diff --git a/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/CMakeLists.txt b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/CMakeLists.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..df66b86d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.8)
+
+project(ini_test)
+
+set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE "Debug")
+set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_DEBUG "$ENV{CXXFLAGS} -O0 -Wall -g2 -ggdb")
+set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE "$ENV{CXXFLAGS} -O3 -Wall")
+
+set(TINY_ROOT ../../../)
+
+include_directories(${TINY_ROOT}/osal/cmsis_os)
+include_directories(${TINY_ROOT}/kernel/core/include)
+include_directories(${TINY_ROOT}/kernel/evtdrv/include)
+include_directories(${TINY_ROOT}/kernel/hal/include)
+include_directories(${TINY_ROOT}/kernel/pm/include)
+
+set(CMSIS_SRCS ${TINY_ROOT}/osal/cmsis_os/cmsis_os.c)
+aux_source_directory(${TINY_ROOT}/kernel/core CORE_SRCS)
+aux_source_directory(${TINY_ROOT}/kernel/evtdrv EVTDRV_SRCS)
+aux_source_directory(${TINY_ROOT}/kernel/pm PM_SRCS)
+
+set(ARCH_ROOT ${TINY_ROOT}/arch/linux)
+
+include_directories(${ARCH_ROOT}/common/include)
+include_directories(${ARCH_ROOT}/posix/gcc)
+include_directories(${TINY_ROOT}/components/utils/Bcrypt/include)
+
+aux_source_directory(${ARCH_ROOT}/common ARCH_COMMON_SRCS)
+aux_source_directory(${ARCH_ROOT}/posix/gcc ARCH_POSIX_SRCS)
+
+aux_source_directory(${TINY_ROOT}/components/utils/Bcrypt/src BCRYPT_SRCS)
+
+set(ARCH_SRCS ${ARCH_COMMON_SRCS} ${ARCH_POSIX_SRCS})
+
+set(TINY_SRCS ${ARCH_SRCS} ${CMSIS_SRCS} ${EVTDRV_SRCS} ${PM_SRCS} ${CORE_SRCS} ${BCRYPT_SRCS} )
+
+include_directories(./)
+include_directories(./inc)
+
+set(APP_SRCS src/main.c)
+
+add_executable(bcrypt_demo ${APP_SRCS} ${TINY_SRCS})
+
+target_link_libraries(bcrypt_demo pthread)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/Makefile b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ef48ab09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+###################################################################
+#automatic detection QTOP and LOCALDIR
+CUR_DIR := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(realpath $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)))))
+TRYQTOP := $(shell if [ -n "$$QTOP" ] ; then\
+ echo $$QTOP;\
+ else\
+ cd $(CUR_DIR); while /usr/bin/test ! -e qmk ; do \
+ dir=`cd ../;pwd`; \
+ if [ "$$dir" = "/" ] ; then \
+ echo Cannot find QTOP in $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)) 1>&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi ; \
+ cd $$dir; \
+ done ; \
+ pwd; \
+ fi)
+QTOP ?= $(realpath ${TRYQTOP})
+
+ifeq ($(QTOP),)
+$(error Please run this in a tree)
+endif
+LOCALDIR = $(patsubst %/,%,$(subst $(realpath $(QTOP))/,,$(CUR_DIR)))
+export QTOP
+
+####################################################################
+
+
+export BP=Linux_Posix
+
+TREE_LIB_ENABLE=1
+lib=
+subdirs =
+
+
+all::
+ make -C ${QTOP}/arch BP=${BP}
+ make -C ${QTOP}/kernel BP=${BP}
+ make -C ${QTOP}/osal BP=${BP}
+ make -C ${QTOP}/net BP=${BP}
+ make -C ${QTOP}/devices BP=${BP}
+exec =
+LD_A_FILES += $(LIBDIR)/libarch.a
+LD_A_FILES += $(LIBDIR)/libkernel.a
+LD_A_FILES += $(LIBDIR)/libbcrypt_demo.a
+LD_A_FILES += $(LIBDIR)/libcmsis_os.a
+LDFLAGS += -lpthread
+
+include ${QTOP}/qmk/generic/Make.exec
+
+
diff --git a/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/inc/lwipopts.h b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/inc/lwipopts.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7e9e2522
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/inc/lwipopts.h
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/**
+ ******************************************************************************
+ * @file lwipopts.h
+ * @author MCD Application Team
+ * @version V1.1.0
+ * @date 31-July-2013
+ * @brief lwIP Options Configuration.
+ * This file is based on Utilities\lwip_v1.4.1\src\include\lwip\opt.h
+ * and contains the lwIP configuration for the STM32F4x7 demonstration.
+ ******************************************************************************
+ * @attention
+ *
+ * © COPYRIGHT 2013 STMicroelectronics
+ *
+ * Licensed under MCD-ST Liberty SW License Agreement V2, (the "License");
+ * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at:
+ *
+ * http://www.st.com/software_license_agreement_liberty_v2
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LWIPOPTS_H__
+#define __LWIPOPTS_H__
+
+/**
+ * SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT==1: if you want inter-task protection for certain
+ * critical regions during buffer allocation, deallocation and memory
+ * allocation and deallocation.
+ */
+#define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT 1
+
+/**
+ * NO_SYS==1: Provides VERY minimal functionality. Otherwise,
+ * use lwIP facilities.
+ */
+#define NO_SYS 0
+
+/**
+ * NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS==1: Drop support for sys_timeout when NO_SYS==1
+ * Mainly for compatibility to old versions.
+ */
+#define NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS 0
+
+/* ---------- Memory options ---------- */
+/* MEM_ALIGNMENT: should be set to the alignment of the CPU for which
+ lwIP is compiled. 4 byte alignment -> define MEM_ALIGNMENT to 4, 2
+ byte alignment -> define MEM_ALIGNMENT to 2. */
+#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 4
+
+/* MEM_SIZE: the size of the heap memory. If the application will send
+a lot of data that needs to be copied, this should be set high. */
+#define MEM_SIZE (5 * 1024)
+
+/* MEMP_NUM_PBUF: the number of memp struct pbufs. If the application
+ sends a lot of data out of ROM (or other static memory), this
+ should be set high. */
+#define MEMP_NUM_PBUF 25
+/* MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB: the number of UDP protocol control blocks. One
+ per active UDP "connection". */
+#define MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB 4
+/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB: the number of simulatenously active TCP
+ connections. */
+#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB 6
+/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN: the number of listening TCP
+ connections. */
+#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN 6
+/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG: the number of simultaneously queued TCP
+ segments. */
+#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG 150
+/* MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT: the number of simulateously active
+ timeouts. */
+#define MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT 6
+
+/* ---------- Pbuf options ---------- */
+/* PBUF_POOL_SIZE: the number of buffers in the pbuf pool. */
+#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE 25
+/* PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE: the size of each pbuf in the pbuf pool. */
+#define PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(TCP_MSS + 40 + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN)
+
+/* ---------- TCP options ---------- */
+#define LWIP_TCP 1
+#define TCP_TTL 255
+
+/* Controls if TCP should queue segments that arrive out of
+ order. Define to 0 if your device is low on memory. */
+#define TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ 0
+
+/* TCP Maximum segment size. */
+#define TCP_MSS (1500 - 40) /* TCP_MSS = (Ethernet MTU - IP header size - TCP header size) */
+
+/* TCP sender buffer space (bytes). */
+#define TCP_SND_BUF (7 * TCP_MSS)
+
+/* TCP_SND_QUEUELEN: TCP sender buffer space (pbufs). This must be at least
+ as much as (2 * TCP_SND_BUF/TCP_MSS) for things to work. */
+
+#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN (8 * TCP_SND_BUF / TCP_MSS)
+
+/* TCP receive window. */
+#define TCP_WND (9 * TCP_MSS)
+
+/* ---------- ICMP options ---------- */
+#define LWIP_ICMP 1
+
+/* ---------- DHCP options ---------- */
+/* Define LWIP_DHCP to 1 if you want DHCP configuration of
+ interfaces. DHCP is not implemented in lwIP 0.5.1, however, so
+ turning this on does currently not work. */
+#define LWIP_DHCP 1
+
+/* ---------- UDP options ---------- */
+#define LWIP_UDP 1
+#define UDP_TTL 255
+
+/* ---------- Statistics options ---------- */
+#define LWIP_STATS 0
+#define LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO 1
+
+/* ---------- link callback options ---------- */
+/* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function from an interface
+ * whenever the link changes (i.e., link down)
+ */
+#define LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK 0
+/*
+ --------------------------------------
+ ---------- Checksum options ----------
+ --------------------------------------
+*/
+
+/*
+The STM32F4x7 allows computing and verifying the IP, UDP, TCP and ICMP checksums by hardware:
+ - To use this feature let the following define uncommented.
+ - To disable it and process by CPU comment the the checksum.
+*/
+#define CHECKSUM_BY_HARDWARE
+//#undef CHECKSUM_BY_HARDWARE
+
+#ifdef CHECKSUM_BY_HARDWARE
+/* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing IP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 0
+/* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing UDP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 0
+/* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing TCP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 0
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming IP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 0
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming UDP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 0
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming TCP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 0
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming ICMP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 0
+#else
+/* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing IP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 1
+/* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing UDP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 1
+/* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing TCP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 1
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming IP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 1
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming UDP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 1
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming TCP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 1
+/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==1: Check checksums by hardware for incoming ICMP packets.*/
+#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 1
+#endif
+
+#define LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING 1
+
+/*
+ ----------------------------------------------
+ ---------- Sequential layer options ----------
+ ----------------------------------------------
+*/
+/**
+ * LWIP_NETCONN==1: Enable Netconn API (require to use api_lib.c)
+ */
+#define LWIP_NETCONN 1
+
+/*
+ ------------------------------------
+ ---------- Socket options ----------
+ ------------------------------------
+*/
+/**
+ * LWIP_SOCKET==1: Enable Socket API (require to use sockets.c)
+ */
+#define LWIP_SOCKET 1
+
+/*
+ ---------------------------------
+ ---------- OS options ----------
+ ---------------------------------
+*/
+
+#define DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 10
+#define DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 10
+#define DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE 10
+#define DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE 1024 * 2
+
+#define TCPIP_THREAD_NAME "lwip"
+#define TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE 1024
+#define TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE 10
+#define TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO 1
+
+#define LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS 1
+#define LWIP_DNS 1
+
+/** DNS server IP address */
+#ifndef DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS
+#define DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS(ipaddr) (ip4_addr_set_u32(ipaddr, ipaddr_addr("208.67.222.222"))) /* resolver1.opendns.com */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ ----------------------------------------
+ ---------- Lwip Debug options ----------
+ ----------------------------------------
+*/
+#define LWIP_DEBUG 0
+
+#define ethernet_with_mac 1
+
+#endif /* __LWIPOPTS_H__ */
+
+/************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE****/
+
diff --git a/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/inc/tos_config.h b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/inc/tos_config.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4c75d6e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/inc/tos_config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#ifndef _TOS_CONFIG_H_
+#define _TOS_CONFIG_H_
+
+#include "stddef.h"
+#include "stdint.h"
+
+#define TOS_CFG_TASK_PRIO_MAX 10u // 配置TencentOS tiny默认支持的最大优先级数量
+
+#define TOS_CFG_ROUND_ROBIN_EN 1u // 配置TencentOS tiny的内核是否开启时间片轮转
+
+#define TOS_CFG_OBJECT_VERIFY_EN 1u // 配置TencentOS tiny是否校验指针合法
+
+#define TOS_CFG_EVENT_EN 1u // TencentOS tiny 事件模块功能宏
+
+#define TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_EN 1u // 配置TencentOS tiny是否开启动态内存模块
+
+#define TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_POOL_SIZE 0x100 // 配置TencentOS tiny动态内存池大小
+
+#define TOS_CFG_MMHEAP_DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 0x100 // 配置TencentOS tiny动态内存池大小
+
+#define TOS_CFG_MUTEX_EN 1u // 配置TencentOS tiny是否开启互斥锁模块
+
+#define TOS_CFG_MESSAGE_QUEUE_EN 1u
+#define TOS_CFG_MAIL_QUEUE_EN 1u
+
+#define TOS_CFG_PRIORITY_MESSAGE_QUEUE_EN 1u
+
+#define TOS_CFG_PRIORITY_MAIL_QUEUE_EN 1u
+#define TOS_CFG_TIMER_EN 1u // 配置TencentOS tiny是否开启软件定时器模块
+
+#define TOS_CFG_SEM_EN 1u // 配置TencentOS tiny是否开启信号量模块
+
+#define TOS_CFG_MMBLK_EN 1u
+
+#if (TOS_CFG_QUEUE_EN > 0u)
+#define TOS_CFG_MSG_EN 1u
+#else
+#define TOS_CFG_MSG_EN 0u
+#endif
+
+#define TOS_CFG_MSG_POOL_SIZE 10u // 配置TencentOS tiny消息队列大小
+
+#define TOS_CFG_IDLE_TASK_STK_SIZE 256u // 配置TencentOS tiny空闲任务栈大小
+
+#define TOS_CFG_CPU_TICK_PER_SECOND 1000u // 配置TencentOS tiny的tick频率
+
+#define TOS_CFG_CPU_CLOCK 1000000u // 配置TencentOS tiny CPU频率
+
+#define TOS_CFG_TIMER_AS_PROC 1u // 配置是否将TIMER配置成函数模式
+
+#endif
diff --git a/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/readme.md b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/readme.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..800c9e44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/readme.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# How to run the demo in linux
+
+## step1
+make sure your develop environment.
++ `cmake` and version greater than 3.8.2
++ `gcc` `gdb` `make` is installed
+
+## step2
+make `build` directory and compile in `build`
+
+```bash
+mkdir build && cd build
+cmake ..
+make
+```
+
+## step3
+run program !!
+
+```bash
+# in build directory
+./bcrypt_demo
+```
+
+## other
+you can copy this demo to other path, but if you want do it,
+you need modify `CMakeLists.txt`. find line
+
+```cmake
+set(TINY_ROOT ../../../)
+```
+
+and modify `path-to-tinyos`
+```cmake
+set(TINY_ROOT path-to-tinyos)
+```
diff --git a/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/src/main.c b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/src/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0a25de40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/Linux_Posix/bcrypt_demo/src/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#include "cmsis_os.h"
+#include "bcrypt.h"
+
+#define TASK1_STK_SIZE 512
+void task1(void *arg);
+osThreadDef(task1, osPriorityNormal, 1, TASK1_STK_SIZE);
+
+int Bcrypt(const char *Src, char *Dst)
+{
+ int Ret = -1;
+ char Salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = {0};
+ char Hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = {0};
+
+ if(NULL == Src)
+ {
+ printf("Src is NULL!\n");
+ goto ErrorHandler;
+ }
+
+ if(NULL == Dst)
+ {
+ printf("Dst is NULL!\n");
+ goto ErrorHandler;
+ }
+
+ Ret = bcrypt_gensalt(12, Salt);
+ if(Ret < 0)
+ {
+ printf("bcrypt_gensalt failed!\n");
+ goto ErrorHandler;
+ }
+
+ Ret = bcrypt_hashpw(Src, Salt, Hash);
+ if(Ret < 0)
+ {
+ printf("bcrypt_hashpw failed!\n");
+ goto ErrorHandler;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(Dst, Hash, sizeof(Hash));
+
+ return 0;
+
+ErrorHandler:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void task1(void *arg)
+{
+ int Ret = -1;
+ char Hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = {0};
+ const char *DeviceKey = "8HLWBzFvOoZDo9wHZnCAKaAZeb8";
+
+ Ret = Bcrypt(DeviceKey, Hash);
+ if(Ret < 0)
+ {
+ printf("Bcrypt failed!\n");
+ return ;
+ }
+
+ printf("Bcrypt DeviceKey = %s\n", Hash);
+
+ while(1)
+ {
+ printf("BcryptTest success!\n");
+ osDelay(1000);
+ }
+}
+
+void application_entry(void *arg)
+{
+ osThreadCreate(osThread(task1), NULL); // Create task1
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ osKernelInitialize(); //TOS Tiny kernel initialize
+ application_entry(NULL);
+ osKernelStart(); //Start TOS Tiny
+
+ while (1)
+ {
+ }
+}
diff --git a/board/Linux_Posix/ini_demo/readme.md b/board/Linux_Posix/ini_demo/readme.md
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index a35c15da..f398018f
--- a/board/Linux_Posix/ini_demo/readme.md
+++ b/board/Linux_Posix/ini_demo/readme.md
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ run program !!
```bash
# in build directory
-./hello_world
+./inidemo
```
## other
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/Makefile b/components/utils/Bcrypt/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..69305393
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+###################################################################
+#automatic detection QTOP and LOCALDIR
+CUR_DIR := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(realpath $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)))))
+TRYQTOP := $(shell if [ -n "$$QTOP" ] ; then\
+ echo $$QTOP;\
+ else\
+ cd $(CUR_DIR); while /usr/bin/test ! -d qmk ; do \
+ dir=`cd ../;pwd`; \
+ if [ "$$dir" = "/" ] ; then \
+ echo Cannot find QTOP in $(firstword $(MAKEFILE_LIST)) 1>&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi ; \
+ cd $$dir; \
+ done ; \
+ pwd; \
+ fi)
+QTOP ?= $(realpath ${TRYQTOP})
+
+ifeq ($(QTOP),)
+$(error Please run this in a tree)
+endif
+LOCALDIR = $(patsubst %/,%,$(subst $(realpath $(QTOP))/,,$(CUR_DIR)))
+
+####################################################################
+
+
+TREE_LIB_ENABLE=y
+lib=
+subdirs=
+
+CFGFLAGS += -I$(CUR_DIR)/include
+
+include ${QTOP}/qmk/generic/Make.tpl
+
+
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/bcrypt.h b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/bcrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..079e1e4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/bcrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#ifndef BCRYPT_H_
+#define BCRYPT_H_
+/*
+ * bcrypt wrapper library
+ *
+ * Written in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 by Ricardo Garcia
+ *
+ * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
+ * and related and neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
+ * worldwide. This software is distributed without any warranty.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along
+ * with this software. If not, see
+ * .
+ */
+
+#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (64)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This function expects a work factor between 4 and 31 and a char array to
+ * store the resulting generated salt. The char array should typically have
+ * BCRYPT_HASHSIZE bytes at least. If the provided work factor is not in the
+ * previous range, it will default to 12.
+ *
+ * The return value is zero if the salt could be correctly generated and
+ * nonzero otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int bcrypt_gensalt(int workfactor, char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]);
+
+/*
+ * This function expects a password to be hashed, a salt to hash the password
+ * with and a char array to leave the result. Both the salt and the hash
+ * parameters should have room for BCRYPT_HASHSIZE characters at least.
+ *
+ * It can also be used to verify a hashed password. In that case, provide the
+ * expected hash in the salt parameter and verify the output hash is the same
+ * as the input hash. However, to avoid timing attacks, it's better to use
+ * bcrypt_checkpw when verifying a password.
+ *
+ * The return value is zero if the password could be hashed and nonzero
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+int bcrypt_hashpw(const char *passwd, const char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE],
+ char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]);
+
+/*
+ * This function expects a password and a hash to verify the password against.
+ * The internal implementation is tuned to avoid timing attacks.
+ *
+ * The return value will be -1 in case of errors, zero if the provided password
+ * matches the given hash and greater than zero if no errors are found and the
+ * passwords don't match.
+ *
+ */
+int bcrypt_checkpw(const char *passwd, const char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]);
+
+/*
+ * Brief Example
+ * -------------
+ *
+ * Hashing a password:
+ *
+ * char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ * char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ * int ret;
+ *
+ * ret = bcrypt_gensalt(12, salt);
+ * assert(ret == 0);
+ * ret = bcrypt_hashpw("thepassword", salt, hash);
+ * assert(ret == 0);
+ *
+ *
+ * Verifying a password:
+ *
+ * int ret;
+ *
+ * ret = bcrypt_checkpw("thepassword", "expectedhash");
+ * assert(ret != -1);
+ *
+ * if (ret == 0) {
+ * printf("The password matches\n");
+ * } else {
+ * printf("The password does NOT match\n");
+ * }
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt.h b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..38472f40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2002.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#include
+
+#if defined(_OW_SOURCE) || defined(__USE_OW)
+#define __SKIP_GNU
+#undef __SKIP_OW
+#include
+#undef __SKIP_GNU
+#endif
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt_blowfish.h b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt_blowfish.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d289eb3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt_blowfish.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
+#define _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
+
+extern int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size);
+extern char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
+ char *output, int size);
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix,
+ unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt_gensalt.h b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt_gensalt.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d2bd6742
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/crypt_gensalt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPT_GENSALT_H
+#define _CRYPT_GENSALT_H
+
+extern unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[];
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix,
+ unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix,
+ unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/ow-crypt.h b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/ow-crypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2c8ddf8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/include/ow-crypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OW_CRYPT_H
+#define _OW_CRYPT_H
+
+#ifndef __GNUC__
+#undef __const
+#define __const const
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __SKIP_GNU
+extern char *crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting);
+extern char *crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting, void *data);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __SKIP_OW
+extern char *crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+ void *data, int size);
+extern char *crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+ void **data, int *size);
+extern char *crypt_gensalt(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ __const char *input, int size);
+extern char *crypt_gensalt_rn(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ __const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+extern char *crypt_gensalt_ra(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ __const char *input, int size);
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/bcrypt.c b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/bcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..278fbcb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/bcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * bcrypt wrapper library
+ *
+ * Written in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 by Ricardo Garcia
+ *
+ * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
+ * and related and neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
+ * worldwide. This software is distributed without any warranty.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along
+ * with this software. If not, see
+ * .
+ */
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "bcrypt.h"
+#include "ow-crypt.h"
+
+#define RANDBYTES (16)
+
+static int try_close(int fd)
+{
+ int ret;
+ for (;;) {
+ errno = 0;
+ ret = close(fd);
+ if (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int try_read(int fd, char *out, size_t count)
+{
+ size_t total;
+ ssize_t partial;
+
+ total = 0;
+ while (total < count)
+ {
+ for (;;) {
+ errno = 0;
+ partial = read(fd, out + total, count - total);
+ if (partial == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (partial < 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ total += partial;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a best effort implementation. Nothing prevents a compiler from
+ * optimizing this function and making it vulnerable to timing attacks, but
+ * this method is commonly used in crypto libraries like NaCl.
+ *
+ * Return value is zero if both strings are equal and nonzero otherwise.
+*/
+static int timing_safe_strcmp(const char *str1, const char *str2)
+{
+ const unsigned char *u1;
+ const unsigned char *u2;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ int len1 = strlen(str1);
+ int len2 = strlen(str2);
+
+ /* In our context both strings should always have the same length
+ * because they will be hashed passwords. */
+ if (len1 != len2)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Force unsigned for bitwise operations. */
+ u1 = (const unsigned char *)str1;
+ u2 = (const unsigned char *)str2;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len1; ++i)
+ ret |= (u1[i] ^ u2[i]);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int bcrypt_gensalt(int factor, char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE])
+{
+ int fd;
+ char input[RANDBYTES];
+ int workf;
+ char *aux;
+
+ fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (try_read(fd, input, RANDBYTES) != 0) {
+ if (try_close(fd) != 0)
+ return 4;
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ if (try_close(fd) != 0)
+ return 3;
+
+ /* Generate salt. */
+ workf = (factor < 4 || factor > 31)?12:factor;
+ aux = crypt_gensalt_rn("$2a$", workf, input, RANDBYTES,
+ salt, BCRYPT_HASHSIZE);
+ return (aux == NULL)?5:0;
+}
+
+int bcrypt_hashpw(const char *passwd, const char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE], char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE])
+{
+ char *aux;
+ aux = crypt_rn(passwd, salt, hash, BCRYPT_HASHSIZE);
+ return (aux == NULL)?1:0;
+}
+
+int bcrypt_checkpw(const char *passwd, const char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE])
+{
+ int ret;
+ char outhash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+
+ ret = bcrypt_hashpw(passwd, hash, outhash);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return timing_safe_strcmp(hash, outhash);
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST_BCRYPT
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ clock_t before;
+ clock_t after;
+ char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ const char pass[] = "hi,mom";
+ const char hash1[] = "$2a$10$VEVmGHy4F4XQMJ3eOZJAUeb.MedU0W10pTPCuf53eHdKJPiSE8sMK";
+ const char hash2[] = "$2a$10$3F0BVk5t8/aoS.3ddaB3l.fxg5qvafQ9NybxcpXLzMeAt.nVWn.NO";
+
+ ret = bcrypt_gensalt(12, salt);
+ assert(ret == 0);
+ printf("Generated salt: %s\n", salt);
+ before = clock();
+ ret = bcrypt_hashpw("testtesttest", salt, hash);
+ assert(ret == 0);
+ after = clock();
+ printf("Hashed password: %s\n", hash);
+ printf("Time taken: %f seconds\n",
+ (double)(after - before) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+
+ ret = bcrypt_hashpw(pass, hash1, hash);
+ assert(ret == 0);
+ printf("First hash check: %s\n", (strcmp(hash1, hash) == 0)?"OK":"FAIL");
+ ret = bcrypt_hashpw(pass, hash2, hash);
+ assert(ret == 0);
+ printf("Second hash check: %s\n", (strcmp(hash2, hash) == 0)?"OK":"FAIL");
+
+ before = clock();
+ ret = (bcrypt_checkpw(pass, hash1) == 0);
+ after = clock();
+ printf("First hash check with bcrypt_checkpw: %s\n", ret?"OK":"FAIL");
+ printf("Time taken: %f seconds\n",
+ (double)(after - before) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+
+ before = clock();
+ ret = (bcrypt_checkpw(pass, hash2) == 0);
+ after = clock();
+ printf("Second hash check with bcrypt_checkpw: %s\n", ret?"OK":"FAIL");
+ printf("Time taken: %f seconds\n",
+ (double)(after - before) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/crypt_blowfish.c b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/crypt_blowfish.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5d0062c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/crypt_blowfish.c
@@ -0,0 +1,907 @@
+/*
+ * The crypt_blowfish homepage is:
+ *
+ * http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
+ *
+ * This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant
+ * and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password
+ * cracking removed.
+ *
+ * Written by Solar Designer in 1998-2014.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system,
+ * as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
+ * ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate
+ * it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in
+ * the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let
+ * you place this code and any modifications you make under a license
+ * of your choice.
+ *
+ * This implementation is fully compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix
+ * "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos , and it uses
+ * some of his ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David
+ * Mazieres . For information on the level of
+ * compatibility for bcrypt hash prefixes other than "$2b$", please refer to
+ * the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the included crypt(3) man page.
+ *
+ * There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
+ *
+ * http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
+ *
+ * Some of the tricks in BF_ROUND might be inspired by Eric Young's
+ * Blowfish library (I can't be sure if I would think of something if I
+ * hadn't seen his code).
+ */
+
+#include
+
+#include
+#ifndef __set_errno
+#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
+#endif
+
+/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */
+#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+#define BF_ASM 1
+#define BF_SCALE 1
+#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__)
+#define BF_ASM 0
+#define BF_SCALE 1
+#else
+#define BF_ASM 0
+#define BF_SCALE 0
+#endif
+
+typedef unsigned int BF_word;
+typedef signed int BF_word_signed;
+
+/* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */
+#define BF_N 16
+
+typedef BF_word BF_key[BF_N + 2];
+
+typedef struct {
+ BF_word S[4][0x100];
+ BF_key P;
+} BF_ctx;
+
+/*
+ * Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end.
+ * The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian.
+ */
+static BF_word BF_magic_w[6] = {
+ 0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C,
+ 0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274
+};
+
+/*
+ * P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi.
+ */
+static BF_ctx BF_init_state = {
+ {
+ {
+ 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
+ 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
+ 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
+ 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
+ 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
+ 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
+ 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
+ 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
+ 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
+ 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
+ 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
+ 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
+ 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
+ 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
+ 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
+ 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
+ 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
+ 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
+ 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
+ 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
+ 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
+ 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
+ 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
+ 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
+ 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
+ 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
+ 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
+ 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
+ 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
+ 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
+ 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
+ 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
+ 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
+ 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
+ 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
+ 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
+ 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
+ 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
+ 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
+ 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
+ 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
+ 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
+ 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
+ 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
+ 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
+ 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
+ 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
+ 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
+ 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
+ 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
+ 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
+ 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
+ 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
+ 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
+ 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
+ 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
+ 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
+ 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
+ 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
+ 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
+ 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
+ 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
+ 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
+ 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a
+ }, {
+ 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
+ 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
+ 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
+ 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
+ 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
+ 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
+ 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
+ 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
+ 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
+ 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
+ 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
+ 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
+ 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
+ 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
+ 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
+ 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
+ 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
+ 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
+ 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
+ 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
+ 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
+ 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
+ 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
+ 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
+ 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
+ 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
+ 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
+ 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
+ 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
+ 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
+ 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
+ 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
+ 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
+ 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
+ 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
+ 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
+ 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
+ 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
+ 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
+ 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
+ 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
+ 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
+ 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
+ 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
+ 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
+ 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
+ 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
+ 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
+ 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
+ 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
+ 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
+ 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
+ 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
+ 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
+ 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
+ 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
+ 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
+ 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
+ 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
+ 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
+ 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
+ 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
+ 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
+ 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7
+ }, {
+ 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
+ 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
+ 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
+ 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
+ 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
+ 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
+ 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
+ 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
+ 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
+ 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
+ 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
+ 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
+ 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
+ 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
+ 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
+ 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
+ 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
+ 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
+ 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
+ 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
+ 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
+ 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
+ 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
+ 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
+ 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
+ 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
+ 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
+ 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
+ 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
+ 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
+ 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
+ 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
+ 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
+ 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
+ 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
+ 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
+ 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
+ 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
+ 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
+ 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
+ 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
+ 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
+ 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
+ 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
+ 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
+ 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
+ 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
+ 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
+ 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
+ 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
+ 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
+ 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
+ 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
+ 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
+ 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
+ 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
+ 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
+ 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
+ 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
+ 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
+ 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
+ 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
+ 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
+ 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0
+ }, {
+ 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
+ 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
+ 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
+ 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
+ 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
+ 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
+ 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
+ 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
+ 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
+ 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
+ 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
+ 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
+ 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
+ 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
+ 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
+ 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
+ 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
+ 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
+ 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
+ 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
+ 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
+ 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
+ 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
+ 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
+ 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
+ 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
+ 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
+ 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
+ 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
+ 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
+ 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
+ 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
+ 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
+ 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
+ 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
+ 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
+ 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
+ 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
+ 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
+ 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
+ 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
+ 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
+ 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
+ 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
+ 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
+ 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
+ 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
+ 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
+ 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
+ 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
+ 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
+ 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
+ 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
+ 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
+ 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
+ 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
+ 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
+ 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
+ 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
+ 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
+ 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
+ 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
+ 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
+ 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6
+ }
+ }, {
+ 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
+ 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
+ 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
+ 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
+ 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
+ }
+};
+
+static unsigned char BF_itoa64[64 + 1] =
+ "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
+
+static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = {
+ 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 0, 1,
+ 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
+ 64, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
+ 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
+ 64, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
+ 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64
+};
+
+#define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \
+{ \
+ tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \
+ if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \
+ tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \
+ if (tmp > 63) return -1; \
+ (dst) = tmp; \
+}
+
+static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size)
+{
+ unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
+ unsigned char *end = dptr + size;
+ const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
+ unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4;
+
+ do {
+ BF_safe_atoi64(c1, *sptr++);
+ BF_safe_atoi64(c2, *sptr++);
+ *dptr++ = (c1 << 2) | ((c2 & 0x30) >> 4);
+ if (dptr >= end) break;
+
+ BF_safe_atoi64(c3, *sptr++);
+ *dptr++ = ((c2 & 0x0F) << 4) | ((c3 & 0x3C) >> 2);
+ if (dptr >= end) break;
+
+ BF_safe_atoi64(c4, *sptr++);
+ *dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4;
+ } while (dptr < end);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size)
+{
+ const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
+ const unsigned char *end = sptr + size;
+ unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
+ unsigned int c1, c2;
+
+ do {
+ c1 = *sptr++;
+ *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1 >> 2];
+ c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4;
+ if (sptr >= end) {
+ *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+ break;
+ }
+
+ c2 = *sptr++;
+ c1 |= c2 >> 4;
+ *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+ c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2;
+ if (sptr >= end) {
+ *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+ break;
+ }
+
+ c2 = *sptr++;
+ c1 |= c2 >> 6;
+ *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+ *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c2 & 0x3f];
+ } while (sptr < end);
+}
+
+static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int count)
+{
+ static int endianness_check = 1;
+ char *is_little_endian = (char *)&endianness_check;
+ BF_word tmp;
+
+ if (*is_little_endian)
+ do {
+ tmp = *x;
+ tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16);
+ *x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF);
+ } while (--count);
+}
+
+#if BF_SCALE
+/* Architectures which can shift addresses left by 2 bits with no extra cost */
+#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
+ tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
+ tmp2 = L >> 8; \
+ tmp2 &= 0xFF; \
+ tmp3 = L >> 16; \
+ tmp3 &= 0xFF; \
+ tmp4 = L >> 24; \
+ tmp1 = data.ctx.S[3][tmp1]; \
+ tmp2 = data.ctx.S[2][tmp2]; \
+ tmp3 = data.ctx.S[1][tmp3]; \
+ tmp3 += data.ctx.S[0][tmp4]; \
+ tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
+ R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \
+ tmp3 += tmp1; \
+ R ^= tmp3;
+#else
+/* Architectures with no complicated addressing modes supported */
+#define BF_INDEX(S, i) \
+ (*((BF_word *)(((unsigned char *)S) + (i))))
+#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
+ tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
+ tmp1 <<= 2; \
+ tmp2 = L >> 6; \
+ tmp2 &= 0x3FC; \
+ tmp3 = L >> 14; \
+ tmp3 &= 0x3FC; \
+ tmp4 = L >> 22; \
+ tmp4 &= 0x3FC; \
+ tmp1 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[3], tmp1); \
+ tmp2 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[2], tmp2); \
+ tmp3 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[1], tmp3); \
+ tmp3 += BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[0], tmp4); \
+ tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
+ R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \
+ tmp3 += tmp1; \
+ R ^= tmp3;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt one block, BF_N is hardcoded here.
+ */
+#define BF_ENCRYPT \
+ L ^= data.ctx.P[0]; \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \
+ BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \
+ BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \
+ tmp4 = R; \
+ R = L; \
+ L = tmp4 ^ data.ctx.P[BF_N + 1];
+
+#if BF_ASM
+#define BF_body() \
+ _BF_body_r(&data.ctx);
+#else
+#define BF_body() \
+ L = R = 0; \
+ ptr = data.ctx.P; \
+ do { \
+ ptr += 2; \
+ BF_ENCRYPT; \
+ *(ptr - 2) = L; \
+ *(ptr - 1) = R; \
+ } while (ptr < &data.ctx.P[BF_N + 2]); \
+\
+ ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; \
+ do { \
+ ptr += 2; \
+ BF_ENCRYPT; \
+ *(ptr - 2) = L; \
+ *(ptr - 1) = R; \
+ } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
+#endif
+
+static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial,
+ unsigned char flags)
+{
+ const char *ptr = key;
+ unsigned int bug, i, j;
+ BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2];
+
+/*
+ * There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While
+ * we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide
+ * a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and
+ * a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain
+ * multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to
+ * the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally
+ * deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions.
+ * While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing
+ * characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a
+ * collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects
+ * only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of
+ * those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid
+ * UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings.
+ * Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a
+ * reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that
+ * are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm.
+ *
+ * We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password
+ * information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead
+ * of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password
+ * length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is
+ * difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by
+ * the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.)
+ *
+ * For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug"
+ * (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the
+ * variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested).
+ * Valid combinations of settings are:
+ *
+ * Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000
+ * Prefix "$2b$": bug = 0, safety = 0
+ * Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0
+ * Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0
+ */
+ bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1;
+ safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15;
+
+ sign = diff = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) {
+ tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+ tmp[0] <<= 8;
+ tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */
+ tmp[1] <<= 8;
+ tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */
+/*
+ * Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet,
+ * and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For
+ * chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign
+ * extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set.
+ */
+ if (j)
+ sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80;
+ if (!*ptr)
+ ptr = key;
+ else
+ ptr++;
+ }
+ diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */
+
+ expanded[i] = tmp[bug];
+ initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug];
+ }
+
+/*
+ * At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced
+ * exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates
+ * that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a
+ * collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of
+ * passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure
+ * is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by
+ * deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this.
+ */
+ diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */
+ diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */
+ diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */
+ sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */
+ sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */
+
+/*
+ * If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm,
+ * flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but
+ * let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's
+ * not any worse than any other choice we could make.)
+ *
+ * It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main
+ * Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a
+ * state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm
+ * (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect).
+ */
+ initial[0] ^= sign;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] =
+ {2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0};
+
+static char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting,
+ char *output, int size,
+ BF_word min)
+{
+#if BF_ASM
+ extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx);
+#endif
+ struct {
+ BF_ctx ctx;
+ BF_key expanded_key;
+ union {
+ BF_word salt[4];
+ BF_word output[6];
+ } binary;
+ } data;
+ BF_word L, R;
+ BF_word tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4;
+ BF_word *ptr;
+ BF_word count;
+ int i;
+
+ if (size < 7 + 22 + 31 + 1) {
+ __set_errno(ERANGE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (setting[0] != '$' ||
+ setting[1] != '2' ||
+ setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' ||
+ !flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] ||
+ setting[3] != '$' ||
+ setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' ||
+ setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' ||
+ (setting[4] == '3' && setting[5] > '1') ||
+ setting[6] != '$') {
+ __set_errno(EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0'));
+ if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) {
+ __set_errno(EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4);
+
+ BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P,
+ flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']);
+
+ memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S));
+
+ L = R = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+ L ^= data.binary.salt[i & 2];
+ R ^= data.binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1];
+ BF_ENCRYPT;
+ data.ctx.P[i] = L;
+ data.ctx.P[i + 1] = R;
+ }
+
+ ptr = data.ctx.S[0];
+ do {
+ ptr += 4;
+ L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 2) & 3];
+ R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 3) & 3];
+ BF_ENCRYPT;
+ *(ptr - 4) = L;
+ *(ptr - 3) = R;
+
+ L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 4) & 3];
+ R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 5) & 3];
+ BF_ENCRYPT;
+ *(ptr - 2) = L;
+ *(ptr - 1) = R;
+ } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
+
+ do {
+ int done;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+ data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i];
+ data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1];
+ }
+
+ done = 0;
+ do {
+ BF_body();
+ if (done)
+ break;
+ done = 1;
+
+ tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0];
+ tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1];
+ tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2];
+ tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3];
+ for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) {
+ data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1;
+ data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2;
+ data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3;
+ data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4;
+ }
+ data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1;
+ data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2;
+ } while (1);
+ } while (--count);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) {
+ L = BF_magic_w[i];
+ R = BF_magic_w[i + 1];
+
+ count = 64;
+ do {
+ BF_ENCRYPT;
+ } while (--count);
+
+ data.binary.output[i] = L;
+ data.binary.output[i + 1] = R;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, setting, 7 + 22 - 1);
+ output[7 + 22 - 1] = BF_itoa64[(int)
+ BF_atoi64[(int)setting[7 + 22 - 1] - 0x20] & 0x30];
+
+/* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so
+ * only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. :-) */
+ BF_swap(data.binary.output, 6);
+ BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23);
+ output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0';
+
+ return output;
+}
+
+int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size)
+{
+ if (size < 3)
+ return -1;
+
+ output[0] = '*';
+ output[1] = '0';
+ output[2] = '\0';
+
+ if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0')
+ output[1] = '1';
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once:
+ *
+ * 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g.
+ * when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or
+ * library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or
+ * it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile
+ * might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such
+ * as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover
+ * from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not
+ * enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed.
+ *
+ * 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash
+ * computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code
+ * would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash
+ * computation is more reliable.
+ *
+ * The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08"
+ * setting.
+ */
+char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
+ char *output, int size)
+{
+ const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8";
+ const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu";
+ static const char * const test_hashes[2] =
+ {"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55", /* 'a', 'b', 'y' */
+ "VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55"}; /* 'x' */
+ const char *test_hash = test_hashes[0];
+ char *retval;
+ const char *p;
+ int save_errno, ok;
+ struct {
+ char s[7 + 22 + 1];
+ char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1];
+ } buf;
+
+/* Hash the supplied password */
+ _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
+ retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
+ save_errno = errno;
+
+/*
+ * Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt()
+ * from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations,
+ * which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the
+ * stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be
+ * detected by the self-test.
+ */
+ memcpy(buf.s, test_setting, sizeof(buf.s));
+ if (retval) {
+ unsigned int flags = flags_by_subtype[
+ (unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'];
+ test_hash = test_hashes[flags & 1];
+ buf.s[2] = setting[2];
+ }
+ memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o));
+ buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0;
+ p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1);
+
+ ok = (p == buf.o &&
+ !memcmp(p, buf.s, 7 + 22) &&
+ !memcmp(p + (7 + 22), test_hash, 31 + 1 + 1 + 1));
+
+ {
+ const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345";
+ BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi;
+ BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */
+ BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */
+ ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */
+ ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 &&
+ !memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) &&
+ !memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai));
+ }
+
+ __set_errno(save_errno);
+ if (ok)
+ return retval;
+
+/* Should not happen */
+ _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
+ __set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+ if (size < 16 || output_size < 7 + 22 + 1 ||
+ (count && (count < 4 || count > 31)) ||
+ prefix[0] != '$' || prefix[1] != '2' ||
+ (prefix[2] != 'a' && prefix[2] != 'b' && prefix[2] != 'y')) {
+ if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+ __set_errno((output_size < 7 + 22 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!count) count = 5;
+
+ output[0] = '$';
+ output[1] = '2';
+ output[2] = prefix[2];
+ output[3] = '$';
+ output[4] = '0' + count / 10;
+ output[5] = '0' + count % 10;
+ output[6] = '$';
+
+ BF_encode(&output[7], (const BF_word *)input, 16);
+ output[7 + 22] = '\0';
+
+ return output;
+}
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/crypt_gensalt.c b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/crypt_gensalt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..36ffb98c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/crypt_gensalt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ *
+ * This file contains salt generation functions for the traditional and
+ * other common crypt(3) algorithms, except for bcrypt which is defined
+ * entirely in crypt_blowfish.c.
+ */
+
+#include
+
+#include
+#ifndef __set_errno
+#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
+#endif
+
+/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */
+#include "crypt_gensalt.h"
+
+unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[64 + 1] =
+ "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+ (void) prefix;
+
+ if (size < 2 || output_size < 2 + 1 || (count && count != 25)) {
+ if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+ __set_errno((output_size < 2 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ output[0] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[0] & 0x3f];
+ output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[1] & 0x3f];
+ output[2] = '\0';
+
+ return output;
+}
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+ unsigned long value;
+
+ (void) prefix;
+
+/* Even iteration counts make it easier to detect weak DES keys from a look
+ * at the hash, so they should be avoided */
+ if (size < 3 || output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1 ||
+ (count && (count > 0xffffff || !(count & 1)))) {
+ if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+ __set_errno((output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!count) count = 725;
+
+ output[0] = '_';
+ output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[count & 0x3f];
+ output[2] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 6) & 0x3f];
+ output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 12) & 0x3f];
+ output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 18) & 0x3f];
+ value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] |
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) |
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16);
+ output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
+ output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
+ output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
+ output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
+ output[9] = '\0';
+
+ return output;
+}
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+ unsigned long value;
+
+ (void) prefix;
+
+ if (size < 3 || output_size < 3 + 4 + 1 || (count && count != 1000)) {
+ if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+ __set_errno((output_size < 3 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ output[0] = '$';
+ output[1] = '1';
+ output[2] = '$';
+ value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] |
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) |
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16);
+ output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
+ output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
+ output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
+ output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
+ output[7] = '\0';
+
+ if (size >= 6 && output_size >= 3 + 4 + 4 + 1) {
+ value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[3] |
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[4] << 8) |
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[5] << 16);
+ output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
+ output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
+ output[9] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
+ output[10] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
+ output[11] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ return output;
+}
diff --git a/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/wrapper.c b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/wrapper.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6bc34bc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/utils/Bcrypt/src/wrapper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2014.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#include
+#ifndef __set_errno
+#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#ifdef TEST_THREADS
+#include
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#define CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 31 + 1)
+#define CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 1)
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+#define __SKIP_GNU
+#endif
+#include "ow-crypt.h"
+
+#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
+#include "crypt_gensalt.h"
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+/* crypt.h from glibc-crypt-2.1 will define struct crypt_data for us */
+#include "crypt.h"
+extern char *__md5_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt,
+ char *buffer, int buflen);
+/* crypt-entry.c needs to be patched to define __des_crypt_r rather than
+ * __crypt_r, and not define crypt_r and crypt at all */
+extern char *__des_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt,
+ struct crypt_data *data);
+extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
+#endif
+
+static int _crypt_data_alloc(void **data, int *size, int need)
+{
+ void *updated;
+
+ if (*data && *size >= need) return 0;
+
+ updated = realloc(*data, need);
+
+ if (!updated) {
+#ifndef __GLIBC__
+ /* realloc(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */
+ __set_errno(ENOMEM);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+ if (need >= sizeof(struct crypt_data))
+ ((struct crypt_data *)updated)->initialized = 0;
+#endif
+
+ *data = updated;
+ *size = need;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *_crypt_retval_magic(char *retval, const char *setting,
+ char *output, int size)
+{
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size))
+ return NULL; /* shouldn't happen */
+
+ return output;
+}
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+/*
+ * Applications may re-use the same instance of struct crypt_data without
+ * resetting the initialized field in order to let crypt_r() skip some of
+ * its initialization code. Thus, it is important that our multiple hashing
+ * algorithms either don't conflict with each other in their use of the
+ * data area or reset the initialized field themselves whenever required.
+ * Currently, the hashing algorithms simply have no conflicts: the first
+ * field of struct crypt_data is the 128-byte large DES key schedule which
+ * __des_crypt_r() calculates each time it is called while the two other
+ * hashing algorithms use less than 128 bytes of the data area.
+ */
+
+char *__crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+ void *data, int size)
+{
+ if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2')
+ return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
+ if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1')
+ return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
+ if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') {
+ __set_errno(EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (size >= sizeof(struct crypt_data))
+ return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)data);
+ __set_errno(ERANGE);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+char *__crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+ void **data, int *size)
+{
+ if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2') {
+ if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
+ return NULL;
+ return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
+ }
+ if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1') {
+ if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
+ return NULL;
+ return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
+ }
+ if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') {
+ __set_errno(EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, sizeof(struct crypt_data)))
+ return NULL;
+ return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)*data);
+}
+
+char *__crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+ struct crypt_data *data)
+{
+ return _crypt_retval_magic(
+ __crypt_rn(key, setting, data, sizeof(*data)),
+ setting, (char *)data, sizeof(*data));
+}
+
+char *__crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting)
+{
+ return _crypt_retval_magic(
+ __crypt_rn(key, setting, &_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar)),
+ setting, (char *)&_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar));
+}
+#else
+char *crypt_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data, int size)
+{
+ return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
+}
+
+char *crypt_ra(const char *key, const char *setting,
+ void **data, int *size)
+{
+ if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
+ return NULL;
+ return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
+}
+
+char *crypt_r(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data)
+{
+ return _crypt_retval_magic(
+ crypt_rn(key, setting, data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE),
+ setting, (char *)data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE);
+}
+
+char *crypt(const char *key, const char *setting)
+{
+ static char output[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+
+ return _crypt_retval_magic(
+ crypt_rn(key, setting, output, sizeof(output)),
+ setting, output, sizeof(output));
+}
+
+#define __crypt_gensalt_rn crypt_gensalt_rn
+#define __crypt_gensalt_ra crypt_gensalt_ra
+#define __crypt_gensalt crypt_gensalt
+#endif
+
+char *__crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+ char *(*use)(const char *_prefix, unsigned long _count,
+ const char *_input, int _size,
+ char *_output, int _output_size);
+
+ /* This may be supported on some platforms in the future */
+ if (!input) {
+ __set_errno(EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!strncmp(prefix, "$2a$", 4) || !strncmp(prefix, "$2b$", 4) ||
+ !strncmp(prefix, "$2y$", 4))
+ use = _crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn;
+ else
+ if (!strncmp(prefix, "$1$", 3))
+ use = _crypt_gensalt_md5_rn;
+ else
+ if (prefix[0] == '_')
+ use = _crypt_gensalt_extended_rn;
+ else
+ if (!prefix[0] ||
+ (prefix[0] && prefix[1] &&
+ memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[0], 64) &&
+ memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[1], 64)))
+ use = _crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn;
+ else {
+ __set_errno(EINVAL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return use(prefix, count, input, size, output, output_size);
+}
+
+char *__crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size)
+{
+ char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+ char *retval;
+
+ retval = __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count,
+ input, size, output, sizeof(output));
+
+ if (retval) {
+ retval = strdup(retval);
+#ifndef __GLIBC__
+ /* strdup(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */
+ if (!retval)
+ __set_errno(ENOMEM);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+char *__crypt_gensalt(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+ const char *input, int size)
+{
+ static char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+
+ return __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count,
+ input, size, output, sizeof(output));
+}
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+weak_alias(__crypt_rn, crypt_rn)
+weak_alias(__crypt_ra, crypt_ra)
+weak_alias(__crypt_r, crypt_r)
+weak_alias(__crypt, crypt)
+weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_rn, crypt_gensalt_rn)
+weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_ra, crypt_gensalt_ra)
+weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt, crypt_gensalt)
+weak_alias(crypt, fcrypt)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST
+static const char *tests[][3] = {
+ {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.E5YPO9kmyuRGyh0XouQYb4YMJKvyOeW",
+ "U*U"},
+ {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.VGOzA784oUp/Z0DY336zx7pLYAy0lwK",
+ "U*U*"},
+ {"$2a$05$XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXOAcXxm9kjPGEMsLznoKqmqw7tc8WCx4a",
+ "U*U*U"},
+ {"$2a$05$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu5s2v8.iXieOjg/.AySBTTZIIVFJeBui",
+ "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
+ "chars after 72 are ignored"},
+ {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+ "\xa3"},
+ {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+ "\xff\xff\xa3"},
+ {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+ "\xff\xff\xa3"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nqd1wy.pTMdcvrRWxyiGL2eMz.2a85.",
+ "\xff\xff\xa3"},
+ {"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+ "\xff\xff\xa3"},
+ {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
+ "\xa3"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
+ "\xa3"},
+ {"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
+ "\xa3"},
+ {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+ "1\xa3" "345"},
+ {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+ "\xff\xa3" "345"},
+ {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+ "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
+ {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+ "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.ZC1JEJ8Z4gPfpe1JOr/oyPXTWl9EFd.",
+ "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
+ {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e",
+ "\xff\xa3" "345"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e",
+ "\xff\xa3" "345"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
+ "\xa3" "ab"},
+ {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
+ "\xa3" "ab"},
+ {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
+ "\xa3" "ab"},
+ {"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/OiwqTymGIGzFsA4hOTWebfehXHNprcAS",
+ "\xd1\x91"},
+ {"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/O9LIGgn8OMzuDoHfof8AQimSGfcSWxnS",
+ "\xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.swQOIzjOiJ9GHEPuhEkvqrUyvWhEMx6",
+ "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+ "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+ "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+ "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+ "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+ "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+ "chars after 72 are ignored as usual"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.R9xrDjiycxMbQE2bp.vgqlYpW5wx2yy",
+ "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+ "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+ "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+ "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+ "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+ "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"},
+ {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.9tQZzcJfm3uj2NvJ/n5xkhpqLrMpWCe",
+ "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+ "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+ "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+ "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+ "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+ "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"},
+ {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.7uG0VCzI2bS7j6ymqJi9CdcdxiRTWNy",
+ ""},
+ {"*0", "", "$2a$03$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+ {"*0", "", "$2a$32$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+ {"*0", "", "$2c$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+ {"*0", "", "$2z$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+ {"*0", "", "$2`$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+ {"*0", "", "$2{$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+ {"*1", "", "*0"},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+#define which tests[0]
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t running;
+
+static void handle_timer(int signum)
+{
+ (void) signum;
+ running = 0;
+}
+
+static void *run(void *arg)
+{
+ unsigned long count = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ void *data = NULL;
+ int size = 0x12345678;
+
+ do {
+ const char *hash = tests[i][0];
+ const char *key = tests[i][1];
+ const char *setting = tests[i][2];
+
+ if (!tests[++i][0])
+ i = 0;
+
+ if (setting && strlen(hash) < 30) /* not for benchmark */
+ continue;
+
+ if (strcmp(crypt_ra(key, hash, &data, &size), hash)) {
+ printf("%d: FAILED (crypt_ra/%d/%lu)\n",
+ (int)((char *)arg - (char *)0), i, count);
+ free(data);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ count++;
+ } while (running);
+
+ free(data);
+ return count + (char *)0;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ struct itimerval it;
+ struct tms buf;
+ clock_t clk_tck, start_real, start_virtual, end_real, end_virtual;
+ unsigned long count;
+ void *data;
+ int size;
+ char *setting1, *setting2;
+ int i;
+#ifdef TEST_THREADS
+ pthread_t t[TEST_THREADS];
+ void *t_retval;
+#endif
+
+ data = NULL;
+ size = 0x12345678;
+
+ for (i = 0; tests[i][0]; i++) {
+ const char *hash = tests[i][0];
+ const char *key = tests[i][1];
+ const char *setting = tests[i][2];
+ const char *p;
+ int ok = !setting || strlen(hash) >= 30;
+ int o_size;
+ char s_buf[30], o_buf[61];
+ if (!setting) {
+ memcpy(s_buf, hash, sizeof(s_buf) - 1);
+ s_buf[sizeof(s_buf) - 1] = 0;
+ setting = s_buf;
+ }
+
+ __set_errno(0);
+ p = crypt(key, setting);
+ if ((!ok && !errno) || strcmp(p, hash)) {
+ printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ok && strcmp(crypt(key, hash), hash)) {
+ printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ for (o_size = -1; o_size <= (int)sizeof(o_buf); o_size++) {
+ int ok_n = ok && o_size == (int)sizeof(o_buf);
+ const char *x = "abc";
+ strcpy(o_buf, x);
+ if (o_size >= 3) {
+ x = "*0";
+ if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0')
+ x = "*1";
+ }
+ __set_errno(0);
+ p = crypt_rn(key, setting, o_buf, o_size);
+ if ((ok_n && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) ||
+ (!ok_n && (!errno || p || strcmp(o_buf, x)))) {
+ printf("FAILED (crypt_rn/%d)\n", i);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ __set_errno(0);
+ p = crypt_ra(key, setting, &data, &size);
+ if ((ok && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) ||
+ (!ok && (!errno || p || strcmp((char *)data, hash)))) {
+ printf("FAILED (crypt_ra/%d)\n", i);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ setting1 = crypt_gensalt(which[0], 12, data, size);
+ if (!setting1 || strncmp(setting1, "$2a$12$", 7)) {
+ puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt)\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ setting2 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting1, 12, data, size);
+ if (strcmp(setting1, setting2)) {
+ puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/1)\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ (*(char *)data)++;
+ setting1 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting2, 12, data, size);
+ if (!strcmp(setting1, setting2)) {
+ puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/2)\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ free(setting1);
+ free(setting2);
+ free(data);
+
+#if defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) || !defined(CLK_TCK)
+ clk_tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK);
+#else
+ clk_tck = CLK_TCK;
+#endif
+
+ running = 1;
+ signal(SIGALRM, handle_timer);
+
+ memset(&it, 0, sizeof(it));
+ it.it_value.tv_sec = 5;
+ setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL);
+
+ start_real = times(&buf);
+ start_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime;
+
+ count = (char *)run((char *)0) - (char *)0;
+
+ end_real = times(&buf);
+ end_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime;
+ if (end_virtual == start_virtual) end_virtual++;
+
+ printf("%.1f c/s real, %.1f c/s virtual\n",
+ (float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real),
+ (float)count * clk_tck / (end_virtual - start_virtual));
+
+#ifdef TEST_THREADS
+ running = 1;
+ it.it_value.tv_sec = 60;
+ setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL);
+ start_real = times(&buf);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++)
+ if (pthread_create(&t[i], NULL, run, i + (char *)0)) {
+ perror("pthread_create");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++) {
+ if (pthread_join(t[i], &t_retval)) {
+ perror("pthread_join");
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!t_retval) continue;
+ count = (char *)t_retval - (char *)0;
+ end_real = times(&buf);
+ printf("%d: %.1f c/s real\n", i,
+ (float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/components/utils/Makefile b/components/utils/Makefile
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 32d4f597..af913516
--- a/components/utils/Makefile
+++ b/components/utils/Makefile
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ TREE_LIB_ENABLE=y
lib=
subdirs=
+CFGFLAGS += -I$(QTOP)/components/utils/Bcrypt/include
CFGFLAGS += -I$(QTOP)/components/utils/JSON/include
CFGFLAGS += -I$(QTOP)/components/utils/INI/include