); + } + + crt->version++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, + &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, + &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * issuer Name + */ + crt->issuer_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p; + + /* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + * + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from, + &crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * subject Name + */ + crt->subject_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p; + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + crt->pk_raw.p = p; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p; + + /* + * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- If present, version shall be v3 + */ + if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) + { + ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) + { + ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( crt->version == 3 ) + { + ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + end = crt_end; + + /* + * } + * -- end of TBSCertificate + * + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || + memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || + sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag || + sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || + ( sig_params1.len != 0 && + memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a + * chained list + */ +static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL ) + { + prev = crt; + crt = crt->next; + } + + /* + * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed. + */ + if( crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL ) + { + crt->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + + if( crt->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + prev = crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( crt->next ); + crt = crt->next; + } + + ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( prev ) + prev->next = NULL; + + if( crt != chain ) + mbedtls_free( crt ); + + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained + * list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; + int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER; +#endif + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or + * one or more PEM certificates. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' && + strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL ) + { + buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM; + } + + if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER ) + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); +#else + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; + + /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ + while( buflen > 1 ) + { + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + + /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */ + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + { + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + + /* + * PEM header and footer were found + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + + if( first_error == 0 ) + first_error = ret; + + total_failed++; + continue; + } + else + break; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* + * Quit parsing on a memory error + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ) + return( ret ); + + if( first_error == 0 ) + first_error = ret; + + total_failed++; + continue; + } + + success = 1; + } + } + + if( success ) + return( total_failed ); + else if( first_error ) + return( first_error ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( chain, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + int w_ret; + WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH]; + char filename[MAX_PATH]; + char *p; + size_t len = strlen( path ); + + WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; + HANDLE hFind; + + if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir) ); + memset( filename, 0, MAX_PATH ); + memcpy( filename, path, len ); + filename[len++] = '\\'; + p = filename + len; + filename[len++] = '*'; + + w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir, + MAX_PATH - 3 ); + if( w_ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hFind = FindFirstFileW( szDir, &file_data ); + if( hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + len = MAX_PATH - len; + do + { + memset( p, 0, len ); + + if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY ) + continue; + + w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, + lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ), + p, (int) len - 1, + NULL, NULL ); + if( w_ret == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename ); + if( w_ret < 0 ) + ret++; + else + ret += w_ret; + } + while( FindNextFileW( hFind, &file_data ) != 0 ); + + if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + +cleanup: + FindClose( hFind ); +#else /* _WIN32 */ + int t_ret; + int snp_ret; + struct stat sb; + struct dirent *entry; + char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN]; + DIR *dir = opendir( path ); + + if( dir == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 ) + { + closedir( dir ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + memset( &sb, 0, sizeof( sb ) ); + + while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL ) + { + snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name, + "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name ); + + if( snp_ret < 0 || (size_t)snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + else if( stat( entry_name, &sb ) == -1 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( !S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) ) + continue; + + // Ignore parse errors + // + t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, entry_name ); + if( t_ret < 0 ) + ret++; + else + ret += t_ret; + } + +cleanup: + closedir( dir ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#endif /* _WIN32 */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/* + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + * + * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, + * as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +static int x509_get_other_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; + const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; + mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; + + if( ( subject_alt_name->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) != + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ) ) + { + /* + * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". + */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + cur_oid.p = p; + cur_oid.len = len; + + /* + * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; + p += len; + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, + sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch( san_buf->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ): + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + + ret = x509_get_other_name( san_buf, &other_name ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; + memcpy( &san->san.other_name, + &other_name, sizeof( other_name ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ): + { + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; + + memcpy( &san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof( *san_buf ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported + */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + int parse_ret; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + memset( &san, 0, sizeof( san ) ); + parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san ); + if( parse_ret != 0 ) + { + if( parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + cur = cur->next; + continue; + } + + switch( san.type ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( p, other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p, + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len ); + p += other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; + + n -= other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; + + }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if( san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len ); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported, skip item. + */ + default: + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + break; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *p = '\0'; + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ + } + +#define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \ + if( ns_cert_type & (type) ) \ + PRINT_ITEM( name ); + +static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA" ); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \ + if( key_usage & (code) ) \ + PRINT_ITEM( name ); + +static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" ); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage; + const char *sep = ""; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) + desc = "???"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + const char *sep = ""; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) + desc = "???"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return an informational string about the certificate. + */ +#define BEFORE_COLON 18 +#define BC "18" +int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + if( NULL == crt ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n", + prefix, crt->version ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sserial number : ", + prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->issuer ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon, + crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour, + crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon, + crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour, + crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk, + crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* Key size */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, + mbedtls_pk_get_name( &crt->pk ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str, + (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &crt->pk ) ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* + * Optional extensions + */ + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix, + crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( crt->max_pathlen > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1 ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n, + &crt->subject_alt_names, + prefix ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_type( &p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_key_usage( &p, &n, crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage( &p, &n, + &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_policies( &p, &n, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +struct x509_crt_verify_string { + int code; + const char *string; +}; + +#define X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( err, err_str, info ) { err, info }, +static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { + MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST + { 0, NULL } +}; +#undef X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + uint32_t flags ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + + for( cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL ; cur++ ) + { + if( ( flags & cur->code ) == 0 ) + continue; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + flags ^= cur->code; + } + + if( flags != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sUnknown reason " + "(this should not happen)\n", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + unsigned int usage ) +{ + unsigned int usage_must, usage_may; + unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY + | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; + + if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + usage_must = usage & ~may_mask; + + if( ( ( crt->key_usage & ~may_mask ) & usage_must ) != usage_must ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + usage_may = usage & may_mask; + + if( ( ( crt->key_usage & may_mask ) | usage_may ) != usage_may ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *usage_oid, + size_t usage_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; + + /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */ + if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list + */ + for( cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf; + + if( cur_oid->len == usage_len && + memcmp( cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) +/* + * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry; + + while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 ) + { + if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len && + memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL. + * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present. + */ +static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) +{ + int flags = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + if( ca == NULL ) + return( flags ); + + while( crl_list != NULL ) + { + if( crl_list->version == 0 || + x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 ) + { + crl_list = crl_list->next; + continue; + } + + /* + * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs + */ + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca, + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + /* + * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA + */ + if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_md ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD; + + if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_pk ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md ); + if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &ca->pk ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, + crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + /* + * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) + */ + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crl_list->next_update ) ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; + + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crl_list->this_update ) ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; + + /* + * Check if certificate is revoked + */ + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( crt, crl_list ) ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED; + break; + } + + crl_list = crl_list->next; + } + + return( flags ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent + */ +static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t hash_len; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md ); + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ + if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); +#else + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md ); + + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( -1 ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( -1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) + { + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) ); + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) ); +} + /* * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'. * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not. @@ -1921,13 +2496,11 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, if( need_ca_bit && ! parent->ca_istrue ) return( -1 ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) if( need_ca_bit && mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN ) != 0 ) { return( -1 ); } -#endif return( 0 ); } @@ -1939,6 +2512,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, * 1. subject name matches child's issuer * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct + * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported) * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied * * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first @@ -1961,23 +2535,54 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, * Arguments: * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents + * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top * of the chain, 0 otherwise * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far * (will never be greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations * * Return value: - * - the first suitable parent found (see above regarding time-validity) - * - NULL if no suitable parent was found + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise */ -static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child, - mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates, - int top, - size_t path_cnt, - size_t self_cnt ) +static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates, + mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent, + int *r_signature_is_good, + int top, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *badtime_parent = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; + int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* did we have something in progress? */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL ) + { + /* restore saved state */ + parent = rs_ctx->parent; + fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good; + + /* clear saved state */ + rs_ctx->parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + /* resume where we left */ + goto check_signature; + } +#endif + + fallback_parent = NULL; + fallback_signature_is_good = 0; for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next ) { @@ -1993,28 +2598,55 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child, } /* Signature */ - if( top && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +check_signature: +#endif + ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) { - continue; + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent = parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + + return( ret ); } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + signature_is_good = ret == 0; + if( top && ! signature_is_good ) + continue; /* optional time check */ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) || mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) ) { - if( badtime_parent == NULL ) - badtime_parent = parent; + if( fallback_parent == NULL ) + { + fallback_parent = parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + } continue; } + *r_parent = parent; + *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + break; } if( parent == NULL ) - parent = badtime_parent; + { + *r_parent = fallback_parent; + *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + } - return( parent ); + return( 0 ); } /* @@ -2026,34 +2658,78 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child, * Arguments: * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed * by a chain of possible intermediates - * - [in] trust_ca: locally trusted CAs - * - [out] 1 if parent was found in trust_ca, 0 if found in provided chain - * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far - * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far + * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates + * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0 + * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 + * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child) + * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far * (will always be no greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations * * Return value: - * - the first suitable parent found (see find_parent_in() for "suitable") - * - NULL if no suitable parent was found + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise */ -static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent( mbedtls_x509_crt *child, - mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, - int *parent_is_trusted, - size_t path_cnt, - size_t self_cnt ) +static int x509_crt_find_parent( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crt **parent, + int *parent_is_trusted, + int *signature_is_good, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; - /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs */ *parent_is_trusted = 1; - parent = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, trust_ca, 1, path_cnt, self_cnt ); - if( parent != NULL ) - return( parent ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 ) + { + *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted; + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + } +#endif - /* Look for a parent upwards the chain */ - *parent_is_trusted = 0; - return( x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, child->next, 0, path_cnt, self_cnt ) ); + while( 1 ) { + search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next; + + ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list, + parent, signature_is_good, + *parent_is_trusted, + path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted; + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */ + if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 ) + break; + + /* prepare second iteration */ + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + } + + /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */ + if( *parent == NULL ) + { + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + *signature_is_good = 0; + } + + return( 0 ); } /* @@ -2102,11 +2778,24 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq * + * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least: + * - trusted EE + * - EE -> trusted root + * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root + * - if relevant: EE untrusted + * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted + * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root). + * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is + * enough (but length 1 is not in general). + * * Arguments: * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile() - * - [out] ver_chain, chain_len: the built and verified chain + * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain + * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise! + * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume. + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations * * Return value: * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined @@ -2117,25 +2806,54 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, - x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE], - size_t *chain_len ) + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { + /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can + * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t *flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; mbedtls_x509_crt *child; mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; - int parent_is_trusted = 0; - int child_is_trusted = 0; - size_t self_cnt = 0; + int parent_is_trusted; + int child_is_trusted; + int signature_is_good; + unsigned self_cnt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent ) + { + /* restore saved state */ + *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt; + + /* restore derived state */ + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1]; + child = cur->crt; + flags = &cur->flags; + + goto find_parent; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ child = crt; - *chain_len = 0; + self_cnt = 0; + parent_is_trusted = 0; + child_is_trusted = 0; while( 1 ) { /* Add certificate to the verification chain */ - ver_chain[*chain_len].crt = child; - flags = &ver_chain[*chain_len].flags; - ++*chain_len; + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len]; + cur->crt = child; + cur->flags = 0; + ver_chain->len++; + flags = &cur->flags; /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) ) @@ -2156,15 +2874,57 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */ - if( *chain_len == 1 && + if( ver_chain->len == 1 && x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 ) { return( 0 ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +find_parent: +#endif + + /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback, + * or use statically provided list. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; + + ret = f_ca_cb( p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + ((void) f_ca_cb); + ((void) p_ca_cb); + cur_trust_ca = trust_ca; + } + /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ - parent = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent_is_trusted, - *chain_len - 1, self_cnt ); + ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, + &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, + ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent; + rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt; + rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif /* No parent? We're done here */ if( parent == NULL ) @@ -2176,7 +2936,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs. * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO], * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */ - if( *chain_len != 1 && + if( ver_chain->len != 1 && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 ) { self_cnt++; @@ -2185,14 +2945,14 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA, * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */ if( ! parent_is_trusted && - *chain_len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ) + ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ) { /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); } - /* if parent is trusted, the signature was checked by find_parent() */ - if( ! parent_is_trusted && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 ) + /* signature was checked while searching parent */ + if( ! signature_is_good ) *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; /* check size of signing key */ @@ -2210,6 +2970,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( child = parent; parent = NULL; child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted; + signature_is_good = 0; } } @@ -2235,6 +2996,25 @@ static int x509_crt_check_cn( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, return( -1 ); } +/* + * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 + */ +static int x509_crt_check_san( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len ) +{ + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) name->tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + + /* dNSName */ + if( san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ) + return( x509_crt_check_cn( name, cn, cn_len ) ); + + /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ + + /* Unrecognized type */ + return( -1 ); +} + /* * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL! */ @@ -2250,7 +3030,7 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, { for( cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) { - if( x509_crt_check_cn( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) + if( x509_crt_check_san( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) break; } @@ -2278,21 +3058,22 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, */ static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( uint32_t *flags, - x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE], - size_t chain_len, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ) { - int ret; - size_t i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned i; uint32_t cur_flags; + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; - for( i = chain_len; i != 0; --i ) + for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i ) { - cur_flags = ver_chain[i-1].flags; + cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1]; + cur_flags = cur->flags; if( NULL != f_vrfy ) - if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, ver_chain[i-1].crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); *flags |= cur_flags; @@ -2302,21 +3083,7 @@ static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( } /* - * Verify the certificate validity - */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, - mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, - const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy ) -{ - return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, - &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, cn, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ) ); -} - -/* - * Verify the certificate validity, with profile + * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version * * This function: * - checks the requested CN (if any) @@ -2324,24 +3091,33 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently * - builds and verifies the chain * - then calls the callback and merges the flags + * + * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb` + * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the + * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will + * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list + * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list + * of CRLs. */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, +static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy ) + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; - x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; - size_t chain_len; - uint32_t *ee_flags = &ver_chain[0].flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + uint32_t ee_flags; *flags = 0; - memset( ver_chain, 0, sizeof( ver_chain ) ); - chain_len = 0; + ee_flags = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain ); if( profile == NULL ) { @@ -2351,28 +3127,44 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, /* check name if requested */ if( cn != NULL ) - x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, ee_flags ); + x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags ); /* Check the type and size of the key */ pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk ); if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 ) - *ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 ) - *ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; /* Check the chain */ - ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, - ver_chain, &chain_len ); + ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile, + &ver_chain, rs_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; + /* Merge end-entity flags */ + ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags; + /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */ - ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, - ver_chain, chain_len, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); + ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); exit: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx ); +#endif + /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */ @@ -2391,6 +3183,77 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, + cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback, + * not restartable). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, NULL, NULL, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ) ); +} + + /* * Initialize a certificate chain */ @@ -2460,7 +3323,17 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); } - if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL ) + seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer ) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len ); mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p ); @@ -2483,4 +3356,36 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) while( cert_cur != NULL ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &ctx->pk ); + + ctx->parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + + ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none; + ctx->self_cnt = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ctx->ver_chain ); +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &ctx->pk ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_csr.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_csr.c similarity index 86% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_csr.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_csr.c index f8442572..25069b2a 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509_csr.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509_csr.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -29,15 +27,12 @@ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -68,7 +63,7 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *ver ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -78,7 +73,7 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -90,7 +85,7 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; unsigned char *p, *end; mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params; @@ -136,8 +131,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } /* @@ -149,7 +144,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; @@ -181,7 +176,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &csr->subject ) ) != 0 ) @@ -215,7 +210,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -249,8 +244,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -262,7 +257,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t use_len; mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif @@ -279,15 +274,24 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, siz { mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", - "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", - buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + } if( ret == 0 ) + { /* * Was PEM encoded, parse the result */ ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( csr, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); + } mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) @@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, siz */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; @@ -319,6 +323,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) #define BEFORE_COLON 14 #define BC "14" /* @@ -327,7 +332,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ) int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; char *p; char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; @@ -363,6 +368,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, return( (int) ( size - n ) ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Initialize a CSR diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509write_crt.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509write_crt.c similarity index 50% rename from components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509write_crt.c rename to components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509write_crt.c index b1ef216c..c8169f1f 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509write_crt.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * X.509 certificate writing * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ /* * References: @@ -25,19 +23,16 @@ * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include @@ -64,41 +59,46 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) ); } -void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version ) +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int version ) { ctx->version = version; } -void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) { ctx->md_alg = md_alg; } -void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) { ctx->subject_key = key; } -void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) { ctx->issuer_key = key; } int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, - const char *subject_name ) + const char *subject_name ) { return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->subject, subject_name ); } int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, - const char *issuer_name ) + const char *issuer_name ) { return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->issuer, issuer_name ); } -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial ) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *serial ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->serial, serial ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -106,8 +106,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls return( 0 ); } -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before, - const char *not_after ) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *not_before, + const char *not_after ) { if( strlen( not_before ) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1 || strlen( not_after ) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1 ) @@ -127,14 +128,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) { - return mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, - critical, val, val_len ); + return( mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + critical, val, val_len ) ); } int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, - int is_ca, int max_pathlen ) + int is_ca, int max_pathlen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[9]; unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); size_t len = 0; @@ -148,32 +149,36 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, { if( max_pathlen >= 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, max_pathlen ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, + max_pathlen ) ); } MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( &c, buf, 1 ) ); } MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), - 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ); + return( + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), + is_ca, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ) ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); size_t len = 0; memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->subject_key ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->subject_key ) ); - ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, + ret = mbedtls_sha1( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20 ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -181,24 +186,27 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ct len = 20; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); - return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), - 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ); + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ); } int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof( buf ); size_t len = 0; memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->issuer_key ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->issuer_key ) ); - ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, + ret = mbedtls_sha1( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20 ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -206,38 +214,55 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert * len = 20; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0 ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), - 0, buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len ); + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( + ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), + 0, buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned int key_usage ) { - unsigned char buf[4], ku; + unsigned char buf[5] = {0}, ku[2] = {0}; unsigned char *c; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned int allowed_bits = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; - /* We currently only support 7 bits, from 0x80 to 0x02 */ - if( ( key_usage & ~0xfe ) != 0 ) + /* Check that nothing other than the allowed flags is set */ + if( ( key_usage & ~allowed_bits ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - c = buf + 4; - ku = (unsigned char) key_usage; + c = buf + 5; + ku[0] = (unsigned char)( key_usage ); + ku[1] = (unsigned char)( key_usage >> 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, ku, 9 ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &ku, 7 ) ) != 4 ) + if( ret < 0 ) return( ret ); + else if( ret < 3 || ret > 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), - 1, buf, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), + 1, c, (size_t)ret ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -247,18 +272,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char ns_cert_type ) { - unsigned char buf[4]; + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; unsigned char *c; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; c = buf + 4; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ) ) != 4 ) + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) return( ret ); ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), - 0, buf, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), + 0, c, (size_t)ret ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -268,7 +294,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *t, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* @@ -280,7 +306,8 @@ static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, (const unsigned char *) t + 2, size - 2 ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME ) ); } else { @@ -288,31 +315,32 @@ static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, (const unsigned char *) t, size ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) ); } return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const char *sig_oid; size_t sig_oid_len = 0; unsigned char *c, *c2; unsigned char hash[64]; - unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char tmp_buf[2048]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; /* - * Prepare data to be signed in tmp_buf + * Prepare data to be signed at the end of the target buffer */ - c = tmp_buf + sizeof( tmp_buf ); + c = buf + size; /* Signature algorithm needed in TBS, and later for actual signature */ @@ -338,27 +366,36 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, /* Only for v3 */ if( ctx->version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 ) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->extensions ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, + buf, ctx->extensions ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3 ) ); } /* * SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->subject_key, - tmp_buf, c - tmp_buf ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->subject_key, + buf, c - buf ) ); c -= pub_len; len += pub_len; /* * Subject ::= Name */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->subject ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->subject ) ); /* * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -367,32 +404,39 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, */ sub_len = 0; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, x509_write_time( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->not_after, - MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + x509_write_time( &c, buf, ctx->not_after, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, x509_write_time( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->not_before, - MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + x509_write_time( &c, buf, ctx->not_before, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); len += sub_len; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, sub_len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, sub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); /* * Issuer ::= Name */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->issuer ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->issuer ) ); /* * Signature ::= AlgorithmIdentifier */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, tmp_buf, - sig_oid, strlen( sig_oid ), 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, + sig_oid, strlen( sig_oid ), 0 ) ); /* * Serial ::= INTEGER */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, tmp_buf, &ctx->serial ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, + &ctx->serial ) ); /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } @@ -402,48 +446,67 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, if( ctx->version != MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 ) { sub_len = 0; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->version ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, ctx->version ) ); len += sub_len; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, sub_len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, sub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ); } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); /* * Make signature */ + + /* Compute hash of CRT. */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->issuer_key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, - f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->issuer_key, ctx->md_alg, + hash, 0, sig, sizeof( sig ), &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } - /* - * Write data to output buffer - */ + /* Move CRT to the front of the buffer to have space + * for the signature. */ + memmove( buf, c, len ); + c = buf + len; + + /* Add signature at the end of the buffer, + * making sure that it doesn't underflow + * into the CRT buffer. */ c2 = buf + size; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, c, sig_oid, sig_oid_len, sig, sig_len ) ); - if( len > (size_t)( c2 - buf ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + /* + * Memory layout after this step: + * + * buf c=buf+len c2 buf+size + * [CRT0,...,CRTn, UNUSED, ..., UNUSED, SIG0, ..., SIGm] + */ - c2 -= len; - memcpy( c2, c, len ); + /* Move raw CRT to just before the signature. */ + c = c2 - len; + memmove( c, buf, len ); len += sig_and_oid_len; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c2, buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c2, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); return( (int) len ); @@ -453,23 +516,23 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, #define PEM_END_CRT "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *crt, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *crt, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) { - int ret; - unsigned char output_buf[4096]; - size_t olen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( crt, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf), + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( crt, buf, size, f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) { return( ret ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CRT, PEM_END_CRT, - output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, - ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + buf + size - ret, ret, + buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509write_csr.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509write_csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..555f2963 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Signing Request writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * References: + * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 + * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->subject ); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->extensions ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + ctx->key = key; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *subject_name ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->subject, subject_name ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + critical, val, val_len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), + 0, c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), + 0, c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509write_csr_der_internal( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *sig_oid; + size_t sig_oid_len = 0; + unsigned char *c, *c2; + unsigned char hash[64]; + size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( ctx->md_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Write the CSR backwards starting from the end of buf */ + c = buf + size; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, buf, + ctx->extensions ) ); + + if( len ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( + &c, buf, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->key, + buf, c - buf ) ); + c -= pub_len; + len += pub_len; + + /* + * Subject ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->subject ) ); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* + * Sign the written CSR data into the sig buffer + * Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, c, len ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, + sig, sig_size, &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + else if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, + &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Move the written CSR data to the start of buf to create space for + * writing the signature into buf. + */ + memmove( buf, c, len ); + + /* + * Write sig and its OID into buf backwards from the end of buf. + * Note: mbedtls_x509_write_sig will check for c2 - ( buf + len ) < sig_len + * and return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if needed. + */ + c2 = buf + size; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, + mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, buf + len, sig_oid, sig_oid_len, + sig, sig_len ) ); + + /* + * Compact the space between the CSR data and signature by moving the + * CSR data to the start of the signature. + */ + c2 -= len; + memmove( c2, buf, len ); + + /* ASN encode the total size and tag the CSR data with it. */ + len += sig_and_oid_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c2, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c2, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* Zero the unused bytes at the start of buf */ + memset( buf, 0, c2 - buf); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *sig; + + if( ( sig = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) ) == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ret = x509write_csr_der_internal( ctx, buf, size, + sig, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, + f_rng, p_rng ); + + mbedtls_free( sig ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#define PEM_BEGIN_CSR "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" +#define PEM_END_CSR "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( ctx, buf, size, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CSR, PEM_END_CSR, + buf + size - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/arc4.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/arc4.c deleted file mode 100644 index b8998ac6..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/arc4.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,201 +0,0 @@ -/* - * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. - * - * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) - -void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); -} - -/* - * ARC4 key schedule - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen ) -{ - int i, j, a; - unsigned int k; - unsigned char *m; - - ctx->x = 0; - ctx->y = 0; - m = ctx->m; - - for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) - m[i] = (unsigned char) i; - - j = k = 0; - - for( i = 0; i < 256; i++, k++ ) - { - if( k >= keylen ) k = 0; - - a = m[i]; - j = ( j + a + key[k] ) & 0xFF; - m[i] = m[j]; - m[j] = (unsigned char) a; - } -} - -/* - * ARC4 cipher function - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int x, y, a, b; - size_t i; - unsigned char *m; - - x = ctx->x; - y = ctx->y; - m = ctx->m; - - for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) - { - x = ( x + 1 ) & 0xFF; a = m[x]; - y = ( y + a ) & 0xFF; b = m[y]; - - m[x] = (unsigned char) b; - m[y] = (unsigned char) a; - - output[i] = (unsigned char) - ( input[i] ^ m[(unsigned char)( a + b )] ); - } - - ctx->x = x; - ctx->y = y; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * ARC4 tests vectors as posted by Eric Rescorla in sep. 1994: - * - * http://groups.google.com/group/comp.security.misc/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 - */ -static const unsigned char arc4_test_key[3][8] = -{ - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char arc4_test_pt[3][8] = -{ - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char arc4_test_ct[3][8] = -{ - { 0x75, 0xB7, 0x87, 0x80, 0x99, 0xE0, 0xC5, 0x96 }, - { 0x74, 0x94, 0xC2, 0xE7, 0x10, 0x4B, 0x08, 0x79 }, - { 0xDE, 0x18, 0x89, 0x41, 0xA3, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x3A } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char ibuf[8]; - unsigned char obuf[8]; - mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; - - mbedtls_arc4_init( &ctx ); - - for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " ARC4 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); - - memcpy( ibuf, arc4_test_pt[i], 8 ); - - mbedtls_arc4_setup( &ctx, arc4_test_key[i], 8 ); - mbedtls_arc4_crypt( &ctx, 8, ibuf, obuf ); - - if( memcmp( obuf, arc4_test_ct[i], 8 ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - -exit: - mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/blowfish.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/blowfish.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5b6bb988..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/blowfish.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,652 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Blowfish implementation - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The Blowfish block cipher was designed by Bruce Schneier in 1993. - * http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html - * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowfish_%28cipher%29 - * - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - -static const uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2] = { - 0x243F6A88L, 0x85A308D3L, 0x13198A2EL, 0x03707344L, - 0xA4093822L, 0x299F31D0L, 0x082EFA98L, 0xEC4E6C89L, - 0x452821E6L, 0x38D01377L, 0xBE5466CFL, 0x34E90C6CL, - 0xC0AC29B7L, 0xC97C50DDL, 0x3F84D5B5L, 0xB5470917L, - 0x9216D5D9L, 0x8979FB1BL -}; - -/* declarations of data at the end of this file */ -static const uint32_t S[4][256]; - -static uint32_t F( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t x ) -{ - unsigned short a, b, c, d; - uint32_t y; - - d = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); - x >>= 8; - c = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); - x >>= 8; - b = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); - x >>= 8; - a = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); - y = ctx->S[0][a] + ctx->S[1][b]; - y = y ^ ctx->S[2][c]; - y = y + ctx->S[3][d]; - - return( y ); -} - -static void blowfish_enc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr ) -{ - uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; - short i; - - Xl = *xl; - Xr = *xr; - - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS; ++i ) - { - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; - Xr = F( ctx, Xl ) ^ Xr; - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - } - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - - Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS]; - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1]; - - *xl = Xl; - *xr = Xr; -} - -static void blowfish_dec( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr ) -{ - uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; - short i; - - Xl = *xl; - Xr = *xr; - - for( i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1; i > 1; --i ) - { - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; - Xr = F( ctx, Xl ) ^ Xr; - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - } - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - - Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[1]; - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[0]; - - *xl = Xl; - *xr = Xr; -} - -void mbedtls_blowfish_init( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_blowfish_free( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); -} - -/* - * Blowfish key schedule - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ) -{ - unsigned int i, j, k; - uint32_t data, datal, datar; - - if( keybits < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS || keybits > MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS || - ( keybits % 8 ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); - } - - keybits >>= 3; - - for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) - { - for( j = 0; j < 256; j++ ) - ctx->S[i][j] = S[i][j]; - } - - j = 0; - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; ++i ) - { - data = 0x00000000; - for( k = 0; k < 4; ++k ) - { - data = ( data << 8 ) | key[j++]; - if( j >= keybits ) - j = 0; - } - ctx->P[i] = P[i] ^ data; - } - - datal = 0x00000000; - datar = 0x00000000; - - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2 ) - { - blowfish_enc( ctx, &datal, &datar ); - ctx->P[i] = datal; - ctx->P[i + 1] = datar; - } - - for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) - { - for( j = 0; j < 256; j += 2 ) - { - blowfish_enc( ctx, &datal, &datar ); - ctx->S[i][j] = datal; - ctx->S[i][j + 1] = datar; - } - } - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE] ) -{ - uint32_t X0, X1; - - GET_UINT32_BE( X0, input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( X1, input, 4 ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) - { - blowfish_dec( ctx, &X0, &X1 ); - } - else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT */ - { - blowfish_enc( ctx, &X0, &X1 ); - } - - PUT_UINT32_BE( X0, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( X1, output, 4 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* - * Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int i; - unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]; - - if( length % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) - { - while( length > 0 ) - { - memcpy( temp, input, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); - - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE;i++ ) - output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); - - memcpy( iv, temp, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); - - input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - else - { - while( length > 0 ) - { - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) - output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); - - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); - memcpy( iv, output, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); - - input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/* - * Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int c; - size_t n = *iv_off; - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) - { - while( length-- ) - { - if( n == 0 ) - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); - - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); - iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; - - n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - else - { - while( length-- ) - { - if( n == 0 ) - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); - - iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); - - n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - - *iv_off = n; - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/* - * Blowfish CTR buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int c, i; - size_t n = *nc_off; - - while( length-- ) - { - if( n == 0 ) { - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, - stream_block ); - - for( i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) - if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - } - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); - - n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - - *nc_off = n; - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -static const uint32_t S[4][256] = { - { 0xD1310BA6L, 0x98DFB5ACL, 0x2FFD72DBL, 0xD01ADFB7L, - 0xB8E1AFEDL, 0x6A267E96L, 0xBA7C9045L, 0xF12C7F99L, - 0x24A19947L, 0xB3916CF7L, 0x0801F2E2L, 0x858EFC16L, - 0x636920D8L, 0x71574E69L, 0xA458FEA3L, 0xF4933D7EL, - 0x0D95748FL, 0x728EB658L, 0x718BCD58L, 0x82154AEEL, - 0x7B54A41DL, 0xC25A59B5L, 0x9C30D539L, 0x2AF26013L, - 0xC5D1B023L, 0x286085F0L, 0xCA417918L, 0xB8DB38EFL, - 0x8E79DCB0L, 0x603A180EL, 0x6C9E0E8BL, 0xB01E8A3EL, - 0xD71577C1L, 0xBD314B27L, 0x78AF2FDAL, 0x55605C60L, - 0xE65525F3L, 0xAA55AB94L, 0x57489862L, 0x63E81440L, - 0x55CA396AL, 0x2AAB10B6L, 0xB4CC5C34L, 0x1141E8CEL, - 0xA15486AFL, 0x7C72E993L, 0xB3EE1411L, 0x636FBC2AL, - 0x2BA9C55DL, 0x741831F6L, 0xCE5C3E16L, 0x9B87931EL, - 0xAFD6BA33L, 0x6C24CF5CL, 0x7A325381L, 0x28958677L, - 0x3B8F4898L, 0x6B4BB9AFL, 0xC4BFE81BL, 0x66282193L, - 0x61D809CCL, 0xFB21A991L, 0x487CAC60L, 0x5DEC8032L, - 0xEF845D5DL, 0xE98575B1L, 0xDC262302L, 0xEB651B88L, - 0x23893E81L, 0xD396ACC5L, 0x0F6D6FF3L, 0x83F44239L, - 0x2E0B4482L, 0xA4842004L, 0x69C8F04AL, 0x9E1F9B5EL, - 0x21C66842L, 0xF6E96C9AL, 0x670C9C61L, 0xABD388F0L, - 0x6A51A0D2L, 0xD8542F68L, 0x960FA728L, 0xAB5133A3L, - 0x6EEF0B6CL, 0x137A3BE4L, 0xBA3BF050L, 0x7EFB2A98L, - 0xA1F1651DL, 0x39AF0176L, 0x66CA593EL, 0x82430E88L, - 0x8CEE8619L, 0x456F9FB4L, 0x7D84A5C3L, 0x3B8B5EBEL, - 0xE06F75D8L, 0x85C12073L, 0x401A449FL, 0x56C16AA6L, - 0x4ED3AA62L, 0x363F7706L, 0x1BFEDF72L, 0x429B023DL, - 0x37D0D724L, 0xD00A1248L, 0xDB0FEAD3L, 0x49F1C09BL, - 0x075372C9L, 0x80991B7BL, 0x25D479D8L, 0xF6E8DEF7L, - 0xE3FE501AL, 0xB6794C3BL, 0x976CE0BDL, 0x04C006BAL, - 0xC1A94FB6L, 0x409F60C4L, 0x5E5C9EC2L, 0x196A2463L, - 0x68FB6FAFL, 0x3E6C53B5L, 0x1339B2EBL, 0x3B52EC6FL, - 0x6DFC511FL, 0x9B30952CL, 0xCC814544L, 0xAF5EBD09L, - 0xBEE3D004L, 0xDE334AFDL, 0x660F2807L, 0x192E4BB3L, - 0xC0CBA857L, 0x45C8740FL, 0xD20B5F39L, 0xB9D3FBDBL, - 0x5579C0BDL, 0x1A60320AL, 0xD6A100C6L, 0x402C7279L, - 0x679F25FEL, 0xFB1FA3CCL, 0x8EA5E9F8L, 0xDB3222F8L, - 0x3C7516DFL, 0xFD616B15L, 0x2F501EC8L, 0xAD0552ABL, - 0x323DB5FAL, 0xFD238760L, 0x53317B48L, 0x3E00DF82L, - 0x9E5C57BBL, 0xCA6F8CA0L, 0x1A87562EL, 0xDF1769DBL, - 0xD542A8F6L, 0x287EFFC3L, 0xAC6732C6L, 0x8C4F5573L, - 0x695B27B0L, 0xBBCA58C8L, 0xE1FFA35DL, 0xB8F011A0L, - 0x10FA3D98L, 0xFD2183B8L, 0x4AFCB56CL, 0x2DD1D35BL, - 0x9A53E479L, 0xB6F84565L, 0xD28E49BCL, 0x4BFB9790L, - 0xE1DDF2DAL, 0xA4CB7E33L, 0x62FB1341L, 0xCEE4C6E8L, - 0xEF20CADAL, 0x36774C01L, 0xD07E9EFEL, 0x2BF11FB4L, - 0x95DBDA4DL, 0xAE909198L, 0xEAAD8E71L, 0x6B93D5A0L, - 0xD08ED1D0L, 0xAFC725E0L, 0x8E3C5B2FL, 0x8E7594B7L, - 0x8FF6E2FBL, 0xF2122B64L, 0x8888B812L, 0x900DF01CL, - 0x4FAD5EA0L, 0x688FC31CL, 0xD1CFF191L, 0xB3A8C1ADL, - 0x2F2F2218L, 0xBE0E1777L, 0xEA752DFEL, 0x8B021FA1L, - 0xE5A0CC0FL, 0xB56F74E8L, 0x18ACF3D6L, 0xCE89E299L, - 0xB4A84FE0L, 0xFD13E0B7L, 0x7CC43B81L, 0xD2ADA8D9L, - 0x165FA266L, 0x80957705L, 0x93CC7314L, 0x211A1477L, - 0xE6AD2065L, 0x77B5FA86L, 0xC75442F5L, 0xFB9D35CFL, - 0xEBCDAF0CL, 0x7B3E89A0L, 0xD6411BD3L, 0xAE1E7E49L, - 0x00250E2DL, 0x2071B35EL, 0x226800BBL, 0x57B8E0AFL, - 0x2464369BL, 0xF009B91EL, 0x5563911DL, 0x59DFA6AAL, - 0x78C14389L, 0xD95A537FL, 0x207D5BA2L, 0x02E5B9C5L, - 0x83260376L, 0x6295CFA9L, 0x11C81968L, 0x4E734A41L, - 0xB3472DCAL, 0x7B14A94AL, 0x1B510052L, 0x9A532915L, - 0xD60F573FL, 0xBC9BC6E4L, 0x2B60A476L, 0x81E67400L, - 0x08BA6FB5L, 0x571BE91FL, 0xF296EC6BL, 0x2A0DD915L, - 0xB6636521L, 0xE7B9F9B6L, 0xFF34052EL, 0xC5855664L, - 0x53B02D5DL, 0xA99F8FA1L, 0x08BA4799L, 0x6E85076AL }, - { 0x4B7A70E9L, 0xB5B32944L, 0xDB75092EL, 0xC4192623L, - 0xAD6EA6B0L, 0x49A7DF7DL, 0x9CEE60B8L, 0x8FEDB266L, - 0xECAA8C71L, 0x699A17FFL, 0x5664526CL, 0xC2B19EE1L, - 0x193602A5L, 0x75094C29L, 0xA0591340L, 0xE4183A3EL, - 0x3F54989AL, 0x5B429D65L, 0x6B8FE4D6L, 0x99F73FD6L, - 0xA1D29C07L, 0xEFE830F5L, 0x4D2D38E6L, 0xF0255DC1L, - 0x4CDD2086L, 0x8470EB26L, 0x6382E9C6L, 0x021ECC5EL, - 0x09686B3FL, 0x3EBAEFC9L, 0x3C971814L, 0x6B6A70A1L, - 0x687F3584L, 0x52A0E286L, 0xB79C5305L, 0xAA500737L, - 0x3E07841CL, 0x7FDEAE5CL, 0x8E7D44ECL, 0x5716F2B8L, - 0xB03ADA37L, 0xF0500C0DL, 0xF01C1F04L, 0x0200B3FFL, - 0xAE0CF51AL, 0x3CB574B2L, 0x25837A58L, 0xDC0921BDL, - 0xD19113F9L, 0x7CA92FF6L, 0x94324773L, 0x22F54701L, - 0x3AE5E581L, 0x37C2DADCL, 0xC8B57634L, 0x9AF3DDA7L, - 0xA9446146L, 0x0FD0030EL, 0xECC8C73EL, 0xA4751E41L, - 0xE238CD99L, 0x3BEA0E2FL, 0x3280BBA1L, 0x183EB331L, - 0x4E548B38L, 0x4F6DB908L, 0x6F420D03L, 0xF60A04BFL, - 0x2CB81290L, 0x24977C79L, 0x5679B072L, 0xBCAF89AFL, - 0xDE9A771FL, 0xD9930810L, 0xB38BAE12L, 0xDCCF3F2EL, - 0x5512721FL, 0x2E6B7124L, 0x501ADDE6L, 0x9F84CD87L, - 0x7A584718L, 0x7408DA17L, 0xBC9F9ABCL, 0xE94B7D8CL, - 0xEC7AEC3AL, 0xDB851DFAL, 0x63094366L, 0xC464C3D2L, - 0xEF1C1847L, 0x3215D908L, 0xDD433B37L, 0x24C2BA16L, - 0x12A14D43L, 0x2A65C451L, 0x50940002L, 0x133AE4DDL, - 0x71DFF89EL, 0x10314E55L, 0x81AC77D6L, 0x5F11199BL, - 0x043556F1L, 0xD7A3C76BL, 0x3C11183BL, 0x5924A509L, - 0xF28FE6EDL, 0x97F1FBFAL, 0x9EBABF2CL, 0x1E153C6EL, - 0x86E34570L, 0xEAE96FB1L, 0x860E5E0AL, 0x5A3E2AB3L, - 0x771FE71CL, 0x4E3D06FAL, 0x2965DCB9L, 0x99E71D0FL, - 0x803E89D6L, 0x5266C825L, 0x2E4CC978L, 0x9C10B36AL, - 0xC6150EBAL, 0x94E2EA78L, 0xA5FC3C53L, 0x1E0A2DF4L, - 0xF2F74EA7L, 0x361D2B3DL, 0x1939260FL, 0x19C27960L, - 0x5223A708L, 0xF71312B6L, 0xEBADFE6EL, 0xEAC31F66L, - 0xE3BC4595L, 0xA67BC883L, 0xB17F37D1L, 0x018CFF28L, - 0xC332DDEFL, 0xBE6C5AA5L, 0x65582185L, 0x68AB9802L, - 0xEECEA50FL, 0xDB2F953BL, 0x2AEF7DADL, 0x5B6E2F84L, - 0x1521B628L, 0x29076170L, 0xECDD4775L, 0x619F1510L, - 0x13CCA830L, 0xEB61BD96L, 0x0334FE1EL, 0xAA0363CFL, - 0xB5735C90L, 0x4C70A239L, 0xD59E9E0BL, 0xCBAADE14L, - 0xEECC86BCL, 0x60622CA7L, 0x9CAB5CABL, 0xB2F3846EL, - 0x648B1EAFL, 0x19BDF0CAL, 0xA02369B9L, 0x655ABB50L, - 0x40685A32L, 0x3C2AB4B3L, 0x319EE9D5L, 0xC021B8F7L, - 0x9B540B19L, 0x875FA099L, 0x95F7997EL, 0x623D7DA8L, - 0xF837889AL, 0x97E32D77L, 0x11ED935FL, 0x16681281L, - 0x0E358829L, 0xC7E61FD6L, 0x96DEDFA1L, 0x7858BA99L, - 0x57F584A5L, 0x1B227263L, 0x9B83C3FFL, 0x1AC24696L, - 0xCDB30AEBL, 0x532E3054L, 0x8FD948E4L, 0x6DBC3128L, - 0x58EBF2EFL, 0x34C6FFEAL, 0xFE28ED61L, 0xEE7C3C73L, - 0x5D4A14D9L, 0xE864B7E3L, 0x42105D14L, 0x203E13E0L, - 0x45EEE2B6L, 0xA3AAABEAL, 0xDB6C4F15L, 0xFACB4FD0L, - 0xC742F442L, 0xEF6ABBB5L, 0x654F3B1DL, 0x41CD2105L, - 0xD81E799EL, 0x86854DC7L, 0xE44B476AL, 0x3D816250L, - 0xCF62A1F2L, 0x5B8D2646L, 0xFC8883A0L, 0xC1C7B6A3L, - 0x7F1524C3L, 0x69CB7492L, 0x47848A0BL, 0x5692B285L, - 0x095BBF00L, 0xAD19489DL, 0x1462B174L, 0x23820E00L, - 0x58428D2AL, 0x0C55F5EAL, 0x1DADF43EL, 0x233F7061L, - 0x3372F092L, 0x8D937E41L, 0xD65FECF1L, 0x6C223BDBL, - 0x7CDE3759L, 0xCBEE7460L, 0x4085F2A7L, 0xCE77326EL, - 0xA6078084L, 0x19F8509EL, 0xE8EFD855L, 0x61D99735L, - 0xA969A7AAL, 0xC50C06C2L, 0x5A04ABFCL, 0x800BCADCL, - 0x9E447A2EL, 0xC3453484L, 0xFDD56705L, 0x0E1E9EC9L, - 0xDB73DBD3L, 0x105588CDL, 0x675FDA79L, 0xE3674340L, - 0xC5C43465L, 0x713E38D8L, 0x3D28F89EL, 0xF16DFF20L, - 0x153E21E7L, 0x8FB03D4AL, 0xE6E39F2BL, 0xDB83ADF7L }, - { 0xE93D5A68L, 0x948140F7L, 0xF64C261CL, 0x94692934L, - 0x411520F7L, 0x7602D4F7L, 0xBCF46B2EL, 0xD4A20068L, - 0xD4082471L, 0x3320F46AL, 0x43B7D4B7L, 0x500061AFL, - 0x1E39F62EL, 0x97244546L, 0x14214F74L, 0xBF8B8840L, - 0x4D95FC1DL, 0x96B591AFL, 0x70F4DDD3L, 0x66A02F45L, - 0xBFBC09ECL, 0x03BD9785L, 0x7FAC6DD0L, 0x31CB8504L, - 0x96EB27B3L, 0x55FD3941L, 0xDA2547E6L, 0xABCA0A9AL, - 0x28507825L, 0x530429F4L, 0x0A2C86DAL, 0xE9B66DFBL, - 0x68DC1462L, 0xD7486900L, 0x680EC0A4L, 0x27A18DEEL, - 0x4F3FFEA2L, 0xE887AD8CL, 0xB58CE006L, 0x7AF4D6B6L, - 0xAACE1E7CL, 0xD3375FECL, 0xCE78A399L, 0x406B2A42L, - 0x20FE9E35L, 0xD9F385B9L, 0xEE39D7ABL, 0x3B124E8BL, - 0x1DC9FAF7L, 0x4B6D1856L, 0x26A36631L, 0xEAE397B2L, - 0x3A6EFA74L, 0xDD5B4332L, 0x6841E7F7L, 0xCA7820FBL, - 0xFB0AF54EL, 0xD8FEB397L, 0x454056ACL, 0xBA489527L, - 0x55533A3AL, 0x20838D87L, 0xFE6BA9B7L, 0xD096954BL, - 0x55A867BCL, 0xA1159A58L, 0xCCA92963L, 0x99E1DB33L, - 0xA62A4A56L, 0x3F3125F9L, 0x5EF47E1CL, 0x9029317CL, - 0xFDF8E802L, 0x04272F70L, 0x80BB155CL, 0x05282CE3L, - 0x95C11548L, 0xE4C66D22L, 0x48C1133FL, 0xC70F86DCL, - 0x07F9C9EEL, 0x41041F0FL, 0x404779A4L, 0x5D886E17L, - 0x325F51EBL, 0xD59BC0D1L, 0xF2BCC18FL, 0x41113564L, - 0x257B7834L, 0x602A9C60L, 0xDFF8E8A3L, 0x1F636C1BL, - 0x0E12B4C2L, 0x02E1329EL, 0xAF664FD1L, 0xCAD18115L, - 0x6B2395E0L, 0x333E92E1L, 0x3B240B62L, 0xEEBEB922L, - 0x85B2A20EL, 0xE6BA0D99L, 0xDE720C8CL, 0x2DA2F728L, - 0xD0127845L, 0x95B794FDL, 0x647D0862L, 0xE7CCF5F0L, - 0x5449A36FL, 0x877D48FAL, 0xC39DFD27L, 0xF33E8D1EL, - 0x0A476341L, 0x992EFF74L, 0x3A6F6EABL, 0xF4F8FD37L, - 0xA812DC60L, 0xA1EBDDF8L, 0x991BE14CL, 0xDB6E6B0DL, - 0xC67B5510L, 0x6D672C37L, 0x2765D43BL, 0xDCD0E804L, - 0xF1290DC7L, 0xCC00FFA3L, 0xB5390F92L, 0x690FED0BL, - 0x667B9FFBL, 0xCEDB7D9CL, 0xA091CF0BL, 0xD9155EA3L, - 0xBB132F88L, 0x515BAD24L, 0x7B9479BFL, 0x763BD6EBL, - 0x37392EB3L, 0xCC115979L, 0x8026E297L, 0xF42E312DL, - 0x6842ADA7L, 0xC66A2B3BL, 0x12754CCCL, 0x782EF11CL, - 0x6A124237L, 0xB79251E7L, 0x06A1BBE6L, 0x4BFB6350L, - 0x1A6B1018L, 0x11CAEDFAL, 0x3D25BDD8L, 0xE2E1C3C9L, - 0x44421659L, 0x0A121386L, 0xD90CEC6EL, 0xD5ABEA2AL, - 0x64AF674EL, 0xDA86A85FL, 0xBEBFE988L, 0x64E4C3FEL, - 0x9DBC8057L, 0xF0F7C086L, 0x60787BF8L, 0x6003604DL, - 0xD1FD8346L, 0xF6381FB0L, 0x7745AE04L, 0xD736FCCCL, - 0x83426B33L, 0xF01EAB71L, 0xB0804187L, 0x3C005E5FL, - 0x77A057BEL, 0xBDE8AE24L, 0x55464299L, 0xBF582E61L, - 0x4E58F48FL, 0xF2DDFDA2L, 0xF474EF38L, 0x8789BDC2L, - 0x5366F9C3L, 0xC8B38E74L, 0xB475F255L, 0x46FCD9B9L, - 0x7AEB2661L, 0x8B1DDF84L, 0x846A0E79L, 0x915F95E2L, - 0x466E598EL, 0x20B45770L, 0x8CD55591L, 0xC902DE4CL, - 0xB90BACE1L, 0xBB8205D0L, 0x11A86248L, 0x7574A99EL, - 0xB77F19B6L, 0xE0A9DC09L, 0x662D09A1L, 0xC4324633L, - 0xE85A1F02L, 0x09F0BE8CL, 0x4A99A025L, 0x1D6EFE10L, - 0x1AB93D1DL, 0x0BA5A4DFL, 0xA186F20FL, 0x2868F169L, - 0xDCB7DA83L, 0x573906FEL, 0xA1E2CE9BL, 0x4FCD7F52L, - 0x50115E01L, 0xA70683FAL, 0xA002B5C4L, 0x0DE6D027L, - 0x9AF88C27L, 0x773F8641L, 0xC3604C06L, 0x61A806B5L, - 0xF0177A28L, 0xC0F586E0L, 0x006058AAL, 0x30DC7D62L, - 0x11E69ED7L, 0x2338EA63L, 0x53C2DD94L, 0xC2C21634L, - 0xBBCBEE56L, 0x90BCB6DEL, 0xEBFC7DA1L, 0xCE591D76L, - 0x6F05E409L, 0x4B7C0188L, 0x39720A3DL, 0x7C927C24L, - 0x86E3725FL, 0x724D9DB9L, 0x1AC15BB4L, 0xD39EB8FCL, - 0xED545578L, 0x08FCA5B5L, 0xD83D7CD3L, 0x4DAD0FC4L, - 0x1E50EF5EL, 0xB161E6F8L, 0xA28514D9L, 0x6C51133CL, - 0x6FD5C7E7L, 0x56E14EC4L, 0x362ABFCEL, 0xDDC6C837L, - 0xD79A3234L, 0x92638212L, 0x670EFA8EL, 0x406000E0L }, - { 0x3A39CE37L, 0xD3FAF5CFL, 0xABC27737L, 0x5AC52D1BL, - 0x5CB0679EL, 0x4FA33742L, 0xD3822740L, 0x99BC9BBEL, - 0xD5118E9DL, 0xBF0F7315L, 0xD62D1C7EL, 0xC700C47BL, - 0xB78C1B6BL, 0x21A19045L, 0xB26EB1BEL, 0x6A366EB4L, - 0x5748AB2FL, 0xBC946E79L, 0xC6A376D2L, 0x6549C2C8L, - 0x530FF8EEL, 0x468DDE7DL, 0xD5730A1DL, 0x4CD04DC6L, - 0x2939BBDBL, 0xA9BA4650L, 0xAC9526E8L, 0xBE5EE304L, - 0xA1FAD5F0L, 0x6A2D519AL, 0x63EF8CE2L, 0x9A86EE22L, - 0xC089C2B8L, 0x43242EF6L, 0xA51E03AAL, 0x9CF2D0A4L, - 0x83C061BAL, 0x9BE96A4DL, 0x8FE51550L, 0xBA645BD6L, - 0x2826A2F9L, 0xA73A3AE1L, 0x4BA99586L, 0xEF5562E9L, - 0xC72FEFD3L, 0xF752F7DAL, 0x3F046F69L, 0x77FA0A59L, - 0x80E4A915L, 0x87B08601L, 0x9B09E6ADL, 0x3B3EE593L, - 0xE990FD5AL, 0x9E34D797L, 0x2CF0B7D9L, 0x022B8B51L, - 0x96D5AC3AL, 0x017DA67DL, 0xD1CF3ED6L, 0x7C7D2D28L, - 0x1F9F25CFL, 0xADF2B89BL, 0x5AD6B472L, 0x5A88F54CL, - 0xE029AC71L, 0xE019A5E6L, 0x47B0ACFDL, 0xED93FA9BL, - 0xE8D3C48DL, 0x283B57CCL, 0xF8D56629L, 0x79132E28L, - 0x785F0191L, 0xED756055L, 0xF7960E44L, 0xE3D35E8CL, - 0x15056DD4L, 0x88F46DBAL, 0x03A16125L, 0x0564F0BDL, - 0xC3EB9E15L, 0x3C9057A2L, 0x97271AECL, 0xA93A072AL, - 0x1B3F6D9BL, 0x1E6321F5L, 0xF59C66FBL, 0x26DCF319L, - 0x7533D928L, 0xB155FDF5L, 0x03563482L, 0x8ABA3CBBL, - 0x28517711L, 0xC20AD9F8L, 0xABCC5167L, 0xCCAD925FL, - 0x4DE81751L, 0x3830DC8EL, 0x379D5862L, 0x9320F991L, - 0xEA7A90C2L, 0xFB3E7BCEL, 0x5121CE64L, 0x774FBE32L, - 0xA8B6E37EL, 0xC3293D46L, 0x48DE5369L, 0x6413E680L, - 0xA2AE0810L, 0xDD6DB224L, 0x69852DFDL, 0x09072166L, - 0xB39A460AL, 0x6445C0DDL, 0x586CDECFL, 0x1C20C8AEL, - 0x5BBEF7DDL, 0x1B588D40L, 0xCCD2017FL, 0x6BB4E3BBL, - 0xDDA26A7EL, 0x3A59FF45L, 0x3E350A44L, 0xBCB4CDD5L, - 0x72EACEA8L, 0xFA6484BBL, 0x8D6612AEL, 0xBF3C6F47L, - 0xD29BE463L, 0x542F5D9EL, 0xAEC2771BL, 0xF64E6370L, - 0x740E0D8DL, 0xE75B1357L, 0xF8721671L, 0xAF537D5DL, - 0x4040CB08L, 0x4EB4E2CCL, 0x34D2466AL, 0x0115AF84L, - 0xE1B00428L, 0x95983A1DL, 0x06B89FB4L, 0xCE6EA048L, - 0x6F3F3B82L, 0x3520AB82L, 0x011A1D4BL, 0x277227F8L, - 0x611560B1L, 0xE7933FDCL, 0xBB3A792BL, 0x344525BDL, - 0xA08839E1L, 0x51CE794BL, 0x2F32C9B7L, 0xA01FBAC9L, - 0xE01CC87EL, 0xBCC7D1F6L, 0xCF0111C3L, 0xA1E8AAC7L, - 0x1A908749L, 0xD44FBD9AL, 0xD0DADECBL, 0xD50ADA38L, - 0x0339C32AL, 0xC6913667L, 0x8DF9317CL, 0xE0B12B4FL, - 0xF79E59B7L, 0x43F5BB3AL, 0xF2D519FFL, 0x27D9459CL, - 0xBF97222CL, 0x15E6FC2AL, 0x0F91FC71L, 0x9B941525L, - 0xFAE59361L, 0xCEB69CEBL, 0xC2A86459L, 0x12BAA8D1L, - 0xB6C1075EL, 0xE3056A0CL, 0x10D25065L, 0xCB03A442L, - 0xE0EC6E0EL, 0x1698DB3BL, 0x4C98A0BEL, 0x3278E964L, - 0x9F1F9532L, 0xE0D392DFL, 0xD3A0342BL, 0x8971F21EL, - 0x1B0A7441L, 0x4BA3348CL, 0xC5BE7120L, 0xC37632D8L, - 0xDF359F8DL, 0x9B992F2EL, 0xE60B6F47L, 0x0FE3F11DL, - 0xE54CDA54L, 0x1EDAD891L, 0xCE6279CFL, 0xCD3E7E6FL, - 0x1618B166L, 0xFD2C1D05L, 0x848FD2C5L, 0xF6FB2299L, - 0xF523F357L, 0xA6327623L, 0x93A83531L, 0x56CCCD02L, - 0xACF08162L, 0x5A75EBB5L, 0x6E163697L, 0x88D273CCL, - 0xDE966292L, 0x81B949D0L, 0x4C50901BL, 0x71C65614L, - 0xE6C6C7BDL, 0x327A140AL, 0x45E1D006L, 0xC3F27B9AL, - 0xC9AA53FDL, 0x62A80F00L, 0xBB25BFE2L, 0x35BDD2F6L, - 0x71126905L, 0xB2040222L, 0xB6CBCF7CL, 0xCD769C2BL, - 0x53113EC0L, 0x1640E3D3L, 0x38ABBD60L, 0x2547ADF0L, - 0xBA38209CL, 0xF746CE76L, 0x77AFA1C5L, 0x20756060L, - 0x85CBFE4EL, 0x8AE88DD8L, 0x7AAAF9B0L, 0x4CF9AA7EL, - 0x1948C25CL, 0x02FB8A8CL, 0x01C36AE4L, 0xD6EBE1F9L, - 0x90D4F869L, 0xA65CDEA0L, 0x3F09252DL, 0xC208E69FL, - 0xB74E6132L, 0xCE77E25BL, 0x578FDFE3L, 0x3AC372E6L } -}; - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/certs.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/certs.c deleted file mode 100644 index f1379b8c..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/certs.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,403 +0,0 @@ -/* - * X.509 test certificates - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/certs.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC \ -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ -"MIICUjCCAdegAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT\r\n" \ -"Ak5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBF\r\n" \ -"QyBDQTAeFw0xMzA5MjQxNTQ5NDhaFw0yMzA5MjIxNTQ5NDhaMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT\r\n" \ -"Ak5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBF\r\n" \ -"QyBDQTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABMPaKzRBN1gvh1b+/Im6KUNLTuBu\r\n" \ -"ww5XUzM5WNRStJGVOQsj318XJGJI/BqVKc4sLYfCiFKAr9ZqqyHduNMcbli4yuiy\r\n" \ -"aY7zQa0pw7RfdadHb9UZKVVpmlM7ILRmFmAzHqOBoDCBnTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUnW0g\r\n" \ -"JEkBPyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnwwbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkBPyvLeLUZvH4kydv7\r\n" \ -"NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UE\r\n" \ -"AxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8w\r\n" \ -"CgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDaQAwZgIxAMO0YnNWKJUAfXgSJtJxexn4ipg+kv4znuR50v56\r\n" \ -"t4d0PCu412mUC6Nnd7izvtE2MgIxAP1nnJQjZ8BWukszFQDG48wxCCyci9qpdSMv\r\n" \ -"uCjn8pwUOkABXK8Mss90fzCfCEOtIA==\r\n" \ -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ); - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[] = -"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -"Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" -"DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E\r\n" -"\r\n" -"IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG\r\n" -"ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq\r\n" -"UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb\r\n" -"a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm\r\n" -"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec ); - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[] = "PolarSSLTest"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec ) - 1; - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[] = -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -"MIICHzCCAaWgAwIBAgIBCTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" -"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" -"MTMwOTI0MTU1MjA0WhcNMjMwOTIyMTU1MjA0WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" -"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG\r\n" -"CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDfMVtl2CR5acj7HWS3/IG7ufPkGkXTQrRS192giWWKSTuUA\r\n" -"2CMR/+ov0jRdXRa9iojCa3cNVc2KKg76Aci07f+jgZ0wgZowCQYDVR0TBAIwADAd\r\n" -"BgNVHQ4EFgQUUGGlj9QH2deCAQzlZX+MY0anE74wbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkB\r\n" -"PyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xh\r\n" -"clNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoG\r\n" -"CCqGSM49BAMCA2gAMGUCMQCaLFzXptui5WQN8LlO3ddh1hMxx6tzgLvT03MTVK2S\r\n" -"C12r0Lz3ri/moSEpNZWqPjkCMCE2f53GXcYLqyfyJR078c/xNSUU5+Xxl7VZ414V\r\n" -"fGa5kHvHARBPc8YAIVIqDvHH1Q==\r\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec ); - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[] = -"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -"MHcCAQEEIPEqEyB2AnCoPL/9U/YDHvdqXYbIogTywwyp6/UfDw6noAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" -"AwEHoUQDQgAEN8xW2XYJHlpyPsdZLf8gbu58+QaRdNCtFLX3aCJZYpJO5QDYIxH/\r\n" -"6i/SNF1dFr2KiMJrdw1VzYoqDvoByLTt/w==\r\n" -"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec ); - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[] = -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -"MIICLDCCAbKgAwIBAgIBDTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" -"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" -"MTMwOTI0MTU1MjA0WhcNMjMwOTIyMTU1MjA0WjBBMQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" -"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxHzAdBgNVBAMTFlBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ2xpZW50IDIw\r\n" -"WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARX5a6xc9/TrLuTuIH/Eq7u5lOszlVT\r\n" -"9jQOzC7jYyUL35ji81xgNpbA1RgUcOV/n9VLRRjlsGzVXPiWj4dwo+THo4GdMIGa\r\n" -"MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHoAX4Zk/OBd5REQO7LmO8QmP8/iMG4GA1Ud\r\n" -"IwRnMGWAFJ1tICRJAT8ry3i1Gbx+JMnb+zZ8oUKkQDA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" -"MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0GC\r\n" -"CQDBQ+J+YkPM6DAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNoADBlAjBKZQ17IIOimbmoD/yN7o89u3BM\r\n" -"lgOsjnhw3fIOoLIWy2WOGsk/LGF++DzvrRzuNiACMQCd8iem1XS4JK7haj8xocpU\r\n" -"LwjQje5PDGHfd3h9tP38Qknu5bJqws0md2KOKHyeV0U=\r\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec ); - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[] = -"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -"MHcCAQEEIPb3hmTxZ3/mZI3vyk7p3U3wBf+WIop6hDhkFzJhmLcqoAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" -"AwEHoUQDQgAEV+WusXPf06y7k7iB/xKu7uZTrM5VU/Y0Dswu42MlC9+Y4vNcYDaW\r\n" -"wNUYFHDlf5/VS0UY5bBs1Vz4lo+HcKPkxw==\r\n" -"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 \ -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ -"MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ -"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ -"MTcwNTA0MTY1NzAxWhcNMjcwNTA1MTY1NzAxWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ -"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ -"CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ -"mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ -"50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ -"YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ -"R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ -"KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ -"gZUwgZIwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MGMGA1UdIwRcMFqA\r\n" \ -"FLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/oT+kPTA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8GA1UE\r\n" \ -"CgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0GCAQAwDAYDVR0T\r\n" \ -"BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAHK/HHrTZMnnVMpde1io+voAtql7j\r\n" \ -"4sRhLrjD7o3THtwRbDa2diCvpq0Sq23Ng2LMYoXsOxoL/RQK3iN7UKxV3MKPEr0w\r\n" \ -"XQS+kKQqiT2bsfrjnWMVHZtUOMpm6FNqcdGm/Rss3vKda2lcKl8kUnq/ylc1+QbB\r\n" \ -"G6A6tUvQcr2ZyWfVg+mM5XkhTrOOXus2OLikb4WwEtJTJRNE0f+yPODSUz0/vT57\r\n" \ -"ApH0CnB80bYJshYHPHHymOtleAB8KSYtqm75g/YNobjnjB6cm4HkW3OZRVIl6fYY\r\n" \ -"n20NRVA1Vjs6GAROr4NqW4k/+LofY9y0LLDE+p0oIEKXIsIvhPr39swxSA==\r\n" \ -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SOME - -static const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; - -#endif - -#if !defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SOME) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 \ -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ -"MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ -"MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ -"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ -"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ -"CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ -"mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ -"50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ -"YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ -"R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ -"KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ -"gZUwgZIwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH\r\n" \ -"/f8wYwYDVR0jBFwwWoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f+hP6Q9MDsxCzAJBgNV\r\n" \ -"BAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEZMBcGA1UEAxMQUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVz\r\n" \ -"dCBDQYIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAuP1U2ABUkIslsCfdlc2i94QHHYeJ\r\n" \ -"SsR4EdgHtdciUI5I62J6Mom+Y0dT/7a+8S6MVMCZP6C5NyNyXw1GWY/YR82XTJ8H\r\n" \ -"DBJiCTok5DbZ6SzaONBzdWHXwWwmi5vg1dxn7YxrM9d0IjxM27WNKs4sDQhZBQkF\r\n" \ -"pjmfs2cb4oPl4Y9T9meTx/lvdkRYEug61Jfn6cA+qHpyPYdTH+UshITnmp5/Ztkf\r\n" \ -"m/UTSLBNFNHesiTZeH31NcxYGdHSme9Nc/gfidRa0FLOCfWxRlFqAI47zG9jAQCZ\r\n" \ -"7Z2mCGDNMhjQc+BYcdnl0lPXjdDK6V0qCg1dVewhUBcW5gZKzV7e9+DpVA==\r\n" \ -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" - -#if !defined (TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SOME) -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); -#endif - -static const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; - -#endif - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[] = -"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -"Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" -"DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,A8A95B05D5B7206B\r\n" -"\r\n" -"9Qd9GeArejl1GDVh2lLV1bHt0cPtfbh5h/5zVpAVaFpqtSPMrElp50Rntn9et+JA\r\n" -"7VOyboR+Iy2t/HU4WvA687k3Bppe9GwKHjHhtl//8xFKwZr3Xb5yO5JUP8AUctQq\r\n" -"Nb8CLlZyuUC+52REAAthdWgsX+7dJO4yabzUcQ22Tp9JSD0hiL43BlkWYUNK3dAo\r\n" -"PZlmiptjnzVTjg1MxsBSydZinWOLBV8/JQgxSPo2yD4uEfig28qbvQ2wNIn0pnAb\r\n" -"GxnSAOazkongEGfvcjIIs+LZN9gXFhxcOh6kc4Q/c99B7QWETwLLkYgZ+z1a9VY9\r\n" -"gEU7CwCxYCD+h9hY6FPmsK0/lC4O7aeRKpYq00rPPxs6i7phiexg6ax6yTMmArQq\r\n" -"QmK3TAsJm8V/J5AWpLEV6jAFgRGymGGHnof0DXzVWZidrcZJWTNuGEX90nB3ee2w\r\n" -"PXJEFWKoD3K3aFcSLdHYr3mLGxP7H9ThQai9VsycxZKS5kwvBKQ//YMrmFfwPk8x\r\n" -"vTeY4KZMaUrveEel5tWZC94RSMKgxR6cyE1nBXyTQnDOGbfpNNgBKxyKbINWoOJU\r\n" -"WJZAwlsQn+QzCDwpri7+sV1mS3gBE6UY7aQmnmiiaC2V3Hbphxct/en5QsfDOt1X\r\n" -"JczSfpRWLlbPznZg8OQh/VgCMA58N5DjOzTIK7sJJ5r+94ZBTCpgAMbF588f0NTR\r\n" -"KCe4yrxGJR7X02M4nvD4IwOlpsQ8xQxZtOSgXv4LkxvdU9XJJKWZ/XNKJeWztxSe\r\n" -"Z1vdTc2YfsDBA2SEv33vxHx2g1vqtw8SjDRT2RaQSS0QuSaMJimdOX6mTOCBKk1J\r\n" -"9Q5mXTrER+/LnK0jEmXsBXWA5bqqVZIyahXSx4VYZ7l7w/PHiUDtDgyRhMMKi4n2\r\n" -"iQvQcWSQTjrpnlJbca1/DkpRt3YwrvJwdqb8asZU2VrNETh5x0QVefDRLFiVpif/\r\n" -"tUaeAe/P1F8OkS7OIZDs1SUbv/sD2vMbhNkUoCms3/PvNtdnvgL4F0zhaDpKCmlT\r\n" -"P8vx49E7v5CyRNmED9zZg4o3wmMqrQO93PtTug3Eu9oVx1zPQM1NVMyBa2+f29DL\r\n" -"1nuTCeXdo9+ni45xx+jAI4DCwrRdhJ9uzZyC6962H37H6D+5naNvClFR1s6li1Gb\r\n" -"nqPoiy/OBsEx9CaDGcqQBp5Wme/3XW+6z1ISOx+igwNTVCT14mHdBMbya0eIKft5\r\n" -"X+GnwtgEMyCYyyWuUct8g4RzErcY9+yW9Om5Hzpx4zOuW4NPZgPDTgK+t2RSL/Yq\r\n" -"rE1njrgeGYcVeG3f+OftH4s6fPbq7t1A5ZgUscbLMBqr9tK+OqygR4EgKBPsH6Cz\r\n" -"L6zlv/2RV0qAHvVuDJcIDIgwY5rJtINEm32rhOeFNJwZS5MNIC1czXZx5//ugX7l\r\n" -"I4sy5nbVhwSjtAk8Xg5dZbdTZ6mIrb7xqH+fdakZor1khG7bC2uIwibD3cSl2XkR\r\n" -"wN48lslbHnqqagr6Xm1nNOSVl8C/6kbJEsMpLhAezfRtGwvOucoaE+WbeUNolGde\r\n" -"P/eQiddSf0brnpiLJRh7qZrl9XuqYdpUqnoEdMAfotDOID8OtV7gt8a48ad8VPW2\r\n" -"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa ); - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = "PolarSSLTest"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1; - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" -"MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" -"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" -"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" -"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" -"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" -"NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" -"tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" -"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" -"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" -"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" -"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJxnXClY\r\n" -"oHkbp70cqBrsGXLybA74czbO5RdLEgFs7rHVS9r+c293luS/KdliLScZqAzYVylw\r\n" -"UfRWvKMoWhHYKp3dEIS4xTXk6/5zXxhv9Rw8SGc8qn6vITHk1S1mPevtekgasY5Y\r\n" -"iWQuM3h4YVlRH3HHEMAD1TnAexfXHHDFQGe+Bd1iAbz1/sH9H8l4StwX6egvTK3M\r\n" -"wXRwkKkvjKaEDA9ATbZx0mI8LGsxSuCqe9r9dyjmttd47J1p1Rulz3CLzaRcVIuS\r\n" -"RRQfaD8neM9c1S/iJ/amTVqJxA1KOdOS5780WhPfSArA+g4qAmSjelc3p4wWpha8\r\n" -"zhuYwjVuX6JHG0c=\r\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa ); - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] = -"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n" -"lqdStJDvLXJ6PiSa/LY0rCT1d+AmZIycsCh9odrqjObJHJa8/sEEUrM21KP64bF2\r\n" -"2JDBYbRmUjaiJlOqq3ReB30Zgtsq2B+g2Q0cLUlm91slc0boC4pPaQy1AJDh2oIQ\r\n" -"Zn2uVCuLZXmRoeJhw81ASQjuaAzxi4bSRr/QuKoRAx5/VqgaHkQYDw+Fi9qLRF7i\r\n" -"GMZiL8dmjfpd2H3zJ4kpAcWQDj8n8TDISg7v1t7HxydrxwU9esQCPJodPg/oNJhb\r\n" -"y3NLUpbYEaIsgIhpOVrTD7DeWS8Rx/fqEgEwlwIDAQABAoIBAQCXR0S8EIHFGORZ\r\n" -"++AtOg6eENxD+xVs0f1IeGz57Tjo3QnXX7VBZNdj+p1ECvhCE/G7XnkgU5hLZX+G\r\n" -"Z0jkz/tqJOI0vRSdLBbipHnWouyBQ4e/A1yIJdlBtqXxJ1KE/ituHRbNc4j4kL8Z\r\n" -"/r6pvwnTI0PSx2Eqs048YdS92LT6qAv4flbNDxMn2uY7s4ycS4Q8w1JXnCeaAnYm\r\n" -"WYI5wxO+bvRELR2Mcz5DmVnL8jRyml6l6582bSv5oufReFIbyPZbQWlXgYnpu6He\r\n" -"GTc7E1zKYQGG/9+DQUl/1vQuCPqQwny0tQoX2w5tdYpdMdVm+zkLtbajzdTviJJa\r\n" -"TWzL6lt5AoGBAN86+SVeJDcmQJcv4Eq6UhtRr4QGMiQMz0Sod6ettYxYzMgxtw28\r\n" -"CIrgpozCc+UaZJLo7UxvC6an85r1b2nKPCLQFaggJ0H4Q0J/sZOhBIXaoBzWxveK\r\n" -"nupceKdVxGsFi8CDy86DBfiyFivfBj+47BbaQzPBj7C4rK7UlLjab2rDAoGBAN2u\r\n" -"AM2gchoFiu4v1HFL8D7lweEpi6ZnMJjnEu/dEgGQJFjwdpLnPbsj4c75odQ4Gz8g\r\n" -"sw9lao9VVzbusoRE/JGI4aTdO0pATXyG7eG1Qu+5Yc1YGXcCrliA2xM9xx+d7f+s\r\n" -"mPzN+WIEg5GJDYZDjAzHG5BNvi/FfM1C9dOtjv2dAoGAF0t5KmwbjWHBhcVqO4Ic\r\n" -"BVvN3BIlc1ue2YRXEDlxY5b0r8N4XceMgKmW18OHApZxfl8uPDauWZLXOgl4uepv\r\n" -"whZC3EuWrSyyICNhLY21Ah7hbIEBPF3L3ZsOwC+UErL+dXWLdB56Jgy3gZaBeW7b\r\n" -"vDrEnocJbqCm7IukhXHOBK8CgYEAwqdHB0hqyNSzIOGY7v9abzB6pUdA3BZiQvEs\r\n" -"3LjHVd4HPJ2x0N8CgrBIWOE0q8+0hSMmeE96WW/7jD3fPWwCR5zlXknxBQsfv0gP\r\n" -"3BC5PR0Qdypz+d+9zfMf625kyit4T/hzwhDveZUzHnk1Cf+IG7Q+TOEnLnWAWBED\r\n" -"ISOWmrUCgYAFEmRxgwAc/u+D6t0syCwAYh6POtscq9Y0i9GyWk89NzgC4NdwwbBH\r\n" -"4AgahOxIxXx2gxJnq3yfkJfIjwf0s2DyP0kY2y6Ua1OeomPeY9mrIS4tCuDQ6LrE\r\n" -"TB6l9VGoxJL4fyHnZb8L5gGvnB1bbD8cL6YPaDiOhcRseC9vBiEuVg==\r\n" -"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa ); - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] = -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -"MIIDhTCCAm2gAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" -"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" -"MTcwNTA1MTMwNzU5WhcNMjcwNTA2MTMwNzU5WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" -"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n" -"BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n" -"M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n" -"1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEw\r\n" -"MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n" -"4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n" -"/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n" -"o4GSMIGPMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITBjBgNVHSMEXDBa\r\n" -"gBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/6E/pD0wOzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNV\r\n" -"BAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBQb2xhclNTTCBUZXN0IENBggEAMAkGA1Ud\r\n" -"EwQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC7yO786NvcHpK8UovKIG9cB32oSQQom\r\n" -"LoR0eHDRzdqEkoq7yGZufHFiRAAzbMqJfogRtxlrWAeB4y/jGaMBV25IbFOIcH2W\r\n" -"iCEaMMbG+VQLKNvuC63kmw/Zewc9ThM6Pa1Hcy0axT0faf1B/U01j0FIcw/6mTfK\r\n" -"D8w48OIwc1yr0JtutCVjig5DC0yznGMt32RyseOLcUe+lfq005v2PAiCozr5X8rE\r\n" -"ofGZpiM2NqRPePgYy+Vc75Zk28xkRQq1ncprgQb3S4vTsZdScpM9hLf+eMlrgqlj\r\n" -"c5PLSkXBeLE5+fedkyfTaLxxQlgCpuoOhKBm04/R1pWNzUHyqagjO9Q=\r\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa ); - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] = -"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6fM60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaF\r\n" -"B9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1\r\n" -"bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEwMjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9\r\n" -"Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH\r\n" -"7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx//DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+v\r\n" -"dqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQABAoIBAGdNtfYDiap6bzst\r\n" -"yhCiI8m9TtrhZw4MisaEaN/ll3XSjaOG2dvV6xMZCMV+5TeXDHOAZnY18Yi18vzz\r\n" -"4Ut2TnNFzizCECYNaA2fST3WgInnxUkV3YXAyP6CNxJaCmv2aA0yFr2kFVSeaKGt\r\n" -"ymvljNp2NVkvm7Th8fBQBO7I7AXhz43k0mR7XmPgewe8ApZOG3hstkOaMvbWAvWA\r\n" -"zCZupdDjZYjOJqlA4eEA4H8/w7F83r5CugeBE8LgEREjLPiyejrU5H1fubEY+h0d\r\n" -"l5HZBJ68ybTXfQ5U9o/QKA3dd0toBEhhdRUDGzWtjvwkEQfqF1reGWj/tod/gCpf\r\n" -"DFi6X0ECgYEA4wOv/pjSC3ty6TuOvKX2rOUiBrLXXv2JSxZnMoMiWI5ipLQt+RYT\r\n" -"VPafL/m7Dn6MbwjayOkcZhBwk5CNz5A6Q4lJ64Mq/lqHznRCQQ2Mc1G8eyDF/fYL\r\n" -"Ze2pLvwP9VD5jTc2miDfw+MnvJhywRRLcemDFP8k4hQVtm8PMp3ZmNECgYEA4gz7\r\n" -"wzObR4gn8ibe617uQPZjWzUj9dUHYd+in1gwBCIrtNnaRn9I9U/Q6tegRYpii4ys\r\n" -"c176NmU+umy6XmuSKV5qD9bSpZWG2nLFnslrN15Lm3fhZxoeMNhBaEDTnLT26yoi\r\n" -"33gp0mSSWy94ZEqipms+ULF6sY1ZtFW6tpGFoy8CgYAQHhnnvJflIs2ky4q10B60\r\n" -"ZcxFp3rtDpkp0JxhFLhiizFrujMtZSjYNm5U7KkgPVHhLELEUvCmOnKTt4ap/vZ0\r\n" -"BxJNe1GZH3pW6SAvGDQpl9sG7uu/vTFP+lCxukmzxB0DrrDcvorEkKMom7ZCCRvW\r\n" -"KZsZ6YeH2Z81BauRj218kQKBgQCUV/DgKP2985xDTT79N08jUo3hTP5MVYCCuj/+\r\n" -"UeEw1TvZcx3LJby7P6Xad6a1/BqveaGyFKIfEFIaBUBItk801sDDpDaYc4gL00Xc\r\n" -"7lFuBHOZkxJYlss5QrGpuOEl9ZwUt5IrFLBdYaKqNHzNVC1pCPfb/JyH6Dr2HUxq\r\n" -"gxUwAQKBgQCcU6G2L8AG9d9c0UpOyL1tMvFe5Ttw0KjlQVdsh1MP6yigYo9DYuwu\r\n" -"bHFVW2r0dBTqegP2/KTOxKzaHfC1qf0RGDsUoJCNJrd1cwoCLG8P2EF4w3OBrKqv\r\n" -"8u4ytY0F+Vlanj5lm3TaoHSVF1+NWPyOTiwevIECGKwSxvlki4fDAA==\r\n" -"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -/* Concatenation of all available CA certificates */ -const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[] = -#ifdef TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 -#endif -#ifdef TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 -#endif -#ifdef TEST_CA_CRT_EC - TEST_CA_CRT_EC -#endif - ""; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cas_pem ); -#endif - -/* List of all available CA certificates */ -const char * mbedtls_test_cas[] = { -#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1, -#endif -#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec, -#endif - NULL -}; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[] = { -#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1) - sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1 ), -#endif -#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256) - sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256 ), -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ), -#endif - 0 -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa; /* SHA1 or SHA256 */ -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key = mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa; -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd = mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt = mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key = mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt = mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key = mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa ); -#else /* ! MBEDTLS_RSA_C, so MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec; -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key = mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec; -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd = mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt = mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key = mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt = mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key = mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec ) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ctr_drbg.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ctr_drbg.c deleted file mode 100644 index 56b4cd8b..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ctr_drbg.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,650 +0,0 @@ -/* - * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - -#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -#include -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -/* - * CTR_DRBG context initialization - */ -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); -#endif -} - -/* - * Non-public function wrapped by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). Necessary to allow - * NIST tests to succeed (which require known length fixed entropy) - */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_entropy, - const unsigned char *custom, - size_t len, - size_t entropy_len ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; - - memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); - - mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->aes_ctx ); - - ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; - ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; - - ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len; - ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; - - /* - * Initialize with an empty key - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, custom, len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_entropy, - const unsigned char *custom, - size_t len ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len, - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); -#endif - mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->aes_ctx ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance ) -{ - ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) -{ - ctx->entropy_len = len; -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ) -{ - ctx->reseed_interval = interval; -} - -static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, - const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) -{ - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; - unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; - unsigned char *p, *iv; - mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; - int ret = 0; - - int i, j; - size_t buf_len, use_len; - - if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - - memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 ); - mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); - - /* - * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer - * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes - * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) || - * data || 0x80 - * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes) - */ - p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 24 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 16 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 8 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len ) & 0xff; - p += 3; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; - memcpy( p, data, data_len ); - p[data_len] = 0x80; - - buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1; - - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ ) - key[i] = i; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - /* - * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data - */ - for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) - { - p = buf; - memset( chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - use_len = buf_len; - - while( use_len > 0 ) - { - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) - chain[i] ^= p[i]; - p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, chain, chain ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - } - - memcpy( tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - - /* - * Update IV - */ - buf[3]++; - } - - /* - * Do final encryption with reduced data - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; - p = output; - - for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - memcpy( p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - } -exit: - mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx ); - /* - * tidy up the stack - */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( chain, sizeof( chain ) ); - if( 0 != ret ) - { - /* - * wipe partial seed from memory - */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); - } - - return( ret ); -} - -static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] ) -{ - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - unsigned char *p = tmp; - int i, j; - int ret = 0; - - memset( tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); - - for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) - { - /* - * Increase counter - */ - for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) - if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* - * Crypt counter block - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - } - - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++ ) - tmp[i] ^= data[i]; - - /* - * Update key and counter - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) -{ - unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - - if( add_len > 0 ) - { - /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match - * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */ - if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) - add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT; - - block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ); - ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ); - } -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) -{ - static unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; - size_t seedlen = 0; - int ret; - - if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT || - len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - - memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); - - /* - * Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state - */ - if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, - ctx->entropy_len ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); - } - - seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; - - /* - * Add additional data - */ - if( additional && len ) - { - memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); - seedlen += len; - } - - /* - * Reduce to 384 bits - */ - if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * Update state - */ - if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - ctx->reseed_counter = 1; - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; - unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - unsigned char *p = output; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; - int i; - size_t use_len; - - if( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); - - if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - - memset( add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); - - if( ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || - ctx->prediction_resistance ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - add_len = 0; - } - - if( add_len > 0 ) - { - if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - } - - while( output_len > 0 ) - { - /* - * Increase counter - */ - for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) - if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* - * Crypt counter block - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : - output_len; - /* - * Copy random block to destination - */ - memcpy( p, tmp, use_len ); - p += use_len; - output_len -= use_len; - } - - if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - ctx->reseed_counter++; - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); -#endif - - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); -#endif - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; - FILE *f; - unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; - - if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; - else - ret = 0; - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - - fclose( f ); - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) -{ - int ret = 0; - FILE *f; - size_t n; - unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; - - if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); - n = (size_t) ftell( f ); - fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); - - if( n > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) - { - fclose( f ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - } - - if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; - else - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n ); - - fclose( f ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[96] = - { 0xc1, 0x80, 0x81, 0xa6, 0x5d, 0x44, 0x02, 0x16, - 0x19, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xb1, 0xc9, 0x20, 0x02, - 0x6a, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0x81, 0x49, 0x8b, - 0x6e, 0xa6, 0x62, 0x52, 0x6d, 0x51, 0xb1, 0xcb, - 0x58, 0x3b, 0xfa, 0xd5, 0x37, 0x5f, 0xfb, 0xc9, - 0xff, 0x46, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xc7, 0x22, 0x3e, 0x95, - 0x45, 0x9d, 0x82, 0xe1, 0xe7, 0x22, 0x9f, 0x63, - 0x31, 0x69, 0xd2, 0x6b, 0x57, 0x47, 0x4f, 0xa3, - 0x37, 0xc9, 0x98, 0x1c, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0x91, 0x31, - 0x4d, 0x55, 0xb9, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x5a, 0x5e, 0xe4, - 0x93, 0x92, 0xcf, 0xc5, 0x23, 0x12, 0xd5, 0x56, - 0x2c, 0x4a, 0x6e, 0xff, 0xdc, 0x10, 0xd0, 0x68 }; - -static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[64] = - { 0x5a, 0x19, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x2b, 0x31, 0x58, 0x14, - 0x54, 0xde, 0xf6, 0x75, 0xfb, 0x79, 0x58, 0xfe, - 0xc7, 0xdb, 0x87, 0x3e, 0x56, 0x89, 0xfc, 0x9d, - 0x03, 0x21, 0x7c, 0x68, 0xd8, 0x03, 0x38, 0x20, - 0xf9, 0xe6, 0x5e, 0x04, 0xd8, 0x56, 0xf3, 0xa9, - 0xc4, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0xbd, 0xc1, 0xd0, 0x08, 0x46, - 0xf5, 0x98, 0x3d, 0x77, 0x1c, 0x1b, 0x13, 0x7e, - 0x4e, 0x0f, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x2e }; - -static const unsigned char nonce_pers_pr[16] = - { 0xd2, 0x54, 0xfc, 0xff, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x69, 0xd2, - 0x29, 0xc9, 0xcf, 0xad, 0x85, 0xfa, 0x48, 0x6c }; - -static const unsigned char nonce_pers_nopr[16] = - { 0x1b, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xff, 0x06, 0x42, 0xbf, 0xf5, - 0x21, 0xf1, 0x5c, 0x1c, 0x0b, 0x66, 0x5f, 0x3f }; - -static const unsigned char result_pr[16] = - { 0x34, 0x01, 0x16, 0x56, 0xb4, 0x29, 0x00, 0x8f, - 0x35, 0x63, 0xec, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x59, 0x07, 0x23 }; - -static const unsigned char result_nopr[16] = - { 0xa0, 0x54, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x88, - 0x9d, 0x90, 0x3e, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0x21, 0x8f }; - -static size_t test_offset; -static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, - size_t len ) -{ - const unsigned char *p = data; - memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); - test_offset += len; - return( 0 ); -} - -#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ - { \ - if( verbose != 0 ) \ - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ - return( 1 ); \ - } - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; - unsigned char buf[16]; - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); - - /* - * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True) - */ - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : " ); - - test_offset = 0; - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( &ctx, ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, - (void *) entropy_source_pr, nonce_pers_pr, 16, 32 ) ); - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ); - CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ); - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - /* - * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE) - */ - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): " ); - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); - - test_offset = 0; - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( &ctx, ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, - (void *) entropy_source_nopr, nonce_pers_nopr, 16, 32 ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, 16 ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, 16 ) ); - CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, 16 ) ); - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdh.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdh.c deleted file mode 100644 index 61380b69..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdh.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,268 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -/* - * References: - * - * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg - * RFC 4492 - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - -#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" - -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) -/* - * Generate public key: simple wrapper around mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) -/* - * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ecp_point P; - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); - - /* - * Make sure Q is a valid pubkey before using it - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &P, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &P ) ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( z, &P.X ) ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ - -/* - * Initialize context - */ -void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdh_context ) ); -} - -/* - * Free context - */ -void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Q ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Qp ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vi ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vf ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->_d ); -} - -/* - * Setup and write the ServerKeyExhange parameters (RFC 4492) - * struct { - * ECParameters curve_params; - * ECPoint public; - * } ServerECDHParams; - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - size_t grp_len, pt_len; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ) - != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf, blen ) ) - != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - buf += grp_len; - blen -= grp_len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, ctx->point_format, - &pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - *olen = grp_len + pt_len; - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Read the ServerKeyExhange parameters (RFC 4492) - * struct { - * ECParameters curve_params; - * ECPoint public; - * } ServerECDHParams; - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, - const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &ctx->grp, buf, end - *buf ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf, end - *buf ) ) - != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Get parameters from a keypair - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, - mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* If it's not our key, just import the public part as Qp */ - if( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) - return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Qp, &key->Q ) ); - - /* Our key: import public (as Q) and private parts */ - if( side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Setup and export the client public value - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ) - != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, ctx->point_format, - olen, buf, blen ); -} - -/* - * Parse and import the client's public value - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) -{ - int ret; - const unsigned char *p = buf; - - if( ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, &p, blen ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( (size_t)( p - buf ) != blen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Derive and export the shared secret - */ -int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, &ctx->d, - f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->z ) > blen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - *olen = ctx->grp.pbits / 8 + ( ( ctx->grp.pbits % 8 ) != 0 ); - return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdsa.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdsa.c deleted file mode 100644 index 17a88bdd..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecdsa.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,461 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Elliptic curve DSA - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -/* - * References: - * - * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - -#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" -#endif - -/* - * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len - * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3 - */ -static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; - size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) ); - if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) ); - - /* While at it, reduce modulo N */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) -/* - * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) - * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, - const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries; - mbedtls_ecp_point R; - mbedtls_mpi k, e, t; - - /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ - if( grp->N.p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t ); - - sign_tries = 0; - do - { - /* - * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair - * and set r = xR mod n - */ - key_tries = 0; - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); - - if( key_tries++ > 10 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 ); - - /* - * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); - - /* - * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step, - * avoiding a potential timing leak. - */ - blind_tries = 0; - do - { - size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) ); - - /* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */ - if( ++blind_tries > 30 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 ); - - /* - * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) ); - - if( sign_tries++ > 10 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -/* - * Deterministic signature wrapper - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, - const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; - unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_mpi h; - - if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx ); - - /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) ); - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len ); - - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) -/* - * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) - * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; - mbedtls_ecp_point R; - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 ); - - /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ - if( grp->N.p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1 - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - /* - * Additional precaution: make sure Q is valid - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) ); - - /* - * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); - - /* - * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) ); - - /* - * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q - * - * Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to - * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for countermesures. - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, &u2, Q ) ); - - if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - /* - * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op) - * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v) - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); - - /* - * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - -cleanup: - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ - -/* - * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 - */ -static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN]; - unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf ); - size_t len = 0; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - - memcpy( sig, p, len ); - *slen = len; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Compute and write signature - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi r, s; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - (void) f_rng; - (void) p_rng; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, - hash, hlen, md_alg ) ); -#else - (void) md_alg; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, - hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, - NULL, NULL ) ); -} -#endif - -/* - * Read and check signature - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig; - const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; - size_t len; - mbedtls_mpi r, s; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - { - ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( p + len != end ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 ) - { - ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen, - &ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature. - * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific - * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */ - if( p != end ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) -/* - * Generate key pair - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid ) || - mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ - -/* - * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx ); - } - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Initialize context - */ -void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); -} - -/* - * Free context - */ -void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9e2c085b..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2207 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -/* - * References: - * - * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg - * GECC = Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone - * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf - * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants - * RFC 7748 for the Curve448 and Curve25519 curve definitions - * - * [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf - * - * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis - * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and - * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. - * - * - * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to - * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology - * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. - * - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#include "mbedtls/threading.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" - -#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. - * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. - */ -static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -#define ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -#define ECP_MONTGOMERY -#endif - -/* - * Curve types: internal for now, might be exposed later - */ -typedef enum -{ - ECP_TYPE_NONE = 0, - ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x + b */ - ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x */ -} ecp_curve_type; - -/* - * List of supported curves: - * - internal ID - * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2) - * - size in bits - * - readable name - * - * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, - * fastest curves first. This provides the default order for the SSL module. - * - * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new curves! - */ -static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, 25, 521, "secp521r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, 28, 512, "brainpoolP512r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, 24, 384, "secp384r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, 27, 384, "brainpoolP384r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, 23, 256, "secp256r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, 22, 256, "secp256k1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, 26, 256, "brainpoolP256r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, 21, 224, "secp224r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, 20, 224, "secp224k1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, 19, 192, "secp192r1" }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" }, -#endif - { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, -}; - -#define ECP_NB_CURVES sizeof( ecp_supported_curves ) / \ - sizeof( ecp_supported_curves[0] ) - -static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_supported_grp_id[ECP_NB_CURVES]; - -/* - * List of supported curves and associated info - */ -const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ) -{ - return( ecp_supported_curves ); -} - -/* - * List of supported curves, group ID only - */ -const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ) -{ - static int init_done = 0; - - if( ! init_done ) - { - size_t i = 0; - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - - for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); - curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - curve_info++ ) - { - ecp_supported_grp_id[i++] = curve_info->grp_id; - } - ecp_supported_grp_id[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - - init_done = 1; - } - - return( ecp_supported_grp_id ); -} - -/* - * Get the curve info for the internal identifier - */ -const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - - for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); - curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - curve_info++ ) - { - if( curve_info->grp_id == grp_id ) - return( curve_info ); - } - - return( NULL ); -} - -/* - * Get the curve info from the TLS identifier - */ -const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - - for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); - curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - curve_info++ ) - { - if( curve_info->tls_id == tls_id ) - return( curve_info ); - } - - return( NULL ); -} - -/* - * Get the curve info from the name - */ -const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - - for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); - curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - curve_info++ ) - { - if( strcmp( curve_info->name, name ) == 0 ) - return( curve_info ); - } - - return( NULL ); -} - -/* - * Get the type of a curve - */ -static inline ecp_curve_type ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) -{ - if( grp->G.X.p == NULL ) - return( ECP_TYPE_NONE ); - - if( grp->G.Y.p == NULL ) - return( ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ); - else - return( ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ); -} - -/* - * Initialize (the components of) a point - */ -void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - if( pt == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->X ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Y ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Z ); -} - -/* - * Initialize (the components of) a group - */ -void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) -{ - if( grp == NULL ) - return; - - memset( grp, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_group ) ); -} - -/* - * Initialize (the components of) a key pair - */ -void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) -{ - if( key == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &key->grp ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &key->d ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &key->Q ); -} - -/* - * Unallocate (the components of) a point - */ -void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - if( pt == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->X ) ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Y ) ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Z ) ); -} - -/* - * Unallocate (the components of) a group - */ -void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) -{ - size_t i; - - if( grp == NULL ) - return; - - if( grp->h != 1 ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->A ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->B ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->G ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->N ); - } - - if( grp->T != NULL ) - { - for( i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++ ) - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->T[i] ); - mbedtls_free( grp->T ); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( grp, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_group ) ); -} - -/* - * Unallocate (the components of) a key pair - */ -void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) -{ - if( key == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &key->grp ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &key->Q ); -} - -/* - * Copy the contents of a point - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->X, &Q->X ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Copy the contents of a group object - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ) -{ - return mbedtls_ecp_group_load( dst, src->id ); -} - -/* - * Set point to zero - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->X , 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Y , 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z , 0 ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Tell if a point is zero - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ); -} - -/* - * Compare two points lazyly - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) -{ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &Q->X ) == 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) == 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) == 0 ) - { - return( 0 ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -} - -/* - * Import a non-zero point from ASCII strings - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, - const char *x, const char *y ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->X, radix, x ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->Y, radix, y ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3) - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int format, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t plen; - - if( format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED && - format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Common case: P == 0 - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) - { - if( buflen < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - buf[0] = 0x00; - *olen = 1; - - return( 0 ); - } - - plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); - - if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ) - { - *olen = 2 * plen + 1; - - if( buflen < *olen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - buf[0] = 0x04; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); - } - else if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) - { - *olen = plen + 1; - - if( buflen < *olen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &P->Y, 0 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); - } - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4) - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t plen; - - if( ilen < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( buf[0] == 0x00 ) - { - if( ilen == 1 ) - return( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pt ) ); - else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); - - if( buf[0] != 0x04 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - - if( ilen != 2 * plen + 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Import a point from a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) - * struct { - * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; - * } ECPoint; - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, - const unsigned char **buf, size_t buf_len ) -{ - unsigned char data_len; - const unsigned char *buf_start; - - /* - * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) - */ - if( buf_len < 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - data_len = *(*buf)++; - if( data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len - 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Save buffer start for read_binary and update buf - */ - buf_start = *buf; - *buf += data_len; - - return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, pt, buf_start, data_len ); -} - -/* - * Export a point as a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) - * struct { - * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; - * } ECPoint; - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, - int format, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) -{ - int ret; - - /* - * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte - */ - if( blen < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, pt, format, - olen, buf + 1, blen - 1) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* - * write length to the first byte and update total length - */ - buf[0] = (unsigned char) *olen; - ++*olen; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Set a group from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) -{ - uint16_t tls_id; - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - - /* - * We expect at least three bytes (see below) - */ - if( len < 3 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled - */ - if( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value - */ - tls_id = *(*buf)++; - tls_id <<= 8; - tls_id |= *(*buf)++; - - if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - - return mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, curve_info->grp_id ); -} - -/* - * Write the ECParameters record corresponding to a group (RFC 4492) - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - - if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp->id ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * We are going to write 3 bytes (see below) - */ - *olen = 3; - if( blen < *olen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - /* - * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve - */ - *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; - - /* - * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value - */ - buf[0] = curve_info->tls_id >> 8; - buf[1] = curve_info->tls_id & 0xFF; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Wrapper around fast quasi-modp functions, with fall-back to mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi. - * See the documentation of struct mbedtls_ecp_group. - * - * This function is in the critial loop for mbedtls_ecp_mul, so pay attention to perf. - */ -static int ecp_modp( mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) -{ - int ret; - - if( grp->modp == NULL ) - return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); - - /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ - if( ( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) || - mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > 2 * grp->pbits ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( grp->modp( N ) ); - - /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ - while( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( N, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) - /* we known P, N and the result are positive */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( N, N, &grp->P ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Fast mod-p functions expect their argument to be in the 0..p^2 range. - * - * In order to guarantee that, we need to ensure that operands of - * mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi are in the 0..p range. So, after each operation we will - * bring the result back to this range. - * - * The following macros are shortcuts for doing that. - */ - -/* - * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, general case, to use after mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#define INC_MUL_COUNT mul_count++; -#else -#define INC_MUL_COUNT -#endif - -#define MOD_MUL( N ) do { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_modp( &N, grp ) ); INC_MUL_COUNT } \ - while( 0 ) - -/* - * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi - * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 - */ -#define MOD_SUB( N ) \ - while( N.s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &N, 0 ) != 0 ) \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &N, &N, &grp->P ) ) - -/* - * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. - * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and - * a bit faster. - */ -#define MOD_ADD( N ) \ - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &N, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &N, &N, &grp->P ) ) - -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) -/* - * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in - * Jacobian coordinates. - * - * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with coutermeasueres against - * SPA, hence timing attacks. - */ - -/* - * Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1 (GECC 3.2.1) - * Cost: 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S - */ -static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pt ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ - mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); - - /* - * X = X / Z^2 mod p - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( ZZi ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->X ); - - /* - * Y = Y / Z^3 mod p - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y ); - - /* - * Z = 1 - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) points, - * using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P. - * (See for example Cohen's "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number - * Theory", Algorithm 10.3.4.) - * - * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is zero! - * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). - * - * Cost: 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S - */ -static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t t_len ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; - - if( t_len < 2 ) - return( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, *T ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, T, t_len); - } -#endif - - if( ( c = mbedtls_calloc( t_len, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); - - /* - * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &c[0], &T[0]->Z ) ); - for( i = 1; i < t_len; i++ ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z ) ); - MOD_MUL( c[i] ); - } - - /* - * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &u, &c[t_len-1], &grp->P ) ); - - for( i = t_len - 1; ; i-- ) - { - /* - * Zi = 1 / Z_i mod p - * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_i) mod P - */ - if( i == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Zi, &u ) ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &Zi, &u, &c[i-1] ) ); MOD_MUL( Zi ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u, &u, &T[i]->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( u ); - } - - /* - * proceed as in normalize() - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( ZZi ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( T[i]->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( T[i]->Y ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( T[i]->Y ); - - /* - * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates - * - not storing Z (always 1) - * - shrinking other coordinates, but still keeping the same number of - * limbs as P, as otherwise it will too likely be regrown too fast. - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->X, grp->P.n ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->Y, grp->P.n ) ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T[i]->Z ); - - if( i == 0 ) - break; - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); - for( i = 0; i < t_len; i++ ) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &c[i] ); - mbedtls_free( c ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Conditional point inversion: Q -> -Q = (Q.X, -Q.Y, Q.Z) without leak. - * "inv" must be 0 (don't invert) or 1 (invert) or the result will be invalid - */ -static int ecp_safe_invert_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - unsigned char inv ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char nonzero; - mbedtls_mpi mQY; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &mQY ); - - /* Use the fact that -Q.Y mod P = P - Q.Y unless Q.Y == 0 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mQY, &grp->P, &Q->Y ) ); - nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Y, 0 ) != 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &Q->Y, &mQY, inv & nonzero ) ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &mQY ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates - * - * Based on http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian.html#doubling-dbl-1998-cmo-2 . - * - * We follow the variable naming fairly closely. The formula variations that trade a MUL for a SQR - * (plus a few ADDs) aren't useful as our bignum implementation doesn't distinguish squaring. - * - * Standard optimizations are applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. - * - * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) - * 4M + 4S (A == -3) - * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise - */ -static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - dbl_count++; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); - - /* Special case for A = -3 */ - if( grp->A.p == NULL ) - { - /* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &P->X, &S ) ); MOD_ADD( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U, &P->X, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( U ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &T, &U ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); - } - else - { - /* M = 3.X^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->X, &P->X ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); - - /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &grp->A, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - /* M += A.Z^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &S, &S ) ); MOD_MUL( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &T, &grp->A ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &S ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); - } - } - - /* S = 4.X.Y^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &P->Y, &P->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->X, &T ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &S, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( S ); - - /* U = 8.Y^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &U, &T, &T ) ); MOD_MUL( U ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &U, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( U ); - - /* T = M^2 - 2.S */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &M, &M ) ); MOD_MUL( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( T ); - - /* S = M(S - T) - U */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S, &S, &T ) ); MOD_SUB( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &S, &M ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S, &S, &U ) ); MOD_SUB( S ); - - /* U = 2.Y.Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &U, &P->Y, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( U ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &U, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( U ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &T ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &S ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &U ) ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates (GECC 3.22) - * - * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), - * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. - * - * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q. - * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb(): - * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor - * being less than its order, so none of them is zero; - * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even multiple, - * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method. - * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. - * - * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as meaning 1. - * - * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S - */ -static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - add_count++; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, P, Q ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ - - /* - * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) - return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, Q ) ); - - if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) - return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); - - /* - * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized - */ - if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T4 ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T2, &T1, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( T2 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T1, &Q->X ) ); MOD_MUL( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T2, &T2, &Q->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( T2 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T1, &T1, &P->X ) ); MOD_SUB( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T2, &T2, &P->Y ) ); MOD_SUB( T2 ); - - /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T1, 0 ) == 0 ) - { - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T2, 0 ) == 0 ) - { - ret = ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ); - goto cleanup; - } - else - { - ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ); - goto cleanup; - } - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &Z, &P->Z, &T1 ) ); MOD_MUL( Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T3, &T1, &T1 ) ); MOD_MUL( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T4, &T3, &T1 ) ); MOD_MUL( T4 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T3, &T3, &P->X ) ); MOD_MUL( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T3, 2 ) ); MOD_ADD( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, &T2, &T2 ) ); MOD_MUL( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); MOD_SUB( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T4 ) ); MOD_SUB( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T3, &T3, &X ) ); MOD_SUB( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T3, &T3, &T2 ) ); MOD_MUL( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T4, &T4, &P->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( T4 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &Y, &T3, &T4 ) ); MOD_SUB( Y ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &X ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &Y ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &Z ) ); - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T4 ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Randomize jacobian coordinates: - * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l - * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_jac(). - * - * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. - */ -static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi l, ll; - size_t p_size; - int count = 0; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ - - p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ll ); - - /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) ); - - if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 ); - - /* Z = l * Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Z ); - - /* X = l^2 * X */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ll, &l, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( ll ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->X ); - - /* Y = l^3 * Y */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ll, &ll, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( ll ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ll ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Check and define parameters used by the comb method (see below for details) - */ -#if MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 2 || MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE > 7 -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE out of bounds" -#endif - -/* d = ceil( n / w ) */ -#define COMB_MAX_D ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 1 ) / 2 - -/* number of precomputed points */ -#define COMB_MAX_PRE ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) - -/* - * Compute the representation of m that will be used with our comb method. - * - * The basic comb method is described in GECC 3.44 for example. We use a - * modified version that provides resistance to SPA by avoiding zero - * digits in the representation as in [3]. We modify the method further by - * requiring that all K_i be odd, which has the small cost that our - * representation uses one more K_i, due to carries. - * - * Also, for the sake of compactness, only the seven low-order bits of x[i] - * are used to represent K_i, and the msb of x[i] encodes the the sign (s_i in - * the paper): it is set if and only if if s_i == -1; - * - * Calling conventions: - * - x is an array of size d + 1 - * - w is the size, ie number of teeth, of the comb, and must be between - * 2 and 7 (in practice, between 2 and MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) - * - m is the MPI, expected to be odd and such that bitlength(m) <= w * d - * (the result will be incorrect if these assumptions are not satisfied) - */ -static void ecp_comb_fixed( unsigned char x[], size_t d, - unsigned char w, const mbedtls_mpi *m ) -{ - size_t i, j; - unsigned char c, cc, adjust; - - memset( x, 0, d+1 ); - - /* First get the classical comb values (except for x_d = 0) */ - for( i = 0; i < d; i++ ) - for( j = 0; j < w; j++ ) - x[i] |= mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i + d * j ) << j; - - /* Now make sure x_1 .. x_d are odd */ - c = 0; - for( i = 1; i <= d; i++ ) - { - /* Add carry and update it */ - cc = x[i] & c; - x[i] = x[i] ^ c; - c = cc; - - /* Adjust if needed, avoiding branches */ - adjust = 1 - ( x[i] & 0x01 ); - c |= x[i] & ( x[i-1] * adjust ); - x[i] = x[i] ^ ( x[i-1] * adjust ); - x[i-1] |= adjust << 7; - } -} - -/* - * Precompute points for the comb method - * - * If i = i_{w-1} ... i_1 is the binary representation of i, then - * T[i] = i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + P - * - * T must be able to hold 2^{w - 1} elements - * - * Cost: d(w-1) D + (2^{w-1} - 1) A + 1 N(w-1) + 1 N(2^{w-1} - 1) - */ -static int ecp_precompute_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_ecp_point T[], const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - unsigned char w, size_t d ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char i, k; - size_t j; - mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1]; - - /* - * Set T[0] = P and - * T[2^{l-1}] = 2^{dl} P for l = 1 .. w-1 (this is not the final value) - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &T[0], P ) ); - - k = 0; - for( i = 1; i < ( 1U << ( w - 1 ) ); i <<= 1 ) - { - cur = T + i; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( cur, T + ( i >> 1 ) ) ); - for( j = 0; j < d; j++ ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, cur, cur ) ); - - TT[k++] = cur; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, k ) ); - - /* - * Compute the remaining ones using the minimal number of additions - * Be careful to update T[2^l] only after using it! - */ - k = 0; - for( i = 1; i < ( 1U << ( w - 1 ) ); i <<= 1 ) - { - j = i; - while( j-- ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i] ) ); - TT[k++] = &T[i + j]; - } - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, k ) ); - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Select precomputed point: R = sign(i) * T[ abs(i) / 2 ] - */ -static int ecp_select_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char t_len, - unsigned char i ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char ii, j; - - /* Ignore the "sign" bit and scale down */ - ii = ( i & 0x7Fu ) >> 1; - - /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */ - for( j = 0; j < t_len; j++ ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii ) ); - } - - /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, R, i >> 7 ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Core multiplication algorithm for the (modified) comb method. - * This part is actually common with the basic comb method (GECC 3.44) - * - * Cost: d A + d D + 1 R - */ -static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char t_len, - const unsigned char x[], size_t d, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; - size_t i; - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Txi ); - - /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */ - i = d; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, t_len, x[i] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) ); - if( f_rng != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - while( i-- != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, R, R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, &Txi, T, t_len, x[i] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, R, &Txi ) ); - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Txi ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Multiplication using the comb method, - * for curves in short Weierstrass form - */ -static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char w, m_is_odd, p_eq_g, pre_len, i; - size_t d; - unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; - mbedtls_ecp_point *T; - mbedtls_mpi M, mm; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &mm ); - - /* we need N to be odd to trnaform m in an odd number, check now */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &grp->N, 0 ) != 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Minimize the number of multiplications, that is minimize - * 10 * d * w + 18 * 2^(w-1) + 11 * d + 7 * w, with d = ceil( nbits / w ) - * (see costs of the various parts, with 1S = 1M) - */ - w = grp->nbits >= 384 ? 5 : 4; - - /* - * If P == G, pre-compute a bit more, since this may be re-used later. - * Just adding one avoids upping the cost of the first mul too much, - * and the memory cost too. - */ -#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 - p_eq_g = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &grp->G.Y ) == 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &grp->G.X ) == 0 ); - if( p_eq_g ) - w++; -#else - p_eq_g = 0; -#endif - - /* - * Make sure w is within bounds. - * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) - */ - if( w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE ) - w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; - if( w >= grp->nbits ) - w = 2; - - /* Other sizes that depend on w */ - pre_len = 1U << ( w - 1 ); - d = ( grp->nbits + w - 1 ) / w; - - /* - * Prepare precomputed points: if P == G we want to - * use grp->T if already initialized, or initialize it. - */ - T = p_eq_g ? grp->T : NULL; - - if( T == NULL ) - { - T = mbedtls_calloc( pre_len, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_point ) ); - if( T == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_precompute_comb( grp, T, P, w, d ) ); - - if( p_eq_g ) - { - grp->T = T; - grp->T_size = pre_len; - } - } - - /* - * Make sure M is odd (M = m or M = N - m, since N is odd) - * using the fact that m * P = - (N - m) * P - */ - m_is_odd = ( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 0 ) == 1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &M, m ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mm, &grp->N, m ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &M, &mm, ! m_is_odd ) ); - - /* - * Go for comb multiplication, R = M * P - */ - ecp_comb_fixed( k, d, w, &M ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb_core( grp, R, T, pre_len, k, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - /* - * Now get m * P from M * P and normalize it - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, R, ! m_is_odd ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, R ) ); - -cleanup: - - /* There are two cases where T is not stored in grp: - * - P != G - * - An intermediate operation failed before setting grp->T - * In either case, T must be freed. - */ - if( T != NULL && T != grp->T ) - { - for( i = 0; i < pre_len; i++ ) - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &T[i] ); - mbedtls_free( T ); - } - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &mm ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( R ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ - -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) -/* - * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective - * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is - * internaly represented as X / Z. - * - * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder. - */ - -/* - * Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1 - * Cost: 1M + 1I - */ -static int ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) -{ - int ret; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, P ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( P->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Randomize projective x/z coordinates: - * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l - * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_mxz(). - * - * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. - * Cost: 2M - */ -static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi l; - size_t p_size; - int count = 0; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, P, f_rng, p_rng ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ - - p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); - - /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) ); - - if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &P->X, &P->X, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( P->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &P->Z, &P->Z, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( P->Z ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Double-and-add: R = 2P, S = P + Q, with d = X(P - Q), - * for Montgomery curves in x/z coordinates. - * - * http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/montgom/xz/ladder/mladd-1987-m.op3 - * with - * d = X1 - * P = (X2, Z2) - * Q = (X3, Z3) - * R = (X4, Z4) - * S = (X5, Z5) - * and eliminating temporary variables tO, ..., t4. - * - * Cost: 5M + 4S - */ -static int ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *d ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) - if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, S, P, Q, d ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &CB ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &A, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( A ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &AA, &A, &A ) ); MOD_MUL( AA ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &B, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_SUB( B ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &BB, &B, &B ) ); MOD_MUL( BB ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &E, &AA, &BB ) ); MOD_SUB( E ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( C ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); MOD_SUB( D ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DA, &D, &A ) ); MOD_MUL( DA ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &CB, &C, &B ) ); MOD_MUL( CB ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &S->X, &DA, &CB ) ); MOD_MUL( S->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->X, &S->X, &S->X ) ); MOD_MUL( S->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S->Z, &DA, &CB ) ); MOD_SUB( S->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->Z, d, &S->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->X, &AA, &BB ) ); MOD_MUL( R->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->Z, &grp->A, &E ) ); MOD_MUL( R->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( R->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->Z, &E, &R->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( R->Z ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &B ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &CB ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Multiplication with Montgomery ladder in x/z coordinates, - * for curves in Montgomery form - */ -static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - unsigned char b; - mbedtls_ecp_point RP; - mbedtls_mpi PX; - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &PX ); - - /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &PX, &P->X ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &RP, P ) ); - - /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->X, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 0 ) ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y ); - - /* RP.X might be sligtly larger than P, so reduce it */ - MOD_ADD( RP.X ); - - /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ - if( f_rng != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ - i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( m ); /* one past the (zero-based) most significant bit */ - while( i-- > 0 ) - { - b = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i ); - /* - * if (b) R = 2R + P else R = 2R, - * which is: - * if (b) double_add( RP, R, RP, R ) - * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP ) - * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &PX ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ - -/* - * Multiplication R = m * P - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - char is_grp_capable = 0; -#endif - - /* Common sanity checks */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( grp, m ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); - } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) - ret = ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ); - -#endif -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) - ret = ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ); - -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) -cleanup: - - if ( is_grp_capable ) - { - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); - } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) -/* - * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key, - * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1) - */ -static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS; - - /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Y, 0 ) < 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->X, &grp->P ) >= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->Y, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RHS ); - - /* - * YY = Y^2 - * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( YY ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS ); - - /* Special case for A = -3 */ - if( grp->A.p == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &RHS, &RHS, 3 ) ); MOD_SUB( RHS ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RHS ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ - -/* - * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 1 and m == -1 - * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass! - */ -static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *m, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) -{ - int ret; - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 1 ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); - } - else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, -1 ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R->Y, 0 ) != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &R->Y, &grp->P, &R->Y ) ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); - } - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Linear combination - * NOT constant-time - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ecp_point mP; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - char is_grp_capable = 0; -#endif - - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) != ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &mP ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, &mP, m, P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, R, n, Q ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); - } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, &mP, R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, R ) ); - -cleanup: - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - if ( is_grp_capable ) - { - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); - } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &mP ); - - return( ret ); -} - - -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) -/* - * Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes - */ -static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - /* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ - /* Allow any public value, if it's too big then we'll just reduce it mod p - * (RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 3). */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ - -/* - * Check that a point is valid as a public key - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) -{ - /* Must use affine coordinates */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); - -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) - return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) ); -#endif -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) - return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) ); -#endif - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -} - -/* - * Check that an mbedtls_mpi is valid as a private key - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d ) -{ -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) - { - /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 1 ) != 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1 != grp->nbits ) /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); - - /* see [Curve25519] page 5 */ - if( grp->nbits == 254 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 2 ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); - - return( 0 ); - } -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) - { - /* see SEC1 3.2 */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); - else - return( 0 ); - } -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -} - -/* - * Generate a keypair with configurable base point - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, - mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; - -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) - { - /* [M225] page 5 */ - size_t b; - - do { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - } while( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) == 0); - - /* Make sure the most significant bit is nbits */ - b = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1; /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based */ - if( b > grp->nbits ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, b - grp->nbits ) ); - else - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, grp->nbits, 1 ) ); - - /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for - Curve25519 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) ); - if( grp->nbits == 254 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) ); - } - } - else -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) - { - /* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */ - int count = 0; - - /* - * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA): - * - use the same byte ordering; - * - keep the leftmost nbits bits of the generated octet string; - * - try until result is in the desired range. - * This also avoids any biais, which is especially important for ECDSA. - */ - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) ); - - /* - * Each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing (the msb has - * a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will be < N), - * so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). - * - * For most curves, 1 try is enough with overwhelming probability, - * since N starts with a lot of 1s in binary, but some curves - * such as secp224k1 are actually very close to the worst case. - */ - if( ++count > 30 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ); - } - else -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - -cleanup: - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -/* - * Generate key pair, wrapper for conventional base point - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -/* - * Generate a keypair, prettier wrapper - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -/* - * Check a public-private key pair - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; - - if( pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || - pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); - mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); - - /* mbedtls_ecp_mul() needs a non-const group... */ - mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &grp, &prv->grp ); - - /* Also checks d is valid */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - -cleanup: - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; - mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; - mbedtls_mpi m; - unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; - /* exponents especially adapted for secp192r1 */ - const char *exponents[] = - { - "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22830", /* N - 1 */ - "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */ - "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */ - "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */ - "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */ - }; - - mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &m ); - - /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) ); -#else - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id ) ); -#endif - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " ); - - /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); - - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); - - for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ ) - { - add_c_prev = add_count; - dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; - mul_c_prev = mul_count; - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); - - if( add_count != add_c_prev || - dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || - mul_count != mul_c_prev ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " ); - /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */ - - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) ); - - for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ ) - { - add_c_prev = add_count; - dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; - mul_c_prev = mul_count; - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) ); - - if( add_count != add_c_prev || - dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || - mul_count != mul_c_prev ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - -cleanup: - - if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", ret ); - - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &m ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp_curves.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp_curves.c deleted file mode 100644 index 68e2441a..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ecp_curves.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1460 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" - -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) - -#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -/* - * Conversion macros for embedded constants: - * build lists of mbedtls_mpi_uint's from lists of unsigned char's grouped by 8, 4 or 2 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) - -#define BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) a << 0 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) b << 8 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) c << 16 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) d << 24 ) - -#define BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, 0, 0 ) - -#define BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ), \ - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( e, f, g, h ) - -#else /* 64-bits */ - -#define BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) a << 0 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) b << 8 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) c << 16 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) d << 24 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) e << 32 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) f << 40 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) g << 48 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) h << 56 ) - -#define BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) - -#define BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) - -#endif /* bits in mbedtls_mpi_uint */ - -/* - * Note: the constants are in little-endian order - * to be directly usable in MPIs - */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for secp192r1 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for secp224r1 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for secp256r1 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for secp384r1 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for secp521r1 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x51, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xC6, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x18, 0x01 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x03, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x05, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x07, 0x00 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81 ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D ), -}; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Create an MPI from embedded constants - * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint) - */ -static inline void ecp_mpi_load( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len ) -{ - X->s = 1; - X->n = len / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); - X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; -} - -/* - * Set an MPI to static value 1 - */ -static inline void ecp_mpi_set1( mbedtls_mpi *X ) -{ - static mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; - X->s = 1; - X->n = 1; - X->p = one; -} - -/* - * Make group available from embedded constants - */ -static int ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen) -{ - ecp_mpi_load( &grp->P, p, plen ); - if( a != NULL ) - ecp_mpi_load( &grp->A, a, alen ); - ecp_mpi_load( &grp->B, b, blen ); - ecp_mpi_load( &grp->N, n, nlen ); - - ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.X, gx, gxlen ); - ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.Y, gy, gylen ); - ecp_mpi_set1( &grp->G.Z ); - - grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); - grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); - - grp->h = 1; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) -/* Forward declarations */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif - -#define NIST_MODP( P ) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; -#else -#define NIST_MODP( P ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ - -/* Additional forward declarations */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); -#endif - -#define LOAD_GROUP_A( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ - G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ - G ## _a, sizeof( G ## _a ), \ - G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ - G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ - G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ - G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) - -#define LOAD_GROUP( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ - G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ - NULL, 0, \ - G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ - G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ - G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ - G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -/* - * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group - */ -static int ecp_use_curve25519( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) -{ - int ret; - - /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &grp->A, 16, "01DB42" ) ); - - /* P = 2^255 - 19 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 255 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 19 ) ); - grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); - - /* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &grp->N, 16, - "14DEF9DEA2F79CD65812631A5CF5D3ED" ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 252, 1 ) ); - - /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. - * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 9 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); - - /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ - grp->nbits = 254; - -cleanup: - if( ret != 0 ) - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -/* - * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group - */ -static int ecp_use_curve448( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi Ns; - int ret; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ns ); - - /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &grp->A, 16, "98AA" ) ); - - /* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); - grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); - - /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. - * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 5 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); - - /* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 446, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &Ns, 16, - "8335DC163BB124B65129C96FDE933D8D723A70AADC873D6D54A7BB0D" ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &grp->N, &grp->N, &Ns ) ); - - /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ - grp->nbits = 447; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &Ns ); - if( ret != 0 ) - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Set a group using well-known domain parameters - */ -int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ) -{ - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); - - grp->id = id; - - switch( id ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: - NIST_MODP( p192 ); - return( LOAD_GROUP( secp192r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: - NIST_MODP( p224 ); - return( LOAD_GROUP( secp224r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: - NIST_MODP( p256 ); - return( LOAD_GROUP( secp256r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: - NIST_MODP( p384 ); - return( LOAD_GROUP( secp384r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: - NIST_MODP( p521 ); - return( LOAD_GROUP( secp521r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: - grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; - return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp192k1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: - grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; - return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp224k1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: - grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; - return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp256k1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: - return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP256r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: - return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP384r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: - return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP512r1 ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: - grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; - return( ecp_use_curve25519( grp ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: - grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; - return( ecp_use_curve448( grp ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ - - default: - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) -/* - * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. - * - * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct - * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our - * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and - * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and - * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -/* - * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, - * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, - * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. - * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, - * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. - * - * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. - * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can - * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. - */ - -/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ -static inline void add64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) -{ - unsigned char i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; - for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++, src++ ) - { - *dst += c; c = ( *dst < c ); - *dst += *src; c += ( *dst < *src ); - } - *carry += c; -} - -/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ -static inline void carry64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) -{ - unsigned char i; - for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++ ) - { - *dst += *carry; - *carry = ( *dst < *carry ); - } -} - -#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) -#define A( i ) N->p + i * WIDTH -#define ADD( i ) add64( p, A( i ), &c ) -#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64( p, &c ) -#define LAST p += WIDTH; *p = c; while( ++p < end ) *p = 0 - -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) - */ -static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; - - /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, 6 * WIDTH ) ); - - p = N->p; - end = p + N->n; - - ADD( 3 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 - ADD( 3 ); ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 - ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); LAST; // A2 += A4 + A5 - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -#undef WIDTH -#undef A -#undef ADD -#undef NEXT -#undef LAST -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -/* - * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same - * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: - * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. - */ - -/* - * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. - * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, - * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. - * - * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, - * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. - * - * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. - */ -#define LOAD32 cur = A( i ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ - -#define MAX32 N->n -#define A( j ) N->p[j] -#define STORE32 N->p[i] = cur; - -#else /* 64-bit */ - -#define MAX32 N->n * 2 -#define A( j ) j % 2 ? (uint32_t)( N->p[j/2] >> 32 ) : (uint32_t)( N->p[j/2] ) -#define STORE32 \ - if( i % 2 ) { \ - N->p[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ - N->p[i/2] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur) << 32; \ - } else { \ - N->p[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ - N->p[i/2] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; \ - } - -#endif /* sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) */ - -/* - * Helpers for addition and subtraction of chunks, with signed carry. - */ -static inline void add32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) -{ - *dst += src; - *carry += ( *dst < src ); -} - -static inline void sub32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) -{ - *carry -= ( *dst < src ); - *dst -= src; -} - -#define ADD( j ) add32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); -#define SUB( j ) sub32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); - -/* - * Helpers for the main 'loop' - * (see fix_negative for the motivation of C) - */ -#define INIT( b ) \ - int ret; \ - signed char c = 0, cc; \ - uint32_t cur; \ - size_t i = 0, bits = b; \ - mbedtls_mpi C; \ - mbedtls_mpi_uint Cp[ b / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1 ]; \ - \ - C.s = 1; \ - C.n = b / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1; \ - C.p = Cp; \ - memset( Cp, 0, C.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); \ - \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, b * 2 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ); \ - LOAD32; - -#define NEXT \ - STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ - cc = c; c = 0; \ - if( cc < 0 ) \ - sub32( &cur, -cc, &c ); \ - else \ - add32( &cur, cc, &c ); \ - -#define LAST \ - STORE32; i++; \ - cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \ - cur = 0; while( ++i < MAX32 ) { STORE32; } \ - if( c < 0 ) fix_negative( N, c, &C, bits ); - -/* - * If the result is negative, we get it in the form - * c * 2^(bits + 32) + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' - */ -static inline int fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, mbedtls_mpi *C, size_t bits ) -{ - int ret; - - /* C = - c * 2^(bits + 32) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) - ((void) bits); -#else - if( bits == 224 ) - C->p[ C->n - 1 ] = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c) << 32; - else -#endif - C->p[ C->n - 1 ] = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; - - /* N = - ( C - N ) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( N, C, N ) ); - N->s = -1; - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) - */ -static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - INIT( 224 ); - - SUB( 7 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 - SUB( 8 ); SUB( 12 ); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 - SUB( 9 ); SUB( 13 ); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 - SUB( 10 ); ADD( 7 ); ADD( 11 ); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 - SUB( 11 ); ADD( 8 ); ADD( 12 ); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 - SUB( 12 ); ADD( 9 ); ADD( 13 ); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 - SUB( 13 ); ADD( 10 ); LAST; // A6 += -A13 + A10 - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) - */ -static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - INIT( 256 ); - - ADD( 8 ); ADD( 9 ); - SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); NEXT; // A0 - - ADD( 9 ); ADD( 10 ); - SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A1 - - ADD( 10 ); ADD( 11 ); - SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A2 - - ADD( 11 ); ADD( 11 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); - SUB( 15 ); SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A3 - - ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); - SUB( 9 ); SUB( 10 ); NEXT; // A4 - - ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); - SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A5 - - ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); - SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A6 - - ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 8 ); - SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); LAST; // A7 - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) - */ -static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - INIT( 384 ); - - ADD( 12 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 20 ); - SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A0 - - ADD( 13 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 23 ); - SUB( 12 ); SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A2 - - ADD( 14 ); ADD( 23 ); - SUB( 13 ); SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A2 - - ADD( 15 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 21 ); - SUB( 14 ); SUB( 22 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A3 - - ADD( 21 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 22 ); - SUB( 15 ); SUB( 23 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A4 - - ADD( 22 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 23 ); - SUB( 16 ); NEXT; // A5 - - ADD( 23 ); ADD( 23 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 22 ); - SUB( 17 ); NEXT; // A6 - - ADD( 19 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 23 ); - SUB( 18 ); NEXT; // A7 - - ADD( 20 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 16 ); - SUB( 19 ); NEXT; // A8 - - ADD( 21 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 17 ); - SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A9 - - ADD( 22 ); ADD( 19 ); ADD( 18 ); - SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A10 - - ADD( 23 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 19 ); - SUB( 22 ); LAST; // A11 - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ - -#undef A -#undef LOAD32 -#undef STORE32 -#undef MAX32 -#undef INIT -#undef NEXT -#undef LAST - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -/* - * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward. - * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits). - */ - -/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ -#define P521_WIDTH ( 521 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) - -/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ -#define P521_MASK 0x01FF - -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) - * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1 - */ -static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi M; - mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1]; - /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits: - * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is - * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */ - - if( N->n < P521_WIDTH ) - return( 0 ); - - /* M = A1 */ - M.s = 1; - M.n = N->n - ( P521_WIDTH - 1 ); - if( M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1 ) - M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1; - M.p = Mp; - memcpy( Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 521 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); - - /* N = A0 */ - N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; - for( i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) - N->p[i] = 0; - - /* N = A0 + A1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -#undef P521_WIDTH -#undef P521_MASK -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) - -/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ -#define P255_WIDTH ( 255 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) - -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 - * Write N as A0 + 2^255 A1, return A0 + 19 * A1 - */ -static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi M; - mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; - - if( N->n < P255_WIDTH ) - return( 0 ); - - /* M = A1 */ - M.s = 1; - M.n = N->n - ( P255_WIDTH - 1 ); - if( M.n > P255_WIDTH + 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - M.p = Mp; - memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); - memcpy( Mp, N->p + P255_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 255 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); - M.n++; /* Make room for multiplication by 19 */ - - /* N = A0 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( N, 255, 0 ) ); - for( i = P255_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) - N->p[i] = 0; - - /* N = A0 + 19 * A1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &M, 19 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) - -/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ -#define P448_WIDTH ( 448 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) - -/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ -#define DIV_ROUND_UP( X, Y ) ( ( ( X ) + ( Y ) - 1 ) / ( Y ) ) -#define P224_WIDTH_MIN ( 28 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) -#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP( 28, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) -#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ( ( P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 ) - 224 ) - -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 - * Write N as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return - * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference - * implementation of Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather - * than a generic bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on - * 32-bit machines by splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the - * arithmetic using the limbs directly as we do for the NIST primes above, - * but for 64-bit targets it should use half the number of operations if we do - * the reduction with 224-bit limbs, since mpi_add_mpi will then use 64-bit adds. - */ -static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi M, Q; - mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH]; - - if( N->n <= P448_WIDTH ) - return( 0 ); - - /* M = A1 */ - M.s = 1; - M.n = N->n - ( P448_WIDTH ); - if( M.n > P448_WIDTH ) - /* Shouldn't be called with N larger than 2^896! */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - M.p = Mp; - memset( Mp, 0, sizeof( Mp ) ); - memcpy( Mp, N->p + P448_WIDTH, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); - - /* N = A0 */ - for( i = P448_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) - N->p[i] = 0; - - /* N += A1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); - - /* Q = B1, N += B1 */ - Q = M; - Q.p = Qp; - memcpy( Qp, Mp, sizeof( Qp ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Q, 224 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &Q ) ); - - /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224, N += M */ - if( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) > 4 ) - Mp[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1 ) >> ( P224_UNUSED_BITS ); - for( i = P224_WIDTH_MAX; i < M.n; ++i ) - Mp[i] = 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &Q ) ); - M.n = P448_WIDTH + 1; /* Make room for shifted carry bit from the addition */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &M, 224 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, - * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. - * - * Write N as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. - * Actually do two passes, since R is big. - */ -#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX ( 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Max limbs in P -#define P_KOBLITZ_R ( 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Limbs in R -static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz( mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, - size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi M, R; - mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1]; - - if( N->n < p_limbs ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Init R */ - R.s = 1; - R.p = Rp; - R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; - - /* Common setup for M */ - M.s = 1; - M.p = Mp; - - /* M = A1 */ - M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); - if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) - M.n = p_limbs + adjust; - memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); - memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); - if( shift != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); - M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ - - /* N = A0 */ - if( mask != 0 ) - N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; - for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) - N->p[i] = 0; - - /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); - - /* Second pass */ - - /* M = A1 */ - M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); - if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) - M.n = p_limbs + adjust; - memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); - memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); - if( shift != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); - M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ - - /* N = A0 */ - if( mask != 0 ) - N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; - for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) - N->p[i] = 0; - - /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, - * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x0100001119 - */ -static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ) }; - - return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 192 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, 0 ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, - * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 - */ -static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ) }; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) - return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 4, 1, 32, 0xFFFFFFFF ) ); -#else - return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 224 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, 0 ) ); -#endif -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -/* - * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, - * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 - */ -static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { - BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ) }; - return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, 0 ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/error.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/error.c deleted file mode 100644 index 6c886891..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/error.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,895 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Error message information - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) -#include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf -#define mbedtls_time_t time_t -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#include "mbedtls/aes.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) -#include "mbedtls/aria.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) -#include "mbedtls/base64.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) -#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) -#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) -#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) -#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) -#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#include "mbedtls/des.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) -#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) -#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) -#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) -#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) -#include "mbedtls/pem.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) -#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) -#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) -#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#include "mbedtls/threading.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) -#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" -#endif - - -void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ - size_t len; - int use_ret; - - if( buflen == 0 ) - return; - - memset( buf, 0x00, buflen ); - - if( ret < 0 ) - ret = -ret; - - if( ret & 0xFF80 ) - { - use_ret = ret & 0xFF80; - - // High level error codes - // - // BEGIN generated code -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Bad input parameters" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the public value failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - DHM hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The signature is not valid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - The selected feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - MD hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Read/write of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unsupported key version" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Invalid key tag or value" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Private key password can't be empty" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - PK hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The public key operation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The private key operation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - RSA hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE) ) - { - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); - return; - } - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Connection requires a write call" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The operation timed out" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Input invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Read/write of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ - // END generated code - - if( strlen( buf ) == 0 ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret ); - } - - use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80; - - if( use_ret == 0 ) - return; - - // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both - // error strings. - // - len = strlen( buf ); - - if( len > 0 ) - { - if( buflen - len < 5 ) - return; - - mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " ); - - buf += len + 3; - buflen -= len + 3; - } - - // Low level error codes - // - // BEGIN generated code -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid key length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid data input length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid input data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - AES hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - Invalid key length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - ARIA hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Data is invalid. (not used)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Invalid key length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Invalid key length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - CCM hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CMAC - CMAC hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DES - DES hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - GCM hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD2 - MD2 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD4 - MD4 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to open a socket" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Binding of the socket failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not listen on the socket" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Connection was reset by peer" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Polling the net context failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Input invalid" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - OID is not found" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - output buffer is too small" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "XTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ - // END generated code - - if( strlen( buf ) != 0 ) - return; - - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret ); -} - -#else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) - -/* - * Provide an non-function in case MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is not defined - */ -void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ - ((void) ret); - - if( buflen > 0 ) - buf[0] = '\0'; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/havege.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/havege.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4dcac028..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/havege.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,241 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The HAVEGE RNG was designed by Andre Seznec in 2002. - * - * http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/publi.php - * - * Contact: seznec(at)irisa_dot_fr - orocheco(at)irisa_dot_fr - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#include "mbedtls/timing.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - * On average, one iteration accesses two 8-word blocks in the havege WALK - * table, and generates 16 words in the RES array. - * - * The data read in the WALK table is updated and permuted after each use. - * The result of the hardware clock counter read is used for this update. - * - * 25 conditional tests are present. The conditional tests are grouped in - * two nested groups of 12 conditional tests and 1 test that controls the - * permutation; on average, there should be 6 tests executed and 3 of them - * should be mispredicted. - * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - */ - -#define SWAP(X,Y) { int *T = X; X = Y; Y = T; } - -#define TST1_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; -#define TST2_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; - -#define TST1_LEAVE U1++; } -#define TST2_LEAVE U2++; } - -#define ONE_ITERATION \ - \ - PTEST = PT1 >> 20; \ - \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - \ - PTX = (PT1 >> 18) & 7; \ - PT1 &= 0x1FFF; \ - PT2 &= 0x1FFF; \ - CLK = (int) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ - \ - i = 0; \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 1]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 4]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (1)) ^ (*A << (31)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (2)) ^ (*B << (30)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN ^ U1; \ - *C = (*C >> (3)) ^ (*C << (29)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (4)) ^ (*D << (28)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - if( PTEST & 1 ) SWAP( A, C ); \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (5)) ^ (*A << (27)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (6)) ^ (*B << (26)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN; CLK = (int) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ - *C = (*C >> (7)) ^ (*C << (25)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (8)) ^ (*D << (24)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 4]; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 1]; \ - \ - PTEST = PT2 >> 1; \ - \ - PT2 = (RES[(i - 8) ^ PTY] ^ WALK[PT2 ^ PTY ^ 7]); \ - PT2 = ((PT2 & 0x1FFF) & (~8)) ^ ((PT1 ^ 8) & 0x8); \ - PTY = (PT2 >> 10) & 7; \ - \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 5]; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 5]; \ - \ - RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> ( 9)) ^ (*A << (23)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (10)) ^ (*B << (22)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN ^ U2; \ - *C = (*C >> (11)) ^ (*C << (21)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (12)) ^ (*D << (20)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (13)) ^ (*A << (19)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (14)) ^ (*B << (18)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN; \ - *C = (*C >> (15)) ^ (*C << (17)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (16)) ^ (*D << (16)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - PT1 = ( RES[( i - 8 ) ^ PTX] ^ \ - WALK[PT1 ^ PTX ^ 7] ) & (~1); \ - PT1 ^= (PT2 ^ 0x10) & 0x10; \ - \ - for( n++, i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \ - hs->pool[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i]; - -/* - * Entropy gathering function - */ -static void havege_fill( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) -{ - int i, n = 0; - int U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D; - int PT1, PT2, *WALK, RES[16]; - int PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN; - - WALK = hs->WALK; - PT1 = hs->PT1; - PT2 = hs->PT2; - - PTX = U1 = 0; - PTY = U2 = 0; - - (void)PTX; - - memset( RES, 0, sizeof( RES ) ); - - while( n < MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE * 4 ) - { - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - } - - hs->PT1 = PT1; - hs->PT2 = PT2; - - hs->offset[0] = 0; - hs->offset[1] = MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE / 2; -} - -/* - * HAVEGE initialization - */ -void mbedtls_havege_init( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) -{ - memset( hs, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_havege_state ) ); - - havege_fill( hs ); -} - -void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) -{ - if( hs == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs, sizeof( mbedtls_havege_state ) ); -} - -/* - * HAVEGE rand function - */ -int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - int val; - size_t use_len; - mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) p_rng; - unsigned char *p = buf; - - while( len > 0 ) - { - use_len = len; - if( use_len > sizeof(int) ) - use_len = sizeof(int); - - if( hs->offset[1] >= MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE ) - havege_fill( hs ); - - val = hs->pool[hs->offset[0]++]; - val ^= hs->pool[hs->offset[1]++]; - - memcpy( p, &val, use_len ); - - len -= use_len; - p += use_len; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md.c deleted file mode 100644 index 303cdcbe..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,475 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file mbedtls_md.c - * - * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -#include -#endif - -/* - * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! - */ -static const int supported_digests[] = { - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, -#endif - - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; - -const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ) -{ - return( supported_digests ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ) -{ - if( NULL == md_name ) - return( NULL ); - - /* Get the appropriate digest information */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - if( !strcmp( "MD2", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - if( !strcmp( "MD4", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - if( !strcmp( "MD5", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - if( !strcmp( "RIPEMD160", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA1", md_name ) || !strcmp( "SHA", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA224", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); - if( !strcmp( "SHA256", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA384", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); - if( !strcmp( "SHA512", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); -#endif - return( NULL ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ) -{ - switch( md_type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return( &mbedtls_md2_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return( &mbedtls_md4_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); -#endif - default: - return( NULL ); - } -} - -void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return; - - if( ctx->md_ctx != NULL ) - ctx->md_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->md_ctx ); - - if( ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->hmac_ctx, - 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size ); - mbedtls_free( ctx->hmac_ctx ); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, - const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ) -{ - if( dst == NULL || dst->md_info == NULL || - src == NULL || src->md_info == NULL || - dst->md_info != src->md_info ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - dst->md_info->clone_func( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) -{ - return mbedtls_md_setup( ctx, md_info, 1 ); -} -#endif - -int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ctx->md_ctx = md_info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - if( hmac != 0 ) - { - ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 2, md_info->block_size ); - if( ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - { - md_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->md_ctx ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - } - - ctx->md_info = md_info; - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( md_info->digest_func( input, ilen, output ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret; - FILE *f; - size_t n; - mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; - unsigned char buf[1024]; - - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - if( ( ret = md_info->starts_func( ctx.md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - while( ( n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) ) > 0 ) - if( ( ret = md_info->update_func( ctx.md_ctx, buf, n ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - if( ferror( f ) != 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; - else - ret = md_info->finish_func( ctx.md_ctx, output ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - fclose( f ); - mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char *ipad, *opad; - size_t i; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size ) - { - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, sum ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - keylen = ctx->md_info->size; - key = sum; - } - - ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; - opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; - - memset( ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size ); - memset( opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size ); - - for( i = 0; i < keylen; i++ ) - { - ipad[i] = (unsigned char)( ipad[i] ^ key[i] ); - opad[i] = (unsigned char)( opad[i] ^ key[i] ); - } - - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, ipad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sum, sizeof( sum ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char *opad; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; - - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, tmp ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, opad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, tmp, - ctx->md_info->size ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - return( ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *ipad; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; - - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - return( ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, ipad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, - const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; - int ret; - - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( ctx->md_info->process_func( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -} - -unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - return md_info->size; -} - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); - - return md_info->type; -} - -const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( NULL ); - - return md_info->name; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md2.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md2.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1c0b3df5..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md2.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,363 +0,0 @@ -/* - * RFC 1115/1319 compliant MD2 implementation - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The MD2 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1989. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1115.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) - -static const unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = -{ - 0x29, 0x2E, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0x7C, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x36, - 0x54, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x06, 0x13, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x05, 0xF3, - 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x73, 0x8C, 0x98, 0x93, 0x2B, 0xD9, 0xBC, 0x4C, - 0x82, 0xCA, 0x1E, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3C, 0xFD, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x16, - 0x67, 0x42, 0x6F, 0x18, 0x8A, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x4E, - 0xC4, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0x9E, 0xDE, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xFB, 0xF5, 0x8E, - 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xEE, 0x7A, 0xA9, 0x68, 0x79, 0x91, 0x15, 0xB2, - 0x07, 0x3F, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x10, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x21, - 0x80, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x90, 0x32, 0x27, 0x35, 0x3E, - 0xCC, 0xE7, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x97, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x30, 0xB3, - 0x48, 0xA5, 0xB5, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x92, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x56, - 0xAA, 0xC6, 0x4F, 0xB8, 0x38, 0xD2, 0x96, 0xA4, 0x7D, 0xB6, - 0x76, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0xE2, 0x9C, 0x74, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x45, 0x9D, - 0x70, 0x59, 0x64, 0x71, 0x87, 0x20, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xCF, 0x65, - 0xE6, 0x2D, 0xA8, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x60, 0x25, 0xAD, 0xAE, 0xB0, - 0xB9, 0xF6, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x61, 0x69, 0x34, 0x40, 0x7E, 0x0F, - 0x55, 0x47, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xAF, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x5C, - 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0xC5, 0xEA, 0x26, 0x2C, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x6E, - 0x85, 0x28, 0x84, 0x09, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x81, - 0x4D, 0x52, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x6C, 0xC1, 0xAB, 0xFA, - 0x24, 0xE1, 0x7B, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0xB1, 0x4A, 0x78, 0x88, - 0x95, 0x8B, 0xE3, 0x63, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0xD5, 0xFE, - 0x3B, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xF2, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x66, 0x58, - 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xA6, 0x77, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x75, 0x4B, 0x0A, - 0x31, 0x44, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x8F, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0x99, - 0x8D, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x11, 0x83, 0x14 -}; - -void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md2_context *src ) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * MD2 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx->cksum, 0, 16 ); - memset( ctx->state, 0, 46 ); - memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 16 ); - ctx->left = 0; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( ctx ); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) -{ - int i, j; - unsigned char t = 0; - - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - { - ctx->state[i + 16] = ctx->buffer[i]; - ctx->state[i + 32] = - (unsigned char)( ctx->buffer[i] ^ ctx->state[i]); - } - - for( i = 0; i < 18; i++ ) - { - for( j = 0; j < 48; j++ ) - { - ctx->state[j] = (unsigned char) - ( ctx->state[j] ^ PI_SUBST[t] ); - t = ctx->state[j]; - } - - t = (unsigned char)( t + i ); - } - - t = ctx->cksum[15]; - - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - { - ctx->cksum[i] = (unsigned char) - ( ctx->cksum[i] ^ PI_SUBST[ctx->buffer[i] ^ t] ); - t = ctx->cksum[i]; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * MD2 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t fill; - - while( ilen > 0 ) - { - if( ilen > 16 - ctx->left ) - fill = 16 - ctx->left; - else - fill = ilen; - - memcpy( ctx->buffer + ctx->left, input, fill ); - - ctx->left += fill; - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - - if( ctx->left == 16 ) - { - ctx->left = 0; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); -} -#endif - -/* - * MD2 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - int ret; - size_t i; - unsigned char x; - - x = (unsigned char)( 16 - ctx->left ); - - for( i = ctx->left; i < 16; i++ ) - ctx->buffer[i] = x; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memcpy( ctx->buffer, ctx->cksum, 16 ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memcpy( output, ctx->state, 16 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( ctx, output ); -} -#endif - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ - -/* - * output = MD2( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_md2_context ctx; - - mbedtls_md2_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_md2_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_ret( input, ilen, output ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * RFC 1319 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char md2_test_str[7][81] = -{ - { "" }, - { "a" }, - { "abc" }, - { "message digest" }, - { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, - { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012" - "345678901234567890" } -}; - -static const size_t md2_test_strlen[7] = -{ - 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 -}; - -static const unsigned char md2_test_sum[7][16] = -{ - { 0x83, 0x50, 0xE5, 0xA3, 0xE2, 0x4C, 0x15, 0x3D, - 0xF2, 0x27, 0x5C, 0x9F, 0x80, 0x69, 0x27, 0x73 }, - { 0x32, 0xEC, 0x01, 0xEC, 0x4A, 0x6D, 0xAC, 0x72, - 0xC0, 0xAB, 0x96, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xC0, 0xB5, 0xD1 }, - { 0xDA, 0x85, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0x3F, 0x88, 0xD9, 0x9B, - 0x30, 0x28, 0x3A, 0x69, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0xD6, 0xBB }, - { 0xAB, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x0B, - 0x21, 0x9F, 0xF3, 0x30, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x06, 0xB0 }, - { 0x4E, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x02, 0x92, 0xAB, - 0x5A, 0x41, 0x08, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x47, 0x94, 0x0B }, - { 0xDA, 0x33, 0xDE, 0xF2, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xF1, 0x39, - 0x75, 0x35, 0x28, 0x46, 0xC3, 0x03, 0x38, 0xCD }, - { 0xD5, 0x97, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x0D, - 0xC9, 0x80, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x66, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xD8 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char md2sum[16]; - - for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " MD2 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); - - ret = mbedtls_md2_ret( md2_test_str[i], md2_test_strlen[i], md2sum ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( memcmp( md2sum, md2_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( 0 ); - -fail: - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md4.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md4.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3f8ddff3..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md4.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,468 +0,0 @@ -/* - * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1186.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE -#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE -#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md4_context *src ) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * MD4 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( ctx ); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; - - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[15], data, 60 ); - -#define S(x,n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) - - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; - -#define F(x, y, z) ((x & y) | ((~x) & z)) -#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) { a += F(b,c,d) + x; a = S(a,s); } - - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 0], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 1], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 2], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[ 3], 19 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 4], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 5], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 6], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[ 7], 19 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 8], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 9], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[10], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[11], 19 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[12], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[13], 7 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[14], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[15], 19 ); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x,y,z) ((x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z)) -#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) { a += F(b,c,d) + x + 0x5A827999; a = S(a,s); } - - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 0], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 4], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 8], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[12], 13 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 1], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 5], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 9], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[13], 13 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 2], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 6], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[10], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[14], 13 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 3], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 7], 5 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[11], 9 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[15], 13 ); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) -#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) { a += F(b,c,d) + x + 0x6ED9EBA1; a = S(a,s); } - - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 0], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 8], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 4], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[12], 15 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 2], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[10], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 6], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[14], 15 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 1], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[ 9], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 5], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[13], 15 ); - P( A, B, C, D, X[ 3], 3 ); - P( D, A, B, C, X[11], 9 ); - P( C, D, A, B, X[ 7], 11 ); - P( B, C, D, A, X[15], 15 ); - -#undef F -#undef P - - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, data ); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * MD4 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t fill; - uint32_t left; - - if( ilen == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) - ctx->total[1]++; - - if( left && ilen >= fill ) - { - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), - (void *) input, fill ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while( ilen >= 64 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if( ilen > 0 ) - { - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), - (void *) input, ilen ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); -} -#endif - -static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = -{ - 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; - -/* - * MD4 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - int ret; - uint32_t last, padn; - uint32_t high, low; - unsigned char msglen[8]; - - high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) - | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); - low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - - PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); - - last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); - - ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, (unsigned char *)md4_padding, padn ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, msglen, 8 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( ctx, output ); -} -#endif - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ - -/* - * output = MD4( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_md4_context ctx; - - mbedtls_md4_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_md4_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_ret( input, ilen, output ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * RFC 1320 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char md4_test_str[7][81] = -{ - { "" }, - { "a" }, - { "abc" }, - { "message digest" }, - { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, - { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012" - "345678901234567890" } -}; - -static const size_t md4_test_strlen[7] = -{ - 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 -}; - -static const unsigned char md4_test_sum[7][16] = -{ - { 0x31, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0xE9, 0x31, - 0xB7, 0x3C, 0x59, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xC0 }, - { 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xB3, 0x1D, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x46, - 0x24, 0x5E, 0x05, 0xFB, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0xFB, 0x24 }, - { 0xA4, 0x48, 0x01, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x21, 0xD8, 0x52, - 0x5F, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0x7A, 0xA6, 0x72, 0x9D }, - { 0xD9, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x64, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xE8, - 0x18, 0x87, 0x48, 0x06, 0xE1, 0xC7, 0x01, 0x4B }, - { 0xD7, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x30, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0xBB, 0xCD, - 0xEE, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x63, 0xDF, 0x41, 0x2D, 0xA9 }, - { 0x04, 0x3F, 0x85, 0x82, 0xF2, 0x41, 0xDB, 0x35, - 0x1C, 0xE6, 0x27, 0xE1, 0x53, 0xE7, 0xF0, 0xE4 }, - { 0xE3, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x38, 0xF2, 0x19, - 0x9C, 0x3E, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xCC, 0x05, 0x36 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char md4sum[16]; - - for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " MD4 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); - - ret = mbedtls_md4_ret( md4_test_str[i], md4_test_strlen[i], md4sum ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( memcmp( md4sum, md4_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( 0 ); - -fail: - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md_wrap.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md_wrap.c deleted file mode 100644 index 32f08719..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/md_wrap.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,586 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md_wrap.c - * - * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - -static int md2_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int md2_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md2_update_ret( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int md2_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *md2_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_md2_init( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void md2_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_free( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void md2_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_clone( (mbedtls_md2_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_md2_context *) src ); -} - -static int md2_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - ((void) data); - - return( mbedtls_internal_md2_process( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, - "MD2", - 16, - 16, - md2_starts_wrap, - md2_update_wrap, - md2_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_md2_ret, - md2_ctx_alloc, - md2_ctx_free, - md2_clone_wrap, - md2_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - -static int md4_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int md4_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md4_update_ret( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int md4_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *md4_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_md4_init( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void md4_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_free( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void md4_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_clone( (mbedtls_md4_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_md4_context *) src ); -} - -static int md4_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_md4_process( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx, data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, - "MD4", - 16, - 64, - md4_starts_wrap, - md4_update_wrap, - md4_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_md4_ret, - md4_ctx_alloc, - md4_ctx_free, - md4_clone_wrap, - md4_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - -static int md5_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int md5_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md5_update_ret( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int md5_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *md5_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_md5_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_md5_init( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void md5_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_free( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void md5_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_clone( (mbedtls_md5_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_md5_context *) src ); -} - -static int md5_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_md5_process( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx, data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, - "MD5", - 16, - 64, - md5_starts_wrap, - md5_update_wrap, - md5_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_md5_ret, - md5_ctx_alloc, - md5_ctx_free, - md5_clone_wrap, - md5_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - -static int ripemd160_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int ripemd160_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int ripemd160_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx, - output ) ); -} - -static void *ripemd160_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_ripemd160_init( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void ripemd160_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_free( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void ripemd160_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) src ); -} - -static int ripemd160_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( - (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx, data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, - "RIPEMD160", - 20, - 64, - ripemd160_starts_wrap, - ripemd160_update_wrap, - ripemd160_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_ripemd160_ret, - ripemd160_ctx_alloc, - ripemd160_ctx_free, - ripemd160_clone_wrap, - ripemd160_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - -static int sha1_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int sha1_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int sha1_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *sha1_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_sha1_init( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void sha1_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_clone( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_sha1_context *) src ); -} - -static void sha1_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_free( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static int sha1_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx, - data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - "SHA1", - 20, - 64, - sha1_starts_wrap, - sha1_update_wrap, - sha1_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_sha1_ret, - sha1_ctx_alloc, - sha1_ctx_free, - sha1_clone_wrap, - sha1_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ - -/* - * Wrappers for generic message digests - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - -static int sha224_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, 1 ) ); -} - -static int sha224_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int sha224_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, - output ) ); -} - -static int sha224_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); -} - -static void *sha224_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_sha256_init( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void sha224_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_free( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void sha224_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_clone( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_sha256_context *) src ); -} - -static int sha224_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, - data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, - "SHA224", - 28, - 64, - sha224_starts_wrap, - sha224_update_wrap, - sha224_finish_wrap, - sha224_wrap, - sha224_ctx_alloc, - sha224_ctx_free, - sha224_clone_wrap, - sha224_process_wrap, -}; - -static int sha256_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, 0 ) ); -} - -static int sha256_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - "SHA256", - 32, - 64, - sha256_starts_wrap, - sha224_update_wrap, - sha224_finish_wrap, - sha256_wrap, - sha224_ctx_alloc, - sha224_ctx_free, - sha224_clone_wrap, - sha224_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - -static int sha384_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, 1 ) ); -} - -static int sha384_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int sha384_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, - output ) ); -} - -static int sha384_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); -} - -static void *sha384_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_sha512_init( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void sha384_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_free( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void sha384_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_clone( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_sha512_context *) src ); -} - -static int sha384_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, - data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - "SHA384", - 48, - 128, - sha384_starts_wrap, - sha384_update_wrap, - sha384_finish_wrap, - sha384_wrap, - sha384_ctx_alloc, - sha384_ctx_free, - sha384_clone_wrap, - sha384_process_wrap, -}; - -static int sha512_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, 0 ) ); -} - -static int sha512_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - "SHA512", - 64, - 128, - sha512_starts_wrap, - sha384_update_wrap, - sha384_finish_wrap, - sha512_wrap, - sha384_ctx_alloc, - sha384_ctx_free, - sha384_clone_wrap, - sha384_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk.c deleted file mode 100644 index f05b139e..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,379 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Public Key abstraction layer - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" - -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" -#endif - -#include -#include - -/* - * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context - */ -void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - ctx->pk_info = NULL; - ctx->pk_ctx = NULL; -} - -/* - * Free (the components of) a mbedtls_pk_context - */ -void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return; - - ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->pk_ctx ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) ); -} - -/* - * Get pk_info structure from type - */ -const mbedtls_pk_info_t * mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ) -{ - switch( pk_type ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return( &mbedtls_rsa_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: - return( &mbedtls_eckey_info ); - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: - return( &mbedtls_eckeydh_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - return( &mbedtls_ecdsa_info ); -#endif - /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */ - default: - return( NULL ); - } -} - -/* - * Initialise context - */ -int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - ctx->pk_info = info; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) -/* - * Initialize an RSA-alt context - */ -int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, - mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, - mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, - mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func ) -{ - mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt; - const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - ctx->pk_info = info; - - rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx->pk_ctx; - - rsa_alt->key = key; - rsa_alt->decrypt_func = decrypt_func; - rsa_alt->sign_func = sign_func; - rsa_alt->key_len_func = key_len_func; - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given type - */ -int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) -{ - /* null or NONE context can't do anything */ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->can_do( type ) ); -} - -/* - * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify - */ -static inline int pk_hashlen_helper( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len ) -{ - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - - if( *hash_len != 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - - *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Verify a signature - */ -int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL || - pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, sig_len ) ); -} - -/* - * Verify a signature with options - */ -int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, - mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx, type ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - - if( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - int ret; - const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; - -#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX - if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ - - if( options == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; - - if( sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); - - ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ), - NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, - md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, - pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, - pss_opts->expected_salt_len, - sig ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); - - return( 0 ); -#else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - } - - /* General case: no options */ - if( options != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( mbedtls_pk_verify( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) ); -} - -/* - * Make a signature - */ -int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL || - pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -/* - * Decrypt message - */ -int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, - output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -/* - * Encrypt message - */ -int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, - output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -/* - * Check public-private key pair - */ -int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv ) -{ - if( pub == NULL || pub->pk_info == NULL || - prv == NULL || prv->pk_info == NULL || - prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT ) - { - if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - } - else - { - if( pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - } - - return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx ) ); -} - -/* - * Get key size in bits - */ -size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen( ctx->pk_ctx ) ); -} - -/* - * Export debug information - */ -int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ctx->pk_info->debug_func == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); - - ctx->pk_info->debug_func( ctx->pk_ctx, items ); - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Access the PK type name - */ -const char *mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( "invalid PK" ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->name ); -} - -/* - * Access the PK type - */ -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); - - return( ctx->pk_info->type ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk_wrap.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk_wrap.c deleted file mode 100644 index 2c7d2d79..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pk_wrap.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,523 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" - -/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#include -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -static int rsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) -{ - return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || - type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ); -} - -static size_t rsa_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) -{ - const mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - return( 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ); -} - -static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); - -#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX - if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ - - if( sig_len < rsa_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, NULL, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, - (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data. - * We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can - * use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a - * valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid - * signature?". */ - if( sig_len > rsa_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - -#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX - if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ - - *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); - - return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); -} - -static int rsa_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - - if( ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) ); -} - -static int rsa_encrypt_wrap( void *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); - - if( *olen > osize ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); - - return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, - ilen, input, output ) ); -} - -static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv ) -{ - return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub, - (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv ) ); -} - -static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_rsa_init( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, 0, 0 ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void rsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_rsa_free( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void rsa_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) -{ - items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; - items->name = "rsa.N"; - items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N ); - - items++; - - items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; - items->name = "rsa.E"; - items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E ); -} - -const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - "RSA", - rsa_get_bitlen, - rsa_can_do, - rsa_verify_wrap, - rsa_sign_wrap, - rsa_decrypt_wrap, - rsa_encrypt_wrap, - rsa_check_pair_wrap, - rsa_alloc_wrap, - rsa_free_wrap, - rsa_debug, -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * Generic EC key - */ -static int eckey_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) -{ - return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || - type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || - type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); -} - -static size_t eckey_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) -{ - return( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -/* Forward declarations */ -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); - -static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); - -static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; - - mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) - ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); - - mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); - - return( ret ); -} - -static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; - - mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) - ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, - f_rng, p_rng ); - - mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub, - (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv ) ); -} - -static void *eckey_alloc_wrap( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void eckey_free_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void eckey_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) -{ - items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP; - items->name = "eckey.Q"; - items->value = &( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q ); -} - -const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, - "EC", - eckey_get_bitlen, - eckey_can_do, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - eckey_verify_wrap, - eckey_sign_wrap, -#else - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, - eckey_alloc_wrap, - eckey_free_wrap, - eckey_debug, -}; - -/* - * EC key restricted to ECDH - */ -static int eckeydh_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) -{ - return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || - type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ); -} - -const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, - "EC_DH", - eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ - eckeydh_can_do, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, - eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ - eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ - eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) -{ - return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); -} - -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) -{ - int ret; - ((void) md_alg); - - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); - - return( ret ); -} - -static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_ecdsa_init( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void ecdsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_ecdsa_free( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - "ECDSA", - eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ - ecdsa_can_do, - ecdsa_verify_wrap, - ecdsa_sign_wrap, - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */ - ecdsa_alloc_wrap, - ecdsa_free_wrap, - eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) -/* - * Support for alternative RSA-private implementations - */ - -static int rsa_alt_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) -{ - return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); -} - -static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) -{ - const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; - - return( 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ); -} - -static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; - -#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX - if( UINT_MAX < hash_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ - - *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ); - - return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); -} - -static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; - - ((void) f_rng); - ((void) p_rng); - - if( ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( rsa_alt->decrypt_func( rsa_alt->key, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv ) -{ - unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char hash[32]; - size_t sig_len = 0; - int ret; - - if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - - memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof( hash ) ); - - if( ( ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap( (void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, - hash, sizeof( hash ), - sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - if( rsa_verify_wrap( (void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, - hash, sizeof( hash ), sig, sig_len ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void rsa_alt_free_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, - "RSA-alt", - rsa_alt_get_bitlen, - rsa_alt_can_do, - NULL, - rsa_alt_sign_wrap, - rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, - NULL, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - rsa_alt_check_pair, -#else - NULL, -#endif - rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, - rsa_alt_free_wrap, - NULL, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs11.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs11.c deleted file mode 100644 index 0ea64252..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/pkcs11.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,240 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file pkcs11.c - * - * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#include - -void mbedtls_pkcs11_init( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_pkcs11_context ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ) -{ - int ret = 1; - unsigned char *cert_blob = NULL; - size_t cert_blob_size = 0; - - if( cert == NULL ) - { - ret = 2; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob( pkcs11_cert, NULL, - &cert_blob_size ) != CKR_OK ) - { - ret = 3; - goto cleanup; - } - - cert_blob = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cert_blob_size ); - if( NULL == cert_blob ) - { - ret = 4; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob( pkcs11_cert, cert_blob, - &cert_blob_size ) != CKR_OK ) - { - ret = 5; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( 0 != mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( cert, cert_blob, cert_blob_size ) ) - { - ret = 6; - goto cleanup; - } - - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - if( NULL != cert_blob ) - mbedtls_free( cert_blob ); - - return( ret ); -} - - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ) -{ - int ret = 1; - mbedtls_x509_crt cert; - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cert ); - - if( priv_key == NULL ) - goto cleanup; - - if( 0 != mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( &cert, pkcs11_cert ) ) - goto cleanup; - - priv_key->len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( &cert.pk ); - priv_key->pkcs11h_cert = pkcs11_cert; - - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cert ); - - return( ret ); -} - -void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key ) -{ - if( NULL != priv_key ) - pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate( priv_key->pkcs11h_cert ); -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len ) -{ - size_t input_len, output_len; - - if( NULL == ctx ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - output_len = input_len = ctx->len; - - if( input_len < 16 || input_len > output_max_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* Determine size of output buffer */ - if( pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, - input_len, NULL, &output_len ) != CKR_OK ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( output_len > output_max_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); - - if( pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, - input_len, output, &output_len ) != CKR_OK ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - *olen = output_len; - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig ) -{ - size_t sig_len = 0, asn_len = 0, oid_size = 0; - unsigned char *p = sig; - const char *oid; - - if( NULL == ctx ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - asn_len = 10 + oid_size; - } - - sig_len = ctx->len; - if( hashlen > sig_len || asn_len > sig_len || - hashlen + asn_len > sig_len ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - /* - * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, - * digest Digest } - * - * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier - * - * Digest ::= OCTET STRING - */ - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x04 + oid_size ); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - *p++ = oid_size & 0xFF; - memcpy( p, oid, oid_size ); - p += oid_size; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - *p++ = hashlen; - } - - memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); - - if( pkcs11h_certificate_signAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, sig, - asn_len + hashlen, sig, &sig_len ) != CKR_OK ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/platform_util.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/platform_util.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1a57de93..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/platform_util.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS - * library. - * - * Copyright (C) 2018, Arm Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) -/* - * This implementation should never be optimized out by the compiler - * - * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin - * Percival's blog article at: - * - * http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html - * - * It uses a volatile function pointer to the standard memset(). Because the - * pointer is volatile the compiler expects it to change at - * any time and will not optimize out the call that could potentially perform - * other operations on the input buffer instead of just setting it to 0. - * Nevertheless, as pointed out by davidtgoldblatt on Hacker News - * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for - * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: - * - * if( memset_func != memset ) - * memset_func( buf, 0, len ); - * - * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers - * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration - * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their - * platform and needs. - */ -static void * (* const volatile memset_func)( void *, int, size_t ) = memset; - -void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ) -{ - memset_func( buf, 0, len ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ripemd160.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ripemd160.c deleted file mode 100644 index bd25ada6..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ripemd160.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,552 +0,0 @@ -/* - * RIPE MD-160 implementation - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -/* - * The RIPEMD-160 algorithm was designed by RIPE in 1996 - * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html - * http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/RIPEMD-160 - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - -#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE -#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE -#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ripemd160_free( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, - const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src ) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * RIPEMD-160 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; - ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( ctx ); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) -/* - * Process one block - */ -int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; - - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( X[15], data, 60 ); - - A = Ap = ctx->state[0]; - B = Bp = ctx->state[1]; - C = Cp = ctx->state[2]; - D = Dp = ctx->state[3]; - E = Ep = ctx->state[4]; - -#define F1( x, y, z ) ( x ^ y ^ z ) -#define F2( x, y, z ) ( ( x & y ) | ( ~x & z ) ) -#define F3( x, y, z ) ( ( x | ~y ) ^ z ) -#define F4( x, y, z ) ( ( x & z ) | ( y & ~z ) ) -#define F5( x, y, z ) ( x ^ ( y | ~z ) ) - -#define S( x, n ) ( ( x << n ) | ( x >> (32 - n) ) ) - -#define P( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, f, k ) \ - a += f( b, c, d ) + X[r] + k; \ - a = S( a, s ) + e; \ - c = S( c, 10 ); - -#define P2( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, rp, sp ) \ - P( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, F, K ); \ - P( a ## p, b ## p, c ## p, d ## p, e ## p, rp, sp, Fp, Kp ); - -#define F F1 -#define K 0x00000000 -#define Fp F5 -#define Kp 0x50A28BE6 - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 0, 11, 5, 8 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 1, 14, 14, 9 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 2, 15, 7, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 3, 12, 0, 11 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 4, 5, 9, 13 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 5, 8, 2, 15 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 6, 7, 11, 15 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 7, 9, 4, 5 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 8, 11, 13, 7 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 9, 13, 6, 7 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 10, 14, 15, 8 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 11, 15, 8, 11 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 12, 6, 1, 14 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 13, 7, 10, 14 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 14, 9, 3, 12 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 15, 8, 12, 6 ); -#undef F -#undef K -#undef Fp -#undef Kp - -#define F F2 -#define K 0x5A827999 -#define Fp F4 -#define Kp 0x5C4DD124 - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 7, 7, 6, 9 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 4, 6, 11, 13 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 13, 8, 3, 15 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 1, 13, 7, 7 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 10, 11, 0, 12 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 6, 9, 13, 8 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 15, 7, 5, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 3, 15, 10, 11 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 12, 7, 14, 7 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 0, 12, 15, 7 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 9, 15, 8, 12 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 5, 9, 12, 7 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 2, 11, 4, 6 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 14, 7, 9, 15 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 11, 13, 1, 13 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 8, 12, 2, 11 ); -#undef F -#undef K -#undef Fp -#undef Kp - -#define F F3 -#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 -#define Fp F3 -#define Kp 0x6D703EF3 - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 3, 11, 15, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 10, 13, 5, 7 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 14, 6, 1, 15 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 4, 7, 3, 11 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 9, 14, 7, 8 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 15, 9, 14, 6 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 8, 13, 6, 6 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 1, 15, 9, 14 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 2, 14, 11, 12 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 7, 8, 8, 13 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 0, 13, 12, 5 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 6, 6, 2, 14 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 13, 5, 10, 13 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 11, 12, 0, 13 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 5, 7, 4, 7 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 12, 5, 13, 5 ); -#undef F -#undef K -#undef Fp -#undef Kp - -#define F F4 -#define K 0x8F1BBCDC -#define Fp F2 -#define Kp 0x7A6D76E9 - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 1, 11, 8, 15 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 9, 12, 6, 5 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 11, 14, 4, 8 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 10, 15, 1, 11 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 0, 14, 3, 14 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 8, 15, 11, 14 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 12, 9, 15, 6 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 4, 8, 0, 14 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 13, 9, 5, 6 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 3, 14, 12, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 7, 5, 2, 12 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 15, 6, 13, 9 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 14, 8, 9, 12 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 5, 6, 7, 5 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 6, 5, 10, 15 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 2, 12, 14, 8 ); -#undef F -#undef K -#undef Fp -#undef Kp - -#define F F5 -#define K 0xA953FD4E -#define Fp F1 -#define Kp 0x00000000 - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 4, 9, 12, 8 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 0, 15, 15, 5 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 5, 5, 10, 12 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 9, 11, 4, 9 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 7, 6, 1, 12 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 12, 8, 5, 5 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 2, 13, 8, 14 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 10, 12, 7, 6 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 14, 5, 6, 8 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 1, 12, 2, 13 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 3, 13, 13, 6 ); - P2( A, B, C, D, E, 8, 14, 14, 5 ); - P2( E, A, B, C, D, 11, 11, 0, 15 ); - P2( D, E, A, B, C, 6, 8, 3, 13 ); - P2( C, D, E, A, B, 15, 5, 9, 11 ); - P2( B, C, D, E, A, 13, 6, 11, 11 ); -#undef F -#undef K -#undef Fp -#undef Kp - - C = ctx->state[1] + C + Dp; - ctx->state[1] = ctx->state[2] + D + Ep; - ctx->state[2] = ctx->state[3] + E + Ap; - ctx->state[3] = ctx->state[4] + A + Bp; - ctx->state[4] = ctx->state[0] + B + Cp; - ctx->state[0] = C; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, data ); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * RIPEMD-160 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t fill; - uint32_t left; - - if( ilen == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) - ctx->total[1]++; - - if( left && ilen >= fill ) - { - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while( ilen >= 64 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if( ilen > 0 ) - { - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); -} -#endif - -static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = -{ - 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; - -/* - * RIPEMD-160 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - int ret; - uint32_t last, padn; - uint32_t high, low; - unsigned char msglen[8]; - - high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) - | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); - low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - - PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); - - last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); - - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, msglen, 8 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( ctx, output ); -} -#endif - -#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ - -/* - * output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; - - mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_ripemd160_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( input, ilen, output ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * Test vectors from the RIPEMD-160 paper and - * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html#HMAC - */ -#define TESTS 8 -static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_str[TESTS][81] = -{ - { "" }, - { "a" }, - { "abc" }, - { "message digest" }, - { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, - { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, - { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012" - "345678901234567890" }, -}; - -static const size_t ripemd160_test_strlen[TESTS] = -{ - 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 56, 62, 80 -}; - -static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_md[TESTS][20] = -{ - { 0x9c, 0x11, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x54, 0x61, 0x28, - 0x08, 0x97, 0x7e, 0xe8, 0xf5, 0x48, 0xb2, 0x25, 0x8d, 0x31 }, - { 0x0b, 0xdc, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x6b, 0x3e, 0xe9, 0xda, 0xae, - 0x34, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0xf4, 0xdc, 0x83, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xfe }, - { 0x8e, 0xb2, 0x08, 0xf7, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x7a, 0x9b, 0x04, - 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x98, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x87, 0xf1, 0x5a, 0x0b, 0xfc }, - { 0x5d, 0x06, 0x89, 0xef, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xfa, 0xe5, 0x72, 0xb8, - 0x81, 0xb1, 0x23, 0xa8, 0x5f, 0xfa, 0x21, 0x59, 0x5f, 0x36 }, - { 0xf7, 0x1c, 0x27, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xbb, - 0xdc, 0xeb, 0x5b, 0x9d, 0x28, 0x65, 0xb3, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xbc }, - { 0x12, 0xa0, 0x53, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x88, 0xe4, 0x05, - 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x27, 0xdc, 0xf4, 0x9a, 0xda, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x2b }, - { 0xb0, 0xe2, 0x0b, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x16, 0x64, 0x02, 0x86, 0xed, - 0x3a, 0x87, 0xa5, 0x71, 0x30, 0x79, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0x51, 0x89 }, - { 0x9b, 0x75, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x57, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0x39, 0xf4, 0xdb, - 0xd3, 0x32, 0x3c, 0xab, 0x82, 0xbf, 0x63, 0x32, 0x6b, 0xfb }, -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char output[20]; - - memset( output, 0, sizeof output ); - - for( i = 0; i < TESTS; i++ ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " RIPEMD-160 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); - - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( ripemd160_test_str[i], - ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( memcmp( output, ripemd160_test_md[i], 20 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( 0 ); - -fail: - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha1.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha1.c deleted file mode 100644 index bab6087c..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/sha1.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,547 +0,0 @@ -/* - * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. - * - * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, - const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * SHA-1 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; - ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx ); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; - - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( W[15], data, 60 ); - -#define S(x,n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) - -#define R(t) \ -( \ - temp = W[( t - 3 ) & 0x0F] ^ W[( t - 8 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ - W[( t - 14 ) & 0x0F] ^ W[ t & 0x0F], \ - ( W[t & 0x0F] = S(temp,1) ) \ -) - -#define P(a,b,c,d,e,x) \ -{ \ - e += S(a,5) + F(b,c,d) + K + x; b = S(b,30); \ -} - - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; - E = ctx->state[4]; - -#define F(x,y,z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) -#define K 0x5A827999 - - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[0] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, W[1] ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, W[2] ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, W[3] ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, W[4] ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[5] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, W[6] ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, W[7] ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, W[8] ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, W[9] ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[10] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, W[11] ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, W[12] ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, W[13] ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, W[14] ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, W[15] ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(16) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(17) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(18) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(19) ); - -#undef K -#undef F - -#define F(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) -#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 - - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(20) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(21) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(22) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(23) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(24) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(25) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(26) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(27) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(28) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(29) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(30) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(31) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(32) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(33) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(34) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(35) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(36) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(37) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(38) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(39) ); - -#undef K -#undef F - -#define F(x,y,z) ((x & y) | (z & (x | y))) -#define K 0x8F1BBCDC - - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(40) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(41) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(42) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(43) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(44) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(45) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(46) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(47) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(48) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(49) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(50) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(51) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(52) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(53) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(54) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(55) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(56) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(57) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(58) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(59) ); - -#undef K -#undef F - -#define F(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) -#define K 0xCA62C1D6 - - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(60) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(61) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(62) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(63) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(64) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(65) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(66) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(67) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(68) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(69) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(70) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(71) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(72) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(73) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(74) ); - P( A, B, C, D, E, R(75) ); - P( E, A, B, C, D, R(76) ); - P( D, E, A, B, C, R(77) ); - P( C, D, E, A, B, R(78) ); - P( B, C, D, E, A, R(79) ); - -#undef K -#undef F - - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; - ctx->state[4] += E; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, data ); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * SHA-1 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret; - size_t fill; - uint32_t left; - - if( ilen == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) - ctx->total[1]++; - - if( left && ilen >= fill ) - { - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while( ilen >= 64 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if( ilen > 0 ) - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); -} -#endif - -/* - * SHA-1 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - int ret; - uint32_t used; - uint32_t high, low; - - /* - * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length - */ - used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - - ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; - - if( used <= 56 ) - { - /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ - memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); - } - else - { - /* We'll need an extra block */ - memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); - } - - /* - * Add message length - */ - high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) - | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); - low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - - PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* - * Output final state - */ - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx, output ); -} -#endif - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ - -/* - * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; - - mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20] ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_ret( input, ilen, output ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * FIPS-180-1 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char sha1_test_buf[3][57] = -{ - { "abc" }, - { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, - { "" } -}; - -static const size_t sha1_test_buflen[3] = -{ - 3, 56, 1000 -}; - -static const unsigned char sha1_test_sum[3][20] = -{ - { 0xA9, 0x99, 0x3E, 0x36, 0x47, 0x06, 0x81, 0x6A, 0xBA, 0x3E, - 0x25, 0x71, 0x78, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x9D }, - { 0x84, 0x98, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xAE, - 0x4A, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x29, 0xE5, 0xE5, 0x46, 0x70, 0xF1 }, - { 0x34, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x3C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x1E, - 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xDB, 0xAD, 0x27, 0x31, 0x65, 0x34, 0x01, 0x6F } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, j, buflen, ret = 0; - unsigned char buf[1024]; - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; - mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; - - mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); - - /* - * SHA-1 - */ - for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " SHA-1 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( i == 2 ) - { - memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); - - for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) - { - ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - } - } - else - { - ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], - sha1_test_buflen[i] ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &ctx, sha1sum ) ) != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( memcmp( sha1sum, sha1_test_sum[i], 20 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - goto exit; - -fail: - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - -exit: - mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cache.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cache.c deleted file mode 100644 index 47867f13..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_cache.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,327 +0,0 @@ -/* - * SSL session cache implementation - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * These session callbacks use a simple chained list - * to store and retrieve the session information. - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" - -#include - -void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) -{ - memset( cache, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context ) ); - - cache->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT; - cache->max_entries = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_init( &cache->mutex ); -#endif -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) -{ - int ret = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *entry; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( 1 ); -#endif - - cur = cache->chain; - entry = NULL; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - entry = cur; - cur = cur->next; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - if( cache->timeout != 0 && - (int) ( t - entry->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) - continue; -#endif - - if( session->ciphersuite != entry->session.ciphersuite || - session->compression != entry->session.compression || - session->id_len != entry->session.id_len ) - continue; - - if( memcmp( session->id, entry->session.id, - entry->session.id_len ) != 0 ) - continue; - - memcpy( session->master, entry->session.master, 48 ); - - session->verify_result = entry->session.verify_result; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - /* - * Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain) - */ - if( entry->peer_cert.p != NULL ) - { - if( ( session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ) ) == NULL ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); - if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( session->peer_cert, entry->peer_cert.p, - entry->peer_cert.len ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - ret = 0; - goto exit; - } - -exit: -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) - ret = 1; -#endif - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) -{ - int ret = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ), oldest = 0; - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; - int count = 0; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); -#endif - - cur = cache->chain; - prv = NULL; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - count++; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - if( cache->timeout != 0 && - (int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) - { - cur->timestamp = t; - break; /* expired, reuse this slot, update timestamp */ - } -#endif - - if( memcmp( session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len ) == 0 ) - break; /* client reconnected, keep timestamp for session id */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - if( oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest ) - { - oldest = cur->timestamp; - old = cur; - } -#endif - - prv = cur; - cur = cur->next; - } - - if( cur == NULL ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - /* - * Reuse oldest entry if max_entries reached - */ - if( count >= cache->max_entries ) - { - if( old == NULL ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - cur = old; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - /* - * Reuse first entry in chain if max_entries reached, - * but move to last place - */ - if( count >= cache->max_entries ) - { - if( cache->chain == NULL ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - cur = cache->chain; - cache->chain = cur->next; - cur->next = NULL; - prv->next = cur; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - else - { - /* - * max_entries not reached, create new entry - */ - cur = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry) ); - if( cur == NULL ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( prv == NULL ) - cache->chain = cur; - else - prv->next = cur; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - cur->timestamp = t; -#endif - } - - memcpy( &cur->session, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - /* - * If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first - */ - if( cur->peer_cert.p != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_free( cur->peer_cert.p ); - memset( &cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf) ); - } - - /* - * Store peer certificate - */ - if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) - { - cur->peer_cert.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert->raw.len ); - if( cur->peer_cert.p == NULL ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, - session->peer_cert->raw.len ); - cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; - - cur->session.peer_cert = NULL; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - ret = 0; - -exit: -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) - ret = 1; -#endif - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) -void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout ) -{ - if( timeout < 0 ) timeout = 0; - - cache->timeout = timeout; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max ) -{ - if( max < 0 ) max = 0; - - cache->max_entries = max; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; - - cur = cache->chain; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - prv = cur; - cur = cur->next; - - mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &prv->session ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_free( prv->peer_cert.p ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - mbedtls_free( prv ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_free( &cache->mutex ); -#endif - cache->chain = NULL; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_tls.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_tls.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8bd74db8..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/ssl_tls.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9719 +0,0 @@ -/* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 shared functions - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, - * and became an IETF standard in 1999. - * - * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#endif - -static void ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); - -/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ -static inline size_t ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 2 ); -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Start a timer. - * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer. - */ -static void ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ) -{ - if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL ) - return; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) ); - ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs ); -} - -/* - * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't. - */ -static int ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) ); - return( -1 ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -static void ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); -static void ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); - -#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 -#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */ -static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - uint8_t slot ); -static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - size_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); - - if( mtu != 0 && mtu < MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) - return( mtu ); - - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); -} - -static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left; - size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl ); - - /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone - * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */ - if( bytes_written > mtu ) - { - /* Should never happen... */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) ); -} - -static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - size_t remaining, expansion; - size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl ); - - if( max_len > mfl ) - max_len = mfl; - - /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension - * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory - * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size - * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's - * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer. - * - * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never - * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead. - */ - if( max_len <= ssl->out_left ) - return( 0 ); - - max_len -= ssl->out_left; -#endif - - ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - remaining = (size_t) ret; - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - expansion = (size_t) ret; - - if( remaining <= expansion ) - return( 0 ); - - remaining -= expansion; - if( remaining >= max_len ) - remaining = max_len; - - return( (int) remaining ); -} - -/* - * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range, - * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached. - */ -static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - uint32_t new_timeout; - - if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) - return( -1 ); - - /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1 - * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first - * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes. - * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be - * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work - * on most non-IP stacks too. */ - if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min ) - ssl->handshake->mtu = 508; - - new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; - - /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */ - if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout || - new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) - { - new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max; - } - - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs", - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs", - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -/* - * Convert max_fragment_length codes to length. - * RFC 6066 says: - * enum{ - * 2^9(1), 2^10(2), 2^11(3), 2^12(4), (255) - * } MaxFragmentLength; - * and we add 0 -> extension unused - */ -static unsigned int ssl_mfl_code_to_length( int mfl ) -{ - switch( mfl ) - { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE: - return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512: - return 512; - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024: - return 1024; - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048: - return 2048; - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096: - return 4096; - default: - return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_session_free( dst ); - memcpy( dst, src, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( src->peer_cert != NULL ) - { - int ret; - - dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ); - if( dst->peer_cert == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( dst->peer_cert ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( dst->peer_cert, src->peer_cert->raw.p, - src->peer_cert->raw.len ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_free( dst->peer_cert ); - dst->peer_cert = NULL; - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( src->ticket != NULL ) - { - dst->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->ticket_len ); - if( dst->ticket == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - memcpy( dst->ticket, src->ticket, src->ticket_len ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, - size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, - size_t maclen ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - -/* - * Key material generation - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static int ssl3_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char padding[16]; - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; - ((void)label); - - mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); - - /* - * SSLv3: - * block = - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'A' + secret + random ) ) + - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'BB' + secret + random ) ) + - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'CCC' + secret + random ) ) + - * ... - */ - for( i = 0; i < dlen / 16; i++ ) - { - memset( padding, (unsigned char) ('A' + i), 1 + i ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padding, 1 + i ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, secret, slen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, random, rlen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, sha1sum ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, secret, slen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, sha1sum, 20 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, dstbuf + i * 16 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padding, sizeof( padding ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) -{ - size_t nb, hs; - size_t i, j, k; - const unsigned char *S1, *S2; - unsigned char tmp[128]; - unsigned char h_i[20]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret; - - mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); - - if( sizeof( tmp ) < 20 + strlen( label ) + rlen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - hs = ( slen + 1 ) / 2; - S1 = secret; - S2 = secret + slen - hs; - - nb = strlen( label ); - memcpy( tmp + 20, label, nb ); - memcpy( tmp + 20 + nb, random, rlen ); - nb += rlen; - - /* - * First compute P_md5(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] - */ - if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S1, hs ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp ); - - for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += 16 ) - { - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 + nb ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp ); - - k = ( i + 16 > dlen ) ? dlen % 16 : 16; - - for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) - dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; - } - - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - - /* - * XOR out with P_sha1(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] - */ - if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S2, hs ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); - - for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += 20 ) - { - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, 20 + nb ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, 20 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); - - k = ( i + 20 > dlen ) ? dlen % 20 : 20; - - for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) - dstbuf[i + j] = (unsigned char)( dstbuf[i + j] ^ h_i[j] ); - } - - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) -{ - size_t nb; - size_t i, j, k, md_len; - unsigned char tmp[128]; - unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret; - - mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); - - if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - - md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - - if( sizeof( tmp ) < md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - nb = strlen( label ); - memcpy( tmp + md_len, label, nb ); - memcpy( tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen ); - nb += rlen; - - /* - * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] - */ - if ( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, secret, slen ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); - - for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len ) - { - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); - - k = ( i + md_len > dlen ) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; - - for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) - dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; - } - - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static int tls_prf_sha256( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) -{ - return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, - label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -static int tls_prf_sha384( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) -{ - return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, - label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * ); -static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * ); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char * ); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char *, int ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * ); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = 0; - unsigned char tmp[64]; - unsigned char keyblk[256]; - unsigned char *key1; - unsigned char *key2; - unsigned char *mac_enc; - unsigned char *mac_dec; - size_t mac_key_len; - size_t iv_copy_len; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) ); - - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( transform->ciphersuite_info->cipher ); - if( cipher_info == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %d not found", - transform->ciphersuite_info->cipher ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( transform->ciphersuite_info->mac ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %d not found", - transform->ciphersuite_info->mac ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* - * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS / TLS1.2 functions - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl; - } - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls; - } - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - transform->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) - { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; - } - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; - } - else -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* - * SSLv3: - * master = - * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'A' + premaster + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'BB' + premaster + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'CCC' + premaster + randbytes ) ) - * - * TLSv1+: - * master = PRF( premaster, "master secret", randbytes )[0..47] - */ - if( handshake->resume == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", handshake->premaster, - handshake->pmslen ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED ) - { - unsigned char session_hash[48]; - size_t hash_len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using extended master secret" ) ); - - ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac == - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) - { - hash_len = 48; - } - else -#endif - hash_len = 32; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - hash_len = 36; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash", session_hash, hash_len ); - - ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, - "extended master secret", - session_hash, hash_len, - session->master, 48 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - } - else -#endif - ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, - "master secret", - handshake->randbytes, 64, - session->master, 48 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster, - sizeof(handshake->premaster) ); - } - else - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) ); - - /* - * Swap the client and server random values. - */ - memcpy( tmp, handshake->randbytes, 64 ); - memcpy( handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 ); - memcpy( handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - - /* - * SSLv3: - * key block = - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'A' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'BB' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'CCC' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'DDDD' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * ... - * - * TLSv1: - * key block = PRF( master, "key expansion", randbytes ) - */ - ret = handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, "key expansion", - handshake->randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite = %s", - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( session->ciphersuite ) ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", session->master, 48 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", handshake->randbytes, 64 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "key block", keyblk, 256 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->randbytes, - sizeof( handshake->randbytes ) ); - - /* - * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. - */ - - transform->keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; - - if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) - { - size_t taglen, explicit_ivlen; - - transform->maclen = 0; - mac_key_len = 0; - - /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs; - * GCM and CCM has 4 implicit and 8 explicit bytes - * ChachaPoly has all 12 bytes implicit - */ - transform->ivlen = 12; - if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) - transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; - else - transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; - - /* All modes have 128-bit tags, except CCM_8 (ciphersuite flag) */ - taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags & - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; - - - /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ - explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + taglen; - } - else - { - /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - /* Get MAC length */ - mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - transform->maclen = mac_key_len; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - /* - * If HMAC is to be truncated, we shall keep the leftmost bytes, - * (rfc 6066 page 13 or rfc 2104 section 4), - * so we only need to adjust the length here. - */ - if( session->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) - { - transform->maclen = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) - /* Fall back to old, non-compliant version of the truncated - * HMAC implementation which also truncates the key - * (Mbed TLS versions from 1.3 to 2.6.0) */ - mac_key_len = transform->maclen; -#endif - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - - /* IV length */ - transform->ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size; - - /* Minimum length */ - if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) - transform->minlen = transform->maclen; - else - { - /* - * GenericBlockCipher: - * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC - * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen - * 2. IV except for SSL3 and TLS 1.0 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if( session->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) - { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen - + cipher_info->block_size; - } - else -#endif - { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen - + cipher_info->block_size - - transform->maclen % cipher_info->block_size; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - ; /* No need to adjust minlen */ - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; - } - else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %d, minlen: %d, ivlen: %d, maclen: %d", - transform->keylen, transform->minlen, transform->ivlen, - transform->maclen ) ); - - /* - * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - { - key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; - key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + transform->keylen; - - mac_enc = keyblk; - mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; - - /* - * This is not used in TLS v1.1. - */ - iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? - transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + transform->keylen, iv_copy_len ); - memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + transform->keylen + iv_copy_len, - iv_copy_len ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - { - key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + transform->keylen; - key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; - - mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; - mac_dec = keyblk; - - /* - * This is not used in TLS v1.1. - */ - iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? - transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + transform->keylen, iv_copy_len ); - memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + transform->keylen + iv_copy_len, - iv_copy_len ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - if( mac_key_len > sizeof transform->mac_enc ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - memcpy( transform->mac_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len ); - memcpy( transform->mac_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - { - /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. - For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ - if( mac_key_len != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len ); - } - } - else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL ) - { - int ret = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, transform->keylen, - transform->iv_enc, transform->iv_dec, - iv_copy_len, - mac_enc, mac_dec, - mac_key_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys != NULL ) - { - ssl->conf->f_export_keys( ssl->conf->p_export_keys, - session->master, keyblk, - mac_key_len, transform->keylen, - iv_copy_len ); - } -#endif - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, - cipher_info->key_bitlen, - MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, - cipher_info->key_bitlen, - MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - // Initialize compression - // - if( session->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) - { - if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Allocating compression buffer" ) ); - ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); - if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Initializing zlib states" ) ); - - memset( &transform->ctx_deflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_deflate ) ); - memset( &transform->ctx_inflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_inflate ) ); - - if( deflateInit( &transform->ctx_deflate, - Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION ) != Z_OK || - inflateInit( &transform->ctx_inflate ) != Z_OK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to initialize compression" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= derive keys" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[36] ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char pad_1[48]; - unsigned char pad_2[48]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify ssl" ) ); - - mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); - - mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); - - memset( pad_1, 0x36, 48 ); - memset( pad_2, 0x5C, 48 ); - - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, pad_1, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); - - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, pad_2, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, hash, 16 ); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); - - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, pad_1, 40 ); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); - - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, pad_2, 40 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, hash + 16, 20 ); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 36 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); - - mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); - - return; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[36] ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify tls" ) ); - - mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); - - mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); - - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 36 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); - - mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); - - return; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[32] ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; - - mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha256" ) ); - - mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, hash ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 32 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); - - mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); - - return; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[48] ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; - - mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha384" ) ); - - mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, hash ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 48 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); - - mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); - - return; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ) -{ - unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; - unsigned char *end = p + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ); - const unsigned char *psk = ssl->conf->psk; - size_t psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; - - /* If the psk callback was called, use its result */ - if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL ) - { - psk = ssl->handshake->psk; - psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; - } - - /* - * PMS = struct { - * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; - * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; - * }; - * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) - { - if( end - p < 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len ); - - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memset( p, 0, psk_len ); - p += psk_len; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) - { - /* - * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, - * and is 48 bytes long - */ - if( end - p < 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - *p++ = 0; - *p++ = 48; - p += 48; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) - { - int ret; - size_t len; - - /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), &len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( len ); - p += len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) - { - int ret; - size_t zlen; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, - p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( zlen >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( zlen ); - p += zlen; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "ECDH: z", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.z ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ - if( end - p < 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len ); - - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memcpy( p, psk, psk_len ); - p += psk_len; - - ssl->handshake->pmslen = p - ssl->handshake->premaster; - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -/* - * SSLv3.0 MAC functions - */ -#define SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */ -static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, - const unsigned char *secret, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, - const unsigned char *ctr, int type, - unsigned char out[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES] ) -{ - unsigned char header[11]; - unsigned char padding[48]; - int padlen; - int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); - int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info ); - - /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */ - if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) - padlen = 48; - else - padlen = 40; - - memcpy( header, ctr, 8 ); - header[ 8] = (unsigned char) type; - header[ 9] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - header[10] = (unsigned char)( len ); - - memset( padding, 0x36, padlen ); - mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); - mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); - mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 ); - mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len ); - mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); - - memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen ); - mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); - mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); - mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); - mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size ); - mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) ) -#define SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC -#endif - -/* The function below is only used in the Lucky 13 counter-measure in - * ssl_decrypt_buf(). These are the defines that guard the call site. */ -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) -/* This function makes sure every byte in the memory region is accessed - * (in ascending addresses order) */ -static void ssl_read_memory( unsigned char *p, size_t len ) -{ - unsigned char acc = 0; - volatile unsigned char force; - - for( ; len != 0; p++, len-- ) - acc ^= *p; - - force = acc; - (void) force; -} -#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC && ( TLS1 || TLS1_1 || TLS1_2 ) */ - -/* - * Encryption/decryption functions - */ -static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; - int auth_done = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) ); - - if( ssl->session_out == NULL || ssl->transform_out == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - /* - * Add MAC before if needed - */ -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || - ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - && ssl->session_out->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED -#endif - ) ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - unsigned char mac[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES]; - - ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, - ssl->transform_out->mac_enc, - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen, - ssl->out_ctr, ssl->out_msgtype, - mac ); - - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - } - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - { - unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_hdr, 3 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_len, 2 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc ); - - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - } - else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", - ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, - ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - - ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->maclen; - auth_done++; - } -#endif /* AEAD not the only option */ - - /* - * Encrypt - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) - { - int ret; - size_t olen = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, " - "including %d bytes of padding", - ssl->out_msglen, 0 ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc, - ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen, - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen, - ssl->out_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->out_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) - { - int ret; - size_t enc_msglen, olen; - unsigned char *enc_msg; - unsigned char add_data[13]; - unsigned char iv[12]; - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; - unsigned char taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags & - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; - size_t explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - - /* - * Prepare additional authenticated data - */ - memcpy( add_data, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - add_data[8] = ssl->out_msgtype; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, add_data + 9 ); - add_data[11] = ( ssl->out_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - add_data[12] = ssl->out_msglen & 0xFF; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data for AEAD", add_data, 13 ); - - /* - * Generate IV - */ - if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 4 ) - { - /* GCM and CCM: fixed || explicit (=seqnum) */ - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_enc, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( ssl->out_iv, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - - } - else if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 12 ) - { - /* ChachaPoly: fixed XOR sequence number */ - unsigned char i; - - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_enc, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - iv[i+4] ^= ssl->out_ctr[i]; - } - else - { - /* Reminder if we ever add an AEAD mode with a different size */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)", - iv, transform->ivlen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)", - ssl->out_iv, explicit_ivlen ); - - /* - * Fix message length with added IV - */ - enc_msg = ssl->out_msg; - enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen; - ssl->out_msglen += explicit_ivlen; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, " - "including 0 bytes of padding", - ssl->out_msglen ) ); - - /* - * Encrypt and authenticate - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - iv, transform->ivlen, - add_data, 13, - enc_msg, enc_msglen, - enc_msg, &olen, - enc_msg + enc_msglen, taglen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( olen != enc_msglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->out_msglen += taglen; - auth_done++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", enc_msg + enc_msglen, taglen ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) - { - int ret; - unsigned char *enc_msg; - size_t enc_msglen, padlen, olen = 0, i; - - padlen = ssl->transform_out->ivlen - ( ssl->out_msglen + 1 ) % - ssl->transform_out->ivlen; - if( padlen == ssl->transform_out->ivlen ) - padlen = 0; - - for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ ) - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen + i] = (unsigned char) padlen; - - ssl->out_msglen += padlen + 1; - - enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen; - enc_msg = ssl->out_msg; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* - * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per - * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) - */ - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - /* - * Generate IV - */ - ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memcpy( ssl->out_iv, ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen ); - - /* - * Fix pointer positions and message length with added IV - */ - enc_msg = ssl->out_msg; - enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen; - ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->ivlen; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, " - "including %d bytes of IV and %d bytes of padding", - ssl->out_msglen, ssl->transform_out->ivlen, - padlen + 1 ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc, - ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen, - enc_msg, enc_msglen, - enc_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( enc_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 - */ - memcpy( ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc.iv, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if( auth_done == 0 ) - { - unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - - /* - * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + - * TLSCipherText.type + - * TLSCipherText.version + - * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + - * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 - * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); - */ - unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); - - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 0, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 8, ssl->out_hdr, 3 ); - pseudo_hdr[11] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->out_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - pseudo_hdr[12] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->out_msglen ) & 0xFF ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, - ssl->out_iv, ssl->out_msglen ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc ); - - memcpy( ssl->out_iv + ssl->out_msglen, mac, - ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - - ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->maclen; - auth_done++; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C || MBEDTLS_ARIA_C ) */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ - if( auth_done != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; - int auth_done = 0; -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) ); - - if( ssl->session_in == NULL || ssl->transform_in == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec ); - - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "in_msglen (%d) < minlen (%d)", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->minlen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) - { - int ret; - size_t olen = 0; - - padlen = 0; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec, - ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen, - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->in_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) - { - int ret; - size_t dec_msglen, olen; - unsigned char *dec_msg; - unsigned char *dec_msg_result; - unsigned char add_data[13]; - unsigned char iv[12]; - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_in; - unsigned char taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags & - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; - size_t explicit_iv_len = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - - /* - * Compute and update sizes - */ - if( ssl->in_msglen < explicit_iv_len + taglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < explicit_iv_len (%d) " - "+ taglen (%d)", ssl->in_msglen, - explicit_iv_len, taglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen - explicit_iv_len - taglen; - - dec_msg = ssl->in_msg; - dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg; - ssl->in_msglen = dec_msglen; - - /* - * Prepare additional authenticated data - */ - memcpy( add_data, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); - add_data[8] = ssl->in_msgtype; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, add_data + 9 ); - add_data[11] = ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - add_data[12] = ssl->in_msglen & 0xFF; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data for AEAD", add_data, 13 ); - - /* - * Prepare IV - */ - if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 4 ) - { - /* GCM and CCM: fixed || explicit (transmitted) */ - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, ssl->in_iv, 8 ); - - } - else if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 12 ) - { - /* ChachaPoly: fixed XOR sequence number */ - unsigned char i; - - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - iv[i+4] ^= ssl->in_ctr[i]; - } - else - { - /* Reminder if we ever add an AEAD mode with a different size */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", dec_msg + dec_msglen, taglen ); - - /* - * Decrypt and authenticate - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec, - iv, transform->ivlen, - add_data, 13, - dec_msg, dec_msglen, - dec_msg_result, &olen, - dec_msg + dec_msglen, taglen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret ); - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - - return( ret ); - } - auth_done++; - - if( olen != dec_msglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) - { - /* - * Decrypt and check the padding - */ - int ret; - unsigned char *dec_msg; - unsigned char *dec_msg_result; - size_t dec_msglen; - size_t minlen = 0; - size_t olen = 0; - - /* - * Check immediate ciphertext sanity - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - minlen += ssl->transform_in->ivlen; -#endif - - if( ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->ivlen || - ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->maclen + 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) " - "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - - dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen; - dec_msg = ssl->in_msg; - dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg; - - /* - * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if( ssl->session_in->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) - { - unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); - - dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; - - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 0, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 8, ssl->in_hdr, 3 ); - pseudo_hdr[11] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - pseudo_hdr[12] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen ) & 0xFF ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, - ssl->in_iv, ssl->in_msglen ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - auth_done++; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ - - /* - * Check length sanity - */ - if( ssl->in_msglen % ssl->transform_in->ivlen != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* - * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up - */ - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - unsigned char i; - dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen; - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen; - - for( i = 0; i < ssl->transform_in->ivlen; i++ ) - ssl->transform_in->iv_dec[i] = ssl->in_iv[i]; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec, - ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen, - dec_msg, dec_msglen, - dec_msg_result, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( dec_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 - */ - memcpy( ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, - ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec.iv, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen ); - } -#endif - - padlen = 1 + ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen - 1]; - - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->maclen + padlen && - auth_done == 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < maclen (%d) + padlen (%d)", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen, padlen ) ); -#endif - padlen = 0; - correct = 0; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - if( padlen > ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %d, " - "should be no more than %d", - padlen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) ); -#endif - correct = 0; - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - /* - * TLSv1+: always check the padding up to the first failure - * and fake check up to 256 bytes of padding - */ - size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1; - size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen; - size_t i; - - /* - * Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if: - * 1. padlen > ssl->in_msglen - * - * 2. padding_idx > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + - * ssl->transform_in->maclen - * - * In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to - * prevent out-of-buffer reads. - */ - correct &= ( padlen <= ssl->in_msglen ); - correct &= ( padding_idx <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - - padding_idx *= correct; - - for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) - { - real_count &= ( i < padlen ); - pad_count += real_count * - ( ssl->in_msg[padding_idx + i] == padlen - 1 ); - } - - correct &= ( pad_count == padlen ); /* Only 1 on correct padding */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 ) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) ); -#endif - padlen &= correct * 0x1FF; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->in_msglen -= padlen; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C || MBEDTLS_ARIA_C ) */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); -#endif - - /* - * Authenticate if not done yet. - * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). - */ -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if( auth_done == 0 ) - { - unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; - - ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ); - ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, - ssl->transform_in->mac_dec, - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype, - mac_expect ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - /* - * Process MAC and always update for padlen afterwards to make - * total time independent of padlen. - * - * Known timing attacks: - * - Lucky Thirteen (http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf) - * - * To compensate for different timings for the MAC calculation - * depending on how much padding was removed (which is determined - * by padlen), process extra_run more blocks through the hash - * function. - * - * The formula in the paper is - * extra_run = ceil( (L1-55) / 64 ) - ceil( (L2-55) / 64 ) - * where L1 is the size of the header plus the decrypted message - * plus CBC padding and L2 is the size of the header plus the - * decrypted message. This is for an underlying hash function - * with 64-byte blocks. - * We use ( (Lx+8) / 64 ) to handle 'negative Lx' values - * correctly. We round down instead of up, so -56 is the correct - * value for our calculations instead of -55. - * - * Repeat the formula rather than defining a block_size variable. - * This avoids requiring division by a variable at runtime - * (which would be marginally less efficient and would require - * linking an extra division function in some builds). - */ - size_t j, extra_run = 0; - - /* - * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of - * in_msglen over all padlen values. - * - * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did - * in_msglen -= padlen. - * - * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer - * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. - */ - const size_t max_len = ssl->in_msglen + padlen; - const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0; - - switch( ssl->transform_in->ciphersuite_info->mac ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - /* 8 bytes of message size, 64-byte compression blocks */ - extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 8 ) / 64 - - ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 8 ) / 64; - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - /* 16 bytes of message size, 128-byte compression blocks */ - extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 16 ) / 128 - - ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 16 ) / 128; - break; -#endif - default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - extra_run &= correct * 0xFF; - - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_hdr, 3 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg, - ssl->in_msglen ); - /* Make sure we access everything even when padlen > 0. This - * makes the synchronisation requirements for just-in-time - * Prime+Probe attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */ - ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, padlen ); - mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); - - /* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks - * that observe whether md_process() was called of not */ - for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ ) - mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg ); - - mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec ); - - /* Make sure we access all the memory that could contain the MAC, - * before we check it in the next code block. This makes the - * synchronisation requirements for just-in-time Prime+Probe - * attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */ - ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + min_len, - max_len - min_len + ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); -#endif - - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); -#endif - correct = 0; - } - auth_done++; - - /* - * Finally check the correct flag - */ - if( correct == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } -#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - - /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ - if( auth_done != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 - && ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - ssl->nb_zero++; - - /* - * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack - * (excessive CPU consumption). - */ - if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty " - "messages, possible DoS attack" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - } - else - ssl->nb_zero = 0; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */ - } - else -#endif - { - unsigned char i; - for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) - if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ - if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#undef MAC_NONE -#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT -#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) -/* - * Compression/decompression functions - */ -static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg; - ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> compress buf" ) ); - - if( len_pre == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->out_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - bytes_written; - - ret = deflate( &ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); - if( ret != Z_OK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform compression (%d)", ret ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); - } - - ssl->out_msglen = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->out_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= compress buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg; - ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) ); - - if( len_pre == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - header_bytes; - - ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); - if( ret != Z_OK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); - } - - ssl->in_msglen = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -static int ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max - * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ - if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0 ) - { - uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; - unsigned char doublings = 1; - - while( ratio != 0 ) - { - ++doublings; - ratio >>= 1; - } - - if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "no longer retransmitting hello request" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - } - - return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); -} -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -/* - * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. - * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. - * - * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are - * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code - * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). - * - * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but - * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, - * since we always read a whole datagram at once. - * - * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when - * they're done reading a record. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) ); - - if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " - "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( nb_want > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - uint32_t timeout; - - /* Just to be sure */ - if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "You must use " - "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* - * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we - * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. - * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the - * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. - */ - - /* - * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable - */ - if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 ) - { - if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; - - if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %d", - ssl->next_record_offset ) ); - memmove( ssl->in_hdr, - ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset, - ssl->in_left ); - } - - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d", - ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); - - /* - * Done if we already have enough data. - */ - if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - /* - * A record can't be split accross datagrams. If we need to read but - * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something - * wrong. - */ - if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* - * Don't even try to read if time's out already. - * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages - * that will end up being dropped. - */ - if( ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; - } - else - { - len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ); - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; - else - timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %u ms", timeout ) ); - - if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) - ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, - timeout ); - else - ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); - - if( ret == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); - } - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) ); - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_resend_hello_request", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - } - - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ssl->in_left = ret; - } - else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d", - ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); - - while( ssl->in_left < nb_want ) - { - len = nb_want - ssl->in_left; - - if( ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; - else - { - if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) - { - ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, - ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len, - ssl->conf->read_timeout ); - } - else - { - ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, - ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d", - ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); - - if( ret == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); - - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > SIZE_MAX ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, - ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %lu were requested", - ret, (unsigned long)len ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->in_left += ret; - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Flush any data not yet written - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *buf; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) ); - - if( ssl->f_send == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " - "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */ - if( ssl->out_left == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - while( ssl->out_left > 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %d, out_left: %d", - mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) ); - - buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left; - ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret ); - - if( ret <= 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > SIZE_MAX ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, - ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %lu bytes were sent", - ret, (unsigned long)ssl->out_left ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->out_left -= ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; - } - else -#endif - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; - } - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -/* - * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight - */ -static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - /* Allocate space for current message */ - if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed", - sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed", ssl->out_msglen ) ); - mbedtls_free( msg ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - /* Copy current handshake message with headers */ - memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - msg->len = ssl->out_msglen; - msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype; - msg->next = NULL; - - /* Append to the current flight */ - if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL ) - ssl->handshake->flight = msg; - else - { - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight; - while( cur->next != NULL ) - cur = cur->next; - cur->next = msg; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) ); - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Free the current flight of handshake messages - */ -static void ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight; - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - next = cur->next; - - mbedtls_free( cur->p ); - mbedtls_free( cur ); - - cur = next; - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif - -/* - * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones - */ -static void ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; - unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; - - if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) ); - return; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) ); - - /* Swap transforms */ - tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out; - ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out; - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; - - /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ - memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 ); - - /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - } -#endif -} - -/* - * Retransmit the current flight of messages. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages. - * - * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns - * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later. - * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); - - if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) ); - - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; - ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); - - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; - } - - while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL ) - { - size_t max_frag_len; - const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg; - - int const is_finished = - ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ); - - uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? - SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; - - /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after - * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. - * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */ - if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) ); - ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); - } - - ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - max_frag_len = (size_t) ret; - - /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */ - if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - if( max_frag_len == 0 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - continue; - } - - memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len ); - ssl->out_msglen = cur->len; - ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; - - /* Update position inside current message */ - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len; - } - else - { - const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; - const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; - const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 ); - const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; - size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; - - if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) ) - { - if( is_finished ) - ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - continue; - } - max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12; - - cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? - max_hs_frag_len : rem_len; - - if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)", - (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len, - (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) ); - } - - /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented, - * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields. - * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */ - memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 ); - - ssl->out_msg[6] = ( ( frag_off >> 16 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[7] = ( ( frag_off >> 8 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[8] = ( ( frag_off ) & 0xff ); - - ssl->out_msg[ 9] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 16 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[10] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 8 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[11] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len ) & 0xff ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 ); - - /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */ - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len ); - ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12; - ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; - - /* Update position inside current message */ - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len; - } - - /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */ - if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len ) - { - if( cur->next != NULL ) - { - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12; - } - else - { - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL; - } - } - - /* Actually send the message out */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Update state and set timer */ - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; - else - { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; - ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received. - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* We won't need to resend that one any more */ - ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight ); - ssl->handshake->flight = NULL; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; - - /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */ - ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; - - /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */ - ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; - - /* Clear future message buffering structure. */ - ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); - - /* Cancel timer */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) - { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; - } - else - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; -} - -/* - * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send. - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl ); - ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) - { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; - } - else - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -/* - * Handshake layer functions - */ - -/* - * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. - * - * - fill in handshake headers - * - update handshake checksum - * - DTLS: save message for resending - * - then pass to the record layer - * - * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be - * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend(). - * - * Inputs: - * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len - * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS) - * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc) - * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body - * - * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record(): - * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents - * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) - * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; - const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) ); - - /* - * Sanity checks - */ - if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ! ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - - if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST && - ssl->handshake == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } -#endif - - /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds - * of the outgoing record buffer. - * This should never fail as the various message - * writing functions must obey the bounds of the - * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe. - * - * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here. - */ - if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: " - "size %u, maximum %u", - (unsigned) ssl->out_msglen, - (unsigned) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* - * Fill handshake headers - */ - if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - ssl->out_msg[1] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 16 ); - ssl->out_msg[2] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[3] = (unsigned char)( hs_len ); - - /* - * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer, - * between the length field and the actual payload: - * uint16 message_seq; - * uint24 fragment_offset; - * uint24 fragment_length; - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */ - if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: " - "size %u, maximum %u", - (unsigned) ( hs_len ), - (unsigned) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len ); - ssl->out_msglen += 8; - - /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */ - if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) - { - ssl->out_msg[4] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - ssl->out_msg[5] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ) & 0xFF; - ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ); - } - else - { - ssl->out_msg[4] = 0; - ssl->out_msg[5] = 0; - } - - /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation, - * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */ - memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 ); - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ - if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) - ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - } - - /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || - hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Record layer functions - */ - -/* - * Write current record. - * - * Uses: - * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS) - * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) - * - ssl->out_msg: record content - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ) -{ - int ret, done = 0; - size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; - uint8_t flush = force_flush; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if( ssl->transform_out != NULL && - ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_compress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - len = ssl->out_msglen; - } -#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()" ) ); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - - if( ret == 0 ) - done = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - if( !done ) - { - unsigned i; - size_t protected_record_size; - - ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 ); - - memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); - ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len ); - - if( ssl->transform_out != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - len = ssl->out_msglen; - ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len ); - } - - protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed - * the remaining space in the datagram. */ - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret ) - { - /* Should never happen */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %d, " - "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d", - ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], - ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", - ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size ); - - ssl->out_left += protected_record_size; - ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size; - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); - - for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) - if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ - if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH ) - { - size_t remaining; - ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram", - ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - remaining = (size_t) ret; - if( remaining == 0 ) - { - flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) && - ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen || - memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 || - memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 ) - { - return( 1 ); - } - return( 0 ); -} - -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) | - ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) | - ssl->in_msg[11] ); -} - -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) | - ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) | - ssl->in_msg[8] ); -} - -static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; - - msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); - frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); - frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); - - if( frag_off > msg_len ) - return( -1 ); - - if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off ) - return( -1 ); - - if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen ) - return( -1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly) - */ -static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len ) -{ - unsigned int start_bits, end_bits; - - start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 ); - if( start_bits != 8 ) - { - size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8; - - /* Special case */ - if( len <= start_bits ) - { - for( ; len != 0; len-- ) - mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len ); - - /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */ - return; - } - - offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */ - len -= start_bits; - - for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- ) - mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 ); - } - - end_bits = len % 8; - if( end_bits != 0 ) - { - size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8; - - len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */ - - for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- ) - mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits ); - } - - memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 ); -} - -/* - * Check that bitmask is full - */ -static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len ) -{ - size_t i; - - for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ ) - if( mask[i] != 0xFF ) - return( -1 ); - - for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ ) - if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 ) - return( -1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */ -static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len, - unsigned add_bitmap ) -{ - size_t alloc_len; - - alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */ - alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */ - - if( add_bitmap ) - alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */ - - return( alloc_len ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) | - ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) | - ssl->in_msg[3] ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %d", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen =" - " %d, type = %d, hslen = %d", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - int ret; - unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; - - if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && - ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && - recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) || - ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) ) - { - if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)", - recv_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } - - /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid - * too many retransmissions. - * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */ - if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, " - "message_seq = %d, start_of_flight = %d", - recv_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: " - "message_seq = %d, expected = %d", - recv_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); - } - /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */ - - /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future - * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and - * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the - * handshake logic layer. */ - if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */ - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL ) - { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen ); - } - - /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake != NULL ) - { - unsigned offset; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; - - /* Increment handshake sequence number */ - hs->in_msg_seq++; - - /* - * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure. - */ - - /* Free first entry */ - ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 ); - - /* Shift all other entries */ - for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; - offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; - offset++, hs_buf++ ) - { - *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1); - } - - /* Create a fresh last entry */ - memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); - } -#endif -} - -/* - * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6 - * - * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb). - * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen. - * - * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of - * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0 - * not seen yet). - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - ssl->in_window_top = 0; - ssl->in_window = 0; -} - -static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf ) -{ - return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) ); -} - -/* - * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); - uint64_t bit; - - if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) - return( 0 ); - - if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) - return( 0 ); - - bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; - - if( bit >= 64 ) - return( -1 ); - - if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 ) - return( -1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Update replay window on new validated record - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); - - if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) - return; - - if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) - { - /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */ - uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top; - - if( shift >= 64 ) - ssl->in_window = 1; - else - { - ssl->in_window <<= shift; - ssl->in_window |= 1; - } - - ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum; - } - else - { - /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */ - uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; - - if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */ - ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* Forward declaration */ -static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ); - -/* - * Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with - * a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message. - * Both input and output include full DTLS headers. - * - * - if cookie is valid, return 0 - * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not, - * fill obuf and set olen, then - * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED - * - otherwise return a specific error code - */ -static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( - mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, - mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, - void *p_cookie, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, - const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) -{ - size_t sid_len, cookie_len; - unsigned char *p; - - if( f_cookie_write == NULL || f_cookie_check == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers, - * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be - * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks - * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier. - * - * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake - * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied - * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0 - * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied - * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored) - * - * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored) - * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored) - * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied - * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0 - * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored) - * - * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored) - * 27-58 Random random; (ignored) - * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content - * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content - * ... - * - * Minimum length is 61 bytes. - */ - if( in_len < 61 || - in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || - in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || - in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - sid_len = in[59]; - if( sid_len > in_len - 61 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - - cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len]; - if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - - if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, - cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 ) - { - /* Valid cookie */ - return( 0 ); - } - - /* - * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR. - * - * 0-0 ContentType type; copied - * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied - * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied - * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied - * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13 - * - * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request - * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25 - * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied - * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied - * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25 - * - * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff - * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie - * - * Minimum length is 28. - */ - if( buf_len < 28 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - /* Copy most fields and adapt others */ - memcpy( obuf, in, 25 ); - obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; - obuf[25] = 0xfe; - obuf[26] = 0xff; - - /* Generate and write actual cookie */ - p = obuf + 28; - if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie, - &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - *olen = p - obuf; - - /* Go back and fill length fields */ - obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 ); - - obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 16 ); - obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 8 ); - obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) ); - - obuf[11] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) >> 8 ); - obuf[12] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); -} - -/* - * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet - * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8). - * - * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record - * that looks like a ClientHello. - * - * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies, - * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then - * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED - * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, - * reset the session of the current context, and - * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT - * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code - * - * mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will ignore the record if anything else than - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or 0 is returned, although this function - * cannot not return 0. - */ -static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - - ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( - ssl->conf->f_cookie_write, - ssl->conf->f_cookie_check, - ssl->conf->p_cookie, - ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, - ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left, - ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret ); - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) - { - /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. - * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, - * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ - (void) ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); - } - - if( ret == 0 ) - { - /* Got a valid cookie, partially reset context */ - if( ( ret = ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ); - } - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -/* - * ContentType type; - * ProtocolVersion version; - * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only - * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only - * uint16 length; - * - * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected) - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected. - * - * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will: - * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0 - * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD - * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value - * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else. - * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received - * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others. - */ -static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int major_ver, minor_ver; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); - - ssl->in_msgtype = ssl->in_hdr[0]; - ssl->in_msglen = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1]; - mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->in_hdr + 1 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %d, " - "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d", - ssl->in_msgtype, - major_ver, minor_ver, ssl->in_msglen ) ); - - /* Check record type */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && - ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* Silently ignore invalid DTLS records as recommended by RFC 6347 - * Section 4.1.2.7 */ - if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - /* Check version */ - if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - /* Check length against the size of our buffer */ - if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - (size_t)( ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - /* - * DTLS-related tests. - * Check epoch before checking length constraint because - * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec - * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message, - * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs - * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than - * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform. - * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently, - * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid - * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; - - /* Check epoch (and sequence number) with DTLS */ - if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: " - "expected %d, received %d", - ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - /* - * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to - * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we - * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the - * fact that the record header len is 13 instead. - */ - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && - rec_epoch == 0 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_left > 13 && - ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect " - "from the same port" ) ); - return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - /* Consider buffering the record. */ - if( rec_epoch == (unsigned int) ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - /* Replay detection only works for the current epoch */ - if( rec_epoch == ssl->in_epoch && - mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } -#endif - - /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, - * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) -#endif - ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - - /* Check length against bounds of the current transform and version */ - if( ssl->transform_in == NULL ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen < 1 || - ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - } - else - { - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->in_msglen > ssl->transform_in->minlen + MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* - * TLS encrypted messages can have up to 256 bytes of padding - */ - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 && - ssl->in_msglen > ssl->transform_in->minlen + - MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 256 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } -#endif - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * If applicable, decrypt (and decompress) record content - */ -static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret, done = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network", - ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->in_msglen ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()" ) ); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - - if( ret == 0 ) - done = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - - if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if( ssl->transform_in != NULL && - ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_decompress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -static void ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/* - * Read a record. - * - * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well, - * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found. - * - */ - -/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */ -static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned update_hs_digest ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) ); - - if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 ) - { - do { - - ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - int have_buffered = 0; - - /* We only check for buffered messages if the - * current datagram is fully consumed. */ - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 ) - { - if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 ) - have_buffered = 1; - } - - if( have_buffered == 0 ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - { - ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl ); - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ) - continue; - - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) - { - /* Buffer future message */ - ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret || - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret ); - - if( 0 != ret ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - update_hs_digest == 1 ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) ); - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) - return( 1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf; - int ret = 0; - - if( hs == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) ); - - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before. - * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */ - if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) ); - ret = -1; - goto exit; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) ); - ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - ssl->in_msglen = 1; - ssl->in_msg[0] = 1; - - /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */ - ssl->in_left = 0; - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - - hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - /* Debug only */ - { - unsigned offset; - for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) - { - hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset]; - if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.", - hs->in_msg_seq + offset, - hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) ); - } - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ - - /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the - * next handshake message. */ - hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; - if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) ) - { - /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ - size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) | - ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) | - hs_buf->data[3]; - - /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered - * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ - if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)", - hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 ); - - ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12; - ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12; - memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen ); - - ret = 0; - goto exit; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered", - hs->in_msg_seq ) ); - } - - ret = -1; - -exit: - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) ); - return( ret ); -} - -static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - size_t desired ) -{ - int offset; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available", - (unsigned) desired ) ); - - /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */ - ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); - - /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ - if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake - * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space, - * starting with the most distant one. */ - for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; - offset >= 0; offset-- ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message", - offset ) ); - - ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset ); - - /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ - if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - } - - return( -1 ); -} - -static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - - if( hs == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) ); - - switch( ssl->in_msgtype ) - { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) ); - - hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: - { - unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; - unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; - size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; - - /* We should never receive an old handshake - * message - double-check nonetheless. */ - if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; - if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) - { - /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, - ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, " - "buffering window %u - %u", - recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) ); - - goto exit; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ", - recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) ); - - hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ]; - - /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */ - if( !hs_buf->is_valid ) - { - size_t reassembly_buf_sz; - - hs_buf->is_fragmented = - ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ); - - /* We copy the message back into the input buffer - * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large. - * This is an implementation-specific limitation - * and not one from the standard, hence it is not - * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */ - if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - /* Ignore message */ - goto exit; - } - - /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */ - if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered > - MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len, - hs_buf->is_fragmented ); - - if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 ) - { - /* If we can't buffer a future message because - * of space limitations -- ignore. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", - (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - goto exit; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n", - (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - } - - if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %u (%u with bitmap) would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- fail\n", - (unsigned) msg_len, - (unsigned) reassembly_buf_sz, - MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - goto exit; - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %d", - msg_len ) ); - - hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz ); - if( hs_buf->data == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz; - - /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq, - * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */ - memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 ); - memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 ); - memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 ); - - hs_buf->is_valid = 1; - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz; - } - else - { - /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */ - if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) ); - /* Ignore */ - goto exit; - } - } - - if( !hs_buf->is_complete ) - { - size_t frag_len, frag_off; - unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12; - - /* - * Check and copy current fragment - */ - - /* Validation of header fields already done in - * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */ - frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); - frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %d, length = %d", - frag_off, frag_len ) ); - memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len ); - - if( hs_buf->is_fragmented ) - { - unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len; - ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len ); - hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask, - msg_len ) == 0 ); - } - else - { - hs_buf->is_complete = 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete", - hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) ); - } - - break; - } - - default: - /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */ - break; - } - -exit: - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) ); - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* - * Consume last content-layer message and potentially - * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' - * consumption state. - * - * (1) Handshake messages: - * Remove last handshake message, move content - * and adapt in_msglen. - * - * (2) Alert messages: - * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. - * - * (3) Change cipher spec: - * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. - * - * (4) Application data: - * Don't do anything - the record layer provides - * the application data as a stream transport - * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. - * - */ - - /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ - if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) - { - /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data - * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during - * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ - if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* - * Get next Handshake message in the current record - */ - - /* Notes: - * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the - * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake - * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment - * size instead. Using the total handshake message - * size here is faulty and should be changed at - * some point. - * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one - * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen - * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. - * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. - * The following check is therefore mandatory, and - * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. - * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of - * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected - * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. - */ - if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) - { - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; - memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, - ssl->in_msglen ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - } - else - { - ssl->in_msglen = 0; - } - - ssl->in_hslen = 0; - } - /* Case (4): Application data */ - else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) - { - return( 0 ); - } - /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ - else - { - ssl->in_msglen = 0; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 ) - return( 1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - if( hs == NULL ) - return; - - if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) - { - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= - hs->buffering.future_record.len; - - mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data ); - hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL; - } -} - -static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - unsigned char * rec; - size_t rec_len; - unsigned rec_epoch; - - if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 0 ); - - if( hs == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data; - rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len; - rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch; - - if( rec == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Only consider loading future records if the - * input buffer is empty. */ - if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 ) - return( 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); - - if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) ); - goto exit; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) ); - - /* Double-check that the record is not too large */ - if( rec_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len ); - ssl->in_left = rec_len; - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - - ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); - -exit: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - size_t const rec_hdr_len = 13; - size_t const total_buf_sz = rec_hdr_len + ssl->in_msglen; - - /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */ - if( hs == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested - * in Finished messages). */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */ - if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */ - if( total_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", - (unsigned) total_buf_sz, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - /* Buffer record */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u", - ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", ssl->in_hdr, - rec_hdr_len + ssl->in_msglen ); - - /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records - * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */ - hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1; - hs->buffering.future_record.len = total_buf_sz; - - hs->buffering.future_record.data = - mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len ); - if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL ) - { - /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a - * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */ - return( 0 ); - } - - memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, ssl->in_hdr, total_buf_sz ); - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += total_buf_sz; - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* We might have buffered a future record; if so, - * and if the epoch matches now, load it. - * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to - * the length of the buffered record, so that - * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will - * essentially be no-ops. */ - ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) - { - ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */ - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; - } - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ) - { - /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */ - ssl->next_record_offset = ssl->in_msglen - + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record " - "(header)" ) ); - } - else - { - /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */ - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - ssl->in_left = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record " - "(header)" ) ); - } - - /* Get next record */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); - } -#endif - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * Read and optionally decrypt the message contents - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->in_msglen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->next_record_offset = ssl->in_msglen + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); - if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) ); - } - } - else -#endif - ssl->in_left = 0; - - if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - /* Silently discard invalid records */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD || - ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) - { - /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here - * probably means something went wrong in the handshake - * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */ - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED || - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); - } -#endif - return( ret ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && - ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } -#endif - - /* As above, invalid records cause - * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ - - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - ssl->in_left = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); - } - - return( ret ); - } - else -#endif - { - /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); - } -#endif - return( ret ); - } - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - /* - * Handle particular types of records - */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %d", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x", - ssl->in_msg[0] ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } -#endif - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 ) - { - /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert - to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't - currently support this. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %d", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%d:%d]", - ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); - - /* - * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation - */ - if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)", - ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) - if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert" ) ); - /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ - return( 0 ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no_cert" ) ); - /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */ - return( 0 ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - - /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char level, - unsigned char message ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message )); - - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; - ssl->out_msglen = 2; - ssl->out_msg[0] = level; - ssl->out_msg[1] = message; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Handshake functions - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); - - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); - - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); -} - -#else -/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - size_t i, n; - const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); - - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - { - if( ssl->client_auth == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* - * If using SSLv3 and got no cert, send an Alert message - * (otherwise an empty Certificate message will be sent). - */ - if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - ssl->out_msglen = 2; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING; - ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got no certificate to send" ) ); - goto write_msg; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - { - if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no certificate to send" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED ); - } - } -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) ); - - /* - * 0 . 0 handshake type - * 1 . 3 handshake length - * 4 . 6 length of all certs - * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 - * 10 . n-1 peer certificate - * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 - * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. - */ - i = 7; - crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ); - - while( crt != NULL ) - { - n = crt->raw.len; - if( n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %d > %d", - i + 3 + n, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE ); - } - - ssl->out_msg[i ] = (unsigned char)( n >> 16 ); - ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = (unsigned char)( n ); - - i += 3; memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n ); - i += n; crt = crt->next; - } - - ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) >> 16 ); - ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[6] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) ); - - ssl->out_msglen = i; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -write_msg: -#endif - - ssl->state++; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate" ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - size_t i, n; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; - uint8_t alert; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); - - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET ) - authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; -#endif - - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) - { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } -#endif - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We - let it decide whether to alert. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - ssl->state++; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* - * Check if the client sent an empty certificate - */ - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) ); - - /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send - one. The client should know what's going on, so we - don't send an alert. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) - return( 0 ); - else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && - memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) ); - - /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send - one. The client should know what's going on, so we - don't send an alert. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) - return( 0 ); - else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE || - ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + 3 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } - - i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); - - /* - * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() - */ - n = ( ssl->in_msg[i+1] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+2]; - - if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || - ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } - - /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */ - if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); - } - - if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, - sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", - sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); - - i += 3; - - while( i < ssl->in_hslen ) - { - if ( i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } - if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } - - n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 ) - | (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2]; - i += 3; - - if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, - ssl->in_msg + i, n ); - switch( ret ) - { - case 0: /*ok*/ - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: - /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a - prior certificate was already trusted. */ - break; - - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; - - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; - - default: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; - crt_parse_der_failed: - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - i += n; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); - - /* - * On client, make sure the server cert doesn't change during renego to - * avoid "triple handshake" attack: https://secure-resumption.com/ - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) - { - if( ssl->session->peer_cert == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } - - if( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len != - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.len || - memcmp( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.p, - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.p, - ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server cert changed during renegotiation" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - - if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) - { - ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; - ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; - } - else -#endif - { - ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; - ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; - } - - /* - * Main check: verify certificate - */ - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, - ca_chain, ca_crl, - ssl->conf->cert_profile, - ssl->hostname, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, - ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret ); - } - - /* - * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - { - const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; - - /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */ - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) && - mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 ) - { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) ); - if( ret == 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - - if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, - ciphersuite_info, - ! ssl->conf->endpoint, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) ); - if( ret == 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - - /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a - * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, - * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds - * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy - * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of - * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ - if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && - ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || - ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) ) - { - ret = 0; - } - - if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; - } - - if( ret != 0 ) - { - /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. - Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send - may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ - if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; - else - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - alert ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x", - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) ); - - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - ssl->out_msglen = 1; - ssl->out_msg[0] = 1; - - ssl->state++; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - - /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1', - * so we don't need to check this here. */ - - /* - * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound - * data. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) ); - ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); -#endif - - /* Increment epoch */ - if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); - /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so - treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 ); - - ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - } -#endif - - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ) -{ - ((void) ciphersuite_info); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1; - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if( ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; - else -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return; - } -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -} - -static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 , buf, len ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 , buf, len ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); -} -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) -{ - const char *sender; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - - unsigned char padbuf[48]; - unsigned char md5sum[16]; - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if( !session ) - session = ssl->session; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished ssl" ) ); - - mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); - - mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); - - /* - * SSLv3: - * hash = - * MD5( master + pad2 + - * MD5( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) - * + SHA1( master + pad2 + - * SHA1( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) - md5.state, sizeof( md5.state ) ); -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) - sha1.state, sizeof( sha1.state ) ); -#endif - - sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ? "CLNT" - : "SRVR"; - - memset( padbuf, 0x36, 48 ); - - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, session->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, padbuf, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, md5sum ); - - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, session->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padbuf, 40 ); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, sha1sum ); - - memset( padbuf, 0x5C, 48 ); - - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, session->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, padbuf, 48 ); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, md5sum, 16 ); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, buf ); - - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, session->master, 48 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padbuf , 40 ); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, sha1sum, 20 ); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, buf + 16 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, 36 ); - - mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md5sum, sizeof( md5sum ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) -{ - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char padbuf[36]; - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if( !session ) - session = ssl->session; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls" ) ); - - mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); - - mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); - - /* - * TLSv1: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * MD5( handshake ) + SHA1( handshake ) )[0..11] - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) - md5.state, sizeof( md5.state ) ); -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) - sha1.state, sizeof( sha1.state ) ); -#endif - - sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, padbuf ); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, padbuf + 16 ); - - ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 36, buf, len ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); - - mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) -{ - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; - unsigned char padbuf[32]; - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if( !session ) - session = ssl->session; - - mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha256" ) ); - - mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); - - /* - * TLSv1.2: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha2 state", (unsigned char *) - sha256.state, sizeof( sha256.state ) ); -#endif - - sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, padbuf ); - - ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 32, buf, len ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); - - mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) -{ - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; - unsigned char padbuf[48]; - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if( !session ) - session = ssl->session; - - mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha384" ) ); - - mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); - - /* - * TLSv1.2: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *) - sha512.state, sizeof( sha512.state ) ); -#endif - - sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, padbuf ); - - ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 48, buf, len ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); - - mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -static void ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); - - /* - * Free our handshake params - */ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); - ssl->handshake = NULL; - - /* - * Free the previous transform and swith in the current one - */ - if( ssl->transform ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); - } - ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) - { - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; - ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; - } -#endif - - /* - * Free the previous session and switch in the current one - */ - if( ssl->session ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = - ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; -#endif - - mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); - } - ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - - /* - * Add cache entry - */ - if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && - ssl->session->id_len != 0 && - resume == 0 ) - { - if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session ) != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cache did not store session" ) ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->flight != NULL ) - { - /* Cancel handshake timer */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - - /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: - * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip freeing handshake and transform" ) ); - } - else -#endif - ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); - - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup" ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret, hash_len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished" ) ); - - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); - - ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint ); - - /* - * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites - * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined - * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has - * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. - */ - hash_len = ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) ? 36 : 12; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; - memcpy( ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len ); -#endif - - ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; - - /* - * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server - * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. - */ - if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; -#endif - } - else - ssl->state++; - - /* - * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound - * data. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for outbound data" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - unsigned char i; - - /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; - memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); - - /* Set sequence_number to zero */ - memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, 0, 6 ); - - /* Increment epoch */ - for( i = 2; i > 0; i-- ) - if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ - if( i == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, 8 ); - - ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); -#endif - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); - return( ret ); - } -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write finished" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 36 -#else -#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned int hash_len; - unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse finished" ) ); - - ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - - /* There is currently no ciphersuite using another length with TLS 1.2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - hash_len = 36; - else -#endif - hash_len = 12; - - if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + hash_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED ); - } - - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), - buf, hash_len ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; - memcpy( ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len ); -#endif - - if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; -#endif - } - else - ssl->state++; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse finished" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake ) -{ - memset( handshake, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_init( &handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_init( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_sha256_init( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - mbedtls_sha512_init( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( &handshake->hash_algs ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_init( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_init( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; -#endif -} - -static void ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ - memset( transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); - - mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); - mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); - - mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); - mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) -{ - memset( session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); -} - -static int ssl_handshake_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* Clear old handshake information if present */ - if( ssl->transform_negotiate ) - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); - if( ssl->session_negotiate ) - mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); - if( ssl->handshake ) - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); - - /* - * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. - * Now allocate missing structures. - */ - if( ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL ) - { - ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); - } - - if( ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) - { - ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); - } - - if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) - { - ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params) ); - } - - /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ - if( ssl->handshake == NULL || - ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || - ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed" ) ); - - mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); - - ssl->handshake = NULL; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - /* Initialize structures */ - mbedtls_ssl_session_init( ssl->session_negotiate ); - ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate ); - ssl_handshake_params_init( ssl->handshake ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; - - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; - else - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; - - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ -static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy( void *ctx, - unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) -{ - ((void) ctx); - ((void) p); - ((void) end); - ((void) cli_id); - ((void) cli_id_len); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); -} - -static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy( void *ctx, - const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) -{ - ((void) ctx); - ((void) cookie); - ((void) cookie_len); - ((void) cli_id); - ((void) cli_id_len); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the - * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers. - * - * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number - * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr, - * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. - */ - -static void ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; - ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 11; - ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 13; - } - else -#endif - { - ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8; - ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; - ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5; - } - - /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */ - if( transform != NULL && - ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv + transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - } - else - ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv; -} - -/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the - * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers. - * - * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number - * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr, - * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. - */ - -static void ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; - ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 11; - ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 13; - } - else -#endif - { - ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; - ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; - ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5; - } - - /* Offset in_msg from in_iv to allow space for explicit IV, if used. */ - if( transform != NULL && - ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv + transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - } - else - ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv; -} - -/* - * Initialize an SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - memset( ssl, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); -} - -/* - * Setup an SSL context - */ - -static void ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; - ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; - ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; - } - - /* Derive other internal pointers. */ - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); - ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) -{ - int ret; - - ssl->conf = conf; - - /* - * Prepare base structures - */ - - /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ - ssl->out_buf = NULL; - - ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); - if( ssl->in_buf == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto error; - } - - ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); - if( ssl->out_buf == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto error; - } - - ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); - - if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - goto error; - - return( 0 ); - -error: - mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); - - ssl->conf = NULL; - - ssl->in_buf = NULL; - ssl->out_buf = NULL; - - ssl->in_hdr = NULL; - ssl->in_ctr = NULL; - ssl->in_len = NULL; - ssl->in_iv = NULL; - ssl->in_msg = NULL; - - ssl->out_hdr = NULL; - ssl->out_ctr = NULL; - ssl->out_len = NULL; - ssl->out_iv = NULL; - ssl->out_msg = NULL; - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining - * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. - * - * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. - * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) - */ -static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) -{ - int ret; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - ((void) partial); -#endif - - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; - - /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; - - ssl->verify_data_len = 0; - memset( ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); - memset( ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); -#endif - ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; - - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); - - ssl->in_msgtype = 0; - ssl->in_msglen = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - ssl->in_epoch = 0; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); -#endif - - ssl->in_hslen = 0; - ssl->nb_zero = 0; - - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; - - ssl->out_msgtype = 0; - ssl->out_msglen = 0; - ssl->out_left = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - if( ssl->split_done != MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ) - ssl->split_done = 0; -#endif - - memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) ); - - ssl->transform_in = NULL; - ssl->transform_out = NULL; - - ssl->session_in = NULL; - ssl->session_out = NULL; - - memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( partial == 0 ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - ssl->in_left = 0; - memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset()" ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - } -#endif - - if( ssl->transform ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); - ssl->transform = NULL; - } - - if( ssl->session ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); - ssl->session = NULL; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) - if( partial == 0 ) -#endif - { - mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); - ssl->cli_id = NULL; - ssl->cli_id_len = 0; - } -#endif - - if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining - * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); -} - -/* - * SSL set accessors - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint ) -{ - conf->endpoint = endpoint; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport ) -{ - conf->transport = transport; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ) -{ - conf->anti_replay = mode; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ) -{ - conf->badmac_limit = limit; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned allow_packing ) -{ - ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - uint32_t min, uint32_t max ) -{ - conf->hs_timeout_min = min; - conf->hs_timeout_max = max; -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ) -{ - conf->authmode = authmode; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy ) -{ - conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; - conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - conf->f_rng = f_rng; - conf->p_rng = p_rng; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), - void *p_dbg ) -{ - conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; - conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *p_bio, - mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, - mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, - mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ) -{ - ssl->p_bio = p_bio; - ssl->f_send = f_send; - ssl->f_recv = f_recv; - ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ) -{ - ssl->mtu = mtu; -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ) -{ - conf->read_timeout = timeout; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *p_timer, - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, - mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer ) -{ - ssl->p_timer = p_timer; - ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; - ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; - - /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - void *p_cache, - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) ) -{ - conf->p_cache = p_cache; - conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; - conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ssl == NULL || - session == NULL || - ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || - ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( ( ret = ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, session ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ssl->handshake->resume = 1; - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites ) -{ - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = ciphersuites; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites, - int major, int minor ) -{ - if( major != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) - return; - - if( minor < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || minor > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - return; - - conf->ciphersuite_list[minor] = ciphersuites; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) -{ - conf->cert_profile = profile; -} - -/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ -static int ssl_append_key_cert( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *key ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; - - new_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert ) ); - if( new_cert == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - new_cert->cert = cert; - new_cert->key = key; - new_cert->next = NULL; - - /* Update head is the list was null, else add to the end */ - if( *head == NULL ) - { - *head = new_cert; - } - else - { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; - while( cur->next != NULL ) - cur = cur->next; - cur->next = new_cert; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) -{ - return( ssl_append_key_cert( &conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) -{ - conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; - conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) -{ - return( ssl_append_key_cert( &ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, - own_cert, pk_key ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) -{ - ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; - ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int authmode ) -{ - ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -/* - * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *pw, - size_t pw_len ) -{ - mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; - - if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; - else - role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; - - return( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - role, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, - pw, pw_len ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, - const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ) -{ - if( psk == NULL || psk_identity == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ - if( ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 || - psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( conf->psk != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); - - mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_len = 0; - } - if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - conf->psk_identity_len = 0; - } - - if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL || - ( conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ) ) == NULL ) - { - mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); - mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - conf->psk_len = psk_len; - conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; - - memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len ); - memcpy( conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ) -{ - if( psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk, - ssl->handshake->psk_len ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk ); - ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; - } - - if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; - memcpy( ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, - size_t), - void *p_psk ) -{ - conf->f_psk = f_psk; - conf->p_psk = p_psk; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, - const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -/* - * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - unsigned int bitlen ) -{ - conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -/* - * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *hashes ) -{ - conf->sig_hashes = hashes; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * Set the allowed elliptic curves - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list ) -{ - conf->curve_list = curve_list; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname ) -{ - /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ - size_t hostname_len = 0; - - /* Check if new hostname is valid before - * making any change to current one */ - if( hostname != NULL ) - { - hostname_len = strlen( hostname ); - - if( hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, - * so we can free it safely */ - - if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); - } - - /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ - - if( hostname == NULL ) - { - ssl->hostname = NULL; - } - else - { - ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc( 1, hostname_len + 1 ); - if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - memcpy( ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len ); - - ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, - const unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_sni ) -{ - conf->f_sni = f_sni; - conf->p_sni = p_sni; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos ) -{ - size_t cur_len, tot_len; - const char **p; - - /* - * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings - * MUST NOT be truncated." - * We check lengths now rather than later. - */ - tot_len = 0; - for( p = protos; *p != NULL; p++ ) - { - cur_len = strlen( *p ); - tot_len += cur_len; - - if( cur_len == 0 || cur_len > 255 || tot_len > 65535 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - conf->alpn_list = protos; - - return( 0 ); -} - -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ssl->alpn_chosen ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) -{ - conf->max_major_ver = major; - conf->max_minor_ver = minor; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) -{ - conf->min_major_ver = major; - conf->min_minor_ver = minor; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ) -{ - conf->fallback = fallback; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - char cert_req_ca_list ) -{ - conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ) -{ - conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ) -{ - conf->extended_ms = ems; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ) -{ - conf->arc4_disabled = arc4; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ) -{ - if( mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || - ssl_mfl_code_to_length( mfl_code ) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate ) -{ - conf->trunc_hmac = truncate; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split ) -{ - conf->cbc_record_splitting = split; -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy ) -{ - conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation ) -{ - conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records ) -{ - conf->renego_max_records = max_records; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char period[8] ) -{ - memcpy( conf->renego_period, period, 8 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets ) -{ - conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, - void *p_ticket ) -{ - conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; - conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; - conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; -} -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, - void *p_export_keys ) -{ - conf->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; - conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( - mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, - mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, - mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, - mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, - void *async_config_data ) -{ - conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; - conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; - conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; - conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; - conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; -} - -void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) -{ - return( conf->p_async_config_data ); -} - -void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) - return( NULL ); - else - return( ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *ctx ) -{ - if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) - ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -/* - * SSL get accessors - */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* - * Case A: We're currently holding back - * a message for further processing. - */ - - if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } - - /* - * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* - * Case C: A handshake message is being processed. - */ - - if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } - - /* - * Case D: An application data message is being processed - */ - if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } - - /* - * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped. - * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if - * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records. - */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) ); - return( 0 ); -} - -uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->session != NULL ) - return( ssl->session->verify_result ); - - if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) - return( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ); - - return( 0xFFFFFFFF ); -} - -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) - return( NULL ); - - return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session->ciphersuite ); -} - -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - switch( ssl->minor_ver ) - { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: - return( "DTLSv1.0" ); - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: - return( "DTLSv1.2" ); - - default: - return( "unknown (DTLS)" ); - } - } -#endif - - switch( ssl->minor_ver ) - { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0: - return( "SSLv3.0" ); - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1: - return( "TLSv1.0" ); - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: - return( "TLSv1.1" ); - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: - return( "TLSv1.2" ); - - default: - return( "unknown" ); - } -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - size_t transform_expansion = 0; - const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; - unsigned block_size; - - if( transform == NULL ) - return( (int) mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if( ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); -#endif - - switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) ) - { - case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: - case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: - transform_expansion = transform->minlen; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: - - block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( - &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); - - /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ - transform_expansion += transform->maclen; - - /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; - * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use - * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ - transform_expansion += block_size; - - /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added - * after the record header. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - transform_expansion += block_size; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - break; - - default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - return( (int)( mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + transform_expansion ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - size_t max_len; - - /* - * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set - */ - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); - - /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ - if( ssl->session_out != NULL && - ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ) < max_len ) - { - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); - } - - /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ - if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && - ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ) < max_len ) - { - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); - } - - return( max_len ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0 ) - return( ssl->mtu ); - - if( ssl->mtu == 0 ) - return( ssl->handshake->mtu ); - - return( ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? - ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - (void) ssl; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl ); - - if( max_len > mfl ) - max_len = mfl; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - const size_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); - const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); - const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; - - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( mtu <= overhead ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "MTU too low for record expansion" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - } - - if( max_len > mtu - overhead ) - max_len = mtu - overhead; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ((void) ssl); -#endif - - return( (int) max_len ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) - return( NULL ); - - return( ssl->session->peer_cert ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *dst ) -{ - if( ssl == NULL || - dst == NULL || - ssl->session == NULL || - ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - return( ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -/* - * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( ssl ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( ssl ); -#endif - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Perform the SSL handshake - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = 0; - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> handshake" ) ); - - while( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( ssl ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - break; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= handshake" ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* - * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server - */ -static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello request" ) ); - - ssl->out_msglen = 4; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello request" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -/* - * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: - * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), - * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), - * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after - * the initial handshake is completed. - * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue - * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. - */ -static int ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> renegotiate" ) ); - - if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and - * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) - { - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; - else - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; - } -#endif - - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= renegotiate" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Renegotiate current connection on client, - * or request renegotiation on server - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - /* On server, just send the request */ - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - { - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; - - /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ - if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) - return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); - - return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - /* - * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, - * if already in progress, continue the handshake - */ - if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) - { - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit. - */ -static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - size_t ep_len = ssl_ep_len( ssl ); - int in_ctr_cmp; - int out_ctr_cmp; - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || - ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) - { - return( 0 ); - } - - in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); - out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); - - if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 ) - { - return( 0 ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) ); - return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -/* - * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n; - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif - - /* - * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is - * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through - * if an unexpected packet is received while the client - * is waiting for the ServerHello. - * - * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on - * the server-side as it is not treated as within - * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello - * after a renegotiation request.) - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ); - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); - return( ret ); - } -#endif - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ); - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */ - while( ssl->in_offt == NULL ) - { - /* Start timer if not already running */ - if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && - ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 ) - { - ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) - return( 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - /* - * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) - return( 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) ); - - /* - * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. - * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. - * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) ); - - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - continue; - } -#endif - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) ); - - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - continue; - } -#endif - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ - if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || - ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == - MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) ) - { - /* - * Accept renegotiation request - */ - - /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - { - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; - } -#endif - ret = ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ); - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - { - /* - * Refuse renegotiation - */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so - we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - - /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been - * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following: - * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record - * has been read yet. - * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received - * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. - * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received - * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting - * the ServerHello. - * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action: - * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check - * if it's application data. - * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data - * is present, hence continue is the same as break - * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record - * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client - * when expecting the ServerHello. - */ - continue; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) - { - if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 ) - { - if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " - "but not honored by client" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - - /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - - ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; - - /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, - * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest. - * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch - * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_resend_hello_request", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - } - - n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen ) - ? len : ssl->in_msglen; - - memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n ); - ssl->in_msglen -= n; - - if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) - { - /* all bytes consumed */ - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; - } - else - { - /* more data available */ - ssl->in_offt += n; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) ); - - return( (int) n ); -} - -/* - * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max - * fragment length and buffer size. - * - * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1: - * - * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are - * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. - * - * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the - * corresponding return code is 0 on success. - */ -static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl ); - const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret; - - if( ret < 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( len > max_len ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) " - "maximum fragment length: %d > %d", - len, max_len ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else -#endif - len = max_len; - } - - if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) - { - /* - * The user has previously tried to send the data and - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially - * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function - * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else - { - /* - * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to - * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure - * to keep track of partial writes - */ - ssl->out_msglen = len; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; - memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - return( (int) len ); -} - -/* - * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary. - * - * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE, - * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so - * remember whether we already did the split or not. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting == - MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED || - len <= 1 || - ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 || - mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc ) - != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) - { - return( ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ) ); - } - - if( ssl->split_done == 0 ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, 1 ) ) <= 0 ) - return( ret ); - ssl->split_done = 1; - } - - if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf + 1, len - 1 ) ) <= 0 ) - return( ret ); - ssl->split_done = 0; - - return( ret + 1 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ - -/* - * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) ); - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); - return( ret ); - } -#endif - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - ret = ssl_write_split( ssl, buf, len ); -#else - ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) ); - - if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) - return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); - - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ - if( transform == NULL ) - return; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate ); - inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate ); -#endif - - mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); - mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); - - mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); - mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static void ssl_key_cert_free( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free( cur ); - cur = next; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - unsigned offset; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - - if( hs == NULL ) - return; - - ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); - - for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) - ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset ); -} - -static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - uint8_t slot ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot]; - - if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) - return; - - if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) - { - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; - mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data ); - memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); - } -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - - if( handshake == NULL ) - return; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - if( ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) - { - ssl->conf->f_async_cancel( ssl ); - handshake->async_in_progress = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_free( &handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_sha256_free( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - mbedtls_sha512_free( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_free( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_free( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free( handshake->ecjpake_cache ); - handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ - mbedtls_free( (void *) handshake->curves ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) - if( handshake->psk != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len ); - mbedtls_free( handshake->psk ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - /* - * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves - * since the belong to the SNI callback - */ - if( handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free( cur ); - cur = next; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie ); - ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight ); - ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); -#endif - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake, - sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) -{ - if( session == NULL ) - return; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); - mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free( session->ticket ); -#endif - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); -} - -/* - * Free an SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl == NULL ) - return; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> free" ) ); - - if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); - } - - if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if( ssl->compress_buf != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->compress_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->compress_buf ); - } -#endif - - if( ssl->transform ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); - } - - if( ssl->handshake ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); - mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); - - mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); - } - - if( ssl->session ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish()" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish( ssl ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= free" ) ); - - /* Actually clear after last debug message */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); -} - -/* - * Initialze mbedtls_ssl_config - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) -{ - memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, -#endif - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; -#endif - -static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - 0 -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE -}; -#endif - -/* - * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int endpoint, int transport, int preset ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - int ret; -#endif - - /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, - * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ - mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( conf, endpoint ); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( conf, transport ); - - /* - * Things that are common to all presets - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - { - conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; -#endif - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - conf->arc4_disabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - conf->cbc_record_splitting = MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; - conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; - conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; - memset( conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2 ); - memset( conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6 ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - { - const unsigned char dhm_p[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; - const unsigned char dhm_g[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; - - if ( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( conf, - dhm_p, sizeof( dhm_p ), - dhm_g, sizeof( dhm_g ) ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif - - /* - * Preset-specific defaults - */ - switch( preset ) - { - /* - * NSA Suite B - */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: - conf->min_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; /* TLS 1.2 */ - conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; - - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = - ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_curves; -#endif - break; - - /* - * Default - */ - default: - conf->min_major_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION > - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION ) ? - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION : - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->min_minor_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION > - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION ) ? - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION : - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION; - conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; -#endif - - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = - mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - conf->curve_list = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; -#endif - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Free mbedtls_ssl_config - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) - if( conf->psk != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); - mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_len = 0; - } - - if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); - mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - conf->psk_identity_len = 0; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - ssl_key_cert_free( conf->key_cert ); -#endif - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) ) -/* - * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); -#endif - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); -} - -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) -{ - switch( type ) { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); - default: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); - } -} - -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ) -{ - switch( sig ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: - return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: - return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - -/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ) -{ - switch( sig_alg ) - { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return( set->rsa ); - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - return( set->ecdsa ); - default: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); - } -} - -/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) -{ - switch( sig_alg ) - { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - if( set->rsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - set->rsa = md_alg; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - if( set->ecdsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - set->ecdsa = md_alg; - break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) -{ - set->rsa = md_alg; - set->ecdsa = md_alg; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ - -/* - * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX - */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ) -{ - switch( hash ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); - } -} - -/* - * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ) -{ - switch( md ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 ); - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 ); - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE ); - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. - * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; - - if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - - for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) - if( *gid == grp_id ) - return( 0 ); - - return( -1 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -/* - * Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list. - * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_md_type_t md ) -{ - const int *cur; - - if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - - for( cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++ ) - if( *cur == (int) md ) - return( 0 ); - - return( -1 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, - int cert_endpoint, - uint32_t *flags ) -{ - int ret = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - int usage = 0; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - const char *ext_oid; - size_t ext_len; -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - ((void) cert); - ((void) cert_endpoint); - ((void) flags); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - { - /* Server part of the key exchange */ - switch( ciphersuite->key_exchange ) - { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; - break; - - /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: - usage = 0; - } - } - else - { - /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - } - - if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( cert, usage ) != 0 ) - { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; - ret = -1; - } -#else - ((void) ciphersuite); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) - { - ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; - ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ); - } - else - { - ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; - ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ); - } - - if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( cert, ext_oid, ext_len ) != 0 ) - { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; - ret = -1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -/* - * Convert version numbers to/from wire format - * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. - * - * For TLS this is the identity. - * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: - * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) - * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2] ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - - ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) ); - ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) ); - } - else -#else - ((void) transport); -#endif - { - ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; - ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; - } -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2] ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; - *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; - - if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - } - else -#else - ((void) transport); -#endif - { - *major = ver[0]; - *minor = ver[1]; - } -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; - - switch( md ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; - break; -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; - break; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; - } - - return 0; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - (void) ssl; - (void) md; - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_md5_context mbedtls_md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1; - - mbedtls_md5_init( &mbedtls_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_init( &mbedtls_sha1 ); - - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque md5_hash[16]; - * opaque sha_hash[20]; - * }; - * - * md5_hash - * MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random - * + ServerParams); - * sha_hash - * SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random - * + ServerParams); - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &mbedtls_md5 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_starts_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &mbedtls_md5, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &mbedtls_md5, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &mbedtls_md5, output ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_finish_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &mbedtls_sha1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, data, - data_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, - output + 16 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret", ret ); - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md5_free( &mbedtls_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &mbedtls_sha1 ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - - return( ret ); - -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); - *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - - mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); - - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque client_random[32]; - * opaque server_random[32]; - * ServerDHParams params; - * }; - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_starts", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); - goto exit; - } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, hash ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret ); - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/timing.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/timing.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3e8139f1..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/timing.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,537 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Portable interface to the CPU cycle counter - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) - -#include "mbedtls/timing.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) - -#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ - !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) -#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in config.h" -#endif - -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif - -#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - -#include -#include - -struct _hr_time -{ - LARGE_INTEGER start; -}; - -#else - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -struct _hr_time -{ - struct timeval start; -}; - -#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - ( defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86) ) || defined(__WATCOMC__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long tsc; - __asm rdtsc - __asm mov [tsc], eax - return( tsc ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - ( _MSC_VER && _M_IX86 ) || __WATCOMC__ */ - -/* some versions of mingw-64 have 32-bit longs even on x84_64 */ -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__i386__) || ( \ - ( defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) ) && __SIZEOF_LONG__ == 4 ) ) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long lo, hi; - asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) ); - return( lo ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __i386__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) ) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long lo, hi; - asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) ); - return( lo | ( hi << 32 ) ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && ( __amd64__ || __x86_64__ ) */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) ) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long tbl, tbu0, tbu1; - - do - { - asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu0) ); - asm volatile( "mftb %0" : "=r" (tbl ) ); - asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu1) ); - } - while( tbu0 != tbu1 ); - - return( tbl ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && ( __powerpc__ || __ppc__ ) */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc64__) - -#if defined(__OpenBSD__) -#warning OpenBSD does not allow access to tick register using software version instead -#else -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long tick; - asm volatile( "rdpr %%tick, %0;" : "=&r" (tick) ); - return( tick ); -} -#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __sparc64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc__) && !defined(__sparc64__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long tick; - asm volatile( ".byte 0x83, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00" ); - asm volatile( "mov %%g1, %0" : "=r" (tick) ); - return( tick ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __sparc__ && !__sparc64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__alpha__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long cc; - asm volatile( "rpcc %0" : "=r" (cc) ); - return( cc & 0xFFFFFFFF ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __alpha__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - unsigned long itc; - asm volatile( "mov %0 = ar.itc" : "=r" (itc) ); - return( itc ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \ - !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - LARGE_INTEGER offset; - - QueryPerformanceCounter( &offset ); - - return( (unsigned long)( offset.QuadPart ) ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && _MSC_VER && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -static int hardclock_init = 0; -static struct timeval tv_init; - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) -{ - struct timeval tv_cur; - - if( hardclock_init == 0 ) - { - gettimeofday( &tv_init, NULL ); - hardclock_init = 1; - } - - gettimeofday( &tv_cur, NULL ); - return( ( tv_cur.tv_sec - tv_init.tv_sec ) * 1000000 - + ( tv_cur.tv_usec - tv_init.tv_usec ) ); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK */ - -volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - -#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) -{ - struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; - - if( reset ) - { - QueryPerformanceCounter( &t->start ); - return( 0 ); - } - else - { - unsigned long delta; - LARGE_INTEGER now, hfreq; - QueryPerformanceCounter( &now ); - QueryPerformanceFrequency( &hfreq ); - delta = (unsigned long)( ( now.QuadPart - t->start.QuadPart ) * 1000ul - / hfreq.QuadPart ); - return( delta ); - } -} - -/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */ -static DWORD alarmMs; - -static DWORD WINAPI TimerProc( LPVOID TimerContext ) -{ - ((void) TimerContext); - Sleep( alarmMs ); - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - return( TRUE ); -} - -void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ) -{ - DWORD ThreadId; - - if( seconds == 0 ) - { - /* No need to create a thread for this simple case. - * Also, this shorcut is more reliable at least on MinGW32 */ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - return; - } - - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - alarmMs = seconds * 1000; - CloseHandle( CreateThread( NULL, 0, TimerProc, NULL, 0, &ThreadId ) ); -} - -#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) -{ - struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; - - if( reset ) - { - gettimeofday( &t->start, NULL ); - return( 0 ); - } - else - { - unsigned long delta; - struct timeval now; - gettimeofday( &now, NULL ); - delta = ( now.tv_sec - t->start.tv_sec ) * 1000ul - + ( now.tv_usec - t->start.tv_usec ) / 1000; - return( delta ); - } -} - -static void sighandler( int signum ) -{ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - signal( signum, sighandler ); -} - -void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ) -{ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - signal( SIGALRM, sighandler ); - alarm( seconds ); - if( seconds == 0 ) - { - /* alarm(0) cancelled any previous pending alarm, but the - handler won't fire, so raise the flag straight away. */ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - } -} - -#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ - -/* - * Set delays to watch - */ -void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ) -{ - mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; - - ctx->int_ms = int_ms; - ctx->fin_ms = fin_ms; - - if( fin_ms != 0 ) - (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 1 ); -} - -/* - * Get number of delays expired - */ -int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ) -{ - mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; - unsigned long elapsed_ms; - - if( ctx->fin_ms == 0 ) - return( -1 ); - - elapsed_ms = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 0 ); - - if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->fin_ms ) - return( 2 ); - - if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->int_ms ) - return( 1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * Busy-waits for the given number of milliseconds. - * Used for testing mbedtls_timing_hardclock. - */ -static void busy_msleep( unsigned long msec ) -{ - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; - unsigned long i = 0; /* for busy-waiting */ - volatile unsigned long j; /* to prevent optimisation */ - - (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 ); - - while( mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ) < msec ) - i++; - - j = i; - (void) j; -} - -#define FAIL do \ - { \ - if( verbose != 0 ) \ - { \ - mbedtls_printf( "failed at line %d\n", __LINE__ ); \ - mbedtls_printf( " cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu\n", \ - cycles, ratio, millisecs, secs, hardfail, \ - (unsigned long) a, (unsigned long) b ); \ - mbedtls_printf( " elapsed(hires)=%lu elapsed(ctx)=%lu status(ctx)=%d\n", \ - mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ), \ - mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx.timer, 0 ), \ - mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) ); \ - } \ - return( 1 ); \ - } while( 0 ) - -/* - * Checkup routine - * - * Warning: this is work in progress, some tests may not be reliable enough - * yet! False positives may happen. - */ -int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - unsigned long cycles = 0, ratio = 0; - unsigned long millisecs = 0, secs = 0; - int hardfail = 0; - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; - uint32_t a = 0, b = 0; - mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " TIMING tests note: will take some time!\n" ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): " ); - - { - secs = 1; - - (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 ); - - mbedtls_set_alarm( (int) secs ); - while( !mbedtls_timing_alarmed ) - ; - - millisecs = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ); - - /* For some reason on Windows it looks like alarm has an extra delay - * (maybe related to creating a new thread). Allow some room here. */ - if( millisecs < 800 * secs || millisecs > 1200 * secs + 300 ) - FAIL; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): " ); - - { - a = 800; - b = 400; - mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, a, a + b ); /* T = 0 */ - - busy_msleep( a - a / 4 ); /* T = a - a/4 */ - if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 0 ) - FAIL; - - busy_msleep( a / 4 + b / 4 ); /* T = a + b/4 */ - if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 1 ) - FAIL; - - busy_msleep( b ); /* T = a + b + b/4 */ - if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 2 ) - FAIL; - } - - mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, 0, 0 ); - busy_msleep( 200 ); - if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != -1 ) - FAIL; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): " ); - - /* - * Allow one failure for possible counter wrapping. - * On a 4Ghz 32-bit machine the cycle counter wraps about once per second; - * since the whole test is about 10ms, it shouldn't happen twice in a row. - */ - -hard_test: - if( hardfail > 1 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed (ignored)\n" ); - - goto hard_test_done; - } - - /* Get a reference ratio cycles/ms */ - millisecs = 1; - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - busy_msleep( millisecs ); - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; - ratio = cycles / millisecs; - - /* Check that the ratio is mostly constant */ - for( millisecs = 2; millisecs <= 4; millisecs++ ) - { - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - busy_msleep( millisecs ); - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; - - /* Allow variation up to 20% */ - if( cycles / millisecs < ratio - ratio / 5 || - cycles / millisecs > ratio + ratio / 5 ) - { - hardfail++; - goto hard_test; - } - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - -hard_test_done: - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/version_features.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/version_features.c deleted file mode 100644 index 777b6034..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/version_features.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,770 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Version feature information - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) - -#include "mbedtls/version.h" - -#include - -static const char *features[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) - "MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) - "MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) - "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - "MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) - "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) - "MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) - "MBEDTLS_GENPRIME", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) - "MBEDTLS_FS_IO", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) - "MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - "MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) - "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) - "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) - "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) - "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) - "MBEDTLS_AES_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - "MBEDTLS_ARC4_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - "MBEDTLS_BASE64_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - "MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) - "MBEDTLS_ARIA_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - "MBEDTLS_CCM_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) - "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - "MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) - "MBEDTLS_DES_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - "MBEDTLS_DHM_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) - "MBEDTLS_ERROR_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - "MBEDTLS_GCM_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) - "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) - "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) - "MBEDTLS_NET_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) - "MBEDTLS_OID_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) - "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) - "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) - "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) - "MBEDTLS_VERSION_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - "MBEDTLS_XTEA_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ - NULL -}; - -int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ) -{ - const char **idx = features; - - if( *idx == NULL ) - return( -2 ); - - if( feature == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - - while( *idx != NULL ) - { - if( !strcmp( *idx, feature ) ) - return( 0 ); - idx++; - } - return( -1 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509write_csr.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509write_csr.c deleted file mode 100644 index 66cee560..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/x509write_csr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,262 +0,0 @@ -/* - * X.509 Certificate Signing Request writing - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ -/* - * References: - * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 - * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) - -#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) -#include "mbedtls/pem.h" -#endif - -void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->subject ); - mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->extensions ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) -{ - ctx->md_alg = md_alg; -} - -void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ) -{ - ctx->key = key; -} - -int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, - const char *subject_name ) -{ - return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->subject, subject_name ); -} - -int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, - const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) -{ - return mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, - 0, val, val_len ); -} - -int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ) -{ - unsigned char buf[4]; - unsigned char *c; - int ret; - - c = buf + 4; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 7 ) ) != 4 ) - return( ret ); - - ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), - buf, 4 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, - unsigned char ns_cert_type ) -{ - unsigned char buf[4]; - unsigned char *c; - int ret; - - c = buf + 4; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ) ) != 4 ) - return( ret ); - - ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), - buf, 4 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - const char *sig_oid; - size_t sig_oid_len = 0; - unsigned char *c, *c2; - unsigned char hash[64]; - unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char tmp_buf[2048]; - size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; - size_t len = 0; - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; - - /* - * Prepare data to be signed in tmp_buf - */ - c = tmp_buf + sizeof( tmp_buf ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->extensions ) ); - - if( len ) - { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ ) ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->key, - tmp_buf, c - tmp_buf ) ); - c -= pub_len; - len += pub_len; - - /* - * Subject ::= Name - */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, tmp_buf, ctx->subject ) ); - - /* - * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } - */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, tmp_buf, 0 ) ); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, tmp_buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, tmp_buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - - /* - * Prepare signature - */ - mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, - f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) - pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; - else if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) - pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; - else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, - &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * Write data to output buffer - */ - c2 = buf + size; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, buf, - sig_oid, sig_oid_len, sig, sig_len ) ); - - if( len > (size_t)( c2 - buf ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - - c2 -= len; - memcpy( c2, c, len ); - - len += sig_and_oid_len; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c2, buf, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c2, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); - - return( (int) len ); -} - -#define PEM_BEGIN_CSR "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" -#define PEM_END_CSR "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) -int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char output_buf[4096]; - size_t olen = 0; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( ctx, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf), - f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CSR, PEM_END_CSR, - output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, - ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/xtea.c b/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/xtea.c deleted file mode 100644 index a33707bc..00000000 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/3rdparty/src/xtea.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,277 +0,0 @@ -/* - * An 32-bit implementation of the XTEA algorithm - * - * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - -#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_xtea_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_xtea_free( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_xtea_context ) ); -} - -/* - * XTEA key schedule - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] ) -{ - int i; - - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context) ); - - for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) - { - GET_UINT32_BE( ctx->k[i], key, i << 2 ); - } -} - -/* - * XTEA encrypt function - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, - const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8]) -{ - uint32_t *k, v0, v1, i; - - k = ctx->k; - - GET_UINT32_BE( v0, input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( v1, input, 4 ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT ) - { - uint32_t sum = 0, delta = 0x9E3779B9; - - for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) - { - v0 += (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); - sum += delta; - v1 += (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); - } - } - else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT */ - { - uint32_t delta = 0x9E3779B9, sum = delta * 32; - - for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) - { - v1 -= (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); - sum -= delta; - v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); - } - } - - PUT_UINT32_BE( v0, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( v1, output, 4 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* - * XTEA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, - unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int i; - unsigned char temp[8]; - - if( length % 8 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT ) - { - while( length > 0 ) - { - memcpy( temp, input, 8 ); - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); - - memcpy( iv, temp, 8 ); - - input += 8; - output += 8; - length -= 8; - } - } - else - { - while( length > 0 ) - { - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); - - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); - memcpy( iv, output, 8 ); - - input += 8; - output += 8; - length -= 8; - } - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * XTEA tests vectors (non-official) - */ - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_key[6][16] = -{ - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_pt[6][8] = -{ - { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x6e, 0x27, 0x89, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x7f }, - { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0x70, 0xe1, 0x22, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x4e, 0x76, 0x55 } -}; - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_ct[6][8] = -{ - { 0x49, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xb5 }, - { 0xe7, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0x13, 0x74, 0x43, 0x41, 0xd8 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0xa0, 0x39, 0x05, 0x89, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xef, 0xa5 }, - { 0xed, 0x23, 0x37, 0x5a, 0x82, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0x2d }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char buf[8]; - mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; - - mbedtls_xtea_init( &ctx ); - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " XTEA test #%d: ", i + 1 ); - - memcpy( buf, xtea_test_pt[i], 8 ); - - mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, xtea_test_key[i] ); - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, buf, buf ); - - if( memcmp( buf, xtea_test_ct[i], 8 ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - -exit: - mbedtls_xtea_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/include/tls_config.h b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/include/tls_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e3c217e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/include/tls_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,3953 @@ +/** + * \file config.h + * + * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable + * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global + * memory footprint. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: System support + * + * This section sets system specific settings. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * The compiler has support for asm(). + * + * Requires support for asm() in compiler. + * + * Used in: + * library/aria.c + * library/timing.c + * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * + * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Comment to disable the use of assembly code. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + * + * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit + * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform). + * + * Used in: + * include/mbedtls/bignum.h + * library/bignum.c + * + * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations. + * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to + * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer + * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros, + * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to + * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type. + * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present. + * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division. + * + * Note that division for the native integer type is always required. + * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit + * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some + * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For + * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling + * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + * + * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication. + * + * Used in: + * library/poly1305.c + * + * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit + * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some + * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in + * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain. + * + * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option + * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware + * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS. + * + * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared + * to using the library function provided by the toolchain. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + * + * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set. + * + * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * System has time.h and time(). + * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used, + * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT, + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME. + * + * Comment if your system does not support time functions + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below). + * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least + * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of + * X.509 certificates. + * + * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock. + * + * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that + * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to + * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information. + * + * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. + */ +// #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + * + * Enable the memory allocation layer. + * + * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free(). + * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be + * provided to the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide + * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and + * free() function pointer at runtime. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the + * alternate function at compile time. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + * + * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) + * + * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support + * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime + * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting + * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the + * platform layer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS support the + * function in the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, mbed TLS will + * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an + * alternative printf function pointer. + * + * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined! + * + * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows; + * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO! + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base + * platform function + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + * + * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to + * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * + * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of + * the parameters passed to it. + * + * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an + * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the + * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in + * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the + * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose + * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers). + * + * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate + * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always + * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted. + * + * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may + * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer + * must not be NULL: + * - The pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled. + * - The content of the buffer is always validated. + * + * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that + * is invalid: + * 1. The function will invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). + * 2. If MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() did not terminate the program, the function + * will immediately return. If the function returns an Mbed TLS error code, + * the error code in this case is MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * When defining this flag, you also need to arrange a definition for + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). You can do this by any of the following methods: + * - By default, the library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call a + * function mbedtls_param_failed(), but the library does not define this + * function. If you do not make any other arrangements, you must provide + * the function mbedtls_param_failed() in your application. + * See `platform_util.h` for its prototype. + * - If you enable the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT, then the + * library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(\c cond) to be `assert(cond)`. + * You can still supply an alternative definition of + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), which may call `assert`. + * - If you define a macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() before including `config.h` + * or you uncomment the definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() in `config.h`, + * the library will call the macro that you defined and will not supply + * its own version. Note that if MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() calls `assert`, + * you need to enable #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source + * files include ``. + * + * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * + * Allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`, and make it default to + * `assert`. This macro is only used if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is defined. + * + * If this macro is not defined, then MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() defaults to + * calling a function mbedtls_param_failed(). See the documentation of + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for details. + * + * Uncomment to allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + +/* \} name SECTION: System support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support + * + * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed + * within the modules that are enabled. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + * + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), + * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() + * + * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. + * + * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at + * compile time. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash + * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep + * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the + * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer + * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base + * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from + * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * module. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend + * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message + * digests and ciphers instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT + +/* + * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is + * implemented with two .c files: + * - ecp.c + * - ecp_curves.c + * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT + * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure + * that you provide functionality for both .c files. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you + * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in + * mind that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will + * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide + * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition + * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible + * with this definition. + * + * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are + * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, + * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should + * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt + * must stay untouched. + * + * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set + * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES + * tables. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding + * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests + * and ciphers instead. + * + * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are + * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the + * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore + * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating + * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() + * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is + * desirable). + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * + * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module. + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind + * that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation + * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the + * alternative. + * + * The original implementation can in addition be removed by setting the + * MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK option, in which case any function for which the + * corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT macro is defined will not be + * able to fallback to curves not supported by the alternative implementation. + * + * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * and implementing the following functions: + * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( + * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the + * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 + * otherwise. + * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are + * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to + * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. + * + * Example: In case you set MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac() + * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac() if the group + * for the operation is supported by your implementation (i.e. your + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable() function returns 1 for this group). If the + * group is not supported by your implementation, then the original mbed TLS + * implementation of ecp_double_jac() is used instead, unless this fallback + * behaviour is disabled by setting MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK (in which case + * ecp_double_jac() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE). + * + * The function prototypes and the definition of mbedtls_ecp_group and + * mbedtls_ecp_point will not change based on MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT, so your + * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp__function_name__ must be compatible + * with their definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + */ +/* Required for all the functions in this section */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT +/* Turn off software fallback for curves not supported in hardware */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK +/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT +/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + * + * Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. + * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has + * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the + * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). + * + * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable + * only for development. + * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + * + * Uncomment this macro to let mbed TLS use your own implementation of a + * hardware entropy collector. + * + * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same + * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. + * + * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + * + * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime. + * + * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb + * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the + * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed. + * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c + * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded + * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + * + * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes). + * + * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + * + * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + * + * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + * + * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + * + * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + * + * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + * + * Enable NULL cipher. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * encryption or channels without any security! + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable + * the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 + * + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for + * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support + * padding (e.g. CBC) + * + * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC. + * + * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + * + * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. + * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * channels with virtually no security at all! + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to + * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them + * explicitly. + * + * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible + * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including + * them explicitly. + * + * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through + * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical + * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Ga?tan + * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls + * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option + * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites. + * + * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve + * module. By default all supported curves are enabled. + * + * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it + */ +/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + * + * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime. + * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times + * faster on the corresponding curve. + * + * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + * + * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an + * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect + * against some side-channel attacks. + * + * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the + * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this + * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification, + * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel + * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of + * that dependency. + * + * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some + * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for + * your use case. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + * + * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed. + * + * This allows various functions to pause by returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in + * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is + * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum + * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information. + * + * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking + * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations. + * + * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of + * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT + * and MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + * + * Use a backward compatible ECDH context. + * + * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context + * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes + * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, + * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + + * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller + * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it + * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. + * The new format is incompatible with applications that access + * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. + * + * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you + * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should + * comment out this macro definition. + * + * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled. + * + * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the + * library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured + * and may modify the layout of the new context type. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + * + * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979). + * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing + * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by + * the deterministic variant. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + * + * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by + * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480. + * + * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC + * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to + * avoid validation issues). + * + * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + * + * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in + * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled + * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled). + * + * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're + * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application. + * + * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the + * mbedtls_strerror() + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + * + * Enable the prime-number generation code. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO + * + * Enable functions that use the filesystem. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, + * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. + * + * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an + * application. + * + * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + * + * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions. + * This is useful if your platform does not support + * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + * + * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the + * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option + * if you have performance concerns. + * + * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source. + * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer) + * + * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a + * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are + * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or + * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used. + * + * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile + * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the + * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at + * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from + * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default + * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * bytes from the file. + * + * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is + * given to an external source, to update it. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + +/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + * + * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier. + * + * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t + * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. + * + * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed + * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + * + * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints + * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables + * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + * + * Include backtrace information with each allocated block. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() an backtrace_symbols() support + * + * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + * + * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * + * Enable support for PSA crypto client. + * + * \note This option allows to include the code necessary for a PSA + * crypto client when the PSA crypto implementation is not included in + * the library (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled). The code included is the + * code to set and get PSA key attributes. + * The development of PSA drivers partially relying on the library to + * fulfill the hardware gaps is another possible usage of this option. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + * + * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + * + * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided + * by a driver, instead of Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * If you enable this option, you must configure the type + * ::mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t in psa/crypto_platform.h + * and define a function called mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * with the following prototype: + * ``` + * psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + * mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + * uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + * ); + * ``` + * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call. + * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \p output_size bytes + * of random data and set \c *output_length to \p output_size. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If you enable this option, code that uses the PSA cryptography + * interface will not use any of the entropy sources set up for + * the entropy module, nor the NV seed that MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * enables. + * + * \note This option is experimental and may be removed without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure + * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a + * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process + * Environment). + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + * + * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is + * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG). + * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in + * entropy source. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + * + * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem + * for the RSA private operation. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + * + * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonnable compromise between + * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at + * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of + * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about + * 30%. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + * + * Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some + * code size on devices that don't use SHA-384. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Uncomment to disable SHA-384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + * + * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC. + * If you choose not to send the alert messages, mbed TLS can still communicate + * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder. + * + * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given + * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel. + * + * Enable sending of all alert messages + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + * + * Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check + * the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has + * not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the + * externally visible state of the SSL context. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable support for record checking. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + * + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes + * in the underlying transport. + * + * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, + * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. + * See the corresponding documentation for more information. + * + * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. + * We make no stability promises for the availability + * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * + * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured + * through the options + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + * + * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows + * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic + * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the + * operation inside the library. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + * + * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the + * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). + * + * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the + * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context + * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize + * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the + * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is + * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the + * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables + * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter, + * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in + * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection. + * + * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are + * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if + * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it. + * + * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + * + * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues. + * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing + * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls. + * + * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging, + * but remove this for production servers that should log as well. + * + * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing + * a timing side-channel. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + * + * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366. + * + * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for + * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks + * on the padding or underlying cipher. + * + * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + * + * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret + * Extension. + * + * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake familiy of + * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable + * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the + * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + * + * Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) + * for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks. + * + * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support + * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients + * implements a fallback strategy. + * + * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which + * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to + * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * + * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake. + * + * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is + * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage. + * + * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still + * defined, but always returns \c NULL. + * + * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the + * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will + * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, + * for exaple by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. + * + * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate + * after the handshake. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + * + * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of + * individual records. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + * + * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. + * + * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk + * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. + * + * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + * + * Enable support for TLS renegotiation. + * + * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived + * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake. + * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since + * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to + * misuse/misunderstand. + * + * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. + * + * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware + * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to + * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1). + * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the + * configuration of this extension). + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + * + * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the + * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + * + * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours + * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + * + * Enable support for SSL 3.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * (Depends on ciphersuites) + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * + * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts + * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of + * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide + * no other purpose. + * + * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, + * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the + * public API. In particular, features under the control + * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any + * stability guarantees. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial + * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). + * + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, + * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + * + * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + * + * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk! + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details. + * + * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers. + * + * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as + * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled + * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the + * environment in which your server operates. + * + * \warning Disabling this can ba a security risk! (see above) + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + * + * Enable support for negotation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) + * through the use_srtp extension. + * + * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required + * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of + * the associated SRTP packet protection key material. + * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the + * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer + * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. + * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating + * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb() should be used to implement + * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 + * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). + * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. + * + * Setting this option enables the runtime API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles() + * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection + * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at + * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + * + * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port. + * + * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the + * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the + * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This + * flag enables that support. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + * + * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + * + * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL. + * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a + * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though). + * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing + * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example + * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + * + * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. + * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for key export + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + * + * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated + * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is + * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness + * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, + * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily + * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save + * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use + * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + * + * When this option is enabled, the SSL buffer will be resized automatically + * based on the negotiated maximum fragment length in each direction. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test + * suites can then be run normally. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for + * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be + * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when + * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + * + * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and + * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests. + * + * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product. + * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior + * is the same as when this feature is disabled. + * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added + * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier. + * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production. + * + * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more + * information. + * + * Uncomment to enable invasive tests. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + * + * Provide your own alternate threading implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + * + * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * + * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and + * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * + * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed + * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts + * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not + * break backwards compatibility. + * + * \warning The PSA Crypto API is in beta stage. While you're welcome to + * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some + * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs that are dependent on the + * PSA Crypto API, so can't come with the same stability guarantees as the + * rest of the Mbed TLS APIs. You're welcome to experiment with them, but for + * now, access to these APIs is opt-in (via enabling the present option), in + * order to clearly differentiate them from the stable Mbed TLS APIs. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * + * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA + * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. + * + * Uncomment this to enable use of PSA Crypto configuration settings which + * can be found in include/psa/crypto_config.h. + * + * If you enable this option and write your own configuration file, you must + * include mbedtls/config_psa.h in your configuration file. The default + * provided mbedtls/config.h contains the necessary inclusion. + * + * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since + * it is not completed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + * + * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users + * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading + * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an unknown critical extension. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + * + * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` + * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure + * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked + * list. + * + * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted + * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient + * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused + * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + * + * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS + * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). + * + * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT + * + * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and + * decompression of packet data. + * + * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the + * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if + * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case. + * + * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. + * + * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed + * in the next major revision of the library. + * + * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. + * + * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules + * + * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * + * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64. + * + * Module: library/aesni.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * Enable the AES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ctr_drbg.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/arc4.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoidng dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 parser. + * + * Module: library/asn1.c + * Caller: library/x509.c + * library/dhm.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 writer. + * + * Module: library/asn1write.c + * Caller: library/ecdsa.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * Enable the Base64 module. + * + * Module: library/base64.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * + * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * + * Enable the multi-precision integer library. + * + * Module: library/bignum.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/ecp.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + * + * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. + * + * Module: library/blowfish.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * Enable the Camellia block cipher. + * + * Module: library/camellia.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * Enable the ARIA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aria.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C + * + * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher. + * + * Module: library/ccm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are + * enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + * + * Enable the test certificates. + * + * Module: library/certs.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/chacha20.c + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * Module: library/chachapoly.c + * + * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * + * Enable the generic cipher layer. + * + * Module: library/cipher.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + * + * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block + * ciphers. + * + * Module: library/cmac.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. + * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. + * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. + * + * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, + * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. + * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. + * + * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + * + * Enable the debug functions. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + * Enable the DES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/des.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. + * + * Module: library/dhm.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. + * + * Module: library/ecdh.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library. + * + * Module: library/ecdsa.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, + * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a + * short Weierstrass curve. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Module: library/ecjpake.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECJPAKE + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library. + * + * Module: library/ecp.c + * Caller: library/ecdh.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/ecjpake.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * + * Enable the platform-specific entropy code. + * + * Module: library/entropy.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * This module provides a generic entropy pool + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + * + * Enable error code to error string conversion. + * + * Module: library/error.c + * Caller: + * + * This module enables mbedtls_strerror(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C + * + * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). + * + * Module: library/gcm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other + * requisites are enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + * + * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized + * environments + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific + * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as + * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool + * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add + * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. + * + * Module: library/havege.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + * + * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869). + * + * Module: library/hkdf.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code + * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator. + * + * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number geerator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * + * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, + * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes + * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. + * + * Module: library/nist_kw.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Enable the generic message digest layer. + * + * Module: library/md.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C + * + * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md2.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C + * + * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md4.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * + * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md5.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking + * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded + * encrypted keys. + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack) + * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free() + * calls) + * + * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS) + * + * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C + * + * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines. + * + * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X) + * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your + * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/net_sockets.c + * + * This module provides networking routines. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C + * + * Enable the OID database. + * + * Module: library/oid.c + * Caller: library/asn1write.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/x509.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86. + * + * Module: library/padlock.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + * + * Enable PEM decoding / parsing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + * + * Enable PEM encoding / writing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key layer. + * + * Module: library/pk.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key parser. + * + * Module: library/pkparse.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key writer. + * + * Module: library/pkwrite.c + * Caller: library/x509write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + * + * Enable PKCS#5 functions. + * + * Module: library/pkcs5.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + * + * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support via the pkcs11-helper library. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Module: library/pkcs11.c + * Caller: library/pk.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. + * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + * + * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions. + * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys + * + * Module: library/pkcs12.c + * Caller: library/pkparse.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign + * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit(). + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT + * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned + * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. + * + * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) + * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * + * Module: library/platform.c + * Caller: Most other .c files + * + * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + * + * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm. + * + * Module: library/poly1305.c + * Caller: library/chachapoly.c + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. + * + * \warning The PSA Crypto API is still beta status. While you're welcome to + * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some + * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * + * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * + * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * cryptography API. + * + * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided + * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of + * the PSA ITS interface + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + * + * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture + * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files. + * + * Module: library/psa_its_file.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + * + * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/ripemd160.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. + * + * Module: library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha1.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. + * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + * + * Enable simple SSL cache implementation. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cache.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + * + * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + * + * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets. + * + * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cli.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Enable the threading abstraction layer. + * By default mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that + * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts + * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race + * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading + * + * Module: library/threading.c + * + * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or + * provided). + * + * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD. + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Enable the semi-portable timing interface. + * + * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, + * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that + * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide + * your own implementation of the whole module by setting + * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file. + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/timing.c + * Caller: library/havege.c + * + * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Enable run-time version information. + * + * Module: library/version.c + * + * This module provides run-time version information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for using certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509.c + * Caller: library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, + * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 CRL parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crl.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_csr.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_create.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR). + * + * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + * + * Enable the XTEA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/xtea.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module configuration options + * + * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and + * configuration options. The default values are already present in the + * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases. + * + * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here + * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences. + * + * Please check the respective header file for documentation on these + * parameters (to prevent duplicate documentation). + * \{ + */ + +/* MPI / BIGNUM options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ + +/* CTR_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* HMAC_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* ECP options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ + +/* Entropy options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */ + +/* Memory buffer allocator options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ + +/* Platform options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< Default allocator to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< Default free to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */ + +/* To Use Function Macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled */ +/* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ + +/** + * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter + * is detected that is only checked with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * (see the documentation of that option for context). + * + * When you leave this undefined here, the library provides + * a default definition. If the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * is defined, the default definition is `assert(cond)`, + * otherwise the default definition calls a function + * mbedtls_param_failed(). This function is declared in + * `platform_util.h` for the benefit of the library, but + * you need to define in your application. + * + * When you define this here, this replaces the default + * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the + * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility + * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in + * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible + * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing + * them in this file next to the macro definition). + * If you define this macro to call `assert`, also define + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source files + * include ``. + * + * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in + * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or + * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid + * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will + * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which + * partially negates the benefits of enabling + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged. + * + * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) + +/* PSA options */ +/** + * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the + * PSA crypto subsystem. + * + * If this option is unset: + * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG. + * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either + * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and + * on unspecified heuristics. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + * Restrict the PSA library to supporting a maximum amount of simultaneously + * loaded keys. A loaded key is a key stored by the PSA Crypto core as a + * volatile key, or a persistent key which is loaded temporarily by the + * library as part of a crypto operation in flight. + * + * If this option is unset, the library will fall back to a default value of + * 32 keys. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 + +/* SSL Cache options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ + +/* SSL options */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers + * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of + * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + * which overwrite the value set by this option. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both + * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer + * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * in TLS 1.3. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping + * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. + * + * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake + * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small. + * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any + * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer + * independently of the incoming I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING + * + * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of + * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. + * + * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLSSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size, + * together with its reassembly bitmap. + * + * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default) + * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows + * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate) + * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 + +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ + +/** + * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. + * + * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only + * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your + * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active. + * + * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all + * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM. + * + * The value below is only an example, not the default. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +/* X509 options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ + +#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE) +#include YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/** + * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for certificate signing. + * Without this build-time option, SHA-1 support must be activated explicitly + * through mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile. Turning on this option is not + * recommended because of it is possible to generate SHA-1 collisions, however + * this may be safe for legacy infrastructure where additional controls apply. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES + +/** + * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake + * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 + * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. + * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by + * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use + * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default + * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general + * warning applies nonetheless: + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to + * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the + * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls + * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination + * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older + * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation + * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to + * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for + * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer + * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from + * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The + * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as + * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target + * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to + * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to + * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex + * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the + * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However, + * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * supplied at compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT + +/** + * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest + * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH + * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access + * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also + * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + +/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" +#define calloc tos_mmheap_calloc +#define free tos_mmheap_free + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/include/tos_tls_config.h b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/include/tos_tls_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5860b43b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/include/tos_tls_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,3269 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls_config.h + * + * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable + * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global + * memory footprint. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * This is an optional version symbol that enables comatibility handling of + * config files. + * + * It is equal to the #MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER of the Mbed TLS version that + * introduced the config format we want to be compatible with. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION 0x03000000 + +/** + * \name SECTION: System support + * + * This section sets system specific settings. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * The compiler has support for asm(). + * + * Requires support for asm() in compiler. + * + * Used in: + * library/aria.c + * library/bn_mul.h + * + * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Comment to disable the use of assembly code. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + * + * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit + * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform). + * + * Used in: + * include/mbedtls/bignum.h + * library/bignum.c + * + * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations. + * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to + * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer + * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros, + * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to + * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type. + * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present. + * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division. + * + * Note that division for the native integer type is always required. + * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit + * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some + * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For + * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling + * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + * + * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication. + * + * Used in: + * library/poly1305.c + * + * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit + * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some + * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in + * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain. + * + * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option + * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware + * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS. + * + * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared + * to using the library function provided by the toolchain. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + * + * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set. + * + * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * System has time.h and time(). + * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used, + * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT, + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME. + * + * Comment if your system does not support time functions + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below). + * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least + * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of + * X.509 certificates. + * + * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock. + * + * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that + * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to + * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information. + * + * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. + */ +// #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + * + * Enable the memory allocation layer. + * + * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free(). + * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be + * provided to the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide + * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and + * free() function pointer at runtime. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the + * alternate function at compile time. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + * + * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) + * + * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support + * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime + * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting + * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the + * platform layer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS support the + * function in the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, mbed TLS will + * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an + * alternative printf function pointer. + * + * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined! + * + * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows; + * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO! + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base + * platform function + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + * + * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to + * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +/* \} name SECTION: System support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support + * + * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed + * within the modules that are enabled. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + * + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for + * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() + * + * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. + * + * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at + * compile time. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash + * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep + * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the + * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer + * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base + * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from + * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * module. + * + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend + * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message + * digests and ciphers instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT + +/* + * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is + * implemented with two .c files: + * - ecp.c + * - ecp_curves.c + * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT + * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure + * that you provide functionality for both .c files. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you + * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in + * mind that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will + * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide + * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition + * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible + * with this definition. + * + * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set + * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES + * tables. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + * + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding + * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests + * and ciphers instead. + * + * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are + * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the + * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore + * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating + * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(). + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * + * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module. + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind + * that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation + * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the + * alternative. + * + * The original implementation can in addition be removed by setting the + * MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK option, in which case any function for which the + * corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT macro is defined will not be + * able to fallback to curves not supported by the alternative implementation. + * + * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * and implementing the following functions: + * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( + * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the + * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 + * otherwise. + * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are + * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to + * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. + * + * Example: In case you set MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac() + * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac() if the group + * for the operation is supported by your implementation (i.e. your + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable() function returns 1 for this group). If the + * group is not supported by your implementation, then the original mbed TLS + * implementation of ecp_double_jac() is used instead, unless this fallback + * behaviour is disabled by setting MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK (in which case + * ecp_double_jac() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE). + * + * The function prototypes and the definition of mbedtls_ecp_group and + * mbedtls_ecp_point will not change based on MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT, so your + * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp__function_name__ must be compatible + * with their definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + */ +/* Required for all the functions in this section */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT +/* Turn off software fallback for curves not supported in hardware */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK +/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT +/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + * + * Uncomment this macro to let mbed TLS use your own implementation of a + * hardware entropy collector. + * + * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same + * prototype as declared in library/entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first + * argument. + * + * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + * + * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime. + * + * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb + * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the + * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed. + * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c + * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded + * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + * + * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables. + * + * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from + * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + * by computing their values on the fly during operations + * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another). + * + * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint + * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during + * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within + * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic + * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss + * depends on the system and memory details. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + * + * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes). + * + * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + * + * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + * + * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + * + * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + * + * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + * + * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + * + * Enable NULL cipher. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * encryption or channels without any security! + * + * To enable the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 + * + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for + * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support + * padding (e.g. CBC) + * + * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC. + * + * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + * + * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. + * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve + * module. By default all supported curves are enabled. + * + * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it + */ +/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + * + * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime. + * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times + * faster on the corresponding curve. + * + * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + * + * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed. + * + * This allows various functions to pause by returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in + * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is + * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum + * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information. + * + * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking + * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations. + * + * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of + * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + * + * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979). + * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing + * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by + * the deterministic variant. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + * + * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by + * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480. + * + * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC + * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to + * avoid validation issues). + * + * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + * + * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in + * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled + * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled). + * + * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're + * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application. + * + * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the + * mbedtls_strerror() + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + * + * Enable the prime-number generation code. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO + * + * Enable functions that use the filesystem. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + * Do not add default entropy sources in mbedtls_entropy_init(). + * + * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an + * application. + * + * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + * + * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions. + * This is useful if your platform does not support + * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + * + * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the + * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option + * if you have performance concerns. + * + * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source. + * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer) + * + * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a + * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are + * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or + * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used. + * + * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile + * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the + * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at + * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from + * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default + * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * bytes from the file. + * + * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is + * given to an external source, to update it. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + +/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + * + * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier. + * + * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t + * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. + * + * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed + * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + * + * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints + * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables + * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + * + * Include backtrace information with each allocated block. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() an backtrace_symbols() support + * + * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + * + * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + * + * Enable support for platform built-in keys. If you enable this feature, + * you must implement the function mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key(). + * See the documentation of that function for more information. + * + * Built-in keys are typically derived from a hardware unique key or + * stored in a secure element. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * + * Enable support for PSA crypto client. + * + * \note This option allows to include the code necessary for a PSA + * crypto client when the PSA crypto implementation is not included in + * the library (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled). The code included is the + * code to set and get PSA key attributes. + * The development of PSA drivers partially relying on the library to + * fulfill the hardware gaps is another possible usage of this option. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + * + * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + * + * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided + * by a driver, instead of Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * If you enable this option, you must configure the type + * ::mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t in psa/crypto_platform.h + * and define a function called mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * with the following prototype: + * ``` + * psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + * mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + * uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + * ); + * ``` + * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call. + * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \p output_size bytes + * of random data and set \c *output_length to \p output_size. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If you enable this option, code that uses the PSA cryptography + * interface will not use any of the entropy sources set up for + * the entropy module, nor the NV seed that MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * enables. + * + * \note This option is experimental and may be removed without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure + * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a + * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process + * Environment). + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + * + * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is + * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG). + * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in + * entropy source. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + * + * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem + * for the RSA private operation. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + * + * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonnable compromise between + * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at + * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of + * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about + * 30%. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + * + * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC. + * If you choose not to send the alert messages, mbed TLS can still communicate + * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder. + * + * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given + * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel. + * + * Enable sending of all alert messages + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + * + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes + * in the underlying transport. + * + * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, + * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. + * See the corresponding documentation for more information. + * + * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. + * We make no stability promises for the availability + * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * + * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured + * through the options + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + * + * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows + * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic + * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the + * operation inside the library. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + * + * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the + * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). + * + * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the + * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context + * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize + * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the + * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is + * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the + * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables + * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter, + * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in + * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection. + * + * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are + * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if + * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it. + * + * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + * + * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues. + * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing + * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls. + * + * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging, + * but remove this for production servers that should log as well. + * + * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing + * a timing side-channel. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + * + * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366. + * + * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for + * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks + * on the padding or underlying cipher. + * + * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + * + * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret + * Extension. + * + * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake familiy of + * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable + * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the + * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * + * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake. + * + * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is + * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage. + * + * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still + * defined, but always returns \c NULL. + * + * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the + * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will + * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, + * for exaple by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. + * + * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate + * after the handshake. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + * + * Enable support for TLS renegotiation. + * + * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived + * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake. + * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since + * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to + * misuse/misunderstand. + * + * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. + * + * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware + * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to + * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1). + * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the + * configuration of this extension). + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * (Depends on ciphersuites) + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * + * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts + * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of + * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide + * no other purpose. + * + * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, + * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the + * public API. In particular, features under the control + * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any + * stability guarantees. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial + * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). + * + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + * + * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + * + * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk! + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details. + * + * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers. + * + * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as + * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled + * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the + * environment in which your server operates. + * + * \warning Disabling this can ba a security risk! (see above) + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + * + * Enable support for negotiation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) + * through the use_srtp extension. + * + * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required + * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of + * the associated SRTP packet protection key material. + * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the + * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer + * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. + * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating + * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb() should be used to implement + * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 + * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). + * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. + * + * Setting this option enables the runtime API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles() + * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection + * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at + * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + * + * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port. + * + * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the + * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the + * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This + * flag enables that support. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + * + * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL. + * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a + * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though). + * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing + * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example + * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + * + * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. + * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for key export + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + * + * When this option is enabled, the SSL buffer will be resized automatically + * based on the negotiated maximum fragment length in each direction. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test + * suites can then be run normally. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for + * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be + * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when + * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + * + * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and + * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests. + * + * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product. + * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior + * is the same as when this feature is disabled. + * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added + * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier. + * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production. + * + * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more + * information. + * + * Uncomment to enable invasive tests. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + * + * Provide your own alternate threading implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + * + * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * + * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and + * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * + * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed + * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts + * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not + * break backwards compatibility. + * + * \warning The PSA Crypto API is in beta stage. While you're welcome to + * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some + * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs that are dependent on the + * PSA Crypto API, so can't come with the same stability guarantees as the + * rest of the Mbed TLS APIs. You're welcome to experiment with them, but for + * now, access to these APIs is opt-in (via enabling the present option), in + * order to clearly differentiate them from the stable Mbed TLS APIs. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * + * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA + * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. + * + * Uncomment this to enable use of PSA Crypto configuration settings which + * can be found in include/psa/crypto_config.h. + * + * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since + * it is not completed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + * + * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users + * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading + * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + * + * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` + * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure + * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked + * list. + * + * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted + * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient + * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO + * + * Disable mbedtls_x509_*_info() and related APIs. + * + * Uncomment to omit mbedtls_x509_*_info(), as well as mbedtls_debug_print_crt() + * and other functions/constants only used by these functions, thus reducing + * the code footprint by several KB. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + * + * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS + * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). + * + * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules + * + * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * + * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64. + * + * Module: library/aesni.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * Enable the AES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ctr_drbg.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 parser. + * + * Module: library/asn1.c + * Caller: library/x509.c + * library/dhm.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 writer. + * + * Module: library/asn1write.c + * Caller: library/ecdsa.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * Enable the Base64 module. + * + * Module: library/base64.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * + * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * + * Enable the multi-precision integer library. + * + * Module: library/bignum.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/ecp.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * Enable the Camellia block cipher. + * + * Module: library/camellia.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * Enable the ARIA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aria.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C + * + * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher. + * + * Module: library/ccm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are + * enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/chacha20.c + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * Module: library/chachapoly.c + * + * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * + * Enable the generic cipher layer. + * + * Module: library/cipher.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + * + * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block + * ciphers. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is active, meaning that the underlying + * implementation of the CMAC algorithm is provided by an alternate + * implementation, that alternate implementation may opt to not support + * AES-192 or 3DES as underlying block ciphers for the CMAC operation. + * + * Module: library/cmac.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. + * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. + * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. + * + * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, + * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. + * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. + * + * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + * + * Enable the debug functions. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + * Enable the DES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/des.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * library/cipher.c + * + * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. + * + * Module: library/dhm.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. + * + * Module: library/ecdh.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library. + * + * Module: library/ecdsa.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, + * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a + * short Weierstrass curve. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. + * + * \note EC J-PAKE support is based on the Thread v1.0.0 specification. + * It has not been reviewed for compliance with newer standards such as + * Thread v1.1 or RFC 8236. + * + * Module: library/ecjpake.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECJPAKE + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library. + * + * Module: library/ecp.c + * Caller: library/ecdh.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/ecjpake.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * + * Enable the platform-specific entropy code. + * + * Module: library/entropy.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * This module provides a generic entropy pool + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + * + * Enable error code to error string conversion. + * + * Module: library/error.c + * Caller: + * + * This module enables mbedtls_strerror(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C + * + * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). + * + * Module: library/gcm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other + * requisites are enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + * + * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869). + * + * Module: library/hkdf.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code + * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator. + * + * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number geerator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * + * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, + * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes + * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. + * + * Module: library/nist_kw.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Enable the generic message digest layer. + * + * Module: library/md.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * + * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md5.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters. + * Further, it is used for checking MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 + * when decrypting PEM-encoded encrypted keys. + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack) + * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free() + * calls) + * + * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS) + * + * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C + * + * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines. + * + * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X) + * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your + * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/net_sockets.c + * + * This module provides networking routines. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C + * + * Enable the OID database. + * + * Module: library/oid.c + * Caller: library/asn1write.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/x509.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86. + * + * Module: library/padlock.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + * + * Enable PEM decoding / parsing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + * + * Enable PEM encoding / writing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key layer. + * + * Module: library/pk.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key parser. + * + * Module: library/pkparse.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key writer. + * + * Module: library/pkwrite.c + * Caller: library/x509write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + * + * Enable PKCS#5 functions. + * + * Module: library/pkcs5.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + * + * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions. + * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys + * + * Module: library/pkcs12.c + * Caller: library/pkparse.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign + * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit(). + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT + * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned + * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. + * + * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) + * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * + * Module: library/platform.c + * Caller: Most other .c files + * + * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + * + * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm. + * + * Module: library/poly1305.c + * Caller: library/chachapoly.c + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. + * + * \warning The PSA Crypto API is still beta status. While you're welcome to + * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some + * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * + * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * + * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * cryptography API. + * + * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided + * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of + * the PSA ITS interface + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + * + * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture + * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files. + * + * Module: library/psa_its_file.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + * + * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/ripemd160.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. + * + * Module: library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha1.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters, + * and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C. The library does not currently support enabling + * SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * Enable the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA224_C. The library does not currently support enabling + * SHA-256 without SHA-224. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-256. + * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Comment to disable SHA-384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Enable SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-512. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + * + * Enable simple SSL cache implementation. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cache.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + * + * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + * + * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets. + * + * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cli.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Enable the threading abstraction layer. + * By default mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that + * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts + * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race + * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading + * + * Module: library/threading.c + * + * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or + * provided). + * + * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD. + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Enable the semi-portable timing interface. + * + * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, + * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that + * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide + * your own implementation of the whole module by setting + * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file. + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/timing.c + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Enable run-time version information. + * + * Module: library/version.c + * + * This module provides run-time version information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for using certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509.c + * Caller: library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, + * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 CRL parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crl.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_csr.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_create.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR). + * + * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module configuration options + * + * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and + * configuration options. The default values are already present in the + * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases. + * + * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here + * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences. + * + * Please check the respective header file for documentation on these + * parameters (to prevent duplicate documentation). + * \{ + */ + +/* MPI / BIGNUM options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ + +/* CTR_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* HMAC_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* ECP options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ + +/* Entropy options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */ + +/* Memory buffer allocator options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ + +/* Platform options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< Default allocator to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< Default free to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */ + +/* To Use Function Macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled */ +/* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ + +/* PSA options */ +/** + * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the + * PSA crypto subsystem. + * + * If this option is unset: + * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG. + * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either + * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and + * on unspecified heuristics. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + * Restrict the PSA library to supporting a maximum amount of simultaneously + * loaded keys. A loaded key is a key stored by the PSA Crypto core as a + * volatile key, or a persistent key which is loaded temporarily by the + * library as part of a crypto operation in flight. + * + * If this option is unset, the library will fall back to a default value of + * 32 keys. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 + +/* SSL Cache options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ + +/* SSL options */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * in TLS 1.3 and when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping + * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. + * + * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake + * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small. + * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any + * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING + * + * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of + * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. + * + * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLSSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size, + * together with its reassembly bitmap. + * + * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default) + * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows + * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate) + * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 + +//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ + +/** + * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. + * + * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only + * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your + * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active. + * + * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all + * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM. + * + * The value below is only an example, not the default. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +/* X509 options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to + * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the + * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls + * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination + * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older + * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation + * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to + * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for + * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer + * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from + * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The + * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as + * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target + * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to + * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to + * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex + * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the + * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However, + * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * supplied at compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT + +/** + * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest + * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH + * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access + * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also + * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + +/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ +#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" +#define calloc tos_mmheap_calloc +#define free tos_mmheap_free diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/net_module_alt.c b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/net_module_alt.c index 758ea1da..fb2ad5dc 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/net_module_alt.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/net_module_alt.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif diff --git a/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/timing_alt.c b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/timing_alt.c index 4ee89a78..8ccc2219 100644 --- a/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/timing_alt.c +++ b/components/security/mbedtls/wrapper/src/timing_alt.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/devices/l610/Makefile similarity index 84% rename from kernel/Makefile rename to devices/l610/Makefile index db366f9c..0ae50fff 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/devices/l610/Makefile @@ -24,14 +24,12 @@ LOCALDIR = $(patsubst %/,%,$(subst $(realpath $(QTOP))/,,$(CUR_DIR))) #################################################################### -TREE_LIB_ENABLE=1 +TREE_LIB_ENABLE=0 lib= subdirs= -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/core/include -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/evtdrv/include -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/hal/include -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/pm/include +CFGFLAGS += -I$(QTOP)/net/at/include +CFGFLAGS += -I$(QTOP)/net/sal_module_wrapper include ${QTOP}/qmk/generic/Make.tpl diff --git a/devices/l610/l610.c b/devices/l610/l610.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c82e5a75 --- /dev/null +++ b/devices/l610/l610.c @@ -0,0 +1,645 @@ +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS + * available. + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. + * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please + * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. + * + * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, + * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause + * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are + * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your + * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well + * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included + * within TencentOS. + *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#include "l610.h" +#include "tos_at.h" +#include "tos_hal.h" +#include "sal_module_wrapper.h" + +#include + +static int l610_check_ready(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + int try = 0; + + while (++try) { + tos_sleep_ms(2000); + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT\r\n"); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int l610_echo_close(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + int try = 0; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "ATE0\r\n"); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return 0; + } + tos_sleep_ms(1000); + + } + + return -1; +} +static int l610_sim_card_check(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + int try = 0; + char echo_buffer[32]; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CPIN?\r\n"); + if (strstr(echo_buffer, "READY")) { + return 0; + } + tos_sleep_ms(2000); + } + + return -1; +} + +static int l610_signal_quality_check(void) +{ + int rssi, ber; + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[32], *str; + int try = 0; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CSQ\r\n"); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(echo.buffer, "+CSQ:"); + if (!str) { + return -1; + } + sscanf(str, "+CSQ:%d,%d", &rssi, &ber); + if (rssi != 99) { + return 0; + } + tos_sleep_ms(2000); + } + + return -1; +} +static int l610_gsm_network_check(void) +{ + int n, stat; + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[32], *str; + int try = 0; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CREG?\r\n"); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(echo.buffer, "+CREG:"); + if (!str) { + return -1; + } + sscanf(str, "+CREG:%d,%d", &n, &stat); + if (stat == 1) { + return 0; + } + tos_sleep_ms(2000); + } + return -1; +} + +static int l610_gprs_network_check(void) +{ + int n, stat; + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[32], *str; + int try = 0; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + while (try++ < 10) { + + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CGREG?\r\n"); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(echo.buffer, "+CGREG:"); + if (!str) { + return -1; + } + sscanf(str, "+CGREG:%d,%d", &n, &stat); + if (stat == 1) { + return 0; + } + + tos_sleep_ms(2000); + } + + return -1; +} + +static int l610_set_data_format(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+GTSET=\"IPRFMT\",0\r\n"); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int l610_check_apn(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + char buffer[64]; + char *str = NULL; + int apn_state; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, buffer, 64, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+MIPCALL?\r\n"); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(buffer, "+MIPCALL:"); + if (str == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + sscanf(str+strlen("+MIPCALL: "), "%d", &apn_state); + if (apn_state == 0) { + return 0; + } else if (apn_state == 1) { + return 1; + } else { + return -1; + } +} + +static int l610_check_close_apn(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + char buffer[64]; + char *str = NULL; + int apn_state; + + apn_state = l610_check_apn(); + + if (apn_state == -1) { + return -1; + } else if (apn_state == 0) { + return 0; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, buffer, 64, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+MIPCALL=0\r\n"); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(buffer, "+MIPCALL:"); + if (str == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + sscanf(str+strlen("+MIPCALL: "), "%d", &apn_state); + if (apn_state == 0) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +static int l610_set_apn(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+MIPCALL"); + tos_at_cmd_exec_until(&echo, 10000, "AT+MIPCALL=1,\"CMNET\"\r\n"); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return -1; + } + + if (l610_check_apn() == 1) { + return 0; + } else { + return -1; + } +} + +static int l610_init(void) +{ + printf("Init l610 ...\n" ); + + if (l610_check_ready() != 0) { + printf("wait module ready timeout, please check your module\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_echo_close() != 0) { + printf("echo close failed,please check your module\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_sim_card_check() != 0) { + printf("sim card check failed,please insert your card\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_signal_quality_check() != 0) { + printf("signal quality check status failed\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_gsm_network_check() != 0) { + printf("GSM network register status check fail\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_gprs_network_check() != 0) { + printf("GPRS network register status check fail\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_set_data_format() != 0) { + printf("set data format fail\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_check_close_apn() != 0) { + printf("close apn failed\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (l610_set_apn() != 0) { + printf("apn set FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + printf("Init l610 ok\n" ); + return 0; +} + +static int l610_connect(const char *ip, const char *port, sal_proto_t proto) +{ + int id; + at_echo_t echo; + + id = tos_at_channel_alloc(ip, port); + if (id == -1) { + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+MIPOPEN"); + tos_at_cmd_exec_until(&echo, 4000, "AT+MIPOPEN=%d,,\"%s\",%d,%d\r\n", + id + 1, ip, atoi(port), proto == TOS_SAL_PROTO_UDP ? 1 : 0); + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + tos_at_channel_free(id); + return -1; + } + + return id; +} + +static int l610_recv_timeout(int id, void *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout) +{ + return tos_at_channel_read_timed(id, buf, len, timeout); +} + +static int l610_recv(int id, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return l610_recv_timeout(id, buf, len, (uint32_t)4000); +} + +int l610_send(int id, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + if (!tos_at_channel_is_working(id)) { + return -1; + } + + if (tos_at_global_lock_pend() != 0) { + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, ">"); + + tos_at_cmd_exec_until(&echo, 1000, "AT+MIPSEND=%d,%d\r\n", id + 1, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+MIPSEND"); + tos_at_raw_data_send_until(&echo, 10000, (uint8_t *)buf, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + + return len; +} + +int l610_recvfrom_timeout(int id, void *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout) +{ + return tos_at_channel_read_timed(id, buf, len, timeout); +} + +int l610_recvfrom(int id, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return l610_recvfrom_timeout(id, buf, len, (uint32_t)4000); +} + +int l610_sendto(int id, char *ip, char *port, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + if (!tos_at_channel_is_working(id)) { + return -1; + } + + if (tos_at_global_lock_pend() != 0) { + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, ">"); + + tos_at_cmd_exec_until(&echo, 1000, "AT+MIPSEND=%d,%d\r\n", id + 1, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+MIPSEND"); + tos_at_raw_data_send_until(&echo, 10000, (uint8_t *)buf, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + + return len; +} + +static void l610_transparent_mode_exit(void) +{ + tos_at_cmd_exec(NULL, 500, "+++"); +} + +static int l610_close(int id) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + l610_transparent_mode_exit(); + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(NULL, 1000, "AT+MIPCLOSE=%d\r\n", id+1); + + tos_at_channel_free(id); + + return 0; +} + +static int l610_parse_domain(const char *host_name, char *host_ip, size_t host_ip_len) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[128]; + char *str = NULL; + int seg1, seg2, seg3, seg4; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 2000, "AT+MIPDNS=\"%s\"\r\n", host_name); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(echo_buffer, "+MIPDNS:"); + if (str == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + sscanf(str + strlen("+MIPDNS: ") + strlen(host_name) + 3, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &seg1, &seg2, &seg3, &seg4); + + snprintf(host_ip, host_ip_len, "%d.%d.%d.%d", seg1, seg2, seg3, seg4); + host_ip[host_ip_len - 1] = '\0'; + + printf("GOT IP: %s\n", host_ip); + + return 0; +} + +__STATIC__ uint8_t __ascii2hex(char in) { + if (('0' <= in) && (in <= '9')) { + return in - '0'; + } + if (('A' <= in) && (in <= 'F')) { + return in - 'A' + 10; + } + if (('a' <= in) && (in <= 'f')) { + return in - 'a' + 10; + } + return (uint8_t)-1; +} + +__STATIC__ void __asciistr2hex(char *in, uint8_t *out, int len) { + int i = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2) { + out[i / 2] = (__ascii2hex(in[i]) << 4) + __ascii2hex(in[i + 1]); + } +} + +__STATIC__ char ascii_stream[1024]; +__STATIC__ uint8_t hex_stream[512]; + +__STATIC__ void l610_tcp_incoming_data_process(void) +{ + uint8_t data; + int channel_id = 0, leaf_data_len = 0, read_len; + + /* + +MIPRTCP: ,, + */ + + while (1) { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { + return; + } + + if (data == ',') { + break; + } + channel_id = channel_id * 10 + (data - '0'); + } + channel_id--; + + while (1) { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { + return; + } + + if (data == ',') { + break; + } + leaf_data_len = leaf_data_len * 10 + (data - '0'); + } + + read_len = tos_at_uart_readline((uint8_t*)ascii_stream, sizeof(ascii_stream)); + + read_len -= 2; + ascii_stream[read_len] = '\0'; + __asciistr2hex(ascii_stream, hex_stream, read_len); + + tos_at_channel_write(channel_id, hex_stream, read_len/2); + + return; +} + +__STATIC__ void l610_udp_incoming_data_process(void) +{ + uint8_t data; + int channel_id = 0, leaf_data_len = 0, read_len; + + /* + +MIPRUDP: ,, ,, + */ + while (1) { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { + return; + } + + if (data == ',') { + break; + } + } + + while (1) { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { + return; + } + + if (data == ',') { + break; + } + } + + while (1) { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { + return; + } + + if (data == ',') { + break; + } + channel_id = channel_id * 10 + (data - '0'); + } + channel_id--; + + while (1) { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { + return; + } + + if (data == ',') { + break; + } + leaf_data_len = leaf_data_len * 10 + (data - '0'); + } + + read_len = tos_at_uart_readline((uint8_t*)ascii_stream, sizeof(ascii_stream)); + + read_len -= 2; + ascii_stream[read_len] = '\0'; + __asciistr2hex(ascii_stream, hex_stream, read_len); + + tos_at_channel_write(channel_id, hex_stream, read_len/2); + + return; +} + +at_event_t l610_at_event[] = { + { "+MIPRTCP: ", l610_tcp_incoming_data_process}, + { "+MIPRUDP: ", l610_udp_incoming_data_process}, +}; + +sal_module_t sal_module_l610 = { + .init = l610_init, + .connect = l610_connect, + .send = l610_send, + .recv_timeout = l610_recv_timeout, + .recv = l610_recv, + .sendto = l610_sendto, + .recvfrom = l610_recvfrom, + .recvfrom_timeout = l610_recvfrom_timeout, + .close = l610_close, + .parse_domain = l610_parse_domain, +}; + +int l610_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port) +{ + + if (tos_at_init(uart_port, l610_at_event, + sizeof(l610_at_event) / sizeof(l610_at_event[0])) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + if (tos_sal_module_register(&sal_module_l610) != 0) { + return -1; + } + if (tos_sal_module_init() != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +int l610_sal_deinit() +{ + int id = 0; + + for (id = 0; id < AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM; ++id) { + tos_sal_module_close(id); + } + + tos_sal_module_register_default(); + + tos_at_deinit(); + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_types.h b/devices/l610/l610.h similarity index 77% rename from kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_types.h rename to devices/l610/l610.h index e0ef3312..7d3fd560 100644 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_types.h +++ b/devices/l610/l610.h @@ -15,14 +15,13 @@ * within TencentOS. *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_TYPES_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_TYPES_H_ +#ifndef __L610_H__ +#define __L610_H__ -typedef int8_t evtdrv_bool_t; -typedef uint8_t evtdrv_task_id_t; // task id type -typedef uint8_t evtdrv_ttb_sz_t; // task table size type -typedef uint64_t evtdrv_tick_t; -typedef uint32_t evtdrv_time_t; +#include "tos_hal.h" -#endif +int l610_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); +int l610_sal_deinit(void); + +#endif /* __L610_H__ */ diff --git a/devices/ml302/Makefile b/devices/ml302/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ae50fff --- /dev/null +++ b/devices/ml302/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +################################################################### +#automatic detection QTOP and LOCALDIR +CUR_DIR := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(realpath $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST))))) +TRYQTOP := $(shell if [ -n "$$QTOP" ] ; then\ + echo $$QTOP;\ + else\ + cd $(CUR_DIR); while /usr/bin/test ! -d qmk ; do \ + dir=`cd ../;pwd`; \ + if [ "$$dir" = "/" ] ; then \ + echo Cannot find QTOP in $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)) 1>&2; \ + exit 1; \ + fi ; \ + cd $$dir; \ + done ; \ + pwd; \ + fi) +QTOP ?= $(realpath ${TRYQTOP}) + +ifeq ($(QTOP),) +$(error Please run this in a tree) +endif +LOCALDIR = $(patsubst %/,%,$(subst $(realpath $(QTOP))/,,$(CUR_DIR))) + +#################################################################### + + +TREE_LIB_ENABLE=0 +lib= +subdirs= + +CFGFLAGS += -I$(QTOP)/net/at/include +CFGFLAGS += -I$(QTOP)/net/sal_module_wrapper + +include ${QTOP}/qmk/generic/Make.tpl + + diff --git a/devices/ml302/ml302.c b/devices/ml302/ml302.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f953787c --- /dev/null +++ b/devices/ml302/ml302.c @@ -0,0 +1,517 @@ +#include "tos_at.h" +#include "ml302.h" +#include "sal_module_wrapper.h" +#include "main.h" +#include +#include +#include + +static int ml302_wait_ok(void) +{ + + int try = 0; + + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + + while (try++ < 10) + { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT\r\n"); + + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int ml302_echo_close(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "ATE0\r\n"); + + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +static int ml302_pin_ready(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+CPIN: READY"); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CPIN?\r\n"); + + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +static int ml302_gsm_network_check(void) +{ + int stat; + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[32], *str; + + int try = 0; + + while (try++ < 10) + { + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CFUN?\r\n"); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(echo.buffer, "+CFUN:"); + + if (!str) + { + return -1; + } + + sscanf(str, "+CFUN:%d", &stat); + + if (stat == 1) + { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int ml302_signal_quality_check(void) +{ + int rssi, ber; + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[32], *str; + + int try = 0; + + while (try++ < 10) + { + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CSQ\r\n"); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(echo.buffer, "+CSQ:"); + + if (!str) + { + return -1; + } + + sscanf(str, "+CSQ:%d,%d", &rssi, &ber); + + if (rssi != 99) + { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int ml302_set_gprs_apn(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+CGDCONT=1,\"IP\",\"CMIOT\"\r\n"); + + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return 0; + } + + return -1 ; +} + +static int ml302_activate(void) +{ + int n, stat; + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[32], *str; + + int try = 0; + + while (try++ < 10) + { + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 6000, "AT+CGACT=1,1\r\n"); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return -1; + } + + str = strstr(echo.buffer, "+CGACT:"); + + if (!str) + { + return -1; + } + + sscanf(str, "+CGACT:%d,%d", &n, &stat); + + if (stat == 1) + { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int ml302_connect(const char *ip, const char *port, sal_proto_t proto) +{ + int id; + at_echo_t echo; + char except_str[16]; + + id = tos_at_channel_alloc(ip, port); + + if (id == -1) + { + return -1; + } + + sprintf(except_str, "%d,CONNECT OK", id); + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, except_str); + tos_at_cmd_exec_until(&echo, 6000, "AT+MIPOPEN=%d,\"%s\",\"%s\",%d\r\n", + id, proto == TOS_SAL_PROTO_UDP ? "UDP" : "TCP", ip, atoi(port)); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT ) + { + tos_at_channel_free(id); + return -1; + } + + return id; +} + +static int ml302_recv_timeout(int id, void *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout) +{ + return tos_at_channel_read_timed(id, buf, len, timeout); +} + +static int ml302_recv(int id, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return ml302_recv_timeout(id, buf, len, (uint32_t)4000); +} + +int ml302_recvfrom_timeout(int id, void *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout) +{ + return tos_at_channel_read_timed(id, buf, len, timeout); +} + +int ml302_recvfrom(int id, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + return ml302_recvfrom_timeout(id, buf, len, (uint32_t)4000); +} + +int ml302_sendto(int id, char *ip, char *port, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + if (tos_at_global_lock_pend() != 0) + { + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, ">"); + + tos_at_cmd_exec_until(&echo, 1000, "AT+MIPSEND=%d,%d\r\n", id, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) + { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "SEND OK"); + tos_at_raw_data_send(&echo, 1000, (uint8_t *)buf, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) + { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + + return len; +} + + +int ml302_send(int id, const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + if (tos_at_global_lock_pend() != 0) + { + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, ">"); + + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, + "AT+MIPSEND=%d,%d\r\n", + id, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK && echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) + { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "SEND OK"); + tos_at_raw_data_send(&echo, 1000, (uint8_t *)buf, len); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK && echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) + { + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return -1; + } + + tos_at_global_lock_post(); + return 0 ; +} + + +static void ml302_transparent_mode_exit(void) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(NULL, 500, "+++"); +} + + +static int ml302_close(int id) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + + ml302_transparent_mode_exit(); + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, "AT+MIPCLOSE=%d\r\n", id); + + tos_at_channel_free(id); + + return 0; +} + + +static int ml302_parse_domain(const char *host_name, char *host_ip, size_t host_ip_len) +{ + char *str; + at_echo_t echo; + char echo_buffer[64]; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, echo_buffer, sizeof(echo_buffer), NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 2000, "AT+MDNSGIP=\"%s\"\r\n", host_name); + + if (echo.status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) + { + return -1; + } + + /* + +MDNSGIP: 0,"www.baidu.com","39.156.66.14","39.156.66.18" + */ + + int seg1, seg2, seg3, seg4; + str = strstr(echo.buffer, "+MDNSGIP: 0,"); + + if (!str) + { + return -1; + } + + str += strlen("+MDNSGIP: 0,\"") + strlen(host_name) + 3; + sscanf(str, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &seg1, &seg2, &seg3, &seg4); + snprintf(host_ip, host_ip_len, "%d.%d.%d.%d", seg1, seg2, seg3, seg4); + host_ip[host_ip_len - 1] = '\0'; + + printf("GOT IP: %s\n", host_ip); + + return 0; +} + +static int ml302_init(void) +{ + printf("Init ML302 ...\n" ); + + if (ml302_wait_ok() != 0) + { + printf("ml302 start FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (ml302_echo_close() != 0) + { + printf("ml302 echo close FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (ml302_pin_ready() != 0) + { + printf("ml302 pin not ready\n"); + return -1; + } + + if(ml302_gsm_network_check() != 0) + { + printf("ml302 GSM network register status check fail\n"); + return -1 ; + } + + if (ml302_signal_quality_check() != 0) + { + printf("ml302 signal quality check status failed\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (ml302_set_gprs_apn() != 0) + { + printf("ml302 set gprs_apn failed\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (ml302_activate()) + { + printf("ml302 activate FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + printf("Init ML302 Done\n" ); + return 0; +} + +__STATIC__ void ml302_incoming_data_process(void) +{ + uint8_t data; + int channel_id = 0, data_len = 0, read_len; + uint8_t buffer[128]; + + /* + +MIPURC: "recv",, + + */ + + while (1) + { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) + { + return; + } + + if (data == ',') + { + break; + } + + channel_id = channel_id * 10 + (data - '0'); + } + + while (1) + { + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) + { + return; + } + + if (data == '\r') + { + break; + } + + data_len = data_len * 10 + (data - '0'); + } + + if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) + { + return; + } + + do + { +#define MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b)) + read_len = MIN(data_len, sizeof(buffer)); + + if (tos_at_uart_read(buffer, read_len) != read_len) + { + return; + } + + if (tos_at_channel_write(channel_id, buffer, read_len) <= 0) + { + return; + } + + data_len -= read_len; + } + while (data_len > 0); + + return; +} + +at_event_t ml302_at_event[] = +{ + { "+MIPURC: \"recv\",", ml302_incoming_data_process }, +}; + + +sal_module_t sal_module_ml302 = +{ + .init = ml302_init, + .connect = ml302_connect, + .send = ml302_send, + .recv = ml302_recv, + .recv_timeout = ml302_recv_timeout, + .sendto = ml302_sendto, + .recvfrom = ml302_recvfrom, + .recvfrom_timeout = ml302_recvfrom_timeout, + .close = ml302_close, + .parse_domain = ml302_parse_domain, +}; + +int ml302_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port) +{ + if (tos_at_init(uart_port, ml302_at_event, + sizeof(ml302_at_event) / sizeof(ml302_at_event[0])) != 0) + { + return -1; + } + + if (tos_sal_module_register(&sal_module_ml302) != 0) + { + return -1; + } + + if (tos_sal_module_init() != 0) + { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv.h b/devices/ml302/ml302.h similarity index 74% rename from kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv.h rename to devices/ml302/ml302.h index 772a23bd..0178d991 100644 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv.h +++ b/devices/ml302/ml302.h @@ -15,19 +15,11 @@ * within TencentOS. *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_H_ +#ifndef __ML302_H_ +#define __ML302_H_ -#include "tos_k.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_err.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_types.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_event.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_msg.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_timer.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_task.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_tick.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_sys.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv_global.h" +#include "tos_hal.h" -#endif +int ml302_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); +#endif /* __ML302_H_ */ diff --git a/devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.c b/devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85eef1e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.c @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +#include "RHF76.h" +#include "tos_hal.h" + +static const char RHF76_LOWPOWER_SET[] = { + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,'A','T','+','L','O','W','P','O','W','E','R','=','a','u','t','o','o','f','f','\r','\n' +}; + +static int rhf76_exit_low_power(void) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+LOWPOWER: AUTOOFF"); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, RHF76_LOWPOWER_SET); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_reset(void) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+RESET: OK"); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, RHF76_ATCMD_RESET); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_set_id(lora_id_type_t id_type, char *id) +{ + char cmd[64] = {0}; + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + switch(id_type) { + case LORA_ID_TYPE_DEVADDR: + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_ID_DEVADDR, id); + break; + case LORA_ID_TYPE_DEVEUI: + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_ID_DEVEUI, id); + break; + case LORA_ID_TYPE_APPEUI: + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_ID_DEVAPPEUI, id); + break; + default: + return -1; + } + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+ID: "); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_set_key(lora_key_type_t key_type, char *key) +{ + char cmd[64] = {0}; + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + switch (key_type) { + case LORA_KEY_TYPE_APPKEY: + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_KEY_TYPE_APPKEY, key); + break; + case LORA_KEY_TYPE_APPSKEY: + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_KEY_TYPE_APPSKEY, key); + break; + case LORA_KEY_TYPE_NWKSKEY: + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_KEY_TYPE_NWKSKEY, key); + break; + default: + return -1; + } + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+KEY:"); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_set_class(lora_class_t lora_class) +{ + char *cmd = NULL, *reply = NULL; + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + switch (lora_class) { + case LORA_CLASS_A: + cmd = RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CLASS_A; + reply = RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_CLASS_A; + break; + case LORA_CLASS_B: + cmd = RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CLASS_B; + reply = RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_CLASS_B; + break; + case LORA_CLASS_C: + cmd = RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CLASS_C; + reply = RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_CLASS_C; + break; + default: + return -1; + } + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, reply); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 1000, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_set_band(void) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_BAND_CN470); + + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, RHF76_ATCMD_SET_BAND_CN470); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_set_chanel(void) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+CH: NUM"); + + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CHANNEL); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +int rhf76_set_repeat(uint8_t num) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + char cmd[14] = {0}; + char expect[10] = {'\0'}; + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_SET_REPT, num); + snprintf(expect, sizeof(expect), "+REPT: %d", num); + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, expect); + + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +int rhf76_set_data_rate(uint8_t num) +{ + if(num>15) return -1; // num should between [0, 15] + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + char cmd[14] = {0}; + char expect[10] = {'\0'}; + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_SET_DATA_RATE, num); + snprintf(expect, sizeof(expect), " DR%d", num); + + tos_at_echo_fuzzy_matching_create(&echo, NULL, 0, expect); + + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +int rhf76_set_delay(char *param) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + char cmd[20] = {0}; + char expect[20] = {'\0'}; + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_SET_DELAY, param); + snprintf(expect, sizeof(expect), "+DELAY %s", param); + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, expect); + + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, cmd); + if(strstr(param,"?")!=NULL) return 0; + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +int rhf76_at_cmd_exe(char *cmd) +{ + at_echo_t echo; + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, NULL); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 8000, cmd); + return 0; +} + +static int rhf76_set_adr_off(void) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+ADR: OFF"); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 3000, RHF76_ATCMD_SET_ADR_OFF); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK|| echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_set_mode(lora_mode_t mode) +{ + char *cmd = NULL, *reply = NULL; + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + switch (mode) { + case LORA_MODE_LWOTAA: + cmd = RHF76_ATCMD_SET_MODE_LWOTAA; + reply = RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_MODE_LWOTAA; + break; + case LORA_MODE_LWABP: + cmd = RHF76_ATCMD_SET_MODE_LWABP; + reply = RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_MODE_LWABP; + break; + default: + return -1; + } + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, reply); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 2500, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +int rhf76_join_otaa(const char *deveui, const char *appkey) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + + if (rhf76_set_mode(LORA_MODE_LWOTAA) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set mode FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_id(LORA_ID_TYPE_DEVEUI, (char *)deveui) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set deveui FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_key(LORA_KEY_TYPE_APPKEY, (char *)appkey) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set appkey FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + tos_stopwatch_delay_ms(2000); + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+JOIN: Network joined"); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 14000, RHF76_ATCMD_JOIN); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +int rhf76_join_abp(const char *deveui, const char *devaddr, const char *nwkskey, const char *appskey) +{ + int try = 0; + at_echo_t echo; + + if (rhf76_set_mode(LORA_MODE_LWABP) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set mode FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_id(LORA_ID_TYPE_DEVEUI, (char *)deveui) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set deveui FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_id(LORA_ID_TYPE_DEVADDR, (char *)devaddr) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set devaddr FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_key(LORA_KEY_TYPE_NWKSKEY, (char *)nwkskey) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set nwkskey FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_key(LORA_KEY_TYPE_APPSKEY, (char *)appskey) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set appskey FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + tos_stopwatch_delay_ms(2000); + + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+JOIN: Network joined"); + while (try++ < 10) { + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 14000, RHF76_ATCMD_JOIN); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_init(void) +{ + printf("Init RHF76 LoRa ...\n" ); + + tos_stopwatch_delay_ms(1000); + if (rhf76_exit_low_power() != 0) { + printf("rhf76 reset FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_reset() != 0) { + printf("rhf76 reset FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_class(LORA_CLASS_A) != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set class FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_band() != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set band FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_chanel() != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set chanel FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (rhf76_set_adr_off() != 0) { + printf("rhf76 set adr FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + + if(rhf76_set_repeat(1)!=0){ + printf("rhf76 set repeat times for unconfirmed message FAILED\n"); + return -1; + } + tos_stopwatch_delay_ms(2000); + printf("Init RHF76 LoRa done\n"); + + /*----------------------------------------------------*/ + /*--- the following code is only used for debuging ---*/ + /*----------------------------------------------------*/ + + /*<-- query/set UART Timeout (~TX timeout) -->*/ + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+UART=TIMEOUT, 300\r\n"); + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+UART=TIMEOUT\r\n"); + + /*<-- query current band config -->*/ + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+DR=SCHEME\r\n"); + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+LW=CDR\r\n"); + + /*<-- query current data rate and the corresponding max payload size -->*/ + rhf76_set_data_rate(0); + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("at+dr=0\r\n"); + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+DR\r\n"); + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+LW=LEN\r\n"); + + /*<-- query RX1\RX2\JRX1\JRX2 delay config -->*/ + // rhf76_set_delay("?"); + + /*<-- query RF config -->*/ + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+MODE=TEST\r\n"); + // rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+TEST=?\r\n"); + + return 0; +} + +__STATIC__ uint8_t __ascii2hex(char in) { + if (('0' <= in) && (in <= '9')) { + return in - '0'; + } + if (('A' <= in) && (in <= 'F')) { + return in - 'A' + 10; + } + if (('a' <= in) && (in <= 'f')) { + return in - 'a' + 10; + } + return (uint8_t)-1; +} + +__STATIC__ void __asciistr2hex(char *in, uint8_t *out, int len) { + int i = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2) { + out[i / 2] = (__ascii2hex(in[i]) << 4) + __ascii2hex(in[i + 1]); + } +} + +__STATIC__ char incoming_data_buffer[128]; +__STATIC__ uint8_t hex_stream[128]; + +__STATIC__ void rhf76_incoming_data_process(void) +{ + int ret; + uint8_t data; + + /* + +CMSG: PORT: 8; RX: "12345678" + RX: prefix + "12345678": data content + */ + + while (1) { + ret = tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1); + if (data == '"') { + break; + } + } + + ret = 0; + + memset(incoming_data_buffer, 0x00, sizeof(incoming_data_buffer)); + + while (1) { + tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1); + if (data == '"') { + break; + } + if(ret<128) + { + incoming_data_buffer[ret++] = data; + } + else + { + printf(" ERR:incomming data is big ,please give more space for incoming_data_buffer\n"); + } + + } + + printf("rhf76_incoming_data_process %d: %s\n", ret, incoming_data_buffer); + + __asciistr2hex(incoming_data_buffer, hex_stream, strlen(incoming_data_buffer)); + + extern lora_module_t lora_module_rhf76; + if (lora_module_rhf76.recv_callback) { + lora_module_rhf76.recv_callback(hex_stream, strlen(incoming_data_buffer) / 2); + } +} + +at_event_t rhf76_at_event[] = { + { "+CMSGHEX: PORT:", rhf76_incoming_data_process }, + { "+MSGHEX: PORT:", rhf76_incoming_data_process } +}; + +static char __num2hex(uint8_t num) +{ + if (num <= 0x9) { + return num + '0'; + } + + if ((0xA <= num) && (num <= 0xF)) { + return num - 0xA + 'A'; + } + + return (char)-1; +} + +static void __hex2str(uint8_t *in, char *out, int len) +{ + int i = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + out[i * 2] = __num2hex(in[i] >> 4); + out[i * 2 + 1] = __num2hex(in[i] & 0x0F); + } + out[2 * len] = '\0'; +} + +static int rhf76_send(const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + char *str_buf = NULL; + + str_buf = tos_mmheap_calloc(2 * len + 1, sizeof(char)); + if (!str_buf) { + return -1; + } + __hex2str((uint8_t *)buf, str_buf, len); + + char cmd[100] = {0}; + at_echo_t echo; + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SEND_CMSGHEX, str_buf); + cmd[sizeof(cmd) - 1] = '\0'; + tos_mmheap_free(str_buf); + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+CMSGHEX: ACK Received"); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 6000, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return len; + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_send_unconfirmed(const void *buf, size_t len) +{ + char *str_buf = NULL; + at_echo_t echo; + + str_buf = tos_mmheap_calloc(2 * len + 1, sizeof(char)); + if (!str_buf) { + return -1; + } + __hex2str((uint8_t *)buf, str_buf, len); + + char cmd[100] = {0}; + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SEND_MSGHEX, str_buf); + cmd[sizeof(cmd) - 1] = '\0'; + tos_mmheap_free(str_buf); + tos_at_echo_create(&echo, NULL, 0, "+MSGHEX: Done"); + tos_at_cmd_exec(&echo, 6000, cmd); + if (echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK || echo.status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { + return len; + } + return -1; +} + +static int rhf76_close(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +lora_module_t lora_module_rhf76 = { + .init = rhf76_init, + .join_otaa = rhf76_join_otaa, + .join_abp = rhf76_join_abp, + .send = rhf76_send, + .send_unconfirmed = rhf76_send_unconfirmed, + .close = rhf76_close, + .recv_callback = K_NULL, +}; + +int rhf76_lora_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port) +{ + if (tos_at_init(uart_port, rhf76_at_event, + sizeof(rhf76_at_event) / sizeof(rhf76_at_event[0])) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + tos_stopwatch_delay_ms(1000); + + if (tos_lora_module_register(&lora_module_rhf76) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + if (tos_lora_module_init() != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.h b/devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f4d88be5 --- /dev/null +++ b/devices/rhf76_lora/RHF76.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS + * available. + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. + * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please + * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. + * + * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, + * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause + * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are + * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your + * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well + * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included + * within TencentOS. + *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#ifndef __RHF76_H__ +#define __RHF76_H__ + +#include +#include +#include "usart.h" +#include "tos_at.h" +#include "lora_module_wrapper.h" + +#define UART_RXBUF_MAXSIZE 256 + +typedef enum lora_class { + LORA_CLASS_A, + LORA_CLASS_B, + LORA_CLASS_C, +} lora_class_t; + +typedef enum lora_mode { + LORA_MODE_LWOTAA, + LORA_MODE_LWABP, +} lora_mode_t; + +typedef enum lora_id_type { + LORA_ID_TYPE_DEVADDR, + LORA_ID_TYPE_DEVEUI, + LORA_ID_TYPE_APPEUI, +} lora_id_type_t; + +typedef enum lora_key_type { + LORA_KEY_TYPE_APPKEY, + LORA_KEY_TYPE_APPSKEY, + LORA_KEY_TYPE_NWKSKEY, +} lora_key_type_t; + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CLASS_A "AT+CLASS=A\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CLASS_B "AT+CLASS=B\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CLASS_C "AT+CLASS=C\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_CLASS_A "+CLASS: A" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_CLASS_B "+CLASS: B" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_CLASS_C "+CLASS: C" + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_RESET "AT+RESET\r\n" + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_ID_DEVADDR "AT+ID=\"devaddr\",\"%s\"\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_ID_DEVEUI "AT+ID=\"deveui\",\"%s\"\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_ID_DEVAPPEUI "AT+ID=\"appeui\",\"%s\"\r\n" + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_KEY_TYPE_APPKEY "AT+KEY=\"appkey\",%s\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_KEY_TYPE_APPSKEY "AT+KEY=\"appskey\",%s\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SET_KEY_TYPE_NWKSKEY "AT+KEY=\"nwkskey\",%s\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SEND_CMSGHEX "AT+CMSGHEX=\"%s\"\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_FMT_SEND_MSGHEX "AT+MSGHEX=\"%s\"\r\n" + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_REPT "AT+REPT=%d\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_DELAY "AT+DELAY=%s\r\n" + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_BAND_CN470 "AT+DR=CN470\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_BAND_CN470 "+DR: CN470" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_DATA_RATE "AT+DR=%d\r\n" + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_CHANNEL "at+ch=num,80-87\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_ADR_OFF "at+adr=off\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_JOIN "AT+join\r\n" + +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_MODE_LWOTAA "AT+MODE=LWOTAA\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_SET_MODE_LWABP "AT+MODE=LWABP\r\n" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_MODE_LWOTAA "+MODE: LWOTAA" +#define RHF76_ATCMD_REPLY_MODE_LWABP "+MODE: LWABP" + +int rhf76_lora_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); + +/** + * @brief set the delay for RX1,RX2,JRX1,JRX2 OR query current delay config + * @note Examples: + * to set the delay(ms): + * rhf76_set_delay("RX1,2000"); + * + * to query current delay config: + * rhf76_set_delay("?"); + * + * @param params operation string + * + * @retval int Status + */ +int rhf76_set_delay(char *param); + +/** + * @brief set repeat times when sending unconfirmed message + * @note it is equal to sending + * AT+REPT=2 + * +REPT: 2 + * + * @param num repeat times + * + * @retval int Status + */ +int rhf76_set_repeat(uint8_t num); + + +/** + * @brief set date rate, which would affect the maximum payload size + * @note this function is for DEBUG purpose only, it allows user to execute + * AT+ commands by passing the AT+ command to the function as an arg- + * ument. + * For example,users can query the RF configuration by following code: + * + * rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+MODE=TEST\r\n"); + * rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+TEST=?\r\n"); + * + * @param num data rate + * + * @retval int Status + */ +int rhf76_set_data_rate(uint8_t num); + + +/** + * @brief execute AT+ commands + * @note this function is for DEBUG purpose only, it allows user to execute + * AT+ commands by passing the AT+ command to the function as an arg- + * ument. + * For example,users can query the RF configuration by following code: + * + * rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+MODE=TEST\r\n"); + * rhf76_at_cmd_exe("AT+TEST=?\r\n"); + * + * @param cmd AT+ commands + * + * @retval int Status + */ +int rhf76_at_cmd_exe(char *cmd); + +#endif /* __RHF76_H__ */ + diff --git a/doc/qmk/01. Intro_Qmk_A_Makefile_Framework_For_TencentOS.md b/doc/qmk/01. Intro_Qmk_A_Makefile_Framework_For_TencentOS.md deleted file mode 100644 index fb83c9bf..00000000 --- a/doc/qmk/01. Intro_Qmk_A_Makefile_Framework_For_TencentOS.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,344 +0,0 @@ -# Qmk（Quick Makefile） - -## 1. ä»‹ç» - -### Qmk 是什么 - -[qmk](../../qmk)， 是TencentOS的一个Makefile编译框架。 - -### Qmk 的特点 -- 使用简å•ï¼Œä»»æ„目录å‡å¯make，支æŒå¸®åŠ©`make help`ï¼› -- 支æŒMakefile调试，任何 目录`make BP= dm`打å°Makefile 的所有å˜é‡å€¼ã€‚ -- 支æŒç¼–译调试, `make V=1`，`Make V=2`。 -- 支æŒå®æ‰©å±•è°ƒè¯•ã€‚`make E=1`。 -- 目录分离。æºç ï¼Œç¼–译产物目录分离。 -- 入门简å•ï¼Œæ–°æºç ç›®å½• Makefile æ‹·è´å³å¯ä½¿ç”¨ï¼› -- 多架构支æŒã€‚支æŒå¤šç§ MCU ARCHã€å¤šç§CC工具链； -- 模æ¿åŒ–。多ç§åœºæ™¯çš„Makefileæ‹·è´å³ç”¨; -- é…置化。board-packæä¾›mcu/arch/bsp等编译时å‚æ•°ã€ç›®å½•çš„é…置； -- 耦åˆä½Žã€‚è·Ÿæºç ç›®å½•ç»“构的耦åˆä½Žï¼› -- å­ç›®å½•å•ç‹¬make支æŒã€‚支æŒå­ç›®å½•ç¼–译.aé™æ€åº“ï¼› - - -## TencentOSçš„make编译 -### TencentOS的整体make -```shell -# 进入board目录支æŒqmkçš„board -cd board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/GCC-QMK - -# 本目录编译 -make - -# 查看帮助 -make help -``` -TencentOS的整体编译过程是： -- 先编译é™æ€åº“ - -3. 从`board/`下的顶级Makefile开始，该Makefile 确定了BP 。 -3. Makefile 通过 `make -C BP=`访问å„个目录，BP用于选择`qmk/board-pack`下的一个`bp.xxx`作为编译å‚数集åˆã€‚ -3. `make -C BP=` 进入 `arch/` `kernel/` `platform/vendor_bsp`等需è¦çš„目录。 -3. make进入å„个目录，根æ®`BP`，生æˆå¯¹åº”çš„`.a`é™æ€åº“，如访问 `arch/`, 生æˆ`libarch.a`，具备编译哪些arch/下的æºç æ–‡ä»¶ç”±`board-pack`确定。 -3. make递归访问其他æºç ç›®å½•ï¼Œç›®å½•çš„`节点Makefile`通过BP渲染`include Make.tpl`模æ¿ç”Ÿæˆã€‚ -3. ä¾æ®ç›®å½•çš„`节点Makefile`，生æˆ`libxxx.a` 。 -3. å„个æºç ç›®å½•èŠ‚点，ä¾æ¬¡ç”Ÿæˆ`.a`é™æ€åº“文件，å‡ä½äºŽ `build/`目录下 。 - -- å†é“¾æŽ¥ -3. make 回到 `board/`的顶级Makefile。 -3. 需è¦é“¾æŽ¥ç”Ÿæˆ`elf`的目录通过`include Make.exec` 。 -3. 编译本目录åŠå…¶å­ç›®å½•ä¸‹æ‰€æœ‰æºæ–‡ä»¶ï¼Œç”Ÿæˆ`.o`文件。 -3. æ ¹æ® `LD_A_FILES`å’Œ`LD_L_LISTS`进行链接。 -3. 整体链接完æˆï¼Œç”Ÿæˆæ–‡ä»¶ä½äºŽ`build/`目录下。 - -### TecentOSçš„å­ç›®å½•make -```shell -# 进入æŸåŒ…å«Makefile的目录 -cd kernel/ - -# 本目录编译，使用Linux_Posix作为Board-Pack -make BP=Linux_Posix -# 本目录编译，使用TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus作为Board-Pack -make BP=TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus - -# 查看帮助 -make help -``` -å•ç›®å½•çš„编译过程是： -3. make访问本目录，读å–本目录Makefile，根æ®å‘½ä»¤è¡Œ`make BP=xxx`çš„BP，选择`mk/board-pack`。 -3. æ ¹æ®BP选择的构建å‚数。 -3. 使用ar进行打包，.a 文件放在`build/`目录。 -3. 构建完æˆã€‚ - -## Qmk 的概念 -### generic-Makefile(mk/generic) -`qmk/generic/Make.tpl` 属于这类。 -åˆç§°å…¨å±€é€šç”¨åž‹Makefile模æ¿ã€‚ä½äºŽ `mk/generic)`。 - -è¦æ±‚对所有boardã€æ‰€æœ‰gcc-toolchainã€cpuã€archã€bsp适用。 -所以一般åªåŒ…å«é€šç”¨çš„规则。 - -| 模æ¿æ–‡ä»¶ |说明| -| :-------- |:------| -|[Make.tpl](../../qmk/generic/Make.tpl) | 一个目录或者多个目录编译æˆ`.a`çš„é€šç”¨æ¨¡æ¿ | -|[Make.exec](../../qmk/generic/Make.exec) | 多个`.a`é“¾æŽ¥æˆ `elf`，生æˆ`.bin`çš„é€šç”¨æ¨¡æ¿ | -|[Make.lib](../../qmk/generic/Make.lib) | 处ç†å¤šä¸ª`.o`生æˆ`.a`的通用模æ¿| -|[Make.subdirs](../../qmk/generic/Make.subdirs) | å¤„ç† make递归进入多个subdir make的通用模æ¿| -|[Make.depend](../../qmk/generic/Make.depend) | å¤„ç† ä¸€ä¸ª`.o`ä¾èµ–多个`.h`,çš„è§„åˆ™æ¨¡æ¿ | -|[Make.debug](../../qmk/generic/Make.debug) | 用于调试Makefile的模æ¿| -|[Make.tools](../../qmk/generic/Make.debug) | 用于å±è”½åœ¨å¤šç§OS使用qmk，sedã€ç­‰åŸºç¡€shell/cli命令路径ä¸åŒ | - - -### boardpack-Makefile(mk/board-pack) -`board-pack/bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus` 属于这类。 - -åˆç§°æ¿çº§Makefile模æ¿ã€‚是一个硬件产å“工程开å‘过程中在编译时的å‚数抽象文件。 - -ä½äºŽmk/board-pack çš„ bp.${BP}，属于boardé…置型Makefile，需è¦ç¡®å®šå·¥å…·é“¾ï¼Œmcu，archã€boardã€bsp等方é¢çš„编译时å‚数集åˆã€‚ -嵌入å¼åº”用开å‘工程师主è¦ä¿®æ”¹è¿™éƒ¨åˆ†Makefile。 - - -### srctree-Makefile -`kernel/Makefile` `arch/Makefile` 都属于这类。 -åˆç§°èŠ‚点Makefile，ä½äºŽå„个æºç ç›®å½•çš„ Makefile。多个board都适用的Makefile，属于æºç èŠ‚点é…置型Makefile。 - - - -ä¸èƒ½åŒ…å«arch，board级别的编译å‚数。 -### link-Makefile -`board/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus/GCC-QMK/app_tencent_os_mqtt/Makefile` 属于这类。 - - - -## Qmk 的使用 - -### 当å‰ç›®å½•æ‰€æœ‰.c，编译æˆä¸€ä¸ª.a库 -`这类Makefile编写å‚考 osal/posix/Makefile`。 -å¤åˆ¶ç²˜è´´ 以下 Makefile 内容到æºç ç›®å½• Makefile。 -无需修改。 -> ->3. 注æ„`TREE_LIB_ENABLE=0`，,ccå’Œar时，åªæœç´¢å½“å‰ç›®å½•æºç ï¼Œä¸åŒ…å«å­ç›®å½•ï¼› -> ->3. 注æ„`lib=`，表示链接åŽçš„库å使用目录åï¼› ->3. 有特别的CFLAG请根æ®æƒ…况é…ç½® `CFGFLAGS`。 ->3. 注æ„æ¿çº§çš„编译å‚数请é…置到pack-Makefile，å¦åˆ™ä¼šå¯¼è‡´å…¶ä»–pack编译报错. - - -```Makefile -################################################################### -#automatic detection QTOP and LOCALDIR -CUR_DIR := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(realpath $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST))))) -TRYQTOP := $(shell if [ -n "$$QTOP" ] ; then\ - echo $$QTOP;\ - else\ - cd $(CUR_DIR); while /usr/bin/test ! -d qmk ; do \ - dir=`cd ../;pwd`; \ - if [ "$$dir" = "/" ] ; then \ - echo Cannot find QTOP in $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)) 1>&2; \ - exit 1; \ - fi ; \ - cd $$dir; \ - done ; \ - pwd; \ - fi) -QTOP ?= $(realpath ${TRYQTOP}) - -ifeq ($(QTOP),) -$(error Please run this in a tree) -endif -LOCALDIR = $(patsubst %/,%,$(subst $(realpath $(QTOP))/,,$(CUR_DIR))) - -#################################################################### - - -TREE_LIB_ENABLE=0 -lib= -subdirs= - -CFGFLAGS += -I$(CUR_DIR)/include - -include ${QTOP}/qmk/generic/Make.tpl - -``` - -### æŸç›®å½•åŠå…¶å­ç›®å½•çš„所有.c，编译æˆä¸€ä¸ª.a库 -`这类Makefile编写å‚考 kernel/Makefile`。 -å¤åˆ¶ç²˜è´´ 以下 Makefile 内容到æºç ç›®å½• Makefile。 -无需修改。 -有特别的CFLAG请根æ®æƒ…况é…ç½® `CFGFLAGS`。 -> ->3. 注æ„`TREE_LIB_ENABLE=1`,ccå’Œar时，会递归æœç´¢æºç ï¼ŒåŒ…å«å½“å‰ç›®å½•åŠå…¶å­ç›®å½•ã€‚ -> ->3. 注æ„`lib=`，表示链接åŽçš„库å使用目录åï¼› ->3. 注æ„æ¿çº§çš„编译å‚数请é…置到pack-Makefile，å¦åˆ™ä¼šå¯¼è‡´å…¶ä»–pack编译报错. -> - - -```Makefile -################################################################### -#automatic detection QTOP and LOCALDIR -CUR_DIR := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(realpath $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST))))) -TRYQTOP := $(shell if [ -n "$$QTOP" ] ; then\ - echo $$QTOP;\ - else\ - cd $(CUR_DIR); while /usr/bin/test ! -d qmk ; do \ - dir=`cd ../;pwd`; \ - if [ "$$dir" = "/" ] ; then \ - echo Cannot find QTOP in $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)) 1>&2; \ - exit 1; \ - fi ; \ - cd $$dir; \ - done ; \ - pwd; \ - fi) -QTOP ?= $(realpath ${TRYQTOP}) - -ifeq ($(QTOP),) -$(error Please run this in a tree) -endif -LOCALDIR = $(patsubst %/,%,$(subst $(realpath $(QTOP))/,,$(CUR_DIR))) - -#################################################################### - - -TREE_LIB_ENABLE=1 -lib= -subdirs= - -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/core/include -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/evtdrv/include -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/hal/include -CFGFLAGS += -I${QTOP}/kernel/pm/include - -include ${QTOP}/qmk/generic/Make.tpl -``` - - -### 当å‰ç›®å½•è¿›å…¥æ‰€æœ‰å­ç›®å½•ã€è¿›å…¥æŒ‡å®šç›®å½•ç¼–译 -`这类Makefile编写å‚考 platform/Makefile`。 -å¤åˆ¶ç²˜è´´ 以下 Makefile 内容到æºç ç›®å½• Makefile。 -无需修改。 -有特别的CFLAG请根æ®æƒ…况é…ç½® `CFGFLAGS`。 ->注æ„` subdirs=`为空，默认会进入所有å­ç›®å½•ã€‚ -> 如果需è¦æŒ‡å®šå­ç›®å½•è¯·ç»™`subdirs`赋值。 -> - -```Makefile -################################################################### -#automatic detection QTOP and LOCALDIR -CUR_DIR := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(realpath $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST))))) -TRYQTOP := $(shell if [ -n "$$QTOP" ] ; then\ - echo $$QTOP;\ - else\ - cd $(CUR_DIR); while /usr/bin/test ! -e qmk ; do \ - dir=`cd ../;pwd`; \ - if [ "$$dir" = "/" ] ; then \ - echo Cannot find QTOP in $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)) 1>&2; \ - exit 1; \ - fi ; \ - cd $$dir; \ - done ; \ - pwd; \ - fi) -QTOP ?= $(realpath ${TRYQTOP}) - -ifeq ($(QTOP),) -$(error Please run this in a tree) -endif -LOCALDIR = $(patsubst %/,%,$(subst $(realpath $(QTOP))/,,$(CUR_DIR))) -#################################################################### - - -TREE_LIB_ENABLE=0 -lib= -subdirs= - - -include ${QTOP}/qmk/generic/Make.tpl - -``` - -### 新增一个 board-pack，支æŒæ–°çš„board - -å‚考 `mk/board-pack/`下的å„个文件。 - -å‚考 `qmk/board-pack/bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus`。 - -board-pack 是对 board 在编译时的一个抽象。 -一个board 确定了 MCU〠archã€å·¥å…·é“¾ï¼ŒæŠŠè¿™äº›ç¼–译时å‚数写æˆä¸€ä¸ªbp.xxx。 - -新整一个board-pack的步骤： -- qmk/board-pack/目录下，新建一个bp.xxx. -- 在bp.xxx定义以下å˜é‡ï¼š - - æ³¨æ„ CFGFLAGS 需è¦åŒ…括 cpuã€archã€board 等类型的FLAG。 - 赋值建议用`+=`，ä¸å…许用 `:=`ã€‚æ³¨æ„ å¯ä»¥å¼•ç”¨`QTOP`，`BLDROOT`å˜é‡,ä¸å»ºè®®å¼•ç”¨å…¶ä»–`qmk/generic/`模æ¿çš„å˜é‡ã€‚ - -| Makefileå˜é‡å | å˜é‡èµ‹å€¼ä¸¾ä¾‹ | å˜é‡è¯´æ˜Ž | -| :-------- | ------ | :--------------------- | -| CROSS_COMPILE | CROSS_COMPILE =arm-none-eabi- | 工具链å‰ç¼€ | -| CC | CC = $(CROSS_COMPILE)gcc | 工具链 | -| CXX | CXX = $(CROSS_COMPILE)g++ | 工具链 | -| LD | LD = $(CROSS_COMPILE)ld | 工具链 | -| ARFLAGS | ARFLAGS = -rc | 工具链 | -| STRIP | STRIP = $(CROSS_COMPILE)strip| 工具链 | -| CFGFLAGS | å‚考`bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus` | 对CFLAGSã€CXXFLAGS 进行增加 | -| ARCH_LSRCS | å‚考`bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus` | board-pack对应的arch/æºç ï¼Œ`make -C arch/时需è¦ç¼–译的æºç ï¼Œç»å¯¹è·¯å¾„，或相对于QTOP的相对路径 | -| BSP_LSRCS | å‚考`bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus` | board-pack对应的board/bspæºç  | -| PLATFORM_VENDOR_BSP_LSRCS | å‚考`bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus` | board-pack对应的vendor_bsp æºç ,`make -C platform/vendor_bsp时需è¦ç¼–译的æºç  | -| PLATFORM_VENDOR_BSP_LSRCS | å‚考`bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus` | board-pack对应的vendor_bsp æºç ,`make -C platform/vendor_bsp时需è¦ç¼–译的æºç  | -| PLATFORM_HAL_LSRCS | å‚考`bp.TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus` | board-pack对应的 hal æºç ,`make -C platform/halæ—¶ | - -## Qmk 的模æ¿çš„内置å˜é‡ - -| å˜é‡å |赋值| å˜é‡å€¼è¯´æ˜Ž | 值举例 | -| :-------- |:------|:------ |:------- | -|AR |bp中赋值| 工具链 | "arm-none-eabi-ar"| -|ARCH_LSRCS|bp中赋值| 进入arch/需è¦ç¼–译的æºç ï¼Œç»å¯¹è·¯å¾„或相对于QTOPçš„æºç è·¯å¾„ | "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_c.c /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_s.S /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_fault.c /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_cpu.c /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_c.c /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_s.S /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_fault.c /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch/arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_cpu.c "| -|ARFLAGS |bp中赋值 | 工具链å‚æ•°|ar å‚æ•°,å«ä¹‰è§`ar --help`| "-rc"| -|BLDDIR |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼|标识.o等编译产物所在的目录，跟æºç LOCALDIR有关| "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/build/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus.arm-none-eabi-gcc.tos/arch"| -|BLDROOT |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼ | 标识编译产物ä½ç½®ç›®å½•ã€‚| "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/build/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus.arm-none-eabi-gcc.tos"| -|BLD_SUFFIX|ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼ |编译产物ä½ç½®ç›®å½•çš„åŽç¼€å | | ".tos"| -|BOBJS |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼ | 所有OBJ集åˆï¼Œç»å¯¹è·¯å¾„ | "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/build/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus.arm-none-eabi-gcc.tos/arch/arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_c.o /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/build/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus.arm-none-eabi-gcc.tos/arch/arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_s.o /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/build/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus.arm-none-eabi-gcc.tos/arch/arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_fault.o /root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/build/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus.arm-none-eabi-gcc.tos/arch/arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_cpu.o"| -|CC | bp中赋值 |"arm-none-eabi-gcc"| -|CROSS_COMPILE | 工具链 | "arm-none-eabi-"| -|CURDIR |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼|标识当å‰Makefile 所在的目录 | "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch"| -|CUR_DIR |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼|标识当å‰Makefile 所在的目录 | "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch"| -|CUR_MK_NODE_DIR |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼|标识当å‰Makefile 所在的目录 | "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/arch"| -|CXX |bp中赋值| "arm-none-eabi-g++"| -|LD |bp中赋值| "arm-none-eabi-ld"| -|LDFLAGS |bp中赋值 | " "| -|LOBJS |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼|OBJ文件集åˆï¼Œç›¸å¯¹è·¯å¾„，相对于当å‰Makefile目录 | "arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_c.o arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_s.o arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_fault.o arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_cpu.o"| -|LOCALDIR |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼|æºç ç›®å½•ä½ç½®ï¼Œç›¸å¯¹è·¯å¾„，相对于QTOP | "arch"| -|LSRCS |ç¦æ­¢åœ¨bp中赋值，å¯ä»¥åœ¨src-Makefile赋值|编译æºä»£ç æ–‡ä»¶é›†åˆï¼Œç›¸å¯¹è·¯å¾„，相对于当å‰Makefile目录，或者ç»å¯¹è·¯å¾„ | "arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_c.c arm/arm-v7m/cortex-m4/gcc/port_s.S arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_fault.c arm/arm-v7m/common/tos_cpu.c "| -|QTOP |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼|æºç ä¸€çº§ç›®å½•| "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny"| -|RANLIB |bp中赋值 | "arm-none-eabi-ranlib"| -|STRIP |bp中赋值| "arm-none-eabi-strip"| -|TREE_LIB_ENABLE |src-Makefile赋值，éž0 表示编译所有å­ç›®å½•æºç | LSRCS是å¦æŠŠå­ç›®å½•æºç  | "0"| -|lib |ä¸å»ºè®®èµ‹å€¼|`.a`库åå˜é‡ï¼Œé»˜è®¤ç›®å½•å| "libarch"| -|targetlib |ç¦æ­¢èµ‹å€¼| "/root/democode/TencentOS-tiny/build/TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus.arm-none-eabi-gcc.tos/libarch.a"| - - -## qmkçš„ make 命令行å‚æ•° -```shell -make help -``` -### make V=1 E=1 -```shell -# verbose打å°ç¼–译时的命令 -make V=1 -# 调试头文件包å«ï¼Œå®æ‰©å±•æ—¶å¾ˆæœ‰ç”¨ï¼Œä¼šåœ¨ç”Ÿæˆ`.o`文件的åŒæ—¶ç”Ÿæˆ`.i`预处ç†æ–‡ä»¶ -make E=1 -``` -```shell -# verbose打å°é“¾æŽ¥æ—¶çš„库æœç´¢è¿‡ç¨‹ -make V=2 -make V=3 -``` -## 调试Makefile -```shell -#进入å«Makefile的目录 -make BP=TencentOS_tiny_EVB_MX_Plus dm -``` - - -## Qmk åŽç»­ diff --git a/examples/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt.c b/examples/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8faeabad..00000000 --- a/examples/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_k.h" - -#define USE_ESP8266 - -#ifdef USE_LWIP -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 -#include "esp8266.h" -#endif - -void application_entry(void *arg) -{ - extern void mqtt_basic_thread(void); - -#ifdef USE_LWIP - dns_init(); - MX_LWIP_Init(); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 - extern int esp8266_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - extern int esp8266_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd); - esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); - esp8266_join_ap("dcxajichu", "githubdev"); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_NB_BC35 - extern int bc35_28_95_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - bc35_28_95_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#endif - - mqtt_basic_thread(); - - while (1) { - printf("This is a mqtt demo!\r\n"); - tos_task_delay(1000); - } -} - diff --git a/examples/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/mqtt_example.c b/examples/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/mqtt_example.c deleted file mode 100644 index 891b6be3..00000000 --- a/examples/aliyun_iotkit_csdk_mqtt/mqtt_example.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,250 +0,0 @@ -#include "dev_sign_api.h" -#include "mqtt_api.h" - -char DEMO_PRODUCT_KEY[IOTX_PRODUCT_KEY_LEN + 1] = {0}; -char DEMO_DEVICE_NAME[IOTX_DEVICE_NAME_LEN + 1] = {0}; -char DEMO_DEVICE_SECRET[IOTX_DEVICE_SECRET_LEN + 1] = {0}; - -void *HAL_Malloc(uint32_t size); -void HAL_Free(void *ptr); -void HAL_Printf(const char *fmt, ...); -int HAL_GetProductKey(char product_key[IOTX_PRODUCT_KEY_LEN + 1]); -int HAL_GetDeviceName(char device_name[IOTX_DEVICE_NAME_LEN + 1]); -int HAL_GetDeviceSecret(char device_secret[IOTX_DEVICE_SECRET_LEN]); -uint64_t HAL_UptimeMs(void); -int HAL_Snprintf(char *str, const int len, const char *fmt, ...); - -#define EXAMPLE_TRACE(fmt, ...) \ - do { \ - HAL_Printf("%s|%03d :: ", __func__, __LINE__); \ - HAL_Printf(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ - HAL_Printf("%s", "\r\n"); \ - } while(0) - -void example_message_arrive(void *pcontext, void *pclient, iotx_mqtt_event_msg_pt msg) -{ - iotx_mqtt_topic_info_t *topic_info = (iotx_mqtt_topic_info_pt) msg->msg; - - switch (msg->event_type) { - case IOTX_MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_RECEIVED: - /* print topic name and topic message */ - EXAMPLE_TRACE("Message Arrived:"); - EXAMPLE_TRACE("Topic : %.*s", topic_info->topic_len, topic_info->ptopic); - EXAMPLE_TRACE("Payload: %.*s", topic_info->payload_len, topic_info->payload); - EXAMPLE_TRACE("\n"); - break; - default: - break; - } -} - -int example_subscribe(void *handle) -{ - int res = 0; - const char *fmt = "/%s/%s/user/get"; - char *topic = NULL; - int topic_len = 0; - - topic_len = strlen(fmt) + strlen(DEMO_PRODUCT_KEY) + strlen(DEMO_DEVICE_NAME) + 1; - topic = HAL_Malloc(topic_len); - if (topic == NULL) { - EXAMPLE_TRACE("memory not enough"); - return -1; - } - memset(topic, 0, topic_len); - HAL_Snprintf(topic, topic_len, fmt, DEMO_PRODUCT_KEY, DEMO_DEVICE_NAME); - - res = IOT_MQTT_Subscribe(handle, topic, IOTX_MQTT_QOS0, example_message_arrive, NULL); - if (res < 0) { - EXAMPLE_TRACE("subscribe failed"); - HAL_Free(topic); - return -1; - } - - HAL_Free(topic); - return 0; -} - -int example_publish(void *handle) -{ - int res = 0; - const char *fmt = "/%s/%s/user/get"; - char *topic = NULL; - int topic_len = 0; - char *payload = "{\"message\":\"hello!\"}"; - - topic_len = strlen(fmt) + strlen(DEMO_PRODUCT_KEY) + strlen(DEMO_DEVICE_NAME) + 1; - topic = HAL_Malloc(topic_len); - if (topic == NULL) { - EXAMPLE_TRACE("memory not enough"); - return -1; - } - memset(topic, 0, topic_len); - HAL_Snprintf(topic, topic_len, fmt, DEMO_PRODUCT_KEY, DEMO_DEVICE_NAME); - - res = IOT_MQTT_Publish_Simple(0, topic, IOTX_MQTT_QOS0, payload, strlen(payload)); - if (res < 0) { - EXAMPLE_TRACE("publish failed, res = %d", res); - HAL_Free(topic); - return -1; - } - - HAL_Free(topic); - return 0; -} - -void example_event_handle(void *pcontext, void *pclient, iotx_mqtt_event_msg_pt msg) -{ - EXAMPLE_TRACE("msg->event_type : %d", msg->event_type); -} - -/* - * NOTE: About demo topic of /${productKey}/${deviceName}/user/get - * - * The demo device has been configured in IoT console (https://iot.console.aliyun.com) - * so that its /${productKey}/${deviceName}/user/get can both be subscribed and published - * - * We design this to completely demonstrate publish & subscribe process, in this way - * MQTT client can receive original packet sent by itself - * - * For new devices created by yourself, pub/sub privilege also requires being granted - * to its /${productKey}/${deviceName}/user/get for successfully running whole example - */ - -int mqtt_basic_thread(int argc, char *argv[]) -{ - void *pclient = NULL; - int res = 0; - int loop_cnt = 0; - iotx_mqtt_param_t mqtt_params; - - HAL_GetProductKey(DEMO_PRODUCT_KEY); - HAL_GetDeviceName(DEMO_DEVICE_NAME); - HAL_GetDeviceSecret(DEMO_DEVICE_SECRET); - - EXAMPLE_TRACE("mqtt example"); - - /* Initialize MQTT parameter */ - /* - * Note: - * - * If you did NOT set value for members of mqtt_params, SDK will use their default values - * If you wish to customize some parameter, just un-comment value assigning expressions below - * - **/ - memset(&mqtt_params, 0x0, sizeof(mqtt_params)); - - /** - * - * MQTT connect hostname string - * - * MQTT server's hostname can be customized here - * - * default value is ${productKey}.iot-as-mqtt.cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com - */ - /* mqtt_params.host = "something.iot-as-mqtt.cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com"; */ - - /** - * - * MQTT connect port number - * - * TCP/TLS port which can be 443 or 1883 or 80 or etc, you can customize it here - * - * default value is 1883 in TCP case, and 443 in TLS case - */ - /* mqtt_params.port = 1883; */ - - /** - * - * MQTT request timeout interval - * - * MQTT message request timeout for waiting ACK in MQTT Protocol - * - * default value is 2000ms. - */ - /* mqtt_params.request_timeout_ms = 2000; */ - - /** - * - * MQTT clean session flag - * - * If CleanSession is set to 0, the Server MUST resume communications with the Client based on state from - * the current Session (as identified by the Client identifier). - * - * If CleanSession is set to 1, the Client and Server MUST discard any previous Session and Start a new one. - * - * default value is 0. - */ - /* mqtt_params.clean_session = 0; */ - - /** - * - * MQTT keepAlive interval - * - * KeepAlive is the maximum time interval that is permitted to elapse between the point at which - * the Client finishes transmitting one Control Packet and the point it starts sending the next. - * - * default value is 60000. - */ - /* mqtt_params.keepalive_interval_ms = 60000; */ - - /** - * - * MQTT write buffer size - * - * Write buffer is allocated to place upstream MQTT messages, MQTT client will be limitted - * to send packet no longer than this to Cloud - * - * default value is 1024. - * - */ - /* mqtt_params.write_buf_size = 1024; */ - - /** - * - * MQTT read buffer size - * - * Write buffer is allocated to place downstream MQTT messages, MQTT client will be limitted - * to recv packet no longer than this from Cloud - * - * default value is 1024. - * - */ - /* mqtt_params.read_buf_size = 1024; */ - - /** - * - * MQTT event callback function - * - * Event callback function will be called by SDK when it want to notify user what is happening inside itself - * - * default value is NULL, which means PUB/SUB event won't be exposed. - * - */ - mqtt_params.handle_event.h_fp = example_event_handle; - - pclient = IOT_MQTT_Construct(&mqtt_params); - if (NULL == pclient) { - EXAMPLE_TRACE("MQTT construct failed"); - return -1; - } - - res = example_subscribe(pclient); - if (res < 0) { - IOT_MQTT_Destroy(&pclient); - return -1; - } - - while (1) { - if (0 == loop_cnt % 20) { - example_publish(pclient); - } - - IOT_MQTT_Yield(pclient, 200); - - loop_cnt += 1; - } - - return 0; -} - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_evtdrv.h b/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_evtdrv.h deleted file mode 100644 index deebf379..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_evtdrv.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,405 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_AT_EVTDRV_H_ -#define _TOS_AT_EVTDRV_H_ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" -#include "tos_at_utils_evtdrv.h" -#include "tos_hal.h" - -#define AT_AGENT_ECHO_OK "OK" -#define AT_AGENT_ECHO_FAIL "FAIL" -#define AT_AGENT_ECHO_ERROR "ERROR" - -#define AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM 6 -#define AT_DATA_CHANNEL_FIFO_BUFFER_SIZE (2048 + 1024) - -#define AT_UART_RX_FIFO_BUFFER_SIZE (2048 + 1024) -#define AT_RECV_CACHE_SIZE 2048 - -#define AT_CMD_BUFFER_SIZE 512 - -#define AT_PARSER_TASK_STACK_SIZE 2048 -#define AT_PARSER_TASK_PRIO 2 - -#define EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING (1u << 0) -#define EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_OVERFLOW (1u << 1) -#define EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EVENT (1u << 2) -#define EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT (1U << 3) -#define EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE (1U << 4) - -typedef enum at_status_en { - AT_STATUS_OK, - AT_STATUS_ERROR, - AT_STATUS_INVALID_ARGS, -} at_status_t; - -typedef struct at_cache_st { - uint8_t *buffer; - size_t buffer_size; - size_t recv_len; - size_t curr_len; - size_t last_data; -} at_cache_t; - -typedef enum at_parse_status_en { - AT_PARSE_STATUS_NONE, - AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE, - AT_PARSE_STATUS_EVENT, - AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT, - AT_PARSE_STATUS_OVERFLOW, -} at_parse_status_t; - -typedef enum at_echo_status_en { - AT_ECHO_STATUS_NONE, - AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK, - AT_ECHO_STATUS_FAIL, - AT_ECHO_STATUS_ERROR, - AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT, -} at_echo_status_t; - -typedef enum at_channel_status_en { - AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_NONE, /*< usually means we are try to get a channel status with invalid id */ - AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_HANGING, /*< channel is not used */ - AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_WORKING, /*< channel is being using */ - AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_BROKEN, /*< channel is broken(module link to remote server is broken) */ -} at_channel_status_t; - -typedef struct at_data_channel_st { - uint8_t is_free; - k_chr_fifo_t rx_fifo; - uint8_t *rx_fifo_buffer; - - at_channel_status_t status; - - const char *remote_ip; - const char *remote_port; -} at_data_channel_t; - -typedef struct at_echo_st { - char *buffer; - size_t buffer_size; - char *echo_expect; - evtdrv_task_id_t module_task_id; - evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags; - int line_num; - at_echo_status_t status; - size_t __w_idx; - evtdrv_event_flag_t __expect_event; -} at_echo_t; - -typedef void (*at_event_callback_t)(void); - -typedef struct at_event_st { - const char *event_header; - at_event_callback_t event_callback; -} at_event_t; - -typedef struct at_agent_st { - evtdrv_task_id_t at_task_id; - - at_data_channel_t data_channel[AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM]; - - at_event_t *event_table; - size_t event_table_size; - - at_echo_t *echo; - - at_cache_t recv_cache; - - at_timer_t timer; - - char *cmd_buf; - - hal_uart_t uart; - - k_chr_fifo_t uart_rx_fifo; - uint8_t *uart_rx_fifo_buffer; -} at_agent_t; - -#define AT_AGENT ((at_agent_t *)(&at_agent)) - -/** - * @brief Write data to a channel. - * Write data to a channel with certain id. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * @param[in] buffer data buffer to write. - * @param[in] buffer_len length of the buffer. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 write failed(error). - * @retval none -1 the number of bytes written. - */ -int tos_at_channel_write(int channel_id, uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len); - -/** - * @brief Read data from a channel. - * Read data from a channel with a timeout. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * @param[out] buffer buffer to hold the data read. - * @param[in] buffer_len length of the buffer. - * @param[in] timeout timeout. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 read failed(error). - * @retval none -1 the number of bytes read. - */ -int tos_at_channel_read_timed(int channel_id, uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint32_t timeout); - -/** - * @brief Read data from a channel. - * Read data from a channel. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * @param[out] buffer buffer to hold the data read. - * @param[in] buffer_len length of the buffer. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 read failed(error). - * @retval none -1 the number of bytes read. - */ -int tos_at_channel_read(int channel_id, uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len); - -/** - * @brief Allocate a channel. - * Allocate a channel with certain id. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * @param[in] ip remote ip of the channel. - * @param[in] port remote port of the channel. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 allocate failed(error). - * @retval none -1 the id of the channel. - */ -int tos_at_channel_alloc_id(int channel_id, const char *ip, const char *port); - -/** - * @brief Allocate a channel. - * Allocate a channel. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] ip remote ip of the channel. - * @param[in] port remote port of the channel. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 allocate failed(error). - * @retval none -1 the id of the channel. - */ -int tos_at_channel_alloc(const char *ip, const char *port); - -/** - * @brief Free a channel. - * Free a channel with certain id. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 free failed(error). - * @retval 0 free successfully. - */ -int tos_at_channel_free(int channel_id); - -/** - * @brief Set channel broken. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 set failed(error). - * @retval 0 set successfully. - */ -__API__ int tos_at_channel_set_broken(int channel_id); - -/** - * @brief Judge whether channel is working. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * - * @return at channel status(type of at_channel_status_t) - */ -__API__ int tos_at_channel_is_working(int channel_id); - -/** - * @brief Initialize the at framework. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] uart_port port number of the uart thougth which the module connect to the MCU. - * @param[in] event_table the listened event table. - * @param[in] event_table_size the size of the listened event table. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 initialize failed(error). - * @retval 0 initialize successfully. - */ -__API__ int tos_at_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port, evtdrv_task_id_t at_task_id, at_event_t *event_table, size_t event_table_size); - -/** - * @brief De-initialize the at framework. - * - * @attention None - * - * @return -None - */ -void tos_at_deinit(void); - -/** - * @brief Create a echo struct. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] echo pointer to the echo struct. - * @param[out] buffer buffer to hold the received message from the module. - * @param[in] buffer_size size of the buffer. - * @param[in] echo_expect the expected echo message. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 create failed(error). - * @retval 0 create successfully. - */ -int tos_at_echo_create(at_echo_t *echo, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, char *echo_expect, evtdrv_task_id_t module_task_id, evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags); - -/** - * @brief Execute an at command. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] echo pointer to the echo struct. - * @param[in] timeout command wait timeout . - * @param[in] cmd at command. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 execute failed(error). - * @retval 0 execute successfully. - */ -int tos_at_cmd_exec(at_echo_t *echo, uint32_t timeout, const char *cmd, ...); - -/** - * @brief Send raw data througth uart. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] echo pointer to the echo struct. - * @param[in] timeout command wait timeout . - * @param[in] buf data to send. - * @param[in] size size of the buf. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval -1 execute failed(error). - * @retval 0 execute successfully. - */ -int tos_at_raw_data_send(at_echo_t *echo, uint32_t timeout, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size); - -/** - * @brief Write byte to the at uart. - * The function called by the uart interrupt, to put the data from the uart to the at framework. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] data uart received data. - * - * @return None - */ -void tos_at_uart_input_byte(uint8_t data); - -/** - * @brief Read data from the uart. - * Read data from the uart, usually called in listened event callback. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[out] buffer buffer to hold the data read from the uart. - * @param[in] buffer_len length of the buffer. - * - * @return length of the data read from the uart. - */ -int tos_at_uart_read(uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len); - -/** - * @brief Read data from the uart. - * Read data from the uart until meet a '\n', usually called in listened event callback. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[out] buffer buffer to hold the data read from the uart. - * @param[in] buffer_len length of the buffer. - * - * @return length of the data read from the uart. - */ -int tos_at_uart_readline(uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len); - -/** - * @brief Read data from the uart. - * Read data from the uart until no more incoming data, usually called in listened event callback. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[out] buffer buffer to hold the data read from the uart. - * @param[in] buffer_len length of the buffer. - * - * @return length of the data read from the uart. - */ -int tos_at_uart_drain(uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len); - -/** - * @brief Get the remote ip of a channel. - * Get the remote ip of a channel with certain id. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * - * @return remote ip of the channel. - */ -const char *tos_at_agent_channel_ip_get(int channel_id); - -/** - * @brief Get the remote port of a channel. - * Get the remote port of a channel with certain id. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] channel_id id of the channel. - * - * @return remote port of the channel. - */ -const char *tos_at_agent_channel_port_get(int channel_id); - -evtdrv_event_flag_t tos_at_evtdrv_task(evtdrv_event_flag_t event); - -#endif /* _TOS_AT_EVTDRV_H_ */ - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.h b/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.h deleted file mode 100644 index d69e8ea9..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/include/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _TOS_AT_UTILS_EVTDRV_H_ -#define _TOS_AT_UTILS_EVTDRV_H_ - -typedef struct at_timer_st { - evtdrv_tick_t end_time; -} at_timer_t; - -void at_delay(evtdrv_tick_t tick); - -void at_delay_ms(uint32_t millisec); - -int at_timer_is_expired(at_timer_t *tmr); - -void at_timer_countdown(at_timer_t *tmr, evtdrv_tick_t tick); - -void at_timer_countdown_ms(at_timer_t *tmr, uint32_t millisec); - -evtdrv_tick_t at_timer_remain(at_timer_t *tmr); - -void at_timer_init(at_timer_t *tmr); - -#endif//_TOS_AT_UTILS_EVTDRV_H_ - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_evtdrv.c b/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_evtdrv.c deleted file mode 100644 index 603ccf0a..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_evtdrv.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,756 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_at_evtdrv.h" - -__STATIC__ at_agent_t at_agent; - -__STATIC__ int at_uart_getchar(uint8_t *data, k_tick_t timeout) -{ - k_err_t err; - - at_delay(1); - - err = tos_chr_fifo_pop(&AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo, data); - - return err == K_ERR_NONE ? 0 : -1; -} - -__STATIC__ at_event_t *at_event_do_get(char *buffer, size_t buffer_len) -{ - int i = 0; - at_event_t *event_table = K_NULL, *event = K_NULL; - size_t event_table_size = 0, event_len; - - event_table = AT_AGENT->event_table; - event_table_size = AT_AGENT->event_table_size; - - for (i = 0; i < event_table_size; ++i) { - event = &event_table[i]; - event_len = strlen(event->event_header); - - if (buffer_len < event_len) { - continue; - } - - if (strncmp(event->event_header, buffer, event_len) == 0) { - return event; - } - } - - return K_NULL; -} - -__STATIC__ at_event_t *at_get_event(void) -{ - char *buffer; - size_t buffer_len; - at_cache_t *at_cache = K_NULL; - - at_cache = &AT_AGENT->recv_cache; - - buffer = (char *)at_cache->buffer; - buffer_len = at_cache->recv_len; - - return at_event_do_get(buffer, buffer_len); -} - -__API__ int tos_at_uart_read(uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len) -{ - uint8_t data; - size_t read_len = 0; - - while (K_TRUE) { - if (at_uart_getchar(&data, TOS_TIME_FOREVER) != 0) { - return read_len; - } - - buffer[read_len++] = data; - - if (read_len == buffer_len) { - return buffer_len; - } - } -} - -__API__ int tos_at_uart_readline(uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len) -{ - uint8_t data; - size_t read_len = 0; - - while (K_TRUE) { - if (at_uart_getchar(&data, TOS_TIME_FOREVER) != 0) { - return read_len; - } - - buffer[read_len++] = data; - - if (data == '\n') { - return read_len; - } else if (read_len == buffer_len) { - return buffer_len; - } - } -} - -__API__ int tos_at_uart_drain(uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len) -{ - uint8_t data; - size_t read_len = 0; - - while (K_TRUE) { - if (at_uart_getchar(&data, TOS_TIME_NOWAIT) != 0) { - return read_len; - } - - buffer[read_len++] = data; - - if (read_len == buffer_len) { - return buffer_len; - } - } -} - -__STATIC__ int at_is_echo_expect(void) -{ - char *recv_buffer, *expect; - size_t recv_buffer_len, expect_len; - at_echo_t *at_echo = K_NULL; - at_cache_t *at_cache = K_NULL; - - at_echo = AT_AGENT->echo; - - if (!at_echo || !at_echo->echo_expect) { - return 0; - } - - at_cache = &AT_AGENT->recv_cache; - - recv_buffer = (char *)at_cache->buffer; - recv_buffer_len = at_cache->recv_len; - - expect = at_echo->echo_expect; - expect_len = strlen(expect); - - if (recv_buffer_len < expect_len) { - return 0; - } - - if (strncmp(expect, recv_buffer, expect_len) == 0) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} - -__STATIC__ void at_echo_buffer_copy(at_cache_t *at_cache, at_echo_t *echo) -{ - uint8_t *recv_buffer = K_NULL; - size_t recv_buffer_len, copy_len, remain_len; - - recv_buffer = at_cache->buffer; - recv_buffer_len = at_cache->recv_len; - - remain_len = echo->buffer_size - echo->__w_idx; - if (remain_len == 0) { - return; - } - - copy_len = remain_len < recv_buffer_len ? remain_len : recv_buffer_len; - memcpy(echo->buffer + echo->__w_idx, recv_buffer, copy_len); - echo->__w_idx += copy_len; - - ++echo->line_num; -} - -__STATIC__ int at_uart_send(const uint8_t *buf, size_t size, uint32_t timeout) -{ - return tos_hal_uart_write(&AT_AGENT->uart, buf, size, timeout); -} - -__API__ int tos_at_echo_create(at_echo_t *echo, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, char *echo_expect, evtdrv_task_id_t module_task_id, evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags) -{ - if (!echo) { - return -1; - } - - if (buffer) { - memset(buffer, 0, buffer_size); - } - - echo->buffer = buffer; - echo->buffer_size = buffer_size; - echo->echo_expect = echo_expect; - echo->module_task_id = module_task_id; - echo->event_flags = event_flags; - echo->line_num = 0; - echo->status = AT_ECHO_STATUS_NONE; - echo->__w_idx = 0; - return 0; -} - -__STATIC_INLINE__ void at_echo_flush(at_echo_t *echo) -{ - echo->line_num = 0; - echo->status = AT_ECHO_STATUS_NONE; - echo->__w_idx = 0; -} - -__STATIC_INLINE void at_echo_attach(at_echo_t *echo) -{ - at_echo_flush(echo); - AT_AGENT->echo = echo; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_raw_data_send(at_echo_t *echo, uint32_t timeout, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size) -{ - int ret = 0; - - if (echo) { - at_echo_attach(echo); - } - - ret = at_uart_send(buf, size, 0xFFFF); - - return ret; -} - -__STATIC__ int at_cmd_do_exec(const char *format, va_list args) -{ - size_t cmd_len = 0; - - cmd_len = vsnprintf(AT_AGENT->cmd_buf, AT_CMD_BUFFER_SIZE, format, args); - - printf("AT CMD:\n%s\n", AT_AGENT->cmd_buf); - - at_uart_send((uint8_t *)AT_AGENT->cmd_buf, cmd_len, 0xFFFF); - - return 0; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_cmd_exec(at_echo_t *echo, uint32_t timeout, const char *cmd, ...) -{ - int ret = 0; - va_list args; - - if (echo) { - at_echo_attach(echo); - } - - va_start(args, cmd); - ret = at_cmd_do_exec(cmd, args); - va_end(args); - - if (ret != 0) { - AT_AGENT->echo = K_NULL; - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -__STATIC__ int at_recv_cache_init(void) -{ - uint8_t *buffer = K_NULL; - - buffer = tos_mmheap_alloc(AT_RECV_CACHE_SIZE); - if (!buffer) { - AT_AGENT->recv_cache.buffer = K_NULL; - return - 1; - } - - AT_AGENT->recv_cache.buffer = buffer; - AT_AGENT->recv_cache.buffer_size = AT_RECV_CACHE_SIZE; - AT_AGENT->recv_cache.recv_len = 0; - return 0; -} - -__STATIC__ void at_recv_cache_deinit(void) -{ - uint8_t *buffer = K_NULL; - - buffer = AT_AGENT->recv_cache.buffer; - if (buffer) { - tos_mmheap_free(buffer); - } - - AT_AGENT->recv_cache.buffer = K_NULL; - AT_AGENT->recv_cache.buffer_size = 0; - AT_AGENT->recv_cache.recv_len = 0; -} - -__STATIC__ at_data_channel_t *at_channel_get(int channel_id, int is_alloc) -{ - /* - if is_alloc is K_TRUE, means we are allocating a channel with certain id, - data_channel[channel_id] must be free if return none K_NULL. - otherwise if is_alloc is K_FALSE, means we are trying to get a channel with - certain id, data_channel[channel_id] must be not free if return none K_NULL. - */ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - if (channel_id < 0 || channel_id >= AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM) { - return K_NULL; - } - - data_channel = &AT_AGENT->data_channel[channel_id]; - - if (is_alloc && data_channel->is_free) { - return data_channel; - } - - if (!is_alloc && !data_channel->is_free) { - return data_channel; - } - - return K_NULL; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_read(int channel_id, uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len) -{ - int read_len; - size_t total_read_len = 0; - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - if (!data_channel || data_channel->status == AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_BROKEN) { - return -1; - } - - while (K_TRUE) { - read_len = tos_chr_fifo_pop_stream(&data_channel->rx_fifo, buffer, buffer_len); - - total_read_len += read_len; - if (total_read_len < buffer_len) { - continue; - } else { - return buffer_len; - } - } -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_read_timed(int channel_id, uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint32_t timeout) -{ - int read_len = 0; - size_t total_read_len = 0; - k_tick_t tick, remain_tick; - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - if (!data_channel || data_channel->status == AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_BROKEN) { - return -1; - } - - tick = tos_millisec2tick(timeout); - - at_timer_countdown(&AT_AGENT->timer, tick); - while (!at_timer_is_expired(&AT_AGENT->timer)) { - remain_tick = at_timer_remain(&AT_AGENT->timer); - if (remain_tick == (k_tick_t)0u) { - return total_read_len; - } - - read_len = tos_chr_fifo_pop_stream(&data_channel->rx_fifo, buffer + read_len, buffer_len - total_read_len); - - total_read_len += read_len; - if (total_read_len < buffer_len) { - continue; - } else { - return buffer_len; - } - } - - return total_read_len; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_write(int channel_id, uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len) -{ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - if (!data_channel) { - return -1; - } - - return tos_chr_fifo_push_stream(&data_channel->rx_fifo, buffer, buffer_len); -} - -__STATIC_INLINE__ int at_channel_construct(at_data_channel_t *data_channel, const char *ip, const char *port) -{ - uint8_t *fifo_buffer = K_NULL; - - fifo_buffer = tos_mmheap_alloc(AT_DATA_CHANNEL_FIFO_BUFFER_SIZE); - if (!fifo_buffer) { - return -1; - } - - data_channel->rx_fifo_buffer = fifo_buffer; - tos_chr_fifo_create(&data_channel->rx_fifo, fifo_buffer, AT_DATA_CHANNEL_FIFO_BUFFER_SIZE); - data_channel->remote_ip = ip; - data_channel->remote_port = port; - - data_channel->is_free = K_FALSE; - data_channel->status = AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_WORKING; - - return 0; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_alloc_id(int channel_id, const char *ip, const char *port) -{ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_TRUE); - if (!data_channel) { - return -1; - } - - if (at_channel_construct(data_channel, ip, port) != 0) { - return -1; - } - - return channel_id; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_alloc(const char *ip, const char *port) -{ - int id = 0; - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - for (id = 0; id < AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM; ++id) { - data_channel = &AT_AGENT->data_channel[id]; - if (data_channel->is_free) { - break; - } - } - - if (id == AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM || !data_channel) { - return -1; - } - - if (at_channel_construct(data_channel, ip, port) != 0) { - return -1; - } - - return id; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_free(int channel_id) -{ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - if (!data_channel) { - return -1; - } - - tos_mmheap_free(data_channel->rx_fifo_buffer); - tos_chr_fifo_destroy(&data_channel->rx_fifo); - - memset(data_channel, 0, sizeof(at_data_channel_t)); - - data_channel->is_free = K_TRUE; - data_channel->status = AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_HANGING; - - return 0; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_set_broken(int channel_id) -{ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - if (!data_channel) { - return -1; - } - - data_channel->status = AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_BROKEN; - return 0; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_channel_is_working(int channel_id) -{ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - return data_channel && data_channel->status == AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_WORKING; -} - -__STATIC__ void at_channel_init(void) -{ - int i = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM; ++i) { - memset(&AT_AGENT->data_channel[i], 0, sizeof(at_data_channel_t)); - AT_AGENT->data_channel[i].is_free = K_TRUE; - AT_AGENT->data_channel[i].status = AT_CHANNEL_STATUS_HANGING; - } -} - -__STATIC__ void at_channel_deinit(void) -{ - int i = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < AT_DATA_CHANNEL_NUM; ++i) { - tos_at_channel_free(i); - } -} - -__API__ const char *tos_at_channel_ip_get(int channel_id) -{ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - if (!data_channel) { - return K_NULL; - } - - return data_channel[channel_id].remote_ip; -} - -__API__ const char *tos_at_channel_port_get(int channel_id) -{ - at_data_channel_t *data_channel = K_NULL; - - data_channel = at_channel_get(channel_id, K_FALSE); - if (!data_channel) { - return K_NULL; - } - - return data_channel[channel_id].remote_port; -} - -__STATIC__ void at_event_table_set(at_event_t *event_table, size_t event_table_size) -{ - AT_AGENT->event_table = event_table; - AT_AGENT->event_table_size = event_table_size; -} - -__API__ int tos_at_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port, evtdrv_task_id_t at_task_id, at_event_t *event_table, size_t event_table_size) -{ - void *buffer = K_NULL; - - memset(AT_AGENT, 0, sizeof(at_agent_t)); - - AT_AGENT->at_task_id = at_task_id; - - at_event_table_set(event_table, event_table_size); - - at_channel_init(); - - at_timer_init(&AT_AGENT->timer); - - buffer = tos_mmheap_alloc(AT_UART_RX_FIFO_BUFFER_SIZE); - if (!buffer) { - return -1; - } - - AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo_buffer = (uint8_t *)buffer; - tos_chr_fifo_create(&AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo, (uint8_t *)buffer, AT_UART_RX_FIFO_BUFFER_SIZE); - - buffer = tos_mmheap_alloc(AT_CMD_BUFFER_SIZE); - if (!buffer) { - goto errout0; - } - AT_AGENT->cmd_buf = (char *)buffer; - - if (at_recv_cache_init() != 0) { - goto errout1; - } - - if (tos_hal_uart_init(&AT_AGENT->uart, uart_port) != 0) { - goto errout2; - } - - return 0; - -errout2: - at_recv_cache_deinit(); - -errout1: - tos_mmheap_free(AT_AGENT->cmd_buf); - AT_AGENT->cmd_buf = K_NULL; - -errout0: - tos_mmheap_free(AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo_buffer); - AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo_buffer = K_NULL; - tos_chr_fifo_destroy(&AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo); - - return -1; -} - -__API__ void tos_at_deinit(void) -{ - tos_hal_uart_deinit(&AT_AGENT->uart); - - at_recv_cache_deinit(); - - tos_mmheap_free(AT_AGENT->cmd_buf); - AT_AGENT->cmd_buf = K_NULL; - - tos_mmheap_free(AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo_buffer); - AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo_buffer = K_NULL; - - tos_chr_fifo_destroy(&AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo); - - at_channel_deinit(); -} - -/* To completely decouple the uart intterupt and at agent, we need a more powerful - hal(driver framework), that would be a huge work, we place it in future plans. */ -__API__ void tos_at_uart_input_byte(uint8_t data) -{ - if (tos_chr_fifo_push(&AT_AGENT->uart_rx_fifo, data) == K_ERR_NONE) { - tos_evtdrv_event_set(AT_AGENT->at_task_id, EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING); - } -} - -__STATIC__ void at_echo_event_emit(at_echo_t *echo) -{ - tos_evtdrv_event_set(echo->module_task_id, echo->event_flags); -} - -__STATIC__ void at_echo_status_set(at_echo_t *echo) -{ - char *buffer; - at_cache_t *at_cache; - - at_cache = &AT_AGENT->recv_cache; - - buffer = (char *)at_cache->buffer; - - if (strstr(buffer, AT_AGENT_ECHO_OK) != K_NULL) { - echo->status = AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK; - } else if (strstr(buffer, AT_AGENT_ECHO_ERROR) != K_NULL) { - echo->status = AT_ECHO_STATUS_ERROR; - } else if (strstr(buffer, AT_AGENT_ECHO_FAIL) != K_NULL) { - echo->status = AT_ECHO_STATUS_FAIL; - } -} - -__STATIC__ void at_recv_cache_reset(void) -{ - at_cache_t *recv_cache = K_NULL; - - recv_cache = &AT_AGENT->recv_cache; - recv_cache->recv_len = 0; - recv_cache->curr_len = 0; - recv_cache->last_data = 0; - memset(recv_cache->buffer, 0, recv_cache->buffer_size); -} - -evtdrv_event_flag_t tos_at_evtdrv_task(evtdrv_event_flag_t event) -{ - at_echo_t *at_echo = K_NULL; - at_event_t *at_event = K_NULL; - at_cache_t *recv_cache = K_NULL; - - recv_cache = &AT_AGENT->recv_cache; - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT) { - at_recv_cache_reset(); - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT; - } - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG) { - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG; - } - - if (event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_OVERFLOW) { - // TODO: fix me - at_recv_cache_reset(); - return EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_OVERFLOW; - } - - if (event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EVENT) { - at_event = at_get_event(); - if (at_event && at_event->event_callback) { - at_event->event_callback(); - } - - at_recv_cache_reset(); - return EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EVENT; - } - - if (event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT || - event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE) { - printf("--->%s\n", recv_cache->buffer); - - at_echo = AT_AGENT->echo; - if (!at_echo) { - at_recv_cache_reset(); - return event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT ? - EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT : EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE; - } - - if (at_echo->status == AT_ECHO_STATUS_NONE) { - if (event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT) { - at_echo->status = AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT; - } else if (event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE) { - at_echo_status_set(at_echo); - } - - if (at_echo->status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_NONE) { - at_echo_event_emit(at_echo); - } - } - - if (at_echo->buffer) { - at_echo_buffer_copy(recv_cache, at_echo); - } - - at_recv_cache_reset(); - return event & EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT ? - EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT : EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE; - } - - if (event & EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING) { - uint8_t data; - - if (at_uart_getchar(&data, TOS_TIME_FOREVER) != 0) { - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - - if (data == '\0') { - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - - if (recv_cache->curr_len < recv_cache->buffer_size) { - recv_cache->buffer[recv_cache->curr_len++] = data; - recv_cache->recv_len = recv_cache->curr_len; - } else { - recv_cache->buffer[recv_cache->buffer_size - 1] = '\0'; - tos_evtdrv_event_set(AT_AGENT->at_task_id, EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_OVERFLOW); - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - - if (at_get_event() != K_NULL) { - tos_evtdrv_event_set(AT_AGENT->at_task_id, EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EVENT); - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - - if (at_is_echo_expect()) { - tos_evtdrv_event_set(AT_AGENT->at_task_id, EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_EXPECT); - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - - if (data == '\n' && recv_cache->last_data == '\r') { // 0xd 0xa - recv_cache->curr_len -= 1; - recv_cache->buffer[recv_cache->curr_len - 1] = '\n'; - recv_cache->recv_len = recv_cache->curr_len; - - if (recv_cache->curr_len == 1) { // only a blank newline, ignore - recv_cache->last_data = 0; - recv_cache->curr_len = 0; - recv_cache->recv_len = 0; - tos_evtdrv_event_set(AT_AGENT->at_task_id, EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE); - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - tos_evtdrv_event_set(AT_AGENT->at_task_id, EVENT_AT_PARSE_STATUS_NEWLINE); - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - - recv_cache->last_data = data; - - return EVENT_AT_UART_INCOMING; - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; -} - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.c b/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.c deleted file mode 100644 index 871b3592..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_at_module/at_evtdrv/src/tos_at_utils_evtdrv.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" -#include "tos_at_evtdrv.h" - -void at_delay(evtdrv_tick_t tick) -{ - evtdrv_tick_t now; - - now = tos_evtdrv_systick_get(); - while ((tos_evtdrv_systick_get() - now) < tick) { - ; - } -} - -void at_delay_ms(uint32_t millisec) -{ - evtdrv_tick_t tick; - - tick = tos_evtdrv_millisec2tick(millisec); - at_delay(tick); -} - -int at_timer_is_expired(at_timer_t *tmr) -{ - evtdrv_tick_t now; - - if (!tmr) { - return -1; - } - - now = tos_evtdrv_systick_get(); - return now >= tmr->end_time; -} - -void at_timer_countdown(at_timer_t *tmr, evtdrv_tick_t tick) -{ - evtdrv_tick_t now; - - if (!tmr) { - return; - } - - now = tos_evtdrv_systick_get(); - tmr->end_time = now + tick; -} - -void at_timer_countdown_ms(at_timer_t *tmr, uint32_t millisec) -{ - evtdrv_tick_t expire; - - if (!tmr) { - return; - } - - expire = tos_millisec2tick(millisec); - at_timer_countdown(tmr, expire); -} - -evtdrv_tick_t at_timer_remain(at_timer_t *tmr) -{ - evtdrv_tick_t now; - - now = tos_evtdrv_systick_get(); - - if (at_timer_is_expired(tmr)) { - return (evtdrv_tick_t)0u; - } - - return tmr->end_time - now; -} - -void at_timer_init(at_timer_t *tmr) -{ - if (!tmr) { - return; - } - - tmr->end_time = 0; -} - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_at_module/esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.c b/examples/event_driven_at_module/esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.c deleted file mode 100644 index bce949a7..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_at_module/esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,687 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_at_evtdrv.h" -#include "esp8266_evtdrv.h" -#include "sal_module_wrapper.h" - -#include "stdio.h" -#include "stdbool.h" -#include "ctype.h" - -typedef struct esp8266_send_info_st { - int sockid; - void *buf; - size_t len; -} esp8266_send_info_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_domain_parse_info_st { - char *host_ip; - size_t host_ip_len; -} esp8266_domain_parse_info_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_context_st { - at_echo_t echo; - char echo_buffer[64]; - int try; - evtdrv_task_id_t self_task_id; - int sockid; - evtdrv_task_id_t caller_task_id; - char *ssid; - char *pwd; - esp8266_send_info_t send_info; - esp8266_domain_parse_info_t domain_parse_info; -} esp8266_context_t; - -esp8266_context_t esp8266_context; - -#define CONTEXT(field) (esp8266_context.##field) - -static void esp8266_restore(void) -{ - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), NULL, 0, NULL, CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_RESTORE); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 3000, "AT+RESTORE\r\n"); -} - -static void esp8266_echo_close(void) -{ - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), NULL, 0, NULL, CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_ECHO_CLOSE); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 1000, "ATE0\r\n"); -} - -static void esp8266_net_mode_set(sal_net_mode_t mode) -{ - char *cmd = NULL; - - switch (mode) { - case SAL_NET_MODE_STA: - cmd = "AT+CWMODE=1\r\n"; - break; - case SAL_NET_MODE_AP: - cmd = "AT+CWMODE=2\r\n"; - break; - case SAL_NET_MODE_STA_AP: - cmd = "AT+CWMODE=3\r\n"; - break; - default: - return; - } - - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), NULL, 0, "no change", CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_NET_MODE_SET); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 1000, cmd); -} - -static void esp8266_send_mode_set(sal_send_mode_t mode) -{ - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), NULL, 0, NULL, CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_MODE_SET); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 1000, "AT+CIPMODE=%d\r\n", mode == SAL_SEND_MODE_NORMAL ? 0 : 1); -} - -static void esp8266_multilink_set(sal_multilink_state_t state) -{ - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), NULL, 0, NULL, CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_MULTILINK_SET); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 500, "AT+CIPMUX=%d\r\n", state == SAL_MULTILINK_STATE_ENABLE ? 1 : 0); -} - -static void esp8266_do_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd) -{ - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), NULL, 0, "OK", CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_JOIN_AP); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 1000, "AT+CWJAP=\"%s\",\"%s\"\r\n", ssid, pwd); -} - -static int esp8266_do_connect(const char *ip, const char *port, sal_proto_t proto) -{ - CONTEXT(sockid) = tos_at_channel_alloc(ip, port); - if (CONTEXT(sockid) == -1) { - return -1; - } - - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), NULL, 0, "OK", CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_CONNECT); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 10000, - "AT+CIPSTART=%d,\"%s\",\"%s\",%s\r\n", - CONTEXT(sockid), proto == TOS_SAL_PROTO_UDP ? "UDP" : "TCP", ip, port); - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_recv_timeout(int id, void *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout) -{ - return tos_at_channel_read_timed(id, buf, len, timeout); -} - -static int esp8266_recv(int id, void *buf, size_t len) -{ - return esp8266_recv_timeout(id, buf, len, (uint32_t)4000); -} - -static int esp8266_is_link_broken(const char *echo_buffer) -{ - if (strstr(echo_buffer, "CLOSED") || - strstr(echo_buffer, "link is not valid")) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_do_send(int id, const void *buf, size_t len) -{ - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), CONTEXT(echo_buffer), sizeof(CONTEXT(echo_buffer)), "SEND OK", CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND); - - /* - ATTENTION: we should wait util "SEND OK" is echoed, otherwise the next - time we execute at command, the esp8266 maybe in a "busy s ..." state. - */ - tos_at_raw_data_send(&CONTEXT(echo), 10000, (uint8_t *)buf, len); - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_do_send_ready(int id, const void *buf, size_t len) -{ - if (!tos_at_channel_is_working(id)) { - return -1; - } - - CONTEXT(sockid) = id; - - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), CONTEXT(echo_buffer), sizeof(CONTEXT(echo_buffer)), ">", CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_READY); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 1000, - "AT+CIPSEND=%d,%d\r\n", - id, len); - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_do_close(int id) -{ - tos_at_cmd_exec(NULL, 1000, "AT+CIPCLOSE=%d\r\n", id); - tos_at_channel_free(id); - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_close(int id) -{ - esp8266_imsg_close_t *msg_close; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_imsg_close_t)); - msg_close = (esp8266_imsg_close_t *)msg_body; - - msg_close->header.event = EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_CLOSE; - msg_close->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - msg_close->sockid = id; - - if (tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(self_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)msg_close) != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_send(int id, const void *buf, size_t len) -{ - esp8266_imsg_send_t *msg_send; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_imsg_send_t)); - msg_send = (esp8266_imsg_send_t *)msg_body; - - msg_send->header.event = EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_SEND; - msg_send->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - msg_send->sockid = id; - msg_send->buf = (void *)buf; - msg_send->len = len; - - if (tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(self_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)msg_send) != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_connect(const char *ip, const char *port, sal_proto_t proto) -{ - esp8266_imsg_connect_t *msg_connect; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_imsg_connect_t)); - msg_connect = (esp8266_imsg_connect_t *)msg_body; - - msg_connect->header.event = EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_CONNECT; - msg_connect->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - msg_connect->ip = (char *)ip; - msg_connect->port = (char *)port; - msg_connect->proto = proto; - - if (tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(self_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)msg_connect) != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_do_parse_domain(const char *host_name, char *host_ip, size_t host_ip_len) -{ - tos_at_echo_create(&CONTEXT(echo), CONTEXT(echo_buffer), sizeof(CONTEXT(echo_buffer)), NULL, CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE); - tos_at_cmd_exec(&CONTEXT(echo), 2000, "AT+CIPDOMAIN=\"%s\"\r\n", host_name); - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_parse_domain(const char *host_name, char *host_ip, size_t host_ip_len) -{ - esp8266_imsg_domain_parse_t *msg_domain_parse; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_imsg_domain_parse_t)); - msg_domain_parse = (esp8266_imsg_domain_parse_t *)msg_body; - - msg_domain_parse->header.event = EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE; - msg_domain_parse->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - msg_domain_parse->host_name = (char *)host_name; - msg_domain_parse->host_ip = (char *)host_ip; - msg_domain_parse->host_ip_len = host_ip_len; - - if (tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(self_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)msg_domain_parse) != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int esp8266_init(void) -{ - if (tos_evtdrv_event_set(CONTEXT(self_task_id), EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_INIT) != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -__STATIC__ uint8_t incoming_data_buffer[512]; - -__STATIC__ void esp8266_incoming_data_process(void) -{ - uint8_t data; - int channel_id = 0, data_len = 0; - - /* - +IPD,0,44:1234... - - +IPD: prefix - 0: link id - 44: data length - 1234...: data content - */ - while (1) { - if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { - return; - } - if (data == ',') { - break; - } - channel_id = channel_id * 10 + (data - '0'); - } - - while (1) { - if (tos_at_uart_read(&data, 1) != 1) { - return; - } - if (data == ':') { - break; - } - data_len = data_len * 10 + (data - '0'); - } - - if (data_len > sizeof(incoming_data_buffer)) { - data_len = sizeof(incoming_data_buffer); - } - - if (tos_at_uart_read(incoming_data_buffer, data_len) != data_len) { - return; - } - - tos_at_channel_write(channel_id, incoming_data_buffer, data_len); -} - -at_event_t esp8266_at_event[] = { - { "+IPD,", esp8266_incoming_data_process }, -}; - -sal_module_t sal_module_esp8266 = { - .init = esp8266_init, - .connect = esp8266_connect, - .send = esp8266_send, - .recv_timeout = esp8266_recv_timeout, - .recv = esp8266_recv, - .close = esp8266_close, - .parse_domain = esp8266_parse_domain, -}; - -int esp8266_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd) -{ - esp8266_imsg_join_ap_t *msg_join_ap; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_imsg_join_ap_t)); - msg_join_ap = (esp8266_imsg_join_ap_t *)msg_body; - - msg_join_ap->header.event = EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_JOIN_AP; - msg_join_ap->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - msg_join_ap->ssid = (char *)ssid; - msg_join_ap->pwd = (char *)pwd; - - if (tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(self_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)msg_join_ap) != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -int esp8266_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port, evtdrv_task_id_t at_task_id, evtdrv_task_id_t esp8266_task_id) -{ - esp8266_imsg_init_t *msg_init; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_imsg_init_t)); - msg_init = (esp8266_imsg_init_t *)msg_body; - - msg_init->header.event = EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_INIT; - msg_init->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - msg_init->uart_port = uart_port; - msg_init->at_task_id = at_task_id; - msg_init->esp8266_task_id = esp8266_task_id; - - if (tos_evtdrv_msg_send(esp8266_task_id, (evtdrv_msg_body_t)msg_init) != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static void esp8266_send_msg_reply(int write_len) -{ - esp8266_omsg_send_t *omsg_send; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_omsg_send_t)); - - omsg_send = (esp8266_omsg_send_t *)msg_body; - - omsg_send->header.event = EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_SEND; - omsg_send->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - omsg_send->write_len = write_len; - - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(caller_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)omsg_send); -} - -static void esp8266_connect_msg_reply(int sockid) -{ - esp8266_omsg_connect_t *omsg_connect; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_omsg_connect_t)); - - omsg_connect = (esp8266_omsg_connect_t *)msg_body; - - omsg_connect->header.event = EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_CONNECT; - omsg_connect->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - omsg_connect->sockid = sockid; - - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(caller_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)omsg_connect); -} - -static void esp8266_common_msg_reply(evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flag, int return_code) -{ - esp8266_omsg_common_t *omsg_common; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(esp8266_omsg_common_t)); - - omsg_common = (esp8266_omsg_common_t *)msg_body; - - omsg_common->header.event = event_flag; - omsg_common->header.sender_id = tos_evtdrv_task_self(); - - omsg_common->return_code = return_code; - - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(CONTEXT(caller_task_id), (evtdrv_msg_body_t)omsg_common); -} - -evtdrv_event_flag_t esp8266_task(evtdrv_event_flag_t event) -{ - esp8266_event_hdr_t *event_hdr; - esp8266_imsg_init_t *imsg_init; - esp8266_imsg_join_ap_t *imsg_join_ap; - esp8266_imsg_connect_t *imsg_connect; - esp8266_imsg_send_t *imsg_send; - esp8266_imsg_close_t *imsg_close; - esp8266_imsg_domain_parse_t *imsg_domain_parse; - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT) { - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT; - } - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG) { - while (event_hdr = (esp8266_event_hdr_t *)tos_evtdrv_msg_recv()) { - switch (event_hdr->event) { - case EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_INIT: - imsg_init = (esp8266_imsg_init_t *)event_hdr; - - CONTEXT(caller_task_id) = event_hdr->sender_id; - CONTEXT(self_task_id) = imsg_init->esp8266_task_id; - CONTEXT(try) = 0; - - if (tos_at_init(imsg_init->uart_port, imsg_init->at_task_id, esp8266_at_event, - sizeof(esp8266_at_event) / sizeof(esp8266_at_event[0])) != 0) { - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, -1); - break; - } - - if (tos_sal_module_register(&sal_module_esp8266) != 0) { - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, -1); - break; - } - - tos_sal_module_init(); - - break; - - case EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_JOIN_AP: - imsg_join_ap = (esp8266_imsg_join_ap_t *)event_hdr; - - CONTEXT(ssid) = imsg_join_ap->ssid; - CONTEXT(pwd) = imsg_join_ap->pwd; - - esp8266_do_join_ap(imsg_join_ap->ssid, imsg_join_ap->pwd); - break; - - case EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_CONNECT: - imsg_connect = (esp8266_imsg_connect_t *)event_hdr; - - if (esp8266_do_connect(imsg_connect->ip, imsg_connect->port, imsg_connect->proto) < 0) { - esp8266_connect_msg_reply(-1); - } - break; - - - case EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_SEND: - imsg_send = (esp8266_imsg_send_t *)event_hdr; - - CONTEXT(send_info).sockid = imsg_send->sockid; - CONTEXT(send_info).buf = imsg_send->buf; - CONTEXT(send_info).len = imsg_send->len; - - if (esp8266_do_send_ready(imsg_send->sockid, imsg_send->buf, imsg_send->len) != 0) { - esp8266_send_msg_reply(-1); - } - - break; - - case EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_CLOSE: - imsg_close = (esp8266_imsg_close_t *)event_hdr; - - esp8266_do_close(imsg_close->sockid); - - break; - - case EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE: - imsg_domain_parse = (esp8266_imsg_domain_parse_t *)event_hdr; - - CONTEXT(domain_parse_info).host_ip = imsg_domain_parse->host_ip; - CONTEXT(domain_parse_info).host_ip_len = imsg_domain_parse->host_ip_len; - - esp8266_do_parse_domain(imsg_domain_parse->host_name, imsg_domain_parse->host_ip, imsg_domain_parse->host_ip_len); - - break; - } - - tos_evtdrv_msg_free((evtdrv_msg_body_t)event_hdr); - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_INIT) { - esp8266_restore(); - - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_INIT; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_RESTORE) { - at_delay_ms(3000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { - if (CONTEXT(try)++ < 10) { - esp8266_restore(); - } else { - printf("restore failed\n"); - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, -1); - } - } else { - esp8266_echo_close(); - } - - CONTEXT(try) = 0; - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_RESTORE; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_ECHO_CLOSE) { - at_delay_ms(2000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { - printf("echo close failed\n"); - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, -1); - } else { - esp8266_net_mode_set(SAL_NET_MODE_STA); - } - - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_ECHO_CLOSE; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_NET_MODE_SET) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK && - CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { - if (CONTEXT(try)++ < 10) { - esp8266_net_mode_set(SAL_NET_MODE_STA); - } else { - printf("net mode set failed\n"); - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, -1); - } - } else { - esp8266_send_mode_set(SAL_SEND_MODE_NORMAL); - } - - CONTEXT(try) = 0; - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_NET_MODE_SET; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_MODE_SET) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { - if (CONTEXT(try)++ < 10) { - esp8266_send_mode_set(SAL_SEND_MODE_NORMAL); - } else { - printf("send mode set failed\n"); - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, -1); - } - } else { - esp8266_multilink_set(SAL_MULTILINK_STATE_ENABLE); - } - - CONTEXT(try) = 0; - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_MODE_SET; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_MULTILINK_SET) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { - if (CONTEXT(try)++ < 10) { - esp8266_multilink_set(SAL_MULTILINK_STATE_ENABLE); - } else { - printf("multilink set failed\n"); - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, -1); - } - } else { - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT, 0); - } - - CONTEXT(try) = 0; - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_MULTILINK_SET; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_JOIN_AP) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { - if (CONTEXT(try)++ < 10) { - esp8266_do_join_ap(CONTEXT(ssid), CONTEXT(pwd)); - } else { - printf("esp8266 join ap failed"); - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_JOIN_AP, -1); - } - } else { - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_JOIN_AP, 0); - } - - CONTEXT(try) = 0; - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_JOIN_AP; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_CONNECT) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT && - CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { - printf("esp8266 connect failed\n"); - esp8266_connect_msg_reply(-1); - } else { - esp8266_connect_msg_reply(CONTEXT(sockid)); - } - - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_CONNECT; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_READY) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK && - CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { - if (esp8266_is_link_broken((const char *)CONTEXT(echo).buffer)) { - tos_at_channel_set_broken(CONTEXT(sockid)); - } - - esp8266_send_msg_reply(-1); - } else { - esp8266_do_send(CONTEXT(send_info).sockid, CONTEXT(send_info).buf, CONTEXT(send_info).len); - } - - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_READY; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_EXPECT) { - if (esp8266_is_link_broken((const char *)CONTEXT(echo).buffer)) { - tos_at_channel_set_broken(CONTEXT(sockid)); - } - - esp8266_send_msg_reply(-1); - } else { - esp8266_send_msg_reply(CONTEXT(send_info).len); - } - - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND; - } - - if (event & EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE) { - at_delay_ms(1000); - if (CONTEXT(echo).status != AT_ECHO_STATUS_OK) { - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE, -1); - } else { - /* - +CIPDOMAIN:183.232.231.172 - */ - char *str = strstr((const char *)CONTEXT(echo_buffer), "+CIPDOMAIN:"); - if (!str) { - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE, -1); - } else { - char *host_ip_buffer = CONTEXT(domain_parse_info).host_ip; - size_t host_ip_buffer_len = CONTEXT(domain_parse_info).host_ip_len; - - sscanf(str, "+CIPDOMAIN:%s", host_ip_buffer); - host_ip_buffer[host_ip_buffer_len - 1] = '\0'; - printf("GOT IP: %s\n", host_ip_buffer); - - esp8266_common_msg_reply(EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE, 0); - } - } - - return EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE; - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; -} - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_at_module/esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.h b/examples/event_driven_at_module/esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.h deleted file mode 100644 index 995767a0..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_at_module/esp8266_evtdrv/esp8266_evtdrv.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,134 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef __ESP8266_EVTDRV_H__ -#define __ESP8266_EVTDRV_H__ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" -#include "tos_hal.h" -#include "sal_module_wrapper.h" - -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_INIT (1u << 0) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_RESTORE (1u << 1) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_ECHO_CLOSE (1u << 2) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_NET_MODE_SET (1u << 3) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_MODE_SET (1u << 4) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_MULTILINK_SET (1u << 5) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_JOIN_AP (1u << 6) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_CONNECT (1u << 7) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND_READY (1u << 8) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_SEND (1u << 9) -#define EVENT_INTERNAL_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE (1u << 10) - -#define EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_INIT (1u << 0) -#define EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_JOIN_AP (1u << 1) -#define EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_CONNECT (1u << 2) -#define EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_SEND (1u << 3) -#define EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_CLOSE (1u << 4) -#define EVENT_IMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE (1u << 5) - - -#define EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT (1u << 0) -#define EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_JOIN_AP (1u << 1) -#define EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_CONNECT (1u << 2) -#define EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_SEND (1u << 3) -#define EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE (1u << 4) - -typedef struct esp8266_event_header_st { - evtdrv_event_flag_t event; - evtdrv_task_id_t sender_id; -} esp8266_event_hdr_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_in_msg_init_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - hal_uart_port_t uart_port; - evtdrv_task_id_t at_task_id; - evtdrv_task_id_t esp8266_task_id; -} esp8266_imsg_init_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_in_msg_join_ap_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - char *ssid; - char *pwd; -} esp8266_imsg_join_ap_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_in_msg_connect_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - char *ip; - char *port; - sal_proto_t proto; -} esp8266_imsg_connect_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_in_msg_send_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - int sockid; - void *buf; - size_t len; -} esp8266_imsg_send_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_in_msg_close_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - int sockid; -} esp8266_imsg_close_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_in_msg_domain_parse_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - char *host_name; - char *host_ip; - size_t host_ip_len; -} esp8266_imsg_domain_parse_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_out_msg_common_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - int return_code; -} esp8266_omsg_common_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_out_msg_connect_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - int sockid; -} esp8266_omsg_connect_t; - -typedef struct esp8266_out_msg_send_st { - esp8266_event_hdr_t header; - int write_len; -} esp8266_omsg_send_t; - - -typedef enum sal_net_mode { - SAL_NET_MODE_STA, - SAL_NET_MODE_AP, - SAL_NET_MODE_STA_AP, -} sal_net_mode_t ; - -typedef enum sal_send_mode { - SAL_SEND_MODE_NORMAL, - SAL_SEND_MODE_TRANSPARENT, -} sal_send_mode_t; - -typedef enum sal_multilink_state { - SAL_MULTILINK_STATE_ENABLE, - SAL_MULTILINK_STATE_DISABLE, -} sal_multilink_state_t; - -int esp8266_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port, evtdrv_task_id_t at_task_id, evtdrv_task_id_t esp8266_task_id); - -int esp8266_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd); - -evtdrv_event_flag_t esp8266_task(evtdrv_event_flag_t event); - -#endif /* __ESP8266_EVTDRV_H__ */ - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_at_module/event_driven_at_module.c b/examples/event_driven_at_module/event_driven_at_module.c deleted file mode 100644 index 92a92f78..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_at_module/event_driven_at_module.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,160 +0,0 @@ -#include "esp8266_evtdrv.h" -#include "tos_at_evtdrv.h" -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" -#include "sal_module_wrapper.h" - -evtdrv_task_id_t at_task_id = 0; -evtdrv_task_id_t esp8266_task_id = 1; -evtdrv_task_id_t user_task_id = 2; - -int socket_id_0 = 0; - -#define RECV_LEN 1024 -uint8_t recv_data_0[RECV_LEN]; - -evtdrv_timer_t task0_send_timer; - -#define EVENT_USER_INIT (1u << 0) -#define EVENT_USER_SEND (1u << 1) -#define EVENT_USER_CLOSE (1u << 2) - -int send_count = 0; - -char host_ip[16]; - -void timer_callback(void *arg) -{ - tos_evtdrv_event_set(user_task_id, EVENT_USER_SEND); -} - -evtdrv_event_flag_t user_task(evtdrv_event_flag_t event) -{ - esp8266_event_hdr_t *event_hdr; - esp8266_omsg_common_t *omsg_common; - esp8266_omsg_connect_t *omsg_connect; - esp8266_omsg_send_t *omsg_send; - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT) { - tos_evtdrv_event_set(user_task_id, EVENT_USER_INIT); - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT; - } - - if (event & EVENT_USER_INIT) { - esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0, at_task_id, esp8266_task_id); - return EVENT_USER_INIT; - } - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG) { - while (event_hdr = (esp8266_event_hdr_t *)tos_evtdrv_msg_recv()) { - if (event_hdr->sender_id == esp8266_task_id) { - switch (event_hdr->event) { - case EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_INIT: - omsg_common = (esp8266_omsg_common_t *)event_hdr; - - if (omsg_common->return_code == 0) { - esp8266_join_ap("SheldonDai", "srnr6x9xbhmb0"); - } else { - printf("esp8266 init failed!\n"); - } - - break; - - case EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_JOIN_AP: - omsg_common = (esp8266_omsg_common_t *)event_hdr; - - if (omsg_common->return_code != 0) { - printf("esp8266 join ap failed!\n"); - break; - } - - tos_sal_module_parse_domain("www.tencent.com", host_ip, sizeof(host_ip)); - break; - - case EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_DOMAIN_PARSE: - omsg_common = (esp8266_omsg_common_t *)event_hdr; - - if (omsg_common->return_code != 0) { - printf("esp8266 domain parse failed!\n"); - } else { - printf("domain parse(www.tencent.com): %s\n", host_ip); - } - - tos_sal_module_connect("39.108.190.129", "8080", TOS_SAL_PROTO_TCP); - - break; - - case EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_CONNECT: - omsg_connect = (esp8266_omsg_connect_t *)event_hdr; - socket_id_0 = omsg_connect->sockid; - - if (socket_id_0 < 0) { - printf("esp8266 connect failed!\n"); - break; - } - - /* ¶¨Ê±·¢ËÍ */ - tos_evtdrv_timer_create(&task0_send_timer, - timer_callback, NULL, - EVTDRV_TIMER_OPT_PERIODIC); - tos_evtdrv_timer_start(&task0_send_timer, 6000); - - break; - - case EVENT_OMSG_ESP8266_SEND: - omsg_send = (esp8266_omsg_send_t *)event_hdr; - int write_len = omsg_send->write_len; - if (write_len < 0) { - printf("write failed! %d\n", write_len); - } else { - printf("task0 write success: %d\n", write_len); - } - - break; - } - } - - tos_evtdrv_msg_free((evtdrv_msg_body_t)event_hdr); - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG; - } - - if (event & EVENT_USER_SEND) { - if (++send_count > 5) { - // after send 5 times, we shutdown the connection - tos_evtdrv_event_set(user_task_id, EVENT_USER_CLOSE); - return EVENT_USER_SEND; - } - - tos_sal_module_send(socket_id_0, "hello", 5); - int len = tos_sal_module_recv(socket_id_0, recv_data_0, sizeof(recv_data_0)); - if (len > 0) { - printf("task0 receive from server(%d): %s\n", len, recv_data_0); - } - - return EVENT_USER_SEND; - } - - if (event & EVENT_USER_CLOSE) { - tos_evtdrv_timer_stop(&task0_send_timer); - tos_sal_module_close(socket_id_0); - return EVENT_USER_CLOSE; - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; -} - -evtdrv_task_entry_t tasks[] = { - tos_at_evtdrv_task, - esp8266_task, - user_task, -}; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - tos_evtdrv_sys_init(tasks, sizeof(tasks) / sizeof(tasks[0]), K_NULL); - tos_evtdrv_sys_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/event_driven_hello_world/event_driven_hello_world.c b/examples/event_driven_hello_world/event_driven_hello_world.c deleted file mode 100644 index 08a4a56c..00000000 --- a/examples/event_driven_hello_world/event_driven_hello_world.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,261 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -typedef struct event_hdr_st { - uint8_t event; -} event_hdr_t; - -typedef struct consumer_msg_st { - event_hdr_t hdr; - uint16_t require_len; -} consumer_msg_t; - -typedef struct productor_msg_st { - event_hdr_t hdr; - uint16_t payload_len; - char *payload; -} productor_msg_t; - -evtdrv_task_id_t productor_id = 0; -evtdrv_task_id_t consumer1_id = 1; -evtdrv_task_id_t consumer2_id = 2; - -#define EVENT_CONSUMER1 (1u << 0) -#define EVENT_CONSUMER2 (1u << 1) -#define EVENT_PRODUCTOR (1u << 2) - -#define EVENT_CONSUER1_HUNGRY (1u << 3) -#define EVENT_CONSUER2_HUNGRY (1u << 4) - -#define CONSUMER1_REQUIRE_LEN 5 -#define CONSUMER2_REQUIRE_LEN 9 - -static void msg_payload_fill(char *payload, uint16_t len) -{ - uint16_t i = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < len - 1; ++i) { - payload[i] = (i % 10) + 'a'; - } - payload[len - 1] = '\0'; -} - -productor_msg_t *msg4consumer_forge(uint16_t consumer_require_len) -{ - productor_msg_t *productor_msg; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(productor_msg_t) + consumer_require_len + 1); - if (!msg_body) { - return K_NULL; - } - - productor_msg = (productor_msg_t *)msg_body; - productor_msg->hdr.event = EVENT_PRODUCTOR; - productor_msg->payload_len = consumer_require_len; - - productor_msg->payload = (char *)(productor_msg + 1); - msg_payload_fill(productor_msg->payload, consumer_require_len + 1); - - return productor_msg; -} - -evtdrv_event_flag_t task_productor(evtdrv_event_flag_t event) -{ - uint16_t consumer_require_len; - consumer_msg_t *consumer_msg; - productor_msg_t *productor_msg; - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT) { - printf("init logic for productor\n"); - - // return event handled - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT; - } - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG) { - while (consumer_msg = (consumer_msg_t *)tos_evtdrv_msg_recv()) { - - consumer_require_len = consumer_msg->require_len; - - switch (consumer_msg->hdr.event) { - case EVENT_CONSUMER1: - printf("msg from consumer1, %d len required\n", consumer_require_len); - - productor_msg = msg4consumer_forge(consumer_require_len); - if (productor_msg) { - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(consumer1_id, (evtdrv_msg_body_t)productor_msg); - } - - break; - - case EVENT_CONSUMER2: - printf("msg from consumer2, %d len required\n", consumer_require_len); - - productor_msg = msg4consumer_forge(consumer_require_len); - if (productor_msg) { - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(consumer2_id, (evtdrv_msg_body_t)productor_msg); - } - - break; - } - - tos_evtdrv_msg_free((evtdrv_msg_body_t)consumer_msg); - } - - // return event handled - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG; - } - - if (event & EVENT_CONSUER1_HUNGRY) { - productor_msg = msg4consumer_forge(CONSUMER1_REQUIRE_LEN); - if (productor_msg) { - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(consumer1_id, (evtdrv_msg_body_t)productor_msg); - } - - // return event handled - return EVENT_CONSUER1_HUNGRY; - } - - if (event & EVENT_CONSUER2_HUNGRY) { - productor_msg = msg4consumer_forge(CONSUMER2_REQUIRE_LEN); - if (productor_msg) { - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(consumer2_id, (evtdrv_msg_body_t)productor_msg); - } - - // return event handled - return EVENT_CONSUER2_HUNGRY; - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; -} - -consumer_msg_t *msg4productor_forge(uint16_t consumer_event, uint16_t consumer_require_len) -{ - consumer_msg_t *consumer_msg; - evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body; - - msg_body = tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(sizeof(consumer_msg_t)); - if (!msg_body) { - return K_NULL; - } - - consumer_msg = (consumer_msg_t *)msg_body; - consumer_msg->hdr.event = consumer_event; - consumer_msg->require_len = consumer_require_len; - - return consumer_msg; -} - -evtdrv_timer_t consumer1_timer; -evtdrv_timer_t consumer2_timer; - -void consumer1_timer_callback(void *arg) -{ - printf("consumer1_timer_callback\n"); - tos_evtdrv_event_set(productor_id, EVENT_CONSUER1_HUNGRY); -} - -void consumer2_timer_callback(void *arg) -{ - printf("consumer2_timer_callback\n"); - tos_evtdrv_event_set(productor_id, EVENT_CONSUER2_HUNGRY); -} - -evtdrv_event_flag_t task_consumer1(evtdrv_event_flag_t event) -{ - consumer_msg_t *consumer_msg; - productor_msg_t *productor_msg; - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT) { - printf("init logic for consumer1\n"); - - tos_evtdrv_timer_create(&consumer1_timer, - consumer1_timer_callback, NULL, - EVTDRV_TIMER_OPT_PERIODIC); - tos_evtdrv_timer_start(&consumer1_timer, 4000); - - consumer_msg = msg4productor_forge(EVENT_CONSUMER1, CONSUMER1_REQUIRE_LEN); - if (consumer_msg) { - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(productor_id, (evtdrv_msg_body_t)consumer_msg); - } - - // return event handled - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT; - } - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG) { - while (productor_msg = (productor_msg_t *)tos_evtdrv_msg_recv()) { - - switch (productor_msg->hdr.event) { - case EVENT_PRODUCTOR: - printf("\nconsumer1:\nmsg from productor, payload_len: %d\npayload: %s\n", productor_msg->payload_len, productor_msg->payload); - - break; - } - - tos_evtdrv_msg_free((evtdrv_msg_body_t)productor_msg); - } - - // return event handled - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG; - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; -} - -evtdrv_event_flag_t task_consumer2(evtdrv_event_flag_t event) -{ - consumer_msg_t *consumer_msg; - productor_msg_t *productor_msg; - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT) { - printf("init logic for consumer2\n"); - - tos_evtdrv_timer_create(&consumer2_timer, - consumer2_timer_callback, NULL, - EVTDRV_TIMER_OPT_PERIODIC); - tos_evtdrv_timer_start(&consumer2_timer, 6000); - - consumer_msg = msg4productor_forge(EVENT_CONSUMER2, CONSUMER2_REQUIRE_LEN); - if (consumer_msg) { - tos_evtdrv_msg_send(productor_id, (evtdrv_msg_body_t)consumer_msg); - } - - // return event handled - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT; - } - - if (event & TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG) { - while (productor_msg = (productor_msg_t *)tos_evtdrv_msg_recv()) { - - switch (productor_msg->hdr.event) { - case EVENT_PRODUCTOR: - printf("\nconsumer2:\nmsg from productor, payload_len: %d\npayload: %s\n", productor_msg->payload_len, productor_msg->payload); - - break; - } - - tos_evtdrv_msg_free((evtdrv_msg_body_t)productor_msg); - } - - // return event handled - return TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG; - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; -} - -evtdrv_task_entry_t tasks[] = { - task_productor, - task_consumer1, - task_consumer2 -}; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - tos_evtdrv_sys_init(tasks, sizeof(tasks) / sizeof(tasks[0]), K_NULL); - tos_evtdrv_sys_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/mqttclient/gokit3_mqttclient.c b/examples/mqttclient/gokit3_mqttclient.c deleted file mode 100644 index 63f20b75..00000000 --- a/examples/mqttclient/gokit3_mqttclient.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -#include "stm32f1xx_hal.h" -#include "bsp_init.h" -#include "tos_k.h" -#include "esp8266.h" -#include "mqttclient.h" - -k_task_t task; -k_stack_t task_stack[2048]; - -static void tos_topic_handler(void* client, message_data_t* msg) -{ - (void) client; - MQTT_LOG_I("-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------"); - MQTT_LOG_I("%s:%d %s()...\ntopic: %s, qos: %d. \nmessage:\n\t%s\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, __FUNCTION__, - msg->topic_name, msg->message->qos, (char*)msg->message->payload); - MQTT_LOG_I("-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n"); -} - - -void mqttclient_task(void *Parameter) -{ - int error; - - char buf[100] = { 0 }; - mqtt_message_t msg; - mqtt_client_t *client = NULL; - - memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); - - printf("\nwelcome to mqttclient test...\n"); - - esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_2); - esp8266_join_ap("wifii", "woshijiejie"); - - mqtt_log_init(); - - client = mqtt_lease(); - - mqtt_set_port(client, "1883"); - mqtt_set_host(client, "www.jiejie01.top"); - mqtt_set_client_id(client, random_string(10)); - mqtt_set_user_name(client, random_string(10)); - mqtt_set_password(client, random_string(10)); - mqtt_set_clean_session(client, 1); - mqtt_set_read_buf_size(client, 256); - mqtt_set_write_buf_size(client, 256); - - error = mqtt_connect(client); - - MQTT_LOG_D("mqtt connect error is %#x", error); - - - error = mqtt_connect(client); - - MQTT_LOG_D("mqtt connect error is %#x", error); - - mqtt_subscribe(client, "tos-topic", QOS0, tos_topic_handler); - - MQTT_LOG_D("mqtt subscribe error is %#x", error); - - memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); - - for (;;) { - - sprintf(buf, "welcome to mqttclient, this is a publish test, a rand number: %d ...", random_number()); - - msg.qos = QOS0; - msg.payload = (void *) buf; - - error = mqtt_publish(client, "tos-topic", &msg); - - tos_task_delay(4000); - } -} - - -int main(void) -{ - - k_err_t err; - - bsp_init(); - - printf("Welcome to TencentOS tiny\r\n"); - - tos_knl_init(); // TOS Tiny kernel initialize - - printf("create mqttclient task\r\n"); - err = tos_task_create(&task, - "mqttclient-task", - mqttclient_task, - NULL, - 3, - task_stack, - 1024, - 20); - if(err != K_ERR_NONE) - printf("TencentOS Create mqttclient task fail! code : %d \r\n",err); - - tos_knl_start(); // Start TOS Tiny - -} diff --git a/examples/mqttclient_iot_explorer/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c b/examples/mqttclient_iot_explorer/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c index 4827a837..a22dc8f3 100644 --- a/examples/mqttclient_iot_explorer/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c +++ b/examples/mqttclient_iot_explorer/mqttclient_iot_explorer.c @@ -5,16 +5,14 @@ #include "sal_module_wrapper.h" #define USE_ESP8266 -//#define USE_NB_BC35 -//#define USE_BC26 -//#define USE_EC200S + +//#define USE_EC600S #if defined(USE_ESP8266) #include "esp8266.h" -#elif defined(USE_BC26) -#include "bc26.h" + #elif defined(USE_EC200S) -#include "ec200s.h" +#include "ec600s.h" #endif #ifdef USE_ESP8266 @@ -102,17 +100,9 @@ void mqttclient_task(void) esp8266_join_ap("Mculover666", "mculover666"); #endif -#ifdef USE_NB_BC35 - int bc35_28_95_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - bc35_28_95_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_BC26 - bc26_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_2); -#endif #ifdef USE_EC200S - ec200s_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_2); + ec600s_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_2); #endif mqtt_log_init(); diff --git a/examples/nb-iot_demo/nb-iot_example.c b/examples/nb-iot_demo/nb-iot_example.c deleted file mode 100644 index df340753..00000000 --- a/examples/nb-iot_demo/nb-iot_example.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -#include "bc35_28_95_lwm2m.h" -#include "mcu_init.h" -#include "sal_module_wrapper.h" -#include "cmsis_os.h" - - -#define NB_IoT_TEST_TASK_STK_SIZE 1024 - -void nb_iot_demo(void); -osThreadDef(nb_iot_demo, osPriorityNormal, 1, NB_IoT_TEST_TASK_STK_SIZE); - -int socket_id=-1; -#define RECV_LEN 1024 -uint8_t recv_data[RECV_LEN]; - -void nb_iot_demo(void) -{ - int recv_len = -1; - - extern int bc35_28_95_sal_lwm2m_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - bc35_28_95_sal_lwm2m_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); - - socket_id = tos_sal_module_connect("49.4.85.232","5683",TOS_SAL_PROTO_UDP); - if(socket_id !=-1) - { - printf("connect to cloud success! fd: %d\n", socket_id); - } - else - { - printf("connect to cloud failed!\n"); - } - - while (1) - { - tos_sal_module_send(socket_id, (const void*)"22", strlen("22")); - - memset(&recv_data[0], 0, sizeof(recv_data)); - recv_len = tos_sal_module_recv(socket_id, recv_data, sizeof(recv_data)); - if (recv_len < 0) - { - printf("task receive error\n"); - } - else if (recv_len == 0) - { - printf("task receive none\n"); - } - else - { - recv_data[recv_len] = 0; - printf("task: receive len: %d\nmsg from remote: %s\n", recv_len, recv_data); - } - - tos_sleep_ms(2000); - } -} - -void application_entry(void *arg) -{ - osThreadCreate(osThread(nb_iot_demo), NULL); -} diff --git a/examples/nimble_gatt/blehr_sens.h b/examples/nimble_gatt/blehr_sens.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2b78543b..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_gatt/blehr_sens.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#ifndef _BLEHR_SENS_H_ -#define _BLEHR_SENS_H_ - -#include "nimble/ble.h" -#include "modlog/modlog.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define GATT_DEVICE_INFO_UUID 0x180A -#define GATT_MANUFACTURER_NAME_UUID 0x2A29 -#define GATT_MODEL_NUMBER_UUID 0x2A24 - -int gatt_svr_init(void); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif //_BLEHR_SENS_H_ diff --git a/examples/nimble_gatt/gatt_svr.c b/examples/nimble_gatt/gatt_svr.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8ad76ef7..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_gatt/gatt_svr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,280 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "host/ble_uuid.h" -#include "blehr_sens.h" - -#include "services/dis/ble_svc_dis.h" -#include "services/bas/ble_svc_bas.h" - -/* UUID = 1bce38b3-d137-48ff-a13e-033e14c7a335 */ -static const ble_uuid128_t gatt_svr_svc_rw_demo_uuid - = BLE_UUID128_INIT(0x35, 0xa3, 0xc7, 0x14, 0x3e, 0x03, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xff, - 0x48, 0x37, 0xd1, 0xb3, 0x38, 0xce, 0x1b); - -/* UUID = 35f28386-3070-4f3b-ba38-27507e991762 */ -static const ble_uuid128_t gatt_svr_chr_rw_demo_write_uuid - = BLE_UUID128_INIT(0x62, 0x17, 0x99, 0x7e, 0x50, 0x27, 0x38, 0xba, 0x3b, - 0x4f, 0x70, 0x30, 0x86, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x35); - -/* UUID = ccdd113f-40d5-4d68-86ac-a728dd82f4aa */ -static const ble_uuid128_t gatt_svr_chr_rw_demo_readonly_uuid - = BLE_UUID128_INIT(0xaa, 0xf4, 0x82, 0xdd, 0x28, 0xa7, 0xac, 0x86, 0x68, - 0x4d, 0xd5, 0x40, 0x3f, 0x11, 0xdd, 0xcc); - -#define REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE 100 -static char reply[REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE]; - -static char rm_demo_write_data[64] = "This characteristic is readable and writeable!"; - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_manufacturer( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_model( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_rw_demo( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -/* define several bluetooth services for our device */ -static const struct ble_gatt_svc_def gatt_svr_svcs[] = { - /* - * access_cb defines a callback for read and write access events on - * given characteristics - */ - { - /* Service: Device Information */ - .type = BLE_GATT_SVC_TYPE_PRIMARY, - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_DEVICE_INFO_UUID), - .characteristics = (struct ble_gatt_chr_def[]) { { - /* Characteristic: * Manufacturer name */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_MANUFACTURER_NAME_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_manufacturer, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - /* Characteristic: Model number string */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_MODEL_NUMBER_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_model, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - 0, /* No more characteristics in this service */ - }, } - }, - { - /* Service: Read/Write Demo */ - .type = BLE_GATT_SVC_TYPE_PRIMARY, - .uuid = (ble_uuid_t*) &gatt_svr_svc_rw_demo_uuid.u, - .characteristics = (struct ble_gatt_chr_def[]) { { - /* Characteristic: Read/Write Demo write */ - .uuid = (ble_uuid_t*) &gatt_svr_chr_rw_demo_write_uuid.u, - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_rw_demo, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ | BLE_GATT_CHR_F_WRITE, - }, { - /* Characteristic: Read/Write Demo read only */ - .uuid = (ble_uuid_t*) &gatt_svr_chr_rw_demo_readonly_uuid.u, - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_rw_demo, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - 0, /* No more characteristics in this service */ - }, } - }, - { - 0, /* No more services */ - }, -}; - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_manufacturer( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - printf("service 'device info: manufacturer' callback triggered\n"); - - snprintf(reply, REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE, "This is TencentOS tiny\n"); - printf("reply: %s\n", reply); - - int rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, reply, strlen(reply)); - - printf("\n"); - - return rc; -} - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_model( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - printf("service 'device info: model' callback triggered\n"); - - snprintf(reply, REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE, "running TencentOS tiny on nordic ble board"); - printf("reply: %s\n", reply); - - int rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, reply, strlen(reply)); - - printf("\n"); - - return rc; -} - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_rw_demo( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - printf("service 'rw demo' callback triggered\n"); - - int rc = 0; - - ble_uuid_t* write_uuid = (ble_uuid_t*) &gatt_svr_chr_rw_demo_write_uuid.u; - ble_uuid_t* readonly_uuid = (ble_uuid_t*) &gatt_svr_chr_rw_demo_readonly_uuid.u; - - if (ble_uuid_cmp(ctxt->chr->uuid, write_uuid) == 0) { - - printf("access to characteristic 'rw demo (write)'\n"); - - switch (ctxt->op) { - - case BLE_GATT_ACCESS_OP_READ_CHR: - printf("read from characteristic\n"); - printf("current value of rm_demo_write_data: '%s'\n", - rm_demo_write_data); - - /* send given data to the client */ - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, &rm_demo_write_data, strlen(rm_demo_write_data)); - - break; - - case BLE_GATT_ACCESS_OP_WRITE_CHR: - printf("write to characteristic\n"); - - printf("old value of rm_demo_write_data: '%s'\n", rm_demo_write_data); - - uint16_t om_len; - om_len = OS_MBUF_PKTLEN(ctxt->om); - - /* read sent data */ - rc = ble_hs_mbuf_to_flat(ctxt->om, &rm_demo_write_data, - sizeof rm_demo_write_data, &om_len); - /* we need to null-terminate the received string */ - rm_demo_write_data[om_len] = '\0'; - - printf("new value of rm_demo_write_data: '%s'\n", - rm_demo_write_data); - - break; - - case BLE_GATT_ACCESS_OP_READ_DSC: - printf("read from descriptor\n"); - break; - - case BLE_GATT_ACCESS_OP_WRITE_DSC: - printf("write to descriptor\n"); - break; - - default: - printf("unhandled operation!\n"); - rc = 1; - break; - } - - printf("\n"); - - return rc; - } - else if (ble_uuid_cmp(ctxt->chr->uuid, readonly_uuid) == 0) { - - printf("access to characteristic 'rw demo (read-only)'\n"); - - if (ctxt->op == BLE_GATT_ACCESS_OP_READ_CHR) { - char random_digit; - /* get random char between '0' and '9' */ - random_digit = 48 + (rand() % 10); - - snprintf(reply, REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE, "new random number: %c", random_digit); - printf("reply: %s\n", reply); - - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, &reply, strlen(reply)); - - printf("\n"); - - return rc; - } - - return 0; - } - - printf("unhandled uuid!\n"); - return 1; -} - -void -gatt_svr_register_cb(struct ble_gatt_register_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - char buf[BLE_UUID_STR_LEN]; - - switch (ctxt->op) { - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_SVC: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registered service %s with handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->svc.svc_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->svc.handle); - break; - - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_CHR: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registering characteristic %s with " - "def_handle=%d val_handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->chr.chr_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->chr.def_handle, - ctxt->chr.val_handle); - break; - - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_DSC: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registering descriptor %s with handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->dsc.dsc_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->dsc.handle); - break; - - default: - assert(0); - break; - } -} - -int -gatt_svr_init(void) -{ - int rc; - - rc = ble_gatts_count_cfg(gatt_svr_svcs); - if (rc != 0) { - return rc; - } - - rc = ble_gatts_add_svcs(gatt_svr_svcs); - if (rc != 0) { - return rc; - } - - return 0; -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_gatt/main.c b/examples/nimble_gatt/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index c4dd5c14..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_gatt/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,229 +0,0 @@ -#include -#include -#include - -#include "nimble/nimble_port_tencentos_tiny.h" - -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "host/util/util.h" -#include "host/ble_gatt.h" -#include "services/gap/ble_svc_gap.h" -#include "services/gatt/ble_svc_gatt.h" - -#include "blehr_sens.h" - -static const char device_name[] = "Nimble Gatt"; - -static uint8_t ble_addr_type; - -static void start_advertise(void); - -static int blegatt_gap_event(struct ble_gap_event *event, void *arg) -{ - switch (event->type) { - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_CONNECT: - if (event->connect.status) { - start_advertise(); - } - break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_DISCONNECT: - start_advertise(); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -static void start_advertise(void) -{ - int rc; - struct ble_gap_adv_params advp; - - memset(&advp, 0, sizeof advp); - advp.conn_mode = BLE_GAP_CONN_MODE_UND; - advp.disc_mode = BLE_GAP_DISC_MODE_GEN; - rc = ble_gap_adv_start(ble_addr_type, NULL, BLE_HS_FOREVER, - &advp, blegatt_gap_event, NULL); - assert(rc == 0); -} - -static void -put_ad(uint8_t ad_type, uint8_t ad_len, const void *ad, uint8_t *buf, - uint8_t *len) -{ - buf[(*len)++] = ad_len + 1; - buf[(*len)++] = ad_type; - - memcpy(&buf[*len], ad, ad_len); - - *len += ad_len; -} - -static void -update_ad(void) -{ - uint8_t ad[BLE_HS_ADV_MAX_SZ]; - uint8_t ad_len = 0; - uint8_t ad_flags = BLE_HS_ADV_F_DISC_GEN | BLE_HS_ADV_F_BREDR_UNSUP; - - put_ad(BLE_HS_ADV_TYPE_FLAGS, 1, &ad_flags, ad, &ad_len); - put_ad(BLE_HS_ADV_TYPE_COMP_NAME, sizeof(device_name), device_name, ad, &ad_len); - - ble_gap_adv_set_data(ad, ad_len); -} - -#if 0 - -#if 1 -/* UUID = 1bce38b3-d137-48ff-a13e-033e14c7a335 */ -static const ble_uuid128_t gatt_svr_svc_rw_demo_uuid - = BLE_UUID128_INIT(0x35, 0xa3, 0xc7, 0x14, 0x3e, 0x03, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xff, - 0x48, 0x37, 0xd1, 0xb3, 0x38, 0xce, 0x1b); - -static ble_uuid128_t svc_adv_uuids_128[] = -{ - { BLE_UUID_TYPE_128, { 0x35, 0xa3, 0xc7, 0x14, 0x3e, 0x03, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xff, - 0x48, 0x37, 0xd1, 0xb3, 0x38, 0xce, 0x1b } }, -}; - -#endif - -static ble_uuid16_t svc_adv_uuids[] = -{ - { BLE_UUID_TYPE_16, GATT_DEVICE_INFO_UUID }, -}; - -void ble_set_fields(void) -{ - struct ble_gap_adv_params adv_params; - struct ble_hs_adv_fields fields; - int rc; - - /* - * Set the advertisement data included in our advertisements: - * o Flags (indicates advertisement type and other general info) - * o Advertising tx power - * o Device name - */ - memset(&fields, 0, sizeof(fields)); - - /* - * Advertise two flags: - * o Discoverability in forthcoming advertisement (general) - * o BLE-only (BR/EDR unsupported) - */ - fields.flags = BLE_HS_ADV_F_DISC_GEN | - BLE_HS_ADV_F_BREDR_UNSUP; - - /* - * Indicate that the TX power level field should be included; have the - * stack fill this value automatically. This is done by assigning the - * special value BLE_HS_ADV_TX_PWR_LVL_AUTO. - */ - fields.tx_pwr_lvl_is_present = 1; - fields.tx_pwr_lvl = BLE_HS_ADV_TX_PWR_LVL_AUTO; - - fields.name = (uint8_t *)device_name; - fields.name_len = strlen(device_name); - fields.name_is_complete = 1; - - /*** 0x02,0x03 - 16-bit service class UUIDs. */ -#if 1 - fields.num_uuids16 = 1; - fields.uuids16 = svc_adv_uuids; - fields.uuids16_is_complete = 1; -#endif - -#if 0 - fields.num_uuids128 = 1; - fields.uuids128 = svc_adv_uuids_128; - fields.uuids128_is_complete = 1; -#endif - - rc = ble_gap_adv_set_fields(&fields); - if (rc != 0) { - MODLOG_DFLT(ERROR, "error setting advertisement data; rc=%d\n", rc); - return; - } - - /*** 0xff - Manufacturer specific data. */ - memset(&fields, 0, sizeof(fields)); - fields.mfg_data = (uint8_t*)"GZH:Bluetooth-BLE,177341833"; - fields.mfg_data_len = 27; - - rc = ble_gap_adv_rsp_set_fields(&fields); - if (rc != 0) { - MODLOG_DFLT(ERROR, "error setting advertisement data; rc=%d\n", rc); - return; - } -} - -#endif - -int ble_boot(void) -{ - int rc = 0; - - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - /* make sure synchronization of host and controller is done */ - while (!ble_hs_synced()) { - ; - } - - rc = ble_hs_util_ensure_addr(0); - assert(rc == 0); - rc = ble_hs_id_infer_auto(0, &ble_addr_type); - assert(rc == 0); - - ble_svc_gap_init(); - ble_svc_gatt_init(); - - /* verify and add our custom services */ - rc = gatt_svr_init(); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* set the device name */ - rc = ble_svc_gap_device_name_set(device_name); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* reload the GATT server to link our added services */ - ble_gatts_start(); - - update_ad(); - -#if 0 - ble_set_fields(); -#endif - - start_advertise(); - - return 0; -} - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[2048]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - /* - in this case, ble_boot_task's priority must lower than MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_HOST_TASK_PRIORITY && MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_LL_TASK_PRIORITY, - numerically bigger - to give the host and ll task a chance to run first just after the nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init. - */ - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 6, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_cn.md b/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_cn.md deleted file mode 100644 index b894adc9..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_cn.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -# NimBLE心率传感器案例 - -本案例通过实现一个模拟的BLE心率传感器，展示如何通过GATT notificationæ¥å®žçŽ°å¼‚步的数æ®ä¼ è¾“。 - -编译工程并烧写åŽï¼Œä½¿ç”¨æ‰‹æœºæˆ–任何能支æŒå¿ƒçŽ‡ä¼ æ„Ÿå™¨app（建议使用Nordic官方的`nRF Toolbox`工具）的设备连接开å‘æ¿åˆ›å»ºçš„Heart Rate Sensorè“牙设备，appç•Œé¢ä¸Šå¯ä»¥èŽ·å–到传感器所在ä½ç½®ä»¥åŠä¸Šä¼ è¿‡æ¥çš„心率信æ¯ã€‚ - diff --git a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_en.md b/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_en.md deleted file mode 100644 index 3a0b9fa0..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/README_en.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -NimBLE Heart Rate Sensor Example -================================ -This example demonstrates how to implement asynchronous data transfer using GATT -notifications by implementing a mock-up BLE heart rate sensor. Once flashed on -a node, you can connect to it using any phone or device capable of using such a -heart rate sensor, e.g. Nordics `nRF Toolbox` for Android -(https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=no.nordicsemi.android.nrftoolbox). - -The heart rate sensor is simulated by simply providing an up- and down counter -for its BPM value. - -On top of the heart rate service, this example implements the device information -as well as the battery service. diff --git a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/blehr_sens.h b/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/blehr_sens.h deleted file mode 100644 index a3f59ca9..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/blehr_sens.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#ifndef H_BLEHR_SENSOR_ -#define H_BLEHR_SENSOR_ - -#include "nimble/ble.h" -#include "modlog/modlog.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Heart-rate configuration */ -#define GATT_HRS_UUID 0x180D -#define GATT_HRS_MEASUREMENT_UUID 0x2A37 -#define GATT_HRS_BODY_SENSOR_LOC_UUID 0x2A38 -#define GATT_DEVICE_INFO_UUID 0x180A -#define GATT_MANUFACTURER_NAME_UUID 0x2A29 -#define GATT_MODEL_NUMBER_UUID 0x2A24 - -extern uint16_t hrs_hrm_handle; - -int gatt_svr_init(void); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/gatt_svr.c b/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/gatt_svr.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1e6b1f00..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/gatt_svr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "host/ble_uuid.h" -#include "blehr_sens.h" - -#include "services/dis/ble_svc_dis.h" -#include "services/bas/ble_svc_bas.h" - -static const char *manuf_name = "TencentOS tiny"; -static const char *model_num = "TOS HR Sensor"; -uint16_t hrs_hrm_handle; - -static const char *serial_num = "deadbeef-baddad"; -static const char *firmware_ver = "1.0.0"; -static const char *hardware_ver = "V1.0"; - -static int -gatt_svr_chr_access_heart_rate(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -static int -gatt_svr_chr_access_battery_level(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -static int -gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -/* GATT service definitions */ -static const struct ble_gatt_svc_def gatt_svr_svcs[] = { - { - /* Service: Heart-rate */ - .type = BLE_GATT_SVC_TYPE_PRIMARY, - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_HRS_UUID), - .characteristics = (struct ble_gatt_chr_def[]) { { - /* Characteristic: Heart-rate measurement */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_HRS_MEASUREMENT_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_heart_rate, - .val_handle = &hrs_hrm_handle, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_NOTIFY, - }, { - /* Characteristic: Body sensor location */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_HRS_BODY_SENSOR_LOC_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_heart_rate, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - 0, /* No more characteristics in this service */ - }, } - }, - - { - /* Service: Device Information */ - .type = BLE_GATT_SVC_TYPE_PRIMARY, - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_DEVICE_INFO_UUID), - .characteristics = (struct ble_gatt_chr_def[]) { { - /* Characteristic: * Manufacturer name */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_MANUFACTURER_NAME_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - /* Characteristic: Model number string */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_MODEL_NUMBER_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(BLE_SVC_DIS_CHR_UUID16_SERIAL_NUMBER), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(BLE_SVC_DIS_CHR_UUID16_FIRMWARE_REVISION), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(BLE_SVC_DIS_CHR_UUID16_HARDWARE_REVISION), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - 0, /* No more characteristics in this service */ - }, } - }, - { - /* Service: Battery Level */ - .type = BLE_GATT_SVC_TYPE_PRIMARY, - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(BLE_SVC_BAS_UUID16), - .characteristics = (struct ble_gatt_chr_def[]) { { - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(BLE_SVC_BAS_CHR_UUID16_BATTERY_LEVEL), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_battery_level, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - 0, /* No more characteristics in this service */ - }, } - }, - { - 0, /* No more services */ - }, -}; - -static int -gatt_svr_chr_access_heart_rate(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - /* Sensor location, set to "Chest" */ - static uint8_t body_sens_loc = 0x01; - uint16_t uuid; - int rc; - - uuid = ble_uuid_u16(ctxt->chr->uuid); - - if (uuid == GATT_HRS_BODY_SENSOR_LOC_UUID) { - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, &body_sens_loc, sizeof(body_sens_loc)); - - return rc == 0 ? 0 : BLE_ATT_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RES; - } - - assert(0); - return BLE_ATT_ERR_UNLIKELY; -} - -static int -gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - uint16_t uuid; - int rc; - - uuid = ble_uuid_u16(ctxt->chr->uuid); - - if (uuid == GATT_MANUFACTURER_NAME_UUID) { - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, manuf_name, strlen(manuf_name)); - return rc == 0 ? 0 : BLE_ATT_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RES; - } - - if (uuid == GATT_MODEL_NUMBER_UUID) { - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, model_num, strlen(model_num)); - return rc == 0 ? 0 : BLE_ATT_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RES; - } - - if (uuid == BLE_SVC_DIS_CHR_UUID16_SERIAL_NUMBER) { - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, serial_num, strlen(serial_num)); - return rc == 0 ? 0 : BLE_ATT_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RES; - } - - if (uuid == BLE_SVC_DIS_CHR_UUID16_FIRMWARE_REVISION) { - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, firmware_ver, strlen(firmware_ver)); - return rc == 0 ? 0 : BLE_ATT_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RES; - } - - if (uuid == BLE_SVC_DIS_CHR_UUID16_HARDWARE_REVISION) { - rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, hardware_ver, strlen(hardware_ver)); - return rc == 0 ? 0 : BLE_ATT_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RES; - } - - assert(0); - return BLE_ATT_ERR_UNLIKELY; -} - -static int -gatt_svr_chr_access_battery_level(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "[READ] battery level service: battery level value"); - - uint8_t level = 42; - int res = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, &level, sizeof(level)); - return (res == 0) ? 0 : BLE_ATT_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RES; -} - -void -gatt_svr_register_cb(struct ble_gatt_register_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - char buf[BLE_UUID_STR_LEN]; - - switch (ctxt->op) { - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_SVC: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registered service %s with handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->svc.svc_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->svc.handle); - break; - - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_CHR: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registering characteristic %s with " - "def_handle=%d val_handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->chr.chr_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->chr.def_handle, - ctxt->chr.val_handle); - break; - - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_DSC: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registering descriptor %s with handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->dsc.dsc_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->dsc.handle); - break; - - default: - assert(0); - break; - } -} - -int -gatt_svr_init(void) -{ - int rc; - - rc = ble_gatts_count_cfg(gatt_svr_svcs); - if (rc != 0) { - return rc; - } - - rc = ble_gatts_add_svcs(gatt_svr_svcs); - if (rc != 0) { - return rc; - } - - return 0; -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/main.c b/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index bfce56d1..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_heart_rate_sensor/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,294 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "console/console.h" -#include "config/private_syscfg.h" -#include "nimble/ble.h" - -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "host/ble_gatt.h" -#include "services/gap/ble_svc_gap.h" -#include "services/gatt/ble_svc_gatt.h" - -#include "blehr_sens.h" -#include "nimble/nimble_port_tencentos_tiny.h" - -static bool notify_state; - -/* Connection handle */ -static uint16_t conn_handle; - -static const char *device_name = "Heart Rate Sensor"; - -static int blehr_gap_event(struct ble_gap_event *event, void *arg); - -static uint8_t ble_addr_type; - -/* Sending notify data timer */ -static struct ble_npl_callout blehr_tx_timer; - -/* Variable to simulate heart beats */ -static uint8_t heartrate = 90; - -static ble_uuid16_t svc_adv_uuids[] = -{ - { BLE_UUID_TYPE_16, GATT_HRS_UUID } -}; - -/* - * Enables advertising with parameters: - * o General discoverable mode - * o Undirected connectable mode - */ -static void -blehr_advertise(void) -{ - struct ble_gap_adv_params adv_params; - struct ble_hs_adv_fields fields; - int rc; - - /* - * Set the advertisement data included in our advertisements: - * o Flags (indicates advertisement type and other general info) - * o Advertising tx power - * o Device name - */ - memset(&fields, 0, sizeof(fields)); - - /* - * Advertise two flags: - * o Discoverability in forthcoming advertisement (general) - * o BLE-only (BR/EDR unsupported) - */ - fields.flags = BLE_HS_ADV_F_DISC_GEN | - BLE_HS_ADV_F_BREDR_UNSUP; - - /* - * Indicate that the TX power level field should be included; have the - * stack fill this value automatically. This is done by assigning the - * special value BLE_HS_ADV_TX_PWR_LVL_AUTO. - */ - fields.tx_pwr_lvl_is_present = 1; - fields.tx_pwr_lvl = BLE_HS_ADV_TX_PWR_LVL_AUTO; - - fields.name = (uint8_t *)device_name; - fields.name_len = strlen(device_name); - fields.name_is_complete = 1; - - /*** 0x02,0x03 - 16-bit service class UUIDs. */ - fields.num_uuids16 = 1; - fields.uuids16 = svc_adv_uuids; - fields.uuids16_is_complete = 1; - - rc = ble_gap_adv_set_fields(&fields); - if (rc != 0) { - MODLOG_DFLT(ERROR, "error setting advertisement data; rc=%d\n", rc); - return; - } - - /*** 0xff - Manufacturer specific data. */ - memset(&fields, 0, sizeof(fields)); - fields.mfg_data = (uint8_t*)"GZH:Bluetooth-BLE,177341833"; - fields.mfg_data_len = 27; - - rc = ble_gap_adv_rsp_set_fields(&fields); - if (rc != 0) { - MODLOG_DFLT(ERROR, "error setting advertisement data; rc=%d\n", rc); - return; - } - - /* Begin advertising */ - memset(&adv_params, 0, sizeof(adv_params)); - adv_params.conn_mode = BLE_GAP_CONN_MODE_UND; - adv_params.disc_mode = BLE_GAP_DISC_MODE_GEN; - rc = ble_gap_adv_start(ble_addr_type, NULL, BLE_HS_FOREVER, - &adv_params, blehr_gap_event, NULL); - if (rc != 0) { - MODLOG_DFLT(ERROR, "error enabling advertisement; rc=%d\n", rc); - return; - } -} - -static void -blehr_tx_hrate_stop(void) -{ - ble_npl_callout_stop(&blehr_tx_timer); -} - -/* Reset heartrate measurment */ -static void -blehr_tx_hrate_reset(void) -{ - int rc; - - rc = ble_npl_callout_reset(&blehr_tx_timer, OS_TICKS_PER_SEC); - assert(rc == 0); -} - -/* This functions simulates heart beat and notifies it to the client */ -static void -blehr_tx_hrate(struct os_event *ev) -{ - static uint8_t hrm[2]; - int rc; - struct os_mbuf *om; - - if (!notify_state) { - blehr_tx_hrate_stop(); - heartrate = 90; - return; - } - - hrm[0] = 0x06; /* contact of a sensor */ - hrm[1] = heartrate; /* storing dummy data */ - - /* Simulation of heart beats */ - heartrate++; - if (heartrate == 160) { - heartrate = 90; - } - - om = ble_hs_mbuf_from_flat(hrm, sizeof(hrm)); - - rc = ble_gattc_notify_custom(conn_handle, hrs_hrm_handle, om); - - assert(rc == 0); - blehr_tx_hrate_reset(); -} - -static int -blehr_gap_event(struct ble_gap_event *event, void *arg) -{ - switch (event->type) { - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_CONNECT: - /* A new connection was established or a connection attempt failed */ - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "connection %s; status=%d\n", - event->connect.status == 0 ? "established" : "failed", - event->connect.status); - - if (event->connect.status != 0) { - /* Connection failed; resume advertising */ - blehr_advertise(); - conn_handle = 0; - } - else { - conn_handle = event->connect.conn_handle; - } - - break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_DISCONNECT: - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "disconnect; reason=%d\n", event->disconnect.reason); - conn_handle = BLE_HS_CONN_HANDLE_NONE; /* reset conn_handle */ - - /* Connection terminated; resume advertising */ - blehr_advertise(); - break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_ADV_COMPLETE: - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "adv complete\n"); - blehr_advertise(); - break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_SUBSCRIBE: - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "subscribe event; cur_notify=%d\n value handle; " - "val_handle=%d\n", - event->subscribe.cur_notify, hrs_hrm_handle); - if (event->subscribe.attr_handle == hrs_hrm_handle) { - notify_state = event->subscribe.cur_notify; - blehr_tx_hrate_reset(); - } else if (event->subscribe.attr_handle != hrs_hrm_handle) { - notify_state = event->subscribe.cur_notify; - blehr_tx_hrate_stop(); - } - break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_MTU: - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "mtu update event; conn_handle=%d mtu=%d\n", - event->mtu.conn_handle, - event->mtu.value); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -static void -blehr_on_sync(void) -{ - int rc; - - /* Use privacy */ - rc = ble_hs_id_infer_auto(0, &ble_addr_type); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* Begin advertising */ - blehr_advertise(); -} - -int ble_boot(void) -{ - int rc = 0; - - /* Initialize the NimBLE host configuration */ - ble_hs_cfg.sync_cb = blehr_on_sync; - - ble_npl_callout_init(&blehr_tx_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - blehr_tx_hrate, NULL); - - /* verify and add our custom services */ - rc = gatt_svr_init(); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* Set the default device name */ - rc = ble_svc_gap_device_name_set(device_name); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* run an event loop for handling the heart rate update events */ - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - return 0; -} - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[512]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 4, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_config.h b/examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_config.h deleted file mode 100644 index 5df5ad17..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_config.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#ifndef QCLOUD_BLE_QIOT_CONFIG_H -#define QCLOUD_BLE_QIOT_CONFIG_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define BLE_QIOT_SDK_VERSION "1.2.0" // sdk version -#define BLE_QIOT_SDK_DEBUG 0 // sdk debug switch - -// the device broadcast is controlled by the user, but we provide a mechanism to help the device save more power. -// if you want broadcast is triggered by something like press a button instead of all the time, and the broadcast -// stopped automatically in a few minutes if the device is not bind, define BLE_QIOT_BUTTON_BROADCAST is 1 and -// BLE_QIOT_BIND_TIMEOUT is the period that broadcast stopped. -// if the device in the bound state, broadcast dose not stop automatically. -#define BLE_QIOT_BUTTON_BROADCAST 0 -#if (1 == BLE_QIOT_BUTTON_BROADCAST) -#define BLE_QIOT_BIND_TIMEOUT (2 * 60 * 1000) // unit: ms -#endif - -// some data like integer need to be transmitted in a certain byte order, defined it according to your device -#define __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1234 -#define __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ 4321 -#define __BYTE_ORDER__ __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ - -// in some BLE stack ble_qiot_log_hex() maybe not work, user can use there own hexdump function -#define BLE_QIOT_USER_DEFINE_HEDUMP 0 - -#if (1 == BLE_QIOT_USER_DEFINE_HEDUMP) -// add your code here like this -// #define ble_qiot_log_hex(level, hex_name, data, data_len) \ -// do { \ -// MY_RAW_LOG("\r\nble qiot dump: %s, length: %d\r\n", hex_name, data_len); \ -// MY_RAW_HEXDUMP_(data, data_len); \ -// } while(0) - -// or use your own hexdump function with same definition -// void ble_qiot_log_hex(e_ble_qiot_log_level level, const char *hex_name, const char *data, uint32_t data_len); -#endif // BLE_QIOT_USER_DEFINE_HEDUMP - -// Macro for logging a formatted string, the function must printf raw string without any color, prefix, newline or -// timestamp -#define BLE_QIOT_LOG_PRINT(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) - -// nrf52832xxAA Flash size is 512KB, nrf52832xxAB Flash size is 512KB, be carefol of the address! -#define BLE_QIOT_RECORD_FLASH_ADDR 0x7e000 // qiot data storage address -#define BLE_QIOT_RECORD_FLASH_PAGESIZE 4096 // flash page size, see chip datasheet -#define BLE_QIOT_RECORD_FLASH_PAGENUM 2 // how many pages qiot use - -// the following definition will affect the stack that LLSync used, the minimum value tested is -// 2048 (BLE_QIOT_EVENT_MAX_SIZE is 128, BLE_QIOT_EVENT_BUF_SIZE is 23) the max length that llsync event data, depends -// on the length of user data reported to Tencent Lianlian at a time -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_MAX_SIZE (128) -// the minimum between BLE_QIOT_EVENT_MAX_SIZE and mtu -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_BUF_SIZE (23) - -#define BLE_QIOT_INCLUDE_PROPERTY - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif // QCLOUD_BLE_QIOT_CONFIG_H diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_import.c b/examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_import.c deleted file mode 100644 index 88ff818b..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/ble_qiot_import.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,424 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -// #include "nrf52832_xxaa_service.h" - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "ble_qiot_import.h" - -// #include "host/ble_hs.h" -// #include "host/ble_uuid.h" -#include "host/ble_gap.h" -#include "host/ble_gatt.h" - -#include "flash_storage.h" -#include "ble_qiot_log.h" - - -// divece configs -// this only for reference, please create your own device and replace it! -// https://cloud.tencent.com/product/iotexplorer -// #define PRODUCT_ID "PRODUCT_ID" // 10 Bytes -// #define DEVICE_NAME "YOUR_DEVICE_NAME" // equal or lesser than 48 Bytes -// #define SECRET_KEY "YOUR_PRODUCT_SECRET_KEY_" // 24 Bytes - -#define ADV_DEVICE_NAME "tos_llsync" - - -#define IOT_BLE_UUID_BASE96 0xe2, 0xa4, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x93, 0xe4, 0x6a, 0xb5, \ - 0x20, 0x4e, 0xd0, 0x65 - -#define UINT16_TO_BYTES(n) ((uint8_t) (n)), ((uint8_t)((n) >> 8)) -#define UINT32_TO_BYTES(n) ((uint8_t) (n)), ((uint8_t)((n) >> 8)), ((uint8_t)((n) >> 16)), ((uint8_t)((n) >> 24)) - -#define UINT16_TO_UUID32(n) ((uint8_t) (n)), ((uint8_t)((n) >> 8)), ((uint8_t)((n) >> 16)), ((uint8_t)((n) >> 24)) -#define IOT_BLE_UUID128_BUILD(uuid) IOT_BLE_UUID_BASE96, UINT16_TO_UUID32(uuid) - -#define IOT_BLE_UUID128_SERVICE IOT_BLE_UUID128_BUILD(IOT_BLE_UUID_SERVICE) -#define IOT_BLE_UUID128_DEVICE_INFO IOT_BLE_UUID128_BUILD(IOT_BLE_UUID_DEVICE_INFO) -#define IOT_BLE_UUID128_DATA IOT_BLE_UUID128_BUILD(IOT_BLE_UUID_DATA) -#define IOT_BLE_UUID128_EVENT IOT_BLE_UUID128_BUILD(IOT_BLE_UUID_EVENT) - -static ble_uuid128_t ble_uuid128_t_service = BLE_UUID128_INIT(IOT_BLE_UUID128_SERVICE); -static ble_uuid128_t ble_uuid128_t_device_info = BLE_UUID128_INIT(IOT_BLE_UUID128_DEVICE_INFO); -static ble_uuid128_t ble_uuid128_t_data = BLE_UUID128_INIT(IOT_BLE_UUID128_DATA); -static ble_uuid128_t ble_uuid128_t_event = BLE_UUID128_INIT(IOT_BLE_UUID128_EVENT); - -static uint16_t qiot_gap_connect_handle; - -static uint16_t qiot_device_info_handle; -static uint16_t qiot_data_handle; -static uint16_t qiot_event_handle; - -static int ble_svc_qiot_access(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -// LLsync BLE services and characteristics -static const struct ble_gatt_svc_def ble_svc_qiot_defs[] = { - { - .type = BLE_GATT_SVC_TYPE_PRIMARY, - .uuid = &ble_uuid128_t_service.u, - // .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(IOT_BLE_UUID_SERVICE), - .characteristics = (struct ble_gatt_chr_def[]) { - { - .uuid = &ble_uuid128_t_device_info.u, - // .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(IOT_BLE_UUID_DEVICE_INFO), - .access_cb = ble_svc_qiot_access, - // .val_handle = &qiot_device_info_handle, - // .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ | BLE_GATT_CHR_F_WRITE_NO_RSP, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_WRITE_NO_RSP, - // .flags = 0xFFF, - }, - { - .uuid = &ble_uuid128_t_data.u, - // .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(IOT_BLE_UUID_DATA), - .access_cb = ble_svc_qiot_access, - // .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ | BLE_GATT_CHR_F_WRITE_NO_RSP, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_WRITE_NO_RSP, - }, - { - .uuid = &ble_uuid128_t_event.u, - // .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(IOT_BLE_UUID_EVENT), - .access_cb = ble_svc_qiot_access, - .val_handle = &qiot_event_handle, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_NOTIFY, - }, - - // end of characteristics - {.uuid = 0}, - }, - }, - - // end of services - {.type = 0}, -}; - -static int ble_svc_qiot_access(uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - const ble_uuid_t *uuid; - // int rand_num; - int rc, ret; - uint16_t len = 0; - uint8_t buf[256] = {0}; - - uuid = ctxt->chr->uuid; - - if(ble_uuid_cmp(uuid, &ble_uuid128_t_device_info.u) == 0) - { - switch (ctxt->op) - { - case BLE_GATT_ACCESS_OP_WRITE_CHR: - rc = ble_hs_mbuf_to_flat(ctxt->om, buf, sizeof(buf), &len); - if (rc != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble att err, ret: %d", ret); - return BLE_ATT_ERR_UNLIKELY; - } - ble_qiot_log_hex(BLE_QIOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "device info raw", (char *)buf, len); - ble_device_info_write_cb(buf, len); - default: - return BLE_ATT_ERR_UNLIKELY; - } - } - else if(ble_uuid_cmp(uuid, &ble_uuid128_t_data.u) == 0) - { - switch (ctxt->op) - { - case BLE_GATT_ACCESS_OP_WRITE_CHR: - rc = ble_hs_mbuf_to_flat(ctxt->om, buf, sizeof(buf), &len); - if (rc != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble att err, ret: %d", ret); - return BLE_ATT_ERR_UNLIKELY; - } - ble_qiot_log_hex(BLE_QIOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "lldata raw", (char *)buf, len); - ble_lldata_write_cb(buf, len); - default: - return BLE_ATT_ERR_UNLIKELY; - } - } - else if(ble_uuid_cmp(uuid, &ble_uuid128_t_event.u) == 0) - { - // this characteristic not have read or write attribute - } - else - { - ble_qiot_log_e("unknown service or characteristic"); - } - - return 0; -} - -// add services and characteristic -void ble_services_add(const qiot_service_init_s *p_service) -{ - int ret = 0; - - ret = ble_gatts_count_cfg(ble_svc_qiot_defs); - if(ret != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble_gatts_count_cfg() err, ret: %d", ret); - } - - ret = ble_gatts_add_svcs(ble_svc_qiot_defs); - if(ret != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble_gatts_add_svcs() err, ret: %d", ret); - } - - return; -} - -int ble_get_product_id(char *product_id) -{ - memcpy(product_id, PRODUCT_ID, strlen(PRODUCT_ID)); - return 0; -} - -int ble_get_device_name(char *device_name) -{ - memcpy(device_name, DEVICE_NAME, strlen(DEVICE_NAME)); - return strlen(DEVICE_NAME); -} - -int ble_get_psk(char *psk) -{ - memcpy(psk, SECRET_KEY, strlen(SECRET_KEY)); - return 0; -} - -int ble_get_mac(char *mac) -{ - memcpy(mac, MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_PUBLIC_DEV_ADDR, sizeof(MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_PUBLIC_DEV_ADDR)); - ble_qiot_log_hex(BLE_QIOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "mac_addr", mac, 6); - - return 0; -} - -int ble_write_flash(uint32_t flash_addr, const char *write_buf, uint16_t write_len) -{ - return fstorage_write(flash_addr, write_len, write_buf); -} - -int ble_read_flash(uint32_t flash_addr, char *read_buf, uint16_t read_len) -{ - return fstorage_read(flash_addr, read_len, read_buf); -} - -int ble_qiot_gap_event_fn(struct ble_gap_event *event, void *arg) -{ - ble_qiot_log_d("get event, type: %d", event->type); - - switch (event->type) { - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_CONNECT: - /* A new connection was established or a connection attempt failed */ - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "connection %s; status=%d\n", - event->connect.status == 0 ? "established" : "failed", - event->connect.status); - - if (event->connect.status != 0) { - /* Connection failed; resume advertising */ - ble_qiot_advertising_start(); - qiot_gap_connect_handle = 0; - } - else - { - qiot_gap_connect_handle = event->connect.conn_handle; - } - - break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_DISCONNECT: - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "disconnect; reason=%d\n", event->disconnect.reason); - - /* Connection terminated; resume advertising */ - ble_qiot_advertising_start(); - qiot_gap_connect_handle = 0; - break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_ADV_COMPLETE: - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "adv complete\n"); - ble_qiot_advertising_start(); - break; - - // case BLE_GAP_EVENT_SUBSCRIBE: - // MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "subscribe event; cur_notify=%d\n value handle; " - // "val_handle=%d\n", - // event->subscribe.cur_notify, hrs_hrm_handle); - // if (event->subscribe.attr_handle == hrs_hrm_handle) { - // notify_state = event->subscribe.cur_notify; - // notify_conn_handle = event->subscribe.conn_handle; - // blehr_tx_hrate_reset(); - // } else if (event->subscribe.attr_handle != hrs_hrm_handle) { - // notify_state = event->subscribe.cur_notify; - // notify_conn_handle = 0; - // blehr_tx_hrate_stop(); - // } - // break; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_MTU: - MODLOG_DFLT(INFO, "mtu update event; conn_handle=%d mtu=%d\n", - event->mtu.conn_handle, - event->mtu.value); - break; - - } - - return 0; -} - - -#define ADV_MAX_UUID16_NUM 15 -static uint8_t ble_addr_type; - -ble_qiot_ret_status_t ble_advertising_start(adv_info_s *adv) -{ - int ret = 0, i = 0; - struct ble_gap_adv_params adv_params; - struct ble_hs_adv_fields fields; - struct ble_hs_adv_fields rsp_fields; - uint8_t adv_manufacture_data[32] = {0}; - ble_uuid16_t adv_uuids16_list[ADV_MAX_UUID16_NUM]; - - memset(&fields, 0, sizeof(fields)); - memset(&rsp_fields, 0, sizeof(rsp_fields)); - - // set advertising data - /* Advertise two flags: - * o Discoverability in forthcoming advertisement (general) - * o BLE-only (BR/EDR unsupported). - */ - fields.flags = BLE_HS_ADV_F_DISC_GEN | - BLE_HS_ADV_F_BREDR_UNSUP; - - // fields.uuids16 = (ble_uuid16_t)adv->uuid_info.uuids;?? - if (adv->uuid_info.uuid_num > ADV_MAX_UUID16_NUM) - { - printf("err: too many uuids16 in adv data! (uuids num %d)\r\n", adv->uuid_info.uuid_num); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - for (i=0; iuuid_info.uuid_num; i++) - { - adv_uuids16_list[i].u.type = BLE_UUID_TYPE_16; - adv_uuids16_list[i].value = adv->uuid_info.uuids[i]; - } - fields.uuids16 = adv_uuids16_list; - fields.num_uuids16 = adv->uuid_info.uuid_num; - fields.uuids16_is_complete = 1; - - memcpy(&adv_manufacture_data[0], (uint8_t *)&adv->manufacturer_info.company_identifier, 2); - memcpy(&adv_manufacture_data[2], adv->manufacturer_info.adv_data, adv->manufacturer_info.adv_data_len); - fields.mfg_data = adv_manufacture_data; - fields.mfg_data_len = adv->manufacturer_info.adv_data_len + 2; - - ret = ble_gap_adv_set_fields(&fields); - if (ret != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble_gap_adv_set_fields() err, ret: %d", ret); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - // set advertising respond data - rsp_fields.name = ADV_DEVICE_NAME; - rsp_fields.name_len = strlen(ADV_DEVICE_NAME); - rsp_fields.name_is_complete = 1; - ret = ble_gap_adv_rsp_set_fields(&rsp_fields); - if(ret != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble_gap_adv_rsp_set_fields() err, ret: %d", ret); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - ret = ble_hs_id_infer_auto(0, &ble_addr_type); - if (ret != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble_hs_id_infer_auto() err, ret: %d", ret); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - memset(&adv_params, 0, sizeof adv_params); - adv_params.conn_mode = BLE_GAP_CONN_MODE_UND; - adv_params.disc_mode = BLE_GAP_DISC_MODE_GEN; - ret = ble_gap_adv_start(ble_addr_type, NULL, BLE_HS_FOREVER, - &adv_params, ble_qiot_gap_event_fn, NULL); - if (ret != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble_gap_adv_start() err, ret: %d", ret); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -ble_qiot_ret_status_t ble_advertising_stop(void) -{ - int ret = 0; - - ble_gap_adv_stop(); - if(ret != 0) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("ble_gap_adv_stop() err, ret: %d", ret); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -ble_qiot_ret_status_t ble_send_notify(uint8_t *buf, uint8_t len) -{ - struct os_mbuf *om; - int rc = 0; - - om = ble_hs_mbuf_from_flat(buf, len); - - rc = ble_gattc_notify_custom(qiot_gap_connect_handle, qiot_event_handle, om); - if(rc) - { - ble_qiot_log_e("send notify err, return %d", rc); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -ble_timer_t ble_timer_create(uint8_t type, ble_timer_cb timeout_handle) -{ - return (ble_timer_t)NULL; -} - -ble_qiot_ret_status_t ble_timer_start(ble_timer_t timer_id, uint32_t period) -{ - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -ble_qiot_ret_status_t ble_timer_stop(ble_timer_t timer_id) -{ - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -ble_qiot_ret_status_t ble_timer_delete(ble_timer_t timer_id) -{ - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -// should return ATT_MTU - 3 -uint16_t ble_get_user_data_mtu_size(void) -{ - // this is an example, the default mtu is 23, user should get real mtu and return it - int mtu = 23; - - return mtu - 3; -} diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/ble_qiot_template.c b/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/ble_qiot_template.c deleted file mode 100644 index 6a009eda..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/ble_qiot_template.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,541 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#include "ble_qiot_template.h" - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "ble_qiot_export.h" -#include "ble_qiot_common.h" -#include "ble_qiot_param_check.h" - - -extern void property_power_switch(const char *data, uint16_t len); -extern void action_led_blink(int ms); -extern void report_reply_blink(void); - - -static uint8_t sg_test_power_switch = false; - -static int ble_property_power_switch_set(const char *data, uint16_t len) -{ - ble_qiot_log_d("set property power_switch %d", *(uint8_t *)data); - property_power_switch(data, len); - sg_test_power_switch = data[0]; - - return 0; -} - -static int ble_property_power_switch_get(char *data, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - ble_qiot_log_d("get property power_switch %d", sg_test_power_switch); - data[0] = sg_test_power_switch; - - return sizeof(uint8_t); -} - -static uint16_t sg_test_color = 0; - -static int ble_property_color_set(const char *data, uint16_t len) -{ - uint16_t color_value = 0; - - memcpy(&color_value, data, sizeof(uint16_t)); - color_value = NTOHS(color_value); - ble_qiot_log_d("set property color %d", color_value); - sg_test_color = color_value; - - return 0; -} - -static int ble_property_color_get(char *data, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - uint16_t color_value = 0; - - ble_qiot_log_d("get property color %d", color_value); - color_value = HTONS(sg_test_color); - memcpy(data, &color_value, sizeof(uint16_t)); - - return sizeof(uint16_t); -} - -static int sg_test_brightness = 0; - -static int ble_property_brightness_set(const char *data, uint16_t len) -{ - int brightness_value = 0; - - memcpy(&brightness_value, data, sizeof(int)); - brightness_value = NTOHL(brightness_value); - - if ((brightness_value < BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_BRIGHTNESS_MIN) || - (brightness_value > BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_BRIGHTNESS_MAX)) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid brightness value %d", brightness_value); - return -1; - } - - ble_qiot_log_d("set property brightness %d", brightness_value); - sg_test_brightness = brightness_value; - - return 0; -} - -static int ble_property_brightness_get(char *data, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int brightness_value = 0; - - ble_qiot_log_d("get property brightness %d", sg_test_brightness); - brightness_value = HTONL(sg_test_brightness); - memcpy(data, &brightness_value, sizeof(int)); - - return sizeof(uint32_t); -} - -static char sg_test_name[100 + 1] = "default name"; - -static int ble_property_name_set(const char *data, uint16_t len) -{ - ble_qiot_log_d("set property name %.*s", len, data); - if (len > sizeof(sg_test_name) - 1) { - ble_qiot_log_d("too long name"); - return -1; - } - memset(sg_test_name, 0, sizeof(sg_test_name)); - memcpy(sg_test_name, data, len); - - return 0; -} - -static int ble_property_name_get(char *data, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int i = 0; - - ble_qiot_log_d("get property name %s", sg_test_name); - if (0 == strncmp("default name", sg_test_name, sizeof("default name") - 1)) { - for (i = 0; i < 26 * 3; i++) { - data[i] = 'a' + (i % 26); - } - return i; - } else { - memcpy(data, sg_test_name, strlen(sg_test_name)); - return strlen(sg_test_name); - } -} - -static ble_property_t sg_ble_property_array[BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_BUTT] = { - {ble_property_power_switch_set, ble_property_power_switch_get, BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_AUTH_RW, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BOOL}, - {ble_property_color_set, ble_property_color_get, BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_AUTH_RW, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_ENUM}, - {ble_property_brightness_set, ble_property_brightness_get, BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_AUTH_RW, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_INT}, - {ble_property_name_set, ble_property_name_get, BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_AUTH_RW, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_STRING}, -}; - -static bool ble_check_space_enough_by_type(uint8_t type, uint16_t left_size) -{ - switch (type) { - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BOOL: - return left_size >= sizeof(uint8_t); - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_INT: - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_FLOAT: - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_TIME: - return left_size >= sizeof(uint32_t); - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_ENUM: - return left_size >= sizeof(uint16_t); - default: - // string length is unknow, default true - return true; - } -} - -static uint16_t ble_check_ret_value_by_type(uint8_t type, uint16_t buf_len, uint16_t ret_val) -{ - switch (type) { - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BOOL: - return ret_val <= sizeof(uint8_t); - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_INT: - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_FLOAT: - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_TIME: - return ret_val <= sizeof(uint32_t); - case BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_ENUM: - return ret_val <= sizeof(uint16_t); - default: - // string length is unknow, default true - return ret_val <= buf_len; - } -} - -uint8_t ble_get_property_type_by_id(uint8_t id) -{ - if (id >= BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid property id %d", id); - return BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT; - } - return sg_ble_property_array[id].type; -} - -int ble_user_property_set_data(const e_ble_tlv *tlv) -{ - POINTER_SANITY_CHECK(tlv, BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR_PARA); - if (tlv->id >= BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid property id %d", tlv->id); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } - - if (NULL != sg_ble_property_array[tlv->id].set_cb) { - if (0 != sg_ble_property_array[tlv->id].set_cb(tlv->val, tlv->len)) { - ble_qiot_log_e("set property id %d failed", tlv->id); - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; - } else { - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; - } - } - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid set callback, id %d", tlv->id); - - return BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR; -} - -int ble_user_property_get_data_by_id(uint8_t id, char *buf, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int ret_len = 0; - - POINTER_SANITY_CHECK(buf, BLE_QIOT_RS_ERR_PARA); - if (id >= BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid property id %d", id); - return -1; - } - - if (NULL != sg_ble_property_array[id].get_cb) { - if (!ble_check_space_enough_by_type(sg_ble_property_array[id].type, buf_len)) { - ble_qiot_log_e("not enough space get property id %d data", id); - return -1; - } - ret_len = sg_ble_property_array[id].get_cb(buf, buf_len); - if (ret_len < 0) { - ble_qiot_log_e("get property id %d data failed", id); - return -1; - } else { - if (ble_check_ret_value_by_type(sg_ble_property_array[id].type, buf_len, ret_len)) { - return ret_len; - } else { - ble_qiot_log_e("property id %d length invalid, type %d", id, sg_ble_property_array[id].type); - return -1; - } - } - } - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid callback, property id %d", id); - - return 0; -} - -int ble_user_property_report_reply_handle(uint8_t result) -{ - ble_qiot_log_d("report reply result %d", result); - if (0 == result) { - report_reply_blink(); - } - - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -static int ble_event_get_status_report_status(char *buf, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - buf[0] = 1; - - return 1; -} - -static int ble_event_get_status_report_message(char *buf, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int i = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 26 * 3; i++) { - buf[i] = 'a' + (i % 26); - } - - return i; -} - -static ble_event_param sg_ble_event_status_report_array[BLE_QIOT_EVENT_STATUS_REPORT_PARAM_ID_BUTT] = { - {ble_event_get_status_report_status, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BOOL}, - {ble_event_get_status_report_message, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_STRING}, -}; - -static int ble_event_get_low_voltage_voltage(char *data, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - float tmp = 1.0; - - memcpy(data, &tmp, sizeof(float)); - - return sizeof(float); -} - -static ble_event_param sg_ble_event_low_voltage_array[BLE_QIOT_EVENT_LOW_VOLTAGE_PARAM_ID_BUTT] = { - {ble_event_get_low_voltage_voltage, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_FLOAT}, -}; - -static int ble_event_get_hardware_fault_name(char *data, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - memcpy(data, "hardware_fault", sizeof("hardware_fault") - 1); - - return sizeof("hardware_fault") - 1; -} - -static int ble_event_get_hardware_fault_error_code(char *data, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int error_code = HTONL(1024); - - memcpy(data, &error_code, sizeof(int)); - - return sizeof(int); -} - -static ble_event_param sg_ble_event_hardware_fault_array[BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_PARAM_ID_BUTT] = { - {ble_event_get_hardware_fault_name, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_STRING}, - {ble_event_get_hardware_fault_error_code, BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_INT}, -}; - -static ble_event_t sg_ble_event_array[BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_BUTT] = { - {sg_ble_event_status_report_array, sizeof(sg_ble_event_status_report_array) / sizeof(ble_event_param)}, - {sg_ble_event_low_voltage_array, sizeof(sg_ble_event_low_voltage_array) / sizeof(ble_event_param)}, - {sg_ble_event_hardware_fault_array, sizeof(sg_ble_event_hardware_fault_array) / sizeof(ble_event_param)}, -}; - -int ble_event_get_id_array_size(uint8_t event_id) -{ - if (event_id >= BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid event id %d", event_id); - return -1; - } - - return sg_ble_event_array[event_id].array_size; -} - -uint8_t ble_event_get_param_id_type(uint8_t event_id, uint8_t param_id) -{ - if (event_id >= BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid event id %d", event_id); - return BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT; - } - if (param_id >= sg_ble_event_array[event_id].array_size) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid param id %d", param_id); - return BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT; - } - - return sg_ble_event_array[event_id].event_array[param_id].type; -} - -int ble_event_get_data_by_id(uint8_t event_id, uint8_t param_id, char *out_buf, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int ret_len = 0; - - if (event_id >= BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid event id %d", event_id); - return -1; - } - if (param_id >= sg_ble_event_array[event_id].array_size) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid param id %d", param_id); - return -1; - } - if (NULL == sg_ble_event_array[event_id].event_array[param_id].get_cb) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid callback, event id %d, param id %d", event_id, param_id); - return 0; - } - - if (!ble_check_space_enough_by_type(sg_ble_event_array[event_id].event_array[param_id].type, buf_len)) { - ble_qiot_log_e("not enough space get data, event id %d, param id %d", event_id, param_id); - return -1; - } - ret_len = sg_ble_event_array[event_id].event_array[param_id].get_cb(out_buf, buf_len); - if (ret_len < 0) { - ble_qiot_log_e("get event data failed, event id %d, param id %d", event_id, param_id); - return -1; - } else { - if (ble_check_ret_value_by_type(sg_ble_event_array[event_id].event_array[param_id].type, buf_len, ret_len)) { - return ret_len; - } else { - ble_qiot_log_e("evnet data length invalid, event id %d, param id %d, type %d", event_id, param_id, - sg_ble_event_array[event_id].event_array[param_id].type); - return -1; - } - } -} - -int ble_user_event_reply_handle(uint8_t event_id, uint8_t result) -{ - ble_qiot_log_d("event id %d, reply result %d", event_id, result); - - return BLE_QIOT_RS_OK; -} - -static int ble_action_handle_loop_input_cb(e_ble_tlv *input_param_array, uint8_t input_array_size, - uint8_t *output_id_array) -{ - int result = 0; - - if (NULL == input_param_array || NULL == output_id_array) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid param"); - return -1; - } - - report_reply_blink(); - for (int i = 0; i < input_array_size; i++) { - ble_qiot_log_d("id %d", input_param_array[i].id); - } - - memcpy(&result, input_param_array[0].val, sizeof(int)); - result = NTOHL(result); - ble_qiot_log_d("id %d, val %d", input_param_array[0].id, result); - action_led_blink(result); - - output_id_array[BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_OUTPUT_ID_RESULT] = true; - - return 0; -} - -static int ble_action_handle_loop_output_cb(uint8_t output_id, char *buf, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int data_len = 0; - int i = 0; - - switch (output_id) { - case BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_OUTPUT_ID_RESULT: - for (i = 0; i < 26 * 3; i++) { - buf[i] = 'a' + (i % 26); - } - data_len = i; - break; - default: - break; - } - return data_len; -} - -static uint8_t sg_ble_action_loop_input_type_array[BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_INPUT_ID_BUTT] = { - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_INT, -}; - -static uint8_t sg_ble_action_loop_output_type_array[BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_OUTPUT_ID_BUTT] = { - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_STRING, -}; - -static ble_action_t sg_ble_action_array[BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT] = { - {ble_action_handle_loop_input_cb, ble_action_handle_loop_output_cb, sg_ble_action_loop_input_type_array, - sg_ble_action_loop_output_type_array, sizeof(sg_ble_action_loop_input_type_array) / sizeof(uint8_t), - sizeof(sg_ble_action_loop_output_type_array) / sizeof(uint8_t)}, -}; - -uint8_t ble_action_get_intput_type_by_id(uint8_t action_id, uint8_t input_id) -{ - if (action_id >= BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid action id %d", action_id); - return BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT; - } - if (input_id >= sg_ble_event_array[action_id].array_size) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid input id %d", input_id); - return BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT; - } - - return sg_ble_action_array[action_id].input_type_array[input_id]; -} - -uint8_t ble_action_get_output_type_by_id(uint8_t action_id, uint8_t output_id) -{ - if (action_id >= BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid action id %d", action_id); - return BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT; - } - if (output_id >= sg_ble_event_array[action_id].array_size) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid output id %d", output_id); - return BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT; - } - - return sg_ble_action_array[action_id].output_type_array[output_id]; -} - -int ble_action_get_input_id_size(uint8_t action_id) -{ - if (action_id >= BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid action id %d", action_id); - return -1; - } - - return sg_ble_action_array[action_id].input_id_size; -} - -int ble_action_get_output_id_size(uint8_t action_id) -{ - if (action_id >= BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid action id %d", action_id); - return -1; - } - - return sg_ble_action_array[action_id].output_id_size; -} - -int ble_action_user_handle_input_param(uint8_t action_id, e_ble_tlv *input_param_array, uint8_t input_array_size, - uint8_t *output_id_array) -{ - if (action_id >= BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid action id %d", action_id); - return -1; - } - - if (NULL != sg_ble_action_array[action_id].input_cb) { - if (0 != sg_ble_action_array[action_id].input_cb(input_param_array, input_array_size, output_id_array)) { - ble_qiot_log_e("input handle error"); - return -1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -int ble_action_user_handle_output_param(uint8_t action_id, uint8_t output_id, char *buf, uint16_t buf_len) -{ - int ret_len = 0; - - if (action_id >= BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid action id %d", action_id); - return -1; - } - if (NULL == sg_ble_action_array[action_id].output_cb) { - ble_qiot_log_e("invalid callback, action id %d", action_id); - return 0; - } - - if (!ble_check_space_enough_by_type(sg_ble_action_array[action_id].output_type_array[output_id], buf_len)) { - ble_qiot_log_e("not enough space get data, action id %d, output id %d", action_id, output_id); - return -1; - } - - ret_len = sg_ble_action_array[action_id].output_cb(output_id, buf, buf_len); - if (ret_len < 0) { - ble_qiot_log_e("get action data failed, action id %d, output id %d", action_id, output_id); - return -1; - } else { - if (ble_check_ret_value_by_type(sg_ble_action_array[action_id].output_type_array[output_id], buf_len, - ret_len)) { - return ret_len; - } else { - ble_qiot_log_e("action data length invalid, action id %d, output id %d", action_id, output_id); - return -1; - } - } -} - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/ble_qiot_template.h b/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/ble_qiot_template.h deleted file mode 100644 index 95117c2b..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/ble_qiot_template.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,285 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ -#ifndef BLE_QIOT_TEMPLATE_H_ -#define BLE_QIOT_TEMPLATE_H_ -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#include - -// data type in template, corresponding to type in json file -enum { - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BOOL = 0, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_INT, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_STRING, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_FLOAT, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_ENUM, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_TIME, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_TYPE_BUTT, -}; - -// message type, reference data template -enum { - BLE_QIOT_MSG_TYPE_PROPERTY = 0, - BLE_QIOT_MSG_TYPE_EVENT, - BLE_QIOT_MSG_TYPE_ACTION, - BLE_QIOT_MSG_TYPE_BUTT, -}; - -// define property authority, not used -enum { - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_AUTH_RW = 0, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_AUTH_READ, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_AUTH_BUTT, -}; - -// define reply result -enum { - BLE_QIOT_REPLY_SUCCESS = 0, - BLE_QIOT_REPLY_FAIL, - BLE_QIOT_REPLY_DATA_ERR, - BLE_QIOT_REPLY_BUTT, -}; - -// define message flow direction -enum { - BLE_QIOT_EFFECT_REQUEST = 0, - BLE_QIOT_EFFECT_REPLY, - BLE_QIOT_EFFECT_BUTT, -}; - -// define message type that from server to device -enum { - BLE_QIOT_DATA_DOWN_REPORT_REPLY = 0, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_DOWN_CONTROL, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_DOWN_GET_STATUS_REPLY, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_DOWN_ACTION, - BLE_QIOT_DATA_DOWN_EVENT_REPLY, -}; - -// define message type that from device to server -enum { - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_PROPERTY_REPORT = 0, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_CONTROL_REPLY, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_GET_STATUS, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_EVENT_POST, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_ACTION_REPLY, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_BIND_SIGN_RET, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_CONN_SIGN_RET, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_UNBIND_SIGN_RET, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_REPORT_MTU, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_UP_BUTT, -}; - -// msg header define, bit 7-6 is msg type, bit 5 means request or reply, bit 4 - 0 is id -#define BLE_QIOT_PARSE_MSG_HEAD_TYPE(_C) (((_C)&0XFF) >> 6) -#define BLE_QIOT_PARSE_MSG_HEAD_EFFECT(_C) ((((_C)&0XFF) & 0X20) ? BLE_QIOT_EFFECT_REPLY : BLE_QIOT_EFFECT_REQUEST) -#define BLE_QIOT_PARSE_MSG_HEAD_ID(_C) ((_C)&0X1F) -#define BLE_QIOT_PACKAGE_MSG_HEAD(_TYPE, _REPLY, _ID) \ - (((_TYPE) << 6) | (((_REPLY) == BLE_QIOT_EFFECT_REPLY) << 5) | ((_ID)&0X1F)) - -// tlv header define, bit 7 - 5 is type, bit 4 - 0 depends on type of data template -#define BLE_QIOT_PARSE_TLV_HEAD_TYPE(_C) (((_C)&0XFF) >> 5) -#define BLE_QIOT_PARSE_TLV_HEAD_ID(_C) ((_C)&0X1F) -#define BLE_QIOT_PACKAGE_TLV_HEAD(_TYPE, _ID) (((_TYPE) << 5) | ((_ID)&0X1F)) - -// define property id -enum { - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_POWER_SWITCH = 0, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_COLOR, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_BRIGHTNESS, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_NAME, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_ID_BUTT, -}; - -// define property color enum -enum { - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_COLOR_RED = 0, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_COLOR_GREEN = 1, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_COLOR_BLUE = 2, - BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_COLOR_BUTT = 3, -}; - -// define brightness attributes -#define BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_BRIGHTNESS_STEP (1) -#define BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_BRIGHTNESS_MIN (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_BRIGHTNESS_MAX (100) -#define BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_BRIGHTNESS_START (1) - -// define name length limit -#define BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_NAME_LEN_MIN (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_PROPERTY_NAME_LEN_MAX (640) - -// define property set handle return 0 if success, other is error -// sdk call the function that inform the server data to the device -typedef int (*property_set_cb)(const char *data, uint16_t len); - -// define property get handle. return the data length obtained, -1 is error, 0 is no data -// sdk call the function fetch user data and send to the server, the data should wrapped by user adn skd just transmit -typedef int (*property_get_cb)(char *buf, uint16_t buf_len); - -// each property have a struct ble_property_t, make up a array named sg_ble_property_array -typedef struct { - property_set_cb set_cb; // set callback - property_get_cb get_cb; // get callback - uint8_t authority; // property authority - uint8_t type; // data type -} ble_property_t; - -// define event id -enum { - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_STATUS_REPORT = 0, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_LOW_VOLTAGE, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_HARDWARE_FAULT, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_ID_BUTT, -}; - -// define param id for event status_report -enum { - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_STATUS_REPORT_PARAM_ID_STATUS = 0, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_STATUS_REPORT_PARAM_ID_MESSAGE, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_STATUS_REPORT_PARAM_ID_BUTT, -}; - -// define range for param message -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_STATUS_REPORT_MESSAGE_LEN_MIN (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_STATUS_REPORT_MESSAGE_LEN_MAX (64) - -// define param id for event low_voltage -enum { - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_LOW_VOLTAGE_PARAM_ID_VOLTAGE = 0, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_LOW_VOLTAGE_PARAM_ID_BUTT, -}; - -// define param voltage attributes -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_LOW_VOLTAGE_VOLTAGE_STEP (1) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_LOW_VOLTAGE_VOLTAGE_MIN (0.0) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_LOW_VOLTAGE_VOLTAGE_MAX (24.0) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_LOW_VOLTAGE_VOLTAGE_START (1) - -// define param id for event hardware_fault -enum { - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_PARAM_ID_NAME = 0, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_PARAM_ID_ERROR_CODE, - BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_PARAM_ID_BUTT, -}; - -// define range for param name -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_NAME_LEN_MIN (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_NAME_LEN_MAX (64) - -// define param error_code attributes -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_STEP (1) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MIN (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MAX (2000) -#define BLE_QIOT_EVENT_HARDWARE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_START (1) - -// define event get handle. return the data length obtained, -1 is error, 0 is no data -// sdk call the function fetch user data and send to the server, the data should wrapped by user adn skd just transmit -typedef int (*event_get_cb)(char *buf, uint16_t buf_len); - -// each param have a struct ble_event_param, make up a array for the event -typedef struct { - event_get_cb get_cb; // get param data callback - uint8_t type; // param type -} ble_event_param; - -// a array named sg_ble_event_array is composed by all the event array -typedef struct { - ble_event_param *event_array; // array of params data - uint8_t array_size; // array size -} ble_event_t; - -// define action id -enum { - BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_LOOP = 0, - BLE_QIOT_ACTION_ID_BUTT, -}; - -// define input id for action loop -enum { - BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_INPUT_ID_INTERVAL = 0, - BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_INPUT_ID_BUTT, -}; - -// define output id for action loop -enum { - BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_OUTPUT_ID_RESULT = 0, - BLE_QIOT_ACTION_LOOP_OUTPUT_ID_BUTT, -}; -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_INPUT_LOOP_INTERVAL_MIN (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_INPUT_LOOP_INTERVAL_MAX (100) -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_INPUT_LOOP_INTERVAL_START (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_INPUT_LOOP_INTERVAL_STEP (1) - -// define output id result attributes -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_OUTPUT_LOOP_RESULT_LEN_MIN (0) -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_OUTPUT_LOOP_RESULT_LEN_MAX (320) - -// define max input id and output id in all of input id and output id above -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_INPUT_ID_BUTT 1 -#define BLE_QIOT_ACTION_OUTPUT_ID_BUTT 1 - -// define tlv struct -typedef struct { - uint8_t type; - uint8_t id; - uint16_t len; - char * val; -} e_ble_tlv; - -// define action input handle, return 0 is success, other is error. -// input_param_array carry the data from server, include input id, data length ,data val -// input_array_size means how many input id -// output_id_array filling with output id numbers that need obtained, sdk will traverse it and call the -// action_output_handle to obtained data -typedef int (*action_input_handle)(e_ble_tlv *input_param_array, uint8_t input_array_size, uint8_t *output_id_array); - -// define action output handle, return length of the data, 0 is no data, -1 is error -// output_id means which id data should be obtained -typedef int (*action_output_handle)(uint8_t output_id, char *buf, uint16_t buf_len); - -// each action have a struct ble_action_t, make up a array named sg_ble_action_array -typedef struct { - action_input_handle input_cb; // handle input data - action_output_handle output_cb; // get output data in the callback - uint8_t * input_type_array; // type array for input id - uint8_t * output_type_array; // type array for output id - uint8_t input_id_size; // numbers of input id - uint8_t output_id_size; // numbers of output id -} ble_action_t; -// property module -uint8_t ble_get_property_type_by_id(uint8_t id); -int ble_user_property_set_data(const e_ble_tlv *tlv); -int ble_user_property_get_data_by_id(uint8_t id, char *buf, uint16_t buf_len); -int ble_user_property_report_reply_handle(uint8_t result); - -// event module -int ble_event_get_id_array_size(uint8_t event_id); -uint8_t ble_event_get_param_id_type(uint8_t event_id, uint8_t param_id); -int ble_event_get_data_by_id(uint8_t event_id, uint8_t param_id, char *out_buf, uint16_t buf_len); -int ble_user_event_reply_handle(uint8_t event_id, uint8_t result); - -// action module -uint8_t ble_action_get_intput_type_by_id(uint8_t action_id, uint8_t input_id); -uint8_t ble_action_get_output_type_by_id(uint8_t action_id, uint8_t output_id); -int ble_action_get_input_id_size(uint8_t action_id); -int ble_action_get_output_id_size(uint8_t action_id); -int ble_action_user_handle_input_param(uint8_t action_id, e_ble_tlv *input_param_array, uint8_t input_array_size, - uint8_t *output_id_array); -int ble_action_user_handle_output_param(uint8_t action_id, uint8_t output_id, char *buf, uint16_t buf_len); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif -#endif // BLE_QIOT_TEMPLATE_H_ diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/nrf52832.json b/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/nrf52832.json deleted file mode 100644 index e313f550..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/date_template/nrf52832.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ -{ - "version": "1.0", - "profile": { - "ProductId": "DHZX03IQAZ", - "CategoryId": "141" - }, - "properties": [ - { - "id": "power_switch", - "name": "电ç¯å¼€å…³", - "desc": "控制电ç¯å¼€ç­", - "required": true, - "mode": "rw", - "define": { - "type": "bool", - "mapping": { - "0": "å…³", - "1": "å¼€" - } - } - }, - { - "id": "color", - "name": "颜色", - "desc": "ç¯å…‰é¢œè‰²", - "mode": "rw", - "define": { - "type": "enum", - "mapping": { - "0": "Red", - "1": "Green", - "2": "Blue" - } - } - }, - { - "id": "brightness", - "name": "亮度", - "desc": "ç¯å…‰äº®åº¦", - "mode": "rw", - "define": { - "type": "int", - "unit": "%", - "step": "1", - "min": "0", - "max": "100", - "start": "1" - } - }, - { - "id": "name", - "name": "ç¯ä½ç½®å称", - "desc": "ç¯ä½ç½®å称：书房ã€å®¢åŽ…ç­‰", - "mode": "rw", - "define": { - "type": "string", - "min": "0", - "max": "640" - }, - "required": false - } - ], - "events": [ - { - "id": "status_report", - "name": "DeviceStatus", - "desc": "Report the device status", - "type": "info", - "required": false, - "params": [ - { - "id": "status", - "name": "running_state", - "desc": "Report current device running state", - "define": { - "type": "bool", - "mapping": { - "0": "normal", - "1": "fault" - } - } - }, - { - "id": "message", - "name": "Message", - "desc": "Some extra message", - "define": { - "type": "string", - "min": "0", - "max": "64" - } - } - ] - }, - { - "id": "low_voltage", - "name": "LowVoltage", - "desc": "Alert for device voltage is low", - "type": "alert", - "required": false, - "params": [ - { - "id": "voltage", - "name": "Voltage", - "desc": "Current voltage", - "define": { - "type": "float", - "unit": "V", - "step": "1", - "min": "0.0", - "max": "24.0", - "start": "1" - } - } - ] - }, - { - "id": "hardware_fault", - "name": "Hardware_fault", - "desc": "Report hardware fault", - "type": "fault", - "required": false, - "params": [ - { - "id": "name", - "name": "Name", - "desc": "Name like: memory,tf card, censors ...", - "define": { - "type": "string", - "min": "0", - "max": "64" - } - }, - { - "id": "error_code", - "name": "Error_Code", - "desc": "Error code for fault", - "define": { - "type": "int", - "unit": "", - "step": "1", - "min": "0", - "max": "2000", - "start": "1" - } - } - ] - } - ], - "actions": [ - { - "id": "loop", - "name": "loop", - "desc": "", - "input": [ - { - "id": "interval", - "name": "interval", - "define": { - "type": "int", - "min": "0", - "max": "100", - "start": "0", - "step": "1", - "unit": "" - } - } - ], - "output": [ - { - "id": "result", - "name": "result", - "define": { - "type": "string", - "min": "0", - "max": "320" - } - } - ], - "required": false - } - ] -} diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.c b/examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1420ef1a..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,209 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#include "flash_storage.h" -#include "ble_qiot_config.h" -#include "nrf_fstorage.h" -#include "nrf_sdh.h" -#include "nrf_sdh_ble.h" -#include "nrf_fstorage_nvmc.h" -#include "nrf_log.h" -#include "nrf_log_ctrl.h" -#include "nrf_log_default_backends.h" -#include - - -#ifdef SOFTDEVICE_PRESENT -#include "nrf_fstorage_sd.h" -#else -#include "nrf_fstorage_nvmc.h" -#endif - -static void fstorage_evt_handler(nrf_fstorage_evt_t *p_evt); - -NRF_FSTORAGE_DEF(nrf_fstorage_t fstorage) = { - /* Set a handler for fstorage events. */ - .evt_handler = fstorage_evt_handler, - - /* These below are the boundaries of the flash space assigned to this instance of fstorage. - * You must set these manually, even at runtime, before nrf_fstorage_init() is called. - * The function nrf5_flash_end_addr_get() can be used to retrieve the last address on the - * last page of flash available to write data. */ - .start_addr = 0x7e000, - .end_addr = 0x7ffff, -}; - -static void *p_write_buf = NULL; - -void fstorage_init(void) -{ - nrf_fstorage_api_t *p_fs_api; - ret_code_t rc; - -#ifdef SOFTDEVICE_PRESENT - NRF_LOG_INFO("SoftDevice is present."); - NRF_LOG_INFO("Initializing nrf_fstorage_sd implementation..."); - /* Initialize an fstorage instance using the nrf_fstorage_sd backend. - * nrf_fstorage_sd uses the SoftDevice to write to flash. This implementation can safely be - * used whenever there is a SoftDevice, regardless of its status (enabled/disabled). */ - p_fs_api = &nrf_fstorage_sd; -#else - NRF_LOG_INFO("SoftDevice not present."); - NRF_LOG_INFO("Initializing nrf_fstorage_nvmc implementation..."); - /* Initialize an fstorage instance using the nrf_fstorage_nvmc backend. - * nrf_fstorage_nvmc uses the NVMC peripheral. This implementation can be used when the - * SoftDevice is disabled or not present. - * - * Using this implementation when the SoftDevice is enabled results in a hardfault. */ - p_fs_api = &nrf_fstorage_nvmc; -#endif - - p_write_buf = NULL; - rc = nrf_fstorage_init(&fstorage, p_fs_api, NULL); - APP_ERROR_CHECK(rc); -} - -/**@brief Helper function to obtain the last address on the last page of the on-chip flash that - * can be used to write user data. - * It is possible to set the start and end addresses of an fstorage instance at runtime. - * They can be set multiple times, should it be needed. The helper function below can - * be used to determine the last address on the last page of flash memory available to - * store data. - */ -/* -static uint32_t nrf5_flash_end_addr_get() -{ - uint32_t const bootloader_addr = NRF_UICR->NRFFW[0]; - uint32_t const page_sz = NRF_FICR->CODEPAGESIZE; - uint32_t const code_sz = NRF_FICR->CODESIZE; - - return (bootloader_addr != 0xFFFFFFFF ? - bootloader_addr : (code_sz * page_sz)); -} -*/ - -/**@brief Sleep until an event is received. */ -static void power_manage(void) -{ -#ifdef SOFTDEVICE_PRESENT - (void)sd_app_evt_wait(); -#else - __WFE(); -#endif -} - -int fstorage_read(uint32_t addr, uint32_t read_len, void *p_data) -{ - ret_code_t rc; - - /* Read data. */ - rc = nrf_fstorage_read(&fstorage, addr, p_data, read_len); - if (rc != NRF_SUCCESS) { - NRF_LOG_ERROR("nrf_fstorage_read() returned: %s\n", nrf_strerror_get(rc)); - return 0; - } - - return read_len; -} - -static uint32_t round_up_u32(uint32_t len) -{ - if (len % sizeof(uint32_t)) { - return (len + sizeof(uint32_t) - (len % sizeof(uint32_t))); - } - - return len; -} - -int fstorage_erase(uint32_t addr) -{ - ret_code_t rc; - - rc = nrf_fstorage_erase(&fstorage, addr, BLE_QIOT_RECORD_FLASH_PAGENUM, NULL); - if (rc != NRF_SUCCESS) { - NRF_LOG_ERROR("nrf_fstorage_erase() returned: %s\n", nrf_strerror_get(rc)); - return rc; - } - - return 0; -} - -int fstorage_write(uint32_t addr, uint32_t write_len, void const *p_data) -{ - /* The following code snippet make sure that the length of the data we are writing to flash - * is a multiple of the program unit of the flash peripheral (4 bytes). - */ - uint32_t len = round_up_u32(write_len); - ret_code_t rc; - - rc = nrf_fstorage_erase(&fstorage, addr, BLE_QIOT_RECORD_FLASH_PAGENUM, NULL); - if (rc != NRF_SUCCESS) { - NRF_LOG_ERROR("nrf_fstorage_erase() returned: %s\n", nrf_strerror_get(rc)); - } - - /* Copy the data to write in flash. - * Because the fstorage interface is asynchrounous, the data must be kept in memory before get - * the NRF_FSTORAGE_EVT_WRITE_RESULT event. This memory will be free in fstorage_evt_handler(). - */ - p_write_buf = (void *)malloc(len); - if (NULL == p_write_buf) { - NRF_LOG_ERROR("fstorage_write() malloc size %d error", len); - return 0; - } - - memset(p_write_buf, 0, len); - memcpy(p_write_buf, p_data, write_len); - - rc = nrf_fstorage_write(&fstorage, addr, p_write_buf, len, NULL); - if (rc != NRF_SUCCESS) { - NRF_LOG_ERROR("nrf_fstorage_write() returned: %s\n", nrf_strerror_get(rc)); - return 0; - } - - return write_len; -} - -static void fstorage_evt_handler(nrf_fstorage_evt_t *p_evt) -{ - if (p_evt->result != NRF_SUCCESS) { - NRF_LOG_INFO("fstorage event received: ERROR while executing an fstorage operation."); - return; - } - - switch (p_evt->id) { - case NRF_FSTORAGE_EVT_WRITE_RESULT: { - free(p_write_buf); - p_write_buf = NULL; - NRF_LOG_INFO("fstorage event received: wrote %d bytes at address 0x%x.", p_evt->len, p_evt->addr); - } break; - - case NRF_FSTORAGE_EVT_ERASE_RESULT: { - NRF_LOG_INFO("fstorage event received: erased %d page from address 0x%x.", p_evt->len, p_evt->addr); - } break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -/** - * @brief While fstorage is busy, sleep and wait for an event. - * - * @param p_fstorage nrf_fstorage_t obj - */ -void wait_for_flash_ready(nrf_fstorage_t const *p_fstorage) -{ - /* While fstorage is busy, sleep and wait for an event. */ - while (nrf_fstorage_is_busy(p_fstorage)) { - power_manage(); - } -} diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.h b/examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.h deleted file mode 100644 index e48b251e..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/flash_storage.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#include - -/** - * @brief initialize of flash storage - * - */ -void fstorage_init(void); - -/** - * @brief read data from flash - * - * @param addr read address from flash - * @param read_len length of data to read - * @param p_data point to read buf - * @return read length is success, other is error - */ -int fstorage_read(uint32_t addr, uint32_t read_len, void *p_data); - -/** - * @brief write data to flash, must erase before write - * - * @param addr write address in flash - * @param write_len length of data to write - * @param p_data point to write buf - * @return write length is success, other is error - */ -int fstorage_write(uint32_t addr, uint32_t write_len, void const *p_data); - -/** - * @brief erase one page - * - * @param addr address must align to page. For example, one page is 4096 bytes, - * you want to erase address 0x1020, you should set address 0x1000 - * @return 0 is succcess, other is error - */ -int fstorage_erase(uint32_t addr); diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.c b/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.c deleted file mode 100644 index 419b3dad..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -/** - * Copyright (c) 2017 - 2019, Nordic Semiconductor ASA - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this - * list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form, except as embedded into a Nordic - * Semiconductor ASA integrated circuit in a product or a software update for - * such product, must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of - * conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other - * materials provided with the distribution. - * - * 3. Neither the name of Nordic Semiconductor ASA nor the names of its - * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this - * software without specific prior written permission. - * - * 4. This software, with or without modification, must only be used with a - * Nordic Semiconductor ASA integrated circuit. - * - * 5. Any software provided in binary form under this license must not be reverse - * engineered, decompiled, modified and/or disassembled. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY NORDIC SEMICONDUCTOR ASA "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS - * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY, NONINFRINGEMENT, AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE - * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL NORDIC SEMICONDUCTOR ASA OR CONTRIBUTORS BE - * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE - * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT - * OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - */ -#include "sdk_common.h" -#if NRF_MODULE_ENABLED(NRF_FPRINTF) -#include - -#include "nrf_assert.h" -#include "nrf_fprintf_format.h" - -void nrf_fprintf_buffer_flush(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx) -{ - ASSERT(p_ctx != NULL); - - if (p_ctx->io_buffer_cnt == 0) - { - return; - } - - p_ctx->fwrite(p_ctx->p_user_ctx, - p_ctx->p_io_buffer, - p_ctx->io_buffer_cnt); - p_ctx->io_buffer_cnt = 0; -} - -void nrf_fprintf(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, - char const * p_fmt, - ...) -{ - ASSERT(p_ctx != NULL); - ASSERT(p_ctx->fwrite != NULL); - ASSERT(p_ctx->p_io_buffer != NULL); - ASSERT(p_ctx->io_buffer_size > 0); - - if (p_fmt == NULL) - { - return; - } - - va_list args = {0}; - va_start(args, p_fmt); - - nrf_fprintf_fmt(p_ctx, p_fmt, &args); - - va_end(args); -} - -#endif // NRF_MODULE_ENABLED(NRF_FPRINTF) - diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.h b/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3edb2c70..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -/** - * Copyright (c) 2017 - 2019, Nordic Semiconductor ASA - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this - * list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form, except as embedded into a Nordic - * Semiconductor ASA integrated circuit in a product or a software update for - * such product, must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of - * conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other - * materials provided with the distribution. - * - * 3. Neither the name of Nordic Semiconductor ASA nor the names of its - * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this - * software without specific prior written permission. - * - * 4. This software, with or without modification, must only be used with a - * Nordic Semiconductor ASA integrated circuit. - * - * 5. Any software provided in binary form under this license must not be reverse - * engineered, decompiled, modified and/or disassembled. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY NORDIC SEMICONDUCTOR ASA "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS - * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY, NONINFRINGEMENT, AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE - * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL NORDIC SEMICONDUCTOR ASA OR CONTRIBUTORS BE - * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE - * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT - * OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - */ -#ifndef NRF_FPRINTF_H__ -#define NRF_FPRINTF_H__ - -#include -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -typedef void (* nrf_fprintf_fwrite)(void const * p_user_ctx, char const * p_str, size_t length); - -/** - * @brief fprintf context - */ -typedef struct nrf_fprintf_ctx -{ - char * const p_io_buffer; ///< Pointer to IO buffer. - size_t const io_buffer_size; ///< IO buffer size. - size_t io_buffer_cnt; ///< IO buffer usage. - bool auto_flush; ///< Auto flush configurator. - - void const * const p_user_ctx; ///< Pointer to user data to be passed to the fwrite funciton. - - nrf_fprintf_fwrite fwrite; ///< Pointer to function sending data stream. -} nrf_fprintf_ctx_t; - - -/** - * @brief Macro for defining nrf_fprintf instance. - * - * @param name Instance name. - * @param _p_user_ctx Pointer to user data. - * @param _p_io_buffer Pointer to IO buffer - * @param _io_buffer_size Size of IO buffer. - * @param _auto_flush Indicator if IO buffer shall be automatically flush. - * @param _fwrite Pointer to function sending data stream. - * */ -#define NRF_FPRINTF_DEF(name, _p_user_ctx, _p_io_buffer, _io_buffer_size, _auto_flush, _fwrite) \ - static nrf_fprintf_ctx_t name = \ - { \ - .p_io_buffer = _p_io_buffer, \ - .io_buffer_size = _io_buffer_size, \ - .io_buffer_cnt = 0, \ - .auto_flush = _auto_flush, \ - .p_user_ctx = _p_user_ctx, \ - .fwrite = _fwrite \ - } - -/** - * @brief fprintf like function which send formated data stream to output specified by user - * @ref nrf_fprintf_ctx_t - * - * @param p_ctx fprintf context. - * @param p_fmt Format string. - * @param ... List of parameters to print. - * */ -void nrf_fprintf(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, - char const * p_fmt, - ...); - -/** - * @brief function flushing data stored in io_buffer @ref nrf_fprintf_ctx_t - * - * @param p_ctx fprintf context - */ -void nrf_fprintf_buffer_flush(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx); - - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* NRF_FPRINTF_H__ */ - diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.c b/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.c deleted file mode 100644 index b5b3e218..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,516 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************* -* SEGGER Microcontroller GmbH & Co. KG * -* The Embedded Experts * -********************************************************************** -* * -* (c) 2014 - 2017 SEGGER Microcontroller GmbH & Co. KG * -* * -* www.segger.com Support: support@segger.com * -* * -********************************************************************** -* * -* SEGGER RTT * Real Time Transfer for embedded targets * -* * -********************************************************************** -* * -* All rights reserved. * -* * -* SEGGER strongly recommends to not make any changes * -* to or modify the source code of this software in order to stay * -* compatible with the RTT protocol and J-Link. * -* * -* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or * -* without modification, are permitted provided that the following * -* conditions are met: * -* * -* o Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * -* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * -* * -* o Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above * -* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following * -* disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided * -* with the distribution. * -* * -* o Neither the name of SEGGER Microcontroller GmbH & Co. KG * -* nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or * -* promote products derived from this software without specific * -* prior written permission. * -* * -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND * -* CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, * -* INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * -* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE * -* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL SEGGER Microcontroller BE LIABLE FOR * -* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * -* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT * -* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; * -* OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * -* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE * -* USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH * -* DAMAGE. * -* * -********************************************************************** -* * -* RTT version: 6.14d * -* * -*********************************************************************/ - -#include "sdk_common.h" -#if NRF_MODULE_ENABLED(NRF_FPRINTF) - -#include - -#include "nrf_assert.h" -#include "nrf_fprintf.h" -#include "nrf_fprintf_format.h" - -#define NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY (1u << 0) -#define NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PAD_ZERO (1u << 1) -#define NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PRINT_SIGN (1u << 2) - -static void buffer_add(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, char c) -{ -#if NRF_MODULE_ENABLED(NRF_FPRINTF_FLAG_AUTOMATIC_CR_ON_LF) - if (c == '\n') - { - buffer_add(p_ctx, '\r'); - } -#endif - p_ctx->p_io_buffer[p_ctx->io_buffer_cnt++] = c; - - if (p_ctx->io_buffer_cnt >= p_ctx->io_buffer_size) - { - nrf_fprintf_buffer_flush(p_ctx); - } -} - -static void string_print(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, - char const * p_str, - uint32_t FieldWidth, - uint32_t FormatFlags) -{ - uint32_t Width = 0; - char c; - - if ((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY) == NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY) - { - while ((c = *p_str) != '\0') - { - p_str++; - Width++; - buffer_add(p_ctx, c); - } - - while ((FieldWidth > Width) && (FieldWidth > 0)) - { - FieldWidth--; - buffer_add(p_ctx, ' '); - } - } - else - { - if (p_str != 0) - { - Width = strlen(p_str); - } - - while ((FieldWidth > Width) && (FieldWidth > 0)) - { - FieldWidth--; - buffer_add(p_ctx, ' '); - } - - while ((c = *p_str) != '\0') - { - p_str++; - Width++; - buffer_add(p_ctx, c); - } - } -} - -static void unsigned_print(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, - uint32_t v, - uint32_t Base, - uint32_t NumDigits, - uint32_t FieldWidth, - uint32_t FormatFlags) -{ - static const char _aV2C[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; - uint32_t Div; - uint32_t Value; - uint32_t Width; - char c; - - Value = v; - // - // Get actual field width - // - Width = 1u; - while (Value >= Base) - { - Value = (Value / Base); - Width++; - } - if (NumDigits > Width) - { - Width = NumDigits; - } - // - // Print leading chars if necessary - // - if ((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY) == 0u) - { - if (FieldWidth != 0u) - { - if (((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PAD_ZERO) == NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PAD_ZERO) && - (NumDigits == 0u)) - { - c = '0'; - } - else - { - c = ' '; - } - while ((FieldWidth != 0u) && (Width < FieldWidth)) - { - FieldWidth--; - buffer_add(p_ctx, c); - } - } - } - - Value = 1; - /* - * Compute Digit. - * Loop until Digit has the value of the highest digit required. - * Example: If the output is 345 (Base 10), loop 2 times until Digit is 100. - */ - while (1) - { - /* User specified a min number of digits to print? => Make sure we loop at least that - * often, before checking anything else (> 1 check avoids problems with NumDigits - * being signed / unsigned) - */ - if (NumDigits > 1u) - { - NumDigits--; - } - else - { - Div = v / Value; - // Is our divider big enough to extract the highest digit from value? => Done - if (Div < Base) - { - break; - } - } - Value *= Base; - } - // - // Output digits - // - do - { - Div = v / Value; - v -= Div * Value; - buffer_add(p_ctx, _aV2C[Div]); - Value /= Base; - } while (Value); - // - // Print trailing spaces if necessary - // - if ((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY) == NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY) - { - if (FieldWidth != 0u) - { - while ((FieldWidth != 0u) && (Width < FieldWidth)) - { - FieldWidth--; - buffer_add(p_ctx, ' '); - } - } - } -} - -static void int_print(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, - int32_t v, - uint32_t Base, - uint32_t NumDigits, - uint32_t FieldWidth, - uint32_t FormatFlags) -{ - uint32_t Width; - int32_t Number; - - Number = (v < 0) ? -v : v; - - // - // Get actual field width - // - Width = 1u; - while (Number >= (int32_t)Base) - { - Number = (Number / (int32_t)Base); - Width++; - } - if (NumDigits > Width) - { - Width = NumDigits; - } - if ((FieldWidth > 0u) && ((v < 0) || - ((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PRINT_SIGN) == NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PRINT_SIGN))) - { - FieldWidth--; - } - // - // Print leading spaces if necessary - // - if ((((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PAD_ZERO) == 0u) || (NumDigits != 0u)) && - ((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY) == 0u)) - { - if (FieldWidth != 0u) - { - while ((FieldWidth != 0u) && (Width < FieldWidth)) - { - FieldWidth--; - buffer_add(p_ctx, ' '); - } - } - } - // - // Print sign if necessary - // - if (v < 0) - { - v = -v; - buffer_add(p_ctx, '-'); - } - else if ((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PRINT_SIGN) == NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PRINT_SIGN) - { - buffer_add(p_ctx, '+'); - } - else - { - /* do nothing */ - } - // - // Print leading zeros if necessary - // - if (((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PAD_ZERO) == NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PAD_ZERO) && - ((FormatFlags & NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY) == 0u) && (NumDigits == 0u)) - { - if (FieldWidth != 0u) - { - while ((FieldWidth != 0u) && (Width < FieldWidth)) - { - FieldWidth--; - buffer_add(p_ctx, '0'); - } - } - } - // - // Print number without sign - // - unsigned_print(p_ctx, (uint32_t)v, Base, NumDigits, FieldWidth, FormatFlags); -} - -void nrf_fprintf_fmt(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, - char const * p_fmt, - va_list * p_args) -{ - ASSERT(p_ctx != NULL); - - ASSERT(p_ctx->fwrite != NULL); - ASSERT(p_ctx->p_io_buffer != NULL); - ASSERT(p_ctx->io_buffer_size > 0); - - if (p_fmt == NULL) - { - return; - } - - char c; - int32_t v; - uint32_t NumDigits; - uint32_t FormatFlags; - uint32_t FieldWidth; - - do - { - c = *p_fmt; - p_fmt++; - - if (c == 0u) - { - break; - } - if (c == '%') - { - // - // Filter out flags - // - FormatFlags = 0u; - v = 1; - - do - { - c = *p_fmt; - switch (c) - { - case '-': - FormatFlags |= NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_LEFT_JUSTIFY; - p_fmt++; - break; - case '0': - FormatFlags |= NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PAD_ZERO; - p_fmt++; - break; - case '+': - FormatFlags |= NRF_CLI_FORMAT_FLAG_PRINT_SIGN; - p_fmt++; - break; - default: - v = 0; - break; - } - } while (v); - - // - // filter out field width - // - FieldWidth = 0u; - do - { - if (c == '*') - { - /*lint -save -e64 -e56*/ - FieldWidth += va_arg(*p_args, unsigned); - /*lint -restore*/ - p_fmt++; - break; - } - c = *p_fmt; - if ((c < '0') || (c > '9')) - { - break; - } - p_fmt++; - FieldWidth = (FieldWidth * 10u) + (c - '0'); - } while (1); - - // - // Filter out precision (number of digits to display) - // - NumDigits = 0u; - c = *p_fmt; - if (c == '.') - { - p_fmt++; - do - { - c = *p_fmt; - if ((c < '0') || (c > '9')) - { - break; - } - p_fmt++; - NumDigits = NumDigits * 10u + (c - '0'); - } while (1); - } - // - // Filter out length modifier - // - c = *p_fmt; - do - { - if ((c == 'l') || (c == 'h')) - { - p_fmt++; - c = *p_fmt; - } - else - { - break; - } - } while (1); - // - // Handle specifiers - // - /*lint -save -e64*/ - switch (c) - { - case 'c': - { - char c0; - v = va_arg(*p_args, int32_t); - c0 = (char)v; - buffer_add(p_ctx, c0); - break; - } - case 'd': - case 'i': - v = va_arg(*p_args, int32_t); - int_print(p_ctx, - v, - 10u, - NumDigits, - FieldWidth, - FormatFlags); - break; - case 'u': - v = va_arg(*p_args, int32_t); - unsigned_print(p_ctx, - (uint32_t)v, - 10u, - NumDigits, - FieldWidth, - FormatFlags); - break; - case 'x': - case 'X': - v = va_arg(*p_args, int32_t); - unsigned_print(p_ctx, - (uint32_t)v, - 16u, - NumDigits, - FieldWidth, - FormatFlags); - break; - case 's': - { - char const * p_s = va_arg(*p_args, const char *); - string_print(p_ctx, p_s, FieldWidth, FormatFlags); - break; - } - case 'p': - v = va_arg(*p_args, int32_t); - buffer_add(p_ctx, '0'); - buffer_add(p_ctx, 'x'); - unsigned_print(p_ctx, (uint32_t)v, 16u, 8u, 8u, 0); - break; - case '%': - buffer_add(p_ctx, '%'); - break; - default: - break; - } - /*lint -restore*/ - p_fmt++; - } - else - { - buffer_add(p_ctx, c); - } - } while (*p_fmt != '\0'); - - if (p_ctx->auto_flush) - { - nrf_fprintf_buffer_flush(p_ctx); - } -} - -#endif // NRF_MODULE_ENABLED(NRF_FPRINTF) - diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.h b/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.h deleted file mode 100644 index 920e6859..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/fprintf/nrf_fprintf_format.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************* -* SEGGER Microcontroller GmbH & Co. KG * -* The Embedded Experts * -********************************************************************** -* * -* (c) 2014 - 2017 SEGGER Microcontroller GmbH & Co. KG * -* * -* www.segger.com Support: support@segger.com * -* * -********************************************************************** -* * -* SEGGER RTT * Real Time Transfer for embedded targets * -* * -********************************************************************** -* * -* All rights reserved. * -* * -* SEGGER strongly recommends to not make any changes * -* to or modify the source code of this software in order to stay * -* compatible with the RTT protocol and J-Link. * -* * -* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or * -* without modification, are permitted provided that the following * -* conditions are met: * -* * -* o Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * -* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * -* * -* o Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above * -* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following * -* disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided * -* with the distribution. * -* * -* o Neither the name of SEGGER Microcontroller GmbH & Co. KG * -* nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or * -* promote products derived from this software without specific * -* prior written permission. * -* * -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND * -* CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, * -* INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * -* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE * -* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL SEGGER Microcontroller BE LIABLE FOR * -* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * -* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT * -* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; * -* OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * -* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE * -* USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH * -* DAMAGE. * -* * -********************************************************************** -* * -* RTT version: 6.14d * -* * -*********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef NRF_FPRINTF_FORMAT_H__ -#define NRF_FPRINTF_FORMAT_H__ - -#include -#include "nrf_fprintf.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @brief Printf like function which sends formated data stream to output. - * - * @param nrf_fprintf_ctx_t Print context. - * @param p_fmt Format string. - * @param p_args List of parameters to print. - * */ -void nrf_fprintf_fmt(nrf_fprintf_ctx_t * const p_ctx, - char const * p_fmt, - va_list * p_args); - - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* NRF_FPRINTF_FORMAT_H__ */ - diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/gatt_svr.c b/examples/nimble_llsync/gatt_svr.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1ebcabe8..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/gatt_svr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,155 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "host/ble_uuid.h" -// #include "blehr_sens.h" - -#include "services/dis/ble_svc_dis.h" -#include "services/bas/ble_svc_bas.h" - -#define GATT_DEVICE_INFO_UUID 0x180A -#define GATT_MANUFACTURER_NAME_UUID 0x2A29 -#define GATT_MODEL_NUMBER_UUID 0x2A24 - -#define REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE 100 -static char reply[REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE]; - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_manufacturer( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_model( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg); - -/* define several bluetooth services for our device */ -static const struct ble_gatt_svc_def gatt_svr_svcs[] = { - /* - * access_cb defines a callback for read and write access events on - * given characteristics - */ - { - /* Service: Device Information */ - .type = BLE_GATT_SVC_TYPE_PRIMARY, - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_DEVICE_INFO_UUID), - .characteristics = (struct ble_gatt_chr_def[]) { { - /* Characteristic: * Manufacturer name */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_MANUFACTURER_NAME_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_manufacturer, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - /* Characteristic: Model number string */ - .uuid = BLE_UUID16_DECLARE(GATT_MODEL_NUMBER_UUID), - .access_cb = gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_model, - .flags = BLE_GATT_CHR_F_READ, - }, { - 0, /* No more characteristics in this service */ - }, } - }, - { - 0, /* No more services */ - }, -}; - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_manufacturer( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - printf("service 'device info: manufacturer' callback triggered\n"); - - snprintf(reply, REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE, "This is TencentOS tiny\n"); - printf("reply: %s\n", reply); - - int rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, reply, strlen(reply)); - - printf("\n"); - - return rc; -} - -static int gatt_svr_chr_access_device_info_model( - uint16_t conn_handle, uint16_t attr_handle, - struct ble_gatt_access_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - printf("service 'device info: model' callback triggered\n"); - - snprintf(reply, REPLY_BUFFER_SIZE, "running TencentOS tiny on nordic ble board"); - printf("reply: %s\n", reply); - - int rc = os_mbuf_append(ctxt->om, reply, strlen(reply)); - - printf("\n"); - - return rc; -} - -void -gatt_svr_register_cb(struct ble_gatt_register_ctxt *ctxt, void *arg) -{ - char buf[BLE_UUID_STR_LEN]; - - switch (ctxt->op) { - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_SVC: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registered service %s with handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->svc.svc_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->svc.handle); - break; - - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_CHR: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registering characteristic %s with " - "def_handle=%d val_handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->chr.chr_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->chr.def_handle, - ctxt->chr.val_handle); - break; - - case BLE_GATT_REGISTER_OP_DSC: - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "registering descriptor %s with handle=%d\n", - ble_uuid_to_str(ctxt->dsc.dsc_def->uuid, buf), - ctxt->dsc.handle); - break; - - default: - assert(0); - break; - } -} - -int -gatt_svr_init(void) -{ - int rc; - - rc = ble_gatts_count_cfg(gatt_svr_svcs); - if (rc != 0) { - return rc; - } - - rc = ble_gatts_add_svcs(gatt_svr_svcs); - if (rc != 0) { - return rc; - } - - return 0; -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_llsync/main.c b/examples/nimble_llsync/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5c26b096..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_llsync/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,142 +0,0 @@ -#include -#include -#include - -#include "nimble/nimble_port_tencentos_tiny.h" - -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "host/util/util.h" -#include "host/ble_gatt.h" -#include "services/gap/ble_svc_gap.h" -#include "services/gatt/ble_svc_gatt.h" - -#include "boards.h" -#include "ble_qiot_config.h" -#include "flash_storage.h" - -#include "ble_qiot_export.h" -#include "ble_qiot_import.h" - - -extern int gatt_svr_init(void); -extern void board_init(void); -extern void nimble_port_init(void); - -static const char device_name[] = "TOS LLSync"; - -static uint8_t ble_addr_type; - -void ble_boot(void *arg) -{ - int rc = 0; - - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - /* make sure synchronization of host and controller is done */ - while (!ble_hs_synced()) { - ; - } - - rc = ble_hs_util_ensure_addr(0); - assert(rc == 0); - rc = ble_hs_id_infer_auto(0, &ble_addr_type); - assert(rc == 0); - - ble_svc_gap_init(); - ble_svc_gatt_init(); - - /* verify and add our custom services */ - rc = gatt_svr_init(); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* init llsync, add llsync services */ - ble_qiot_explorer_init(); - - /* set the device name */ - rc = ble_svc_gap_device_name_set(device_name); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* reload the GATT server to link our added services */ - ble_gatts_start(); - - /* llsync start advertising */ - ble_qiot_advertising_start(); - - return; -} - -static void leds_init(void) -{ - bsp_board_init(BSP_INIT_LEDS); -} - -void property_power_switch(const char *data, uint16_t len) -{ - if (data[0]) { - bsp_board_led_on(BSP_BOARD_LED_0); - printf("Received LED ON!"); - } else { - bsp_board_led_off(BSP_BOARD_LED_0); - printf("Received LED OFF!"); - } - return; -} - -void action_led_blink(int ms) -{ - bsp_board_led_on(BSP_BOARD_LED_1); - tos_sleep_ms(ms); - bsp_board_led_off(BSP_BOARD_LED_1); - tos_sleep_ms(ms); - bsp_board_led_on(BSP_BOARD_LED_1); - tos_sleep_ms(ms); - bsp_board_led_off(BSP_BOARD_LED_1); - tos_sleep_ms(ms); - bsp_board_led_on(BSP_BOARD_LED_1); - tos_sleep_ms(ms); - bsp_board_led_off(BSP_BOARD_LED_1); -} - -void report_reply_blink(void) -{ - bsp_board_led_on(BSP_BOARD_LED_2); - tos_sleep_ms(200); - bsp_board_led_off(BSP_BOARD_LED_2); - tos_sleep_ms(200); - bsp_board_led_on(BSP_BOARD_LED_2); - tos_sleep_ms(200); - bsp_board_led_off(BSP_BOARD_LED_2); -} - - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[2048]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - // other devices init - leds_init(); - - /* init flash that llsync need to save some device info */ - fstorage_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - /* - in this case, ble_boot_task's priority must lower than MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_HOST_TASK_PRIORITY && MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_LL_TASK_PRIORITY, - numerically bigger - to give the host and ll task a chance to run first just after the nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init. - */ - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 6, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh/main.c b/examples/nimble_mesh/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index 90808a17..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,564 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#include -#include "mesh/mesh.h" -#include "console/console.h" -#if 0 -#include "hal/hal_system.h" -#include "hal/hal_gpio.h" -#include "bsp/bsp.h" -#include "shell/shell.h" -#endif - -/////////////////////// -// stub-s -#define LED_1 17 -#define LED_2 18 -#define LED_3 19 -#define LED_4 20 - -void hal_gpio_init_out(int led, int s) -{ - -} - -void hal_gpio_write(int led, int s) -{ - -} - -int __atomic_load_4(int *p) -{ - return *p; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_and_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p & v; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_or_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p | v; -} - -int __atomic_exchange_4(int *p, int v) -{ - int old = *p; - *p = v; - return old; -} - -void unreachable(void) -{ - while (1) { - ; - } -} - -////////////////////// - - -/* BLE */ -#include "nimble/ble.h" -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "services/gap/ble_svc_gap.h" -#include "mesh/glue.h" - -#define BT_DBG_ENABLED (MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_DEBUG)) - -/* Company ID */ -#define CID_VENDOR 0x05C3 -#define STANDARD_TEST_ID 0x00 -#define TEST_ID 0x01 -static int recent_test_id = STANDARD_TEST_ID; - -#define FAULT_ARR_SIZE 2 - -static bool has_reg_fault = true; - -static struct bt_mesh_cfg_srv cfg_srv = { - .relay = BT_MESH_RELAY_DISABLED, - .beacon = BT_MESH_BEACON_ENABLED, -#if MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_FRIEND) - .frnd = BT_MESH_FRIEND_ENABLED, -#else - .gatt_proxy = BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY_NOT_SUPPORTED, -#endif -#if MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_GATT_PROXY) - .gatt_proxy = BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY_ENABLED, -#else - .gatt_proxy = BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY_NOT_SUPPORTED, -#endif - .default_ttl = 7, - - /* 3 transmissions with 20ms interval */ - .net_transmit = BT_MESH_TRANSMIT(2, 20), - .relay_retransmit = BT_MESH_TRANSMIT(2, 20), -}; - -static int -fault_get_cur(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - uint8_t *test_id, - uint16_t *company_id, - uint8_t *faults, - uint8_t *fault_count) -{ - uint8_t reg_faults[FAULT_ARR_SIZE] = { [0 ... FAULT_ARR_SIZE-1] = 0xff }; - - console_printf("fault_get_cur() has_reg_fault %u\n", has_reg_fault); - - *test_id = recent_test_id; - *company_id = CID_VENDOR; - - *fault_count = min(*fault_count, sizeof(reg_faults)); - memcpy(faults, reg_faults, *fault_count); - - return 0; -} - -static int -fault_get_reg(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - uint16_t company_id, - uint8_t *test_id, - uint8_t *faults, - uint8_t *fault_count) -{ - if (company_id != CID_VENDOR) { - return -BLE_HS_EINVAL; - } - - console_printf("fault_get_reg() has_reg_fault %u\n", has_reg_fault); - - *test_id = recent_test_id; - - if (has_reg_fault) { - uint8_t reg_faults[FAULT_ARR_SIZE] = { [0 ... FAULT_ARR_SIZE-1] = 0xff }; - - *fault_count = min(*fault_count, sizeof(reg_faults)); - memcpy(faults, reg_faults, *fault_count); - } else { - *fault_count = 0; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int -fault_clear(struct bt_mesh_model *model, uint16_t company_id) -{ - if (company_id != CID_VENDOR) { - return -BLE_HS_EINVAL; - } - - has_reg_fault = false; - - return 0; -} - -static int -fault_test(struct bt_mesh_model *model, uint8_t test_id, uint16_t company_id) -{ - if (company_id != CID_VENDOR) { - return -BLE_HS_EINVAL; - } - - if (test_id != STANDARD_TEST_ID && test_id != TEST_ID) { - return -BLE_HS_EINVAL; - } - - recent_test_id = test_id; - has_reg_fault = true; - bt_mesh_fault_update(bt_mesh_model_elem(model)); - - return 0; -} - -static const struct bt_mesh_health_srv_cb health_srv_cb = { - .fault_get_cur = &fault_get_cur, - .fault_get_reg = &fault_get_reg, - .fault_clear = &fault_clear, - .fault_test = &fault_test, -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_health_srv health_srv = { - .cb = &health_srv_cb, -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub health_pub; - -static void -health_pub_init(void) -{ - health_pub.msg = BT_MESH_HEALTH_FAULT_MSG(0); -} - -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_level_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub; - -static uint8_t gen_on_off_state; -static int16_t gen_level_state; - -static void gen_onoff_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(3); - uint8_t *status; - - console_printf("#mesh-onoff STATUS\n"); - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x04)); - status = net_buf_simple_add(msg, 1); - *status = gen_on_off_state; - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - console_printf("#mesh-onoff STATUS: send status failed\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void gen_onoff_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - console_printf("#mesh-onoff GET\n"); - - gen_onoff_status(model, ctx); -} - -static void gen_onoff_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - console_printf("#mesh-onoff SET\n"); - - gen_on_off_state = buf->om_data[0]; - hal_gpio_write(LED_2, !gen_on_off_state); - - gen_onoff_status(model, ctx); -} - -static void gen_onoff_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - console_printf("#mesh-onoff SET-UNACK\n"); - - gen_on_off_state = buf->om_data[0]; - hal_gpio_write(LED_2, !gen_on_off_state); -} - -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_onoff_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x01), 0, gen_onoff_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x02), 2, gen_onoff_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x03), 2, gen_onoff_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -static void gen_level_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(4); - - console_printf("#mesh-level STATUS\n"); - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x08)); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, gen_level_state); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - console_printf("#mesh-level STATUS: send status failed\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void gen_level_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - console_printf("#mesh-level GET\n"); - - gen_level_status(model, ctx); -} - -static void gen_level_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - int16_t level; - - level = (int16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - console_printf("#mesh-level SET: level=%d\n", level); - - gen_level_status(model, ctx); - - gen_level_state = level; - console_printf("#mesh-level: level=%d\n", gen_level_state); -} - -static void gen_level_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - int16_t level; - - level = (int16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - console_printf("#mesh-level SET-UNACK: level=%d\n", level); - - gen_level_state = level; - console_printf("#mesh-level: level=%d\n", gen_level_state); -} - -static void gen_delta_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - int16_t delta_level; - - delta_level = (int16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - console_printf("#mesh-level DELTA-SET: delta_level=%d\n", delta_level); - - gen_level_status(model, ctx); - - gen_level_state += delta_level; - console_printf("#mesh-level: level=%d\n", gen_level_state); -} - -static void gen_delta_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - int16_t delta_level; - - delta_level = (int16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - console_printf("#mesh-level DELTA-SET-UNACK: delta_level=%d\n", delta_level); - - gen_level_state += delta_level; - console_printf("#mesh-level: level=%d\n", gen_level_state); -} - -static void gen_move_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ -} - -static void gen_move_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ -} - -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_level_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x05), 0, gen_level_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x06), 3, gen_level_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x07), 3, gen_level_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x09), 5, gen_delta_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0a), 5, gen_delta_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0b), 3, gen_move_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0c), 3, gen_move_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_model root_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL_CFG_SRV(&cfg_srv), - BT_MESH_MODEL_HEALTH_SRV(&health_srv, &health_pub), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_SRV, gen_onoff_op, - &gen_onoff_pub, NULL), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_LEVEL_SRV, gen_level_op, - &gen_level_pub, NULL), -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub vnd_model_pub; - -static void vnd_model_recv(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(3); - - console_printf("#vendor-model-recv\n"); - - console_printf("data:%s len:%d\n", bt_hex(buf->om_data, buf->om_len), - buf->om_len); - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x01, CID_VENDOR)); - os_mbuf_append(msg, buf->om_data, buf->om_len); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - console_printf("#vendor-model-recv: send rsp failed\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op vnd_model_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x01, CID_VENDOR), 0, vnd_model_recv }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_model vnd_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL_VND(CID_VENDOR, BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_SRV, vnd_model_op, - &vnd_model_pub, NULL), -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_elem elements[] = { - BT_MESH_ELEM(0, root_models, vnd_models), -}; - -static const struct bt_mesh_comp comp = { - .cid = CID_VENDOR, - .elem = elements, - .elem_count = ARRAY_SIZE(elements), -}; - -static int output_number(bt_mesh_output_action_t action, uint32_t number) -{ - console_printf("OOB Number: %lu\n", number); - - return 0; -} - -static void prov_complete(u16_t net_idx, u16_t addr) -{ - console_printf("Local node provisioned, primary address 0x%04x\n", addr); -} - -static const uint8_t dev_uuid[16] = MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_DEV_UUID); - -static const struct bt_mesh_prov prov = { - .uuid = dev_uuid, - .output_size = 4, - .output_actions = BT_MESH_DISPLAY_NUMBER | BT_MESH_BEEP | BT_MESH_VIBRATE | BT_MESH_BLINK, - .output_number = output_number, - .complete = prov_complete, -}; - -static void -blemesh_on_reset(int reason) -{ - BLE_HS_LOG(ERROR, "Resetting state; reason=%d\n", reason); -} - -void mesh_initialized(void); - -static void -blemesh_on_sync(void) -{ - int err; - ble_addr_t addr; - - console_printf("Bluetooth initialized\n"); - - /* Use NRPA */ - err = ble_hs_id_gen_rnd(1, &addr); - assert(err == 0); - err = ble_hs_id_set_rnd(addr.val); - assert(err == 0); - - err = bt_mesh_init(addr.type, &prov, &comp); - if (err) { - console_printf("Initializing mesh failed (err %d)\n", err); - return; - } - -#if (MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_SHELL)) - shell_register_default_module("mesh"); -#endif - - console_printf("Mesh initialized\n"); - - /* THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT */ - /* the official sample doesnot do this, the meshctl cannot discover the mesh device */ - mesh_initialized(); - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SETTINGS)) { - settings_load(); - } - - if (bt_mesh_is_provisioned()) { - printk("Mesh network restored from flash\n"); - } -} - -void *ble_mesh_adv_task(void *param) -{ - mesh_adv_thread(param); - return NULL; -} - -k_stack_t ble_mesh_adv_stack[1024]; -static struct ble_npl_task s_task_mesh_adv; - -void mesh_initialized(void) -{ - ble_npl_task_init(&s_task_mesh_adv, "ble_mesh_adv", ble_mesh_adv_task, - NULL, 4, BLE_NPL_TIME_FOREVER, - ble_mesh_adv_stack, sizeof(ble_mesh_adv_stack)); -} - -int ble_boot(void) -{ -#ifdef ARCH_sim - mcu_sim_parse_args(argc, argv); -#endif - - ble_svc_gap_init(); - ble_svc_gatt_init(); - bt_mesh_register_gatt(); - - /* XXX Need to have template for store */ - ble_store_ram_init(); - - /* Initialize the NimBLE host configuration. */ - ble_hs_cfg.reset_cb = blemesh_on_reset; - ble_hs_cfg.sync_cb = blemesh_on_sync; - ble_hs_cfg.store_status_cb = ble_store_util_status_rr; - - hal_gpio_init_out(LED_2, 0); - - health_pub_init(); - - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - return 0; -} - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[512]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 4, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7ac253b8..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,244 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#include "syscfg/syscfg.h" - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_SHELL_MODELS) - -#include "mesh/mesh.h" -#if 0 -#include "bsp.h" -#include "pwm/pwm.h" -#endif -#include "light_model.h" -#include "ws2812.h" - -#if (!MYNEWT_VAL(USE_NEOPIXEL)) -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_0) -struct pwm_dev *pwm0; -#endif -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_1) -struct pwm_dev *pwm1; -#endif -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_2) -struct pwm_dev *pwm2; -#endif -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_3) -struct pwm_dev *pwm3; -#endif - -static uint16_t top_val; -#endif - -#if (MYNEWT_VAL(USE_NEOPIXEL)) -static uint32_t neopixel[WS2812_NUM_LED]; -#endif - -static u8_t gen_onoff_state; -static s16_t gen_level_state; - -static void light_set_lightness(u8_t percentage) -{ -#if (!MYNEWT_VAL(USE_NEOPIXEL)) - int rc; - - uint16_t pwm_val = (uint16_t) (percentage * top_val / 100); - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_0) - rc = pwm_set_duty_cycle(pwm0, 0, pwm_val); - assert(rc == 0); -#endif -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_1) - rc = pwm_set_duty_cycle(pwm1, 0, pwm_val); - assert(rc == 0); -#endif -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_2) - rc = pwm_set_duty_cycle(pwm2, 0, pwm_val); - assert(rc == 0); -#endif -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_3) - rc = pwm_set_duty_cycle(pwm3, 0, pwm_val); - assert(rc == 0); -#endif -#else - int i; - u32_t lightness; - u8_t max_lightness = 0x1f; - - lightness = (u8_t) (percentage * max_lightness / 100); - - for (i = 0; i < WS2812_NUM_LED; i++) { - neopixel[i] = (lightness | lightness << 8 | lightness << 16); - } - ws2812_write(neopixel); -#endif -} - -static void update_light_state(void) -{ - u16_t level = (u16_t)gen_level_state; - int percent = 100 * level / 0xffff; - - if (gen_onoff_state == 0) { - percent = 0; - } - light_set_lightness((uint8_t) percent); -} - -int light_model_gen_onoff_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, u8_t *state) -{ - *state = gen_onoff_state; - return 0; -} - -int light_model_gen_onoff_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, u8_t state) -{ - gen_onoff_state = state; - update_light_state(); - return 0; -} - -int light_model_gen_level_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t *level) -{ - *level = gen_level_state; - return 0; -} - -int light_model_gen_level_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t level) -{ - gen_level_state = level; - if ((u16_t)gen_level_state > 0x0000) { - gen_onoff_state = 1; - } - if ((u16_t)gen_level_state == 0x0000) { - gen_onoff_state = 0; - } - update_light_state(); - return 0; -} - -int light_model_light_lightness_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t *lightness) -{ - return light_model_gen_level_get(model, lightness); -} - -int light_model_light_lightness_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t lightness) -{ - return light_model_gen_level_set(model, lightness); -} - -#if (!MYNEWT_VAL(USE_NEOPIXEL)) -struct pwm_dev_cfg dev_conf = { - .n_cycles = 0, - .int_prio = 3, -}; - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_0) -static struct pwm_chan_cfg led1_conf = { - .pin = LED_1, - .inverted = true, -}; -#endif - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_1) -static struct pwm_chan_cfg led2_conf = { - .pin = LED_2, - .inverted = true, -}; -#endif - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_2) -static struct pwm_chan_cfg led3_conf = { - .pin = LED_3, - .inverted = true, -}; -#endif -#endif - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_3) -static struct pwm_chan_cfg led4_conf = { - .pin = LED_4, - .inverted = true, -}; -#endif - -#if (!MYNEWT_VAL(USE_NEOPIXEL)) -void init_pwm_dev(struct pwm_dev **pwm, char *dev_name, struct pwm_chan_cfg *chan_cfg) -{ - int rc = 0; - - *pwm = (struct pwm_dev *) os_dev_open(dev_name, 0, NULL); - assert(pwm); - rc = pwm_configure_device(*pwm, &dev_conf); - assert(rc == 0); - rc = pwm_configure_channel(*pwm, 0, chan_cfg); - assert(rc == 0); - rc = pwm_enable(*pwm); - assert(rc == 0); -} - -int pwm_init(void) -{ - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_0) - init_pwm_dev(&pwm0, "pwm0", &led1_conf); -#endif - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_1) - init_pwm_dev(&pwm1, "pwm1", &led2_conf); -#endif - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_2) - init_pwm_dev(&pwm2, "pwm2", &led3_conf); -#endif - -#if MYNEWT_VAL(PWM_3) - init_pwm_dev(&pwm3, "pwm3", &led4_conf); -#endif - - if (!pwm0) { - return 0; - } - - top_val = (uint16_t) pwm_get_top_value(pwm0); - update_light_state(); - - return 0; -} -#endif -#endif - -int light_model_init(void) -{ -#if MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_SHELL_MODELS) - int rc; -#if (!MYNEWT_VAL(USE_NEOPIXEL)) - rc = pwm_init(); - assert(rc == 0); -#else - rc = ws2812_init(); - assert(rc == 0); - update_light_state(); -#endif - return rc; -#else - return 0; -#endif -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7fcdd0c3..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/light_model.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - * - * Copyright (c) 2017 Intel Corporation - * - */ - -#ifndef __BT_MESH_LIGHT_MODEL_H -#define __BT_MESH_LIGHT_MODEL_H - -#include "syscfg/syscfg.h" -#include "mesh/mesh.h" - -int light_model_gen_onoff_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, u8_t *state); -int light_model_gen_onoff_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, u8_t state); -int light_model_gen_level_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t *level); -int light_model_gen_level_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t level); -int light_model_light_lightness_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t *lightness); -int light_model_light_lightness_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, s16_t lightness); -int light_model_init(void); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/main.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_light/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index cf798969..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ -#include -#include "sysinit/sysinit.h" -#include "os/os.h" -#include "mesh/mesh.h" -#include "console/console.h" -#if 0 -#include "hal/hal_system.h" -#include "hal/hal_gpio.h" -#include "bsp/bsp.h" -#endif - -#include "shell.h" - -/* BLE */ -#include "nimble/ble.h" -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "services/gap/ble_svc_gap.h" -#include "mesh/glue.h" -#include "mesh/testing.h" -#include "mesh/model_srv.h" -#include "light_model.h" - -/////////////////////// -// stub-s - -int __atomic_load_4(int *p) -{ - return *p; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_and_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p & v; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_or_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p | v; -} - -int __atomic_exchange_4(int *p, int v) -{ - int old = *p; - *p = v; - return old; -} - -void unreachable(void) -{ - while (1) { - ; - } -} - -void shell_register_default_module(char *module) -{ -} - -void shell_evq_set(struct ble_npl_eventq *evq) -{ -} - -int shell_register(const char *module_name, const struct shell_cmd *commands) -{ - return 0; -} -////////////////////// - -static void model_bound_cb(u16_t addr, struct bt_mesh_model *model, - u16_t key_idx) -{ - int rc; - - console_printf("Model bound: remote addr 0x%04x key_idx 0x%04x model %p\n", - addr, key_idx, model); - - if (model->id != BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_LEVEL_SRV) { - return; - } - - /* Hack for demo purposes */ - rc = bt_test_bind_app_key_to_model(model, key_idx, - BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SRV); - - if (rc) { - console_printf("Failed to bind light lightness srv model to app_key"); - } else { - console_printf("Successfuly bound light lightness srv model to app_key"); - } -} - -static struct bt_test_cb bt_test_cb = { - .mesh_model_bound = model_bound_cb, -}; - -static void -blemesh_on_reset(int reason) -{ - BLE_HS_LOG(ERROR, "Resetting state; reason=%d\n", reason); -} - -static struct bt_mesh_gen_onoff_srv_cb gen_onoff_srv_cb = { - .get = light_model_gen_onoff_get, - .set = light_model_gen_onoff_set, -}; -static struct bt_mesh_gen_level_srv_cb gen_level_srv_cb = { - .get = light_model_gen_level_get, - .set = light_model_gen_level_set, -}; -static struct bt_mesh_light_lightness_srv_cb light_lightness_srv_cb = { - .get = light_model_light_lightness_get, - .set = light_model_light_lightness_set, -}; - -static void -blemesh_on_sync(void) -{ - console_printf("Bluetooth initialized\n"); - - shell_register_default_module("mesh"); - - bt_test_cb_register(&bt_test_cb); - - light_model_init(); - bt_mesh_set_gen_onoff_srv_cb(&gen_onoff_srv_cb); - bt_mesh_set_gen_level_srv_cb(&gen_level_srv_cb); - bt_mesh_set_light_lightness_srv_cb(&light_lightness_srv_cb); - - console_printf("Mesh initialized\n"); - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SETTINGS)) { - settings_load(); - } - - if (bt_mesh_is_provisioned()) { - printk("Mesh network restored from flash\n"); - } - - /* Hack for demo purposes */ - bt_test_shell_init(); - -#if 1 // we donnot have a shell yet, trigger the command by code... - if (bt_mesh_prov_enable(BT_MESH_PROV_GATT | BT_MESH_PROV_ADV)) { - console_printf("Failed to enable PB-ADV & PB-GATT\n"); - } else { - console_printf("PB-ADV & PB-GATT enabled\n"); - } -#endif -} - -int ble_boot(void) -{ - ble_svc_gap_init(); - ble_svc_gatt_init(); - bt_mesh_register_gatt(); - - /* XXX Need to have template for store */ - ble_store_ram_init(); - - /* Initialize the NimBLE host configuration. */ - ble_hs_cfg.reset_cb = blemesh_on_reset; - ble_hs_cfg.sync_cb = blemesh_on_sync; - ble_hs_cfg.store_status_cb = ble_store_util_status_rr; - - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - return 0; -} - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[512]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 4, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.c deleted file mode 100644 index b3c9addd..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -/** - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#include "syscfg/syscfg.h" - -#if (MYNEWT_VAL(USE_NEOPIXEL)) - -#include -#include -#include -#include "sysinit/sysinit.h" -#include "os/os.h" -#if 0 -#include "bsp/bsp.h" -#include "pwm/pwm.h" -#endif -#include "nrfx.h" -#include "nrfx_pwm.h" -#include "ws2812.h" - -#define BITS_PER_SEQ (24) -#define BIT0 (0x8000 | 6) -#define BIT1 (0x8000 | 11) - -static const nrfx_pwm_t pwm = NRFX_PWM_INSTANCE(WS2812_PWM); - -static const nrfx_pwm_config_t pwm_config = { - .output_pins = { WS2812_GPIO, NRFX_PWM_PIN_NOT_USED, NRFX_PWM_PIN_NOT_USED, NRFX_PWM_PIN_NOT_USED }, - .irq_priority = 3, - .base_clock = NRF_PWM_CLK_16MHz, - .count_mode = NRF_PWM_MODE_UP, - .top_value = 20, - .load_mode = NRF_PWM_LOAD_COMMON, - .step_mode = NRF_PWM_STEP_AUTO, -}; - -static uint16_t pwm_seq_values[2][BITS_PER_SEQ]; - -static const nrf_pwm_sequence_t pwm_seq[2] = { - { - .values.p_raw = pwm_seq_values[0], - .length = BITS_PER_SEQ, - .repeats = 0, - .end_delay = 0, - }, { - .values.p_raw = pwm_seq_values[1], - .length = BITS_PER_SEQ, - .repeats = 0, - .end_delay = 0, - }, -}; - -static uint32_t led_color[WS2812_NUM_LED]; -static int led_idx; - -static void -load_pixel(void) -{ - uint16_t *seq_values; - uint32_t grb; - int i; - - seq_values = pwm_seq_values[led_idx & 1]; - grb = led_color[led_idx]; - - for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_SEQ; i++) { - *seq_values = grb & 0x800000 ? BIT1 : BIT0; - grb <<= 1; - seq_values++; - } - - led_idx++; -} - -static void -pwm_handler_func(nrfx_pwm_evt_type_t event_type) -{ - switch (event_type) { - case NRFX_PWM_EVT_END_SEQ0: - case NRFX_PWM_EVT_END_SEQ1: - load_pixel(); - break; - default: - break; - } -} - -int -ws2812_init(void) -{ -#if 0 - nrfx_err_t err; - - err = nrfx_pwm_init(&pwm, &pwm_config, pwm_handler_func); - - return err != NRFX_SUCCESS; -#endif - return 0; -} - -int -ws2812_write(const uint32_t *rgb) -{ - uint32_t grb; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < WS2812_NUM_LED; i++) { - grb = 0; - grb |= (rgb[i] & 0x00FF00) << 8; - grb |= (rgb[i] & 0xFF0000) >> 8; - grb |= (rgb[i] & 0x0000FF); - - led_color[i] = grb; - } - - led_idx = 0; - - load_pixel(); - load_pixel(); - nrfx_pwm_complex_playback(&pwm, &pwm_seq[0], &pwm_seq[1], WS2812_NUM_LED, - NRFX_PWM_FLAG_SIGNAL_END_SEQ0 | - NRFX_PWM_FLAG_SIGNAL_END_SEQ1 | - NRFX_PWM_FLAG_STOP); - - return 0; -} -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.h deleted file mode 100644 index 93b8faf8..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_light/ws2812.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -/** - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#ifndef __WS2812_H__ -#define __WS2812_H__ - -#include -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define WS2812_PWM 0 -#define WS2812_GPIO 30 -#define WS2812_NUM_LED 32 - -int ws2812_init(void); - -int ws2812_write(const uint32_t *rgb); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* __WS2812_H__ */ diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_1/README.md b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_1/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index fde49536..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_1/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -### Bluetooth: Mesh OnOff Model - - -#### Overview - -This is a simple application demonstrating a Bluetooth mesh multi-element node. -Each element has a mesh onoff client and server -model which controls one of the 4 sets of buttons and LEDs . - -Prior to provisioning, an unprovisioned beacon is broadcast that contains -a UUID. Each button controls the state of its -corresponding LED and does not initiate any mesh activity. - -The models for button 1 and LED 1 are in the node's root element. -The 3 remaining button/LED pairs are in elements 1 through 3. -Assuming the provisioner assigns 0x100 to the root element, -the secondary elements will appear at 0x101, 0x102 and 0x103. - -After provisioning, the button clients must -be configured to publish and the LED servers to subscribe. - -If a LED server is provided with a publish address, it will -also publish its status on an onoff state change. - -If a button is pressed only once within a 1 second interval, it sends an -"on" message. If it is pressed more than once, it -sends an "off" message. The buttons are quite noisy and are debounced in -the button_pressed() interrupt handler. An interrupt within 250ms of the -previous is discarded. This might seem a little clumsy, but the alternative of -using one button for "on" and another for "off" would reduce the number -of onoff clients from 4 to 2. - -#### Requirements -************ - -This sample has been tested on the Nordic nRF52840-PDK board, but would -likely also run on the nrf52_pca10040 board. - -#### Building and Running -******************** - -Prior to provisioning, each button controls its corresponding LED as one -would expect with an actual switch. - -Provisioning is done using the BlueZ meshctl utility. Below is an example that -binds button 2 and LED 1 to application key 1. It then configures button 2 -to publish to group 0xc000 and LED 1 to subscribe to that group. - -``` -discover-unprovisioned on -provision -menu config -target 0100 -appkey-add 1 -bind 0 1 1000 # bind appkey 1 to LED server on element 0 (unicast 0100) -sub-add 0100 c000 1000 # add subscription to group address c000 to the LED server -bind 1 1 1001 # bind appkey 1 to button 2 on element 1 (unicast 0101) -pub-set 0101 c000 1 0 0 1001 # publish button 2 to group address c000 -``` - -The meshctl utility maintains a persistent JSON database containing -the mesh configuration. As additional nodes (boards) are provisioned, it -assigns sequential unicast addresses based on the number of elements -supported by the node. This example supports 4 elements per node. - -The first or root element of the node contains models for configuration, -health, and onoff. The secondary elements only -have models for onoff. The meshctl target for configuration must be the -root element's unicast address as it is the only one that has a -configuration server model. - -If meshctl is gracefully exited, it can be restarted and reconnected to -network 0x0. - -The meshctl utility also supports a onoff model client that can be used to -change the state of any LED that is bound to application key 0x1. -This is done by setting the target to the unicast address of the element -that has that LED's model and issuing the onoff command. -Group addresses are not supported. diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_1/main.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_1/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index f786a88e..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_1/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,817 +0,0 @@ -/* main.c - Application main entry point */ - -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Intel Corporation - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -/* - * This application is specific to the Nordic nRF52840-PDK board. - * - * It supports the 4 buttons and 4 LEDs as mesh clients and servers. - * - * Prior to provisioning, a button inverts the state of the - * corresponding LED. - * - * Button and LED 1 are in the root node. - * The 3 remaining button/LED pairs are in element 1 through 3. - * Assuming the provisioner assigns 0x100 to the root node, - * the secondary elements will appear at 0x101, 0x102 and 0x103. - * - * It's anticipated that after provisioning, the button clients would - * be configured to publish and the LED servers to subscribe. - * - * If a LED server is provided with a publish address, it will - * also publish its status on a state change. - * - * Messages from a button to its corresponding LED are ignored as - * the LED's state has already been changed locally by the button client. - * - * The buttons are debounced at a nominal 250ms. That value can be - * changed as needed. - * - */ - -#include "bsp/bsp.h" -#include "console/console.h" -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "mesh/glue.h" -#include "mesh/mesh.h" - -/////////////////////// -// stub-s - -/* - * The "pull" of the gpio. This is either an input or an output. - */ -enum hal_gpio_pull { - /** Pull-up/down not enabled */ - HAL_GPIO_PULL_NONE = 0, - /** Pull-up enabled */ - HAL_GPIO_PULL_UP = 1, - /** Pull-down enabled */ - HAL_GPIO_PULL_DOWN = 2 -}; -typedef enum hal_gpio_pull hal_gpio_pull_t; - -/* - * IRQ trigger type. - */ -enum hal_gpio_irq_trigger { - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_NONE = 0, - /** IRQ occurs on rising edge */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_RISING = 1, - /** IRQ occurs on falling edge */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_FALLING = 2, - /** IRQ occurs on either edge */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_BOTH = 3, - /** IRQ occurs when line is low */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_LOW = 4, - /** IRQ occurs when line is high */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_HIGH = 5 -}; -typedef enum hal_gpio_irq_trigger hal_gpio_irq_trig_t; - - -/* Function proto for GPIO irq handler functions */ -typedef void (*hal_gpio_irq_handler_t)(void *arg); - -int hal_gpio_irq_init(int pin, hal_gpio_irq_handler_t handler, void *arg, - hal_gpio_irq_trig_t trig, hal_gpio_pull_t pull) -{ - // printf("gpio irq init\n"); - return 0; -} - -void hal_gpio_irq_enable(int pin) -{ - // printf("gpio irq enable\n"); -} - -void hal_gpio_init_out(int led, int s) -{ - // printf("gpio init out\n"); -} - -void hal_gpio_write(int led, int s) -{ - // printf("led[%d]: %s\n", s == 0 ? "OFF" : "ON"); -} - -int __atomic_load_4(int *p) -{ - return *p; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_and_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p & v; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_or_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p | v; -} - -int __atomic_exchange_4(int *p, int v) -{ - int old = *p; - *p = v; - return old; -} - -void unreachable(void) -{ - while (1) { - ; - } -} - -/////////////////////// - - -#define CID_RUNTIME 0x05C3 - -/* Model Operation Codes */ -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_GET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x01) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x02) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET_UNACK BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x03) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x04) - -static void gen_onoff_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf); - -static void gen_onoff_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf); - -static void gen_onoff_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf); - -static void gen_onoff_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf); - -/* - * Server Configuration Declaration - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_cfg_srv cfg_srv = { - .relay = BT_MESH_RELAY_DISABLED, - .beacon = BT_MESH_BEACON_ENABLED, -#if defined(CONFIG_BT_MESH_FRIEND) - .frnd = BT_MESH_FRIEND_ENABLED, -#else - .frnd = BT_MESH_FRIEND_NOT_SUPPORTED, -#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY) - .gatt_proxy = BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY_ENABLED, -#else - .gatt_proxy = BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY_NOT_SUPPORTED, -#endif - .default_ttl = 7, - - /* 3 transmissions with 20ms interval */ - .net_transmit = BT_MESH_TRANSMIT(2, 20), - .relay_retransmit = BT_MESH_TRANSMIT(2, 20), -}; - -/* - * Client Configuration Declaration - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_cfg_cli cfg_cli = { -}; - -/* - * Health Server Declaration - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_health_srv health_srv = { -}; - -/* - * Publication Declarations - * - * The publication messages are initialized to the - * the size of the opcode + content - * - * For publication, the message must be in static or global as - * it is re-transmitted several times. This occurs - * after the function that called bt_mesh_model_publish() has - * exited and the stack is no longer valid. - * - * Note that the additional 4 bytes for the AppMIC is not needed - * because it is added to a stack variable at the time a - * transmission occurs. - * - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub health_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_srv; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_cli; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_0; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_0; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_1; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_1; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_2; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_2; - -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_health_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_0; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_0; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_1; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_1; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_2; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_2; - -void init_pub(void) -{ - bt_mesh_pub_msg_health_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(1 + 3 + 0); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_0 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_0 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_1 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_1 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_2 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_2 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2); - - health_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_health_pub; - gen_onoff_pub_srv.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv; - gen_onoff_pub_cli.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli; - gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_0.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_0; - gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_0.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_0; - gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_1.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_1; - gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_1.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_1; - gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_2.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_2; - gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_2.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_2; -} - -/* - * Models in an element must have unique op codes. - * - * The mesh stack dispatches a message to the first model in an element - * that is also bound to an app key and supports the op code in the - * received message. - * - */ - -/* - * OnOff Model Server Op Dispatch Table - * - */ - -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_onoff_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_GET, 0, gen_onoff_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET, 2, gen_onoff_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET_UNACK, 2, gen_onoff_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* - * OnOff Model Client Op Dispatch Table - */ - -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_onoff_cli_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_STATUS, 1, gen_onoff_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -struct onoff_state { - u8_t current; - u8_t previous; - u8_t led_gpio_pin; -}; - -/* - * Declare and Initialize Element Contexts - * Change to select different GPIO output pins - */ - -static struct onoff_state onoff_state_arr[] = { - { .led_gpio_pin = LED_1 }, - { .led_gpio_pin = LED_2 }, - { .led_gpio_pin = LED_3 }, - { .led_gpio_pin = LED_4 }, -}; - -/* - * - * Element Model Declarations - * - * Element 0 Root Models - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_model root_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL_CFG_SRV(&cfg_srv), - BT_MESH_MODEL_CFG_CLI(&cfg_cli), - BT_MESH_MODEL_HEALTH_SRV(&health_srv, &health_pub), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_SRV, gen_onoff_srv_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_srv, &onoff_state_arr[0]), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_CLI, gen_onoff_cli_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_cli, &onoff_state_arr[0]), -}; - -/* - * Element 1 Models - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_model secondary_0_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_SRV, gen_onoff_srv_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_0, &onoff_state_arr[1]), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_CLI, gen_onoff_cli_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_0, &onoff_state_arr[1]), -}; - -/* - * Element 2 Models - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_model secondary_1_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_SRV, gen_onoff_srv_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_1, &onoff_state_arr[2]), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_CLI, gen_onoff_cli_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_1, &onoff_state_arr[2]), -}; - -/* - * Element 3 Models - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_model secondary_2_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_SRV, gen_onoff_srv_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_srv_s_2, &onoff_state_arr[3]), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_CLI, gen_onoff_cli_op, - &gen_onoff_pub_cli_s_2, &onoff_state_arr[3]), -}; - -/* - * Button to Client Model Assignments - */ - -struct bt_mesh_model *mod_cli_sw[] = { - &root_models[4], - &secondary_0_models[1], - &secondary_1_models[1], - &secondary_2_models[1], -}; - -/* - * LED to Server Model Assigmnents - */ - -struct bt_mesh_model *mod_srv_sw[] = { - &root_models[3], - &secondary_0_models[0], - &secondary_1_models[0], - &secondary_2_models[0], -}; - -/* - * Root and Secondary Element Declarations - */ - -static struct bt_mesh_elem elements[] = { - BT_MESH_ELEM(0, root_models, BT_MESH_MODEL_NONE), - BT_MESH_ELEM(0, secondary_0_models, BT_MESH_MODEL_NONE), - BT_MESH_ELEM(0, secondary_1_models, BT_MESH_MODEL_NONE), - BT_MESH_ELEM(0, secondary_2_models, BT_MESH_MODEL_NONE), -}; - -static const struct bt_mesh_comp comp = { - .cid = CID_RUNTIME, - .elem = elements, - .elem_count = ARRAY_SIZE(elements), -}; - -struct sw { - u8_t sw_num; - u8_t onoff_state; - struct ble_npl_callout button_work; - struct ble_npl_callout button_timer; -}; - - -static u8_t button_press_cnt; -static struct sw sw; - -static u8_t trans_id; -static u32_t time, last_time; -static u16_t primary_addr; -static u16_t primary_net_idx; - -/* - * Generic OnOff Model Server Message Handlers - * - * Mesh Model Specification 3.1.1 - * - */ - -static void gen_onoff_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 1 + 4); - struct onoff_state *state = model->user_data; - - BT_INFO("addr 0x%04x onoff 0x%02x", - bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr, state->current); - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->current); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - BT_ERR("Unable to send On Off Status response"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void gen_onoff_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct onoff_state *state = model->user_data; - int err; - - state->current = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - BT_INFO("addr 0x%02x state 0x%02x", - bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr, state->current); - - /* Pin set low turns on LED's on the nrf52840-pca10056 board */ - hal_gpio_write(state->led_gpio_pin, - state->current ? 0 : 1); - - /* - * If a server has a publish address, it is required to - * publish status on a state change - * - * See Mesh Profile Specification 3.7.6.1.2 - * - * Only publish if there is an assigned address - */ - - if (state->previous != state->current && - model->pub->addr != BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - BT_INFO("publish last 0x%02x cur 0x%02x", - state->previous, - state->current); - state->previous = state->current; - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->current); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - BT_ERR("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d", err); - } - } -} - -static void gen_onoff_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - BT_INFO(""); - - gen_onoff_set_unack(model, ctx, buf); - gen_onoff_get(model, ctx, buf); -} - -static void gen_onoff_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t state; - - state = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - BT_INFO("Node 0x%04x OnOff status from 0x%04x with state 0x%02x", - bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr, ctx->addr, state); -} - -static int output_number(bt_mesh_output_action_t action, u32_t number) -{ - BT_INFO("OOB Number %u", number); - return 0; -} - -static int output_string(const char *str) -{ - BT_INFO("OOB String %s", str); - return 0; -} - -static void prov_complete(u16_t net_idx, u16_t addr) -{ - BT_INFO("provisioning complete for net_idx 0x%04x addr 0x%04x", - net_idx, addr); - primary_addr = addr; - primary_net_idx = net_idx; -} - -static void prov_reset(void) -{ - bt_mesh_prov_enable(BT_MESH_PROV_ADV | BT_MESH_PROV_GATT); -} - -static u8_t dev_uuid[16] = MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_DEV_UUID); - -#define BUTTON_DEBOUNCE_DELAY_MS 250 - -/* - * Map GPIO pins to button number - * Change to select different GPIO input pins - */ - -static uint8_t pin_to_sw(int pin_pos) -{ - switch (pin_pos) { - case BUTTON_1: return 0; - case BUTTON_2: return 1; - case BUTTON_3: return 2; - case BUTTON_4: return 3; - default:break; - } - - BT_ERR("No match for GPIO pin 0x%08x", pin_pos); - return 0; -} - -static void button_pressed(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - int pin_pos = (int ) ev->arg; - /* - * One button press within a 1 second interval sends an on message - * More than one button press sends an off message - */ - - time = k_uptime_get_32(); - - /* debounce the switch */ - if (time < last_time + BUTTON_DEBOUNCE_DELAY_MS) { - last_time = time; - return; - } - - if (button_press_cnt == 0) { - ble_npl_callout_reset(&sw.button_timer, ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32(K_SECONDS(1))); - } - - BT_INFO("button_press_cnt 0x%02x", button_press_cnt); - button_press_cnt++; - - /* The variable pin_pos is the pin position in the GPIO register, - * not the pin number. It's assumed that only one bit is set. - */ - - sw.sw_num = pin_to_sw(pin_pos); - last_time = time; -} - -/* - * Button Count Timer Worker - */ - -static void button_cnt_timer(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct sw *button_sw = work->arg; - - button_sw->onoff_state = button_press_cnt == 1 ? 1 : 0; - BT_INFO("button_press_cnt 0x%02x onoff_state 0x%02x", - button_press_cnt, button_sw->onoff_state); - button_press_cnt = 0; - ble_npl_callout_reset(&sw.button_work, 0); -} - -/* - * Button Pressed Worker Task - */ - -static void button_pressed_worker(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(1); - struct bt_mesh_model *mod_cli, *mod_srv; - struct bt_mesh_model_pub *pub_cli, *pub_srv; - struct sw *sw = work->arg; - u8_t sw_idx = sw->sw_num; - int err; - - mod_cli = mod_cli_sw[sw_idx]; - pub_cli = mod_cli->pub; - - mod_srv = mod_srv_sw[sw_idx]; - pub_srv = mod_srv->pub; - (void)pub_srv; - - /* If unprovisioned, just call the set function. - * The intent is to have switch-like behavior - * prior to provisioning. Once provisioned, - * the button and its corresponding led are no longer - * associated and act independently. So, if a button is to - * control its associated led after provisioning, the button - * must be configured to either publish to the led's unicast - * address or a group to which the led is subscribed. - */ - - if (primary_addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx ctx = { - .addr = sw_idx + primary_addr, - }; - - /* This is a dummy message sufficient - * for the led server - */ - - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, sw->onoff_state); - gen_onoff_set_unack(mod_srv, &ctx, msg); - goto done; - } - - if (pub_cli->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - goto done; - } - - BT_INFO("publish to 0x%04x onoff 0x%04x sw_idx 0x%04x", - pub_cli->addr, sw->onoff_state, sw_idx); - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(pub_cli->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(pub_cli->msg, sw->onoff_state); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(pub_cli->msg, trans_id++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(mod_cli); - if (err) { - BT_ERR("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d", err); - } - -done: - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -/* Disable OOB security for SILabs Android app */ - -static const struct bt_mesh_prov prov = { - .uuid = dev_uuid, -#if 1 - .output_size = 6, - .output_actions = (BT_MESH_DISPLAY_NUMBER | BT_MESH_DISPLAY_STRING), - .output_number = output_number, - .output_string = output_string, -#else - .output_size = 0, - .output_actions = 0, - .output_number = 0, -#endif - .complete = prov_complete, - .reset = prov_reset, -}; - -void init_led(u8_t dev) -{ - hal_gpio_init_out(onoff_state_arr[dev].led_gpio_pin, 1); -} - -static struct ble_npl_event button_event; - -static void -gpio_irq_handler(void *arg) -{ - button_event.arg = arg; - ble_npl_eventq_put(nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), &button_event); -} - -void init_button(int button) -{ - button_event.fn = button_pressed; - - hal_gpio_irq_init(button, gpio_irq_handler, (void *)button, - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_FALLING, HAL_GPIO_PULL_UP); - hal_gpio_irq_enable(button); -} - -static void -blemesh_on_reset(int reason) -{ - BLE_HS_LOG(ERROR, "Resetting state; reason=%d\n", reason); -} - -static void -blemesh_on_sync(void) -{ - int err; - ble_addr_t addr; - - console_printf("Bluetooth initialized\n"); - - /* Use NRPA */ - err = ble_hs_id_gen_rnd(1, &addr); - assert(err == 0); - err = ble_hs_id_set_rnd(addr.val); - assert(err == 0); - - err = bt_mesh_init(addr.type, &prov, &comp); - if (err) { - console_printf("Initializing mesh failed (err %d)\n", err); - return; - } - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SETTINGS)) { - settings_load(); - } - - if (bt_mesh_is_provisioned()) { - console_printf("Mesh network restored from flash\n"); - } - - bt_mesh_prov_enable(BT_MESH_PROV_GATT | BT_MESH_PROV_ADV); - - console_printf("Mesh initialized\n"); -} - -int ble_boot(void) -{ -#ifdef ARCH_sim - mcu_sim_parse_args(argc, argv); -#endif - - BT_INFO("Initializing..."); - - /* Initialize the button debouncer */ - last_time = k_uptime_get_32(); - - /* Initialize button worker task*/ - ble_npl_callout_init(&sw.button_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - button_pressed_worker, &sw); - - /* Initialize button count timer */ - ble_npl_callout_init(&sw.button_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - button_cnt_timer, &sw); - - /* Initialize LED's */ - init_led(0); - init_led(1); - init_led(2); - init_led(3); - - init_button(BUTTON_1); - init_button(BUTTON_2); - init_button(BUTTON_3); - init_button(BUTTON_4); - - init_pub(); - - /* Initialize the NimBLE host configuration. */ - ble_hs_cfg.reset_cb = blemesh_on_reset; - ble_hs_cfg.sync_cb = blemesh_on_sync; - ble_hs_cfg.store_status_cb = ble_store_util_status_rr; - - bt_mesh_register_gatt(); - - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - return 0; -} - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[512]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 4, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/README.md b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7bec909e..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,101 +0,0 @@ -#### Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - -##### Overview -******** - -This is a application demonstrating a Bluetooth mesh node in -which Root element has following models - -- Generic OnOff Server -- Generic OnOff Client -- Generic Level Server -- Generic Level Client -- Generic Default Transition Time Server -- Generic Default Transition Time Client -- Generic Power OnOff Server -- Generic Power OnOff Setup Server -- Generic Power OnOff Client -- Light Lightness Server -- Light Lightness Setup Server -- Light Lightness Client -- Light CTL Server -- Light CTL Setup Server -- Light CTL Client -- Vendor Model - -And Secondary element has following models - -- Generic Level Server -- Generic Level Client -- Light CTL Temperature Server - -Prior to provisioning, an unprovisioned beacon is broadcast that contains -a unique UUID. Each button controls the state of its -corresponding LED and does not initiate any mesh activity - -##### Associations of Models with hardware -************************************ -For the nRF52840-PDK board, these are the model associations: - -* LED1 is associated with generic OnOff Server's state which is part of Root element -* LED2 is associated with Vendor Model which is part of Root element -* LED3 is associated with generic Level (ROOT) / Light Lightness Actual value -* LED4 is associated with generic Level (Secondary) / Light CTL Temperature value -* Button1 and Button2 are associated with gen. OnOff Client or Vendor Model which is part of Root element -* Button3 and Button4 are associated with gen. Level Client / Light Lightness Client / Light CTL Client which is part of Root element - -States of Servers are bounded as per Bluetooth SIG Mesh Model Specification v1.0 - -After provisioning, the button clients must -be configured to publish and the LED servers to subscribe. -If a server is provided with a publish address, it will -also publish its relevant status. - -##### Requirements -************ -This sample has been tested on the Nordic nRF52840-PDK board, but would -likely also run on the nrf52_pca10040 board. - - -##### Running -************ - -Provisioning is done using the BlueZ meshctl utility. In this example, we'll use meshctl commands to bind: - -- Button1, Button2, and LED1 to application key 1. It then configures Button1 and Button2 - to publish to group 0xC000 and LED1 to subscribe to that group. -- Button3, Button4, and LED3 to application key 1. It then configures Button3 and Button4 - to publish to group 0xC000 and LED3 to subscribe to that group. - -``` -discover-unprovisioned on -provision -menu config -target 0100 -appkey-add 1 -bind 0 1 1000 -bind 0 1 1001 -bind 0 1 1002 -bind 0 1 1003 -sub-add 0100 c000 1000 -sub-add 0100 c000 1002 -pub-set 0100 c000 1 0 5 1001 -pub-set 0100 c000 1 0 5 1003 -``` - -The meshctl utility maintains a persistent JSON database containing -the mesh configuration. As additional nodes (boards) are provisioned, it -assigns sequential unicast addresses based on the number of elements -supported by the node. This example supports 2 elements per node. - -The meshctl target for configuration must be the root element's unicast -address as it is the only one that has a configuration server model. If -meshctl is gracefully exited, it can be restarted and reconnected to -network 0x0. - -The meshctl utility also supports a onoff model client that can be used to -change the state of any LED that is bound to application key 0x1. -This is done by setting the target to the unicast address of the element -that has that LED's model and issuing the onoff command. -Group addresses are not supported. - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.c deleted file mode 100644 index b3a70755..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include "bsp/bsp.h" -#include "console/console.h" -#include "mesh/mesh.h" - -#include "app_gpio.h" -#include "publisher.h" - -int button_device[] = { - BUTTON_1, - BUTTON_2, - BUTTON_3, - BUTTON_4, -}; - -int led_device[] = { - LED_1, - LED_2, - LED_3, - LED_4, -}; - -static struct ble_npl_callout button_work; - -static void button_pressed(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - ble_npl_callout_reset(&button_work, 0); -} - -static struct ble_npl_event button_event; - -static void gpio_irq_handler(void *arg) -{ - button_event.arg = arg; - ble_npl_eventq_put(nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), &button_event); -} - -void app_gpio_init(void) -{ - /* LEDs configiuratin & setting */ - -#if 0 - hal_gpio_init_out(led_device[0], 1); - hal_gpio_init_out(led_device[1], 1); - hal_gpio_init_out(led_device[2], 1); - hal_gpio_init_out(led_device[3], 1); - - /* Buttons configiuratin & setting */ - - ble_npl_callout_init(&button_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), publish, NULL); - - button_event.ev_cb = button_pressed; - - hal_gpio_irq_init(button_device[0], gpio_irq_handler, NULL, - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_FALLING, HAL_GPIO_PULL_UP); - hal_gpio_irq_enable(button_device[0]); - - hal_gpio_irq_init(button_device[1], gpio_irq_handler, NULL, - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_FALLING, HAL_GPIO_PULL_UP); - hal_gpio_irq_enable(button_device[1]); - - hal_gpio_irq_init(button_device[2], gpio_irq_handler, NULL, - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_FALLING, HAL_GPIO_PULL_UP); - hal_gpio_irq_enable(button_device[2]); - - hal_gpio_irq_init(button_device[3], gpio_irq_handler, NULL, - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_FALLING, HAL_GPIO_PULL_UP); - hal_gpio_irq_enable(button_device[3]); -#endif -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.h deleted file mode 100644 index 6eabc1ce..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/app_gpio.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _APP_GPIO_H -#define _APP_GPIO_H - -/* GPIO */ -extern int button_device[]; -extern int led_device[]; - -void app_gpio_init(void); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.c deleted file mode 100644 index 86d4c515..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include "console/console.h" - -#include "common.h" -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "device_composition.h" - -#define OOB_AUTH_ENABLE 1 - -#ifdef OOB_AUTH_ENABLE - -static int output_number(bt_mesh_output_action_t action, u32_t number) -{ - printk("OOB Number: %lu\n", number); - return 0; -} - -static int output_string(const char *str) -{ - printk("OOB String: %s\n", str); - return 0; -} - -#endif - -static void prov_complete(u16_t net_idx, u16_t addr) -{ - printk("Local node provisioned, primary address 0x%04x\n", addr); -} - -static void prov_reset(void) -{ - bt_mesh_prov_enable(BT_MESH_PROV_ADV | BT_MESH_PROV_GATT); -} - -static u8_t dev_uuid[16] = MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_MESH_DEV_UUID); - -static const struct bt_mesh_prov prov = { - .uuid = dev_uuid, - -#ifdef OOB_AUTH_ENABLE - - .output_size = 6, - .output_actions = BT_MESH_DISPLAY_NUMBER | BT_MESH_DISPLAY_STRING, - .output_number = output_number, - .output_string = output_string, - -#endif - - .complete = prov_complete, - .reset = prov_reset, -}; - -void blemesh_on_reset(int reason) -{ - BLE_HS_LOG(ERROR, "Resetting state; reason=%d\n", reason); -} - -void blemesh_on_sync(void) -{ - int err; - ble_addr_t addr; - - console_printf("Bluetooth initialized\n"); - - /* Use NRPA */ - err = ble_hs_id_gen_rnd(1, &addr); - assert(err == 0); - err = ble_hs_id_set_rnd(addr.val); - assert(err == 0); - - err = bt_mesh_init(addr.type, &prov, &comp); - if (err) { - console_printf("Initializing mesh failed (err %d)\n", err); - return; - } - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SETTINGS)) { - settings_load(); - } - - if (bt_mesh_is_provisioned()) { - console_printf("Mesh network restored from flash\n"); - } - - bt_mesh_prov_enable(BT_MESH_PROV_GATT | BT_MESH_PROV_ADV); - - console_printf("Mesh initialized\n"); - - bt_initialized(); -} diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.h deleted file mode 100644 index c02af243..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/ble_mesh.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _BLE_MESH_H -#define _BLE_MESH_H - -#include "mesh/mesh.h" -#include "mesh/glue.h" - -/* Model Operation Codes */ -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_GET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x01) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x02) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET_UNACK BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x03) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x04) - -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_GET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x05) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_SET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x06) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_SET_UNACK BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x07) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x08) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_DELTA_SET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x09) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_DELTA_SET_UNACK BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0A) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_MOVE_SET BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0B) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_MOVE_SET_UNACK BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0C) - -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x10) - -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_GEN_ONPOWERUP_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x12) - -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4E) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_LINEAR_STATUS \ - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x52) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_LAST_STATUS \ - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x54) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_DEFAULT_STATUS \ - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x56) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_RANGE_STATUS \ - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x58) - -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x60) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_RANGE_STATUS \ - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x63) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x66) -#define BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_DEFAULT_STATUS BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x68) - -void blemesh_on_reset(int reason); -void blemesh_on_sync(void); -void init_pub(void); - -#endif - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/common.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/common.h deleted file mode 100644 index 57cd401a..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/common.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _COMMON_H -#define _COMMON_H - -void update_light_state(void); -void bt_initialized(void); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/device_composition.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/device_composition.c deleted file mode 100644 index af94d35a..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/device_composition.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2778 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include "console/console.h" -#include "mesh/mesh.h" - -#include "app_gpio.h" -#include "storage.h" - -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "device_composition.h" -#include "state_binding.h" -#include "transition.h" - -static struct bt_mesh_cfg_srv cfg_srv = { - .relay = BT_MESH_RELAY_ENABLED, - .beacon = BT_MESH_BEACON_ENABLED, - -#if defined(CONFIG_BT_MESH_FRIEND) - .frnd = BT_MESH_FRIEND_ENABLED, -#else - .frnd = BT_MESH_FRIEND_NOT_SUPPORTED, -#endif - -#if defined(CONFIG_BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY) - .gatt_proxy = BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY_ENABLED, -#else - .gatt_proxy = BT_MESH_GATT_PROXY_NOT_SUPPORTED, -#endif - - .default_ttl = 7, - - /* 2 transmissions with 20ms interval */ - .net_transmit = BT_MESH_TRANSMIT(2, 20), - - /* 3 transmissions with 20ms interval */ - .relay_retransmit = BT_MESH_TRANSMIT(3, 20), -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_health_srv health_srv = { -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub health_pub; - -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_srv_pub_root; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_onoff_cli_pub_root; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_level_srv_pub_root; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_level_cli_pub_root; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_def_trans_time_srv_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_def_trans_time_cli_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_power_onoff_srv_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_power_onoff_cli_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub light_lightness_srv_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub light_lightness_cli_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub light_ctl_srv_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub light_ctl_cli_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub vnd_pub; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_level_srv_pub_s0; -static struct bt_mesh_model_pub gen_level_cli_pub_s0; - - -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_health_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_srv_pub_root; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_cli_pub_root; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_srv_pub_root; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_cli_pub_root; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_def_trans_time_srv_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_def_trans_time_cli_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_power_onoff_srv_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_power_onoff_cli_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_lightness_srv_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_lightness_cli_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_ctl_srv_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_ctl_cli_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_vnd_pub; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_srv_pub_s0; -static struct os_mbuf *bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_cli_pub_s0; - - -void init_pub(void) -{ - bt_mesh_pub_msg_health_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(1 + 3 + 0); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_srv_pub_root = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 3); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_cli_pub_root = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 4); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_srv_pub_root = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_cli_pub_root = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 7); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_power_onoff_srv_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 1); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_power_onoff_cli_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 1); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_def_trans_time_srv_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 1); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_def_trans_time_cli_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 1); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_lightness_srv_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_lightness_cli_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_ctl_srv_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 9); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_ctl_cli_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 9); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_vnd_pub = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(3 + 6); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_srv_pub_s0 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5); - bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_cli_pub_s0 = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 7); - - - health_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_health_pub; - gen_onoff_srv_pub_root.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_srv_pub_root; - gen_onoff_cli_pub_root.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_onoff_cli_pub_root; - gen_level_srv_pub_root.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_srv_pub_root; - gen_level_cli_pub_root.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_cli_pub_root; - gen_power_onoff_srv_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_power_onoff_srv_pub; - gen_power_onoff_cli_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_power_onoff_cli_pub; - gen_def_trans_time_srv_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_def_trans_time_srv_pub; - gen_def_trans_time_cli_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_def_trans_time_cli_pub; - light_lightness_srv_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_lightness_srv_pub; - light_lightness_cli_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_lightness_cli_pub; - light_ctl_srv_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_ctl_srv_pub; - light_ctl_cli_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_light_ctl_cli_pub; - vnd_pub.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_vnd_pub; - gen_level_srv_pub_s0.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_srv_pub_s0; - gen_level_cli_pub_s0.msg = bt_mesh_pub_msg_gen_level_cli_pub_s0; -} - -/* Definitions of models user data (Start) */ -struct generic_onoff_state gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data = { - .transition = &lightness_transition, -}; - -struct generic_level_state gen_level_srv_root_user_data = { - .transition = &lightness_transition, -}; - -struct gen_def_trans_time_state gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data; - -struct generic_onpowerup_state gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data; - -struct light_lightness_state light_lightness_srv_user_data = { - .transition = &lightness_transition, -}; - -struct light_ctl_state light_ctl_srv_user_data = { - .transition = &lightness_transition, -}; - -struct vendor_state vnd_user_data; - -struct generic_level_state gen_level_srv_s0_user_data = { - .transition = &temp_transition, -}; -/* Definitions of models user data (End) */ - -static struct bt_mesh_elem elements[]; - -/* message handlers (Start) */ - -/* Generic OnOff Server message handlers */ -static void gen_onoff_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 3 + 4); - struct generic_onoff_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->onoff); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->target_onoff); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send GEN_ONOFF_SRV Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -void gen_onoff_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct generic_onoff_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->onoff); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->target_onoff); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void gen_onoff_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, onoff, tt, delay; - s64_t now; - struct generic_onoff_state *state = model->user_data; - - onoff = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - if (onoff > STATE_ON) { - return; - } - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_onoff = onoff; - - if (state->target_onoff != state->onoff) { - onoff_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_onoff_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->onoff = state->target_onoff; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_onoff_publish(model); - onoff_handler(state); -} - -static void gen_onoff_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, onoff, tt, delay; - s64_t now; - struct generic_onoff_state *state = model->user_data; - - onoff = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - if (onoff > STATE_ON) { - return; - } - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - gen_onoff_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_onoff = onoff; - - if (state->target_onoff != state->onoff) { - onoff_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_onoff_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_onoff_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->onoff = state->target_onoff; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_onoff_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_onoff_publish(model); - onoff_handler(state); -} - -/* Generic OnOff Client message handlers */ -static void gen_onoff_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from GEN_ONOFF_SRV\n"); - printk("Present OnOff = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - - if (buf->om_len == 2) { - printk("Target OnOff = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - printk("Remaining Time = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - } -} - -/* Generic Level Server message handlers */ -static void gen_level_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5 + 4); - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->level); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_level); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send GEN_LEVEL_SRV Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -void gen_level_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->level); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_level); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void gen_level_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t level; - s64_t now; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - level = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_level = level; - - if (state->target_level != state->level) { - level_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_level_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->level = state->target_level; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_level_publish(model); - - if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[0].addr) { - /* Root element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TT; - level_lightness_handler(state); - } else if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[1].addr) { - /* Secondary element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TEMP_TT; - level_temp_handler(state); - } -} - -static void gen_level_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t level; - s64_t now; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - level = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - gen_level_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_level = level; - - if (state->target_level != state->level) { - level_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_level_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_level_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->level = state->target_level; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_level_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_level_publish(model); - - if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[0].addr) { - /* Root element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TT; - level_lightness_handler(state); - } else if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[1].addr) { - /* Secondary element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TEMP_TT; - level_temp_handler(state); - } -} - -static void gen_delta_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s32_t tmp32, delta; - s64_t now; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - delta = (s32_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le32(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - - if (state->last_delta == delta) { - return; - } - tmp32 = state->last_level + delta; - - } else { - state->last_level = state->level; - tmp32 = state->level + delta; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->last_delta = delta; - - if (tmp32 < INT16_MIN) { - tmp32 = INT16_MIN; - } else if (tmp32 > INT16_MAX) { - tmp32 = INT16_MAX; - } - - state->target_level = tmp32; - - if (state->target_level != state->level) { - level_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_level_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->level = state->target_level; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_level_publish(model); - - if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[0].addr) { - /* Root element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TT_DELTA; - level_lightness_handler(state); - } else if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == - elements[1].addr) { - /* Secondary element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TEMP_TT_DELTA; - level_temp_handler(state); - } -} - -static void gen_delta_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s32_t tmp32, delta; - s64_t now; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - delta = (s32_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le32(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - - if (state->last_delta == delta) { - gen_level_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - tmp32 = state->last_level + delta; - - } else { - state->last_level = state->level; - tmp32 = state->level + delta; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->last_delta = delta; - - if (tmp32 < INT16_MIN) { - tmp32 = INT16_MIN; - } else if (tmp32 > INT16_MAX) { - tmp32 = INT16_MAX; - } - - state->target_level = tmp32; - - if (state->target_level != state->level) { - level_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_level_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_level_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->level = state->target_level; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_level_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_level_publish(model); - - if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[0].addr) { - /* Root element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TT_DELTA; - level_lightness_handler(state); - } else if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[1].addr) { - /* Secondary element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TEMP_TT_DELTA; - level_temp_handler(state); - } -} - -static void gen_level_move_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5 + 4); - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->level); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - if (state->last_delta < 0) { - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, INT16_MIN); - } else { /* 0 should not be possible */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, INT16_MAX); - } - - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, UNKNOWN_VALUE); - } - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send GEN_LEVEL_SRV Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void gen_level_move_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->level); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - if (state->last_delta < 0) { - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, INT16_MIN); - } else { /* 0 should not be possible */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, INT16_MAX); - } - - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, UNKNOWN_VALUE); - } - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void gen_move_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t delta; - s32_t tmp32; - s64_t now; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - delta = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->last_delta = delta; - - tmp32 = state->level + delta; - if (tmp32 < INT16_MIN) { - tmp32 = INT16_MIN; - } else if (tmp32 > INT16_MAX) { - tmp32 = INT16_MAX; - } - - state->target_level = tmp32; - - if (state->target_level != state->level) { - level_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_level_move_publish(model); - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - return; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_level_move_publish(model); - - if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[0].addr) { - /* Root element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TT_MOVE; - level_lightness_handler(state); - } else if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[1].addr) { - /* Secondary element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TEMP_TT_MOVE; - level_temp_handler(state); - } -} - -static void gen_move_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t delta; - s32_t tmp32; - s64_t now; - struct generic_level_state *state = model->user_data; - - delta = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - gen_level_move_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->last_delta = delta; - - tmp32 = state->level + delta; - if (tmp32 < INT16_MIN) { - tmp32 = INT16_MIN; - } else if (tmp32 > INT16_MAX) { - tmp32 = INT16_MAX; - } - - state->target_level = tmp32; - - if (state->target_level != state->level) { - level_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - gen_level_move_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_level_move_publish(model); - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - return; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - gen_level_move_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_level_move_publish(model); - - if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[0].addr) { - /* Root element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TT_MOVE; - level_lightness_handler(state); - } else if (bt_mesh_model_elem(model)->addr == elements[1].addr) { - /* Secondary element */ - transition_type = LEVEL_TEMP_TT_MOVE; - level_temp_handler(state); - } -} - -/* Generic Level Client message handlers */ -static void gen_level_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from GEN_LEVEL_SRV\n"); - printk("Present Level = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - - if (buf->om_len == 3) { - printk("Target Level = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Remaining Time = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - } -} - -/* Generic Default Transition Time Server message handlers */ -static void gen_def_trans_time_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 1 + 4); - struct gen_def_trans_time_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->tt); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send GEN_DEF_TT_SRV Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void gen_def_trans_time_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct gen_def_trans_time_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->tt); - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static bool gen_def_trans_time_setunack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tt; - struct gen_def_trans_time_state *state = model->user_data; - - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - /* Here, Model specification is silent about tid implementation */ - - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return false; - } - - if (state->tt != tt) { - state->tt = tt; - default_tt = tt; - - save_on_flash(GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_STATE); - } - - return true; -} - -static void gen_def_trans_time_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (gen_def_trans_time_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - gen_def_trans_time_publish(model); - } -} - -static void gen_def_trans_time_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (gen_def_trans_time_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - gen_def_trans_time_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_def_trans_time_publish(model); - } -} - -/* Generic Default Transition Time Client message handlers */ -static void gen_def_trans_time_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from GEN_DEF_TT_SRV\n"); - printk("Transition Time = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); -} - -/* Generic Power OnOff Server message handlers */ -static void gen_onpowerup_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 1 + 4); - struct generic_onpowerup_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_GEN_ONPOWERUP_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->onpowerup); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send GEN_POWER_ONOFF_SRV Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -/* Generic Power OnOff Client message handlers */ -static void gen_onpowerup_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from GEN_POWER_ONOFF_SRV\n"); - printk("OnPowerUp = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); -} - -/* Generic Power OnOff Setup Server message handlers */ - -static void gen_onpowerup_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct generic_onpowerup_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_GEN_ONPOWERUP_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->onpowerup); - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static bool gen_onpowerup_setunack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t onpowerup; - struct generic_onpowerup_state *state = model->user_data; - - onpowerup = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - /* Here, Model specification is silent about tid implementation */ - - if (onpowerup > STATE_RESTORE) { - return false; - } - - if (state->onpowerup != onpowerup) { - state->onpowerup = onpowerup; - - save_on_flash(GEN_ONPOWERUP_STATE); - } - - return true; -} - -static void gen_onpowerup_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (gen_onpowerup_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - gen_onpowerup_publish(model); - } -} - -static void gen_onpowerup_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (gen_onpowerup_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - gen_onpowerup_get(model, ctx, buf); - gen_onpowerup_publish(model); - } -} - -/* Vendor Model message handlers*/ -static void vnd_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(3 + 6 + 4); - struct vendor_state *state = model->user_data; - - /* This is dummy response for demo purpose */ - state->response = 0xA578FEB3; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x04, CID_RUNTIME)); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->current); - net_buf_simple_add_le32(msg, state->response); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send VENDOR Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void vnd_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid; - int current; - s64_t now; - struct vendor_state *state = model->user_data; - - current = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->current = current; - - printk("Vendor model message = %04x\n", state->current); - - if (state->current == STATE_ON) { - /* LED2 On */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[1], 0); - } else { - /* LED2 Off */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[1], 1); - } -} - -static void vnd_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - vnd_set_unack(model, ctx, buf); - vnd_get(model, ctx, buf); -} - -static void vnd_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from Vendor\n"); - printk("cmd = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("response = %08lx\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le32(buf)); -} - -/* Light Lightness Server message handlers */ -static void light_lightness_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5 + 4); - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->actual); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_actual); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightLightnessAct Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -void light_lightness_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->actual); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_actual); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - u16_t actual; - s64_t now; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - actual = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - - if (actual > 0 && actual < state->light_range_min) { - actual = state->light_range_min; - } else if (actual > state->light_range_max) { - actual = state->light_range_max; - } - - state->target_actual = actual; - - if (state->target_actual != state->actual) { - light_lightness_actual_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_lightness_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->actual = state->target_actual; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_lightness_publish(model); - light_lightness_actual_handler(state); -} - -static void light_lightness_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - u16_t actual; - s64_t now; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - actual = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - light_lightness_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - - if (actual > 0 && actual < state->light_range_min) { - actual = state->light_range_min; - } else if (actual > state->light_range_max) { - actual = state->light_range_max; - } - - state->target_actual = actual; - - if (state->target_actual != state->actual) { - light_lightness_actual_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_lightness_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_lightness_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->actual = state->target_actual; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_lightness_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_lightness_publish(model); - light_lightness_actual_handler(state); -} - -static void light_lightness_linear_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5 + 4); - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_LINEAR_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->linear); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_linear); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightLightnessLin Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -void light_lightness_linear_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_LINEAR_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->linear); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_linear); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_linear_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - u16_t linear; - s64_t now; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - linear = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_linear = linear; - - if (state->target_linear != state->linear) { - light_lightness_linear_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_lightness_linear_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->linear = state->target_linear; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_lightness_linear_publish(model); - light_lightness_linear_handler(state); -} - -static void light_lightness_linear_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - u16_t linear; - s64_t now; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - linear = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - light_lightness_linear_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_linear = linear; - - if (state->target_linear != state->linear) { - light_lightness_linear_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_lightness_linear_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_lightness_linear_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->linear = state->target_linear; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_lightness_linear_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_lightness_linear_publish(model); - light_lightness_linear_handler(state); -} - -static void light_lightness_last_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2 + 4); - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_LAST_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->last); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightLightnessLast Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void light_lightness_default_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 2 + 4); - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_DEFAULT_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->def); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightLightnessDef Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void light_lightness_range_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5 + 4); - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - state->status_code = RANGE_SUCCESSFULLY_UPDATED; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_RANGE_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->status_code); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->light_range_min); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->light_range_max); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightLightnessRange Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -/* Light Lightness Setup Server message handlers */ - -static void light_lightness_default_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_DEFAULT_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->def); - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_default_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u16_t lightness; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - lightness = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - - /* Here, Model specification is silent about tid implementation */ - - if (state->def != lightness) { - state->def = lightness; - light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_def = state->def; - - save_on_flash(LIGHTNESS_TEMP_DEF_STATE); - } - - light_lightness_default_publish(model); -} - -static void light_lightness_default_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - light_lightness_default_set_unack(model, ctx, buf); - light_lightness_default_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_lightness_default_publish(model); -} - -static void light_lightness_range_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_RANGE_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->status_code); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->light_range_min); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->light_range_max); - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static bool light_lightness_range_setunack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u16_t min, max; - struct light_lightness_state *state = model->user_data; - - min = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - max = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - - /* Here, Model specification is silent about tid implementation */ - - if (min == 0 || max == 0) { - return false; - } else { - if (min <= max) { - state->status_code = RANGE_SUCCESSFULLY_UPDATED; - - if (state->light_range_min != min || - state->light_range_max != max) { - - state->light_range_min = min; - state->light_range_max = max; - - save_on_flash(LIGHTNESS_RANGE); - } - } else { - /* The provided value for Range Max cannot be set */ - state->status_code = CANNOT_SET_RANGE_MAX; - return false; - } - } - - return true; -} - -static void light_lightness_range_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (light_lightness_range_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - light_lightness_range_publish(model); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_range_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (light_lightness_range_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - light_lightness_range_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_lightness_range_publish(model); - } -} - -/* Light Lightness Client message handlers */ -static void light_lightness_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SRV (Actual)\n"); - printk("Present Lightness = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - - if (buf->om_len == 3) { - printk("Target Lightness = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Remaining Time = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_linear_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SRV (Linear)\n"); - printk("Present Lightness = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - - if (buf->om_len == 3) { - printk("Target Lightness = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Remaining Time = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_last_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SRV (Last)\n"); - printk("Lightness = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); -} - -static void light_lightness_default_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SRV (Default)\n"); - printk("Lightness = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); -} - -static void light_lightness_range_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SRV (Lightness Range)\n"); - printk("Status Code = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - printk("Range Min = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Range Max = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); -} - -/* Light CTL Server message handlers */ -static void light_ctl_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 9 + 4); - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->lightness); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_lightness); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_temp); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightCTL Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -void light_ctl_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_STATUS); - - /* Here, as per Model specification, status should be - * made up of lightness & temperature values only - */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->lightness); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_lightness); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_temp); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t delta_uv; - u16_t lightness, temp; - s64_t now; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - lightness = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - temp = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - delta_uv = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - if (temp < TEMP_MIN || temp > TEMP_MAX) { - return; - } - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_lightness = lightness; - - if (temp < state->temp_range_min) { - temp = state->temp_range_min; - } else if (temp > state->temp_range_max) { - temp = state->temp_range_max; - } - - state->target_temp = temp; - state->target_delta_uv = delta_uv; - - if (state->target_lightness != state->lightness || - state->target_temp != state->temp || - state->target_delta_uv != state->delta_uv) { - light_ctl_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_ctl_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->lightness = state->target_lightness; - state->temp = state->target_temp; - state->delta_uv = state->target_delta_uv; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_ctl_publish(model); - light_ctl_handler(state); -} - -static void light_ctl_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t delta_uv; - u16_t lightness, temp; - s64_t now; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - lightness = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - temp = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - delta_uv = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - if (temp < TEMP_MIN || temp > TEMP_MAX) { - return; - } - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - light_ctl_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - state->target_lightness = lightness; - - if (temp < state->temp_range_min) { - temp = state->temp_range_min; - } else if (temp > state->temp_range_max) { - temp = state->temp_range_max; - } - - state->target_temp = temp; - state->target_delta_uv = delta_uv; - - if (state->target_lightness != state->lightness || - state->target_temp != state->temp || - state->target_delta_uv != state->delta_uv) { - light_ctl_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_ctl_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_ctl_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->lightness = state->target_lightness; - state->temp = state->target_temp; - state->delta_uv = state->target_delta_uv; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_ctl_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_ctl_publish(model); - light_ctl_handler(state); -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_range_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 5 + 4); - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - state->status_code = RANGE_SUCCESSFULLY_UPDATED; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_RANGE_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->status_code); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp_range_min); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp_range_max); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightCTL Temp Range Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -static void light_ctl_default_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 6 + 4); - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_DEFAULT_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->lightness_def); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp_def); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->delta_uv_def); - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightCTL Default Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -/* Light CTL Setup Server message handlers */ - -static void light_ctl_default_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_DEFAULT_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->lightness_def); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp_def); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->delta_uv_def); - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static bool light_ctl_default_setunack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u16_t lightness, temp; - s16_t delta_uv; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - lightness = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - temp = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - delta_uv = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - - /* Here, Model specification is silent about tid implementation */ - - if (temp < TEMP_MIN || temp > TEMP_MAX) { - return false; - } - - if (temp < state->temp_range_min) { - temp = state->temp_range_min; - } else if (temp > state->temp_range_max) { - temp = state->temp_range_max; - } - - if (state->lightness_def != lightness || state->temp_def != temp || - state->delta_uv_def != delta_uv) { - state->lightness_def = lightness; - state->temp_def = temp; - state->delta_uv_def = delta_uv; - - save_on_flash(LIGHTNESS_TEMP_DEF_STATE); - } - - return true; -} - -static void light_ctl_default_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (light_ctl_default_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - light_ctl_default_publish(model); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_default_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (light_ctl_default_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - light_ctl_default_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_ctl_default_publish(model); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_range_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_RANGE_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->status_code); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp_range_min); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp_range_max); - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static bool light_ctl_temp_range_setunack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u16_t min, max; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - min = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - max = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - - /* Here, Model specification is silent about tid implementation */ - - /* This is as per 6.1.3.1 in Mesh Model Specification */ - if (min < TEMP_MIN || min > TEMP_MAX || - max < TEMP_MIN || max > TEMP_MAX) { - return false; - } - - if (min <= max) { - state->status_code = RANGE_SUCCESSFULLY_UPDATED; - - if (state->temp_range_min != min || - state->temp_range_max != max) { - - state->temp_range_min = min; - state->temp_range_max = max; - - save_on_flash(TEMPERATURE_RANGE); - } - } else { - /* The provided value for Range Max cannot be set */ - state->status_code = CANNOT_SET_RANGE_MAX; - return false; - } - - return true; -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_range_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (light_ctl_temp_range_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - light_ctl_temp_range_publish(model); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_range_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - if (light_ctl_temp_range_setunack(model, ctx, buf) == true) { - light_ctl_temp_range_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_ctl_temp_range_publish(model); - } -} - -/* Light CTL Client message handlers */ -static void light_ctl_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_CTL_SRV\n"); - printk("Present CTL Lightness = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Present CTL Temperature = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - - if (buf->om_len == 5) { - printk("Target CTL Lightness = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Target CTL Temperature = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Remaining Time = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_range_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_CTL_SRV (Temperature Range)\n"); - printk("Status Code = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - printk("Range Min = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Range Max = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_SRV\n"); - printk("Present CTL Temperature = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Present CTL Delta UV = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - - if (buf->om_len == 5) { - printk("Target CTL Temperature = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Target CTL Delta UV = %04x\n", - net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Remaining Time = %02x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf)); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_default_status(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - printk("Acknownledgement from LIGHT_CTL_SRV (Default)\n"); - printk("Lightness = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Temperature = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); - printk("Delta UV = %04x\n", net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf)); -} - -/* Light CTL Temp. Server message handlers */ -static void light_ctl_temp_get(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - struct os_mbuf *msg = NET_BUF_SIMPLE(2 + 9 + 4); - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->delta_uv); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_temp); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_delta_uv); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - if (bt_mesh_model_send(model, ctx, msg, NULL, NULL)) { - printk("Unable to send LightCTL Temp. Status response\n"); - } - - os_mbuf_free_chain(msg); -} - -void light_ctl_temp_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model) -{ - int err; - struct os_mbuf *msg = model->pub->msg; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - if (model->pub->addr == BT_MESH_ADDR_UNASSIGNED) { - return; - } - - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(msg, BT_MESH_MODEL_LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_STATUS); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->temp); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->delta_uv); - - if (state->transition->counter) { - calculate_rt(state->transition); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_temp); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(msg, state->target_delta_uv); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(msg, state->transition->rt); - } - - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(model); - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish err %d\n", err); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_set_unack(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t delta_uv; - u16_t temp; - s64_t now; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - temp = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - delta_uv = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - if (temp < TEMP_MIN || temp > TEMP_MAX) { - return; - } - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - - if (temp < state->temp_range_min) { - temp = state->temp_range_min; - } else if (temp > state->temp_range_max) { - temp = state->temp_range_max; - } - - state->target_temp = temp; - state->target_delta_uv = delta_uv; - - if (state->target_temp != state->temp || - state->target_delta_uv != state->delta_uv) { - light_ctl_temp_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_ctl_temp_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->temp = state->target_temp; - state->delta_uv = state->target_delta_uv; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_ctl_temp_publish(model); - light_ctl_temp_handler(state); -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_set(struct bt_mesh_model *model, - struct bt_mesh_msg_ctx *ctx, - struct os_mbuf *buf) -{ - u8_t tid, tt, delay; - s16_t delta_uv; - u16_t temp; - s64_t now; - struct light_ctl_state *state = model->user_data; - - temp = net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - delta_uv = (s16_t) net_buf_simple_pull_le16(buf); - tid = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - - if (temp < TEMP_MIN || temp > TEMP_MAX) { - return; - } - - now = k_uptime_get(); - if (state->last_tid == tid && - state->last_src_addr == ctx->addr && - state->last_dst_addr == ctx->recv_dst && - (now - state->last_msg_timestamp <= K_SECONDS(6))) { - light_ctl_temp_get(model, ctx, buf); - return; - } - - switch (buf->om_len) { - case 0x00: /* No optional fields are available */ - tt = default_tt; - delay = 0; - break; - case 0x02: /* Optional fields are available */ - tt = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - if ((tt & 0x3F) == 0x3F) { - return; - } - - delay = net_buf_simple_pull_u8(buf); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *ptr_counter = 0; - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - - state->last_tid = tid; - state->last_src_addr = ctx->addr; - state->last_dst_addr = ctx->recv_dst; - state->last_msg_timestamp = now; - - if (temp < state->temp_range_min) { - temp = state->temp_range_min; - } else if (temp > state->temp_range_max) { - temp = state->temp_range_max; - } - - state->target_temp = temp; - state->target_delta_uv = delta_uv; - - if (state->target_temp != state->temp || - state->target_delta_uv != state->delta_uv) { - light_ctl_temp_tt_values(state, tt, delay); - } else { - light_ctl_temp_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_ctl_temp_publish(model); - return; - } - - /* For Instantaneous Transition */ - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->temp = state->target_temp; - state->delta_uv = state->target_delta_uv; - } - - state->transition->just_started = true; - light_ctl_temp_get(model, ctx, buf); - light_ctl_temp_publish(model); - light_ctl_temp_handler(state); -} - -/* message handlers (End) */ - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic OnOff Server (0x1000) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_onoff_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x01), 0, gen_onoff_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x02), 2, gen_onoff_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x03), 2, gen_onoff_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic OnOff Client (0x1001) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_onoff_cli_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x04), 1, gen_onoff_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic Levl Server (0x1002) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_level_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x05), 0, gen_level_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x06), 3, gen_level_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x07), 3, gen_level_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x09), 5, gen_delta_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0A), 5, gen_delta_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0B), 3, gen_move_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0C), 3, gen_move_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic Level Client (0x1003) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_level_cli_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x08), 2, gen_level_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic Default TT Server (0x1004) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_def_trans_time_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0D), 0, gen_def_trans_time_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0E), 1, gen_def_trans_time_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x0F), 1, gen_def_trans_time_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic Default TT Client (0x1005) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_def_trans_time_cli_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x10), 1, gen_def_trans_time_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic Power OnOff Server (0x1006) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_power_onoff_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x11), 0, gen_onpowerup_get }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic Power OnOff Setup Server (0x1007) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_power_onoff_setup_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x13), 1, gen_onpowerup_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x14), 1, gen_onpowerup_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Generic Power OnOff Client (0x1008) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op gen_power_onoff_cli_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x12), 1, gen_onpowerup_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Light Lightness Server (0x1300) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op light_lightness_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4B), 0, light_lightness_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4C), 3, light_lightness_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4D), 3, light_lightness_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4F), 0, light_lightness_linear_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x50), 3, light_lightness_linear_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x51), 3, - light_lightness_linear_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x53), 0, light_lightness_last_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x55), 0, light_lightness_default_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x57), 0, light_lightness_range_get }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Light Lightness Setup Server (0x1301) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op light_lightness_setup_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x59), 2, light_lightness_default_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5A), 2, - light_lightness_default_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5B), 4, light_lightness_range_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5C), 4, light_lightness_range_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Light Lightness Client (0x1302) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op light_lightness_cli_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4E), 2, light_lightness_status }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x52), 2, light_lightness_linear_status }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x54), 2, light_lightness_last_status }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x56), 2, light_lightness_default_status }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x58), 5, light_lightness_range_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Light CTL Server (0x1303) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op light_ctl_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5D), 0, light_ctl_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5E), 7, light_ctl_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5F), 7, light_ctl_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x62), 0, light_ctl_temp_range_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x67), 0, light_ctl_default_get }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Light CTL Setup Server (0x1304) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op light_ctl_setup_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x69), 6, light_ctl_default_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x6A), 6, light_ctl_default_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x6B), 4, light_ctl_temp_range_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x6C), 4, light_ctl_temp_range_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Light CTL Client (0x1305) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op light_ctl_cli_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x60), 4, light_ctl_status }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x63), 5, light_ctl_temp_range_status }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x66), 4, light_ctl_temp_status }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x68), 6, light_ctl_default_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Light CTL Temp. Server (0x1306) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op light_ctl_temp_srv_op[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x61), 0, light_ctl_temp_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x64), 5, light_ctl_temp_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x65), 5, light_ctl_temp_set_unack }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -/* Mapping of message handlers for Vendor (0x4321) */ -static const struct bt_mesh_model_op vnd_ops[] = { - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x01, CID_RUNTIME), 0, vnd_get }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x02, CID_RUNTIME), 3, vnd_set }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x03, CID_RUNTIME), 3, vnd_set_unack }, - { BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x04, CID_RUNTIME), 6, vnd_status }, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_END, -}; - -struct bt_mesh_model root_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL_CFG_SRV(&cfg_srv), - BT_MESH_MODEL_HEALTH_SRV(&health_srv, &health_pub), - - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_SRV, - gen_onoff_srv_op, &gen_onoff_srv_pub_root, - &gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_ONOFF_CLI, - gen_onoff_cli_op, &gen_onoff_cli_pub_root, - NULL), - - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_LEVEL_SRV, - gen_level_srv_op, &gen_level_srv_pub_root, - &gen_level_srv_root_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_LEVEL_CLI, - gen_level_cli_op, &gen_level_cli_pub_root, - NULL), - - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_SRV, - gen_def_trans_time_srv_op, - &gen_def_trans_time_srv_pub, - &gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_CLI, - gen_def_trans_time_cli_op, - &gen_def_trans_time_cli_pub, - NULL), - - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_POWER_ONOFF_SRV, - gen_power_onoff_srv_op, &gen_power_onoff_srv_pub, - &gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_POWER_ONOFF_SETUP_SRV, - gen_power_onoff_setup_srv_op, - &gen_power_onoff_srv_pub, - &gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_POWER_ONOFF_CLI, - gen_power_onoff_cli_op, &gen_power_onoff_cli_pub, - NULL), - - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SRV, - light_lightness_srv_op, &light_lightness_srv_pub, - &light_lightness_srv_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_SETUP_SRV, - light_lightness_setup_srv_op, - &light_lightness_srv_pub, - &light_lightness_srv_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_CLI, - light_lightness_cli_op, &light_lightness_cli_pub, - NULL), - - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_CTL_SRV, - light_ctl_srv_op, &light_ctl_srv_pub, - &light_ctl_srv_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_CTL_SETUP_SRV, - light_ctl_setup_srv_op, &light_ctl_srv_pub, - &light_ctl_srv_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_CTL_CLI, - light_ctl_cli_op, &light_ctl_cli_pub, - NULL), -}; - -struct bt_mesh_model vnd_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL_VND(CID_RUNTIME, 0x4321, vnd_ops, - &vnd_pub, &vnd_user_data), -}; - -struct bt_mesh_model s0_models[] = { - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_LEVEL_SRV, - gen_level_srv_op, &gen_level_srv_pub_s0, - &gen_level_srv_s0_user_data), - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_GEN_LEVEL_CLI, - gen_level_cli_op, &gen_level_cli_pub_s0, - NULL), - - BT_MESH_MODEL(BT_MESH_MODEL_ID_LIGHT_CTL_TEMP_SRV, - light_ctl_temp_srv_op, &light_ctl_srv_pub, - &light_ctl_srv_user_data), -}; - -static struct bt_mesh_elem elements[] = { - BT_MESH_ELEM(0, root_models, vnd_models), - BT_MESH_ELEM(0, s0_models, BT_MESH_MODEL_NONE), -}; - -const struct bt_mesh_comp comp = { - .cid = CID_RUNTIME, - .elem = elements, - .elem_count = ARRAY_SIZE(elements), -}; - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/device_composition.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/device_composition.h deleted file mode 100644 index 38507195..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/device_composition.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,177 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _DEVICE_COMPOSITION_H -#define _DEVICE_COMPOSITION_H - -#define CID_RUNTIME 0x05C3 - -#define STATE_OFF 0x00 -#define STATE_ON 0x01 -#define STATE_DEFAULT 0x01 -#define STATE_RESTORE 0x02 - -/* Following 4 values are as per Mesh Model specification */ -#define LIGHTNESS_MIN 0x0001 -#define LIGHTNESS_MAX 0xFFFF -#define TEMP_MIN 0x0320 -#define TEMP_MAX 0x4E20 - -/* Refer 7.2 of Mesh Model Specification */ -#define RANGE_SUCCESSFULLY_UPDATED 0x00 -#define CANNOT_SET_RANGE_MIN 0x01 -#define CANNOT_SET_RANGE_MAX 0x02 - -struct generic_onoff_state { - u8_t onoff; - u8_t target_onoff; - - u8_t last_tid; - u16_t last_src_addr; - u16_t last_dst_addr; - s64_t last_msg_timestamp; - - s32_t tt_delta; - - struct transition *transition; -}; - -struct generic_level_state { - s16_t level; - s16_t target_level; - - s16_t last_level; - s32_t last_delta; - - u8_t last_tid; - u16_t last_src_addr; - u16_t last_dst_addr; - s64_t last_msg_timestamp; - - s32_t tt_delta; - - struct transition *transition; -}; - -struct generic_onpowerup_state { - u8_t onpowerup; -}; - -struct gen_def_trans_time_state { - u8_t tt; -}; - -struct vendor_state { - int current; - u32_t response; - u8_t last_tid; - u16_t last_src_addr; - u16_t last_dst_addr; - s64_t last_msg_timestamp; -}; - -struct light_lightness_state { - u16_t linear; - u16_t target_linear; - - u16_t actual; - u16_t target_actual; - - u16_t last; - u16_t def; - - u8_t status_code; - u16_t light_range_min; - u16_t light_range_max; - u32_t lightness_range; - - u8_t last_tid; - u16_t last_src_addr; - u16_t last_dst_addr; - s64_t last_msg_timestamp; - - s32_t tt_delta_actual; - s32_t tt_delta_linear; - - struct transition *transition; -}; - -struct light_ctl_state { - u16_t lightness; - u16_t target_lightness; - - u16_t temp; - u16_t target_temp; - - s16_t delta_uv; - s16_t target_delta_uv; - - u8_t status_code; - u16_t temp_range_min; - u16_t temp_range_max; - u32_t temperature_range; - - u16_t lightness_def; - u16_t temp_def; - u32_t lightness_temp_def; - s16_t delta_uv_def; - - u32_t lightness_temp_last; - - u8_t last_tid; - u16_t last_src_addr; - u16_t last_dst_addr; - s64_t last_msg_timestamp; - - s32_t tt_delta_lightness; - s32_t tt_delta_temp; - s32_t tt_delta_duv; - - struct transition *transition; -}; - -extern struct generic_onoff_state gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data; -extern struct generic_level_state gen_level_srv_root_user_data; -extern struct gen_def_trans_time_state gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data; -extern struct generic_onpowerup_state gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data; -extern struct light_lightness_state light_lightness_srv_user_data; -extern struct light_ctl_state light_ctl_srv_user_data; -extern struct generic_level_state gen_level_srv_s0_user_data; - -extern struct bt_mesh_model root_models[]; -extern struct bt_mesh_model vnd_models[]; -extern struct bt_mesh_model s0_models[]; - -extern const struct bt_mesh_comp comp; - -void gen_onoff_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model); -void gen_level_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model); -void light_lightness_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model); -void light_lightness_linear_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model); -void light_ctl_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model); -void light_ctl_temp_publish(struct bt_mesh_model *model); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/main.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index 998c753e..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,365 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - - -#include "console/console.h" -#include "mesh/mesh.h" - -#include "app_gpio.h" -#include "storage.h" - -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "device_composition.h" -#include "no_transition_work_handler.h" -#include "publisher.h" -#include "state_binding.h" -#include "transition.h" - -static bool reset; - - -/////////////////////// -// stub-s - -/* - * The "pull" of the gpio. This is either an input or an output. - */ -enum hal_gpio_pull { - /** Pull-up/down not enabled */ - HAL_GPIO_PULL_NONE = 0, - /** Pull-up enabled */ - HAL_GPIO_PULL_UP = 1, - /** Pull-down enabled */ - HAL_GPIO_PULL_DOWN = 2 -}; -typedef enum hal_gpio_pull hal_gpio_pull_t; - -/* - * IRQ trigger type. - */ -enum hal_gpio_irq_trigger { - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_NONE = 0, - /** IRQ occurs on rising edge */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_RISING = 1, - /** IRQ occurs on falling edge */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_FALLING = 2, - /** IRQ occurs on either edge */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_BOTH = 3, - /** IRQ occurs when line is low */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_LOW = 4, - /** IRQ occurs when line is high */ - HAL_GPIO_TRIG_HIGH = 5 -}; -typedef enum hal_gpio_irq_trigger hal_gpio_irq_trig_t; - - -/* Function proto for GPIO irq handler functions */ -typedef void (*hal_gpio_irq_handler_t)(void *arg); - -int hal_gpio_irq_init(int pin, hal_gpio_irq_handler_t handler, void *arg, - hal_gpio_irq_trig_t trig, hal_gpio_pull_t pull) -{ - // printf("gpio irq init\n"); - return 0; -} - -void hal_gpio_irq_enable(int pin) -{ - // printf("gpio irq enable\n"); -} - -void hal_gpio_init_out(int led, int s) -{ - // printf("gpio init out\n"); -} - -void hal_gpio_write(int led, int s) -{ - // printf("led[%d]: %s\n", s == 0 ? "OFF" : "ON"); -} - -int hal_gpio_read(int pin) -{ - -} - -int __atomic_load_4(int *p) -{ - return *p; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_and_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p & v; -} - -int __atomic_fetch_or_4(int *p, int v) -{ - return *p | v; -} - -int __atomic_exchange_4(int *p, int v) -{ - int old = *p; - *p = v; - return old; -} - -void unreachable(void) -{ - while (1) { - ; - } -} - -/////////////////////// - - -static void light_default_var_init(void) -{ - gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data.tt = 0x00; - - gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup = STATE_DEFAULT; - - light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min = LIGHTNESS_MIN; - light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max = LIGHTNESS_MAX; - light_lightness_srv_user_data.last = LIGHTNESS_MAX; - light_lightness_srv_user_data.def = LIGHTNESS_MAX; - - /* Following 2 values are as per specification */ - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_min = TEMP_MIN; - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_max = TEMP_MAX; - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_def = TEMP_MIN; - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last = - (u32_t) ((LIGHTNESS_MAX << 16) | TEMP_MIN); -} - -static void light_default_status_init(void) -{ - u16_t lightness; - - lightness = (u16_t) (light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last >> 16); - - if (lightness) { - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff = STATE_ON; - } else { - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff = STATE_OFF; - } - - /* Retrieve Default Lightness & Temperature Values */ - - if (light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def) { - light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_def = (u16_t) - (light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def >> 16); - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_def = (u16_t) - (light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def); - } - - light_lightness_srv_user_data.def = - light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_def; - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp = light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_def; - - /* Retrieve Range of Lightness & Temperature */ - - if (light_lightness_srv_user_data.lightness_range) { - light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max = (u16_t) - (light_lightness_srv_user_data.lightness_range >> 16); - - light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min = (u16_t) - (light_lightness_srv_user_data.lightness_range); - } - - if (light_ctl_srv_user_data.temperature_range) { - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_max = (u16_t) - (light_ctl_srv_user_data.temperature_range >> 16); - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_min = (u16_t) - (light_ctl_srv_user_data.temperature_range); - } - - switch (gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup) { - case STATE_OFF: - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff = STATE_OFF; - state_binding(ONOFF, ONOFF_TEMP); - break; - case STATE_DEFAULT: - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff = STATE_ON; - state_binding(ONOFF, ONOFF_TEMP); - break; - case STATE_RESTORE: - light_lightness_srv_user_data.last = (u16_t) - (light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last >> 16); - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp = - (u16_t) (light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last); - - state_binding(ONPOWERUP, ONOFF_TEMP); - break; - } - - default_tt = gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data.tt; -} - -void update_light_state(void) -{ - u8_t power, color; - - power = 100 * ((float) lightness / 65535); - color = 100 * ((float) (temperature + 32768) / 65535); - - printk("power-> %d, color-> %d\n", power, color); - - if (lightness) { - /* LED1 On */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[0], 0); - } else { - /* LED1 Off */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[0], 1); - } - - if (power < 50) { - /* LED3 On */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[2], 0); - } else { - /* LED3 Off */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[2], 1); - } - - if (color < 50) { - /* LED4 On */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[3], 0); - } else { - /* LED4 Off */ - hal_gpio_write(led_device[3], 1); - } - - if (*ptr_counter == 0 || reset == false) { - reset = true; - ble_npl_callout_reset(&no_transition_work, 0); - } -} - -static void short_time_multireset_bt_mesh_unprovisioning(void) -{ - if (reset_counter >= 4) { - reset_counter = 0; - printk("BT Mesh reset\n"); - bt_mesh_reset(); - } else { - printk("Reset Counter -> %d\n", reset_counter); - reset_counter++; - } - - save_on_flash(RESET_COUNTER); -} - -static void reset_counter_timer_handler(struct ble_npl_event *dummy) -{ - reset_counter = 0; - save_on_flash(RESET_COUNTER); - printk("Reset Counter set to Zero\n"); -} - -struct ble_npl_callout reset_counter_timer; - -static void init_timers(void) -{ - - ble_npl_callout_init(&reset_counter_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - reset_counter_timer_handler, NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&reset_counter_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32(K_MSEC(7000))); - - no_transition_work_init(); -} - -void bt_initialized(void) -{ - light_default_status_init(); - - update_light_state(); - - randomize_publishers_TID(); - - short_time_multireset_bt_mesh_unprovisioning(); -} - -int ble_boot(void) -{ -#ifdef ARCH_sim - mcu_sim_parse_args(argc, argv); -#endif - - light_default_var_init(); - - app_gpio_init(); - - init_timers(); - - transition_timers_init(); - - init_pub(); - -#if 0 // disable this... - ps_settings_init(); -#endif - - printk("Initializing...\n"); - - /* Initialize the NimBLE host configuration. */ - ble_hs_cfg.reset_cb = blemesh_on_reset; - ble_hs_cfg.sync_cb = blemesh_on_sync; - ble_hs_cfg.store_status_cb = ble_store_util_status_rr; - - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - return 0; -} - - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[512]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 4, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/no_transition_work_handler.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/no_transition_work_handler.c deleted file mode 100644 index b63b421d..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/no_transition_work_handler.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "device_composition.h" - -#include "storage.h" - -static void unsolicitedly_publish_states_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - gen_onoff_publish(&root_models[2]); - gen_level_publish(&root_models[4]); - light_lightness_publish(&root_models[11]); - light_lightness_linear_publish(&root_models[11]); - light_ctl_publish(&root_models[14]); - - gen_level_publish(&s0_models[0]); - light_ctl_temp_publish(&s0_models[2]); -} - -struct ble_npl_callout unsolicitedly_publish_states_work; - -static void unsolicitedly_publish_states_timer_handler(struct ble_npl_event *dummy) -{ - ble_npl_callout_reset(&unsolicitedly_publish_states_work, 0); -} - -struct ble_npl_callout unsolicitedly_publish_states_timer; - -static void save_lightness_temp_last_values_timer_handler(struct ble_npl_event *dummy) -{ - save_on_flash(LIGHTNESS_TEMP_LAST_STATE); -} - -struct ble_npl_callout save_lightness_temp_last_values_timer; - -static void no_transition_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - ble_npl_callout_reset(&unsolicitedly_publish_states_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32(K_MSEC(5000))); - - /* If Lightness & Temperature values remains stable for - * 10 Seconds then & then only get stored on SoC flash. - */ - if (gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup == STATE_RESTORE) { - ble_npl_callout_reset(&save_lightness_temp_last_values_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(10000))); - } -} - -struct ble_npl_callout no_transition_work; - -void no_transition_work_init(void) -{ - ble_npl_callout_init(&no_transition_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - no_transition_work_handler, NULL); - ble_npl_callout_init(&save_lightness_temp_last_values_timer, - nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - save_lightness_temp_last_values_timer_handler, - NULL); - ble_npl_callout_init(&unsolicitedly_publish_states_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - unsolicitedly_publish_states_work_handler, NULL); - ble_npl_callout_init(&unsolicitedly_publish_states_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - unsolicitedly_publish_states_timer_handler, NULL); -} diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/no_transition_work_handler.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/no_transition_work_handler.h deleted file mode 100644 index a747dfda..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/no_transition_work_handler.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _NO_TRANSITION_WORK_HANDLER_H -#define _NO_TRANSITION_WORK_HANDLER_H - -extern struct os_callout no_transition_work; - -void no_transition_work_init(void); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.c deleted file mode 100644 index e0a1dc6e..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,265 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include "console/console.h" - -#include "app_gpio.h" - -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "device_composition.h" -#include "publisher.h" - -#define ONOFF -#define GENERIC_LEVEL -/* #define LIGHT_CTL */ -/* #define LIGHT_CTL_TEMP */ - -static bool is_randomization_of_TIDs_done; - -#if (defined(ONOFF) || defined(ONOFF_TT)) -static u8_t tid_onoff; -#elif defined(VND_MODEL_TEST) -static u8_t tid_vnd; -#endif - -static u8_t tid_level; - -void randomize_publishers_TID(void) -{ -#if (defined(ONOFF) || defined(ONOFF_TT)) - bt_rand(&tid_onoff, sizeof(tid_onoff)); -#elif defined(VND_MODEL_TEST) - bt_rand(&tid_vnd, sizeof(tid_vnd)); -#endif - - bt_rand(&tid_level, sizeof(tid_level)); - - is_randomization_of_TIDs_done = true; -} - -static u32_t button_read(int button) -{ - return (uint32_t) hal_gpio_read(button); -} - -void publish(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - int err = 0; - - if (is_randomization_of_TIDs_done == false) { - return; - } - - if (button_read(button_device[0]) == 0) { -#if defined(ONOFF) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[3].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x01); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, tid_onoff++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[3]); -#elif defined(ONOFF_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[3].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x01); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, tid_onoff++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x28); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[3]); -#elif defined(VND_MODEL_TEST) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(vnd_models[0].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x03, CID_RUNTIME)); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(vnd_models[0].pub->msg, 0x0001); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(vnd_models[0].pub->msg, tid_vnd++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&vnd_models[0]); -#endif - - } else if (button_read(button_device[1]) == 0) { -#if defined(ONOFF) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[3].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x00); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, tid_onoff++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[3]); -#elif defined(ONOFF_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[3].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x00); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, tid_onoff++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[3].pub->msg, 0x28); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[3]); -#elif defined(VND_MODEL_TEST) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(vnd_models[0].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_3(0x03, CID_RUNTIME)); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(vnd_models[0].pub->msg, 0x0000); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(vnd_models[0].pub->msg, tid_vnd++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&vnd_models[0]); -#endif - - } else if (button_read(button_device[2]) == 0) { -#if defined(GENERIC_LEVEL) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[5].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[5].pub->msg, LEVEL_S25); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[5]); -#elif defined(ONOFF_GET) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[3].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_ONOFF_GET); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[3]); -#elif defined(GENERIC_DELTA_LEVEL) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[5].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_DELTA_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_le32(root_models[5].pub->msg, 100); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[5]); -#elif defined(GENERIC_MOVE_LEVEL_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[5].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_MOVE_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[5].pub->msg, 13100); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, tid_level++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, 0x00); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[5]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[13].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4D)); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[13].pub->msg, LEVEL_U25); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[13].pub->msg, tid_level++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[13].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[13].pub->msg, 0x28); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[13]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_CTL) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[16].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5F)); - /* Lightness */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, LEVEL_U25); - /* Temperature (value should be from 0x0320 to 0x4E20 */ - /* This is as per 6.1.3.1 in Mesh Model Specification */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0320); - /* Delta UV */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0000); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[16]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_CTL_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[16].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5F)); - /* Lightness */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, LEVEL_U25); - /* Temperature (value should be from 0x0320 to 0x4E20 */ - /* This is as per 6.1.3.1 in Mesh Model Specification */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0320); - /* Delta UV */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0000); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, tid_level++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x00); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[16]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_CTL_TEMP) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[16].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x65)); - /* Temperature (value should be from 0x0320 to 0x4E20 */ - /* This is as per 6.1.3.1 in Mesh Model Specification */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0320); - /* Delta UV */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0000); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[16]); -#endif - - } else if (button_read(button_device[3]) == 0) { -#if defined(GENERIC_LEVEL) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[5].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_LEVEL_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[5].pub->msg, LEVEL_S100); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[5]); -#elif defined(GENERIC_DELTA_LEVEL) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[5].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_DELTA_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_le32(root_models[5].pub->msg, -100); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[5]); -#elif defined(GENERIC_MOVE_LEVEL_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[5].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_GEN_MOVE_SET_UNACK); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[5].pub->msg, -13100); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, tid_level++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[5].pub->msg, 0x00); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[5]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_LIGHTNESS_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[13].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x4D)); - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[13].pub->msg, LEVEL_U100); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[13].pub->msg, tid_level++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[13].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[13].pub->msg, 0x28); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[13]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_CTL) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[16].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5F)); - /* Lightness */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, LEVEL_U100); - /* Temperature (value should be from 0x0320 to 0x4E20 */ - /* This is as per 6.1.3.1 in Mesh Model Specification */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x4E20); - /* Delta UV */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0000); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[16]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_CTL_TT) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[16].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x5F)); - /* Lightness */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, LEVEL_U100); - /* Temperature (value should be from 0x0320 to 0x4E20 */ - /* This is as per 6.1.3.1 in Mesh Model Specification */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x4E20); - /* Delta UV */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0000); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, tid_level++); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x45); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x00); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[16]); -#elif defined(LIGHT_CTL_TEMP) - bt_mesh_model_msg_init(root_models[16].pub->msg, - BT_MESH_MODEL_OP_2(0x82, 0x65)); - /* Temperature (value should be from 0x0320 to 0x4E20 */ - /* This is as per 6.1.3.1 in Mesh Model Specification */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x4E20); - /* Delta UV */ - net_buf_simple_add_le16(root_models[16].pub->msg, 0x0000); - net_buf_simple_add_u8(root_models[16].pub->msg, tid_level++); - err = bt_mesh_model_publish(&root_models[16]); -#endif - } - - if (err) { - printk("bt_mesh_model_publish: err: %d\n", err); - } -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.h deleted file mode 100644 index abf6b298..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/publisher.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _PUBLISHER_H -#define _PUBLISHER_H - -/* Others */ -#define LEVEL_S0 -32768 -#define LEVEL_S25 -16384 -#define LEVEL_S50 0 -#define LEVEL_S75 16384 -#define LEVEL_S100 32767 - -#define LEVEL_U0 0 -#define LEVEL_U25 16384 -#define LEVEL_U50 32768 -#define LEVEL_U75 49152 -#define LEVEL_U100 65535 - -void randomize_publishers_TID(void); -void publish(struct ble_npl_event *work); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/state_binding.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/state_binding.c deleted file mode 100644 index ae539433..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/state_binding.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,308 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include - -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "device_composition.h" -#include "state_binding.h" -#include "transition.h" - - -u16_t lightness, target_lightness; -s16_t temperature, target_temperature; - -static s32_t ceiling(float num) -{ - s32_t inum; - - inum = (s32_t) num; - if (num == (float) inum) { - return inum; - } - - return inum + 1; -} - -u16_t actual_to_linear(u16_t val) -{ - float tmp; - - tmp = ((float) val / 65535); - - return (u16_t) ceiling(65535 * tmp * tmp); -} - -u16_t linear_to_actual(u16_t val) -{ - return (u16_t) (65535 * sqrt(((float) val / 65535))); -} - -static void constrain_lightness(u16_t var) -{ - if (var > 0 && var < light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min) { - var = light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min; - } else if (var > light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max) { - var = light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max; - } - - lightness = var; -} - -static void constrain_lightness2(u16_t var) -{ - /* This is as per Mesh Model Specification 3.3.2.2.3 */ - if (var > 0 && var < light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min) { - if (gen_level_srv_root_user_data.last_delta < 0) { - var = 0U; - } else { - var = light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min; - } - } else if (var > light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max) { - var = light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max; - } - - lightness = var; -} - -static void constrain_target_lightness(u16_t var) -{ - if (var > 0 && - var < light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min) { - var = light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min; - } else if (var > light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max) { - var = light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max; - } - - target_lightness = var; -} - -static s16_t light_ctl_temp_to_level(u16_t temp) -{ - float tmp; - - /* Mesh Model Specification 6.1.3.1.1 2nd formula start */ - - tmp = (temp - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_min) * 65535; - - tmp = tmp / (light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_max - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_min); - - return (s16_t) (tmp - 32768); - - /* 6.1.3.1.1 2nd formula end */ -} - -static u16_t level_to_light_ctl_temp(s16_t level) -{ - u16_t tmp; - float diff; - - /* Mesh Model Specification 6.1.3.1.1 1st formula start */ - diff = (float) (light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_max - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_min) / 65535; - - - tmp = (u16_t) ((level + 32768) * diff); - - return (light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_min + tmp); - - /* 6.1.3.1.1 1st formula end */ -} - -void state_binding(u8_t light, u8_t temp) -{ - switch (temp) { - case ONOFF_TEMP: - case CTL_TEMP: - temperature = - light_ctl_temp_to_level(light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp); - - gen_level_srv_s0_user_data.level = temperature; - break; - case LEVEL_TEMP: - temperature = gen_level_srv_s0_user_data.level; - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp = - level_to_light_ctl_temp(temperature); - break; - default: - break; - } - - switch (light) { - case ONPOWERUP: - if (gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff == STATE_OFF) { - lightness = 0U; - } else if (gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff == STATE_ON) { - lightness = light_lightness_srv_user_data.last; - } - break; - case ONOFF: - if (gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff == STATE_OFF) { - lightness = 0U; - } else if (gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff == STATE_ON) { - if (light_lightness_srv_user_data.def == 0) { - lightness = light_lightness_srv_user_data.last; - } else { - lightness = light_lightness_srv_user_data.def; - } - } - break; - case LEVEL: - lightness = gen_level_srv_root_user_data.level + 32768; - break; - case DELTA_LEVEL: - lightness = gen_level_srv_root_user_data.level + 32768; - constrain_lightness2(lightness); - goto jump; - case ACTUAL: - lightness = light_lightness_srv_user_data.actual; - break; - case LINEAR: - lightness = - linear_to_actual(light_lightness_srv_user_data.linear); - break; - case CTL: - lightness = light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness; - break; - default: - break; - } - - constrain_lightness(lightness); - -jump: - if (lightness != 0) { - light_lightness_srv_user_data.last = lightness; - } - - if (lightness) { - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff = STATE_ON; - } else { - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.onoff = STATE_OFF; - } - - gen_level_srv_root_user_data.level = lightness - 32768; - light_lightness_srv_user_data.actual = lightness; - light_lightness_srv_user_data.linear = actual_to_linear(lightness); - light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness = lightness; -} - -void calculate_lightness_target_values(u8_t type) -{ - bool set_light_ctl_temp_target_value; - u16_t tmp; - - set_light_ctl_temp_target_value = true; - - switch (type) { - case ONOFF: - if (gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.target_onoff == 0) { - tmp = 0U; - } else { - if (light_lightness_srv_user_data.def == 0) { - tmp = light_lightness_srv_user_data.last; - } else { - tmp = light_lightness_srv_user_data.def; - } - } - break; - case LEVEL: - tmp = gen_level_srv_root_user_data.target_level + 32768; - break; - case ACTUAL: - tmp = light_lightness_srv_user_data.target_actual; - break; - case LINEAR: - tmp = linear_to_actual(light_lightness_srv_user_data.target_linear); - break; - case CTL: - set_light_ctl_temp_target_value = false; - - tmp = light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_lightness; - - target_temperature = light_ctl_temp_to_level(light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_temp); - gen_level_srv_s0_user_data.target_level = target_temperature; - break; - default: - return; - } - - constrain_target_lightness(tmp); - - if (target_lightness) { - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.target_onoff = STATE_ON; - } else { - gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data.target_onoff = STATE_OFF; - } - - gen_level_srv_root_user_data.target_level = target_lightness - 32768; - - light_lightness_srv_user_data.target_actual = target_lightness; - - light_lightness_srv_user_data.target_linear = - actual_to_linear(target_lightness); - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_lightness = target_lightness; - - if (set_light_ctl_temp_target_value) { - target_temperature = light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp; - light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_temp = target_temperature; - } -} - -void calculate_temp_target_values(u8_t type) -{ - bool set_light_ctl_delta_uv_target_value; - - set_light_ctl_delta_uv_target_value = true; - - switch (type) { - case LEVEL_TEMP: - target_temperature = gen_level_srv_s0_user_data.target_level; - light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_temp = - level_to_light_ctl_temp(target_temperature); - break; - case CTL_TEMP: - set_light_ctl_delta_uv_target_value = false; - - target_temperature = light_ctl_temp_to_level(light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_temp); - gen_level_srv_s0_user_data.target_level = target_temperature; - break; - default: - return; - } - - target_lightness = light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness; - light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_lightness = target_lightness; - - if (set_light_ctl_delta_uv_target_value) { - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.target_delta_uv = - light_ctl_srv_user_data.delta_uv; - } -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/state_binding.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/state_binding.h deleted file mode 100644 index db1f2a2e..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/state_binding.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _STATE_BINDING_H -#define _STATE_BINDING_H - -enum state_binding { - ONPOWERUP = 0x01, - ONOFF, - LEVEL, - DELTA_LEVEL, - ACTUAL, - LINEAR, - CTL, - IGNORE, - - ONOFF_TEMP, - LEVEL_TEMP, - CTL_TEMP, - IGNORE_TEMP -}; - -extern u16_t lightness, target_lightness; -extern s16_t temperature, target_temperature; - -void state_binding(u8_t lightness, u8_t temperature); -void calculate_lightness_target_values(u8_t type); -void calculate_temp_target_values(u8_t type); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.c deleted file mode 100644 index 39afa23d..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,266 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include "base64/base64.h" -#include "console/console.h" -#include "mesh/mesh.h" - -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "device_composition.h" -#include "storage.h" - -static u8_t storage_id; -u8_t reset_counter; - -#if 0 - -static void save_reset_counter(void) -{ - char buf[5]; - - settings_str_from_bytes(&reset_counter, sizeof(reset_counter), buf, - sizeof(buf)); - - settings_save_one("ps/rc", buf); -} - -static void save_gen_def_trans_time_state(void) -{ - char buf[5]; - - settings_str_from_bytes(&gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data.tt, - sizeof(gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data.tt), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - - settings_save_one("ps/gdtt", buf); -} - -static void save_gen_onpowerup_state(void) -{ - char buf[5]; - - settings_str_from_bytes(&gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup, - sizeof(gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - - settings_save_one("ps/gpo", buf); - - if (gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup == 0x02) { - save_on_flash(LIGHTNESS_TEMP_LAST_STATE); - } -} - -static void save_lightness_temp_def_state(void) -{ - char buf[12]; - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def = - (u32_t) ((light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_def << 16) | - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_def); - - settings_str_from_bytes(&light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def, - sizeof(light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - - settings_save_one("ps/ltd", buf); -} - -static void save_lightness_temp_last_state(void) -{ - char buf[12]; - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last = - (u32_t) ((light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness << 16) | - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp); - - settings_str_from_bytes(&light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last, - sizeof(light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - - settings_save_one("ps/ltl", buf); - - printk("Light CTL Last values have beed saved !!\n"); -} - -static void save_lightness_range(void) -{ - char buf[12]; - - light_lightness_srv_user_data.lightness_range = - (u32_t) ((light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_max << 16) | - light_lightness_srv_user_data.light_range_min); - - settings_str_from_bytes(&light_lightness_srv_user_data.lightness_range, - sizeof(light_lightness_srv_user_data.lightness_range), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - - settings_save_one("ps/lr", buf); -} - -static void save_temperature_range(void) -{ - char buf[12]; - - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temperature_range = - (u32_t) ((light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_max << 16) | - light_ctl_srv_user_data.temp_range_min); - - settings_str_from_bytes(&light_ctl_srv_user_data.temperature_range, - sizeof(light_ctl_srv_user_data.temperature_range), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - - settings_save_one("ps/tr", buf); -} - -static void storage_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - switch (storage_id) { - case RESET_COUNTER: - save_reset_counter(); - break; - case GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_STATE: - save_gen_def_trans_time_state(); - break; - case GEN_ONPOWERUP_STATE: - save_gen_onpowerup_state(); - break; - case LIGHTNESS_TEMP_DEF_STATE: - save_lightness_temp_def_state(); - break; - case LIGHTNESS_TEMP_LAST_STATE: - save_lightness_temp_last_state(); - break; - case LIGHTNESS_RANGE: - save_lightness_range(); - break; - case TEMPERATURE_RANGE: - save_temperature_range(); - break; - } -} - -struct ble_npl_callout storage_work; - -void save_on_flash(u8_t id) -{ - storage_id = id; - ble_npl_callout_reset(&storage_work, 0); -} - -static int ps_set(int argc, char **argv, char *val) -{ - int len; - - if (argc == 1) { - if (!strcmp(argv[0], "rc")) { - len = sizeof(reset_counter); - - return settings_bytes_from_str(val, &reset_counter, - &len); - } - - if (!strcmp(argv[0], "gdtt")) { - len = sizeof(gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data.tt); - - return settings_bytes_from_str(val, - &gen_def_trans_time_srv_user_data.tt, &len); - } - - if (!strcmp(argv[0], "gpo")) { - len = sizeof(gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup); - - return settings_bytes_from_str(val, - &gen_power_onoff_srv_user_data.onpowerup, &len); - } - - if (!strcmp(argv[0], "ltd")) { - len = sizeof(light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def); - - return settings_bytes_from_str(val, - &light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_def, - &len); - } - - if (!strcmp(argv[0], "ltl")) { - len = sizeof(light_ctl_srv_user_data. - lightness_temp_last); - - return settings_bytes_from_str(val, - &light_ctl_srv_user_data.lightness_temp_last, - &len); - } - - if (!strcmp(argv[0], "lr")) { - len = sizeof(light_lightness_srv_user_data. - lightness_range); - - return settings_bytes_from_str(val, - &light_lightness_srv_user_data.lightness_range, - &len); - } - - if (!strcmp(argv[0], "tr")) { - len = sizeof(light_ctl_srv_user_data. - temperature_range); - - return settings_bytes_from_str(val, - &light_ctl_srv_user_data. temperature_range, - &len); - } - } - - return -ENOENT; -} - -static struct conf_handler ps_settings = { - .ch_name = "ps", - .ch_set = ps_set, -}; - -int ps_settings_init(void) -{ - int err; - - ble_npl_callout_init(&storage_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - storage_work_handler, NULL); - - err = conf_register(&ps_settings); - if (err) { - printk("ps_settings_register failed (err %d)", err); - return err; - } - - return 0; -} - -#else - -void save_on_flash(u8_t id) -{ -} - -#endif - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.h deleted file mode 100644 index b9327536..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/storage.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _STORAGE_H -#define _STORAGE_H - -enum ps_variables_id { - RESET_COUNTER = 0x01, - GEN_DEF_TRANS_TIME_STATE, - GEN_ONPOWERUP_STATE, - LIGHTNESS_TEMP_DEF_STATE, - LIGHTNESS_TEMP_LAST_STATE, - LIGHTNESS_RANGE, - TEMPERATURE_RANGE -}; - -extern u8_t reset_counter; - -extern struct ble_npl_callout storage_work; - -int ps_settings_init(void); -void save_on_flash(u8_t id); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.c b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.c deleted file mode 100644 index a35ed9e1..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,792 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#include "ble_mesh.h" -#include "common.h" -#include "device_composition.h" -#include "state_binding.h" -#include "transition.h" - -struct ble_npl_callout onoff_work; -struct ble_npl_callout level_lightness_work; -struct ble_npl_callout level_temp_work; -struct ble_npl_callout light_lightness_actual_work; -struct ble_npl_callout light_lightness_linear_work; -struct ble_npl_callout light_ctl_work; -struct ble_npl_callout light_ctl_temp_work; - -struct ble_npl_callout dummy_timer; - -u8_t transition_type, default_tt; -u32_t *ptr_counter; -struct ble_npl_callout *ptr_timer = &dummy_timer; - -struct transition lightness_transition, temp_transition; - -/* Function to calculate Remaining Time (Start) */ - -void calculate_rt(struct transition *transition) -{ - u8_t steps, resolution; - s32_t duration_remainder; - s64_t now; - - if (transition->just_started) { - transition->rt = transition->tt; - } else { - now = k_uptime_get(); - duration_remainder = transition->total_duration - - (now - transition->start_timestamp); - - if (duration_remainder > 620000) { - /* > 620 seconds -> resolution = 0b11 [10 minutes] */ - resolution = 0x03; - steps = duration_remainder / 600000; - } else if (duration_remainder > 62000) { - /* > 62 seconds -> resolution = 0b10 [10 seconds] */ - resolution = 0x02; - steps = duration_remainder / 10000; - } else if (duration_remainder > 6200) { - /* > 6.2 seconds -> resolution = 0b01 [1 seconds] */ - resolution = 0x01; - steps = duration_remainder / 1000; - } else if (duration_remainder > 0) { - /* <= 6.2 seconds -> resolution = 0b00 [100 ms] */ - resolution = 0x00; - steps = duration_remainder / 100; - } else { - resolution = 0x00; - steps = 0x00; - } - - transition->rt = (resolution << 6) | steps; - } -} - -/* Function to calculate Remaining Time (End) */ - -static void bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(u8_t type) -{ - switch (type) { - case ONOFF: - case LEVEL: - case ACTUAL: - case LINEAR: - light_ctl_srv_user_data.transition = &lightness_transition; - break; - case CTL: - light_ctl_srv_user_data.transition = &lightness_transition; - gen_level_srv_s0_user_data.transition = &lightness_transition; - break; - case LEVEL_TEMP: - case CTL_TEMP: - gen_level_srv_s0_user_data.transition = &temp_transition; - light_ctl_srv_user_data.transition = &temp_transition; - break; - default: - break; - } -} - -static void tt_values_calculator(struct transition *transition) -{ - u8_t steps_multiplier, resolution; - - resolution = (transition->tt >> 6); - steps_multiplier = (transition->tt & 0x3F); - - switch (resolution) { - case 0: /* 100ms */ - transition->total_duration = steps_multiplier * 100; - break; - case 1: /* 1 second */ - transition->total_duration = steps_multiplier * 1000; - break; - case 2: /* 10 seconds */ - transition->total_duration = steps_multiplier * 10000; - break; - case 3: /* 10 minutes */ - transition->total_duration = steps_multiplier * 600000; - break; - } - - transition->counter = ((float) transition->total_duration / 100); - - if (transition->counter > DEVICE_SPECIFIC_RESOLUTION) { - transition->counter = DEVICE_SPECIFIC_RESOLUTION; - } - - ptr_counter = &transition->counter; -} - -void onoff_tt_values(struct generic_onoff_state *state, u8_t tt, u8_t delay) -{ - bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(ONOFF); - calculate_lightness_target_values(ONOFF); - state->transition->tt = tt; - state->transition->delay = delay; - - if (tt != 0) { - tt_values_calculator(state->transition); - } else { - return; - } - - state->transition->quo_tt = state->transition->total_duration / - state->transition->counter; - - state->tt_delta = ((float) (lightness - target_lightness) / - state->transition->counter); -} - -void level_tt_values(struct generic_level_state *state, u8_t tt, u8_t delay) -{ - if (state == &gen_level_srv_root_user_data) { - bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(LEVEL); - calculate_lightness_target_values(LEVEL); - } else if (state == &gen_level_srv_s0_user_data) { - bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(LEVEL_TEMP); - calculate_temp_target_values(LEVEL_TEMP); - } - state->transition->tt = tt; - state->transition->delay = delay; - - if (tt != 0) { - tt_values_calculator(state->transition); - } else { - return; - } - - state->transition->quo_tt = state->transition->total_duration / - state->transition->counter; - - state->tt_delta = ((float) (state->level - state->target_level) / - state->transition->counter); -} - -void light_lightness_actual_tt_values(struct light_lightness_state *state, - u8_t tt, u8_t delay) -{ - bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(ACTUAL); - calculate_lightness_target_values(ACTUAL); - state->transition->tt = tt; - state->transition->delay = delay; - - if (tt != 0) { - tt_values_calculator(state->transition); - } else { - return; - } - - state->transition->quo_tt = state->transition->total_duration / - state->transition->counter; - - state->tt_delta_actual = - ((float) (state->actual - state->target_actual) / - state->transition->counter); -} - -void light_lightness_linear_tt_values(struct light_lightness_state *state, - u8_t tt, u8_t delay) -{ - bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(LINEAR); - calculate_lightness_target_values(LINEAR); - state->transition->tt = tt; - state->transition->delay = delay; - - if (tt != 0) { - tt_values_calculator(state->transition); - } else { - return; - } - - state->transition->quo_tt = state->transition->total_duration / - state->transition->counter; - - state->tt_delta_linear = - ((float) (state->linear - state->target_linear) / - state->transition->counter); -} - -void light_ctl_tt_values(struct light_ctl_state *state, u8_t tt, u8_t delay) -{ - bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(CTL); - calculate_lightness_target_values(CTL); - state->transition->tt = tt; - state->transition->delay = delay; - - if (tt != 0) { - tt_values_calculator(state->transition); - } else { - return; - } - - state->transition->quo_tt = state->transition->total_duration / - state->transition->counter; - - state->tt_delta_lightness = - ((float) (state->lightness - state->target_lightness) / - state->transition->counter); - - state->tt_delta_temp = - ((float) (state->temp - state->target_temp) / - state->transition->counter); - - state->tt_delta_duv = - ((float) (state->delta_uv - state->target_delta_uv) / - state->transition->counter); -} - -void light_ctl_temp_tt_values(struct light_ctl_state *state, - u8_t tt, u8_t delay) -{ - bound_states_transition_type_reassignment(CTL_TEMP); - calculate_temp_target_values(CTL_TEMP); - state->transition->tt = tt; - state->transition->delay = delay; - - if (tt != 0) { - tt_values_calculator(state->transition); - } else { - return; - } - - state->transition->quo_tt = state->transition->total_duration / - state->transition->counter; - - state->tt_delta_temp = ((float) (state->temp - state->target_temp) / - state->transition->counter); - - state->tt_delta_duv = - ((float) (state->delta_uv - state->target_delta_uv) / - state->transition->counter); -} - -/* Timers related handlers & threads (Start) */ -static void onoff_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct generic_onoff_state *state = &gen_onoff_srv_root_user_data; - - if (state->transition->just_started) { - state->transition->just_started = false; - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state_binding(ONOFF, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } else { - state->transition->start_timestamp = k_uptime_get(); - - if (state->target_onoff == STATE_ON) { - state->onoff = STATE_ON; - } - } - - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter != 0) { - state->transition->counter--; - - lightness -= state->tt_delta; - - state_binding(IGNORE, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->onoff = state->target_onoff; - lightness = target_lightness; - - state_binding(IGNORE, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } -} - -static void level_lightness_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - u8_t level; - struct generic_level_state *state = &gen_level_srv_root_user_data; - - switch (transition_type) { - case LEVEL_TT: - level = LEVEL; - break; - case LEVEL_TT_DELTA: - level = DELTA_LEVEL; - break; - case LEVEL_TT_MOVE: - level = LEVEL; - break; - default: - return; - } - - if (state->transition->just_started) { - state->transition->just_started = false; - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state_binding(level, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } else { - state->transition->start_timestamp = k_uptime_get(); - } - - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter != 0) { - state->transition->counter--; - - state->level -= state->tt_delta; - - state_binding(level, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->level = state->target_level; - - state_binding(level, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } -} - -static void level_temp_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct generic_level_state *state = &gen_level_srv_s0_user_data; - - switch (transition_type) { - case LEVEL_TEMP_TT: - break; - case LEVEL_TEMP_TT_DELTA: - break; - case LEVEL_TEMP_TT_MOVE: - break; - default: - return; - } - - if (state->transition->just_started) { - state->transition->just_started = false; - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state_binding(IGNORE, LEVEL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } else { - state->transition->start_timestamp = k_uptime_get(); - } - - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter != 0) { - state->transition->counter--; - - state->level -= state->tt_delta; - - state_binding(IGNORE, LEVEL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->level = state->target_level; - - state_binding(IGNORE, LEVEL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_actual_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct light_lightness_state *state = &light_lightness_srv_user_data; - - if (state->transition->just_started) { - state->transition->just_started = false; - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state_binding(ACTUAL, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } else { - state->transition->start_timestamp = k_uptime_get(); - } - - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter != 0) { - state->transition->counter--; - - state->actual -= state->tt_delta_actual; - - state_binding(ACTUAL, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->actual = state->target_actual; - - state_binding(ACTUAL, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } -} - -static void light_lightness_linear_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct light_lightness_state *state = &light_lightness_srv_user_data; - - if (state->transition->just_started) { - state->transition->just_started = false; - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state_binding(LINEAR, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } else { - state->transition->start_timestamp = k_uptime_get(); - } - - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter != 0) { - state->transition->counter--; - - state->linear -= state->tt_delta_linear; - - state_binding(LINEAR, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->linear = state->target_linear; - - state_binding(LINEAR, IGNORE_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct light_ctl_state *state = &light_ctl_srv_user_data; - - if (state->transition->just_started) { - state->transition->just_started = false; - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state_binding(CTL, CTL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } else { - state->transition->start_timestamp = k_uptime_get(); - } - - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter != 0) { - state->transition->counter--; - - /* Lightness */ - state->lightness -= state->tt_delta_lightness; - - /* Temperature */ - state->temp -= state->tt_delta_temp; - - /* Delta_UV */ - state->delta_uv -= state->tt_delta_duv; - - state_binding(CTL, CTL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->lightness = state->target_lightness; - state->temp = state->target_temp; - state->delta_uv = state->target_delta_uv; - - state_binding(CTL, CTL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_work_handler(struct ble_npl_event *work) -{ - struct light_ctl_state *state = &light_ctl_srv_user_data; - - if (state->transition->just_started) { - state->transition->just_started = false; - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state_binding(IGNORE, CTL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } else { - state->transition->start_timestamp = k_uptime_get(); - } - - return; - } - - if (state->transition->counter != 0) { - state->transition->counter--; - - /* Temperature */ - state->temp -= state->tt_delta_temp; - - /* Delta UV */ - state->delta_uv -= state->tt_delta_duv; - - state_binding(IGNORE, CTL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - } - - if (state->transition->counter == 0) { - state->temp = state->target_temp; - state->delta_uv = state->target_delta_uv; - - state_binding(IGNORE, CTL_TEMP); - update_light_state(); - - ble_npl_callout_stop(ptr_timer); - } -} - -static void dummy_timer_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ } - -static void onoff_tt_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - struct generic_onoff_state *state = ev->arg; - - assert(state != NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&onoff_work, 0); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&state->transition->timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(state->transition->quo_tt))); -} - -static void level_lightness_tt_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - struct generic_level_state *state = ev->arg; - - assert(state != NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&level_lightness_work, 0); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&state->transition->timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(state->transition->quo_tt))); -} - -static void level_temp_tt_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - struct generic_level_state *state = ev->arg; - - assert(state != NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&level_temp_work, 0); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&state->transition->timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(state->transition->quo_tt))); -} - -static void light_lightness_actual_tt_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - struct light_lightness_state *state = ev->arg; - - assert(state != NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&light_lightness_actual_work, 0); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&state->transition->timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(state->transition->quo_tt))); -} - -static void light_lightness_linear_tt_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - struct light_lightness_state *state = ev->arg; - - assert(state != NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&light_lightness_linear_work, 0); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&state->transition->timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(state->transition->quo_tt))); -} - -static void light_ctl_tt_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - struct light_ctl_state *state = ev->arg; - - assert(state != NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&light_ctl_work, 0); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&state->transition->timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(state->transition->quo_tt))); -} - -static void light_ctl_temp_tt_handler(struct ble_npl_event *ev) -{ - struct light_ctl_state *state = ev->arg; - - assert(state != NULL); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&light_ctl_temp_work, 0); - ble_npl_callout_reset(&state->transition->timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(state->transition->quo_tt))); -} -/* Timers related handlers & threads (End) */ - -/* Messages handlers (Start) */ -void onoff_handler(struct generic_onoff_state *state) -{ - ptr_timer = &state->transition->timer; - - ble_npl_callout_init(ptr_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - onoff_tt_handler, NULL); - ptr_timer->ev.arg = state; - ble_npl_callout_reset(ptr_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(5 * state->transition->delay))); -} - -void level_lightness_handler(struct generic_level_state *state) -{ - ptr_timer = &state->transition->timer; - - ble_npl_callout_init(ptr_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - level_lightness_tt_handler, NULL); - ptr_timer->ev.arg = state; - ble_npl_callout_reset(ptr_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(5 * state->transition->delay))); -} - -void level_temp_handler(struct generic_level_state *state) -{ - ptr_timer = &state->transition->timer; - - ble_npl_callout_init(ptr_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - level_temp_tt_handler, NULL); - ptr_timer->ev.arg = state; - ble_npl_callout_reset(ptr_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(5 * state->transition->delay))); -} - -void light_lightness_actual_handler(struct light_lightness_state *state) -{ - ptr_timer = &state->transition->timer; - - ble_npl_callout_init(ptr_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_lightness_actual_tt_handler, NULL); - ptr_timer->ev.arg = state; - ble_npl_callout_reset(ptr_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(5 * state->transition->delay))); -} - -void light_lightness_linear_handler(struct light_lightness_state *state) -{ - ptr_timer = &state->transition->timer; - - ble_npl_callout_init(ptr_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_lightness_linear_tt_handler, NULL); - ptr_timer->ev.arg = state; - ble_npl_callout_reset(ptr_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(5 * state->transition->delay))); -} - -void light_ctl_handler(struct light_ctl_state *state) -{ - ptr_timer = &state->transition->timer; - - ble_npl_callout_init(ptr_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_ctl_tt_handler, NULL); - ptr_timer->ev.arg = state; - ble_npl_callout_reset(ptr_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(5 * state->transition->delay))); -} - -void light_ctl_temp_handler(struct light_ctl_state *state) -{ - ptr_timer = &state->transition->timer; - - ble_npl_callout_init(ptr_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_ctl_temp_tt_handler, NULL); - ptr_timer->ev.arg = state; - ble_npl_callout_reset(ptr_timer, - ble_npl_time_ms_to_ticks32( - K_MSEC(5 * state->transition->delay))); -} -/* Messages handlers (End) */ - -void transition_timers_init(void) -{ - ble_npl_callout_init(&onoff_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - onoff_work_handler, NULL); - - ble_npl_callout_init(&level_lightness_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - level_lightness_work_handler, NULL); - ble_npl_callout_init(&level_temp_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - level_temp_work_handler, NULL); - - ble_npl_callout_init(&light_lightness_actual_work, - nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_lightness_actual_work_handler, NULL); - ble_npl_callout_init(&light_lightness_linear_work, - nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_lightness_linear_work_handler, NULL); - - ble_npl_callout_init(&light_ctl_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_ctl_work_handler, NULL); - ble_npl_callout_init(&light_ctl_temp_work, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - light_ctl_temp_work_handler, NULL); - - ble_npl_callout_init(&dummy_timer, nimble_port_get_dflt_eventq(), - dummy_timer_handler, NULL); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.h b/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.h deleted file mode 100644 index bbe9b00b..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_mesh_models_example_2/transition.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -/* Bluetooth: Mesh Generic OnOff, Generic Level, Lighting & Vendor Models - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Vikrant More - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - */ - -#ifndef _TRANSITION_H -#define _TRANSITION_H - -#define UNKNOWN_VALUE 0x3F -#define DEVICE_SPECIFIC_RESOLUTION 10 - -enum level_transition_types { - LEVEL_TT, - LEVEL_TT_DELTA, - LEVEL_TT_MOVE, - - LEVEL_TEMP_TT, - LEVEL_TEMP_TT_DELTA, - LEVEL_TEMP_TT_MOVE, -}; - -struct transition { - bool just_started; - u8_t tt; - u8_t rt; - u8_t delay; - u32_t quo_tt; - u32_t counter; - u32_t total_duration; - s64_t start_timestamp; - - struct ble_npl_callout timer; -}; - -extern u8_t transition_type, default_tt; -extern u32_t *ptr_counter; -extern struct ble_npl_callout *ptr_timer; - -extern struct transition lightness_transition, temp_transition; - -extern struct ble_npl_callout dummy_timer; - -void calculate_rt(struct transition *transition); - - -void onoff_tt_values(struct generic_onoff_state *state, u8_t tt, u8_t delay); -void level_tt_values(struct generic_level_state *state, u8_t tt, u8_t delay); -void light_lightness_actual_tt_values(struct light_lightness_state *state, - u8_t tt, u8_t delay); -void light_lightness_linear_tt_values(struct light_lightness_state *state, - u8_t tt, u8_t delay); -void light_ctl_tt_values(struct light_ctl_state *state, u8_t tt, u8_t delay); -void light_ctl_temp_tt_values(struct light_ctl_state *state, - u8_t tt, u8_t delay); - -void onoff_handler(struct generic_onoff_state *state); -void level_lightness_handler(struct generic_level_state *state); -void level_temp_handler(struct generic_level_state *state); -void light_lightness_actual_handler(struct light_lightness_state *state); -void light_lightness_linear_handler(struct light_lightness_state *state); -void light_ctl_handler(struct light_ctl_state *state); -void light_ctl_temp_handler(struct light_ctl_state *state); - -void transition_timers_init(void); - -#endif diff --git a/examples/nimble_scanner/main.c b/examples/nimble_scanner/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index 766188d6..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_scanner/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,313 +0,0 @@ -#include -#include -#include - -#include "nimble/nimble_port_tencentos_tiny.h" - -#include "nimble/ble.h" -#include "host/ble_gap.h" - -#define BLE_RAW_ADV_DATA_LEN (31U) - -typedef enum nimble_scan_status_en { - NIMBLE_SCAN_STATUS_STOPPED = 0, - NIMBLE_SCAN_STATUS_SCANNING = 1, -} nimble_scan_status_t; - -typedef struct nimble_scan_item_st { - k_list_t list; - ble_addr_t addr; /* ble address */ - uint8_t adv_data[BLE_RAW_ADV_DATA_LEN]; /* advertising data received */ - uint8_t adv_data_len; /* length of the advertising data */ - int8_t rssi; /* last RSSI of a scanned node */ - uint8_t type; /* advertising packet type */ -} nimble_scan_item_t; - -/* -type: type of advertising packet, e.g BLE_HCI_ADV_TYPE_ADV_IND -disc_addr: advertising address of the source node -disc_rssi: RSSI value for the received packet -disc_adv_data: received advertising data -disc_adv_data_len: length of disc_adv_data in bytes -*/ -typedef void(*nimble_scan_cb_t)(uint8_t type, - const ble_addr_t *disc_addr, int8_t disc_rssi, - const uint8_t *disc_adv_data, size_t disc_adv_data_len); - -static uint8_t ble_addr_type; -static nimble_scan_cb_t scan_disc_cb = NULL; -static struct ble_gap_disc_params scan_params = { 0 }; - -static nimble_scan_item_t entry_pool[200]; -TOS_LIST_DEFINE(free_entry); -TOS_LIST_DEFINE(scan_entry); - -void nimble_scan_info_list_init(void) -{ - int i = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(entry_pool) / sizeof(entry_pool[0]); ++i) { - tos_list_init(&entry_pool[i].list); - tos_list_add(&entry_pool[i].list, &free_entry); - } -} - -void nimble_scan_item_addr_display(ble_addr_t *addr) -{ - int i = 0; - - printf("%02x", (int)addr->val[5]); - - for (i = 4; i >=0; --i) { - printf(":%02x", addr->val[i]); - } - - switch (addr->type) { - case BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC: - printf(" (PUBLIC)"); - break; - - case BLE_ADDR_RANDOM: - printf(" (RANDOM)"); - break; - - case BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID: - printf(" (PUB_ID)"); - break; - - case BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID: - printf(" (RAND_ID)"); - break; - - default: - printf(" (UNKNOWN)"); - break; - } -} - -void nimble_scan_item_type_display(uint8_t type) -{ - switch (type) { - case BLE_HCI_ADV_TYPE_ADV_IND: - printf(" [IND]"); - break; - - case BLE_HCI_ADV_TYPE_ADV_DIRECT_IND_HD: - printf(" [DIRECT_IND_HD]"); - break; - - case BLE_HCI_ADV_TYPE_ADV_SCAN_IND: - printf(" [SCAN_IND]"); - break; - - case BLE_HCI_ADV_TYPE_ADV_NONCONN_IND: - printf(" [NONCONN_IND]"); - break; - - case BLE_HCI_ADV_TYPE_ADV_DIRECT_IND_LD: - printf(" [DIRECT_IND_LD]"); - break; - - default: - printf(" [INVALID]"); - break; - } -} - -void nimble_scan_item_display(nimble_scan_item_t *item) -{ - nimble_scan_item_addr_display(&item->addr); - nimble_scan_item_type_display(item->type); - printf(", rssi: %d\n", item->rssi); - printf("\n"); -} - -void nimble_scan_info_list_display(void) -{ - nimble_scan_item_t *iter; - - TOS_LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(iter, nimble_scan_item_t, list, &scan_entry) { - nimble_scan_item_display(iter); - } -} - -nimble_scan_item_t *nimble_scan_item_alloc(void) -{ - return TOS_LIST_FIRST_ENTRY_OR_NULL(&free_entry, nimble_scan_item_t, list); -} - -int nimble_scan_item_is_exist(ble_addr_t *addr) -{ - nimble_scan_item_t *iter; - - TOS_LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(iter, nimble_scan_item_t, list, &free_entry) { - if (ble_addr_cmp(&addr, &iter->addr) == 0) { - return K_TRUE; - } - } - return K_FALSE; -} - -void nimble_scan_info_save(uint8_t type, const ble_addr_t *disc_addr, int8_t disc_rssi, - const uint8_t *disc_adv_data, size_t disc_adv_data_len) -{ - int i = 0; - nimble_scan_item_t *item; - - if (nimble_scan_item_is_exist(disc_addr)) { - return; - } - - item = nimble_scan_item_alloc(); - if (!item) { - return; - } - - memcpy(&item->addr, disc_addr, sizeof(ble_addr_t)); - if (disc_adv_data) { - memcpy(&item->adv_data, disc_adv_data, disc_adv_data_len); - } - item->adv_data_len = disc_adv_data_len; - item->rssi = disc_rssi; - item->type = type; - - tos_list_del(&item->list); - tos_list_add(&item->list, &scan_entry); -} - -static int blescan_gap_event(struct ble_gap_event *event, void *arg) -{ - /* only interested in the DISC event */ - switch (event->type) { - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_DISC: - scan_disc_cb(event->disc.event_type, &event->disc.addr, event->disc.rssi, - event->disc.data, (size_t)event->disc.length_data); - break; - - default: - /* should never happen */ - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "unexpected event: (%d)\n", (int)event->type); - assert(0); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -int nimble_scan_start(void) -{ - int rc; - - if (ble_gap_disc_active() != NIMBLE_SCAN_STATUS_STOPPED) { - return 0; - } - - rc = ble_gap_disc(ble_addr_type, BLE_HS_FOREVER, - &scan_params, blescan_gap_event, NULL); - if (rc != 0) { - MODLOG_DFLT(DEBUG, "[scanner] err: start failed (%i)\n", rc); - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -void nimble_scan_stop(void) -{ - int rc; - - if (ble_gap_disc_active() != NIMBLE_SCAN_STATUS_SCANNING) { - return; - } - - rc = ble_gap_disc_cancel(); - assert(rc == 0); -} - -nimble_scan_status_t nimble_scan_status(void) -{ - return ble_gap_disc_active() == 1 ? NIMBLE_SCAN_STATUS_SCANNING : NIMBLE_SCAN_STATUS_STOPPED; -} - -int nimble_scan_init(const struct ble_gap_disc_params *params, nimble_scan_cb_t disc_cb) -{ - assert(disc_cb); - - if (params) { - memcpy(&scan_params, params, sizeof(scan_params)); - } else { - memset(&scan_params, 0, sizeof(scan_params)); - } - scan_disc_cb = disc_cb; - - return 0; -} - -int ble_boot(void) -{ - int rc; - - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - /* make sure synchronization of host and controller is done */ - while (!ble_hs_synced()) { - ; - } - - rc = ble_hs_util_ensure_addr(0); - assert(rc == 0); - rc = ble_hs_id_infer_auto(0, &ble_addr_type); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* do a 'full time' scan, set the window equal the interval */ - struct ble_gap_disc_params scan_params = { - .itvl = BLE_GAP_LIM_DISC_SCAN_INT, - .window = BLE_GAP_LIM_DISC_SCAN_WINDOW, - .filter_policy = 0, /* dummy */ - .limited = 0, /* no limited discovery */ - .passive = 0, /* no passive scanning */ - .filter_duplicates = 0, /* no duplicate filtering */ - }; - - nimble_scan_info_list_init(); - - /* initialize the nimble scanner */ - nimble_scan_init(&scan_params, nimble_scan_info_save); - - rc = nimble_scan_start(); - assert(rc == 0); - - tos_task_delay(2000); - - nimble_scan_stop(); - - nimble_scan_info_list_display(); - - return 0; -} - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[2048]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - /* - in this case, ble_boot_task's priority must lower than MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_HOST_TASK_PRIORITY && MYNEWT_VAL_BLE_LL_TASK_PRIORITY, - numerically bigger - to give the host and ll task a chance to run first just after the nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init. - */ - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "ble_boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 6, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/nimble_uart/main.c b/examples/nimble_uart/main.c deleted file mode 100644 index ea376e49..00000000 --- a/examples/nimble_uart/main.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,258 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one - * or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file - * distributed with this work for additional information - * regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file - * to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the - * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance - * with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, - * software distributed under the License is distributed on an - * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the - * specific language governing permissions and limitations - * under the License. - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -/* BLE */ -#include "nimble/ble.h" -#include "host/ble_hs.h" -#include "host/ble_hs_adv.h" -#include "host/ble_uuid.h" -#include "host/ble_att.h" -#include "host/ble_gap.h" -#include "host/ble_gatt.h" -#include "host/ble_l2cap.h" -#include "host/ble_sm.h" -#include "controller/ble_ll.h" - -/* RAM HCI transport. */ -#include "transport/ram/ble_hci_ram.h" - -/* Mandatory services. */ -#include "services/gap/ble_svc_gap.h" -#include "services/gatt/ble_svc_gatt.h" - -#include "bleuart/bleuart.h" - -#include "nimble/nimble_port_tencentos_tiny.h" - -static const char device_name[] = "Nimble Uart"; - -static int bleuart_gap_event(struct ble_gap_event *event, void *arg); - -/** - * Enables advertising with the following parameters: - * o General discoverable mode. - * o Undirected connectable mode. - */ -static void -bleuart_advertise(void) -{ - struct ble_gap_adv_params adv_params; - struct ble_hs_adv_fields fields; - int rc; - - /* - * Set the advertisement data included in our advertisements: - * o Flags (indicates advertisement type and other general info). - * o Advertising tx power. - * o 128 bit UUID - */ - - memset(&fields, 0, sizeof fields); - - /* Advertise two flags: - * o Discoverability in forthcoming advertisement (general) - * o BLE-only (BR/EDR unsupported). - */ - fields.flags = BLE_HS_ADV_F_DISC_GEN | - BLE_HS_ADV_F_BREDR_UNSUP; - - /* Indicate that the TX power level field should be included; have the - * stack fill this value automatically. This is done by assiging the - * special value BLE_HS_ADV_TX_PWR_LVL_AUTO. - */ - fields.tx_pwr_lvl_is_present = 1; - fields.tx_pwr_lvl = BLE_HS_ADV_TX_PWR_LVL_AUTO; - - fields.uuids128 = BLE_UUID128(&gatt_svr_svc_uart_uuid.u); - fields.num_uuids128 = 1; - fields.uuids128_is_complete = 1; - - rc = ble_gap_adv_set_fields(&fields); - if (rc != 0) { - return; - } - - memset(&fields, 0, sizeof fields); - fields.name = (uint8_t *)ble_svc_gap_device_name(); - fields.name_len = strlen((char *)fields.name); - fields.name_is_complete = 1; - - rc = ble_gap_adv_rsp_set_fields(&fields); - if (rc != 0) { - return; - } - - /* Begin advertising. */ - memset(&adv_params, 0, sizeof adv_params); - adv_params.conn_mode = BLE_GAP_CONN_MODE_UND; - adv_params.disc_mode = BLE_GAP_DISC_MODE_GEN; - rc = ble_gap_adv_start(BLE_OWN_ADDR_PUBLIC, NULL, BLE_HS_FOREVER, - &adv_params, bleuart_gap_event, NULL); - if (rc != 0) { - return; - } -} - -/** - * The nimble host executes this callback when a GAP event occurs. The - * application associates a GAP event callback with each connection that forms. - * bleuart uses the same callback for all connections. - * - * @param event The type of event being signalled. - * @param ctxt Various information pertaining to the event. - * @param arg Application-specified argument; unuesd by - * bleuart. - * - * @return 0 if the application successfully handled the - * event; nonzero on failure. The semantics - * of the return code is specific to the - * particular GAP event being signalled. - */ -static int -bleuart_gap_event(struct ble_gap_event *event, void *arg) -{ - struct ble_gap_conn_desc desc; - int rc; - - switch (event->type) { - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_CONNECT: - /* A new connection was established or a connection attempt failed. */ - if (event->connect.status == 0) { - rc = ble_gap_conn_find(event->connect.conn_handle, &desc); - assert(rc == 0); - bleuart_set_conn_handle(event->connect.conn_handle); - } - - if (event->connect.status != 0) { - /* Connection failed; resume advertising. */ - bleuart_advertise(); - } - return 0; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_DISCONNECT: - /* Connection terminated; resume advertising. */ - bleuart_advertise(); - return 0; - - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_ADV_COMPLETE: - /* Advertising terminated; resume advertising. */ - bleuart_advertise(); - return 0; - - case BLE_GAP_EVENT_REPEAT_PAIRING: - /* We already have a bond with the peer, but it is attempting to - * establish a new secure link. This app sacrifices security for - * convenience: just throw away the old bond and accept the new link. - */ - - /* Delete the old bond. */ - rc = ble_gap_conn_find(event->repeat_pairing.conn_handle, &desc); - assert(rc == 0); - ble_store_util_delete_peer(&desc.peer_id_addr); - - /* Return BLE_GAP_REPEAT_PAIRING_RETRY to indicate that the host should - * continue with the pairing operation. - */ - return BLE_GAP_REPEAT_PAIRING_RETRY; - } - - return 0; -} - -static void -bleuart_on_sync(void) -{ - /* Begin advertising. */ - bleuart_advertise(); -} - -static void -put_ad(uint8_t ad_type, uint8_t ad_len, const void *ad, uint8_t *buf, - uint8_t *len) -{ - buf[(*len)++] = ad_len + 1; - buf[(*len)++] = ad_type; - - memcpy(&buf[*len], ad, ad_len); - - *len += ad_len; -} - -static void -update_ad(void) -{ - uint8_t ad[BLE_HS_ADV_MAX_SZ]; - uint8_t ad_len = 0; - uint8_t ad_flags = BLE_HS_ADV_F_DISC_GEN | BLE_HS_ADV_F_BREDR_UNSUP; - - put_ad(BLE_HS_ADV_TYPE_FLAGS, 1, &ad_flags, ad, &ad_len); - put_ad(BLE_HS_ADV_TYPE_COMP_NAME, sizeof(device_name), device_name, ad, &ad_len); - - ble_gap_adv_set_data(ad, ad_len); -} - -int ble_boot(void) -{ - int rc = 0; - - /* Initialize the BLE host. */ - ble_hs_cfg.sync_cb = bleuart_on_sync; - ble_hs_cfg.store_status_cb = ble_store_util_status_rr; - - rc = bleuart_gatt_svr_init(); - assert(rc == 0); - - /* Set the default device name */ - rc = ble_svc_gap_device_name_set(device_name); - assert(rc == 0); - - update_ad(); - - /* run an event loop for handling the heart rate update events */ - extern void nimble_port_run(void); - nimble_port_tencentos_tiny_init(nimble_port_run); - - return 0; -} - -k_task_t ble_boot_task; -k_stack_t ble_boot_stack[512]; - -int main(void) -{ - board_init(); - - /* Initialize OS */ - tos_knl_init(); - - nimble_port_init(); - - tos_task_create(&ble_boot_task, "boot", ble_boot, NULL, - 4, - ble_boot_stack, sizeof(ble_boot_stack), - 0); - tos_knl_start(); -} - diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/action_config.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/action_config.c deleted file mode 100644 index c62fcd33..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/action_config.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -#ifdef ACTION_ENABLED - -#define TOTAL_ACTION_COUNTS (1) - -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_INT sg_light_blink_in_time = 0; -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_BOOL sg_light_blink_in_color = 0; -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_INT sg_light_blink_in_total_time = 0; -static DeviceProperty g_actionInput_light_blink[] = { - - {.key = "time", .data = &sg_light_blink_in_time, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_INT}, - {.key = "color", .data = &sg_light_blink_in_color, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_BOOL}, - {.key = "total_time", .data = &sg_light_blink_in_total_time, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_INT}, -}; -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_BOOL sg_light_blink_out_err_code = 0; -static DeviceProperty g_actionOutput_light_blink[] = { - - {.key = "err_code", .data = &sg_light_blink_out_err_code, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_BOOL}, -}; - - -static DeviceAction g_actions[]={ - - { - .pActionId = "light_blink", - .timestamp = 0, - .input_num = sizeof(g_actionInput_light_blink)/sizeof(g_actionInput_light_blink[0]), - .output_num = sizeof(g_actionOutput_light_blink)/sizeof(g_actionOutput_light_blink[0]), - .pInput = g_actionInput_light_blink, - .pOutput = g_actionOutput_light_blink, - }, -}; - -#endif diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/data_config.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/data_config.c deleted file mode 100644 index e962652f..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/data_config.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -/*-----------------data config start -------------------*/ - -#define TOTAL_PROPERTY_COUNT 4 - -static sDataPoint sg_DataTemplate[TOTAL_PROPERTY_COUNT]; - -typedef struct _ProductDataDefine { - TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_BOOL m_power_switch; - TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_ENUM m_color; - TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_INT m_brightness; - TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_STRING m_name[64+1]; -} ProductDataDefine; - -static ProductDataDefine sg_ProductData; - -static void _init_data_template(void) -{ - sg_ProductData.m_power_switch = 0; - sg_DataTemplate[0].data_property.data = &sg_ProductData.m_power_switch; - sg_DataTemplate[0].data_property.key = "power_switch"; - sg_DataTemplate[0].data_property.type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_BOOL; - - sg_ProductData.m_color = 0; - sg_DataTemplate[1].data_property.data = &sg_ProductData.m_color; - sg_DataTemplate[1].data_property.key = "color"; - sg_DataTemplate[1].data_property.type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_ENUM; - - sg_ProductData.m_brightness = 1; - sg_DataTemplate[2].data_property.data = &sg_ProductData.m_brightness; - sg_DataTemplate[2].data_property.key = "brightness"; - sg_DataTemplate[2].data_property.type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_INT; - - sg_ProductData.m_name[0] = '\0'; - sg_DataTemplate[3].data_property.data = sg_ProductData.m_name; - sg_DataTemplate[3].data_property.data_buff_len = sizeof(sg_ProductData.m_name)/sizeof(sg_ProductData.m_name[3]); - sg_DataTemplate[3].data_property.key = "name"; - sg_DataTemplate[3].data_property.type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING; - -}; diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/data_template_sample.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/data_template_sample.c deleted file mode 100644 index b01b058a..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/data_template_sample.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,590 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making IoT Hub available. - * Copyright (C) 2016 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "qcloud_iot_export.h" -#include "qcloud_iot_import.h" -#include "lite-utils.h" -#include "data_config.c" - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - static char sg_cert_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device cert file - static char sg_key_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device key file -#endif - -static DeviceInfo sg_devInfo; -static MQTTEventType sg_subscribe_event_result = MQTT_EVENT_UNDEF; -static bool sg_control_msg_arrived = false; -static char sg_data_report_buffer[2048]; -size_t sg_data_report_buffersize = sizeof(sg_data_report_buffer) / sizeof(sg_data_report_buffer[0]); - -#ifdef EVENT_POST_ENABLED - -#if defined(EVENT_TIMESTAMP_USED) -#undef EVENT_TIMESTAMP_USED -#endif - -#include "events_config.c" -static void update_events_timestamp(sEvent *pEvents, int count) -{ - int i; - - for(i = 0; i < count; i++){ - if (NULL == (&pEvents[i])) { - Log_e("null event pointer"); - return; - } -#ifdef EVENT_TIMESTAMP_USED - pEvents[i].timestamp = time(NULL); //should be UTC and accurate -#else - pEvents[i].timestamp = 0; -#endif - } -} - -static void event_post_cb(void *pClient, MQTTMessage *msg) -{ - Log_d("Reply:%.*s", msg->payload_len, msg->payload); - IOT_Event_clearFlag(pClient, FLAG_EVENT0|FLAG_EVENT1|FLAG_EVENT2); -} - -//event check and post -static void eventPostCheck(void *client) -{ - int i; - int rc; - uint32_t eflag; - uint8_t event_count; - sEvent *pEventList[EVENT_COUNTS]; - - IOT_Event_setFlag(client, FLAG_EVENT0|FLAG_EVENT1|FLAG_EVENT2); - eflag = IOT_Event_getFlag(client); - if((EVENT_COUNTS > 0 )&& (eflag > 0)){ - event_count = 0; - for(i = 0; i < EVENT_COUNTS; i++){ - if((eflag&(1<pInput; - for (i = 0; i < pAction->input_num; i++) { - if (JSTRING == pActionInput[i].type) { - Log_d("Input:[%s], data:[%s]", pActionInput[i].key, pActionInput[i].data); - HAL_Free(pActionInput[i].data); - } else { - if(JINT32 == pActionInput[i].type) { - Log_d("Input:[%s], data:[%d]", pActionInput[i].key, *((int*)pActionInput[i].data)); - } else if( JFLOAT == pActionInput[i].type) { - Log_d("Input:[%s], data:[%f]", pActionInput[i].key, *((float*)pActionInput[i].data)); - } else if( JUINT32 == pActionInput[i].type) { - Log_d("Input:[%s], data:[%u]", pActionInput[i].key, *((uint32_t*)pActionInput[i].data)); - } - } - } - - // construct output - memset((char *)&replyPara, 0, sizeof(sReplyPara)); - replyPara.code = eDEAL_SUCCESS; - replyPara.timeout_ms = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT; - strcpy(replyPara.status_msg, "action execute success!"); //add the message about the action resault - - DeviceProperty *pActionOutnput = pAction->pOutput; - (void)pActionOutnput; //elimate warning - //TO DO: add your aciont logic here and set output properties which will be reported by action_reply - - IOT_ACTION_REPLY(pClient, pClientToken, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize, pAction, &replyPara); -} - -static int _register_data_template_action(void *pTemplate_client) -{ - int i,rc; - - for (i = 0; i < TOTAL_ACTION_COUNTS; i++) { - rc = IOT_Template_Register_Action(pTemplate_client, &g_actions[i], OnActionCallback); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - rc = IOT_Template_Destroy(pTemplate_client); - Log_e("register device data template action failed, err: %d", rc); - return rc; - } else { - Log_i("data template action=%s registered.", g_actions[i].pActionId); - } - } - - return QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; -} -#endif - - -static void event_handler(void *pclient, void *handle_context, MQTTEventMsg *msg) -{ - uintptr_t packet_id = (uintptr_t)msg->msg; - - switch(msg->event_type) { - case MQTT_EVENT_UNDEF: - Log_i("undefined event occur."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_DISCONNECT: - Log_i("MQTT disconnect."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_RECONNECT: - Log_i("MQTT reconnect."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_SUCCESS: - sg_subscribe_event_result = msg->event_type; - Log_i("subscribe success, packet-id=%u", packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_TIMEOUT: - sg_subscribe_event_result = msg->event_type; - Log_i("subscribe wait ack timeout, packet-id=%u", packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_NACK: - sg_subscribe_event_result = msg->event_type; - Log_i("subscribe nack, packet-id=%u", packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_SUCCESS: - Log_i("publish success, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("publish timeout, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_NACK: - Log_i("publish nack, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - default: - Log_i("Should NOT arrive here."); - break; - } -} - -// Setup MQTT construct parameters -static int _setup_connect_init_params(TemplateInitParams* initParams) -{ - int ret; - - ret = HAL_GetDevInfo((void *)&sg_devInfo); - if(QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != ret){ - return ret; - } - - initParams->device_name = sg_devInfo.device_name; - initParams->product_id = sg_devInfo.product_id; - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - /* TLS with certs*/ - char certs_dir[PATH_MAX + 1] = "certs"; - char current_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; - char *cwd = getcwd(current_path, sizeof(current_path)); - if (cwd == NULL) - { - Log_e("getcwd return NULL"); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - sprintf(sg_cert_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_cert_file_name); - sprintf(sg_key_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_key_file_name); - - initParams->cert_file = sg_cert_file; - initParams->key_file = sg_key_file; -#else - initParams->device_secret = sg_devInfo.device_secret; -#endif - - initParams->command_timeout = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT; - initParams->keep_alive_interval_ms = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_KEEP_ALIVE_INTERNAL; - initParams->auto_connect_enable = 1; - initParams->event_handle.h_fp = event_handler; - - return QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; -} - -static void OnControlMsgCallback(void *pClient, const char *pJsonValueBuffer, uint32_t valueLength, DeviceProperty *pProperty) -{ - int i = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < TOTAL_PROPERTY_COUNT; i++) { - /* handle self defined string/json here. Other properties are dealed in _handle_delta()*/ - if (strcmp(sg_DataTemplate[i].data_property.key, pProperty->key) == 0) { - sg_DataTemplate[i].state = eCHANGED; - Log_i("Property=%s changed", pProperty->key); - sg_control_msg_arrived = true; - return; - } - } - - Log_e("Property=%s changed no match", pProperty->key); -} - -static void OnReportReplyCallback(void *pClient, Method method, ReplyAck replyAck, const char *pJsonDocument, void *pUserdata) { - Log_i("recv report reply response, reply ack: %d", replyAck); -} - -// register data template properties -static int _register_data_template_property(void *pTemplate_client) -{ - int i,rc; - - for (i = 0; i < TOTAL_PROPERTY_COUNT; i++) { - rc = IOT_Template_Register_Property(pTemplate_client, &sg_DataTemplate[i].data_property, OnControlMsgCallback); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - rc = IOT_Template_Destroy(pTemplate_client); - Log_e("register device data template property failed, err: %d", rc); - return rc; - } else { - Log_i("data template property=%s registered.", sg_DataTemplate[i].data_property.key); - } - } - - return QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; -} - -///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -__weak void OLED_Clear(void) -{ - printf("OLED Clear\n"); -} - -__weak void OLED_ShowString(int x, int y, uint8_t *str, int bold) -{ - printf("OLED ShowString: %s\n", (char *)str); -} - -// handle the light(simulated) -static void light_change_color(const char *color) -{ - // 作为demo，这里用oledå±å­—符显示æ¥æ¨¡æ‹Ÿç¯é¢œè‰²çš„åˆ‡æ¢ - // 这里应该由用户实现硬件æ“作代ç ï¼Œæ¥æ”¹å˜æ™ºèƒ½ç¯çš„颜色 - // 此处demo，在开å‘æ¿æ˜¾ç¤ºå±ä¸Šæ˜¾ç¤ºå…·ä½“的颜色 - OLED_ShowString(0, 0, (uint8_t *)color, 8); -} - -static void light_change_brightness(TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_INT brightness) -{ - // 作为demo，这里用oledå±å­—符显示æ¥æ¨¡æ‹Ÿç¯é¢œè‰²çš„åˆ‡æ¢ - // 这里应该由用户实现硬件æ“作代ç ï¼Œæ¥æ”¹å˜æ™ºèƒ½ç¯çš„颜色 - // 此处demo，在开å‘æ¿æ˜¾ç¤ºå±ä¸Šæ˜¾ç¤ºå…·ä½“的颜色 - char brightness_str[12]; - - snprintf(brightness_str, sizeof(brightness_str), "%d", brightness); - brightness_str[sizeof(brightness_str) - 1] = '\0'; - OLED_ShowString(0, 2, (uint8_t *)brightness_str, 8); -} - -static void light_power_on(void) -{ - // 作为demo，这里用oledå±å­—符显示æ¥æ¨¡æ‹Ÿç¯é¢œè‰²çš„åˆ‡æ¢ - OLED_Clear(); -} - -static void light_power_off(void) -{ - // 作为demo，这里用oledå±å­—符显示æ¥æ¨¡æ‹Ÿç¯é¢œè‰²çš„åˆ‡æ¢ - char *info = "light off"; - OLED_Clear(); - OLED_ShowString(0, 0, (uint8_t *)info, 16); -} -///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - -// when control msg received, data_template's properties has been parsed in pData -// you should add your logic how to use pData -void deal_down_stream_user_logic(void *client, ProductDataDefine * pData) -{ - Log_d("someting about your own product logic wait to be done"); - -///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - char *color_name; - - /* ç¯å…‰é¢œè‰² */ - switch (sg_ProductData.m_color) { - case 0: - color_name = " RED "; - break; - - case 1: - color_name = "GREEN"; - break; - - case 2: - color_name = "BLUE"; - break; - } - - if (sg_ProductData.m_power_switch == 1) { - /* ç¯å…‰å¼€å¯å¼ï¼ŒæŒ‰ç…§æŽ§åˆ¶å‚数展示 */ - light_power_on(); - light_change_color(color_name); - light_change_brightness(sg_ProductData.m_brightness); - } else { - /* ç¯å…‰å…³é—­å±•ç¤º */ - light_power_off(); - } -} - -void first_time_report_construct(DeviceProperty *pReportDataList[], int *pCount) -{ - int i, j; - - for (i = 0, j = 0; i < TOTAL_PROPERTY_COUNT; i++) { - pReportDataList[j++] = &(sg_DataTemplate[i].data_property); - } - *pCount = j; -} -///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - - -// demo for up-stream -// add changed properties to pReportDataList, then the changed properties would be reported -// you should add your own logic for how to get the changed properties -int deal_up_stream_user_logic(DeviceProperty *pReportDataList[], int *pCount) -{ - int i, j; - - for (i = 0, j = 0; i < TOTAL_PROPERTY_COUNT; i++) { - if(eCHANGED == sg_DataTemplate[i].state) { - pReportDataList[j++] = &(sg_DataTemplate[i].data_property); - sg_DataTemplate[i].state = eNOCHANGE; - } - } - *pCount = j; - - return (*pCount > 0)?QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS:QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; -} - -/*You should get the real info for your device, here just for example*/ -static int _get_sys_info(void *handle, char *pJsonDoc, size_t sizeOfBuffer) -{ - /*platform info has at least one of module_hardinfo/module_softinfo/fw_ver property*/ - DeviceProperty plat_info[] = { - {.key = "module_hardinfo", .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING, .data = "ESP8266"}, - {.key = "module_softinfo", .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING, .data = "V1.0"}, - {.key = "fw_ver", .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING, .data = QCLOUD_IOT_DEVICE_SDK_VERSION}, - {.key = "imei", .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING, .data = "11-22-33-44"}, - {.key = "lat", .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING, .data = "22.546015"}, - {.key = "lon", .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING, .data = "113.941125"}, - {NULL, NULL, 0} //end - }; - - /*self define info*/ - DeviceProperty self_info[] = { - {.key = "append_info", .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING, .data = "your self define info"}, - {NULL, NULL, 0} //end - }; - - return IOT_Template_JSON_ConstructSysInfo(handle, pJsonDoc, sizeOfBuffer, plat_info, self_info); -} - -int data_template_light_thread(void) { - int rc; - sReplyPara replyPara; - DeviceProperty *pReportDataList[TOTAL_PROPERTY_COUNT]; - int ReportCont; - - //init log level - IOT_Log_Set_Level(eLOG_DEBUG); - - //init connection - TemplateInitParams init_params = DEFAULT_TEMPLATE_INIT_PARAMS; - rc = _setup_connect_init_params(&init_params); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_e("init params err,rc=%d", rc); - return rc; - } - - void *client = IOT_Template_Construct(&init_params, NULL); - if (client != NULL) { - Log_i("Cloud Device Construct Success"); - } else { - Log_e("Cloud Device Construct Failed"); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - -/////////////////////////////////// - - int first_time_report = 1; - light_power_off(); - -/////////////////////////////////// - - //init data template - _init_data_template(); - - //register data template propertys here - rc = _register_data_template_property(client); - if (rc == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_i("Register data template propertys Success"); - } else { - Log_e("Register data template propertys Failed: %d", rc); - return rc; - } - - //register data template actions here -#ifdef ACTION_ENABLED - rc = _register_data_template_action(client); - if (rc == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_i("Register data template actions Success"); - } else { - Log_e("Register data template actions Failed: %d", rc); - return rc; - } -#endif - - //report device info, then you can manager your product by these info, like position - rc = _get_sys_info(client, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize); - if(QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS == rc){ - rc = IOT_Template_Report_SysInfo_Sync(client, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize, QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_e("Report system info fail, err: %d", rc); - goto exit; - } - }else { - Log_e("Get system info fail, err: %d", rc); - } - - //get the property changed during offline - rc = IOT_Template_GetStatus_sync(client, QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_e("Get data status fail, err: %d", rc); - //goto exit; - }else { - Log_d("Get data status success"); - } - - while (IOT_Template_IsConnected(client) || rc == QCLOUD_ERR_MQTT_ATTEMPTING_RECONNECT - || rc == QCLOUD_RET_MQTT_RECONNECTED || QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS == rc) { - - rc = IOT_Template_Yield(client, 200); - - if (rc == QCLOUD_ERR_MQTT_ATTEMPTING_RECONNECT) { - HAL_SleepMs(1000); - continue; - } - else if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_e("Exit loop caused of errCode: %d", rc); - } - - /* handle control msg from server */ - if (sg_control_msg_arrived) { - deal_down_stream_user_logic(client, &sg_ProductData); - - /* control msg should reply, otherwise server treat device didn't receive and retain the msg which would be get by get status*/ - memset((char *)&replyPara, 0, sizeof(sReplyPara)); - replyPara.code = eDEAL_SUCCESS; - replyPara.timeout_ms = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT; - replyPara.status_msg[0] = '\0'; //add extra info to replyPara.status_msg when error occured - - rc = IOT_Template_ControlReply(client, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize, &replyPara); - if (rc == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_d("Contol msg reply success"); - sg_control_msg_arrived = false; - } else { - Log_e("Contol msg reply failed, err: %d", rc); - } - }else { - Log_d("No control msg received..."); - } - -/////////////////////////////////// - // some mistake(kind of bug) in this official sample, must do the first time report - // the cloud take the light switch state as ON by default - if (first_time_report) { - /*report msg to server*/ - /*report the lastest properties's status*/ - first_time_report_construct(pReportDataList, &ReportCont); - rc = IOT_Template_JSON_ConstructReportArray(client, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize, ReportCont, pReportDataList); - if (rc == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - rc = IOT_Template_Report(client, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize, - OnReportReplyCallback, NULL, QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT); - if (rc == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_i("data template reporte success"); - } else { - Log_e("data template reporte failed, err: %d", rc); - } - } else { - Log_e("construct reporte data failed, err: %d", rc); - } - - first_time_report = 0; - } else { -/////////////////////////////////// - - /*report msg to server*/ - /*report the lastest properties's status*/ - if(QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS == deal_up_stream_user_logic(pReportDataList, &ReportCont)){ - rc = IOT_Template_JSON_ConstructReportArray(client, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize, ReportCont, pReportDataList); - if (rc == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - rc = IOT_Template_Report(client, sg_data_report_buffer, sg_data_report_buffersize, - OnReportReplyCallback, NULL, QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT); - if (rc == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_i("data template reporte success"); - } else { - Log_e("data template reporte failed, err: %d", rc); - } - } else { - Log_e("construct reporte data failed, err: %d", rc); - } - - }else { - //Log_d("no data need to be reported or someting goes wrong"); - } -/////////////////////////////////// - } -/////////////////////////////////// - -#ifdef EVENT_POST_ENABLED - eventPostCheck(client); -#endif - - HAL_SleepMs(3000); - }/*end of while*/ -exit: - rc = IOT_Template_Destroy(client); - - return rc; -} diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/entry.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/entry.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8a654434..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/entry.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_k.h" - -/* 用户根æ®è‡ªå·±çš„底层通信链路æ¥é…ç½®æ­¤å® - * 如果是基于以太网lwip的链路，这里应该定义 USE_LWIP - * 如果是基于模组的通信链路，这里应该定义相应的模组å®ï¼Œå¦‚使用ESP8266则定义 USE_ESP8266 - * */ -#define USE_ESP8266 - -#ifdef USE_LWIP -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 -#include "esp8266.h" -#endif - -void application_entry(void *arg) -{ -#ifdef USE_LWIP - dns_init(); - MX_LWIP_Init(); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 - extern int esp8266_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - extern int esp8266_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd); - esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); - esp8266_join_ap("SheldonDai", "srnr6x9xbhmb0"); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_NB_BC35 - extern int bc35_28_95_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - bc35_28_95_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#endif - - data_template_light_thread(); - - while (1) { - printf("This is a qcloud explorer sdk data template demo!\r\n"); - tos_task_delay(1000); - } -} - diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/events_config.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/events_config.c deleted file mode 100644 index ad8af0eb..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_data_template/events_config.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -#ifdef EVENT_POST_ENABLED - -#define EVENT_COUNTS (3) - -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_BOOL sg_status_report_status = 0; -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_STRING sg_status_report_message[64+1]={0}; -static DeviceProperty g_propertyEvent_status_report[] = { - - {.key = "status", .data = &sg_status_report_status, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_BOOL}, - {.key = "message", .data = sg_status_report_message, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING}, -}; - -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_FLOAT sg_low_voltage_voltage = 1; -static DeviceProperty g_propertyEvent_low_voltage[] = { - - {.key = "voltage", .data = &sg_low_voltage_voltage, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_FLOAT}, -}; - -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_STRING sg_hardware_fault_name[64+1]={0}; -static TYPE_DEF_TEMPLATE_INT sg_hardware_fault_error_code = 1; -static DeviceProperty g_propertyEvent_hardware_fault[] = { - - {.key = "name", .data = sg_hardware_fault_name, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_STRING}, - {.key = "error_code", .data = &sg_hardware_fault_error_code, .type = TYPE_TEMPLATE_INT}, -}; - - -static sEvent g_events[]={ - - { - .event_name = "status_report", - .type = "info", - .timestamp = 0, - .eventDataNum = sizeof(g_propertyEvent_status_report)/sizeof(g_propertyEvent_status_report[0]), - .pEventData = g_propertyEvent_status_report, - }, - { - .event_name = "low_voltage", - .type = "alert", - .timestamp = 0, - .eventDataNum = sizeof(g_propertyEvent_low_voltage)/sizeof(g_propertyEvent_low_voltage[0]), - .pEventData = g_propertyEvent_low_voltage, - }, - { - .event_name = "hardware_fault", - .type = "fault", - .timestamp = 0, - .eventDataNum = sizeof(g_propertyEvent_hardware_fault)/sizeof(g_propertyEvent_hardware_fault[0]), - .pEventData = g_propertyEvent_hardware_fault, - }, -}; - -#endif diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_ota/entry.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_ota/entry.c deleted file mode 100644 index a3d29c44..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_ota/entry.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_k.h" - -/* 用户根æ®è‡ªå·±çš„底层通信链路æ¥é…ç½®æ­¤å® - * 如果是基于以太网lwip的链路，这里应该定义 USE_LWIP - * 如果是基于模组的通信链路，这里应该定义相应的模组å®ï¼Œå¦‚使用ESP8266则定义 USE_ESP8266 - * */ -#define USE_ESP8266 - -#ifdef USE_LWIP -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 -#include "esp8266.h" -#endif - -void application_entry(void *arg) -{ -#ifdef USE_LWIP - dns_init(); - MX_LWIP_Init(); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 - extern int esp8266_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - extern int esp8266_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd); - esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); - esp8266_join_ap("SheldonDai", "srnr6x9xbhmb0"); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_NB_BC35 - extern int bc35_28_95_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - bc35_28_95_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#endif - - ota_thread(); - - while (1) { - printf("This is a qcloud explorer sdk ota demo!\r\n"); - tos_task_delay(1000); - } -} - diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_ota/ota_mqtt_sample.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_ota/ota_mqtt_sample.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9bab8761..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_explorer_sdk_ota/ota_mqtt_sample.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,522 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making IoT Hub available. - * Copyright (C) 2016 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "qcloud_iot_export.h" -#include "qcloud_iot_import.h" -#include "lite-utils.h" - - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT -static char sg_cert_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device cert file -static char sg_key_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device key file -#endif - - -static DeviceInfo sg_devInfo; - - -#define OTA_BUF_LEN (5000) - -static bool sg_pub_ack = false; -static int sg_packet_id = 0; - -static void event_handler(void *pclient, void *handle_context, MQTTEventMsg *msg) -{ - uintptr_t packet_id = (uintptr_t)msg->msg; - - switch (msg->event_type) { - case MQTT_EVENT_UNDEF: - Log_i("undefined event occur."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_DISCONNECT: - Log_i("MQTT disconnect."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_RECONNECT: - Log_i("MQTT reconnect."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_SUCCESS: - Log_i("subscribe success, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("subscribe wait ack timeout, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_NACK: - Log_i("subscribe nack, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_SUCCESS: - Log_i("publish success, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - if (sg_packet_id == packet_id) - sg_pub_ack = true; - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("publish timeout, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_NACK: - Log_i("publish nack, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - default: - Log_i("Should NOT arrive here."); - break; - } -} - -/* demo of firmware info management in device side for resuming download from break point */ -#define VERSION_FILE_PATH "./local_fw_info.json" -#define KEY_VER "version" -#define KEY_MD5 "md5" -#define KEY_SIZE "downloadSize" -#define KEY_STATE "state" -#define KEY_PREVER "running_version" -static char * get_local_fw_version(char **ver, char **md5, char **size) -{ -#define INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN 256 - - FILE *fp; - int len; - int rlen; - char *preVer; - char *reportVer = NULL; - - fp = fopen(VERSION_FILE_PATH, "r"); - if (NULL == fp) { - Log_e("open file %s failed", VERSION_FILE_PATH); - goto exit; - } - - fseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_END); - len = ftell(fp); - if (len > INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN) { - Log_e("%s is too big, pls check", VERSION_FILE_PATH); - goto exit; - } - - char *JsonDoc = (char *)HAL_Malloc(len + 10); - if (NULL == JsonDoc) { - Log_e("malloc buffer for json file read fail"); - goto exit; - } - - rewind(fp); - rlen = fread(JsonDoc, 1, len, fp); - - if (len != rlen) { - Log_e("read data len (%d) less than needed (%d), %s", rlen, len, JsonDoc); - } - - *ver = LITE_json_value_of(KEY_VER, JsonDoc); - *md5 = LITE_json_value_of(KEY_MD5, JsonDoc); - *size = LITE_json_value_of(KEY_SIZE, JsonDoc); - preVer = LITE_json_value_of(KEY_PREVER, JsonDoc); - - if ((NULL != *ver) && (NULL != preVer) && (0 == strcmp(*ver, preVer))) { - reportVer = *ver; - HAL_Free(preVer); - } else { - reportVer = preVer; - } - -exit: - - if (NULL != fp) { - fclose(fp); - } - - return reportVer; -#undef INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN -} - -/* update local firmware info for resuming download from break point */ -static int update_local_fw_info(const char *version, const char *preVer, const char *md5, uint32_t downloadedSize) -{ -#define INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN 256 - - FILE *fp; - int wlen; - int ret = QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; - static char dataBuff[INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN]; - - memset(dataBuff, 0, INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN); - HAL_Snprintf(dataBuff, INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN, "{\"%s\":\"%s\", \"%s\":\"%s\",\"%s\":%d,\"%s\":\"%s\"}", \ - KEY_VER, version, KEY_MD5, md5, KEY_SIZE, downloadedSize, \ - KEY_PREVER, (NULL == preVer) ? "1.0.0" : preVer); - - fp = fopen(VERSION_FILE_PATH, "w"); - if (NULL == fp) { - Log_e("open file %s failed", VERSION_FILE_PATH); - ret = QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - goto exit; - } - - wlen = fwrite(dataBuff, 1, strlen(dataBuff), fp); - if (wlen != strlen(dataBuff)) { - Log_e("save version to file err"); - ret = QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - -exit: - - if (NULL != fp) { - fclose(fp); - } - - return ret; -#undef INFO_FILE_MAX_LEN -} - -/* get local firmware offset for resuming download from break point */ -static int getFwOffset(void *h_ota, char *local_ver, char *local_md5, char *local_size, uint32_t *offset, uint32_t *size_file) -{ - static char version[128], md5sum[33]; - uint32_t local_len; - int Ret; - - Ret = IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_VERSION, version, 128); - Ret |= IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_MD5SUM, md5sum, 33); - Ret |= IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_FILE_SIZE, size_file, 4); - - local_len = (NULL == local_size) ? 0 : atoi(local_size); - - - if ((NULL == local_ver) || (NULL == local_md5) || (NULL == local_size)) { - *offset = 0; - } else if ((0 != strcmp(local_ver, version)) || (0 != strcmp(local_md5, md5sum)) || (local_len > *size_file)) { - *offset = 0; - } else { - *offset = local_len; - } - - return Ret; -} - -/* calculate left MD5 for resuming download from break point */ -static int cal_exist_fw_md5(void *h_ota, FILE *fp, size_t size) -{ -#define BUFF_LEN 1024 - - static char buff[BUFF_LEN]; - size_t rlen; - int Ret = QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; - - while ((size > 0) && (!feof(fp))) { - rlen = (size > BUFF_LEN) ? BUFF_LEN : size; - if (rlen != fread(buff, 1, rlen, fp)) { - Log_e("read data len not expected"); - Ret = QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - break; - } - IOT_OTA_UpdateClientMd5(h_ota, buff, rlen); - size -= rlen; - } - return Ret; -#undef BUFF_LEN -} - -static int _setup_connect_init_params(MQTTInitParams* initParams) -{ - int ret; - - ret = HAL_GetDevInfo((void *)&sg_devInfo); - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != ret) { - return ret; - } - - initParams->device_name = sg_devInfo.device_name; - initParams->product_id = sg_devInfo.product_id; - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - char certs_dir[PATH_MAX + 1] = "certs"; - char current_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; - char *cwd = getcwd(current_path, sizeof(current_path)); - if (cwd == NULL) { - Log_e("getcwd return NULL"); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - sprintf(sg_cert_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_cert_file_name); - sprintf(sg_key_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_key_file_name); - - initParams->cert_file = sg_cert_file; - initParams->key_file = sg_key_file; -#else - initParams->device_secret = sg_devInfo.device_secret; -#endif - - - initParams->command_timeout = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT; - initParams->keep_alive_interval_ms = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_KEEP_ALIVE_INTERNAL; - initParams->auto_connect_enable = 1; - initParams->event_handle.h_fp = event_handler; - - return QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; -} - -int ota_thread(void) -{ - IOT_Log_Set_Level(eLOG_DEBUG); - int rc; - uint32_t firmware_valid; - static char version[128], md5sum[33]; - uint32_t len, size_downloaded, size_file; - - int ota_over = 0; - bool upgrade_fetch_success = true; - static char buf_ota[OTA_BUF_LEN]; - FILE *fp = NULL; - uint32_t offset = 0; - - - MQTTInitParams init_params = DEFAULT_MQTTINIT_PARAMS; - rc = _setup_connect_init_params(&init_params); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_e("init params err,rc=%d", rc); - return rc; - } - - void *client = IOT_MQTT_Construct(&init_params); - if (client != NULL) { - Log_i("Cloud Device Construct Success"); - } else { - Log_e("Cloud Device Construct Failed"); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - - void *h_ota = IOT_OTA_Init(sg_devInfo.product_id, sg_devInfo.device_name, client); - if (NULL == h_ota) { - Log_e("initialize OTA failed"); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - - IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 1000); //make sure subscribe success - - char *local_ver = NULL, *local_md5 = NULL, *local_size = NULL, *reportVer = NULL; - reportVer = get_local_fw_version(&local_ver, &local_md5, &local_size); - Log_d("local_ver:%s local_md5:%s, local_size:%s", local_ver, local_md5, local_size); - - /* Must report version first */ - if (0 > IOT_OTA_ReportVersion(h_ota, (NULL == reportVer) ? "1.0.0" : reportVer)) { - Log_e("report OTA version failed"); - goto exit; - } - - do { - Log_i("wait for ota upgrade command..."); - - IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 200); - - if (IOT_OTA_IsFetching(h_ota)) { - - /*check pre-download finished or not*/ - /*if version & MD5 is the same,then pre-download not finished,get breakpoint continue download.otherwise the version is new*/ - rc = getFwOffset(h_ota, local_ver, local_md5, local_size, &offset, &size_file); - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != rc) { - Log_e("get fw offset err,rc:%d", rc); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - break; - } - - //finish download but not report state - if(offset == size_file) { - Log_d("download success last time without report!"); - upgrade_fetch_success = true; - - /* get fw information */ - IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_MD5SUM, md5sum, 33); - IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_VERSION, version, 128); - size_downloaded = size_file; - break; - } - - /*start http connect*/ - rc = IOT_OTA_StartDownload(h_ota, offset, size_file); - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != rc) { - Log_e("OTA download start err,rc:%d", rc); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - break; - } - - /*cal file md5*/ - //Log_d("Get offset:%d(%x)", offset, offset); - if (offset > 0) { - if (NULL == (fp = fopen("ota.bin", "ab+"))) { - Log_e("open file failed"); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - break; - } - - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != cal_exist_fw_md5(h_ota, fp, offset)) { - Log_e("cal exist fw md5 failed"); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - break; - } - - /*set offset*/ - fseek(fp, offset, SEEK_SET); - } else { - if (NULL == (fp = fopen("ota.bin", "wb+"))) { - Log_e("open file failed"); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - break; - } - } - - - do { - len = IOT_OTA_FetchYield(h_ota, buf_ota, OTA_BUF_LEN, 1); - if (len > 0) { - if (1 != fwrite(buf_ota, len, 1, fp)) { - Log_e("write data to file failed"); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - break; - } - } else if (len < 0) { - Log_e("download fail rc=%d", len); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - break; - } - fflush(fp); - - /* get OTA information and update local info */ - IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_FETCHED_SIZE, &size_downloaded, 4); - IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_FILE_SIZE, &size_file, 4); - IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_MD5SUM, md5sum, 33); - IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_VERSION, version, 128); - rc = update_local_fw_info(version, reportVer, md5sum, size_downloaded); - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != rc) { - Log_e("update local fw info err,rc:%d", rc); - } - - IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 100); - - } while (!IOT_OTA_IsFetchFinish(h_ota)); - - fclose(fp); - fp = NULL; - - /* Must check MD5 match or not */ - if (upgrade_fetch_success) { - IOT_OTA_Ioctl(h_ota, IOT_OTAG_CHECK_FIRMWARE, &firmware_valid, 4); - if (0 == firmware_valid) { - Log_e("The firmware is invalid"); - upgrade_fetch_success = false; - rc = update_local_fw_info(NULL, reportVer, NULL, 0); - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != rc) { - Log_e("update local fw info err,rc:%d", rc); - } - } else { - Log_i("The firmware is valid"); - upgrade_fetch_success = true; - } - } - - ota_over = 1; - } - - HAL_SleepMs(2000); - } while (!ota_over); - - - if (upgrade_fetch_success) { - /* begin execute OTA files, should report upgrade begin */ - sg_packet_id = IOT_OTA_ReportUpgradeBegin(h_ota); - if (0 > sg_packet_id) { - Log_e("report OTA begin failed error:%d", sg_packet_id); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - while (!sg_pub_ack) { - HAL_SleepMs(1000); - IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 200); - } - sg_pub_ack = false; - - //* add your own upgrade logic here*// - //* fw_upgrade..... - - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS == rc) { - /* if upgrade success */ - /* after execute OTA files, should report upgrade result */ - sg_packet_id = IOT_OTA_ReportUpgradeSuccess(h_ota, NULL); - if (0 > sg_packet_id) { - Log_e("report OTA result failed error:%d", sg_packet_id); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - while (!sg_pub_ack) { - HAL_SleepMs(1000); - IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 200); - } - rc = update_local_fw_info(version, version, md5sum, size_downloaded); // just for example, add your own logic - sg_pub_ack = false; - - } else { - /* if upgrade fail */ - sg_packet_id = IOT_OTA_ReportUpgradeFail(h_ota, NULL); - if (0 > sg_packet_id) { - Log_e("report OTA result failed error:%d", sg_packet_id); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - while (!sg_pub_ack) { - HAL_SleepMs(1000); - IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 200); - } - rc = update_local_fw_info(NULL, reportVer, NULL, 0); // just for example, add your own logic - sg_pub_ack = false; - - } - } - -exit: - - if (NULL != fp) { - fclose(fp); - fp = NULL; - } - - if (NULL != local_ver) { - reportVer = (reportVer == local_ver) ? NULL : reportVer; - HAL_Free(local_ver); - local_ver = NULL; - } - - if (NULL != local_md5) { - HAL_Free(local_md5); - local_md5 = NULL; - } - - if (NULL != local_size) { - HAL_Free(local_size); - local_size = NULL; - } - - if (NULL != reportVer) { - HAL_Free(reportVer); - reportVer = NULL; - } - - IOT_OTA_Destroy(h_ota); - - IOT_MQTT_Destroy(&client); - - return 0; -} diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap/coap_sample.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap/coap_sample.c deleted file mode 100644 index 24899afd..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap/coap_sample.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,191 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making IoT Hub available. - * Copyright (C) 2016 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "qcloud_iot_export.h" -#include "qcloud_iot_import.h" - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - static char sg_cert_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device cert file - static char sg_key_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device key file -#endif - -static DeviceInfo sg_devInfo; - - -void response_message_callback(void* coap_message, void* userContext) -{ - int ret_code = IOT_COAP_GetMessageCode(coap_message); - switch (ret_code) { - case COAP_EVENT_RECEIVE_ACK: - Log_i("message received ACK, msgid: %d", IOT_COAP_GetMessageId(coap_message)); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_RECEIVE_RESPCONTENT: - { - char* payload = NULL; - int payload_len = 0; - int ret = -1; - ret = IOT_COAP_GetMessagePayload(coap_message, &payload, &payload_len); - if (ret == QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_i("message received response, content: %s", payload); - } - else { - Log_e("message received response, content error."); - } - } - - break; - case COAP_EVENT_UNAUTHORIZED: - Log_i("coap client auth token expired or invalid, msgid: %d", IOT_COAP_GetMessageId(coap_message)); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_FORBIDDEN: - Log_i("coap URI is invalid for this device, msgid: %d", IOT_COAP_GetMessageId(coap_message)); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR: - Log_i("coap server internal error, msgid: %d", IOT_COAP_GetMessageId(coap_message)); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_ACK_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("message receive ACK timeout, msgid: %d", IOT_COAP_GetMessageId(coap_message)); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_SEPRESP_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("message received ACK but receive response timeout, msgid: %d", IOT_COAP_GetMessageId(coap_message)); - break; - default: - break; - } -} - -void event_handler(void *pcontext, CoAPEventMessage *message) -{ - switch (message->event_type) { - case COAP_EVENT_RECEIVE_ACK: - Log_i("message received ACK, msgid: %d", (unsigned)(uintptr_t)message->message); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_RECEIVE_RESPCONTENT: - Log_i("message received response, content: %s", IOT_COAP_GetMessageId(message->message)); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_UNAUTHORIZED: - Log_i("coap client auth token expired or invalid, msgid: %d", (unsigned)(uintptr_t)message->message); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_FORBIDDEN: - Log_i("coap URI is invalid for this device, msgid: %d", (unsigned)(uintptr_t)message->message); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR: - Log_i("coap server internal error, msgid: %d", (unsigned)(uintptr_t)message->message); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_ACK_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("message receive ACK timeout, msgid: %d", (unsigned)(uintptr_t)message->message); - break; - case COAP_EVENT_SEPRESP_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("message received ACK but receive response timeout, msgid: %d", (unsigned)(uintptr_t)message->message); - break; - default: - Log_e("unrecogonized event type: %d", message->event_type); - break; - } -} - -static int _setup_connect_init_params(CoAPInitParams* initParams) -{ - int ret; - - ret = HAL_GetDevInfo((void *)&sg_devInfo); - if(QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != ret){ - return ret; - } - - initParams->device_name = sg_devInfo.device_name; - initParams->product_id = sg_devInfo.product_id; - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - char certs_dir[PATH_MAX + 1] = "certs"; - char current_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; - char *cwd = getcwd(current_path, sizeof(current_path)); - if (cwd == NULL) - { - Log_e("getcwd return NULL"); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - sprintf(sg_cert_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_cert_file_name); - sprintf(sg_key_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_key_file_name); - - initParams->cert_file = sg_cert_file; - initParams->key_file = sg_key_file; -#else - initParams->device_secret = sg_devInfo.device_secret; -#endif - - initParams->command_timeout = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT; - initParams->event_handle.h_fp = event_handler; - initParams->max_retry_count = 3; - - - return QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; -} - - -int coap_basic_thread(void) -{ - int rc = QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; - - IOT_Log_Set_Level(eLOG_DEBUG); - - CoAPInitParams init_params = DEFAULT_COAPINIT_PARAMS; - rc = _setup_connect_init_params(&init_params); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_e("init params err,rc=%d", rc); - return rc; - } - - void *coap_client = IOT_COAP_Construct(&init_params); - if (coap_client == NULL) { - Log_e("COAP Client construct failed."); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - - do { - SendMsgParams send_params = DEFAULT_SENDMSG_PARAMS; - send_params.pay_load = "{\"name\":\"hello world\"}"; - send_params.pay_load_len = strlen("{\"name\":\"hello world\"}"); - send_params.resp_callback = response_message_callback; - - char topicName[128] = ""; - sprintf(topicName, "%s/%s/data", sg_devInfo.product_id, sg_devInfo.device_name); - Log_i("topic name is %s", topicName); - - rc = IOT_COAP_SendMessage(coap_client, topicName, &send_params); - if (rc < 0) { - Log_e("client publish topic failed :%d.", rc); - } - else { - Log_d("client topic has been sent, msg_id: %d", rc); - } - - rc = IOT_COAP_Yield(coap_client, 200); - - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS){ - Log_e("exit with error: %d", rc); - break; - } - } while (1); - - IOT_COAP_Destroy(&coap_client); - - return QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; -} diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap.c deleted file mode 100644 index 914e7f5a..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_coap.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_k.h" - -/* 用户根æ®è‡ªå·±çš„底层通信链路æ¥é…ç½®æ­¤å® - * 如果是基于以太网lwip的链路，这里应该定义 USE_LWIP - * 如果是基于模组的通信链路，这里应该定义相应的模组å®ï¼Œå¦‚使用ESP8266则定义 USE_ESP8266 - * */ -#define USE_ESP8266 - -#ifdef USE_LWIP -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 -#include "esp8266.h" -#endif - -void application_entry(void *arg) -{ - extern void mqtt_basic_thread(void); - -#ifdef USE_LWIP - dns_init(); - MX_LWIP_Init(); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 - extern int esp8266_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - extern int esp8266_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd); - esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); - esp8266_join_ap("SheldonDai", "srnr6x9xbhmb0"); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_NB_BC35 - extern int bc35_28_95_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - bc35_28_95_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#endif - - coap_basic_thread(); - - while (1) { - printf("This is a coap demo!\r\n"); - tos_task_delay(1000); - } -} - diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt/mqtt_sample.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt/mqtt_sample.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8301e805..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt/mqtt_sample.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,322 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making IoT Hub available. - * Copyright (C) 2016 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - - * Licensed under the MIT License (the "License"); you may not use this file except in - * compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT - - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is - * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, - * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "utils_getopt.h" -#include "qcloud_iot_export.h" -#include "qcloud_iot_import.h" - - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - static char sg_cert_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device cert file - static char sg_key_file[PATH_MAX + 1]; // full path of device key file -#endif - - -static DeviceInfo sg_devInfo; -static int sg_count = 0; -static int sg_sub_packet_id = -1; - - -// user's log print callback -static bool log_handler(const char* message) -{ - // return true if print success - return false; -} - -// MQTT event callback -static void _mqtt_event_handler(void *pclient, void *handle_context, MQTTEventMsg *msg) -{ - MQTTMessage* mqtt_messge = (MQTTMessage*)msg->msg; - uintptr_t packet_id = (uintptr_t)msg->msg; - - switch(msg->event_type) { - case MQTT_EVENT_UNDEF: - Log_i("undefined event occur."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_DISCONNECT: - Log_i("MQTT disconnect."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_RECONNECT: - Log_i("MQTT reconnect."); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_RECVEIVED: - Log_i("topic message arrived but without any related handle: topic=%.*s, topic_msg=%.*s", - mqtt_messge->topic_len, - mqtt_messge->ptopic, - mqtt_messge->payload_len, - mqtt_messge->payload); - break; - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_SUCCESS: - Log_i("subscribe success, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - sg_sub_packet_id = packet_id; - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("subscribe wait ack timeout, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - sg_sub_packet_id = packet_id; - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_SUBCRIBE_NACK: - Log_i("subscribe nack, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - sg_sub_packet_id = packet_id; - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_UNSUBCRIBE_SUCCESS: - Log_i("unsubscribe success, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_UNSUBCRIBE_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("unsubscribe timeout, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_UNSUBCRIBE_NACK: - Log_i("unsubscribe nack, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_SUCCESS: - Log_i("publish success, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_TIMEOUT: - Log_i("publish timeout, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - - case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISH_NACK: - Log_i("publish nack, packet-id=%u", (unsigned int)packet_id); - break; - default: - Log_i("Should NOT arrive here."); - break; - } -} - - -// Setup MQTT construct parameters -static int _setup_connect_init_params(MQTTInitParams* initParams) -{ - int ret; - - ret = HAL_GetDevInfo((void *)&sg_devInfo); - if(QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS != ret){ - return ret; - } - - initParams->device_name = sg_devInfo.device_name; - initParams->product_id = sg_devInfo.product_id; - -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - char certs_dir[PATH_MAX + 1] = "certs"; - char current_path[PATH_MAX + 1]; - char *cwd = getcwd(current_path, sizeof(current_path)); - - if (cwd == NULL) - { - Log_e("getcwd return NULL"); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - -#ifdef WIN32 - sprintf(sg_cert_file, "%s\\%s\\%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_cert_file_name); - sprintf(sg_key_file, "%s\\%s\\%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_key_file_name); -#else - sprintf(sg_cert_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_cert_file_name); - sprintf(sg_key_file, "%s/%s/%s", current_path, certs_dir, sg_devInfo.dev_key_file_name); -#endif - - initParams->cert_file = sg_cert_file; - initParams->key_file = sg_key_file; -#else - initParams->device_secret = sg_devInfo.device_secret; -#endif - - initParams->command_timeout = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT; - initParams->keep_alive_interval_ms = QCLOUD_IOT_MQTT_KEEP_ALIVE_INTERNAL; - - initParams->auto_connect_enable = 1; - initParams->event_handle.h_fp = _mqtt_event_handler; - initParams->event_handle.context = NULL; - - return QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS; -} - -#define MAX_SIZE_OF_TOPIC_CONTENT 100 -// publish MQTT msg -static int _publish_test_msg(void *client, char *topic_keyword, QoS qos) -{ - char topicName[128] = {0}; - sprintf(topicName,"%s/%s/%s", sg_devInfo.product_id, sg_devInfo.device_name, topic_keyword); - - PublishParams pub_params = DEFAULT_PUB_PARAMS; - pub_params.qos = qos; - - char topic_content[MAX_SIZE_OF_TOPIC_CONTENT + 1] = {0}; - - int size = HAL_Snprintf(topic_content, sizeof(topic_content), "{\"action\": \"publish_test\", \"count\": \"%d\"}", sg_count++); - if (size < 0 || size > sizeof(topic_content) - 1) { - Log_e("payload content length not enough! content size:%d buf size:%d", size, (int)sizeof(topic_content)); - return -3; - } - - pub_params.payload = topic_content; - pub_params.payload_len = strlen(topic_content); - - return IOT_MQTT_Publish(client, topicName, &pub_params); -} - -// callback when MQTT msg arrives -static void on_message_callback(void *pClient, MQTTMessage *message, void *userData) -{ - if (message == NULL) { - return; - } - - Log_i("Receive Message With topicName:%.*s, payload:%.*s", - (int) message->topic_len, message->ptopic, (int) message->payload_len, (char *) message->payload); -} - -// subscrib MQTT topic -static int _subscribe_topic(void *client, char *topic_keyword, QoS qos) -{ - static char topic_name[128] = {0}; - int size = HAL_Snprintf(topic_name, sizeof(topic_name), "%s/%s/%s", sg_devInfo.product_id, sg_devInfo.device_name, topic_keyword); - - if (size < 0 || size > sizeof(topic_name) - 1) { - Log_e("topic content length not enough! content size:%d buf size:%d", size, (int)sizeof(topic_name)); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - SubscribeParams sub_params = DEFAULT_SUB_PARAMS; - sub_params.qos = qos; - sub_params.on_message_handler = on_message_callback; - return IOT_MQTT_Subscribe(client, topic_name, &sub_params); -} - -#ifdef LOG_UPLOAD -// init log upload module -static int _init_log_upload(void) -{ - LogUploadInitParams log_init_params; - memset(&log_init_params, 0, sizeof(LogUploadInitParams)); - - log_init_params.product_id = sg_devInfo.product_id; - log_init_params.device_name = sg_devInfo.device_name; -#ifdef AUTH_MODE_CERT - log_init_params.sign_key = sg_cert_file; -#else - log_init_params.sign_key = sg_devInfo.device_secret; -#endif - -#if defined(__linux__) || defined(WIN32) - log_init_params.read_func = HAL_Log_Read; - log_init_params.save_func = HAL_Log_Save; - log_init_params.del_func = HAL_Log_Del; - log_init_params.get_size_func = HAL_Log_Get_Size; -#endif - - return IOT_Log_Init_Uploader(&log_init_params); - -} - -#endif - -int mqtt_basic_thread(void) -{ - int rc; - //init log level - IOT_Log_Set_Level(eLOG_DEBUG); - IOT_Log_Set_MessageHandler(log_handler); - - //init connection - MQTTInitParams init_params = DEFAULT_MQTTINIT_PARAMS; - rc = _setup_connect_init_params(&init_params); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) { - Log_e("init params error, rc = %d", rc); - return rc; - } - -#ifdef LOG_UPLOAD - // _init_log_upload should be done after _setup_connect_init_params and before IOT_MQTT_Construct - rc = _init_log_upload(); - if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS) - Log_e("init log upload error, rc = %d", rc); -#endif - - // create MQTT client and connect with server - void *client = IOT_MQTT_Construct(&init_params); - if (client != NULL) { - Log_i("Cloud Device Construct Success"); - } else { - rc = IOT_MQTT_GetErrCode(); - Log_e("MQTT Construct failed, rc = %d", rc); - IOT_Log_Upload(true); - return QCLOUD_ERR_FAILURE; - } - -#ifdef SYSTEM_COMM - long time = 0; - // get system timestamp from server - rc = IOT_Get_SysTime(client, &time); - if (QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS == rc){ - Log_i("system time is %ld", time); - } else { - Log_e("get system time failed!"); - } -#endif - - //subscribe normal topics here - rc = _subscribe_topic(client, "data", QOS0); - if (rc < 0) { - Log_e("Client Subscribe Topic Failed: %d", rc); - IOT_Log_Upload(true); - return rc; - } - - // wait for subscription result - IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 500); - - do { - - if (sg_sub_packet_id > 0) { - rc = _publish_test_msg(client, "data", QOS1); - if (rc < 0) { - Log_e("client publish topic failed :%d.", rc); - } - } - - rc = IOT_MQTT_Yield(client, 500); - if (rc == QCLOUD_ERR_MQTT_ATTEMPTING_RECONNECT) { - HAL_SleepMs(1000); - continue; - } else if (rc != QCLOUD_RET_SUCCESS && rc != QCLOUD_RET_MQTT_RECONNECTED){ - Log_e("exit with error: %d", rc); - break; - } - } while (1); - - rc = IOT_MQTT_Destroy(&client); - - IOT_Log_Upload(true); - - return rc; -} diff --git a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt.c b/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt.c deleted file mode 100644 index 0b2da9ce..00000000 --- a/examples/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt/qcloud_iot_hub_sdk_mqtt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -#include "tos_k.h" - -/* 用户根æ®è‡ªå·±çš„底层通信链路æ¥é…ç½®æ­¤å® - * 如果是基于以太网lwip的链路，这里应该定义 USE_LWIP - * 如果是基于模组的通信链路，这里应该定义相应的模组å®ï¼Œå¦‚使用ESP8266则定义 USE_ESP8266 - * */ -#define USE_ESP8266 - -#ifdef USE_LWIP -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 -#include "esp8266.h" -#endif - -void application_entry(void *arg) -{ - extern void mqtt_basic_thread(void); - -#ifdef USE_LWIP - dns_init(); - MX_LWIP_Init(); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ESP8266 - extern int esp8266_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - extern int esp8266_join_ap(const char *ssid, const char *pwd); - esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); - esp8266_join_ap("SheldonDai", "srnr6x9xbhmb0"); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_NB_BC35 - extern int bc35_28_95_sal_init(hal_uart_port_t uart_port); - bc35_28_95_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#endif - - mqtt_basic_thread(); - - while (1) { - printf("This is a mqtt demo!\r\n"); - tos_task_delay(1000); - } -} - diff --git a/examples/tcp_through_module/tcp_through_module.c b/examples/tcp_through_module/tcp_through_module.c index 98bb7677..19df6797 100644 --- a/examples/tcp_through_module/tcp_through_module.c +++ b/examples/tcp_through_module/tcp_through_module.c @@ -3,41 +3,20 @@ #include "cmsis_os.h" #define USE_ESP8266 -//#define USE_SIM800A -//#define USE_BC26 -//#define USE_EC20 -//#define USE_EC200S + //#define USE_AIR724 -//#define USE_L610 + //#define USE_EC600S #ifdef USE_ESP8266 #include "esp8266.h" #endif -#ifdef USE_SIM800A -#include "sim800a.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_BC26 -#include "bc26.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_EC20 -#include "ec20.h" -#endif - -#ifdef USE_EC200S -#include "ec200s.h" -#endif #ifdef USE_AIR724 #include "air724.h" #endif -#ifdef USE_L610 -#include "l610.h" -#endif #ifdef USE_EC600S #include "ec600s.h" @@ -106,19 +85,8 @@ void application_entry(void *arg) #if defined(USE_ESP8266) esp8266_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); esp8266_join_ap("Mculover666", "mculover666"); -#elif defined(USE_SIM800A) - sim800a_power_on(); - sim800a_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_2); -#elif defined(USE_BC26) - bc26_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_2); -#elif defined(USE_EC20) - ec20_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#elif defined(USE_EC200S) - ec200s_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); #elif defined(USE_AIR724) air724_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); -#elif defined(USE_L610) - l610_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); #elif defined(USE_EC600S) ec600s_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); #endif diff --git a/examples/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket.c b/examples/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket.c index 60037b69..05b6bf50 100644 --- a/examples/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket.c +++ b/examples/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket/tcp_through_module_based_at_socket.c @@ -76,10 +76,6 @@ void application_entry(void *arg) esp8266_join_ap("SheldonDai", "srnr6x9xbhmb0"); #endif -#ifdef USE_SIM800A - sim800a_power_on(); - sim800a_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_2); -#endif #ifdef USE_AIR724 air724_sal_init(HAL_UART_PORT_0); diff --git a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.c b/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.c deleted file mode 100644 index 199299a3..00000000 --- a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -#include "cmsis_os.h" -#include "tcp_client_echo.h" - -#include "utils/debug/art_assert.h" -#include "utils/debug/log.h" - -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/netdb.h" -#include "lwip/netifapi.h" - -#define TCP_CLI_ECHO_STK_SIZE 512*3 -void tcp_client_echo_task_entry(void *arg); -osThreadDef(tcp_client_echo_task_entry, osPriorityNormal, 1, TCP_CLI_ECHO_STK_SIZE); - - -#define BUFSZ 1500 -static char recv_data[BUFSZ]; - -void tcp_client_echo_task_entry(void *arg) -{ - int ret; - int conn; - static uint64_t cli_recv_count = 0; - - struct sockaddr_in target_sockaddr; - ip4_addr_t target_ser_ip; - - int optval = 0; - int len = sizeof(int); - struct timeval tv; - - target_ser_t target_ser = *(target_ser_t*)arg; - - - if(!ipaddr_aton((const char *)target_ser.ip, &target_ser_ip)) - { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]Convert target server ip addr failed.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - return; - } - - if ((conn = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) - { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]Socket creat error.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - return; - } - - tv.tv_sec = 5; - tv.tv_usec = 0; - setsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (char*)&tv, sizeof(struct timeval)); - tv.tv_sec = 5; - tv.tv_usec = 0; - setsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (char*)&tv, sizeof(struct timeval)); - - target_sockaddr.sin_family = AF_INET; - target_sockaddr.sin_port = htons(target_ser.port); - target_sockaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = target_ser_ip.addr; - memset(&(target_sockaddr.sin_zero), 0, sizeof(target_sockaddr.sin_zero)); - - while (1) - { - - if(connect(conn, (struct sockaddr *)&target_sockaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr)) == -1) - { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]Connect target tcp server faild!\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - OS_MsDelay(3000); - continue; - } - - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]Connect target tcp server successful!\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - - while (1) - { - ret = send(conn, "hello", strlen("hello"), 0); - - //---------------recv data-----------------------// - memset(recv_data,0,sizeof(recv_data)); - - ret = recv(conn, recv_data, BUFSZ-1, 0); - getsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, (socklen_t *)&len); - if (ret < 0) - { - if(optval == EWOULDBLOCK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv < 0 (recv timeout)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__ ); - continue; - } else if(optval == ECONNABORTED) { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv < 0 (conn abort)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__ ); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv < 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__,optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - else if(ret == 0) - { - if(optval == ERR_OK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv = 0 ERR_OK\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - continue; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv = 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - else - { - cli_recv_count += ret; - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "client_recv_count = %u\r\n", cli_recv_count); - } - - //---------------send data-----------------------// - LOG(LOG_LVL_INFO, "received: %s\r\n", recv_data); - - getsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, (socklen_t *)&len); - if (ret < 0) - { - if(optval == EWOULDBLOCK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send < 0 (send timeout)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - continue; - } else if(optval == ECONNABORTED) { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send < 0 (conn abort)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send < 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - else if(ret == 0) - { - if(optval == ERR_OK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send = 0 ERR_OK\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - continue; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send = 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - - OS_MsDelay(3000); - } - } - - closesocket(conn); - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]tcp client sock closed.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); -} - - -void tcp_client_echo_task_creat(uint8_t * ser_ip, uint32_t port) -{ - static target_ser_t ser = {0}; - ser.ip = ser_ip; - ser.port = port; - - osThreadCreate(osThread(tcp_client_echo_task_entry), &ser); -} - - - diff --git a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.h b/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.h deleted file mode 100644 index 09d3bea9..00000000 --- a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_client_echo.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef __TCP_CLIENT_ECHO_H__ -#define __TCP_CLIENT_ECHO_H__ - -#include "stdint.h" - -typedef struct{ - uint8_t * ip; - uint32_t port; -}target_ser_t; - -void tcp_client_echo_task_creat(uint8_t * ser_ip, uint32_t port); - - - -#endif /* __TCP_CLIENT_ECHO_H__ */ - diff --git a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.c b/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.c deleted file mode 100644 index 25ec0396..00000000 --- a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,165 +0,0 @@ -#include "cmsis_os.h" -#include "tcp_server_echo.h" - -#include "utils/debug/art_assert.h" -#include "utils/debug/log.h" - -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/netdb.h" -#include "lwip/netifapi.h" - -#define TCP_SER_ECHO_STK_SIZE 512*3 -void tcp_server_echo_task_entry(void *arg); -osThreadDef(tcp_server_echo_task_entry, osPriorityNormal, 1, TCP_SER_ECHO_STK_SIZE); - - -#define BUFSZ 1500 -static char recv_data[BUFSZ]; - -void tcp_server_echo_task_entry(void *arg) -{ - socklen_t sin_size; - int server_sock, conn; - struct sockaddr_in server_addr, client_addr; - bool stop = false; - int ret; - - static uint64_t ser_recv_count = 0; - - static int optval = 0; - int len = sizeof(int); - struct timeval tv; - - uint32_t ser_port = *(uint32_t *)arg; - - if ((server_sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]create server_sock failed.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - return; - } - - server_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; - server_addr.sin_port = htons(ser_port); - server_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); - memset(&(server_addr.sin_zero), 0, sizeof(server_addr.sin_zero)); - - if (bind(server_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr)) == -1){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]bind error.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - closesocket(server_sock); - return; - } - - if (listen(server_sock, 5) == -1){ - getsockopt(server_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, (socklen_t *)&len); - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]listen error.optval=%d\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - closesocket(server_sock); - return; - } - - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]listening on port %d\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, ser_port); - - while (stop != true) - { - ser_recv_count = 0; - sin_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); - - if ((conn = accept(server_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr, &sin_size)) < 0) - { - getsockopt(server_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, (socklen_t *)&len); - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]accept failed.optval=%d\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - break; - } - - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]got a conn from (%s , %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, inet_ntoa(client_addr.sin_addr), ntohs(client_addr.sin_port)); - - tv.tv_sec = 3; - tv.tv_usec = 0; - setsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (char*)&tv, sizeof(struct timeval)); - tv.tv_sec = 3; - tv.tv_usec = 0; - setsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (char*)&tv, sizeof(struct timeval)); - - while (1) - { - //---------------recv data-----------------------// - memset(recv_data,0,sizeof(recv_data)); - - ret = recv(conn, recv_data, BUFSZ-1, 0); - getsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, (socklen_t *)&len); - if (ret < 0) - { - if(optval == EWOULDBLOCK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv < 0 (recv timeout)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__ ); - continue; - } else if(optval == ECONNABORTED) { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv < 0 (conn abort)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__ ); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv < 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__,optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - else if(ret == 0) - { - if(optval == ERR_OK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv = 0 ERR_OK\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - continue; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] recv = 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - else - { - ser_recv_count += ret; - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "server_recv_count = %u\r\n", ser_recv_count); - } - - //---------------send data-----------------------// - ret = send(conn, recv_data, ret, 0); - getsockopt(conn, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, (socklen_t *)&len); - if (ret < 0) - { - if(optval == EWOULDBLOCK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send < 0 (send timeout)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - continue; - } else if(optval == ECONNABORTED) { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send < 0 (conn abort)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send < 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - else if(ret == 0) - { - if(optval == ERR_OK){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send = 0 ERR_OK\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - continue; - } else { - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d] send = 0 (err optval = %d)\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, optval); - closesocket(conn); - break; - } - } - } - } - - closesocket(server_sock); - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]server_sock closed.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); -} - - -void tcp_server_echo_task_creat(uint32_t port) -{ - static uint32_t server_port; - server_port = port; - osThreadCreate(osThread(tcp_server_echo_task_entry), &server_port); -} - - - diff --git a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.h b/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.h deleted file mode 100644 index e4d88425..00000000 --- a/examples/wifi_ln882x/tcp_server_echo.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef __TCP_SERVER_ECHO_H__ -#define __TCP_SERVER_ECHO_H__ - -#include "stdint.h" - - -void tcp_server_echo_task_creat(uint32_t port); - - - -#endif /* __TCP_SERVER_ECHO_H__ */ - diff --git a/examples/wifi_ln882x/wifi_app_ln882x.c b/examples/wifi_ln882x/wifi_app_ln882x.c deleted file mode 100644 index ca1221c6..00000000 --- a/examples/wifi_ln882x/wifi_app_ln882x.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,210 +0,0 @@ -#include "cmsis_os.h" -#include "osal/osal.h" -#include "utils/debug/log.h" -#include "utils/debug/art_assert.h" -#include "utils/art_string.h" -#include "wifi/wifi.h" -#include "ping/ping.h" -#include "netif/ethernetif.h" -#include "wifi_manager/wifi_manager.h" -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#include "drv_adc_measure.h" -#include "utils/system_parameter.h" -#include "hal/hal_adc.h" - -#include "tcp_server_echo.h" -#include "tcp_client_echo.h" - - -static OS_Thread_t g_temp_cal_thread; -#define TEMP_APP_TASK_STACK_SIZE 4*256 //Byte - -volatile uint8_t dhcp_get_ip = 0; - -void wifi_init_sta(void) -{ - uint8_t macaddr[6] = {0}, macaddr_default[6] = {0}; - wifi_config_t wifi_config = { - .sta = { - .ssid = "SheldonDai", - .password = "srnr6x9xbhmb0", - 0, - }, - }; - - wifi_config_t temp_config = {0}; - - wifi_init_type_t init_param = { - .wifi_mode = WIFI_MODE_STATION, - .sta_ps_mode = WIFI_NO_POWERSAVE, - #if 1 - .dhcp_mode = WLAN_DHCP_CLIENT, - #else - .dhcp_mode = WLAN_STATIC_IP, - .local_ip_addr = "192.168.1.110", - .net_mask = "255.255.255.0", - .gateway_ip_addr = "192.168.1.1", - #endif - //In station mode, define the length of the AP list scanned. - .scanned_ap_list_size = SCANNED_AP_LIST_SIZE, - }; - - - //Set wifi mode - wifi_set_mode(init_param.wifi_mode); - - //Check mac address - system_parameter_get_wifi_macaddr_default(STATION_IF, macaddr_default); - wifi_get_macaddr(STATION_IF, macaddr); - if(is_valid_mac((const char *)macaddr) && memcmp(macaddr, macaddr_default, 6) != 0){ - //If there is a valid MAC in flash, use it - wifi_set_macaddr_current(STATION_IF, macaddr); - }else{ - //generate random macaddr - generate_mac_randomly(macaddr); - wifi_set_macaddr(STATION_IF, macaddr); - } - - //Check config - wifi_get_config(STATION_IF, &temp_config); - if(strlen((const char *)temp_config.sta.ssid) > 0){ - //If there is a valid config in flash, use it; - wifi_set_config_current(STATION_IF, &temp_config); - }else{ - //else, use the prev wifi_config and save it to flash. - wifi_set_config(STATION_IF, &wifi_config); - } - - //Startup WiFi. - if(!wifi_start(&init_param)){//WIFI_MAX_POWERSAVE - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]wifi_start() fail.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - } -} - -void wifi_init_ap(void) -{ - uint8_t macaddr[6] = {0}, macaddr_default[6] = {0}; - wifi_config_t wifi_config = { - .ap = { - .ssid = "ln882x-softap", - .ssid_len = strlen("ln882x-softap"), - .password = "12345678", - .channel = 1, - .authmode = WIFI_AUTH_OPEN, - .ssid_hidden = 0, - .max_connection = 4, - .beacon_interval = 100, - .reserved = 0, - }, - }; - - wifi_config_t temp_config = {0}; - - wifi_init_type_t init_param = { - .wifi_mode = WIFI_MODE_AP, - .sta_ps_mode = WIFI_NO_POWERSAVE, - .dhcp_mode = WLAN_DHCP_SERVER, - }; - - //Set wifi mode - wifi_set_mode(init_param.wifi_mode); - - //Check mac address - system_parameter_get_wifi_macaddr_default(SOFT_AP_IF, macaddr_default); - wifi_get_macaddr(SOFT_AP_IF, macaddr); - if(is_valid_mac((const char *)macaddr) && memcmp(macaddr, macaddr_default, 6) != 0){ - //If there is a valid MAC in flash, use it - wifi_set_macaddr_current(SOFT_AP_IF, macaddr); - }else{ - //generate random macaddr - generate_mac_randomly(macaddr); - wifi_set_macaddr(SOFT_AP_IF, macaddr); - } - - //Check config - wifi_get_config(SOFT_AP_IF, &temp_config); - if(strlen((const char *)temp_config.sta.ssid) > 0){ - //If there is a valid config in flash, use it; - wifi_set_config_current(SOFT_AP_IF, &temp_config); - }else{ - //else, use the prev wifi_config and save it to flash. - wifi_set_config(SOFT_AP_IF, &wifi_config); - } - - //Startup WiFi. - if(!wifi_start(&init_param)){ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "[%s, %d]wifi_start() fail.\r\n", __func__, __LINE__); - } -} - - -void temp_cal_app_task_entry(void *params) -{ - drv_adc_init(); - OS_MsDelay(1); - wifi_temp_cal_init(drv_adc_read(ADC_CHAN_0)); - - while(1) - { - OS_MsDelay(1); - wifi_do_temp_cal_period(drv_adc_read(ADC_CHAN_0)); - OS_MsDelay(1000); - } -} - -void wifi_event_sta_got_ip_cb(wifi_msg_t * msg) -{ - dhcp_get_ip = 1; -}; - - -void application_entry(void *arg) -{ - //wifi chip temperature calibration. - if(OS_OK != OS_ThreadCreate(&g_temp_cal_thread, "TempAPP", temp_cal_app_task_entry, NULL, OS_PRIORITY_BELOW_NORMAL, TEMP_APP_TASK_STACK_SIZE)) { - ART_ASSERT(1); - } - - reg_wifi_msg_callbcak(WIFI_MSG_ID_STA_DHCP_GOT_IP,wifi_event_sta_got_ip_cb); - - wifi_mode_enum_t wifi_mode = WIFI_MODE_STATION; - - tcpip_ip_info_t ip_info = {0}; - wifi_interface_enum_t if_index; - - if(wifi_mode == WIFI_MODE_STATION){ - if_index = STATION_IF; - wifi_init_sta(); - }else if(wifi_mode == WIFI_MODE_AP){ - if_index = SOFT_AP_IF; - wifi_init_ap(); - }else if(wifi_mode == WIFI_MODE_MONITOR){ - if_index = MONITOR_IF; - }else{ - LOG(LOG_LVL_ERROR, "wifi interface error!\r\n"); - } - - if((wifi_mode == WIFI_MODE_STATION)||(wifi_mode == WIFI_MODE_AP)) { - //Wait for network link up - while(LINK_UP != ethernetif_get_link_state()){ - OS_MsDelay(1000); - } - - ethernetif_get_ip_info(if_index, &ip_info); - } - - while(!dhcp_get_ip){ - OS_MsDelay(1000); - }; - - tcp_server_echo_task_creat(8087); -// tcp_client_echo_task_creat((uint8_t *)"39.108.190.129", 8000);//ͨÐÅè²âÊÔ(IP:120.76.100.197) 10002¶Ë¿Ú - - while(1) - { - tos_task_delay(1*1000); - } -} - - - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_err.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_err.h deleted file mode 100644 index 38310754..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_err.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_ERR_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_ERR_H_ - -typedef enum evtdrv_err_en { - EVTDRV_ERR_NONE = 0x0u, - EVTDRV_ERR_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED = 0x1u, - EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL = 0x2u, - EVTDRV_ERR_MSG_BUSY = 0x3u, - EVTDRV_ERR_TASK_INVALID = 0x4u, - EVTDRV_ERR_MMHEAP_INIT_FAILED = 0x5u, - - EVTDRV_ERR_EVENT_INVALID = 0x10u, - EVTDRV_ERR_EVENT_OVERFLOW = 0x11u, - - EVTDRV_ERR_TIMER_ALREADY_EXIST = 0x20u, - EVTDRV_ERR_TIMER_INACTIVE = 0x21u, -} evtdrv_err_t; - -#endif - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_event.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_event.h deleted file mode 100644 index 88c30586..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_event.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_H_ - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -typedef uint16_t evtdrv_event_flag_t; -typedef uint16_t evtdrv_event_nesting_t; - -#define EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MASK (evtdrv_event_flag_t)(0x3 << (sizeof(evtdrv_event_flag_t) * 8 - 2)) -#define EVTDRV_USR_EVENT_MASK (evtdrv_event_flag_t)(~(EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MASK)) - -/* highest two bits are reserved for system event - 0x8000 init all tasks - 0x4000 msg received -*/ -#define TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE (evtdrv_event_flag_t)0x0u -#define TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT (evtdrv_event_flag_t)(0x2 << (sizeof(evtdrv_event_flag_t) * 8 - 2)) -#define TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG (evtdrv_event_flag_t)(0x1 << (sizeof(evtdrv_event_flag_t) * 8 - 2)) - -typedef struct evtdrv_event_st { - evtdrv_event_flag_t flags; - evtdrv_event_nesting_t nesting[sizeof(evtdrv_event_flag_t) * 8]; -} evtdrv_event_t; - -/** - * @brief Set event to the target task. - * Set event to the target task, next time the target task is "scheduled", the task will handle the event. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] task_id id of the target task. - * @param[in] event_flags the event flags set to the task - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_TASK_INVALID task id is invalid. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE return successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_event_set(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id, evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags); - -/** - * @brief Reset the event of the target task. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] task_id id of the target task. - * @param[in] event_flags the event flags reset of the task - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_TASK_INVALID task id is invalid. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE return successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_event_reset(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id, evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags); - -__KNL__ evtdrv_err_t evtdrv_event_init(void); - -__KNL__ evtdrv_event_flag_t evtdrv_event_fetch(evtdrv_task_id_t *task_id); - -__STATIC_INLINE__ evtdrv_bool_t evtdrv_event_is_usr(evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flag) -{ - return event_flag & EVTDRV_USR_EVENT_MASK; -} - -__STATIC_INLINE__ evtdrv_bool_t evtdrv_event_is_sys(evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flag) -{ - return event_flag & EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MASK; -} - -#endif /* TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN */ - -#endif /* _TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_H_ */ - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_global.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_global.h deleted file mode 100644 index 62f440a9..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_global.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_GLOBAL_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_GLOBAL_H_ - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -extern evtdrv_task_entry_t *evtdrv_task_table; -extern evtdrv_ttb_sz_t evtdrv_task_table_size; - -extern evtdrv_task_id_t evtdrv_curr_task; - -extern evtdrv_event_t *evtdrv_events; - -extern k_list_t evtdrv_msg_list; - -extern k_list_t evtdrv_timer_list; - -extern k_evtdrv_poll_t evtdrv_poll; - -extern evtdrv_tick_t evtdrv_tick_count; - -#endif /* TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN */ - -#endif /* _TOS_EVTDRV_GLOBAL_H_ */ - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_msg.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_msg.h deleted file mode 100644 index 50aa6d50..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_msg.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_MSG_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_MSG_H_ - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -typedef uint16_t evtdrv_msg_len_t; -typedef uint8_t *evtdrv_msg_body_t; - -typedef struct evtdrv_message_header_st { - k_list_t list; - evtdrv_task_id_t dst_task_id; // destination task id - evtdrv_msg_len_t len; -} evtdrv_msg_hdr_t; - -#define EVTDRV_MSG_BODY2HDR(msg_body) ((evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *)((uint8_t *)msg_body - sizeof(evtdrv_msg_hdr_t))) -#define EVTDRV_MSG_LEN(msg_len) (sizeof(evtdrv_msg_hdr_t) + msg_len) -#define EVTDRV_MSG_HDR2BODY(msg_hdr) ((evtdrv_msg_body_t)((evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *)msg_hdr + 1)) - -/** - * @brief Allocate a message body. - * Allocate a message body as a payload to hold the message content. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] msg_len the length of the message payload. - * - * @return the message body allocated. - * @retval #NULL allocate failed. - * @retval #NO-NULL allocate successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_msg_body_t tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(evtdrv_msg_len_t msg_len); - -/** - * @brief Free a message body. - * - * @attention if you wanna free a message body, the message must be "dequeued"(already received by the target task) - * - * @param[in] msg_body message body to free. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL message body is NULL. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_MSG_BUSY message is still in the message queue(not received). - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE free successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_msg_free(evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body); - -/** - * @brief Send a message to the target task. - * - * @attention next time the target task should be "wakeup" by the event of TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG. - * - * @param[in] task_id id of the target task. - * @param[in] msg_body message body to send. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL message body is NULL. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_TASK_INVALID target task id is invalid. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE send successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_msg_send(evtdrv_task_id_t dst_task_id, evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body); - -__API__ evtdrv_msg_body_t tos_evtdrv_msg_recv(void); - -__KNL__ void evtdrv_msg_init(void); - -#endif /* TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN */ - -#endif /* _TOS_EVTDRV_MSG_H_ */ - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_sys.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_sys.h deleted file mode 100644 index 76dd1d39..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_sys.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_H_ - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -typedef void (*k_evtdrv_poll_t)(void); - -/** - * @brief Initialize the event-driven system. - * - * @attention event-driven is a simplified schedule model to support the none-context-switch-based multi-task programming.("the big while 1") - * - * @param[in] tasks array of the tasks. - * @param[in] task_table_size size of the tasks. - * @param[in] poll the user defined poll function. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_MMHEAP_NOT_ENABLED mmheap is not enabled. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED memory allocate failed. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE initialize successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_sys_init(evtdrv_task_entry_t tasks[], evtdrv_ttb_sz_t task_table_size, k_evtdrv_poll_t poll); - -/** - * @brief Start the event-driven system. - * - * @attention start the event-driven multi-task "schedule". - * - * @return None - */ -__API__ void tos_evtdrv_sys_start(void); - -#endif /* TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN */ - -#endif /* _TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_H_ */ - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_task.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_task.h deleted file mode 100644 index 728fb128..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_task.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_H_ - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -#define TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_ID_NONE ((evtdrv_task_id_t)-1) - -// return event handled -typedef evtdrv_event_flag_t (*evtdrv_task_entry_t)(evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags); - -#define EVTDRV_TASK_ID2TASK(task_id) (evtdrv_task_entry_t)(evtdrv_task_table[task_id]) - -/** - * @brief Get the actived("running") task id. - * - * @attention - * - * @return the actived("running") task id. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_task_id_t tos_evtdrv_task_self(void); - -__KNL__ evtdrv_bool_t evtdrv_task_id_is_invalid(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id); - -__KNL__ evtdrv_bool_t evtdrv_task_is_self(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id); - -__KNL__ void evtdrv_task_init(void); - -#endif /* TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN */ - -#endif /* _TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_H_ */ - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_tick.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_tick.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7ebf7c67..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_tick.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_TICK_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_TICK_H_ - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -/** - * @brief Get the current systick count. - * - * @attention - * - * @return current systick count. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_tick_t tos_evtdrv_systick_get(void); - -/** - * @brief tick interrupt handler. - * - * @attention if you wanna use event-driven timer, you must deal with the tick. - * - * @return None. - */ -__API__ void tos_evtdrv_tick_handler(void); - -/** - * @brief Convert tick count to milli-seconds. - * - * @attention - * - * @return the milli-seconds equals to the tick count. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_time_t tos_evtdrv_tick2millisec(evtdrv_tick_t tick); - -/** - * @brief Convert milli-seconds to tick count. - * - * @attention - * - * @return the tick count equals to the tick count. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_tick_t tos_evtdrv_millisec2tick(evtdrv_time_t ms); - -#endif /* TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN */ - -#endif /* _TOS_EVTDRV_TICK_H_ */ - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_timer.h b/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_timer.h deleted file mode 100644 index 16eb7721..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/include/tos_evtdrv_timer.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef _TOS_EVTDRV_TIMER_H_ -#define _TOS_EVTDRV_TIMER_H_ - -#define EVTDRV_TIME_MILLISEC_PER_SEC (1000u) - -typedef enum evtdrv_timer_option_en { - EVTDRV_TIMER_OPT_ONESHOT, - EVTDRV_TIMER_OPT_PERIODIC, -} evtdrv_timer_opt_t; - -typedef void (*evtdrv_timer_callback_t)(void *arg); - -typedef struct evtdrv_timer_st { - evtdrv_timer_callback_t cb; - void *cb_arg; - - k_list_t list; - evtdrv_tick_t expires; - evtdrv_tick_t period; - - evtdrv_timer_opt_t opt; -} evtdrv_timer_t; - -typedef struct evtdrv_timer_control_st { - evtdrv_tick_t next_expires; - evtdrv_tick_t list; -} evtdrv_timer_ctl_t; - -/** - * @brief Create a timer. - * Create a timer. - * - * @attention - * - * @param[in] tmr pointer to the handler of the timer. - * @param[in] callback callback function called when the timer expires. - * @param[in] cb_arg argument for the callback. - * @param[in] opt option for the function call. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL task_id is invalid. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE event_flags is not valid for user use. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_timer_create(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr, - evtdrv_timer_callback_t callback, - void *cb_arg, - evtdrv_timer_opt_t opt); - -/** - * @brief Start a timer. - * Start the timer to run. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] tmr pointer to the handler of the timer. - * @param[in] timeout how much time(in evtdrv_tick_t) the timer would be expired. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL tmr is a NULL pointer. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_TIMER_ALREADY_EXIST tmr is already exist. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE return successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_timer_start(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr, evtdrv_tick_t timeout); - -/** - * @brief Stop a timer. - * Stop the timer from running. - * - * @attention None - * - * @param[in] tmr pointer to the handler of the timer. - * - * @return errcode - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL tmr is a NULL pointer. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_TIMER_INACTIVE the timer is not active yet. - * @retval #EVTDRV_ERR_NONE return successfully. - */ -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_timer_stop(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr); - -__KNL__ void evtdrv_timer_update(void); - -#endif /* _TOS_EVTDRV_TIMER_H_ */ - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_event.c b/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_event.c deleted file mode 100644 index 0f4b7b0d..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_event.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,128 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_event_set(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id, evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - uint8_t i = 0; - evtdrv_event_t *event; - evtdrv_event_flag_t flag; - - if (evtdrv_task_id_is_invalid(task_id)) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_TASK_INVALID; - } - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - - event = &evtdrv_events[task_id]; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(evtdrv_event_flag_t) * 8; ++i) { - flag = (1 << i); - - if (event_flags & flag) { - if (event->nesting[i] == (evtdrv_event_nesting_t)-1) { - continue; - } - - ++event->nesting[i]; - event->flags |= flag; - } - } - - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_event_reset(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id, evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flags) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - uint8_t i = 0; - evtdrv_event_t *event; - evtdrv_event_flag_t flag; - - if (evtdrv_task_id_is_invalid(task_id)) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_TASK_INVALID; - } - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - - event = &evtdrv_events[task_id]; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(evtdrv_event_flag_t) * 8; ++i) { - flag = (1 << i); - - if (event_flags & flag) { - if (!(event->flags & flag)) { - continue; - } - - if (event->nesting[i] > (evtdrv_event_nesting_t)0u) { - --event->nesting[i]; - } - - if (event->nesting[i] == (evtdrv_event_nesting_t)0u) { - event->flags &= ~flag; - } - } - } - - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__KNL__ evtdrv_err_t evtdrv_event_init(void) -{ - evtdrv_task_id_t i; - evtdrv_event_t *event; - - evtdrv_events = (evtdrv_event_t *)tos_mmheap_calloc(evtdrv_task_table_size, sizeof(evtdrv_event_t)); - if (!evtdrv_events) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - - for (i = 0; i < evtdrv_task_table_size; ++i) { - event = &evtdrv_events[i]; - event->flags = TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; - } - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__KNL__ evtdrv_event_flag_t evtdrv_event_fetch(evtdrv_task_id_t *task_id) -{ - evtdrv_task_id_t i; - evtdrv_event_t *event; - - for (i = 0; i < evtdrv_task_table_size; ++i) { - event = &evtdrv_events[i]; - if (event->flags != TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE) { - if (task_id) { - *task_id = i; - } - return event->flags; - } - } - - return TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; -} - -#endif - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_global.c b/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_global.c deleted file mode 100644 index a8e07777..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_global.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -evtdrv_task_entry_t *evtdrv_task_table = K_NULL; -evtdrv_ttb_sz_t evtdrv_task_table_size = 0; - -evtdrv_task_id_t evtdrv_curr_task = TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_ID_NONE; - -evtdrv_event_t *evtdrv_events = K_NULL; - -k_evtdrv_poll_t evtdrv_poll = K_NULL; - -evtdrv_tick_t evtdrv_tick_count = (evtdrv_tick_t)0u; - -TOS_LIST_DEFINE(evtdrv_msg_list); - -TOS_LIST_DEFINE(evtdrv_timer_list); - -#endif - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_msg.c b/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_msg.c deleted file mode 100644 index 333c27a8..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_msg.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,121 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -__API__ evtdrv_msg_body_t tos_evtdrv_msg_alloc(evtdrv_msg_len_t msg_len) -{ - evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *msg_hdr = K_NULL; - - if (!msg_len) { - return K_NULL; - } - - msg_hdr = (evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *)tos_mmheap_alloc(EVTDRV_MSG_LEN(msg_len)); - if (!msg_hdr) { - return K_NULL; - } - - tos_list_init(&msg_hdr->list); - msg_hdr->len = msg_len; - msg_hdr->dst_task_id = TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_ID_NONE; - - return EVTDRV_MSG_HDR2BODY(msg_hdr); -} - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_msg_free(evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body) -{ - evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *msg_hdr = K_NULL; - - if (!msg_body) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL; - } - - msg_hdr = EVTDRV_MSG_BODY2HDR(msg_body); - if (msg_hdr->dst_task_id != TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_ID_NONE || - !tos_list_empty(&msg_hdr->list)) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_MSG_BUSY; - } - - tos_mmheap_free(msg_hdr); - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_msg_send(evtdrv_task_id_t dst_task_id, evtdrv_msg_body_t msg_body) -{ - evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *msg_hdr = K_NULL; - - if (!msg_body) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL; - } - - if (evtdrv_task_id_is_invalid(dst_task_id)) { - tos_evtdrv_msg_free(msg_body); - return EVTDRV_ERR_TASK_INVALID; - } - - msg_hdr = EVTDRV_MSG_BODY2HDR(msg_body); - msg_hdr->dst_task_id = dst_task_id; - tos_list_add(&msg_hdr->list, &evtdrv_msg_list); - - tos_evtdrv_event_set(dst_task_id, TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG); - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__STATIC_INLINE__ void evtdrv_msg_prepare4use(evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *msg_hdr) -{ - tos_list_del_init(&msg_hdr->list); - msg_hdr->dst_task_id = TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_ID_NONE; -} - -__API__ evtdrv_msg_body_t tos_evtdrv_msg_recv(void) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - evtdrv_msg_hdr_t *msg_hdr, *tmp; - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - - TOS_LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY_SAFE(msg_hdr, tmp, evtdrv_msg_hdr_t, list, &evtdrv_msg_list) { - if (!evtdrv_task_is_self(msg_hdr->dst_task_id)) { - continue; - } - - evtdrv_msg_prepare4use(msg_hdr); - tos_evtdrv_event_set(tos_evtdrv_task_self(), TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG); - - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); - return EVTDRV_MSG_HDR2BODY(msg_hdr); - } - - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); - - tos_evtdrv_event_reset(tos_evtdrv_task_self(), TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_MSG); - - return K_NULL; -} - -__KNL__ void evtdrv_msg_init(void) -{ - tos_list_init(&evtdrv_msg_list); -} - -#endif - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_sys.c b/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_sys.c deleted file mode 100644 index 448185c1..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_sys.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_sys_init(evtdrv_task_entry_t tasks[], evtdrv_ttb_sz_t task_table_size, k_evtdrv_poll_t poll) -{ - k_err_t kerr; - evtdrv_err_t err; - - evtdrv_task_table = &tasks[0]; - evtdrv_task_table_size = task_table_size; - - evtdrv_poll = poll; - -#if TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_EN > 0 -#if TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_DEFAULT_POOL_EN > 0u - kerr = mmheap_init_with_pool(k_mmheap_default_pool, TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE); -#else - kerr = mmheap_init(); -#endif - if (kerr != K_ERR_NONE) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_MMHEAP_INIT_FAILED; - } -#endif - - err = evtdrv_event_init(); - if (err != EVTDRV_ERR_NONE) { - return err; - } - - evtdrv_msg_init(); - - evtdrv_task_init(); - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__STATIC__ void evtdrv_sys_run(void) -{ - evtdrv_event_flag_t event_flag = TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE; - evtdrv_task_id_t task_id = TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_ID_NONE; - - evtdrv_timer_update(); - - if (evtdrv_poll) { - evtdrv_poll(); - } - - event_flag = evtdrv_event_fetch(&task_id); - if (event_flag != TOS_EVTDRV_EVENT_NONE) { - evtdrv_curr_task = task_id; - event_flag = (EVTDRV_TASK_ID2TASK(task_id))(event_flag); - evtdrv_curr_task = TOS_EVTDRV_TASK_ID_NONE; - - // after task process, event that the task handled is returned. - tos_evtdrv_event_reset(task_id, event_flag); - } else { -#if TOS_CFG_PWR_MGR_EN > 0u - pm_power_manager(); -#endif - } -} - -__API__ void tos_evtdrv_sys_start(void) -{ - while (K_TRUE) { - evtdrv_sys_run(); - } -} - -#endif - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_task.c b/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_task.c deleted file mode 100644 index c6f860f1..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_task.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -__API__ evtdrv_task_id_t tos_evtdrv_task_self(void) -{ - return evtdrv_curr_task; -} - -__KNL__ evtdrv_bool_t evtdrv_task_id_is_invalid(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id) -{ - return task_id >= evtdrv_task_table_size; -} - -__KNL__ evtdrv_bool_t evtdrv_task_is_self(evtdrv_task_id_t task_id) -{ - return task_id == evtdrv_curr_task; -} - -__KNL__ void evtdrv_task_init(void) -{ - evtdrv_task_id_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < evtdrv_task_table_size; ++i) { - (evtdrv_task_table[i])(TOS_EVTDRV_SYS_EVENT_INIT); - } -} - -#endif - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_tick.c b/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_tick.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8959bffc..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_tick.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -__API__ evtdrv_time_t tos_evtdrv_tick2millisec(evtdrv_tick_t tick) -{ - return (evtdrv_time_t)(tick * EVTDRV_TIME_MILLISEC_PER_SEC / TOS_CFG_CPU_TICK_PER_SECOND); -} - -__API__ evtdrv_tick_t tos_evtdrv_millisec2tick(evtdrv_time_t ms) -{ - return ((evtdrv_tick_t)ms * TOS_CFG_CPU_TICK_PER_SECOND / EVTDRV_TIME_MILLISEC_PER_SEC); -} - -__API__ evtdrv_tick_t tos_evtdrv_systick_get(void) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - evtdrv_tick_t tick; - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - tick = evtdrv_tick_count; - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); - return tick; -} - -__API__ void tos_evtdrv_tick_handler(void) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - ++evtdrv_tick_count; - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); -} - -#endif - diff --git a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_timer.c b/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_timer.c deleted file mode 100644 index bdb54c3e..00000000 --- a/kernel/evtdrv/tos_evtdrv_timer.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,126 +0,0 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Tencent is pleased to support the open source community by making TencentOS - * available. - * - * Copyright (C) 2019 THL A29 Limited, a Tencent company. All rights reserved. - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS binary from Tencent, please - * note that the TencentOS binary is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License. - * - * If you have downloaded a copy of the TencentOS source code from Tencent, - * please note that TencentOS source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause - * License, except for the third-party components listed below which are - * subject to different license terms. Your integration of TencentOS into your - * own projects may require compliance with the BSD 3-Clause License, as well - * as the other licenses applicable to the third-party components included - * within TencentOS. - *---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "tos_evtdrv.h" - -#if TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN > 0u - -__STATIC__ void evtdrv_timer_place(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr, evtdrv_tick_t timeout) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - evtdrv_timer_t *curr_tmr; - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - tmr->expires = tos_evtdrv_systick_get() + timeout; - - TOS_LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(curr_tmr, evtdrv_timer_t, list, &evtdrv_timer_list) { - if (tmr->expires < curr_tmr->expires) { - break; - } - } - tos_list_add_tail(&tmr->list, &curr_tmr->list); - - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); -} - -__STATIC__ void evtdrv_timer_takeoff(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - tos_list_del(&tmr->list); - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); -} - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_timer_create(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr, - evtdrv_timer_callback_t callback, - void *cb_arg, - evtdrv_timer_opt_t opt) -{ - if (!tmr || !callback) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL; - } - - tmr->cb = callback; - tmr->opt = opt; - tos_list_init(&tmr->list); - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_timer_start(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr, evtdrv_tick_t timeout) -{ - if (!tmr) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL; - } - - if (!tos_list_empty(&tmr->list)) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_TIMER_ALREADY_EXIST; - } - - evtdrv_timer_place(tmr, timeout); - if (tmr->opt == EVTDRV_TIMER_OPT_PERIODIC) { - tmr->period = timeout; - } - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__API__ evtdrv_err_t tos_evtdrv_timer_stop(evtdrv_timer_t *tmr) -{ - if (!tmr) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_PTR_NULL; - } - - if (tos_list_empty(&tmr->list)) { - return EVTDRV_ERR_TIMER_INACTIVE; - } - - evtdrv_timer_takeoff(tmr); - - return EVTDRV_ERR_NONE; -} - -__KNL__ void evtdrv_timer_update(void) -{ - TOS_CPU_CPSR_ALLOC(); - evtdrv_timer_t *tmr, *tmp; - - TOS_CPU_INT_DISABLE(); - - TOS_LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY_SAFE(tmr, tmp, evtdrv_timer_t, list, &evtdrv_timer_list) { - if (tmr->expires > tos_evtdrv_systick_get()) { - break; - } - - // time's up - evtdrv_timer_takeoff(tmr); - - if (tmr->opt == EVTDRV_TIMER_OPT_PERIODIC) { - evtdrv_timer_place(tmr, tmr->period); - } else { - evtdrv_timer_takeoff(tmr); - } - - (*tmr->cb)(tmr->cb_arg); - } - - TOS_CPU_INT_ENABLE(); -} - -#endif /* TOS_CFG_EVENT_DRIVEN_EN */ - diff --git a/tools/addr2line.zip b/tools/addr2line.zip new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..edb7d0023a05c0ceaf2bb5ccd153245719f7b21b GIT binary patch literal 708599 zcmZ^pWl$VU)TI+bLI@VzA-KB+cXxMpcbDMq?he6&2OZqqCAjOL12ZtgzV-ds+O68{ zpIxU;S66k_y|rEA3msk{XqQxQ2*~!m@R!QuX>RJG*;S#g*bA;KYp40 z@JT9~z@bi7QW1*@eO@+Fc94P~L^VL7UUNB9pDzES200?fr=KL!ho9Q&+tuo`+IMQ0 zMnAy$&QsDlnoA_~ul#PB<+V*HC4(P-Tl2mSw4x^4+!+Ic-@#y+llos(X4I9+8MDwcQR2Gx z)|}&-yym2%E1Sv0uLNoLU?JFYBXdA@qdLar!Ym 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